Dear President Bush:

Section 1049 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) required a study of the national security interagency system by an independent, non-profit, non-partisan organization. This letter forwards the results of that study, prepared by the Project on National Security Reform, under the sponsorship of the Center for the Study of the Presidency.

We, twenty-two members of the Guiding Coalition of the Project on National Security Reform, affirm unanimously that the national security of the United States of America is fundamentally at risk.

Our study provides compelling evidence of this risk and the increasing misalignment of the national security system with a rapidly changing global security environment. The study analyzes the problems in the system’s performance, their causes, and their consequences and proposes an integrated set of reforms for the Executive Branch and Congress.

We have now turned the Project’s attention to drafting the necessary legal instruments—an executive order, amendments to
Senate and House rules, and a new national security act – to gain approval of these urgently needed reforms and the renewal they would bring.

The Project on National Security Reform is ready to assist in consideration and action on a bold transformation of the national security system.

Respectfully yours,

[Signatures]
ABOUT THE PROJECT
ON NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM

The non-partisan Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) was established to assist the nation in identifying and implementing the kind of comprehensive reform that the government urgently needs. A key component of PNSR’s work has been a thorough analysis of current problems; PNSR’s working groups have conducted 37 major case studies and 63 mini case studies. Ten analytic working groups have examined different aspects of the national security system and are developing recommendations for addressing problems within their respective domains. Three additional groups will take the products from the main analytic working groups and work with the executive branch and Congress to develop mechanisms for reform, draft legislative proposals and executive orders, develop suggested amendments to House and Senate rules, and assist in the implementation of reforms.

The project is led by James R. Locher III, a principal architect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that modernized the joint military system, and sponsored by the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress, which is led by Ambassador David Abshire. PNSR’s Guiding Coalition, comprised of distinguished Americans with extensive service in the public and private sectors, sets strategic direction for the project. PNSR works closely with Congress, executive departments and agencies, nonprofit public policy organizations, universities, industry, and private foundations.
ABOUT THE CENTER
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The Center for the Study of the Presidency (CSP), founded in 1965, is a non-partisan, non-profit organization that provides an institutional memory of and for the U.S. presidency in a changing world. The center is the only organization that systematically examines past successes and failures of the presidency and relates its findings to present challenges and opportunities. By highlighting past presidential successes and failures, the center seeks to offer wisdom to current and future presidents, their staffs, Congress, and to students and journalists studying the presidency. Today, both the executive and legislative branches are highly compartmentalized, and this is the enemy of strategic thinking, action, and the best use of resources. In addition, the nation is polarized even though public opinion polls show a desire to break these barriers and face our nation's real public policy issues. Lessons learned from past American experiences offer insights on how best to deal with these challenges. The center organizes conferences, working groups, and publications to preserve the presidential memory, examines current organizational problems through an historical lens, and nurtures future leaders.

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The Research & Analysis Directorate of the Project on National Security Reform is comprised of 10 working groups. The project also includes a Legal Working Group, which made significant contributions to this research. The membership of these working groups includes experienced and deeply knowledgeable individuals committed to the successful reform of our national security system. The content of this report has been informed and shaped by each member listed below. The Project on National Security Reform would like to thank all of the working group members for their individual contributions to this report.

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Project on National Security Reform

Forging a New Shield

November 2008
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PRÉCIS

Forging a New Shield represents the culmination of more than two years of work by more than three hundred dedicated U.S. national security executives, professionals, and scholars. It provides a comprehensive historical analysis of the current U.S. national security system, an evaluation of the system’s performance since its inception in 1947, and a detailed analysis of its current capabilities. On the basis of these assessments, the report proposes a fully integrated program of reform and renewal.

This executive summary highlights the compelling case for redesigning the U.S. national security system, distills the study’s essential assessments and findings, and outlines the detailed, integrated set of recommendations put forth in the report.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Case for Action

We, twenty-two members of the Guiding Coalition of the Project on National Security Reform, affirm unanimously that the national security of the United States of America is fundamentally at risk. The U.S. position of world leadership, our country’s prosperity and priceless freedoms, and the safety of our people are challenged not only by a profusion of new and unpredictable threats, but by the now undeniable fact that the national security system of the United States is increasingly misaligned with a rapidly changing global security environment.

The legacy structures and processes of a national security system that is now more than 60 years old no longer help American leaders to formulate coherent national strategy. They do not enable them to integrate America’s hard and soft power to achieve policy goals. They prevent them from matching resources to objectives, and from planning rationally and effectively for future contingencies. As presently constituted, too, these structures and processes lack means to detect and remedy their own deficiencies.

The United States therefore needs a bold, but carefully crafted plan of comprehensive reform to institute a national security system that can manage and overcome the challenges of our time. We propose such a bold reform in this report; if implemented, it would constitute the most far-reaching governmental design innovation in national security since the passage of the National Security Act in 1947.

However daunting the task, we believe that nothing less will reliably secure our country from clear and present danger. We are optimistic that American government can re-invent itself once more, as it has done many times in the past, not only for the sake of our national security, but for better and more effective government generally. No area of policy is more critical, however, than national security; if we fail to keep pace with the opportunities afforded by change as well as the challenges posed by an unpredictable world, we will ultimately be unable to preserve and strive to perfect our way of life at home.

Our optimism is buoyed by a widespread and growing consensus that we have reached a moment of decision. Not everyone, however, is yet convinced that a major reform of the U.S. national security system is necessary. Some skepticism is understandable. After all, despite its shortcomings the system did work well enough to achieve its principal aim of victory in the Cold War. Moreover, major reforms in other areas of government, such as for the intelligence community, have not always produced the benefits advertised for them. Besides, every presidential administration since that of Harry Truman has altered the system he inherited to some degree, presumably showing that the 1947 system is flexible enough as is. Hence, it is sometimes argued, all we need do is put the right leaders in the right places and they will overcome any organizational design deficiencies they encounter.
Notwithstanding these arguments, we believe the case for fundamental renewal is compelling. First of all, we face within the legacy national security system, as within all government organizations, the problems of bureaucratic aging. No large organization consisting of multiple parts is static. While the world is changing, and as its interactions pick up speed thanks to the spreading implications of the information revolution, most of the component parts of the U.S. national security system, still organized hierarchically around traditional organizational disciplines, grow more ponderous and reactive.

As important, the national security structures designed in 1947, and incrementally tweaked ever since, arose and evolved in response to a singular, unambiguous threat to the United States and its constitutional order that was expressed principally in military terms. The threats we face today are diffuse, ambiguous, and express themselves in a multitude of potential forms. Our concerns once flowed from the strength of determined opponents; now our concerns flow as often from the weaknesses of other states, which spawn adversaries we must strain even to detect before they strike. No mere tinkering can transform a national security organization designed, tested, and tempered to deal with a focused state-centric military threat into one that can deal with highly differentiated threats whose sources may be below and above as well as at the level of the state system. The gap between the challenges we face and our capacity to deal with them is thus widening from both ends.

The events of recent decades have validated the accuracy of this key observation. Upon close examination, the failure rate of the 1947 system was not small, but failure encompassed neither the majority of cases nor cases of supreme U.S. national security interest. But that is because most challenges to the United States during the Cold War fell into the paths of well-honed departmental competencies. What government organizations do routinely they tend to do tolerably well, and the core challenges we faced between 1947 and 1989 broke down in ways that the Department of Defense or the Department of State, aided by the intelligence community and very occasionally by other agencies of government, could handle on their own.

Many Cold War-era challenges, too, could be handled sequentially, with the Defense Department actively or tacitly shaping the strategic environment, and the State Department then negotiating and managing political outcomes based thereon. The contours of most major contingencies, from the Korean War to the Cuban missile crisis to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, also allowed Congressional oversight to operate effectively in structures parallel to those of the executive branch. But when a contingency required not the sequential but the simultaneous integration of military,
diplomatic and other assets of American power, the outcome was often suboptimal, and occasionally, as with the Vietnam War, an acutely damaging one.

Clearly, U.S. national security apparatus failed at many integrative challenges before the Vietnam War, and it failed at many such challenges after Vietnam. It is troubled still, as current dilemmas attest. After more than seven years, the U.S. government has proved unable to integrate adequately the military and nonmilitary dimensions of a complex war on terror, or to effectively integrate hard and soft power in Iraq. It has faced the same challenge in Afghanistan, where it has also had trouble integrating allied contributions into an effective strategy. And it has been unable so far to integrate properly the external and homeland dimensions of post-9/11 national security strategy, as the uneven performance of the federal government during and after Hurricane Katrina showed.

It is facile to blame all these regrettable outcomes on particular leaders and their policy choices. Leadership and judgment matter, to be sure, but as this Report demonstrates, no leader, no matter how strategically farsighted and talented as a manager, could have handled these issues without being hampered by the weaknesses of the current system. What has changed is not so much the capacity of the legacy system to manage complex contingencies that demand interagency coordination. What has changed is the frequency of significant challenges that bear such characteristics, and the possibility that they may be of paramount significance to American power, principle, and safety.

It is our unshakable conviction that the United States simply cannot afford the failure rate that the current national security system is not only prone but virtually guaranteed to cause. Not even astute leaders, if we are fortunate enough to merit them, will be able to overcome its increasingly dangerous shortcomings. Unless we redesign what we have inherited from more than 60 years ago, even the wisest men and women upon whom we come to depend are doomed to see their most solid policy understandings crumble into the dust of failure. It is our generation’s responsibility, at this moment of peril and promise, to make sure that does not happen.

**Major Assessments and Findings**

The report’s major assessments and findings follow a four-part logic. From an assessment of the international environment, we revise our conceptual grasp of national security. We then identify the problems of the current system in that light, and on that basis spell out the predicates and goals for effective reform.

**A Changing World**

It is widely understood that the security environment of the early 21st century differs significantly from the one the U.S. national security system was created to manage. The character of the actors has changed; the diversity of state capabilities is greater; and the international norms delimiting legitimate behaviors have shifted as well. Exchanges of goods, information, ideas, and people are also far denser and more variable than they were even a dozen years ago, let alone in 1947. Taken together, these developments and others have given rise to novel security conditions and dynamics. Four aspects of this environment are especially striking.
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First, while no single challenge rises to the level of the Cold War’s potential “doomsday” scenario of superpower nuclear war, a multitude of other challenges from a variety of sources—rising state powers, rogue regime proliferators, and non-state actors that include terrorists, transnational criminal organizations, and other assorted entrepreneurs of violence—threaten the integrity of the state system itself, with unknown and largely unknowable consequences for U.S. security.

Second, since we do not know which of today’s challenges is more likely to emerge and which may pose the greatest peril, we must spread our attention and limited resources to cover many contingencies. There are now more nuclear-armed states than during the Cold War, with several rogue states not presently deterred from pursuing acquisition or development of nuclear weapons of their own. Terrorists openly seek access to weapons of mass destruction and aver their intent to use them against the United States, its allies and friends. In the face of these threats, we must devise risk-management hedging strategies based on necessarily incomplete information. This constitutes a far more daunting planning template than that which we grew used to during the Cold War.

Third, the complexity of these challenges is compounded by the fact that the pursuit of science and technology is now a global enterprise in which even small groups can participate. Hostile states and non-state actors alike can employ existing knowledge and technique as well as new science and technology to assail far stronger states. This marks a broad diffusion of policy capacity and initiative worldwide that the United States and its allies must face.

Fourth, current challenges reflect an interdependence that makes it impossible for any single nation to address on its own the full range of today’s complex security challenges. The now widespread perception of interdependence may also paradoxically increase competition to influence or control the presumed torque points of that interdependence. Traditional alliances, while still vitally important, must therefore be augmented by both situation-specific temporary coalitions and new partners above and below the state level—regional and global institutions, for example, as well as localized elements of the private sector and the scientific community.

It is clear, then, that most major challenges can no longer be met successfully by traditional Cold War approaches. We cannot prevent the failure of a state or mitigate the effects of climate change with conventional military forces or nuclear weapons. The national security challenges inherent in a widespread international financial contagion or a major pandemic do not lend themselves to resolution through the use of air power or special operations forces.

Diplomacy, too, now requires skill sets and operational capabilities that Foreign Service Officers during the Cold War would have considered both esoteric and marginal to their duties. The intelligence craft, as well, faces unfamiliar collection and analysis demands that far exceed the scope of issues and methods with which the intelligence community is comfortable.
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Regrettably, the U.S. national security system is still organized to win the last challenge, not the ones that come increasingly before us. We have not kept up with the character and scope of change in the world despite the tectonic shift occasioned by the end of the Cold War and the shock of the 9/11 attacks. We have responded incrementally, not systematically; we have responded with haste driven by political imperatives, not with patience and perspicacity.

If we do not act boldly but deliberately now, as the term of the 44th president of the United States begins, to achieve comprehensive reform, the nation is bound to regret its lack of foresight. We will pay increased costs in human lives, financial resources, and global influence from crises that could have been averted and nasty surprises that need never have happened. Important opportunities to promote a more benign international environment will go unexploited, probably even unnoticed. The hope for a world of freedom and basic human decency that the United States has represented over the past two centuries for uncounted millions of people will dim.

A New Concept of National Security

For all these reasons, we must learn to think differently about national security and devise new means to ensure it. The Cold War-era concept of national security has broadened as new categories of issues have pushed their way onto the national security agenda; yet others are bound to arrive in coming years, too, without neat labels or instructions for assembly and operation. This means that the operative definition of security itself must change from an essentially static concept to a dynamic one.

In our view, national security must be conceived as the capacity of the United States to define, defend, and advance its interests and principles in the world. The objectives of national security policy, in the world as it now is, therefore are:

- **To maintain security from aggression against the nation by means of a national capacity to shape the strategic environment; to anticipate and prevent threats; to respond to attacks by defeating enemies; to recover from the effects of attack; and to sustain the costs of defense**

- **To maintain security against massive societal disruption as a result of natural forces, including pandemics, natural disasters, and climate change**

- **To maintain security against the failure of major national infrastructure systems by means of building up and defending robust and resilient capacities and investing in the ability to recover from damage done to them**

It follows from these objectives that success in national security—*genuine* success over generations—depends on integrated planning and action, and on the sustained stewardship of the foundations of national power. Sound economic policy, energy security, robust physical and human infrastructures including our health and education systems, especially in the sciences and engineering, are no less important in the longer run than our weapons and our wealth. Genuine success also depends on the example the United States sets for the rest of the world through its actions at home and abroad.
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Four fundamental principles follow from a more refined definition of national security and its key policy objectives.

First, efforts to address current and future challenges must be as multidimensional as the challenges themselves. Addressing successfully the contingency of a terrorist detonation of a “dirty” bomb in a major city, for example, entails a range of critical functions including deterrence, norm-building, prevention, defense, preparedness, and consequence management. Focusing on any single dimension or lesser subset of this spectrum of functions will sharply increase the likelihood of major failure.

Second, the national security system must integrate diverse skills and perspectives. The actors in U.S. national security policy today already include government departments that have not traditionally had front-row seats, like Justice and Treasury. But departments such as Agriculture, Interior, and Transportation, agencies such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention within the Department of Health and Human Services, and elements of state and local government and the private sector are playing increasingly greater roles as well. Creating ways to mobilize and integrate this diverse set of actors is essential to make effective and informed decisions in today’s national security environment.

Third, a new concept of national security demands recalibration of how we think about and manage national security resources and budgeting. Today’s more complex challenges impose qualitatively more demanding resource allocation choices, even in good economic times. If we should face a period of protracted austerity in government, as now seems more likely than not, meeting those challenges will become orders of magnitude more difficult. In developing and implementing national security policy, the rubber meets the road where money is spent, and we are unanimously agreed that the current system’s gross inefficiencies risk collapse under the weight of the protracted budget pressures that likely lie ahead. We need to do more with less, but we cannot hope to achieve even that without fundamental reform of the resource management function.

Fourth, the current environment virtually by definition puts a premium on foresight—the ability to anticipate unwelcome contingencies. While the ability to specifically predict the future will always elude us, foresight that enables anticipation and planning is the only means we have to increase response times in a world of rapid unpredictable change. It constitutes the critical precondition for actively shaping the global security environment in ways conducive to achieving national security goals.

Identifying the Problems

By thoroughly examining the structures and processes of the current legacy national security system—including its human and physical capital and management dimensions, as well as its executive-legislative branch dynamics—we have isolated the system’s essential problems. Unless these essential, underlying problems are rectified, system failures will occur with increasing frequency. Five interwoven problems, which the report details at length, are key.
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1. The system is grossly imbalanced. It supports strong departmental capabilities at the expense of integrating mechanisms.

2. Resources allocated to departments and agencies are shaped by their narrowly defined core mandates rather than broader national missions.

3. The need for presidential integration to compensate for the systemic inability to adequately integrate or resource missions overly centralizes issue management and overburdens the White House.

4. A burdened White House cannot manage the national security system as a whole to be agile and collaborative at any time, but it is particularly vulnerable to breakdown during the protracted transition periods between administrations.

5. Congress provides resources and conducts oversight in ways that reinforce the first four problems and make improving performance extremely difficult.

Taken together, the basic deficiency of the current national security system is that parochial departmental and agency interests, reinforced by Congress, paralyze interagency cooperation even as the variety, speed, and complexity of emerging security issues prevent the White House from effectively controlling the system. The White House bottleneck, in particular, prevents the system from reliably marshaling the needed but disparate skills and expertise from wherever they may be found in government, and from providing the resources to match the skills. That bottleneck, in short, makes it all but impossible to bring human and material assets together into a coherent operational ensemble. Moreover, because an excessively hierarchical national security system does not “know what it knows” as a whole, it also cannot achieve the necessary unity of effort and command to exploit opportunities.

The resulting second- and third-tier operational deficiencies that emanate from these five basic problems are vast. As detailed in the report, among the most worrisome is an inability to formulate and implement a coherent strategy. Without that ability, we cannot do remotely realistic planning. The inevitable result is a system locked into a reactive posture and doomed to policy stagnation. Without a sound strategy and planning process, we wastefully duplicate efforts even as we allow dangerous gaps in coverage to form. These systemic shortcomings invariably generate frustration among senior leaders, often giving rise to “end runs” and other informal attempts to produce desired results. Sometimes these end runs work as short-term fixes; other times, however, they produce debacles like the Iran-Contra fiasco.

Over the years, the interagency system has become so lethargic and dysfunctional that it inhibits the ability to apply the vast power of the U.S. government on problems. You see this inability to synchronize in our operations in Iraq and in Afghanistan, across our foreign policy, and in our response to Katrina.

-- Gen. Wayne Downing
Former Commander-in-Chief,
U.S. Special Operations Command
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A key part of the system’s planning deficit arises from the fact that it is designed to provide resources to build capabilities, not to execute missions. Since we do not budget by mission, no clear link exists between strategy and resources for interagency activities. As things stand, departments and agencies have little incentive to include funding for interagency purposes; they are virtually never rewarded for doing so. As a consequence, mission-essential capabilities that fall outside the core mandates of our departments and agencies are virtually never planned or trained for—a veritable formula for being taken unawares and unprepared.

This explains why departments and agencies, when faced with challenges that fall outside traditional departmental competencies, almost invariably produce ad hoc arrangements that prove suboptimal by almost every measure. Personnel are often deployed to missions for which they have little if any relevant training or experience. It also explains why in novel environments, like “nation-building” missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, multiple U.S. departments and agencies have trouble cooperating effectively with each other; nothing has prepared them for so doing.

An overburdened White House also produces an array of less obvious collateral damage. As a rule, U.S. presidents have resorted to two means of reducing their burdens when the interagency process fails to produce adequate policy integration: designate a lead agency or a lead individual—a “czar.” Neither means has worked well. Neither a lead organization nor a lead individual has the de jure or de facto authority to command independent departments and agencies. The lead agency approach thus usually means in practice a sole agency approach. Similarly, czars must rely on their proximity to the president and their powers of persuasion, which, if institutional stakes are high, can be downplayed if not entirely dismissed. The illusion that lead agency or lead individual fixes will work in turn tends to demobilize continuing efforts at creative thinking among senior officials, thus enlarging the prospect of ultimate mission failure.

White House centralization of interagency missions also risks creating an untenable span of control over policy implementation. By one count more than 29 agencies or special groups report directly to the president. Centralization also tends to burn out National Security Council staff, which impedes timely, disciplined, and integrated decision formulation and option assessment over time. Further, time invariably becomes too precious to be spent rigorously assessing performance, which essentially vitiates any chance for institutional learning and dooms the system to making the same mistakes over and over again.

Lastly in this regard, the time pressures that an overburdened White House faces almost guarantees an inability to do deliberate, careful strategy formulation, thus completing the circle that ensures the system’s inability to break out of its own

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Even as it crowds into every square inch of available office space, the NSC staff is still not sized or funded to be an executive agency. . . . Yet a subtler and more serious danger is that as the NSC staff is consumed by these day-to-day tasks, it has less capacity to find the time and detachment needed to advise a president on larger policy issues.

-- 9/11 Commission Report
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dysfunctional pattern. When there are fires to put out every day, there is little opportunity to see and evaluate the bigger picture. Too short-term a focus also blinds leaders to the need to attend to system management and design issues. This significantly compounds the system’s inability to learn and adapt.

The results are cumulatively calamitous. Without a realistic and creative national security strategy, no one can say what policy balances and tradeoffs are needed. No one can devise a rational investment strategy. No one can devise appropriate human resources and education programs to assure an effective system for the future, or recognize the critical importance of generating a supportive common culture among national security professionals.

Ossified and unable to adapt, our national security system today can reliably handle only those challenges that fall within the relatively narrow realm of its experience in a world in which the set-piece challenges of the past are shrinking in frequency and importance. We are living off the depleted intellectual and organizational capital of a bygone era, and we are doing so in a world in which the boundaries between global dynamics and what we still quaintly call domestic consequences are blurred almost beyond recognition. We thus risk a policy failure rate of such scope that our constitutional order cannot confidently be assured.

Predicates and Goals for Effective Reform

True national security reform demands a new way of thinking and a different way of doing business. Just as the 1947 National Security Act sought to create a decision-making and policy implementation system for addressing the then novel challenges of the post-World War II world, a national security system for today and tomorrow must be responsive to 21st century security challenges by:

- Understanding that the nature of contemporary security challenges represents a mix of the traditional and nontraditional, generating both dangers and opportunities greater in number and more varied in nature than in the past;

- Discarding processes, practices, and institutions that may once have been useful but which are now out of kilter with global security issues and dynamics;

- Mobilizing all tools of national power as the basis for conducting a truly comprehensive and agile national security strategy;

- Ensuring the democratic accountability of both decision-makers and policy implementers; and

- Developing an approach that enjoys the support of the American people and provides hope for the rest of the world.

Acknowledging these predicates of effective reform requires that a new national security system identify critical functions that must be integrated into a genuinely strategic
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approach. It must set key goals and link them to discrete critical outcomes. This is the only way that the costs and pain of a redesign transition can be worth the effort.

Acutely mindful of these costs, and mindful that wrongheaded reform efforts can do net harm, the report focuses on four key goals as the basis for its recommendations. To achieve desired goals and to achieve them efficiently, the national security system must:

- Mobilize and marshal the full panoply of the instruments of national power to achieve national security objectives
- Create and sustain an environment conducive to the exercise of effective leadership, optimal decision-making, and capable management
- Devise a more constructive relationship between the executive branch and Congress appropriate for tackling the expanded national security agenda successfully
- Generate a sustainable capacity for the practice of stewardship—defined as the long-term ability to nurture the underlying assets of American power in human capital, social trust and institutional coherence—throughout all domains of American statecraft

Recommendations

Forging a New Shield’s major and subordinate recommendations, expressed here within seven key themes, are constructed as a single integrated proposal. These themes and recommendations are dependent on each other for their effectiveness no less than a building’s foundation, superstructure and functional systems must be conceived as an aggregate for any part of it to work as intended. The members of the Guiding Coalition agreed with the general thrust of the integrated set of recommendations and not necessarily every recommendation as expressed.

Some of our recommendations require congressional action to be implemented while some can be implemented by Executive Order, and others at the Cabinet level by Secretarial order, as specified in the report. The following summary sketches only the highlights of our integrated proposal for the redesign of the U.S. national security system.

We wish particularly to emphasize the proposal’s integrated nature, which only careful study of the report itself can fully reveal. While some of our recommendations may require fine-tuning during implementation, we caution against an à la carte approach to reform. We have ample recent experience with half-measures and lowest-common-denominator political compromises. Though they may seem pragmatic at first blush, they only delay the emergence of problems or shift them from one place to another; ultimately, they don’t work.
*We must adopt new approaches to national security system design focused on national missions and outcomes, emphasizing integrated effort, collaboration, and agility.*

To broaden the conceptual scope of national security to align with twenty-first-century realities, we recommend the establishment of a President’s Security Council (PSC) that would replace the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council. International economic and energy policy would be handled by the PSC as well, fully integrated into U.S. political and security strategies that focus not on departmental strengths and goals but on national missions and outcomes.

To more effectively integrate the national security policy of the United States, we recommend the statutory creation of a director for national security (DNS) within the Executive Office of the President. The director would be responsible for tasks encompassing the high-level operation of the national security system (specified in detail in the report) that go beyond those of the present assistant to the president for national security affairs.

To establish a coherent framework for the national security system, we recommend the issuance of an Executive Order, supplemented as necessary by presidential directives, to define the national security system, establish presidential expectations for it, and establish norms for its fundamental functions that are likely to transcend administrations.

We recommend that Congress prescribe in statute the national security roles of each executive branch department and agency, including non-traditional components of the national security system; and that nontraditional components should create the position of assistant for national security to clarify and facilitate the coordination of the department’s new national security mission within the national security system.

To improve the international relations of the United States, we recommend transforming the Department of State by consolidating within it all functions now assigned to other departments and agencies that fall within the core competencies of the Department of State.

We recommend the statutory creation of a Homeland Security Collaboration Committee to provide a venue for the collaboration of state and local government authorities, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations with the federal government; and of a Business Emergency Management Assistance Compact to facilitate private sector and nongovernmental assistance in emergency management.
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**We must focus the Executive Office of the President on strategy and strategic management.**

To improve strategic planning and system management, we **recommend instituting a National Security Review to be performed at the beginning of each presidential term**, as directed by the new President’s Security Council. The review should prioritize objectives, establish risk management criteria, specify roles and responsibilities for priority missions, assess required capabilities, and identify capability gaps.

We **recommend the preparation of the National Security Planning Guidance**, to be issued annually by the president to all national security departments and agencies, in order to provide guidance to departments and agencies based on the results of the National Security Review. The president should further direct that departmental and agency planning conform to this guidance.

To enhance the management of the national security system, we **recommend that an executive secretary** of the President’s Security Council be empowered by statute, as detailed in the report, to support overall system management. The executive secretary would report to the director for national security.

To enhance the performance and oversight of the national security system, we **recommend the creation of an official, reporting to the director for national security, to analyze interagency operations**, including real-time assessments of overall system performance and system components’ performance.

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**Even as we centralize strategy formulation, we must decentralize the modalities of policy implementation by creating Interagency Teams and Interagency Crisis Task Forces.**

We **recommend that the president selectively shift management of issues away from the President’s Security Council staff (and supporting interagency committees) to new empowered Interagency Teams**. These teams would be composed of full-time personnel, would be properly resourced and of flexible duration, and be able to implement a whole-of-government approach to those issues beyond the coping capacities of the existing system. The characteristics, authorities, and chains of command for interagency teams, and how Interagency Teams would coordinate their activities with existing departmental and agency functions, are defined and detailed in the report.

To enhance crisis management, we **recommend that the president create Interagency Crisis Task Forces** to handle crises that exceed the capacities of both existing departmental capabilities and new Interagency Teams.

We **recommend that the secretary of homeland security develop a National Operational Framework** that specifies operational integration among the private sector and all levels
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of government for the full range of homeland security activities, including prevention and protection as well as response and recovery.

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We must link resources to goals through national security mission analysis and mission budgeting.

To more effectively resource national security missions, we recommend that national security departments and agencies be required to prepare six-year budget projections derived from the National Security Planning Guidance. The PSC staff should then lead a joint PSC-Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review of the six-year resource plan of each national security department and agency to assess consistency with the National Security Planning Guidance. Based on that review, OMB should issue guidance for each department’s and agency’s six-year program in a National Security Resource Document which presents the president’s integrated, rolling six-year national security resource strategy proposal to Congress.

We recommend the creation of an integrated national security budget to provide the president and the Congress a government-wide understanding of activities, priorities, and resource allocation, and to identify redundancies and deficiencies in the resourcing of national security missions. This budget display should be submitted to Congress with agency budgets and be accompanied by justification material that reflects how the budget aligns with the objectives outlined in the National Security Review and National Security Planning Guidance.

§

We must align personnel incentives, personnel preparation, and organizational culture with strategic objectives.

We recommend the creation of a National Security Professional Corps (NSPC) in order to create a cadre of national security professionals specifically trained for interagency assignments. As detailed in the report, NSPC personnel slots must be explicitly defined, and NSPC cadre must be accorded proper incentives and career-long training opportunities to be effective.

To create a personnel “float” that will enable critical interagency training and ongoing professional education, we recommend increasing civilian personnel authorizations and appropriations in annual increments to be phased in over five years and based upon a manpower analysis; we further recommend using the National Security Education Consortium, established by Executive Order 13434, for that purpose.

We recommend the development of a National Security Strategic Human Capital Plan, as detailed in the report, to identify and secure the human capital capabilities necessary to achieve national security objectives. To advise the PSC executive secretary on national security human capital, we recommend further the creation of a Human Capital Advisory Board consisting of public and private experts.
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We also recommend establishing the expectation that, within an administration, each presidential appointee—unless disabled, experiencing a hardship, requested to resign by the president, or appointed to another government position—would serve until the president has appointed his or her successor.

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We must greatly improve the flow of knowledge and information.

We recommend the creation of a chief knowledge officer in the PSC Executive Secretariat to enhance decision support to the president and his advisers, and to ensure that the national security system as a whole can develop, store, retrieve, and share knowledge.

To enhance information management, we recommend the creation of a chief knowledge officer in each national security department and agency, as well as the creation of a Federal Chief Knowledge Officer Council.

To enable cross-departmental information sharing, we recommend the creation and development of a collaborative information architecture. Parallel with the construction of this information architecture, the PSC Executive Secretariat must develop overarching business rules for interdepartmental communications and data access in order to eliminate bureaucratic barriers presently hindering the flow of knowledge and information.

To streamline particular security functions, we strongly recommend the establishment of a single security classification and access regime for the entire national security system, and, pursuant to statute, security clearance procedures and approval should be consolidated across the entire national security system.

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We must build a better executive-legislative branch partnership.

To improve the overall functioning of the national security system, we recommend establishing Select Committees on National Security in the Senate and House of Representatives and assigning each committee jurisdiction over all interagency operations and activities, commands, other organizations, and embassies; funding; personnel policies; education and training; and nominees for any Senate-confirmed interagency positions that may be established.¹ These select committees should also be assigned jurisdiction for a new national security act.

¹Except for those pertaining to internal matters of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and its components.
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To empower the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee to formulate and enact annual authorization bills, we recommend that new House and Senate rules be adopted. This will require, inter alia, amending section 302(a) of the Congressional Budget Act to provide that the Senate and House Budget Committees recommend allocations for all national security budget function components; reenacting the firewalls that prevented floor amendments transferring funds from international or defense programs to domestic programs that exceed caps on discretionary spending; and requiring a supermajority in the House to waive the current rule requiring passage of authorizing legislation prior to consideration of appropriations bills for defense and foreign policy.

To facilitate prompt consideration of senior national security officials, we recommend that each nomination for the ten most senior positions in a national security department or agency should be placed on the executive calendar of the Senate, with or without a committee recommendation, after no more than 30 days of legislative session; and we recommend the abolition of the practice of honoring a hold by one or more Senators on a nominee for a national security position.

We recommend the comprehensive revision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by the end of the 111th Congress (December 2010) in order to restore and advance the integrity of the U.S. foreign assistance program.

To optimize the oversight of homeland security activities, we recommend consolidating oversight of the Department of Homeland Security to one authorizing committee and one appropriations subcommittee per chamber.

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This summary of Forging a New Shield’s recommendations illustrates in brief the scope of our proposal for the redesign of the U.S. national security system. While our vision remains firmly faithful to and deeply rooted in our Constitutional framework, it is nonetheless a bold plan for reform. Indeed, we firmly believe that, if implemented, our vision for renewal will evoke the very best in the balanced system our Founders conceived.

The Founders created a system of strong presidential government because they understood that leadership is the sine qua non of an effective and sustainable political order. But they embedded their design for strong leadership in a framework of law that insures democratic accountability to the people in whom American sovereignty ultimately rests. It has been our purpose in this report to maximize both the potential for wise leadership and the safeguards of democratic accountability, for only by balancing these two imperatives will America be able to match its power to its principles for the benefit of our own citizens and those of the world.
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We invite constructive and vigorous engagement on our proposal. Indeed, we are eager for it, and so we say to all our countrymen, and to our friends abroad as well, in the words of Isaiah, “Come now, let us reason together.”
PART I: INTRODUCTION

Overview of the Project on National Security Reform

Established by the National Security Act of 1947, the national security system successfully waged the Cold War but often failed to integrate the elements of national power as it was intended to do, sometimes with disastrous results. As the security environment continues to change, the limitations of the current national security system—particularly an inability to meet the threat of pandemics, cyber attacks, and possible terrorist strikes with weapons of mass destruction—become more glaring.

Complex security challenges demand more extensive, skillful, and willing interagency collaboration, not only in Washington but also at regional, national, multilateral, and state and local levels. Yet the current system and the manner in which Congress oversees and funds it does not permit the timely, effective integration of the diverse departmental expertise and capabilities required to protect the United States, its interests, and its citizens in an increasingly complex and rapidly changing world.

The inefficiency of the current system in matching resources to problems, and its limited effectiveness in meeting challenges that demand the integration of multiple elements of power, must be corrected. Toward this end a bipartisan group of public and private national security leaders founded the Project on National Security Reform to analyze the problems that limit the performance of the national security system, identify the most sensible means of solving them, and persuade national leadership to take remedial action.

The PNSR study 1) examines the history and underlying assumptions of the national security system to determine how it took its current form; 2) identifies the current problems, causes, and consequences; 3) develops a range of alternative solutions and evaluates them; and 4) makes appropriate recommendations. The scope of the study is limited to how the government uses institutions and processes to integrate and resource the elements of national power. The performance of individual departments and agencies are not examined except when required to better explain overall system performance. Similarly, the study does not address policy issues, such as the importance of China, space, cyber defense, or the rebalancing of military and civilian capabilities except where those issues intersect with the explanation of current system performance.

The project has two measures of success for its analysis of national security system performance. The first is identification of core problems and their root causes, not just peripheral impediments or mere symptoms of problems; the second is production of solutions that are tightly and logically linked to those problems, rather than just a list of plausible, but not compelling, options for reform.

Reform Trends

U.S. leadership has tinkered with the results of the 1947 act almost since its inception, amending the national security apparatus numerous times. Particularly in the last
decade, however, reform studies and senior leader recommendations have consistently cited the need for systemwide reform. As the 9/11 Commission report noted, “Americans should not settle for incremental, ad hoc adjustments to a system designed generations ago for a world that no longer exists.”\(^2\) Although they may differ as to the feasibility, scope, and appropriate method of reforming the system, many experts in academia, the executive branch, and Congress believe the nation has crossed a historical threshold where incremental and ad hoc adjustments are no longer adequate to defend and advance U.S. national security interests.

Just over sixty years ago, in the aftermath of World War II, bipartisan efforts across the executive and legislative branches reformed the national security system in the aftermath of World War II. Signed by President Harry S. Truman, the National Security Act of 1947 marked a watershed in the organization of the contemporary U.S. national security system. For more than forty years, the National Security Act proved its value, underpinning a system that matched and defeated the Soviet threat during the Cold War. National security failures during this period—for example, in the Bay of Pigs Invasion and the Iran-Contra Affair—often were attributable to insufficient integration of diverse elements of national power, a problem the act was intended to resolve.

However, the world has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. Today, rapid change in many sectors—political and military, economic and financial, energy and environmental, scientific and technological, demographic and social, cultural and intellectual—is a constant feature of the security environment. In addition, there are a growing number and variety of actors who both affect and are affected by these changes. Often subsumed under the term “globalization,” such changes are characterized by interconnections, exchanges, and flows of goods and resources, information and knowledge, science and technology, money and services, and people and ideas between and among many actors, state and nonstate. These dynamics are distinguished not only by their worldwide scope but also by their speed, magnitude, density, and complexity.

As the security environment continues to change, the limitations of the current national security system become more glaring—particularly the lack of preparedness to meet the threat of pandemics, cyber attacks, and possible terrorist strikes with weapons of mass destruction. Complex security challenges demand more extensive, skillful, and willing interagency collaboration, not only in Washington but also at regional, national, multilateral, and state and local levels.

Currently, the system is not capable of effectively marshaling and integrating resources within and across federal agencies to meet such critical national security objectives. Unlike many of our adversaries, our national security system is not agile and responsive. The lapses revealed by the terror attacks on 9/11, the confused national and local coordination during the Hurricane Katrina disaster, and the slow recognition and response to insurgency in Iraq highlight our system’s inadequacies.
While the need for change is becoming more apparent, the underlying causes of the system’s inadequacies are not new. They can be traced back to a basic shortfall of our national security system: it cannot integrate and resource the elements of power well enough to conduct the full range of national security missions necessary to protect the nation. The current system and the manner in which Congress governs and funds it does not permit the timely, effective integration of the diverse departmental expertise and capabilities required to protect the United States, its interests, and its citizens in an increasingly complex and rapidly changing world.

The need for such integration has long been recognized. In 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his national security advisor, Robert Cutler, agreed on a set of guidelines for the national security structures and processes. Cutler explained the rationale for the guidelines in terms of how the president struggled to meet the demands of a changing security environment:

In a world shrunk in size by supersonic speeds, loomed over by ominous atomic clouds, fragmenting into new political entities, living in uneasy peace or scoured—as in Korea—by war, it was no longer possible for a President himself to integrate the intelligence and opinions flooding in from all sides. Eisenhower sought an integration of views which would be the product of continuous association between skilled representatives of all elements of Government germane to the national security.  

What President Eisenhower sought for policy integration, subsequent presidents desired as well, and not only for policy development but also for its implementation. Yet the national security system, as this report will demonstrate, cannot routinely provide such unity of purpose and effort. The president has only a narrow range of options for effectively managing the system. Using an outmoded set of structures and processes has eroded the nation’s image and position in the world, undermined the trust and confidence of the American people in their government, and jeopardized the nation’s security.

A. Overview of the Project on National Security Reform

The timing for systemic national security reform is right. Seven years have passed since terrorists launched a small but coordinated and strategic attack on major American institutions. Strenuous efforts have prevented a repeat of that outrage, but few working within the system or evaluating its performance from without are confident that that record will hold. On the contrary, the magnitude and frequency of expert opinion proclaiming shortfalls in the current system constitute a compelling case for reform.

Acting on this manifest need, a bipartisan group of national security leaders in and out of government started the Project on National Security Reform. The purpose of the project is to analyze the problems that limit the performance of the national security system, identify the most sensible means of solving them, and persuade national leadership to

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take remedial action. In this endeavor, the project has received grants and pro bono support from several private firms and public policy institutes.

Both Congress and the executive branch understand the requirement for better national security system performance, and the Project on National Security Reform has been given the tremendous responsibility of pointing an effective way forward. Congress demonstrated its support for the project’s objectives in the (FY) 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4986; P. L. 110-181). This legislation authorized the secretary of defense to contract with an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization for up to $3 million to conduct a study of the national security interagency process. On February 22, 2008, the Department of Defense signed a collaborative agreement with the Center for the Study of the Presidency to conduct the study through its sponsorship of the Project on National Security Reform. Both Congress and the executive branch understand the requirement for better national security system performance, and the Project on National Security Reform has been given the tremendous responsibility of pointing an effective way forward.

1. Purpose and Scope of the Study

As Winston Churchill remarked long ago, “There is nothing wrong with change, if it is in the right direction.” The purpose of the Project on National Security Reform study is to point the right direction for national security reform and chart a course toward that end. The legislation mandating this study captures the scope of the effort:

A study on the national security interagency system, to include the structures, mechanisms, and processes by which the departments, agencies, and elements of the Federal Government that have national security missions integrate their policies, capabilities, expertise, and activities to accomplish such missions, and any recommendations for changes to the national security interagency system.4

The Department of Defense’s cooperative agreement with the Project on National Security Reform also specifies that the study will examine national security structures, mechanisms, and processes in light of the external challenges facing the United States in the twenty-first century. The scope of the study is thus limited to how the government currently uses institutions and processes to integrate the elements of national power. The study does not evaluate the performance of individual departments and agencies except to better explain overall system performance, and particularly how individual departments or agencies participate in interagency activities. Similarly, the study does not address specific policy issues, such as the importance of China, space, cyber defense or the rebalancing of military and civilian capabilities. Only where these issues intersect with an explanation of current system performance are they raised.

2. Organization of the Study

The project’s study is modeled in part on the historic Goldwater-Nichols legislation, which transformed the American military and gave it unprecedented world-class capability for joint warfare. By means of rigorous examination of the origins, history, and performance of the national security system, our study identified problems that impede the nation’s ability to integrate and resource well the elements of national power. The study, conducted by PNSR’s Directorate for Research and Analysis, included ten working groups: Case Studies, Vision, Processes, Structure, Human Capital, Resources, Knowledge Management, Congress and Other Oversight, Overarching Issues, and a Core Study team. These working groups have drawn upon more than 300 national security professionals working in collaborative relationships from an array of think tanks, universities, and companies, including private intellectuals, current and former practitioners, former national leaders, military officers, and government personnel. The Core Study team coordinated and integrated the working groups.

In addition to these primary study groups, the Project on National Security Reform has other working groups that are contributing to the project’s knowledge base and study. For example, the Legal Working Group has researched broad legal issues, as well as specific issues raised by the project’s study working groups. Typical legal issues raised have included the legal relationship between the National Security Council (NSC) and Homeland Security Council (HSC), malleability of interagency personnel policies, legal framework for information sharing, and provisions in law regarding the integration of public diplomacy across the national security system.

The project’s Guiding Coalition is a group of twenty-two distinguished Americans with extensive service in the public and private sectors that set strategic direction for the project and guided the study. These individuals ensured a comprehensive and bipartisan view of major issues and will help communicate the ultimate findings and proposals of the project to national constituencies and the general public. The project’s Executive Secretariat provided policy direction to the study effort and managed the entire project. PNSR’s Directorate for Political and Legal Affairs has responsibility for gaining statutory and regulatory approval of the study’s recommendations.

3. Study Methodology

The study has four tasks. It 1) examines the history and underlying assumptions of the national security system to determine how it took its current form; 2) identifies problems, their causes, and their consequences; 3) develops a range of alternative solutions and evaluates them; and 4) makes appropriate recommendations.

1. History of the national security system in its current form: The history of the system drew largely upon secondary literature and first person accounts from senior participants. The analysis identified the critical assumptions that informed the creation of the national security system, and charted the evolution of the current structure and processes. Past reform efforts and their effects were considered as well. Doing so increased the likelihood that the project would
succeed in identifying core problems and the most effective means of resolving them. An extensive review of existing literature was conducted and a comprehensive bibliography was prepared.

2. **Problems, their causes, and their consequences:** The majority of the study effort was devoted to identifying problems. The Case Studies Working Group developed a comprehensive statement of problems inhibiting interagency collaboration and unity of effort based on past behavior. It developed 100 case studies, summarizing existing scholarship and commissioning original case studies while using a common methodology. The case studies collectively resolve whether and to what extent the U.S. government has a problem integrating all elements of national power for maximum efficiency and effectiveness. Each case study answered four fundamental questions:

- Did the government have a discernable strategy for solving the national security problem, or did it pursue an ad hoc effort?
- If there was a strategy, did it require interagency collaboration for successful execution and, if so, to what extent?
- Assuming closer interagency collaboration was necessary, to what extent did it occur? To the extent it did not occur, why not?
- What were the consequences of less than desirable interagency collaboration?

The study’s other working groups delved deeper into problem identification and analysis in their respective areas. Each working group’s assessment of problems drew upon, and was broadly consistent with, the case-study research. The findings and recommendations of all working groups were then integrated to ensure that the working groups benefited from each other’s insights. Diverse opinions were treated as hypotheses until the study team could thoroughly evaluate arguments and evidence to arrive at the most objective conclusions. During problem identification, the working groups:

- Developed working assumptions, including definitions of terms
- Collected data, previous research, and best-informed opinions
- Explicitly identified problems to be solved and the characteristics of a solution
- Identified necessary prerequisites for success in obtaining desired outcomes
- Isolated the most important impediments to successful outcomes
3. **A range of solutions:** This portion of the study examined diverse solutions to the problems and advanced a range of solutions, but it included only those that would redress the identified problems. The working groups commissioned papers, held seminars, researched past national security reform studies, and participated in conferences to solicit expert opinions on the range and applicability of plausible solutions. Each working group then compared its findings with those of the other working groups to identify overlapping issues. Working collaboratively, the working group leaders then:

- Developed national security system attributes that would correct existing deficiencies and correspond to changes in the security environment.
- Evaluated the efficacy of the alternative solution sets for solving the core problems identified by applying them in nine alternative future scenarios.
- Evaluated the consistency of the alternative solutions sets with the system imperatives.

4. **Appropriate recommendations:** Working group leaders then developed the preferred set of solutions to the core problems and identified the advantages and disadvantages of alternative solution sets. Each working group also developed more detailed recommended solutions to problems identified in their respective areas. Collaboration among working groups helped promote coherency across the recommendations of the nine working groups. The working group leaders integrated the diverse findings and oversaw the drafting of the final recommendations based on those findings.

Throughout this process, the Guiding Coalition received regular briefings on progress and individual products, engaged in thorough discussions, reviewed and commented on working group products, and responded with clarifying guidance as required.

4. **Conclusion**

Only insightful description and penetrating explanations for current performance will inspire sufficient confidence to act on the study’s prescriptions. With this in mind, leaders of the Project on National Security Reform set stringent requirements for the study. First, they required an accurate description of the national security system that simplifies the large and complex establishment and its processes, yet rings true to practitioners with decades of experience in the system. Second, they required an interdisciplinary explanation for system performance that is informed by advances in organizational knowledge while accounting for the unique dimensions of the national security discipline. To meet these requirements, the report is organized around typical organization and management concepts but uses numerous examples, quotations, and vignettes from the national security experience to illustrate its findings.

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5 The results of testing our solutions in the nine future scenarios will be published as a separate PNSR document.
In summary, the project’s two metrics for analytic success are whether the study 1) succeeds in identifying core problems and their root causes rather than peripheral impediments or mere symptoms of problems and 2) produces solutions that are tightly and logically linked to those problems rather than just a list of plausible, but not compelling, options for reform. The Project on National Security Reform asserts that this study of the national security system meets these criteria for success, and moreover, that it builds upon a growing body of evidence and analysis that support the need for systemic reform.

**B. Reform Trends**

During July 2007, the Project on National Security Reform held the plenary session of its conference on the sixtieth anniversary of the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. This historic legislation constituted a wholesale reform of U.S. government national security functions, incorporating lessons from World War II and anticipating the post-war security environment. The architects of the 1947 act drew upon a few studies and reform proposals that predate victory in World War II, but they were more influenced by the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and integration challenges during World War II. U.S. leadership has tinkered with the results of the 1947 act almost since its inception, amending the national security apparatus numerous times. Since the end of the Cold War, however, momentum toward more systematic overhaul has grown.


At first glance, it might seem as if the national security system is constantly evolving. Over the past six decades, there have been hundreds of major and minor reforms as well as numerous commission reports and studies.

Beginning in February 1949, the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, also known as the Hoover Commission, recommended several major reforms, including further clarifying and strengthening the secretary of defense’s authority in the national military establishment (which would become the Department of Defense) and improved “[t]eamwork throughout the National Security Organization.”

The National Security Act Amendments of 1949 captured the Hoover Commission’s recommendations.

A series of presidential reorganization plans during the administrations of Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower brought further changes. For example, Truman’s Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1949 moved the National Security Council and National Security Resources Board (NSRB) into the Executive Office of the President. Eisenhower disbanded the NSRB, most functions of which—including NSC membership—had already transferred to the Office of Defense Mobilization, pursuant to his Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1953. That same year, in order to increase the independence of public diplomacy efforts and separate them from the State Department’s

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INTRODUCTION

private diplomacy function, Eisenhower created the United States Information Agency under Reorganization Plan No. 8. In 1958, Eisenhower used another reorganization plan\(^7\) to vest the Office of Defense Mobilization’s NSC membership and other statutory powers in the president.

With respect to the president’s oversight of intelligence, Eisenhower’s Executive Order 10656 established the Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities. Although this entity expired at the end of the Eisenhower administration, other presidents saw the merits of such advisory assistance.\(^8\) In 1960, the Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, also known as the Jackson Subcommittee, released its first reports on suggested national security system reforms. Kennedy adopted some of these reforms in 1961, and President Lyndon B. Johnson maintained them during his presidency. Among Kennedy’s actions was the reduction in NSC staff size and the elimination of Eisenhower’s NSC Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board. This left Kennedy and his successor with a leaner and less formal NSC system.


2. Late Cold War Reforms (1968–1991)

In June 1975, the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, also known as the Murphy Commission, issued a report critical of enhanced NSC staff roles and Henry Kissinger’s simultaneous service as national security advisor and secretary of state. The report included a few proposed new NSC structures to integrate economic and national security policy considerations and coordination. Although President Gerald Ford did end the dual-hatting of the national security advisor and secretary of state, he vetoed a bill that would have amended the 1947 act to add the secretary of the treasury as a statutory member of the NSC. Concerned about Congress’s investigations of the intelligence community and its practices, Ford reorganized the intelligence community.\(^9\) This reorganization reaffirmed the NSC’s control over foreign intelligence, eliminated and replaced existing oversight offices, and


\(^8\) President John F. Kennedy’s Executive Order 10938 created the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). President Jimmy Carter disbanded it in 1977, but President Ronald Reagan reconstituted it in 1981, and President George H.W. Bush recently renamed it the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board.

created a mechanism to review the legality and suitability of intelligence community operations.

Years later, under Reagan, the Iran-Contra controversy led to the Report of the President’s Special Review Board, known as the Tower Commission after its chairman, former Senator John Tower (R-TX), which proffered a set of best practices for NSC organization. Most of the Tower Commission recommendations were adopted at the end of the Reagan administration, further solidified by the administration of President George H.W. Bush, and continued by the two subsequent administrations.


The end of the Cold War stimulated numerous examinations of how the United States should restructure various components of its national security apparatus and associated activities. In April 1991, President George H.W. Bush created an independent, bipartisan task force to study and make recommendations on how to reorganize and restructure U.S. government international broadcasting for the post-Cold War world. The International Broadcasting Act of 1994 consolidated all nonmilitary U.S. government international broadcasting within the U.S. Information Agency (USIA). That same year, bills sponsored by Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), Representative Benjamin Gilman (R-NY), and Vice President Al Gore’s National Performance Review each focused on merging USAID, USIA, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) into the State Department. Eventually, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 merged USIA and ACDA into the State Department, while making USAID a statutory agency under the authority and guidance of the secretary of state. In 1997, President William J. Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, which focused on improving interagency management of complex contingency operations. In addition, President Clinton, convinced that economic security deserved more attention, established the National Economic Council early in his tenure as president.

The statutory and other reforms undertaken during the Clinton and Bush administrations are indicative of changes in the post-Cold War security environment, but they also reflect a series of influential post-Cold War national security reform studies. In December 1997, the National Defense Panel published “Transforming Defense—National Security in the 21st Century.” Although the report focused on Department of Defense (DoD) reforms, it recognized that defense “is but one element of the broader national security structure. If we are to succeed in meeting the challenges of the future, the entire U.S. national security structure must become more integrated, coherent, and proactive.” The report further observed that “[t]he national security structures laid out by the 1947 National Security

Act have served us well over the past 50 years. It is time, however, to think through what changes are necessary and to update accordingly.”\textsuperscript{13} Shortly after the National Defense Panel’s report, the secretary of defense chartered the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (USCNS/21), also known as the Hart-Rudman Commission. A series of three reports were released by the Hart-Rudman Commission in 1999, 2000, and 2001. The commission’s Phase III report concluded that the United States “must redesign not just individual departments and agencies but its national security apparatus as a whole. Serious deficiencies exist that cannot be solved by a piecemeal approach.”\textsuperscript{14} Among the Hart-Rudman Commission recommendations was creation of a homeland security agency. A variation on this commission’s recommendation eventually was enacted in the wake of 9/11.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, congressional leaders also have pushed for fundamental reassessments of the Cold War national security system.\textsuperscript{15} Early in the 1990s, congressional interest centered on how to shape traditional military elements of national power for new challenges, ideally at the most efficient resource funding levels. Legislative attention later focused on the government’s ability to cohesively apply the broader suite of U.S. powers. Recent years have brought more intense focus on the efficacy of the entire system, as the importance of proactive engagement and the price of failure have become increasingly clear.

\textbf{a. Early Post-Cold War Defense Reform}

As the threat to NATO dissipated, first from the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and then the collapse of the Soviet Union, senior members of Congress began to advocate a fundamental review of U.S. national security. Beginning in late 1989, the chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, Representative Les Aspin (D-WI) and Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), respectively advocated substantive but reasoned reductions in U.S. forces, particularly those stationed in Western Europe. In the first half of 1992, Aspin introduced a series of white papers exploring the future challenges to U.S. security and proposing a set of force posture options to address those challenges. Nunn pushed for a more thorough reevaluation of the nation’s military requirements, calling in a speech on the Senate floor for a “no-holds-barred, everything-on-the-table” review of Service roles and missions: “We must reshape, reconfigure, and modernize our overall forces—not just make them smaller. We must find the best way to provide a fighting force in the future that is not bound by the constraints of the roles and missions outlined in 1948.”\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} This section draws upon a research paper produced for PNSR by Martin Hrivnak, “Congressional Interest in National Security Reform.”
When the Clinton administration selected Aspin to be its first secretary of defense, he and his staff conducted a review of security requirements, but it did not satisfy Congress. Congressional advocates of reform renewed efforts to impose change from the outside. The FY 1994 National Defense Authorization Act directed the establishment of an independent Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM). The output of the CORM also failed to meet the expectations of many members of Congress for a dramatic reevaluation of defense organization and management. The CORM report narrowed its focus from the expansive authorization act language on reassessing the allocation of “roles, missions, and functions” to more limited reforms that would permit DoD elements to work together more cohesively.\(^\text{17}\) However, the commission promoted a reform with a broader scope than many in Congress anticipated by recommending a quadrennial strategy review, which it envisioned as a National Security Council-led interagency project to be conducted at the beginning of each new administration or as necessary. The commission thought the review should assess recent and anticipated geopolitical and policy changes, technological developments, opportunities for shaping the security environment, the plausible range of DoD budget levels and a robust set of force and capability options. We also suggest a different force planning concept that evaluates various force/capability mixes possible at each of several different funding levels to determine relative value across the spectrum of possible contingencies.\(^\text{18}\)

b. Congress Weighs In on Broader Defense Reform Issues

Congress first included a requirement for a quadrennial study in the FY 1997 National Defense Authorization Act. The act cited the “pace of global change” as requiring a “new, comprehensive assessment of the defense strategy of the United States and the force structure of the Armed Forces required to meet the threats to the United States in the twenty-first century.”\(^\text{19}\) Although the CORM recommended a quadrennial strategy review managed at the interagency level, the authorization act mandated a narrower quadrennial defense review (QDR) to be conducted by the secretary of defense, in consultation with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By this time, after years of trying to prompt the defense bureaucracy to substantially reform itself without success, Congress established a parallel assessment, the National Defense Panel, to serve as a check on the Pentagon effort. It was tasked with providing an analysis that would be “more comprehensive than prior assessments of the force structure, extend beyond the quadrennial defense review, and explore innovative and forward-thinking ways of


meeting such challenges.”\(^{20}\) Congress put the emphasis on the need for stark choices, emphasizing the word “variety” in the authorization act.

The National Defense Panel’s output went further toward satisfying Congress’s intent than the first QDR report (delivered to Congress in 1997). It argued that defense planning was seeking to minimize risk to the United States from current threats, while neglecting to position the country for potential long-term challenges. Unlike previous post-Cold War studies of defense requirements, the National Defense Panel report adopted a broadened view of national security and concluded that changes were necessary across government to leverage all elements of national power against future challenges. In addition to reshaping the nation’s military forces, a need existed to “look at the best way to change and integrate alliance structures, the intelligence structure, and the interagency process to better employ our forces and capabilities to meet the challenges of the future.”\(^{21}\)

Widening the scope of national security—and consequently the institutional targets for reform—would also become the major theme of the decade’s last major review of post-Cold War requirements, the Hart-Rudman report. Named after Senators Gary Hart (D-CO) and Warren Rudman (R-NH), the report predicted that “terrorists, and other disaffected groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction and mass disruption, and some will use them. Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers.” As noted above, some recommendations from the Hart-Rudman report were adopted after 9/11.

Congress scrutinized intelligence as well. The chairmen of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, Representative Dave McCurdy (D-OK) and Senator David Boren (D-OK), separately offered proposals in early 1992 for completely restructuring the intelligence community.\(^{22}\) Their common themes included the creation of a director for national intelligence with the authority to transfer personnel, reprogram funds, and task agencies across existing bureaucratic lines. Although the most significant of the McCurdy and Boren proposals did not make it into law, there remained in Congress substantial concern that the intelligence community was not properly organized for new challenges. The FY 1995 Intelligence Authorization bill established a Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community to review the appropriateness of the intelligence structure for the post-Cold War environment. The staff of the House Intelligence Committee concurrently conducted the Intelligence Community in the 21st Century (IC21) study, which also produced proposals for major restructuring and realignment of authorities.\(^{23}\)

\(^{20}\) Ibid.

\(^{21}\) United States, Transforming Defense, 61.


\(^{23}\) Ibid. 30.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 ushered in additional reform studies. On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States released its report, better known as the “9/11 Commission Report.” The report noted that the “attacks showed, emphatically, that ways of doing business rooted in a different era are just not good enough. Americans should not settle for incremental, ad hoc adjustments to a system designed generations ago for a world that no longer exists.”

President George W. Bush oversaw additional national security system reforms following the 9/11 attacks. The Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council were established in October 2001. A year later, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 codified the HSC and created the Department of Homeland Security. The war on terror and concern about its progress led to other reform studies and initiatives. Congress requested an “Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World” to study the Department of State’s public diplomacy efforts in those regions and recommend improvements. The group operated as a subcommittee of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, a bipartisan panel created by Congress and appointed by the president to provide oversight of U.S. government public diplomacy activities. The group’s report was released in October 2003. It outlined problems with the United States’s public diplomacy efforts and offered solutions to fix them.

Congress’s interest in national security reform following 9/11 differed in several ways from the reform concerns of the 1990s. First, the imperative to find savings from a defense budget perceived to be bloated was muted. Concerns still abound that U.S. military forces are excessively structured for major traditional war, but calls to reshape those forces to deal better with stability operations, homeland defense, and combating terrorism are predominantly strategy, not budget, driven. Second, the segment of Congress engaged on national security issues is much larger than during the 1990s, when domestic policy was ascendant. Congressional interest now focuses on how to make the various pieces of government work better together, rather than just how to restructure the military. Major development over the past several years—including 9/11, the Iraq war and its aftermath, prolonged conflict in Afghanistan, and the response to Hurricane Katrina—underlined for many members of Congress the importance of integrating all aspects of national power.

Among the structural changes to the national security system enacted by Congress was the creation of a Cabinet level Department of Homeland Security in spite of an initially

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reluctant administration. Congress also played the principal role in creating the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States and then in enacting many of its
recommendations. It overcame a resistant Pentagon to establish a director of national
intelligence with greater authority over all the agencies of the intelligence community.
Congressional support also is generating some of the recent expert community analysis of
the national security system. For instance, Congress funded three phases of the Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Beyond Goldwater-Nichols project.

In advance of the 2008 elections Congress increased its efforts to force rethinking about
security and defense requirements and how the U.S. government is organized for those
purposes. The FY 2008 Defense Authorization Act directed the Pentagon to revisit the
distribution of roles and missions among the services and defense agencies every four
years, with the first review to take place in 2008, positioning its findings to influence the
next QDR. A temporary Roles and Missions Panel of the House Armed Services
Committee examined similar issues at both the department and interagency levels.
Congress also mandated that the next administration carry out the third fundamental
review of the nation’s nuclear posture since the end of the Cold War, establishing and
directing the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States to provide
independent analysis and recommendations.

Also reflecting experience from the war on terror, in July 2004, the Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization was created within the State Department
with the intent that it would “lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government
civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations” like those encountered
following the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The following year, Bush further
strengthened the attempt to improve postconflict interagency activities by issuing
National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44, which officially superseded
Clinton’s PDD 56. Among other things, the directive designated the secretary of state as
the coordinator for all interagency efforts focused on reconstruction and stabilization.
Also, in the summer of 2004, Bush signed four executive orders designed to strengthen
the intelligence community. Many of the provisions of these orders were later codified or
superseded by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which also
created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Building on the theme of a new era, other studies explored the dynamics of the new
environment and offered additional reform proposals. The Princeton Project on National
Security published its final report in the fall of 2006, recommending a new national
security strategy that would cover the new, more diverse range of security challenges.
The CSIS Beyond Goldwater Nichols project, mentioned above, is a four-phase study on
“reforms for organizing both the U.S. military and national security apparatus to meet
21st century challenges.” The Phase II report includes numerous recommendations
with the unifying theme of addressing how to “get the many disparate parts of the U.S.

28 United States Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Panel on Roles and Missions,
national security structure to work together, in both planning and execution.\textsuperscript{30} Inside the
U.S. government, Project Horizon began in 2005 with the purpose of developing
“realistic interagency strategies” and identifying “capabilities…to prepare for the
unforeseen threats and opportunities that will face the nation over the next 20 years.”\textsuperscript{31}
Although the project concluded most of its work by mid-May 2006, other more narrowly
focused studies benefited from some of its insights, such as CSIS’s Embassy of the
Future project, which released its report in 2007.

Finally, the ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have generated numerous studies,
many of which conclude that the U.S. government is not able to get its various national
security organizations to work together well enough. For example, the 2006 Iraq Study
Group report included recommended organizational changes to the U.S. national security
system, such as the creation of a position to oversee economic reconstruction, enhanced
chief-of-mission budget authority, flexibility for security assistance programs and for
mixing U.S. and international donor funds, and personnel education and training matters.
The Iraq Study Group report also included a sweeping recommendation that went well
beyond the subject of Iraq:

For the longer term, the United States government needs to improve how
its constituent agencies—Defense, State, Agency for International
Development, Treasury, Justice, the intelligence community, and others—
respond to a complex stability operation like that represented by this
decade’s Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the previous decade’s operations
in the Balkans. They need to train for, and conduct, joint operations across
agency boundaries, following the Goldwater-Nichols model that has
proved so successful in the U.S. armed services.\textsuperscript{32}

Expert opinion in Congress, the Executive Branch and the national security community
more broadly, as well as recent experience, point to the same conclusion; that the United
States needs broader national security reform, and that it should improve the ability of
diverse national security organizations to collaborate.

5. Emerging Consensus on the Need for Systemic Reform

National security experts in Congress, the federal government, and academia generally
agree that the United States has failed to sufficiently integrate diplomatic, military,
economic, and other elements of national power, primarily because its various national
security organizations are not well incentivized to collaborate. Senator John Warner (R-VA)
voiced this sentiment in a letter to White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card when
he wrote that “our mission in Iraq and Afghanistan requires coordinated and integrated

\textsuperscript{30} Clark A. Murdock, Michèle A. Flournoy, and Mac Bollman, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S.
Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report, (Washington: Center for
\textsuperscript{31} U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Futures | Office of Science Policy | US
\textsuperscript{32} Iraq Study Group (U.S.), James Addison Baker, Lee Hamilton, and Lawrence S. Eagleburger,
action among all federal departments and agencies of our government. This mission has revealed that our government is not adequately organized to conduct interagency operations.” Other congressional leaders, including Representatives Ike Skelton (D-MO), Jim Marshall (D-GA), and Geoff Davis (R-KY) have expressed similar views. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has been a major proponent of reform: “America’s national security apparatus, military and civilian, needs to be more adept in operating along a continuum involving military, political, and economic skills... Bureaucratic barriers that hamper effective action should be rethought and reformed. The disparate strands of our national security apparatus, civilian and military, should be prepared ahead of time to deploy and operate together.” General Wayne Downing, USA (Ret.) similarly called attention to the inadequacy of the current system:

Over the years, the interagency system has become so lethargic and dysfunctional that it inhibits the ability to apply the vast power of the U.S. government on problems. You see this inability to synchronize in our operations in Iraq and in Afghanistan, across our foreign policy, and in our response to Katrina.

Former ambassadors James Dobbins, now with RAND, and David Abshire of the Center for the Study of the Presidency, and many other national security scholars and practitioners concur in this estimation.

Frequently, those calling for reform advocate legislation similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which required the different military services to cooperate more effectively. The current interest is focused on improving integration of major national security institutions like the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security, and others. Many current and former senior military officers are especially inclined toward the Goldwater-Nichols analogy. Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, recent vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, summarized this view:

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33 John Warner, letter to White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, 15 March 2006
INTRODUCTION

Goldwater-Nichols…proves its value as a model for improving integration among disparate but related organizations that share a common goal. DoD’s experience in implementing Goldwater-Nichols provides us with particular insights into the challenges ahead, as we seek to expand that success throughout the federal government.\(^\text{38}\)

A variety of others, including Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Stuart Bowen, presidential candidates in 2008, and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace have made similar statements that support Goldwater-Nichols-like legislation for national security reform.\(^\text{39}\)

At the same time, some national security leaders question the necessity and adequacy of a Goldwater-Nichols type of national security reform. Some suggest incremental reforms may be sufficient. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told the House Armed Services Committee that she is

> very much of the view that it is fine to think of trying to plan for the reconstruction of the…interagency process. But really, we have gone a long way to creating new tools of interagency coordination. They may well have been born of necessity. They may well have been ad hoc in character at first. But…it is often the case that that which is invented in response to new and real on-the-ground contingencies turn out to be the best institutions for the future.\(^\text{40}\)

Others caution that internal U.S. reform efforts may fail to secure their desired effect if they do not adequately address the challenge of working with other countries and multilateral and non-governmental organizations.\(^\text{41}\) Although experts may differ as to the

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\(^{38}\) Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, Testimony, Admiral Edmund Giambastiani’s Testimony Before House Armed Services Committee, Washington: testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 4 April 2006.


feasibility, scope, and appropriate method of ensuring this change, nearly all practitioners agree—reform is imperative.

6. Building toward Systemic Reform

All reform studies and efforts since 1947, whether stimulated by Congress or undertaken by the executive branch, express the common theme that change must be responsive to the strategic environment. Initial post-Cold War emphasis on economic vitality, and the hopeful assessment that the United States would enjoy a period of relative security, has given way to deeper concerns that the national security system is increasingly unable to keep pace with changes in the security environment. Particularly in the last decade, reform studies and senior leader recommendations have consistently cited the need for system-wide reform. Many experts in academia, the executive branch, and Congress believe the nation has crossed a historical threshold where incremental and ad hoc adjustments are no longer sufficient to defend and advance U.S. national security interests. Before explaining why these experts are right, it is first necessary to describe the current national security system and how it developed over the past sixty years.
PART II: DESCRIPTION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SYSTEM

Components of the National Security System

The U.S. national security system is an enormous aggregate of interacting and interdependent institutions with structural and functional relationships which must function in a complex and dynamic environment. This environment includes a variety of actors: other nation states, international organizations, and nonstate actors ranging from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to transnational terrorist networks.

The president is the key figure in the national security system. His ability to shape and respond to a complex, rapidly changing security environment hinges on the effectiveness of the national security system he oversees and directs. At the national level, the primary purpose of the national security system is policymaking and execution. Component functions include intelligence and warning, issue management, decision support, capability building, and system management. The intelligence and warning function is the foundation of presidential decision support, but the president must draw upon many other institutions to manage national security issues. Once the president—or the national or homeland security advisor acting on his behalf—identifies priority issues they assign them to a person, group, or agency. The system must then oversee the progress of those issues, from assessing relevant factors involved, to formulating policy and following it through to its implementation.

Issue management occurs through a hierarchical system of interagency committees (working groups, Deputies Committees, and Principals Committees, from lowest to highest) and lead agencies or individuals, sometimes referred to as czars, or some combination of these elements. Agencies, interagency committees, and czars are grouped under or participate in three overarching councils, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the National Economic Council. Coordination with state and local governments takes place through the homeland security council.

Since national-level structures cannot exercise sufficient day-to-day control over all subordinate activities, regional-level structures (e.g., regional combatant commands) manage interrelated and overlapping national security issues that extend beyond U.S. boundaries. At the country level, the U.S. ambassador oversees the embassy and its associated interagency missions. Effective issue management requires good decision support. This type of support comes from two overlapping national security communities: the intelligence community and the analytic community.

National security departments and agencies build the expertise and capabilities required to conduct national security missions. Capability building may be defined as using organizational authorities to generate capabilities sufficient to successfully execute national security roles and missions. In addition to issue management (e.g., intelligence and warning and decision support) and capability building, the president and his security advisors are also responsible for national security system management. This requires
ensuring that all elements of the system work well together to achieve desired outcomes. The demands of issue management often displace system management.

The performance of the U.S. national security system is independently assessed by Congress. Assessments range from reviews of component performance to scrutinizing the outcomes of missions. In addition to Congress, other agencies act as external auditors of mission efficiency and effectiveness, such as the Government Accountability Office and the Office of Management and Budget.

**History of the National Security System**

Even before World War I some people understood the extent to which the government found it difficult to integrate the elements of national power. This awareness increased as the twentieth century progressed, as did efforts to improve coordination and integration. All of these efforts aimed to improve integration either within one functional area (e.g., defense, with the establishment of the Department of Defense) or among the departments involved in a specific mission (e.g., complex contingency operations, with the creation of the Clinton administration’s Executive Committee).

Failures of coordination have led presidents to draw authority into the White House and created a burdensome span of control for the president. Presidents are able, at best, to integrate or coordinate responses to only a few problems. New administrations often vow to delegate national security responsibilities back to departments and agencies or to give integration authority to various councils and committees, but then find that these options fail to produce the required level of cooperation. History demonstrates that presidents have no effective way to delegate authority for integration of department and agency efforts, and that responsibility ends up back on White House shoulders.

Along with this dramatic oscillation between centralization and dispersion of authority, the constant but superficial adjustments administrations make to accommodate differences in decision-making styles give the impression that the national security system is flexible. Actually it is rigid. The basic system has not changed since 1947, and it cannot generate new levels of performance in response to new demands. Instead, the system is only capable of innumerable minor adjustments that, once tried, are found wanting. Both the changes in the security environment and the history of attempts to respond to those changes indicate that the limits of the current system have been reached, and that something different is now necessary.
A. Components of the National Security System

1. Introduction

The U.S. national security system is an enormous aggregate of interacting, interrelated, and interdependent institutions with structural and functional relationships that form a complex whole. For example, during the first year of the George W. Bush administration, the National Security Council (NSC) included six regional committees and eleven policy committees covering diverse topics from counterterrorism to the global environment. The diplomatic community includes 305 embassies, consulates, and diplomatic missions around the globe;42 the defense community includes seventeen defense agencies, nine unified combatant commands, and seven “field activities”—complete with news service and healthcare establishment; the intelligence community includes sixteen separate government agencies; and the department of homeland security encompasses twenty-two formerly separate government agencies and cooperates with tens of thousands of state and local authorities across the country. Overall, the federal government portion of the system includes approximately 4 million personnel—not counting those from the private sector who support the system—and continues to grow in size and complexity.43

To fully describe how all of the people and organizations interact is beyond the scope of this report. However, it is possible to describe the essential components of the system, its institutions and functions, and the way it responds to presidential direction. The place to begin is by describing how new administrations interact with the security environment. They enter office with worldviews and national security agendas reinforced by election success. They attempt to implement their agendas with the assistance of departments and

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agencies already at work on problems carried over from previous administrations. As presidents confront the reality that the security environment is difficult to shape and capable of rapid changes, they sometimes must adjust their plans, preconceptions, and preferred policies. They do so through the national security system, which they direct and shape over the course of their term of office.

For example, when William J. Clinton became president, his administration intended to better support and use the United Nations’ (UN) role as an international peacekeeper and humanitarian aid provider. As Clinton’s senior officials took their new positions, they reviewed the policy process and created working groups to which all of the relevant departments and agencies sent representatives. The purpose of these working groups was to codify new presidential direction on peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.

During the U.S.-backed UN intervention in Somalia, the Clinton administration used the policy mechanisms it inherited from President George H. W. Bush. Officials in the State Department and the Department of Defense provided their recommendations through interagency working groups and, ultimately, to the president. The president’s direction came down through these committees and went out to the field. Throughout, U.S. government officials discussed Somalia with officials at the UN and in other governments. Informal contact occurred among officials in Washington, Somalia, and the UN headquarters as well.

As the national security system worked on policy, events on the ground in Somalia followed their own course. A humanitarian relief effort became mired in a political struggle between the UN and rival armed factions in Somalia. Violence ensued, culminating in an attack on UN peacekeepers. UN requests for additional U.S. forces came through the regional combatant commander and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Both the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the request to deploy additional U.S. forces. A series of small engagements eventually culminated in a prolonged, bloody gunfight during which eighteen Americans and hundreds of Somalis died. The event forced the Clinton administration to substantially modify its nascent policy on the United Nations and peacekeeping operations.

As events in Somalia unfolded, the Clinton administration was dealt another peacekeeping problem: ethnic strife in the Balkans. Attention fixed initially on Bosnia and the fighting there between Serbs and Bosnians and Croats. As this conflict unfolded, U.S. officials realized that a province of Serbia, Kosovo, populated largely by ethnic Albanians, loomed as another probable flashpoint. Before leaving office in December 1992, President Bush had warned the Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic, that the United States was prepared to use military force against Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia if they instigated conflict in Kosovo.

The Clinton administration reiterated these warnings; however, internal pressure for Kosovar independence led to increasing problems. Intelligence reports tracked the growing conflict. After several years of conflict, the interagency working group responsible for the Balkans noted the pending escalation and prepared options for senior leaders. The White House, in turn, adjusted policy and increased both contact with and
pressure on Milosevic. Despite this, beginning in early 1998, the Serbs escalated their violence in Kosovo. Finally, U.S.-led allied bombing and the threat of invasion convinced Milosevic to call off his forces.

George W. Bush took office in 2001 promising changes in national security, including a reduction in U.S. support to “nation building” efforts. In the midst of internal policy reviews—and withdrawal from various international peacekeeping efforts—the 9/11 terrorist attacks occurred. From that moment, the preeminent focus of the president and his Cabinet was on national security. The National Security Council developed policies that would guide America’s response to the ruling Taliban authority in Afghanistan, where al-Qaeda was based.

What followed was a combination of diplomacy, consultation with other countries, and a presidential ultimatum to Afghanistan to turn over the terrorists they harbored “or share their fate.”

When the Taliban refused the U.S. demands to surrender al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, U.S. forces entered Afghanistan and, supporting Afghan tribes who had been resisting Taliban dominance, drove the Taliban from power.

The Bush administration then turned to Iraq, promoting the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. After debate within the national security establishment, the president decided to make the Department of Defense the lead agency for Iraq. In planning for the aftermath of the war, the Pentagon did not anticipate the level of post-conflict civil disorder. It also was slow to acknowledge the insurgency that developed amidst the escalating violence. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the early policy to reduce support for nation-building ad-hoc efforts gave way to efforts to do just that—and the following years were marked by long-term post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction efforts.

These recent examples illustrate a foundational truth about the national security system—that it must function in a complex, ever-changing environment. This environment includes a variety of actors: other nation states, international organizations, and nonstate actors, ranging from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to transnational terrorist networks. The NGOs alone have increased from approximately 1,000 to more than 20,000 since 1956 and their influence is growing. Also, in this more dynamic environment, “micropowers” (e.g., individuals hacking into national computers) can threaten “megaplayers” (e.g., nation states), who have access to technology and “how-to” instructions on everything from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to nuclear weapons. The increase in the number and type of actors, and in the means at their

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46 Ibid.


disposal, increases the complexity of the environment and broadens the range of possible national security concerns. As the 9/11 Commission observed in their final report, “terrorism against American interests ‘over there’ should be regarded just as we regard terrorism against America ‘over here.’ In this same sense, the American homeland is the planet.”

2. The President

The president’s ability to shape and respond to a complex, rapidly changing security environment hinges on the effectiveness of the national security system he oversees and directs. Some trends are beyond the ability of the United States to control so the nation must simply accommodate itself as best it can. Yet every resolved crisis, seized opportunity, ignored threat, accumulated success, and failed effort affects the evolution of that security environment. As shown in the above chart, the president largely depends on the intelligence institutions to identify issues in the security environment and provide warnings. The president then uses this information to manage the system’s components and coordination with other, cooperating actors in the security environment.

05 July 2008, 17 July 2008

a. Intelligence and Warning

The first and most important function of the system is to help the president identify national security issues that demand his attention. The national security system has a diverse set of institutions and functions designed to help the president understand and interpret the environment so that he can develop and execute national security policy. In particular, the president and his advisors require intelligence and timely warning about developments in the security environment.

When President John F. Kennedy’s advisors first brought to his attention threatening developments in Cuba, the briefing included high-altitude-reconnaissance photos of areas where missile delivery structures appeared to stand. President Kennedy questioned the photos, wondering aloud whether they also indicated that the missile sites were being manned. His advisors then showed him additional images taken from the same plane. The resolution was so clear that the president could see not only men but, in one photo, the headlines of a newspaper that a man was reading. That kind of intelligence and warning capability supports the president and his advisors in their efforts to identify emerging issues and evaluate their progress in resolving them.

President Harry S. Truman believed that, as the commander-in-chief, “A President has to know what is going on all around the world in order to be ready to act when action is needed. The President must have all the facts that may affect the foreign policy or the military policy of the United States.” Commenting on the Pearl Harbor attacks, President Truman noted that it had become increasingly clear through Senate investigations of the event, that different agencies were offering conflicting findings and that the roots of the differences lay in the scattered and uncoordinated methods of obtaining information:

I have often thought that if there had been something like coordination of information in the government it would have been more difficult, if not impossible, for the Japanese to succeed in the sneak attack at Pearl Harbor. In those days the military did not know everything the State Department knew, and the diplomats did not have access to all the Army and Navy knew. The Army and the Navy, in fact, had only a very informal arrangement to keep each other informed as to their plans.

To meet President Truman’s needs for integrated intelligence, Congress created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Then, largely in response to the 9/11 attacks, Congress established the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in 2004. The ODNI became the chief coordinating body for the nation’s intelligence gathering and assessment organizations, superseding the CIA as the primary coordinator of the intelligence agencies within the federal government. The ODNI coordinates an array of

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52 Ibid.
intelligence institutions, including the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and even the more functionally specialized institutions such as Marine Corps Intelligence Activity.

Among other intelligence and warning responsibilities, the director of national intelligence oversees the production of a wide range of products designed to inform the entire national security system, especially the president. Thousands of analysts vie for the honor of making a contribution to either the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, the intelligence community’s classified daily “newspaper” that goes to senior national security officials, or the President’s Daily Brief (PDB), a short daily list of the overnight outputs of the intelligence community that the director of national intelligence presents to the president each morning.\(^53\) The PDB alerts the president to the most important pending developments in the security environment and allows him to take appropriate action.

Still, busy presidents and their advisors can miss important signals, even when presented in the condensed form of a PDB. For example, Larry Johnson, a former CIA officer and the deputy director of the Department of State’s Office of Counterterrorism from 1989 to 1993, recalled an important August 6, 2001, PDB prior to the 9/11 attacks:

> The PDB…should have compelled everyone to rush back to Washington. In his CIA days, Johnson wrote ‘about 40’ PDBs. They're usually dispassionate in tone, a mere paragraph or two. The PDB of Aug. 6 was a page and a half. ‘That's the intelligence-community equivalent of writing *War and Peace,*’ Johnson said. And the title—Bin Laden Determined To Strike in US—was clearly designed to set off alarm bells.\(^54\)

Yet the president and his advisors missed the importance of the warning. President George W. Bush later noted that he already knew what the article told him—that al-Qaeda was dangerous—since the organization’s leader, Osama bin Laden, had long been talking about his desire to attack America.\(^55\)

The incident underscores the difficulty that any president faces in identifying issues and making decisions on the basis of summaries that have been highly condensed to allow him the time to read. The *intelligence and warning* function of the national security system serves as the foundation of decision support to the president, but the president must draw upon many other institutions to manage national security issues.

**b. Issue Management**

To effectively manage the many national security issues and the institutions involved in their resolution, the president must ensure that the national security system performs a set

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\(^{53}\) National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 90.


\(^{55}\) National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 260.
of core activities well, including issue management. After the president—or the national or homeland security advisor acting on his behalf—identifies priority issues, those issues must be assigned to a person, group, or agency. The system must then oversee the progress of those issues, from assessing the relevant factors involved, to formulating policy and following it all the way through its implementation.

Issue management happens at multiple levels in the national security system as national security leaders are required to make many consequential decisions on a daily basis. At the national level, the Department of State manages the counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, at times using diplomatic tools to move international institutions such as the United Nations to adopt counterproliferation policies that the United States favors. However, management of that same issue may occur differently at the regional level, since counterproliferation concerns vary in the Middle East, Latin America, and elsewhere. Finally, at the level of a specific country, it is the U.S. ambassador and his or her country team, comprised of representatives from many departments and agencies, who manage the counterproliferation efforts.

This illustrates that national security issue management requires a range of decision-makers, from the president and Cabinet officials to ambassadors and military commanders. A variety of organizations, including national-level councils and committees, support the president at each level.

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56 There is no agreed-on definition for national security system terms like “issue management.” To help ensure consistent usage, PNSR uses a standard lexicon. See Appendix 2: Glossary of Terms.

57 Policy is the articulation of the national interest in matters of national security, which sets strategic direction for each issue. Strategy is the idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve policy objectives. Planning is the formation of a program for accomplishing a given strategic goal to further broad national policy. Implementation is the actual execution of planned actions. Finally, evaluation is the process of reviewing and reforming the policy-to-implementation chain as needed to achieve the outcome. For more on these topics, see the section on Process in Part IV.

58 According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, nonproliferation stops the spread of dangerous weapons while counterproliferation is applied in situations where prevention fails. This report refers more often to counterproliferation than nonproliferation because the counterproliferation mission requires more cooperation among departments and agencies. Nonproliferation focuses primarily on diplomatic efforts while counterproliferation typically draws upon diplomatic, military and other elements of national power. However, the organizational distinctions between the two missions and terms are often slight. For example, the State Department has a Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) that includes an Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives (ISN/CPI). Both entities use the same organizations and mechanisms to focus on decreasing the spread of WMDs.
3. National-Level Councils and Committees

Organizations at the national level have two essential purposes: *policymaking* and *policy execution*. Washington-based organizations such as the Executive Office of the President, the Vice President’s Office, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council (HSC), the National Economic Council (NEC), the Office of Management and Budget, the departments (including State, Defense, Homeland Security, Treasury, Justice, etc.), and other agencies with national security responsibilities—all pursue policymaking. Often the role national organizations’ play in policy execution is to provide oversight, but they also may have direct execution responsibilities.

A long-time participant in White House operations provides a glimpse into how multiple national-level organizations interact in national security policymaking and execution:

Assume that the president is going to travel to Moscow to try to persuade the Russian president to collaborate on a missile defense arrangement. Military options and background must be elicited from Defense; diplomatic repercussions evaluated by State; assessments on Russian
capabilities will come from the intelligence community; the White House National Security Council staff will assemble the material.\textsuperscript{59}

\textbf{a. National Security Council}

The National Security Council is the most prominent formal interagency council. By law, the NSC’s role is to “advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security” in order to “enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security.”\textsuperscript{60} The NSC also may perform “such other functions as the President may direct, for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies...”\textsuperscript{61}

The NSC acts as the president’s tool to coordinate action and reconcile disputes within the national security establishment. The president calls the NSC into meeting at his discretion, and usually only on the most pressing national security matters. The frequency of NSC meetings can vary greatly. In 1989, under President George H. W. Bush, the NSC held thirty-eight meetings, but by 1992 that number had fallen to four.\textsuperscript{62} The national security advisor and his or her staff support the president and the NSC, tracking the progress of issues and alerting the president when those issues require his intervention.

\textbf{b. Homeland Security Council}

Following the terror attacks on 9/11, the president created the Homeland Security Council and appointed a homeland security advisor, the staff for which is approximately one-quarter the size of the NSC staff. The HSC’s membership differs from that of the NSC (see table below) but often works with the NSC on national security issues, as in 2003 when biodefense issues galvanized an end-to-end assessment of the country’s biodefense posture—bringing the NSC and HSC into a joint effort to create a biodefense strategy. That NSC-HSC effort informed the Homeland Security Presidential Directive-10, \textit{Biodefense for the 21st Century}, released in 2004.\textsuperscript{63}

The legally designated purpose of the HSC reflects the same concerns about coordination that led to the creation of the NSC:

\begin{quote}
The HSC’s purpose is to ensure coordination of all homeland security-related activities among executive departments and agencies, and to
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{60} National Security Act of 1947, P.L. 80-253, § 101(a), 61 Stat. 496 (1947).
\end{flushright}
promote the effective development and implementation of all homeland security policies.  

The NSC and HSC staffs are run, respectively, by an assistant to the president for national security affairs and an assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism. Neither is confirmed by the Senate, which underscores the fact that they and their staff play an advisory and not a directive role for the president.

c. National Economic Council

President Clinton deemed economic matters so important to the nation’s security that he created the National Economic Council in 1993—though he originally intended to call it the “Economic Security Council.” Creating the NEC was a response to an economic environment that was becoming globally integrated in historically unprecedented ways. Coordinating the multiple departments and agencies charged with economic issue management required more White House attention.

President George W. Bush continued to use the NEC. After the 9/11 attacks, his administration integrated an economic strategy with national security goals:

The [NEC] strategy sought to use America’s economic strength and the lucrative financial benefits of free trade with the United States as leverage to push for economic liberalization and democratization in emerging markets in key strategic regions, such as the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East. By opening trade negotiations with individual nations such as Jordan and Morocco, [Bush’s national economic advisor, Lawrence Lindsey and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick] believed they would set off a competition among other nations in the region to enter into free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations with the United States. [They] utilized the joint NSC/NEC organization to identify strategic priorities and the NEC interagency to coordinate the development of the FTAs.

The assistant to the president for economic policy and director of NEC leads the NEC’s staff, which includes two deputy assistants to the president, one for domestic and the other for international economic issues. The deputy who deals with international

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65 Rather than the current, formal titles, the term “national security advisor” and “homeland security advisor” are used throughout this report.


economic issues also reports to the national security advisor. Currently, the NEC has four principal functions: to coordinate policymaking for domestic and international economic issues, to coordinate economic policy advice for the president, to ensure that policy decisions and programs are consistent with the president’s economic goals, and to monitor implementation of the president’s economic policy agenda.

d. Council Membership and Attendance

Under the current Bush administration, attendees of NSC meetings may be divided into five categories, including 1) statutory members, 2) regular attendees, 3) statutory advisors, 4) standing invitees, and 5) select invitees. Statutory members are generally limited to officials prescribed in statute who are subject to Senate confirmation. Because the national security advisor is not subject to Senate confirmation, he could not technically be a member of the NSC. This is likely the primary contributor to the current president’s creation of a new category of NSC attendees entitled “regular attendees.” As the name suggests—these officials are expected to regularly attend NSC meetings, like NSC members. Statutory advisors are officials who are prescribed in statute as the principal advisors to the NSC for a particular subject area, like the military and intelligence. These officials attend most NSC meetings. Standing invitees are officials who, by presidential directive, are authorized to attend any NSC meeting. Select invitees, on the other hand, are officials who, by presidential directive, may only attend particular NSC meetings, often depending on the subject matter of deliberations.

The general categories of attendees for the HSC largely mirror those for the NSC, with one major exception. In the case of the HSC, the term “member” (distinct from statutory member) is used as opposed to “regular attendee.” This is likely attributable to the statutory language that governs HSC membership. Unlike the NSC statute, the HSC statute does not require members of the HSC to be confirmed by the Senate. Instead, it prescribes certain members and vests the president with the authority to designate any other individual as a member, regardless of Senate confirmation. Consequently, the president probably saw no need to use a different term, such as “regular attendee”, to avoid contradicting a statute. In the case of the NEC, a non-statutory body, only one category of attendees exist—namely “members.” This category is prescribed in an Executive Order.

Table 1. Attendance at NSC, HSC, and NEC Meetings

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<th>OFFICIALS</th>
<th>NSC</th>
<th>HSC</th>
<th>NEC</th>
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⁶⁸ See 50 U.S.C. § 402(a) (listing the statutory membership of the NSC).
⁷⁰ See Executive Order 12835, Establishment of the National Economic Council (Clinton, Jan. 25, 1993); see also Executive Order 13286, Amendment of Executive Orders, and Other Actions, in Connection With the Transfer of Certain Functions to the Secretary of Homeland Security (George W. Bush, Feb. 28, 2003) (amending E.O. 12835 to add the Secretary as a member of the NEC).
### OFFICIALS

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\(^{71}\) See 10 U.S.C § 151(b); the Chairman is “the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.”

\(^{72}\) See 50 U.S.C. § 403(b)(2), which states the DNI shall “act as the principal adviser to the President, to the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council” for intelligence matters.

\(^{73}\) See 6 U.S.C. § 313 (c)(4)(A) (“The Administrator [of FEMA] is the principal advisor to the President, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary for all matters relating to emergency management in the United States.”).

\(^{74}\) See NSPD-1, Organization of the National Security Council System (George W. Bush, Feb. 13, 2001) (listing the regular attendees and invitees of meetings of the NSC).

e. Joint Intelligence Community Council

The Joint Intelligence Community Council was formed in January of 2006 as a result of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. The council provides executive intelligence oversight and assistance to the director of national intelligence, reviewing intelligence budgets, financial management, and the intelligence community’s performance. In addition, it is the council’s responsibility to ensure the timely execution of any of the director’s policies, programs, or directives.

The body consists of the secretaries of state, defense, homeland security, energy, and the treasury, as well as the attorney general, with the director of national intelligence serving as the chair of the council. Members of the council are encouraged to present advice and opinions contrary to those offered by the director of national intelligence to the president or National Security Council. The director is then required, by law, to ensure that this information is delivered at the same time as his or her own recommendations. Members of the council are also permitted to present their advice or opinions on intelligence matters, at any time, to Congress.76

f. National Intelligence Council

The intelligence community’s “center for mid-term and long-term strategic thinking”—was formed in 1979 by drawing on the best-available expertise, both inside and outside the U.S. government, to produce estimative intelligence. Under the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the council stands as the bridge between the intelligence and policy communities, providing a source of deep substantive expertise on intelligence matters and acting as the chief driver and facilitator of analytic collaboration in the intelligence community.

Each of the council’s 13 National Intelligence Officers are responsible for either a geographic area (e.g., East Asia) or a functional or overarching issue (e.g., Science and Technology). They publish products designed for specific customers and purposes, including intelligence community assessments, intelligence community briefs, desktop reports, watch lists, conference reports, and sense of the community memoranda. The core missions of the National Intelligence Council include generating new knowledge and insight on a range of national security issues; providing substantive counsel to the IC and senior policymakers; reaching out to nongovernmental experts in academia and the private sector to broaden the IC’s perspective; articulating substantive intelligence priorities and procedures to guide intelligence collection and analysis; and producing the national intelligence estimate.

g. Interagency Committees

Some presidents have managed crises directly through their security councils, as President Gerald Ford did during the last official battle of the Vietnam War, when Khmer Rouge forces in Cambodia captured the Mayaguez, a U.S. merchant vessel.77 Other

76 50 USC § 402–1
presidents have created ad hoc interagency groups to manage important security issues. President John F. Kennedy used this approach when he formed an “executive committee” of his most senior advisors during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Despite the availability of senior councils of Cabinet level officials and other committees, presidents seldom manage issues directly through such organizations. More often than not, presidents delegate the responsibility of issue management to interagency committees.

There are three types of interagency committees: the Principals Committee, the Deputies Committee, and Policy Coordination Committees. The Principals Committee is “the senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security…since 1989.” Membership of the Principals Committee changes by administration and topic, but presumed regular attendees include the secretary of state; the secretary of the treasury; the secretary of defense; the chief of staff to the president; and the assistant to the president for national security affairs, who chairs the committee. The chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff usually attends the Principals Committee meetings as an advisor if not a member.

The Principals Committee meets much more frequently than the formal National Security Council, and many expect it to vet all major national security decision. For example, CIA Director George Tenet remarked about the absence of a Principals Committee meeting to consider the “de-Baathification of Iraqi society” following the defeat of Saddam Hussein’s military forces in May 2003: “Clearly this was a critical policy decision…yet there was no NSC principals meeting to debate the move.” Tenet complained that senior U.S. officials in Baghdad announced the orders on de-Baathification “to Iraq and the world” but that the decision “hadn’t been touched by the formal interagency process.”

The Deputies Committee, consisting of officials who are second in command in their departments and agencies, pursues the same function as the Principals Committee, but at the sub-Cabinet level. Below the Deputies Committee are the Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs), whose members are usually of assistant secretary rank and include a member of the NSC staff, as well as representatives from other, often diverse organizations that are relevant to the functional or geographic orientation of the PCC.

Generally, briefing papers and issue papers from the PCCs fuel the work of the deputies and Principals Committees. These papers may originate in a department or agency or they may be assigned to lower level ad hoc working groups. During the first thirty-three months of Richard Nixon’s administration, national security advisor Henry Kissinger ordered 138 study assignments, sixty-seven of which were assigned to ad hoc groups.

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78 Patterson 60–61.
Once a policy decision is made, the national security system may be notified through presidential policy directives. These directives “are no less binding on the executive branch than executive orders, although they are often less formal and may offer more in policy framework than declaratory direction.”  

Many remain in effect from one administration to the next, as do executive orders. Another function of the PCCs is to monitor policy implementation to ensure compliance.

The Homeland Security Council and National Economic Council are also supported by interagency committees. When the HSC was first created, it had eleven different PCCs, including Detection, Surveillance, and Intelligence; Plans, Training, Exercises, and Evaluation; and Law Enforcement and Investigation. Before the HSC was created, the domestic consequences of the 9/11 attacks had to be worked through the NSC: “There were so many domestic issues related to the [attacks from two days before] crowding the agenda of the constantly meeting National Security Council that…Joshua Bolten, a deputy chief of staff, was made the chair of a rump Domestic Consequences Principals Committee, which would include roughly a dozen senior staffers and key cabinet members.”

h. Lead Agency (and Multilateral Relations)

If an issue falls clearly into the domain of a department or agency, the interagency committees may assign the issue to that institution alone or they may authorize one department or agency as the “lead” to coordinate the activities of all other interested institutions. The Department of State, for example, is generally the lead agency for multilateral relations. The Department of State maintains a number of multilateral missions (e.g., at the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], and the European Union) whose success necessitates interagency cooperation. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is a lead agency that coordinates national assistance to support state and local responses to natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina.

The lead agency approach is the most common means of attempting to secure interagency coordination when jurisdiction over an issue is not clear. The lead agency approach is often used to clarify authority relationships and coordination responsibilities.

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85 The primary intent behind the creation of FEMA in 1979 through Executive Order 12148 was to transfer “All functions vested in the President that have been delegated or assigned to the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, [and] Department of Defense.” This gave FEMA jurisdiction over coordinating the nation’s civil emergency response to nuclear attack or any other large-scale disaster affecting the civilian population.
for potential crises. In the event of a flu pandemic, for example, the division of labor has been explained as follows:

“DHS is going to turn to Health and Human Services [HHS] to work with the states and the locals on the actual health and medical response to what’s going on,” said Mark Wolfson, an HHS spokesman. “In the meantime, if we’re dealing with a pandemic situation, where we’ve got people getting sick all over the country and all over the world, then what Homeland Security is going to be doing is coordinating the overall federal response to implications of the pandemic.”

i. Lead Individual

The president may appoint an individual with special authority to coordinate the activities of multiple departments and agencies. These individuals are often referred to as “czars.” President Bush’s appointment of Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute to a rank equal to that of the national security advisor, with a portfolio to manage the entire national security system’s efforts in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, is the most recent notable example.

In theory, the NSC should have had the prime responsibility for overseeing White House policy during a war; however, the NSC members’ responsibilities were already overwhelming. Therefore, President Bush appointed Lt. Gen. Lute to provide greater focus on a unified effort and to ensure that the one person responsible would have direct access to the president. A press account relates the chain of events that led to the decision:

Mr. Bush ordered the formation of an Iraq Stabilization Group to run things from the White House. That action reflected the first recognition by the White House that Donald H. Rumsfeld’s Pentagon was more interested in deposing dictators than nation-building. When that group was formed, Mr. Rumsfeld snapped that it was about time that the National Security Council performed its traditional job unifying the actions of a government whose agencies often spent much of their day battling one another. That approach worked, for a while. But then… the State and Defense Departments reverted to bureaucratic spats…. At a news conference, Mr. Gates offered a public endorsement for the idea of empowering someone at the White House to better carry out the president’s priorities. “This person is not ‘running the war,’ ” Mr. Gates said. “This ‘czar’ term is, I think, kind of silly.” Instead, he said, “this is what [National Security Advisor] Steve Hadley would do if Steve Hadley had the time, but he doesn’t have the time to do it full time.”

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Other presidents have used similar methods when they felt an issue required special attention and coordination. For example, Ronald Reagan’s administration began the practice of using a czar to coordinate the “War on Drugs.”

4. Overseas: Regional and Country Levels

National-level structures cannot exercise sufficient day-to-day control over all subordinate activities; therefore, regional-level structures are required to manage the interrelated and overlapping national security issues that extend beyond U.S. boundaries. The Department of State, for example, chairs the regional Policy Coordination Committees that oversee policy integration. In contrast, the Department of Defense maintains *regional* combatant commands (e.g., Pacific Command) and *functional* combatant commands (e.g., U.S. Transportation Command) that focus on operations and relations in a region. All of the Department of Defense regional commands now have Joint Interagency Coordination Groups to support their information sharing with diverse departments and agencies involved in national security matters.

At the country level, the U.S. ambassador oversees the embassy and its associated interagency missions. The ambassador coordinates activities through the “country team,” a council of interagency representatives that typically includes such U.S. government departments as Defense, Agriculture, Treasury, and Commerce. The departments send personnel to oversee their own department’s efforts, and that diverse representation has been growing:

> The scope and scale of representation from other federal agencies at embassies have been growing steadily, with 27 agencies (and numerous subagencies) represented overseas. In some large embassies, the proportion of State Department representation relative to other federal agencies can be less than one-third of full-time U.S. personnel. From 2004 to 2006, Defense Department personnel grew by 40 percent over previous periods, Department of Justice by 18 percent, and Department of Homeland Security by 14 percent, respectively.\(^89\)

In addition to overseeing the embassy and its primary functions, ambassadors may have to oversee other interagency field activities. For example, in post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization environments, ambassadors may use field teams (called “advance civilian teams”) to provide field management, logistics capabilities, and planning and implementation expertise. Despite the number of departments and agencies and their diverse activities, on occasion they work well together toward unified goals:

> South Africa is a case in point. During the transition period from Apartheid (1992–1994), the U.S. Ambassador successfully built a cross-agency working group, which the political counselor chaired. USAID transferred $1 million each year to the U.S. Information Agency to fund more short-term visitor training programs; the Defense Attachés went

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beyond their normal roles to liaison (with Washington’s permission) with
the African National Congress “armed forces” leadership to facilitate
integration into a national Army; and the Agricultural Attache’ provided
invaluable feedback on the farming communities’ attitudes toward the
political transition. In sum, the entire team focused on the primary U.S.
objective: to help see a successful, relatively peaceful transition out of
Apartheid.\textsuperscript{90}

However, representatives from different agencies often pursue their organizational
interests at the expense of a broader, integrated approach, especially when the
ambassador tries to lead “in anything other than a laissez-faire manner.” As Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice recently admitted to Congress, it has “become an almost
impossible task of coordinating massive numbers of agencies on the ground.”\textsuperscript{91}

\section*{5. Domestic: Regional, State, and Local Levels}

Interagency coordinating bodies also collaborate on homeland security for domestic
regions. For example, the FBI leads “Joint Terrorism Task Forces” in more than 100
cities, 65 of which were created after 9/11. These task forces use as many as “2,196
Special Agents, 838 state/local law enforcement officers, and 689 professionals from
other government agencies [such as] the Department of Homeland Security, the CIA, and
the Transportation Security Administration.”\textsuperscript{92} Officials from the Department of
Homeland Security, in cooperation with the Department of Justice, Department of Labor,
Department of State, and other agencies, have also created task forces in major U.S. cities
to combat immigration fraud.\textsuperscript{93}

In addition to federal government national security institutions, homeland security
requires collaboration with state and local authorities. Although the National Security
Act of 1947 does not define the appropriate roles of the state and local governments in
formulating and executing national security policy, those governments share security
responsibilities with the federal government, particularly when threats to the homeland
arise. State and local authorities are often in the best position to respond to a crisis first—
providing state National Guard troops and local police, fire, emergency medical,
hazardous material, and other emergency capabilities. Major city police forces perhaps
best illustrate the point with the special role they play in the counterterrorism mission in
support of homeland security.

The Council on Foreign Relations notes that since the September 2001 attacks, “local
governments play a distinct role in preventing terrorism and responding to disasters as

\textsuperscript{90} Robert B. Oakley and Michael Casey, Jr., “The Country Team: Restructuring America’s First
\textsuperscript{91} Nicholas Kralev, “Rice Urges More Ambassador Powers,” \textit{The Washington Times} 18 April
ambassador-powers>.
\textsuperscript{92} “A Closer Look at the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” 01 December 2004, 30 September
\textsuperscript{93} DHS press release, 5 April 2006, 30 September 2008
they often have more intimate knowledge of the communities under their care."94 The street-level knowledge of state and local authorities often provides that key piece of “actionable intelligence” (exact times, places, names, etc.) that allows the government to respond to possible threats. State and local governments also know which aspects of their local systems need additional funding and preparation in the event of either a national security event or a natural disaster.

Coordinating domestic emergency responses by federal, state, and local governments, which number “more than 87,000 different and overlapping jurisdictions,”95 is a monumental task. And there also is a lot to protect. The United States has “more than 2,800 power plants, 190,000 miles of natural-gas pipelines, nearly 600,000 bridges, 463 sky scrapers, 20,000 miles of border and 285,000,000 people.”96

6. Decision Support

Effective issue management requires good decision support. Intelligence and warning is the foundation of decision support, but decision-makers also require analysis that helps identify issues, priorities, and the advantages and disadvantages of courses of action for managing a particular issue (or overlapping issues). This type of support comes from two overlapping national security communities: the intelligence community and the analytic community. The intelligence community provides decision support in the form of strategic warning, as discussed above, but also a wide range of analytic products designed to support decision-making. National security leaders also routinely reach out to a broader analytic community for decision support. The national security analytic community includes organizations resident within the major departments and agencies, as well as private sector think tanks, Federally Funded Research and Development Centers and nongovernmental organizations such as foreign policy institutes and interest groups.

a. Formal Decision Support

Decision support can serve both formal and informal issue management structures and processes. Formal interagency committees from the National Security Council down to the PCCs can commission analytic support, and typically do. Some presidents, like Dwight Eisenhower, routinely used formal structures like the National Security Council to organize decision support. Other presidents, like John F. Kennedy “disliked meetings, especially large ones,” and convened their Cabinets rarely.97 Similarly, some national security advisors differ in their approach to the use of formal decision support

structures. Henry Kissinger became famous for using the formal decision structures and processes to preoccupy the bureaucracy:

There are twenty thousand people in the State Department and fifty thousand in Defense. They all need each other’s clearances in order to move…and they all want to do what I’m doing. So the problem becomes: how do you get them to push papers around, spin their wheels, so that you can get your work done?\(^{98}\)

Ad hoc structures can become formal processes that also demand decision support, such as the 2007 White House oversight regime for assessing the status of events in Iraq. One observer notes that

Every Monday there [was] a secure video teleconference between the president and both the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq and the U.S. ambassador in Baghdad. That teleconference also [included] the vice president, the secretaries of state and defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the director of the CIA, the director of national intelligence, and the national security advisor.\(^ {99}\)

b. Informal Decision Support

The president does not always use the formal decision-making structures and process. Often, presidents use informal groups of their most trusted advisors and confidantes. A tight-knit group of the president’s closest aides may take formal-structure intelligence and analysis and digest the information in informal settings—where they believe they can receive unfettered advice from those they most trust. For example, besides the formal teleconferences on Iraq, the White House also managed a set of informal meetings to discuss Iraq:

…[T]he network of informal communication arrangements that [Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen] Hadley…erected [supplied] the strongest yarn for “knitting up” the national security community. Every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, Hadley [had] an informal 6:45 a.m. secure telephone call with the secretaries of state and defense. These three plus the vice president often [met] for lunch—just the four of them. That foursome also [met] informally at the White House residence.\(^ {100}\)

Even a single individual could constitute an informal structure and process, as Harry Hopkins did for Franklin D. Roosevelt. A close friend of the president’s, Hopkins held no official position yet was part of President Roosevelt’s inner circle of advisors. He

\(^{99}\) Patterson 60–61.  
\(^{100}\) Ibid.
took part in “national emergency” and other national security-related discussions, and was considered to be the president’s “alter ego.”

There are several reasons presidents look to informal groups or individual relationships for decision support. First, they may do so because they fear leaks in the formal decision process—a premature disclosure of plans or even discussions of possible plans—which might result in an unwelcome controversy that jeopardizes a policy’s success. Second, they may use informal meetings to bypass the formal national security apparatus, especially the department and agency heads who might obstruct a president’s policy decision. Deputy National Security Advisor John Poindexter noted just how far this went when President Reagan purposefully announced a new missile defense initiative at the end of a speech on the defense budget:

“We didn’t tell anyone else what we were doing. The chiefs didn’t know. Defense didn’t know. State didn’t know.” Weinberger and Shultz were only informed about the speech finale at the last minute, a deliberate ploy by [National Security Advisor] Clark to ensure that the powerful secretaries wouldn’t have time to voice their objections as well as to prevent the possibility of a leak.

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7. Capability Building

A primary purpose of national security departments and agencies is to build the expertise and capabilities required for conducting national security missions. Decision-makers cannot manage issues, much less resolve them, without having the full range of requisite means. Many national security issues require multiple elements of national power (diplomatic, military, economic, informational, etc.) for successful resolution. As the American World War II General Omar N. Bradley once noted, battles are won by the military, but “wars are won by the great strength of the nation—the soldier and the civilian working together.”

The same point could be made about many other national security issues. The national security system must therefore ensure that a full range of civilian and military capabilities are effective and available in sufficient capacity.

Capability building may be defined as using organizational authorities to generate capabilities in a capacity sufficient for successfully executing national security roles and missions. When properly integrated, these authorities, capabilities, and capacities produce new competencies for the system—that is, sets of integrated capabilities useful for resolving a particular issue or fulfilling a particular mission.

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In the current national security system, the departments and agencies responsible for building the capabilities required for missions also employ them. The Department of Defense, for example, both builds military capability and employs it when directed by the president and secretary of defense to do so. Similarly, the Department of State builds expertise in diplomacy and employs it; the CIA builds covert operational capability and employs it; and so on. One result is that, while policy may be centrally developed, it is executed in a largely decentralized fashion through the disparate national security organizations.

8. System Management

Issue management and capability building are the primary set of activities that the president and the national security system undertake, but not the only ones. The president and his security advisors are also responsible for national security system management. This requires ensuring that all elements of the system work well together to achieve desired outcomes. In theory, the president’s security advisors are supposed to provide decision support to manage the national security system as a whole, yet issue management frequently consumes them. Many national security advisors have lamented their inability to find the time and resources to conduct the systems analysis and long-range planning that managing the system requires.

System management also requires other, more routine support activities, such as selecting, assigning, and rewarding key leaders and personnel working on multiagency issues and controlling how individuals and institutions collect and share information. Each department and agency has its own human capital and knowledge management systems, but the president’s interagency councils and committees also require this type of support.

The 1994 U.S. intervention in Haiti illustrates how inadequate information sharing among U.S. decision-makers can result in contradictory signals. From the Haitian perspective, the U.S. vice president and secretary of state were not in sync on a key milestone for returning democracy to Haiti. Exiled Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide told Haitian Prime Minister Robert Malval that Vice President Al Gore had promised him that a key Haitian strongman would be removed from power by a particular date. “I don’t know if there are two U.S. governments,” Malval replied, “but I just had a conversation with Secretary of State Warren Christopher and that’s not what he told me.” On other occasions, the lack of communication within the U.S. national security establishment surprises U.S. officials rather than their foreign counterparts. During the Somalia intervention in 1993, both the president and secretary of state were surprised to

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104 See the next section (“Historical Background”) for more on how presidents have used the national security system and their advisors.

discover that U.S. military operations against a warlord in Mogadishu continued despite their decision to pursue political solutions to the conflict.\textsuperscript{106}

\textbf{9. Oversight Mechanisms}

Congress independently assesses how the U.S. national security system performs. Those assessments range from reviews of how components of the national security system are performing, to scrutinizing the outcomes of specific missions. In addition to Congress, other agencies act as external auditors of mission efficiency and effectiveness, such as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Sometimes these audits complicate rather than elucidate. In one four-year period, the GAO produced nearly 400 reports on energy policy, totaling over 20,000 pages—“far in excess of what any elected functionary, administrator, or ordinary citizen has time to read.”\textsuperscript{107} Further, most executive branch departments and agencies contain their own internal oversight mechanisms (e.g., inspector general offices), and must report to both executive and congressional bodies.

Congress also provides oversight through its control over appropriations. Congress evaluates and adjusts the president’s budget priorities for funding long- or short-term national security capabilities. Ultimately, resource allocation drives the development of new capacities, generally following four phases:

1. Agencies, with OMB guidance, prepare budgets during the summer before submitting the requests to OMB in the fall. (The Department of Defense and intelligence budgets follow a modified path and schedule.)

2. The Executive Office of the President and the OMB aggregate the agency requests and the projected income and revenue. Chiefly with input from his staff, the president prioritizes funding. The president makes final decisions before submitting the budget to Congress for the following fiscal year.

3. Congress appropriates funds, with the option of adding accompanying legislation.

4. The executive branch executes the functions for which the funds were allocated.

Congress also enacts \textit{supplemental} appropriations bills to cover unforeseen emergencies, a process that bypasses the regular authorizing committees. The budget process rules exempt such emergency funds from spending caps and other restrictions that the rules impose on regular appropriations measures. Since the 9/11 attacks, Congress has

\textsuperscript{106} Christopher J. Lamb with Nicholas Moon, “Somalia: Did Leaders or the System Fail?” Project on National Security Reform Case Study (2008).


appropriated several hundred billions of dollars in emergency supplementals for military and related operations that have not been subject to programmatic review by the usual authorizing committees.

As of 2007, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that these emergency supplemental measures—rather than the regular defense appropriations bill—are funding 40 percent of all military procurement. Some of the procurement is to replace combat losses—helicopters, tanks, and armored vehicles that have been destroyed—and some is to purchase new equipment like mine-resistant vehicles. Legislators have demanded that war funding be included in the regular defense budget in order to allow for more oversight, but there has been no significant change in this pattern yet.\footnote{U.S. Congressional Budget Office, “Analysis of the Growth in Funding for Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Elsewhere in the War on Terrorism,” Letter to Chairman Kent Conrad, 11 February 2008, 01 October 2008 <http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/89xx/doc8971/Letter.2.1.shtml>.

10. Conclusion

This overview of the national security system emphasizes the role of the president and briefly explains the basic system functions, structures, and processes. In reality, the entire national security system is far more varied and complex. Elements of the system existed prior to the National Security Act of 1947, and the act itself created new organizations that are still among the national security system’s most notable structures,
and decades of development since then have added to the complexity of the system. To better understand how and why presidents and Congress have continually modified the system requires an historical overview of the system’s evolution in response to changes in the security environment. In the next section of this report, both continuities and discontinuities in the national security system are highlighted to better explain why the system currently performs the way it does, and why in particular it proves increasingly difficult for presidents to successfully manage.

B. History of the National Security System

1. Introduction

Today’s large and complex national security system arose in response to the burgeoning national security challenges and international responsibilities during and following World War II. Before the passage of the 1947 National Security Act, there was a widespread recognition that the agencies responsible for national security needed to be better coordinated. After the passage of the act, there was an almost immediate recognition that many problems remained unresolved, and, unintentionally, new ones were developing. Through the years, presidents and their chief security advisors have tried to make the system work—none have been satisfied with the result.

The history of the national security system reveals something else as well: Its core problems have many symptoms that permeate every level of government, from the Executive Office of the President in Washington to our ambassadors overseas. New administrations focused on reform of this system have tried to delegate national security responsibilities to various councils and committees, only to find that for many reasons this doesn’t work, and responsibility ends up back on White House shoulders.

This history section presents an overview of the national security system from the early 1900s to today.\textsuperscript{110} The collective experience reveals that Congress and presidents pay more attention to adjusting the functional capabilities of the separate departments and agencies than to improving how those capabilities are integrated. The problem of interagency coordination is well recognized, and has been for at least the better part of a century, but it has not been resolved. The roles and responsibilities for national security among agencies, advisors, secretaries, committees, and the White House are persistently characterized by conflicts of authority, disagreement, and a lack of coordination.

2. Pre-1947 Developments

\textbf{a. National Security Reform in the Early 1900s}

The history of national security begins in the early 1900s when painful lessons from the Spanish-American War led to the perception that the various instruments of national security needed to be better organized. A few steps were taken to encourage greater

\textsuperscript{110} This section was written with major contributions from Richard Best, Congressional Research Service, Jim Lacey, on loan to PNSR from the Institute for Defense Analyses, John F. Morton and Matt Shabat.
Army-Navy cooperation with some thought given to the State Department’s role, but no substantial changes were made beyond the creation of a Joint Army-Navy Board in 1903 with a very limited planning role.

In 1911, Congressman Richmond Pearson proposed a Council of National Defense to identify requirements for the military and naval forces that were to include the secretaries of state, war, and Navy; the chairmen of relevant congressional committees; and the presidents of the war colleges. However, the State Department opposed the idea and Congress did not take action. Yet the idea did not die. The New York Times observed in March 1916 that

> Years have passed during which we have drifted without policy or preparedness, various departments of the Government presenting or formulating bills from time to time and working at cross purposes. There is no head, no coherency, no common sense; it is a shameful muddle with no solution in sight. . . . The appointment of a council of national defense would serve to coordinate all the agencies . . . and to outline clearly and intelligently measures that are necessary to put the policy in force with such a beginning that the committees of Congress could proceed with less delay in preparing appropriation bills, without which nothing will be done unless a sudden emergency or a brigand like Villa forces the adoption of hurried measures at once inadequate and un-economical.\(^\text{112}\)

Several months later, under the Army Appropriation Act of 1916, Congress created the Council of National Defense because, in the words of President Woodrow Wilson, “The Congress has realized that the country is best prepared for war when thoroughly prepared for peace.” Consisting of the secretaries of war, Navy, interior, agriculture, commerce, and labor (but not state), as well as several prominent civilians, the council was not concerned with military or diplomatic matters but rather with the coordination of resources and for national defense and the stimulation of civilian morale.\(^\text{113}\)

Two years later, the need to manage industrial mobilization, such as setting production quotas and allocating raw materials, led President Wilson to turn to Bernard Baruch to set up a War Industries Board under the Council of National Defense. However, at the end of World War I, President Wilson shut down the board and council as he was not inclined to let senior military and naval leaders participate in foreign policy. Instead, he

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assembled a group of academic specialists, collectively known as the Inquiry, to assist him in defining U.S. post-war policies.

In 1915, Secretary of State Robert Lansing established a Joint State-Navy Neutrality Board\textsuperscript{114} as an advisory body on diplomacy and international law, but the State Department objected to military involvement in foreign policy and refused to join the board’s Joint Planning Committee. Undeterred, then-Secretary of the Navy Franklin Roosevelt recommended creating a Joint Plan Making Body of State, War, and Navy to define U.S. war objectives. This plan was never considered and may never have even been read in the State Department.\textsuperscript{115}

In 1919, the Army Chief of Staff, General Peyton Conway March, proposed the creation of a single executive department for the U.S. military establishment\textsuperscript{116}—the first of approximately 50 military reorganization bills considered by Congress between 1921 and 1945. This proposal was opposed by the Navy and war departments because they feared losing authority when combined into a single department.\textsuperscript{117}

The Army proposed another national defense council in 1926 as part of an effort to agree upon a common national policy that would provide the basis for naval and military planning. Again, no action was taken by Congress. Although the legislation included a role for the State Department, one representative concluded that inclusion in the council might compromise the State Department in conducting matters of diplomacy by giving the impression to the minds of our sister nations that though the Secretary of State might be talking peace and disarmament and cooperation with one side of his mouth, he is over here…engaged in cooperating and planning with the war-making establishment to make war.\textsuperscript{118}

This comment reflected the Department of State argument during this period that war and peace were distinct conditions with different institutional requirements. During peacetime, the predominant condition in American experience, the State Department was in charge. In wartime, the military departments were. Thus, the State Department discouraged efforts to include the military in the conduct of peacetime foreign affairs and declined to involve itself in military affairs. This explains the department’s opposition to

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various pre-World War II efforts to better coordinate the efforts of all agencies involved in ensuring America’s security. It also explains why during this period “as a rule . . . diplomatic and military recommendations reached the White House separately, and the relationship between political aims and military capabilities had to be gauged, if at all, by the President.”

Although some military advocates did support integrating America’s security capabilities, it was not always for the sake of better coordination. For example, the Navy League supported proposals for national defense councils in order to secure larger Navy budgets. Others thought a national defense council would minimize congressional influences on military and naval spending. As it turned out, both the Army and the Navy developed plans during the inter-war years for operations against potential enemies, such as Japan, but neither coordinated with the other or with the State Department. These failures of cooperation highlighted the need for better interagency structures at the national level. Although many senior leaders in both the executive branch and Congress understood this, they preferred to limit military expenditures and avoid foreign entanglements.

On the eve of World War II, the Department of State reconsidered its insistence on the sharp distinction between war and peace. In 1938, Secretary of State Cordell Hull suggested establishing a Standing Liaison Committee with the War and Navy departments. Consisting of the undersecretary of state, the Army chief of staff, and the chief of naval operations, the committee was “the first American agency for regular political-military consultation on foreign policy.” In practice, the Standing Liaison Committee did not regularly address important issues of policy; however, it did provide an opportunity for sharing information, especially in regard to Latin America. Perhaps the limited scope of the committee was due to the State Department’s limited commitment: “When Secretary of War Stimson asked Hull about the committee in 1940, Secretary Hull had forgotten that it existed.”

A year after Hull’s proposal for the Standing Liaison Committee, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an executive order that transferred the Joint Board of the Army and Navy into the Executive Office of the President. This permitted him to oversee and direct war planning and conduct. The board provided a staff for what was to become the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In 1940, as the international situation continued to deteriorate, weekly meetings among the secretaries of war, state, and Navy were inaugurated; in 1941, the

120 May 164.
123 May 172.
124 Stuart 35.
DESCRIPTION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SYSTEM

meetings expanded to include senior military leaders and were chaired by President Roosevelt as a war council. When war broke out in December 1941, however, the president worked directly with his White House staff and senior military leaders, excluding civilian secretaries (including Secretary of State Hull) from war-related policymaking.

Despite the existence of interagency councils, President Roosevelt “kept the main strands of national policy in his own hands, and his Cabinet assistants advised him as individuals rather than as a body.”125 In 1940, using the authority granted by the Army Appropriations Act of 1916, he formed the National Defense Advisory Council, which consisted of private citizens with economic expertise. The council’s function was similar to the earlier Council of National Defense: economic mobilization in anticipation of impending war. In response to Pearl Harbor, a Joint Intelligence Committee was created in 1941. Later its membership expanded to include other agencies when it was reconfigured as a coordinating mechanism for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It consisted of representatives from the intelligence functions of the Army, Navy, State Department, Board of Economic Welfare, and the coordinator of information, which was a position Roosevelt created shortly before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. In 1942, he redesignated it the Office of Strategic Services.

Prior to World War II, a number of those involved in security matters, as well as members of Congress, editorial writers, and outside observers, realized that modern industrial warfare and America’s changing role in world affairs required the U.S. government to develop better means of coordinating the activities of its diplomats and various military forces. World War II broadened and deepened this realization.

b. World War II and the Need for Interagency Cooperation

Efforts to enhance interagency coordination before, during, and after World War I were desultory, but the necessity of an organized staff to coordinate the State Department efforts with those of the military services became starkly apparent during World War II. The enormous demands that World War II placed on American policymaking machinery and on the nation’s economy clearly revealed the inadequacy of federal policymaking structures. A few weeks after Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and the senior military leadership of both countries met in Washington. The Americans found themselves outclassed by the British, who had been at war for over two years and who had developed a complex machinery of interagency committees to support the British War Cabinet. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff system emerged in early 1942 as:

An organization to co-ordinate [American] views for presentation to the British military leaders. This organization sprang up almost accidentally to answer the practical need for a joint committee system that would fit the

pattern of the well-established British arrangements for interservice collaboration.\textsuperscript{126}

However, when Admiral William Leahy, who served as President Roosevelt’s liaison to the military, pressed the president to formally document the establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff structure, Roosevelt resisted and claimed that it “would provide no benefits and might in some ways impair flexibility of operations.”\textsuperscript{127}

The Joint Chiefs of Staff structure was built around the needs of the military services, with little input from a State Department, which had long been disinclined to address issues of military strategy. As the war progressed, however, Secretary of State Cordell Hull complained of being excluded from many of the wartime conferences with the British, where decisions were made that had vast geopolitical ramifications.\textsuperscript{128} U.S. military leaders also felt they were often left in the dark about political issues that would affect military plans. Army Chief of Staff George Marshall acknowledged the difficulties:

Superficially, at least, the great advantage on the British side has been the fact that they are connected up with other branches of their Government through an elaborate but most closely knit Secretariat. On our side there is no such animal and we suffer accordingly. The British therefore present a solid front of all officials and committees. We cannot muster such strength.\textsuperscript{129}

The problem caused by an absence of structure was exacerbated by Roosevelt’s management style. President Roosevelt depended on a wide range of informal contacts and on his ability to hold multitudinous threads of policy in his own hands. However, his approach was limited by the lack of a formal system for sharing his decisions with the military and diplomatic officials who would be in charge of their implementation. This flaw drove even his friends to distraction; one loyal Cabinet officer, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, wrote in his diary: “The President is the worst administrator I have ever worked under….”\textsuperscript{130} In dealing with industrial mobilization issues, Roosevelt set up competing bureaucracies that lacked clearly defined roles and missions—fortunately, due to a strong U.S. economy, war production was not crippled as a result.

The net effect of inconsistent politico-military coordination during World War II was that the nation found itself:

Confronting a power vacuum created by the lack of a high-level agency…to establish the government’s policy on the conduct of the war.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid. 98.
\textsuperscript{129} Cline, \textit{United States Army in World War II}, 106.
\end{flushleft}
The lack of such an agency was due to President Roosevelt’s own particular style of administration.… [T]he consequence was an almost complete loss of civilian control below the presidential level during the war and in the formulation of U.S. policy in the immediate post-war period…. As a result, during the course of the war, the military became involved in diplomacy and negotiations as well as international politics and economics.\textsuperscript{131}

The Standing Liaison Committee disbanded in 1943, and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, which emerged from weekly, informal State-War-Navy lunches,\textsuperscript{132} was established in early 1945 at the suggestion of Secretary of War Henry Stimson. Stimson proposed this committee because military officers looking to the end of the war and post-war problems were already making informal contacts with State Department officials.\textsuperscript{133} The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee was made up of civilian officials at the assistant secretary level but did not include senior military leaders as it concentrated on post-war political issues.

Although Roosevelt’s management limitations can be considered in the context of considerable accomplishments (e.g., his White House-centric process guided a successful war effort through the use of “patchwork administration”),\textsuperscript{134} by the end of the war, senior military leaders, their civilian counterparts, and influential members of Congress concluded that Roosevelt’s informal policymaking style had fundamental drawbacks and could not easily serve as a precedent for his successors in peacetime.

\textbf{c. The Origins of the National Security Council}

Dissatisfaction with Roosevelt’s decision-making processes did not immediately lead to the current National Security Council structure. Rather, the current system’s structure was a side effect of a key initiative of President Harry S. Truman, who assumed office in April 1945. Truman, and others, had long sought to unify the armed forces into one Cabinet department and create an independent air force. However, the Navy feared that its roles and missions (and appropriations) would suffer at the hands of a department dominated by Army concerns. In the midst of prolonged debate over the issue, Senator David I. Walsh, chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, proposed instead a committee of national defense that would include both the Army and Navy.\textsuperscript{135} Navy

\textsuperscript{131} United States, Defense Organization: The Need for Change: Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Staff Report, 99-86 (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1985) 37.


\textsuperscript{133} Stuart 69; See also: Amy Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC, (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1999).

\textsuperscript{134} Stuart 71.

\textsuperscript{135} Walsh wrote to Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy, in May 1945, “It seems to me, that those of us who feel such a consolidation [of the Army and Navy] would not be effective should attempt to formulate a plan which would be more effective in accomplishing the objective sought. . . . Several nations have established planning and coordinating agencies which seem to be very satisfactory. For example, the British have had a Council on Imperial Defense for a considerable number of years. It seems, from the
Secretary James V. Forrestal asked a former business colleague who had served as vice chairman of the War Production Board, Ferdinand Eberstadt, to study the effects of unification on national security and to recommend a government organization that would be most effective in protecting the country.  

Eberstadt accepted Walsh’s general approach of a council that would exercise a degree of collective responsibility for national security policymaking, in some ways similar to the role of the British War Cabinet. The Eberstadt report envisioned a National Security Council chaired by the president (or, in his absence, the vice president), which would include the four service secretaries, the secretary of state, and the chairman of a board to coordinate allocation of resources. However, this approach drew criticism as being inconsistent with the concept of the president as chief executive under the Constitution. According to one scholar, Eberstadt had “an inclination to modify the Presidency as an institution.” The final Eberstadt report proposed joining the Navy, the Army, and a newly independent air force under a “National Military Establishment,” but without unifying the services.

Despite the recommendations in Eberstadt’s report, President Truman sent a special message to Congress, in December 1945, requesting a statute to establish a single department of national defense and a single chief of staff, without mention of a national security council. Congress, however, was more sympathetic to the Navy’s concerns and to the Eberstadt recommendations. Therefore, the May 1946 bill from the Senate Military Affairs Committee proposed a secretary of common defense and provided for a “Council of Common Defense,” similar to Eberstadt’s proposal. The council was to be headed by the secretary of state (not the president) and included the secretary of common defense as a member, but did not include the service secretaries. Since a Department of Defense had not yet been created, the position of secretary of common defense was referred to as “the civilian head of the military establishment.”

The Navy did not initially accept the Senate bill as it opposed establishing a single, overall secretary of the armed forces. Forrestal and the Navy were willing to accept the council, without the secretary, if it included the civilian heads of the military services along with the secretary of state and the resource allocation board chairman. These

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compromises made the legislation possible. With Navy support, the administration then submitted a second plan to Congress that proposed a single civilian head of the armed services, but no single chief of staff, and a council of common defense whose membership would include the service secretaries.

Although much of the impetus for a national security council derived from the need to finesse controversies over unification of the armed services, national security reform touched the authority of several institutions and players. Truman’s Budget Bureau recommended a significant defense of presidential prerogative, persuading the White House to revise the draft legislation so that the council’s role would be “to advise the President with respect to the integration of…policies,” rather than “to integrate…policies.” Any sense that the president would be bound by the council consensus was viewed by Truman as infringing on his constitutional powers. In addition, the State Department objected to an early draft of the National Security Act because it provided that the function of the council would be “to integrate our foreign and military policies”—a provision that it felt might compromise its preeminence in foreign policy.

The Bureau of the Budget insisted on its own independence from the council, anticipating that it could be dominated by military officers or civilians working with them who would attempt to determine annual budgets largely based on military and diplomatic considerations. Reflecting these various concerns and with the agreement of his secretaries, President Truman submitted his second unification plan in the form of a letter to the chairmen of both the military and naval affairs committees in Congress in June 1946.

Truman and his staff also gave extensive consideration to the question of whether the president should be a member of the Council of Common Defense. Although Truman expressed concern that including the president might weaken the presidential office, ultimately this provision was left intact with the understanding that the president could not be forced to attend council meetings. A key goal of President Truman was to ensure that the council was advisory in nature and would not infringe on the president’s constitutional responsibilities to determine policy and command the military services. The council would not, in and of itself, have the authority to integrate foreign and military policies.

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140 Other compromises included the creation of a weak secretary of defense position, separately administered service departments, and no single chief of staff over the armed forces. For additional details of the compromises, see Stevenson, “Underlying Assumptions of the National Security Act of 1947.”


143 Ibid. 376.

144 Ibid. 314–315.
d. The National Security Act of 1947

The reorganization of Congress was an important preliminary step for the passage of the National Security Act. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 reduced the total number of standing committees from thirty-three to fifteen in the Senate and from forty-eight to nineteen in the House of Representatives. Congress consolidated the long-separate military affairs and naval affairs committees into the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, which were given jurisdiction over the armed forces. Foreign policy matters remained under the purview of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee (the latter has had some name changes). The defense committees focused on the military aspects of national security issues, while the foreign policy committees concentrated on international relations.

The committee realignment facilitated national security reform. With congressional committees reconfigured for more integrated oversight, and after several months of negotiations, the new national security legislation was enacted in July as the National Security Act of 1947. In addition to establishing a separate Air Force and CIA, it created the NSC, which included the president, the secretary of state, the new secretary of defense, the secretaries of the three military departments, and the chairman of the new National Security Resources Board (NSRB). Other officials who had been confirmed by the Senate could be added as NSC members by the president from time to time. According to the act, the responsibility of the NSC was:

To advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.

Based on the difficulties of mobilizing for World War II, officials saw atomic-age mobilization as a continuous requirement, even in peacetime. The NSRB was the civilian peacetime successor of the Army-Navy Munitions Board—but with the authority of an independent agency. Drawing upon insights from Bernard Baruch, who had extensive experience in managing mobilization, Eberstadt “considered [the NSRB] as the key mechanism to connect unification to a larger corporate political-economic organization by coordinating military, industry, labor, and business in a national security program.”

Eberstadt’s vision was resource-driven. The NSC was to serve as an interagency vehicle to weigh options and advise the president. With the CIA providing information on foreign matters and the NSRB on domestic ones, the authors of the 1947 act hoped that

146 The service secretaries would be removed as members and the vice president added pursuant to the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (Public Law 81-216).
the “basic mechanism to balance the nation’s supply of resources with its military
demands”\textsuperscript{149} was in place.

The NSRB, which was an integral part of the NSC’s original structure, was based on the
examples of the War Industries Board of World War I and the War Production Board of
World War II. It was vested with the responsibility for post-war emergency preparedness
planning (similar to the National Response Framework that now guides homeland
security planning). The NSRB chairman was to be a civilian presidential appointee
requiring Senate confirmation. As for the military side of mobilization, the National
Security Act of 1947 also established the Munitions Board, housed in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, as a successor agency to the Army-Navy Munitions Board.

Two bureaucracies, the NSRB on one side and the Munitions Board on the other, now
competed for control of post-war resource management, which raised questions about
their respective roles and missions. It was not clear whether the NSRB was just a
planning body or if it was also responsible for operations, or whether it or the Munitions
Board was the primary contact point for industry. The president would not go so far as to
make NSRB into a War Production Board as intended by its architects. Truman wanted it
to be merely a body to coordinate mobilization plans across government.

New national security institutions also had to deal with issues of intelligence. Having
disbanded the Office of Strategic Services at the close of the war, President Truman
created the National Intelligence Authority in January 1946, with its staff arm, the
Central Intelligence Group (CIG), established to coordinate, plan, evaluate, and
disseminate intelligence. The National Intelligence Authority’s budget and staff were
drawn from the military and State Department, and a director of central intelligence
position was established to head the organization. The CIG had an Office of Reports and
Estimates that continued to exist even after the formation of the CIA in 1947; this office
eventually evolved into the National Intelligence Council. The operational capabilities of
the Office of Strategic Services ended up in the new CIA, after a brief stay in the new
Defense Department. Defense was glad to transfer these capabilities, deeming them
incompatible with the military ethos.\textsuperscript{150} Over the next few years, CIA took charge of and
further developed covert operations capabilities. In the area of what was then called
psychological warfare, this led to coordination problems with both the State and Defense
departments.\textsuperscript{151}

The National Security Act of 1947 was referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee
because the main purpose of the bill was deemed to be the integration of the armed
forces, and to the House Committee on Expenditures in the executive departments,
because that committee was deemed more sympathetic to the legislation than the former
members of the Naval Affairs Committee now serving on the Armed Services

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid. 106.

\textsuperscript{150} David Tucker, \textit{Confronting the Unconventional: Innovation and Transformation in Military

\textsuperscript{151} Tucker, \textit{Confronting the Unconventional}; Gregory Mitrovich, \textit{Undermining the Kremlin:
America’s Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956}, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,
2000).
Committee. This restructuring put Congress in a better position following the 1947 act to oversee the individual departments of the executive branch involved in national security; however, it did not provide any institutional means for overseeing whether those departments cooperated to achieve national security.

Two years after the National Security Act, Congress passed the Classification Act of 1949. This act set the personnel rules under which the national security system was to operate for the next fifty years. The act divided personnel into grades with associated pay that rewarded longevity rather than performance. George W. Bush’s administration worked with Congress to make changes to the rules governing civilian personnel in the national security system. (See the section on human capital in Part IV of this report for a discussion on these changes and their implications.)

3. Evolution of the National Security System since 1947

The practical effect of the 1947 act was to create the basis for a new national security system. As Richard E. Neustadt and Graham T. Allison have observed:

The change in our own weaponry, combined with our wide-ranging economic and political endeavors overseas, was mixing up the jurisdictions of all agencies with roles to play, or claim, in national security: mingling operations along programmatic lines, cutting across vertical lines of authority, breaching the neat boxes on organizational charts. Defense, State, CIA, AID, Treasury, together with the President’s Executive Office Staffs, came to form a single complex—a national security complex, tied together by an intricate network of program and staff interrelationships in Washington and in the field.

Managing and coordinating this new national security complex is an enduring challenge. In trying to direct and manage the system, presidents and their key advisors have tailored national security structure and processes to their particular leadership style or to accommodate personal relationships. The remainder of this historical overview proceeds chronologically through administrations—beginning with Harry S. Truman and ending with George W. Bush—highlighting each administration’s trials and tribulations with national security reform.

A preliminary matter of terminology should be clarified to reduce confusion for the reader. Administrations use different names for their national security decision and review directives, as well as different labels for their committees that support the National Security Council. Over the past twenty years, the uniformity of the terminology increased but variation still creates some lingering confusion. The tables below (see Tables 2 and 3) clarify the terminology. When not referring to a specific historical event, the rest of the report will refer to the document and committee names used over the last eight years by the Bush administration.

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152 Committee jurisdictions are set forth in Senate Rule XXV and House Rule X.
Table 2. National Security Decision & Review Directive Titles by Administration

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Table 3. National Security Committee Names by Administration

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<td>Reagan</td>
<td>Senior Review Group (SRG)(^{160})</td>
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<tr>
<td>George H.W. Bush</td>
<td>Principals Committee (PC)</td>
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<td>Clinton</td>
<td>Principals Committee (PC)</td>
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\(^{156}\) The Operational Groups under Nixon were the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) and the Undersecretaries Committee. The Review Groups were the Senior Review Group, the Defense Program Review Committee, the Verification Panel, and the Intelligence Committee. See “National Security Memoranda,” Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives and Records Administration, 31 Oct 2008 <http://nixon.archives.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/nationalsecuritymemoranda.php>.


\(^{159}\) The Operational Groups under Ford were the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) and the Undersecretaries Committee. The senior-level Intermediate Groups were the Senior Review Group, the Verification Panel, the Defense Review Panel, the Committee on Foreign Intelligence, and the Operations Advisory Group. See U.S. National Security Council: Institutional Files, 1974-77,” Gerald R. Ford Library, (Ann Arbor), 31 Oct 2008 <http://www.ford.utexas.edu/LIBRARY/guides/finding%20aids/us_national_security_council_institutional_files.htm>.


\(^{163}\) Reagan used other NSC interagency groups as well, such as the Special Situation Group and the National Security Planning Group. See Part II, page 60 of the report.


a. Truman’s Defense of Presidential Authority

President Truman's use of the National Security Council before the outbreak of the Korean War reflected his sensitivity to the protection of presidential authority. As a means of emphasizing the advisory role of the NSC, Truman did not regularly attend its meetings. After the first meeting on September 26, 1947, he did not attend again for over ten months. President Truman recalled in his memoirs:

There were times during the early days of the National Security Council when one or two of its members tried to change it into an operating super-cabinet on the British model. Secretary Forrestal and Secretary [Louis] Johnson [the second Secretary of Defense], for instance, would at times put pressure on the [NSC’s] Executive Secretary. What they wanted him to do was to assume the authority of supervising other agencies of the government and see that the approved decisions of the Council were carried out. The Executive Secretary very properly declined to do this, stating that if it had been the intention of the Congress for him to have that power it would have been specified in the act.

In large measure, President Truman’s approach to the NSC reflected a test of wills with Forrestal—the former Navy secretary and first secretary of defense. Truman was aware of the administrative chaos that often resulted from President Roosevelt’s decision-making processes, but at the same time he was determined not to be constrained by an NSC created by statute at the expense of his presidential authorities. Instead, he preferred to use the State Department as a lead agency for national security policies and programs. In addition to support from the Department of State, the president’s views were strongly encouraged by Budget Bureau officials who guarded the bureau’s


167 In the 57 NSC meetings prior to the Korean War, Truman presided over only 11. Only those officials specified by the National Security Act attended initially, with others invited to participate in discussions of particular interest to their agencies. The director of the CIA also sat in as an advisor and observer during most sessions. In January 1949, Truman directed that the secretary of the treasury attend all meetings, while amendments to the National Security Act eliminated the service secretaries from council membership, added the vice president, and, by designating the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the "principal military advisors" to the president, the National Security Council, and the secretary of defense, opened the way for regular attendance by the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, beginning in 1950. See also: Stanley L. Falk, “The National Security Council under Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy,” Political Science Quarterly (September 1964): 408.


169 A “lead agency” determines the agenda, ensures cohesion among the agencies, and is responsible for implementing decisions.
traditional roles. The question of budgetary and military priorities became especially acute in the late 1940s when military leaders first pressed for expanded capabilities to confront the Soviet Union, proposals which conflicted sharply with the Budget Bureau’s determination to restrict annual defense spending to $15 billion.

The National Security Act Amendments of 1949\textsuperscript{170} placed both the NSRB and the NSC in the Executive Office of the President. In 1950, as war erupted in Korea, the NSRB’s responsibilities transferred to the Office of Defense Mobilization. These two events meant that the NSRB never functioned as intended.\textsuperscript{171} With the advent of the Korean War, Truman directed that the NSC meet each week and that all major national security initiatives be coordinated through it. From this point forward, Truman attended virtually every meeting.

In 1950, “[i]n an effort to make the NSC more effective,” President Truman reorganized the NSC system to include a senior staff that was to be comprised of department and agency personnel of undersecretary level\textsuperscript{172} However, in practice, members tended to be more junior in rank and, since the president continued to look to individuals other than the senior staff or to other agencies for advice and recommendations, the NSC was not a dominant force in shaping national security policy. Although the Truman NSC “provided a convenient mechanism” for staffing and coordinating interdepartmental views, “it had not yet attained the rigidity of organization and performance which the Eisenhower Administration was to give it.”\textsuperscript{173}

Thus, even though there was a widely shared understanding of the need for coordinated national security policies in the aftermath of World War II and the emerging Cold War, there was considerable resistance within the Truman administration to changing traditional means of national security policymaking and implementation. The compromise result was an NSC that became a useful tool for presenting information to the president and, especially after the outbreak of the Korean War, a locus for presidential decision-making. The NSC did not, however, take on any independent role in either policymaking or execution processes, nor did it determine the size or scope of the defense budget.

\textsuperscript{170} This move toward White House centralization was reminiscent of Roosevelt’s 1939 decision to transfer the Joint Board of the Army and Navy into the Executive Office of the President.

\textsuperscript{171} By the mid-1950s, there were over 40,000 defense contractors working for the federal government. Mobilization may have failed conclusively in the post-war era as something managed by civilians at the federal level in the Executive Office of the President or in some independent agency, but the concept did not go away. Ironically, it survived under another structure and under another name: Pentagon acquisition. The Eisenhower reorganization plan of 1953 abolished both the Munitions Board and the NSRB. “[T]his vital corporatist agency [the NSRB] had seemingly been removed from the national security system. In fact, industrial mobilization planning, stockpiling, contracting, and research and development functions shifted to the defense establishment. Assistant defense secretaries and a collection of functional defense agencies replaced the NSRB, Munitions Board, and Research and Development Board nexus.” See also: Dorwart 178–179.


\textsuperscript{173} Walter Millis, with Harvey Mansfield and Harold Stein, \textit{Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy}, (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958) 255.
b. Eisenhower’s System and the Development of the Country Team

During the 1952 election campaign, candidate General Dwight Eisenhower criticized Truman’s use of the NSC. He promised, if elected, to elevate the NSC to the role he believed Congress originally envisioned, and to use it as his principal arm in formulating military and security policy. Based on his long Army career culminating in service as chief of staff, Eisenhower was familiar with the functions of military staffs and no one in his Cabinet would challenge his national security policymaking approaches. He had a free hand to formulate mutually reinforcing NSC system structures and processes.

Eisenhower appointed Robert Cutler, a banker who had served on active duty in the War Department during World War II, as special assistant for national security affairs. This position was separate and distinct from the executive secretary of the NSC, which had chiefly been concerned with administrative and housekeeping functions. In effect, Cutler became the first national security advisor. His detailed 1953 report to President Eisenhower became the basis for their restructuring of the NSC. By 1960, the NSC had developed into a highly complicated but relatively smoothly operating machine. Undergirding his restructured system was Eisenhower’s philosophy that the organization’s purpose was to simplify, clarify, expedite and coordinate; it is a bulwark against chaos, confusion, delay and failure . . . . Organization cannot make a successful leader out of a dunce, any more than it should make a decision for its chief. But it is effective in minimizing the chances of failure and in insuring that the right hand does, indeed, know what the left is doing.

The NSC served as a central policymaking forum in the Eisenhower administration. Weekly meetings were chaired by the president himself. There were two primary structural components of Eisenhower’s national security system: the NSC Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board. Analysis and recommendations generated at multiple levels were reviewed by the Planning Board and elevated, where appropriate, to the NSC itself. A staff for the NSC Planning Board prepared the papers that served as the basis of discussions at the weekly meeting of NSC members. Presidential decisions were then conveyed to the departments and agencies via the Operations Coordinating Board, which monitored the implementation of presidential decisions. The Eisenhower administration’s national security system was characterized as a “policy hill,” with issues flowing upward to the president and NSC for decision and then downward for implementation.

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174 Falk 418.
176 The Operations Coordinating Board, established by Executive Order (EO) 10483 and later modified by EO 10700, was not technically part of the NSC, but it did function under the direction of Cutler and his successors. Although some of Eisenhower’s advisors recommended that he situate it within the NSC system, the Bureau of the Budget recommended that it remain outside of the NSC as a voluntary, independent agency. It was not brought within the formal NSC apparatus until July 1, 1957.
Much like Truman’s senior staff, the Operations Coordinating Board was designed to include members at undersecretary level or higher, depending on the department or agency represented. Interestingly, the board, which was proposed by the president’s Committee on International Information Activities (also known as the William Jackson Committee), was actually the committee’s third choice for a mechanism to monitor implementation. The first two choices were to have the NSC staff support both the policy planning and implementation coordination functions, or alternatively, to develop a “Department of Foreign Affairs” to oversee all aspects of national security policy implementation. This [latter option] was not proposed because the committee recognized the reluctance and probably the inability of the state department to assume this larger role.¹⁷⁷

Nowhere was Eisenhower’s national security system more important than in planning the overall defense policies regarding the Soviet Union. As the Korean War began, some in the Truman administration were inclined toward a policy that would have greatly expanded conventional military capabilities both for the United States and its European allies. Much of this policy was expressed in NSC-68 (1950). Prepared in the State Department with the participation of a Defense Department representative, NSC-68 did not fully consider the economic costs and political effects of greatly expanding conventional military power. Concerned with these effects, President Eisenhower directed a comprehensive analysis (named the Solarium Project), which included a detailed, two-month study by three teams at the National War College, one headed by George Kennan, one by Major General Jim McCormick, and another headed by Admiral Connally, the president of the Navy War College.¹⁷⁸ The teams reported their alternative positions to the NSC, Joint Chiefs of Staff, service secretaries, and NSC Planning Board. After careful consideration, Eisenhower adopted a revised containment policy coupled with capabilities for massive retaliation using nuclear weapons, which would avoid the need for creating large armies and enormous budgets.

Eisenhower’s interagency system revolved around a chief executive with a keen understanding of and interest in national security policy. The system focused on the process to support his decision-making. His three national security advisors—Cutler, Dillon Anderson, and Gordon Gray—were not policy advocates but process managers. In 1960, the national security advisor became the chair of the Operations Coordinating Board in order to ensure impartial direction.

Under Eisenhower, the NSC staff framed debates in three ways. First, it presented participants with draft statements of administration policy, highlighting disagreement among the various agencies. Second, it supported regular NSC meetings in which the policy proposals were vigorously debated in the presence of the president, who then personally established the administration’s policies. Finally, it provided NSC members with written reports of Eisenhower’s conclusions. The Operations Coordinating Board

¹⁷⁸ Notes from a February 2000 presentation by General Andrew J. Goodpaster, a participant in Project Solarium, provided by Jim Kurtz, Institute for Defense Analyses.
ensured implementation of the policies thus established. According to two admiring observers:

The great value of the system lay in the vigorous and informed debate regarding national security policy that it generated among the key officials and the president, as well as among officials at lower levels of the agencies…. By design the NSC papers and discussions normally concentrated on setting the basic guidelines necessary for coherent policy and planning. Eisenhower never intended the official statements of policy the Council produced to serve as blueprints for operations. They were intentionally general and strategic in that they were driven by longer term premises and objectives.  

The NSC meetings, Eisenhower believed, were the most effective means to school his subordinates about the guidelines he expected them to follow. The dissemination of NSC records of action from these meeting provided insurance against misinterpretation.  

Eisenhower’s administration also oversaw several major adjustments to the larger interagency system. Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1953 created the United States Information Agency as a mechanism for advancing public diplomacy that was independent of the State Department. In addition, an executive order established a Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, which was designed to provide the president with independent analysis of U.S. foreign intelligence programs. The board focused on the quality of training and personnel, security, progress in research, effectiveness of specific projects, and general competence in carrying out assigned tasks. Although this board ended with the Eisenhower administration, President John F. Kennedy created an organization with a similar function. Separately, a congressional study recommended that the director of central intelligence empower a deputy to oversee the CIA so that the director could focus on the intelligence community at large—a recommendation that would echo periodically over the subsequent fifty years. In 1957, the Civilian Political Advisor (POLAD) program, in which military commanders added political advisors with their staffs, became an official institution. As a former military commander, Eisenhower understood the benefit of political advisors and encouraged the formal use of such resources by the military. Eisenhower also oversaw the formalization of the “country team” concept (see sidebar) to bring consistency to U.S. activities overseas through centralized control (although U.S. military operations were not included in this concept). In developing the country team, he acted upon recommendations from a 1959 report by Harlan Cleveland, dean of Syracuse University’s  

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180 Ibid.
182 30 September 2008 <http://www.espionageinfo.com/Pa-Po/PFIAB-President-s-Foreign-Intelligence-Advisory-Board.html>.
Maxwell Graduate School for Citizenship and Public Affairs, which recommended further strengthening the role of U.S. ambassadors at foreign posts.  

THE COUNTRY TEAM

Overseas embassies conduct much of the day-to-day management of foreign relations at the country level. Since 1947, the struggle to gain control over unwieldy interagency activities at the country level has intensified. As the United States emerged from World War II, massive nation-building and foreign assistance efforts began to rebuild European states and to counter Soviet influence. U.S. government agencies, such as the Departments of Defense, Agriculture, and Treasury, and the Economic Cooperation Administration, dispatched personnel overseas to accomplish U.S. objectives. With the proliferation of agencies and personnel overseas, the execution of U.S. foreign policy—led by the Department of State—became more complex, and problems coordinating agencies in the field—more widespread.

Among the first instances of this can be found in President Harry S. Truman’s declaration of economic and military assistance to Greece and Turkey in 1947. The State Department administered the program differently for each country. In Turkey, the U.S. ambassador also served as the chief of the American mission for aid to Turkey. In Greece, however, “Dwight P. Griswold was appointed…to be Chief of the American Mission for aid to Greece, and his mission was outside and independent of the embassy at Athens and of Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh.” Inevitably, the Greeks observed that Griswold controlled the resources, so they bypassed the ambassador and dealt directly with him. The ambassador’s authority diminished and a conflict within the embassy emerged. Rather than reconfirming the ambassador’s authority in the matter, the State Department recalled both Griswold and Ambassador MacVeagh, and then deployed a new ambassador who also served as chief of the aid mission. This course of action revealed two long-standing Department of State tendencies: 1) the assumption that effective diplomats can avoid such contretemps and 2) the default position that the ambassador is ultimately responsible for all embassy activities.

By 1951, with the Department of Defense and economic aid programs expanding overseas, Truman saw the need to specify mechanisms for coordination at the country and regional levels. General Lucius Clay, who served as military governor in post-war Germany, negotiated with government agencies to identify the best means to achieve coordination overseas. Along with establishing the concept of the “country team,” the “Clay Paper” argued that

To insure the full coordination of the U.S. effort, U.S. representatives at the country level shall constitute a team under the leadership of the Ambassador. The Ambassador’s responsibility for coordination, general

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direction, and leadership shall be given *renewed* emphasis, and all United
States elements shall be *reindoctrinated* with respect to the Ambassador’s
role as senior representative for the United States in the country.\textsuperscript{185}
(Emphasis added)

The country team concept, mentioned first in the Clay Paper, is both executive measure
and codified law, granting the ambassador the means to coordinate all U.S. government
activities to maximize the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy in the country to which she
or he is assigned.\textsuperscript{186}

Despite the efforts of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower through Executive Orders and
memoranda such as the Clay Paper, interagency coordination at the country level
remained elusive. Shortly after arriving in the White House, President John F. Kennedy
decided to solve the problem decisively by dispatching a letter to all ambassadors in
which he outlined his expectations for the country team, as well as the authorities at the
ambassadors’ disposal. President Kennedy wrote:

\begin{quotation}
You are in charge of the entire United States Diplomatic Mission, and I
shall expect you to supervise all of its operations. The Mission includes
not only the personnel of the Department of State and the Foreign Service,
but also the representatives of all other United States agencies which have
programs or activities in [name of country]. I shall give you full support
and backing in carrying out your assignment.\textsuperscript{187}
\end{quotation}

Kennedy also granted ambassadors complete authority over the composition of the
country team, with the proviso that employees of every agency had the right to appeal to
Washington if they found themselves in disagreement with the ambassador.
Additionally, President Kennedy addressed the issue of military forces engaged in
military operations. In such instances, Kennedy declared that the ambassador “should
work closely with the appropriate area military commander to assure the full exchange of
information.” If the ambassador felt “that activities by the United States military forces
may adversely affect our overall relations with the people or government of [country],”
Kennedy instructed that the ambassador “should promptly discuss the matter with the
military commander and, if necessary, request a decision by higher authority.”\textsuperscript{188} In
contrast, to this day, the military, with the exception of Special Forces, is not routinely
enjoined to work with ambassadors or to elevate differences of opinion to higher levels.
For example, the current Unified Command Plan, signed by President Bush in 2006,
makes no mention of the combatant commander’s responsibilities to work in concert with
the local U.S. ambassador(s).

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{185} Extract of the “Clay Paper,” found in *The Ambassador and the Problem of Coordination*, U.S.
Senate Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress (September 13, 1963) 60–61.
\textsuperscript{186} 22 USC § 3927
\textsuperscript{187} A copy of President Kennedy’s letter to Chiefs of Mission, dated May 29, 1961, may be found
in *The Ambassador and the Problem of Coordination*, U.S. Senate Subcommittee on National Security
Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress (September 13, 1963) 155–156.
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
The Eisenhower approach did not go unchallenged. After the shock of Sputnik, the Soviet satellite launched in 1957, and reports of a perceived “missile gap” between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Eisenhower administration was criticized for an alleged failure to keep pace with Soviet developments in intercontinental missiles. One of the principal charges was that the institutional machinery used to systematize national security deliberations had resulted in a “papermill” out of which emerged “least-common-denominator” policies. The Bureau of the Budget had in 1952 made the same charge of least-common-denominator policymaking against the less formal national security system used by the Truman administration, suggesting that perhaps the problem did not originate in the system’s degree of formality.  

The Senate Government Operations Subcommittee, chaired by Senator Henry Jackson (D-WA), undertook wide-ranging hearings on Eisenhower’s NSC. After hearing witnesses from Eisenhower’s administration and outside experts, the Jackson Subcommittee issued a series of reports that specifically criticized Eisenhower’s organizational structure:

> The root causes of difficulty are found in over-crowded agendas, overly elaborate and stylized procedures, excessive reliance on subordinate interdepartmental mechanisms, and the use of the NSC system for comprehensive coordinating and follow-through responsibilities it is ill suited to discharge.

Those reports particularly criticized the fact that much of the NSC’s work addressed foreign policy issues rather than national security problems, especially “country papers,” which appeared to be a logical responsibility of the State Department. According to the critique, the NSC had not dealt with the larger issues: the size and composition of the national security budget, the strength and makeup of the armed services, foreign economic policy, and the translation of policy goals into concrete plans and programs.

According to the report:

> Departments and agencies often work actively and successfully to keep critical policy issues outside the NSC system…. When the policy stakes are high and departmental differences deep, agency heads are loath to submit problems to the scrutiny of coordinating committees or councils. They aim in such cases to bypass the committees while keeping them occupied with less important matters. They try to settle important questions in dispute through “out of court” informal interagency negotiations, when they are doubtful of the President’s position. Or else they try “end runs” to the President himself when they think this might be advantageous.

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189 Sander, Eisenhower’s Executive Office, 73.
191 Ibid. 33.
192 Ibid.
The subcommittee’s recommendations emphasized the need for an NSC that would provide “an accustomed forum where [the president] and a small number of his top advisors can gain that intellectual intimacy and mutual understanding on which true coordination depends.”

Senator Jackson himself argued that the NSC should provide “a means of bringing the full implications of policy alternatives out on the table, and a vehicle through which the president can inform his lieutenants of his decisions and of the chain of reasoning behind them.” He added, “the pitfalls to be avoided are clearly marked: at one extreme, over-institutionalization of the NSC system—with overly elaborate procedures and over-production of routine papers; at the other extreme, excessive informality—with Council meetings tending in the direction of official bull sessions.”

The criticisms leveled against the Eisenhower NSC by Senator Jackson and his committee were based on a view that there was a need for “an intimate forum” that could address a limited number of critical problems and devise appropriate policies. According to this view—strongly advanced by the influential political scientist Richard Neustadt—interdepartmental coordination was less important for success in national security affairs than the president’s expertise, political skills, and the vigor with which he deployed them.

A small team of close-knit advisors could support this effort; a large and complex staff would stifle it.

In hindsight, it appears that some of the subcommittee’s accusations were partially inaccurate. They failed to consider President Eisenhower’s decision-making structures and processes in their entirety. It is true that the “policy hill” consisted of highly formalized structures and processes that produced papers and reports in a machine-like manner. However, this was only one mechanism used by President Eisenhower to make decisions. In an unpublished manuscript, Eisenhower’s son “said he thought his father regarded NSC meetings as a ‘debating society’ and that the ‘real decisions were in the Oval Office with a small select group.’” Thus, Eisenhower also made extensive use of less formalized processes, such as permitting Secretary of State Dulles to take full advantage of direct access to the president in order to bypass formal NSC meetings.

Eisenhower did have “a use for the NSC, but it was not the use that Jackson criticized.” As the reference to a “small select group” suggests, the “intimate forum” that Jackson wanted “was already at work in the Oval Office.”

Eisenhower’s special assistant, Dillon Anderson, observed that “[w]hile [Eisenhower] welcomed the use of the NSC mechanism, as an advisory body, or a sort of super-staff for him in the delineation of our national security policy, he nevertheless felt that the onus of

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193 Ibid. 38.
194 Ibid. 68.
197 Ibid.
responsibility for decision lay exclusively with him.”  Eisenhower’s use of both formal and informal decision-making processes required the president’s interest, attention, and purposeful commitment in both processes. Without Eisenhower’s personal involvement in the NSC’s formal “policy hill” process, it might have been just the “paper mill” that Senator Jackson claimed it to be.

**c. Kennedy’s “Situation Room,” the Bay of Pigs, and the Cuban Missile Crisis**

Agreeing in large measure with the Jackson Subcommittee’s critique, President Kennedy dismantled the elaborate NSC system of his predecessor shortly after his inauguration and replaced it with a looser and more flexible set of procedures more suited to his own methods. The NSC Planning Board, with its formal system for paper development, was dissolved along with the Operations Coordinating Board. Regularly scheduled meetings of the NSC were cancelled. In their place was a new method of national security decision-making based on the concept that, rather than being tied down by efforts to achieve consensus among the bureaucracies, the president should be in a position to decide policy issues on his own supported by a small number of experts.

Thus, the NSC staff was significantly reduced and experts were brought in to fill their places. McGeorge Bundy, former dean of arts and sciences at Harvard, became Kennedy’s national security advisor. This was a significant change to the NSC. Prior to the Kennedy administration, the NSC was staffed by career civil servants who managed interagency policy planning. Under Kennedy, these men (and few if any women) were replaced by aides appointed to serve a specific president, whose job was not planning but day-to-day issue management. Every administration since has followed the Kennedy model.

President Kennedy indicated that he expected most policymaking to devolve to the Departments of State and Defense under Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara. However, President Kennedy did bring a large portion of policy planning back to the NSC staff from the State Department following the Bay of Pigs episode and after observing that he and Bundy could “get more done in one day in the White House than they do in six months at the State Department.”

The NSC was only one of several tools that Kennedy employed to help him reach decisions on major issues affecting the security of the nation, and it was used irregularly at best. In the first six months of Kennedy’s term, it met sixteen times, but most decisions were made in separate meetings of the president and Secretaries Rusk and

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199 E.O. 10920 formally abolished the Operations Coordinating Board.
202 Falk 433.
McNamara, or in NSC committees that included only a few of the statutory members. Many observers at the time believed that a contributing cause of the Bay of Pigs debacle in April 1961 was the absence of a rigorous review by a fully staffed NSC. The military noted problems in the CIA’s plans, but no mechanism existed for bringing these problems to general awareness among civilian decision-makers. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, however, Kennedy created the Executive Committee (ExComm) of the NSC, composed of NSC members in addition to other senior officials, which met often for many days, provided advice, and served as the sounding board that helped him resolve the crisis.

President Kennedy also established the “Situation Room” in the White House’s West Wing basement, a “knowledge management” milestone in the national security system. The Situation Room allowed the president and his NSC staff to monitor fast-breaking developments directly by reading copies of Department of Defense, State Department, and CIA overseas cable traffic. Prior to the advent of the Situation Room, “messengers from the various agencies would trot across town, hand-carrying into the White House envelopes that contained paper copies of a few selected cables.” Since then, departmental operations centers have implemented technology that permits users to “almost automatically skim off the most urgent and important national security messages and relay them immediately and electronically to the [Situation] Room.”

An important interagency initiative in the Kennedy administration was the effort to deal with “people’s war” or insurgency. The administration believed that insurgency resulted from the discontents, dislocations, and unfulfilled promises of economic development. According to the administration, political unrest or even violence resulting from these problems was understandable. According to Kennedy’s intentions, the United States should not oppose this unrest but rather guide it, if possible. What the United States should oppose was efforts by Marxists to exploit the unrest. To this end, the administration promulgated an “Overseas Internal Defense Policy” that aimed to help developing countries turn into functioning democracies by providing political, military, social, economic, legal, and police assistance. “As a corollary,” the policy noted, “the U.S. Government must strengthen organization, and procedures to enable it to apply these [development] resources in a unified, coordinated, and effective manner.”

Highlighting the importance of the counterinsurgency effort, the administration set up what it called the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) in January 1962. The purpose of the Special Group was “to assure unity of effort and the use of all available resources with maximum effectiveness in preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and

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204 Ibid.
related forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries.”

The Special Group consisted of the military representative of the president (chairman); the attorney general; deputy under secretary of state for political affairs; deputy secretary of defense; chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; director of central intelligence; special assistant to the president for national security affairs; the administrator, Agency for International Development; and the director, United States Information Agency.

The Kennedy administration did not succeed in integrating U.S. government efforts to combat insurgency, largely because U.S. agencies focused on their functional specialties. Counterinsurgency “fell between stools; it was everybody’s business and nobody’s.”

Not until the establishment of the Office of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) in 1967 did the U.S. government find an effective way to organize interagency activity for counterinsurgency, and then only in the field. This effort succeeded only with the support and close involvement of President Lyndon Johnson (see text box).

CORDS: AN INTERAGENCY SUCCESS

If the Bay of Pigs fiasco represented the failure of the national security system in this period, the Office of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) is generally taken to be a success, representing effective interagency coordination, especially in the field.

CORDS was created in 1967. It was an experiment that placed all interagency assets used in the pacification struggle in Vietnam under one civilian manager. That civilian, a member of the NSC staff, was then placed within the military hierarchy as a deputy commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). This military-civilian relationship was replicated down to the individual village level.

Studies suggest that CORDS was an effective counterinsurgency tool, but it was introduced too late in Vietnam to affect the ultimate outcome. President Johnson was personally involved in establishing CORDS and remained so in forcing its implementation. CORDS was an extraordinary example of presidential intervention down to the tactical level, one that, despite its success, has never been repeated.

By focusing on the attitudes of several agencies, a 1961 memorandum from the Joint Staff on interdepartmental planning explains why the Kennedy administration had so much trouble achieving the interagency coordination its policies called for. Although

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written almost fifty years ago, its descriptions are still recognizable, suggesting the enduring and intractable problems of interagency coordination:

In the past it has been extremely difficult to achieve coordinated interdepartmental planning. This has been partly due to a lack of understanding by other departments of systematic planning procedures, but also due in part to a different basic approach to the solution of problems. For example, State Department shies away from specific planning projected too far into the future since it could infringe upon their flexibility and runs counter to their traditional policy of reacting to daily changes in the situation. CIA is to some degree reluctant to coordinate planning due to a possible compromise of security and their basic concept of compartmented organization and operation. USIA has been somewhat hesitant to associate themselves with departments such as Defense and the CIA due to their basic policy of avoiding any taint of transmitting propaganda. Too close association with the coordinated plan of other agencies for special operations which involve propaganda requirements could in their view detract from their desired “truth” image. These inhibitions of other governmental agencies must in some way be overcome.209

d. Johnson’s Further Dismantling of the Formal NSC System

For his part, President Lyndon B. Johnson made few changes in the national security process. He did, however, like President Kennedy, initiate an effort to empower the Department of State. In the wake of a study conducted by General Maxwell Taylor, Johnson gave the State Department a more formal leadership role in policy formation. Specifically, the secretary of state was to have the “authority and responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas.”210

To accomplish this, President Johnson created211 a Senior Intergovernmental Group (SIG) chaired by the undersecretary of state. The SIG was supposed to oversee foreign policy implementation, supported by several Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRGs), which were chaired by the relevant regional assistant secretaries of state. Members of the SIG included the undersecretary of state, the deputy secretary of defense, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) administrator, the director of central intelligence, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) director, and the national security advisor.212

The accomplishments of the SIG were limited, however, as national security advisor Walt Rostow continued to overshadow the State Department’s influence. Johnson’s continued

211 Pursuant to Johnson, National Security Action Memorandum.
212 Johnson, National Security Action Memorandum 2.
use of informal lunches with senior NSC officials also tended to diminish the efficacy of
the SIG and IRGs.

Having abolished the elaborate NSC mechanisms of their predecessor, Presidents
Kennedy and Johnson relied upon close relationships with their secretaries of state. Their
national security advisors, McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow, were major policy
advisors, not merely coordinators of NSC decision-making.

There is no general consensus on the effectiveness of NSC decision-making during this
period. While the looser NSC structure was blamed for the ill-fated effort to support a
Cuban exile invasion at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961, the more adroit handling of the
Cuban Missile Crisis over a year later reflected the close coordination of senior policy
officials dealing with a crisis that could have led to a nuclear exchange with the Soviet
Union. Vietnam policymaking, greatly criticized then and now, reflected the influence of
Rostow working with Rusk and the Defense Department. Unstructured Tuesday lunches
hosted by President Johnson for the secretaries of state and defense and a few other
senior officials may have served to reach a shared understanding of the president’s
desired policies, but the sensitivity of the issues limited record-keeping and the
dissemination of decisions to government officials. Owing to the Tuesday lunch group’s
“restricted membership and informal methods, several government officials complained
that they received less than a full account of what had transpired at the meetings,
complicat[ing] their task of implementing the president’s decisions.”

Few historians would attribute Vietnam War controversies to the structure, or absence
thereof, of the NSC in the Johnson administration, but it is clear that decision-making had
become centralized in the White House. The NSC system at the time did not lend itself
to more comprehensive consideration of national security issues; rather, it focused
narrowly on military and diplomatic issues directly related to the conduct of the war in
Vietnam.

e. Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford: Efforts to Restore the Power of the NSC

Richard Nixon came to the White House with the intent of returning the NSC system to
one that was more structured than that of the Kennedy-Johnson years—similar to the
Eisenhower model that President Nixon had closely observed during his years as vice
president. As part of his effort to restore and empower the NSC and its staff, Nixon
instituted a process that consisted of one set of papers to study national security priorities
(National Security Study Memoranda) and another set to disseminate presidential
decisions (National Security Decision Memora nda—NSDM), a system which every
subsequent administration has used, albeit using different names for the documents. Both
President Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, preferred the
systematic, written development of policies linked to clear strategic objectives. However,
President Nixon intended to make policy at the White House and not to be constrained by

213 Karl F. Inderfurth and Loch K. Johnson, Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security
the need to accommodate Cabinet departments, especially the Department of State. Kissinger assisted President Nixon in this approach.

To an even greater extent than Bundy or Rostow, Kissinger went well beyond being a coordinator of recommendations from various departments. He was the key advisor on policy choices, undertaking a large number of important diplomatic initiatives with limited or no State Department involvement. In fact, policymaking centered on Kissinger—first as the national security advisor and later as the secretary of state. When Kissinger became secretary of state, his deputy at the NSC, Brent Scowcroft, continued to coordinate interagency functions.

Prior to Nixon’s inauguration, he began devising with Kissinger ways to organize his NSC system. Kissinger recalls:

> [He] sent [Nixon] a memorandum discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the previous systems as I saw them: the flexibility and occasional disarray of the informal Johnson procedure; the formality but also rigidity of the Eisenhower structure, which faced the President with a bureaucratic system but no real choices. Our task, I argued, was to combine the best features of the two systems: the regularity and efficiency of the National Security Council, coupled with procedures that ensured that the President and his top advisors considered all the realistic alternatives, the costs and benefits of each, and the separate views of all interested agencies.

In order to develop alternative choices for decision-makers, and to provide greater White House control, President Nixon’s NSDM 2 created several NSC committees, the most important of which were chaired by the national security advisor. They included:

- The Washington Special Action Group, to address contingency planning and crisis management
- The NSC Intelligence Committee, to provide policy guidance on intelligence issues
- The Defense Program Review Committee, to increase integration of defense and domestic considerations in natural resource allocation
- The Senior Policy Review Group, to direct and review policy studies while also acting as a senior-level deliberative body

Since Kissinger chaired each of these groups, the State Department’s influence in the NSC system was greatly reduced. These groups requested a large number of National Security Study Memoranda, which involved multiple national security departments. Due to the extreme political sensitivity of the issues involved—such as negotiations with the

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214 In 1973, Kissinger assumed the position of secretary of state while retaining his position as national security advisor, a precedent that few observers have found commendable.

North Vietnamese, the opening to the People’s Republic of China, and the negotiations of strategic arms control agreements with Moscow—the work was undertaken in the White House without coordination with the departments. This approach also reflected President Nixon’s preferences and Kissinger’s negotiating strategies.

The NSC committees chaired by Kissinger allowed the White House to control policy formation and implementation. This control was part of a long-term trend, the movement from a council of senior cabinet members deliberating with the president to a group of White House staff members headed by the assistant to the president for national security affairs, known as the national security adviser. Over the years, the NSC has increased the power of the [national security advisor] and the president but weakened those cabinet members without strong ties to the man in the Oval Office.216

The extent to which Cabinet departments, and especially the State Department, were excluded from decision-making in the Nixon administration generated intense criticism and served to generate congressional opposition to administration policies. Subsequently, the question of who chairs NSC interagency committees has often been a central structural issue and a reflection of administration priorities for decision-making.

In many ways, historians accept the successes of the Nixon-Kissinger approach without acknowledging the divisive effects of limiting the involvement of the departments and failing to share crucial information with the rest of the executive branch and Congress. The Defense Program Review Committee was perhaps the least effective of the NSC subcommittees, inasmuch as Defense Secretary Melvin Laird resisted interference with policies that he developed outside of the NSC system with the support of congressional defense committees.

Ultimately, in 1973, President Nixon tried to end counterproductive competition between the NSC and the State Department by “double-hatting” Kissinger as both national security advisor and secretary of state. One resulting problem was that interagency participants could no longer be sure whether Kissinger was fairly representing the agency-neutral perspective of the president or a State Department position.

When Gerald Ford took office in 1974, he largely kept the Nixon-Kissinger system in place, with a few modifications. He tried to restore balance on his national security team by assigning military policy to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and foreign policy to Kissinger. In addition, President Ford replaced Kissinger with Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft as national security advisor in 1975. Scowcroft subsequently set a pattern for the national security advisor that would have a defining influence. More of a policy advisor than Cutler in the Eisenhower administration, Scowcroft was an “honest broker,” mediating between the agencies and the White House and ensuring implementation of presidential decisions. Secretary of State Kissinger, however, remained the dominant influence on policy throughout the Ford administration.

216 Destler, “The Power Brokers.”
In June 1975, the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, headed by veteran diplomat Robert Murphy and also known as the Murphy Commission, issued its report on the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. Established by Congress in 1972, the commission criticized Kissinger’s expansion of the NSC staff role and made a number of recommendations, including the following:

- Only the president should have line authority in the White House, while the NSC staff should not issue directives to departmental officials.
- The national security advisor should have no other official responsibilities, a recommendation made presumably in response to Kissinger’s “double-hatting.”
- The National Security Act of 1947 should be amended to add the secretary of the treasury as a statutory NSC member.
- The NSC’s scope should broaden to include international economic matters.

Ford did put an end to Secretary Kissinger’s dual role as national security advisor and secretary of state. Otherwise, no actions were taken to implement these recommendations. In fact, President Ford vetoed an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947 that would have added the treasury secretary to the NSC.

An important development in the national security system under President Nixon was the reorganization of the Bureau of the Budget as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 1970. Roy Ash, President Nixon’s budget director, and Deputy Director Frederik Malek implemented the second major OMB reorganization of the Nixon presidency in 1973. As a result of these reorganizations, three OMB officials now occupy positions that require Senate confirmation (that is, the director of OMB, the administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, and the administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs). This sets OMB apart from the rest of the Executive Office of the President and creates a level of independent interaction between OMB and Congress that is not present in other entities within the Executive Office. While OMB has made a number of internal organizational changes since its creation, its budget process role has been stable.

The massacre in Munich of members of Israel’s Olympic team by Palestinian terrorists on September 5, 1972, led the Nixon administration to take the first interagency steps to deal with the emerging problem of terrorism. On September 9, the administration set up an intelligence committee consisting of representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the CIA, and the State Department. An official from State’s Near Eastern and South Asia Bureau chaired the committee. On September 25, the administration established the Cabinet Committee on Terrorism, which consisted of the secretaries of state (chairman), defense, treasury, and transportation; the directors of the

CIA and FBI; the attorney general; the ambassador to the United Nations; and the assistants to the president for National Security Affairs and Domestic Affairs. The committee was to coordinate the government’s counterterrorism efforts. To assist in this task, the Cabinet Committee had a working group composed of lower ranking officials from various agencies.\textsuperscript{218} A final major national security system development in the mid-1970s was the establishment by both chambers of Congress of select committees to oversee intelligence matters. These committees continue to function today.

\textbf{f. Carter, Brzezinski, and Vance: Attempts to Re-strengthen the Cabinet}

Upon taking office, President Jimmy Carter began altering Nixon and Ford’s national security apparatus. The Department of State was once again elevated to the primary position in policy formation and implementation while focusing the NSC staff on integration and facilitation of foreign and defense policy decisions. Carter reduced NSC staff committees from seven to two—the Policy Review Committee (PRC) and the Special Coordination Committee (SCC). The PRC was to address issues falling within the primary responsibility of a single department, but which had important implications for other agencies. PRC members included the vice president, secretary of state, secretary of defense, national security advisor, director of central intelligence, and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Other officials could attend as appropriate. PRCs were to be chaired by whichever member’s agency was the lead on a given matter. NSC Interdepartmental Groups (IGs), addressing issues as specified by the president, operated under the PRC.

The SCC addressed individual, cross-cutting matters requiring the development of options and the implementation of presidential decisions, including Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), intelligence policy matters, and crisis management. The national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, chaired these meetings. Members of the SCC included the vice president, secretary of state, secretary of defense, the director of central intelligence, and the national security advisor. Other officials could attend meetings depending on the subject matter under discussion. Brzezinski later recalled:

\begin{quote}
I used the SCC to try to shape our policy toward the Persian Gulf, on European security issues, on strategic matters, as well as in determining our response to Soviet aggression. Moreover, right from the very start of the Carter Administration, the SCC was the central organ for shaping our SALT policy.\textsuperscript{219}
\end{quote}

Brzezinski notes that the NSC system’s formal processes, which used the PRC, IG, and SCC structures, was “supplemented” by Friday breakfasts initially attended by the president, vice president, secretary of state, and the national security advisor. Later, the number of invitees expanded to include the secretary of defense and other senior officials. The breakfasts were designed to permit informal freewheeling discussions, but the

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absence of a formal agenda and notes complicated matters. Brzezinski worked to provide an informal agenda and eventually was authorized to circulate an authoritative summary of the discussion with the president.\(^\text{220}\) In addition to the Friday breakfasts, Brzezinski organized weekly lunches among himself and the secretaries of state and defense to consider matters that did not require more formal attention by the SCC or PRC. These did have formal agendas and a list of agreed-upon decisions was circulated.\(^\text{221}\)

The Carter administration’s goal was to strengthen the Cabinet departments after the centralizing efforts of the Nixon and Ford administrations. However, the result was unresolved policy disputes. In particular, the NSC under Brzezinski and the State Department headed by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance often clashed. Robert Gates, then an NSC staff member in the Carter administration, later recalled:

> Brzezinski’s struggle with Vance was not personal in the sense of ambition, power, and the perception of influence—their differences were deep, philosophical, and were centered, in the first instance, on how to deal with the Soviet Union. They agreed on the desirability of SALT, but Vance believed that arms control was so overriding that no action should be taken that might jeopardize negotiations or the political relationship necessary for their ultimate success. On one regional dispute after another, Vance saw each as a local conflict and feared that Brzezinski and others would turn it into an East-West issue imperiling his first priority. For Brzezinski, SALT had to be embedded in the overall relationship, a relationship that was potentially cooperative but inherently confrontational—and he was concerned that neither aspect could be managed in isolation from the other. At a minimum, public opinion would not allow it.\(^\text{222}\)

These disputes continued through negotiations over arms control agreements with the Soviet Union and, most noticeably, in planning the U.S. response to the capture of the American Embassy in Tehran by Iranian revolutionary elements in November 1979. A rescue mission, planned as a result of White House initiative and over Vance’s objections, led to his resignation. The rescue failed spectacularly. Critics charged that the apparent irresolution of disputes between the NSC and the State Department undermined many of its policy initiatives. Ultimately, despite the initial effort to emphasize the role of Cabinet departments, Carter presided over what Brzezinski termed “the most centralized” national security decision-making style of the post-World War II era.\(^\text{223}\) Arguably Brzezinski indulged in a bit of hyperbole considering the Nixon-Kissinger experience, but his comment underscores the Carter administration’s transition to tighter White House control over the national security decision-making process.

\(^{220}\) Ibid. 68–69.
\(^{221}\) Ibid. 70.
\(^{223}\) Brzezinski 74.
The Carter administration continued the work of the Nixon administration with regard to terrorism, even before Iranians took U.S. embassy employees hostage in 1979. Upon taking office, President Carter initiated a review of U.S. counterterrorism policies and capabilities. The review led to the disestablishment of the Cabinet Committee on Terrorism and its working group, which critics considered ineffectual. A particular complaint was that it had not fostered the sharing of information among the agencies involved. The administration gave the State Department responsibility for international incidents, the Justice Department and FBI responsibility for domestic incidents, and the Federal Aviation Administration responsibility for domestic aircraft hijacking. In the administration’s plan, the lead agencies operated with oversight from the SCC and a special Executive Committee of senior agency representatives (the lead agencies, plus representatives from the Departments of Defense, Energy, and Transportation), which provided supervision to a working group that had members from approximately twenty additional agencies.  

This counterterrorism apparatus did not immediately improve the coordination of the U.S. government’s response or the flow of information among agencies. For example, when terrorists took hostages at a foreign consulate in Chicago, both the State Department and the FBI claimed to be in charge. During the hostage crisis, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance restricted the flow of information to the Defense Department at levels below his because of the sensitivity of the situation and the resulting need to maintain control of the U.S. response. At least the first of these difficulties reflected the fact that the jurisdiction of the lead agencies was a matter of continuing refinement, if not dispute. One problem with lead agencies was (and still is) that none of them could compel other agencies to do what those other agencies did not want to do. Nor was it clear that the SCC and the Executive Committee had that authority.

The Carter administration also created a number of new organizations. In 1979, President Carter established the Federal Emergency Management Agency through an executive order. The order assigned to the director of FEMA the responsibilities and functions previously under the jurisdiction of: 1) the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (a Defense Department agency), 2) the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (a Department of Housing and Urban Development organization), 3) the Federal Preparedness Agency (an agency of the General Services Administration), and 4) the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977. Carter’s executive order establishing FEMA centralized control over national mobilization, nuclear attack preparedness, and civil emergency preparedness in one agency.

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224 Tucker, Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire, 13.
225 Ibid. 15.
226 Ibid. 20–22.
Through a subsequent executive order, President Carter established the International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA), placing USAID within it.\(^{228}\) The order directed USIA to perform all public information functions abroad with respect to U.S. foreign assistance, aid, and development programs. A Development Coordination Committee was also created. Its membership included the director of IDCA (as chair), USAID administrator, director of the Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation, undersecretary of state for economic affairs, undersecretary of the treasury for monetary affairs, undersecretary of commerce, undersecretary of agriculture, under (deputy) secretary of labor, undersecretary of energy, a deputy special representative for trade negotiations, an associate director of OMB, a representative of the national security advisor, president of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, director of the Peace Corps, and president of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. The committee’s purpose was to advise the president on the coordination of U.S. policy related to developing countries, including programs of bilateral and multilateral development assistance. Such advice was subject to the secretary of state’s foreign policy guidance. Designed to operate on a consensus basis, the Development Coordination Committee met only sporadically and the program failed.

### g. Reagan and the Tower Report’s Call for Reform of the NSC

During the 1980 presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan made a pledge to downgrade the post of national security advisor in order to end the rivalry between the NSC and the Department of State. With this in mind, Secretary of State Alexander Haig presented the president a draft National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) that would have placed overall responsibility for the direction and implementation of U.S. foreign policy within the State Department. Senior members of the White House staff were concerned that the proposed reorganization took too much power out of the president’s hands and that an activist secretary of state operating with wide powers might eclipse the presidential role in determining U.S. foreign policy.

President Reagan did not accept Haig’s proposal, but he did lower the status of the NSC staff by placing it and National Security Advisor Richard Allen under the supervision of presidential counselor Edwin Meese. For the first time, the national security advisor lost direct access to the president. Allen attempted to make this system work, but eventually resigned in frustration. He was replaced by Deputy Secretary of State William Clark. Clark, who had little experience in national security policy issues, insisted nevertheless that he report directly to the president and was instrumental in getting the president to sign NSDD-2 in January 1982, outlining the structure and functions of the National Security Council system. The directive placed responsibility for developing, coordinating, and monitoring national security policy with the national security advisor in consultation with the NSC members. It assigned to the secretary of state “authority and responsibility” for the “overall direction, coordination and supervision of the interdepartmental activities incident to foreign policy formulation, and the activities of

executive departments and agencies overseas,” except for military activities. NSDD-2 provided similar authority to the secretary of defense and director of central intelligence in their respective areas of endeavor and delineated the functions of three SIGs for interagency deliberations.

The secretary of state was designated the chairman of the Foreign Policy SIG. To assist the Foreign Policy SIG, the secretary of state set up an Interagency Group for each geographic region, for politico-military affairs, and for international economic affairs. The Interagency Groups, in turn, created full-time working groups. The two other SIGs followed a similar structure under the leadership of the secretary of defense and the director of central intelligence. Over the next five years, the Reagan administration established additional SIGs and regional and functional interagency groups to support them. Observers criticized the overuse of SIGs and the increasing confusion about the scope of their overlapping responsibilities.

President Reagan created other interagency committees as well. A Special Situation Group (SSG), chaired by the vice president, was created to advise the president with respect to crisis management, including terrorism incidents. Its membership included the statutory members of the NSC along with the president’s counselor, chief of staff, deputy chief of staff, the national security advisor, and others designated by the vice president. The rationale behind the SSG’s creation was that certain national security matters, such as crisis management, may require “Presidential decisions and implementing instructions…more rapidly than routine interdepartmental NSC staff support provides.”

In addition, President Reagan established the National Security Planning Group within his NSC system. The group, whose members included the president, vice president, secretaries of state and defense, counselor to the president, director of central intelligence, chief of staff to the president, deputy chief of staff to the president, national security advisor, and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was created as “the component of the National Security Council authorized to establish, review, evaluate, provide guidance for and direction to the conduct of covert action and ensure coordination of covert action with other instruments of US national security policy.”

Reagan created the group to prevent leaks from his advisors. It was supported by a deputies-level committee, the Planning and Coordination Group, which was designed to review covert action proposals and monitor their implementation and integration with other U.S. efforts. However, it became the “principal forum within the Reagan Administration for national security decision-making,” and “a more informal forum

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231 The “Deputies Committee” consists of the second-ranking official of departments or agencies involved in national security matters.
somewhat like President Carter’s ‘Friday breakfast’ and President Johnson’s ‘Tuesday lunch’ groups.”

The NSC system under Deputy Secretary of State Clark did not solve ongoing coordination problems. Friction between the Department of State and the NSC continued, coming to a head during intense debates over the Lebanon crisis. As Robert Gates observed in 1996:

Downgraded in 1981, a weak and often incompetent Reagan NSC removed from the bureaucratic equation a powerful protection for the President - a potent personal representative who could bring the national security mandarins together, develop agreements and compromises when possible, and crystallize disputes into manageable alternatives for presidential decision…. During the first six years of the Reagan Administration, there was no one at the NSC whom Cabinet officers would keep regularly informed of their activities and who could, as necessary, coordinate those activities and make sure all were adhering to the policies determined by the President. End runs to the President by individual Cabinet members bypassing the NSC interagency process were commonplace and caused endless trouble.

The disputes resulted in Secretary Haig’s resignation on June 25, 1982, and the appointment of George P. Shultz as the new secretary of state. Shultz and his counterpart at the Pentagon, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, found themselves locked in their own interagency disputes for the duration of Weinberger’s time in office. The “struggle centered on major policy issues—the direction of U.S.-Soviet relations and arms control, for example—and, as in past administrations, on who would speak for the administration.”

The Weinberger-Shultz disputes continued until the secretary of defense resigned in 1987. During Secretary of State Shultz’s tenure, the Department of State also continued to have disagreements with the NSC staff, which involved itself in the day-to-day management of U.S. foreign relations. When Deputy National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane replaced Philip C. Habib as the chief U.S. Middle East negotiator in July 1983, the NSC staff again became directly involved in the operations of foreign policy.

During 1985 and 1986, the national security advisor and certain staff members were deeply involved in the formulation and execution of policy in the Caribbean, Central America, and the Middle East. In the “Iran-Contra affair,” NSC staff officers negotiated the release of hostages held in the Middle East despite public policy against negotiations; they also worked to support the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance at a time when Congress had proscribed support by intelligence agencies. These activities, when revealed, led to severe congressional criticism of the NSC and forced the resignation of Vice Admiral John Poindexter, the national security advisor.

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232 Inderfurth and Johnson 75–76.
234 Inderfurth and Johnson 76.
A Presidential Special Review Board, two congressional select committees, and an Independent Counsel examined in great detail the activities of the NSC staff, as well as the actions and responsibilities of the president, the national security advisor, and the heads of agencies. The Special Review Board, headed by Senator John Tower and including former Senator and Secretary of State Edmund Muskie and former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, made several recommendations in its report (known as “the Tower report”) for the reform of the NSC. The board recommended that the national security advisor chair the senior-level committees of the NSC system. It also recommended that NSC staff neither implement policy nor conduct operations. These recommendations became guidelines followed by subsequent NSC staffs of both parties.

President Reagan’s NSDD-266 (March 31, 1987) adopted the board’s major recommendations and the reforms were carried out by the new national security advisor, Frank Carlucci, who replaced more than half of the professional staff of the NSC within three months. Moreover, Carlucci withdrew the NSC from its operational role while continuing to coordinate foreign policy activities. In 2004, Carlucci’s successor as national security advisor, then-Major General Colin Powell, recalled:

[T]he Tower Report became our owner’s manual. We did what it recommended. Carlucci issued an order that the NSC was not to become involved in operations. We advised presidents; we did not run wars or covert strategies.  

Based on the Tower report recommendations and a follow-on NSDD (Number 276, issued on June 9, 1987), Carlucci created a Senior Review Group (SRG) that he chaired, which was composed of the statutory NSC members (other than the president and vice president) and a Policy Review Group (PRG) chaired by his deputy and composed of second-ranking officials of national security agencies. The SRG was designed to address high-level decisions prior to presentation to the president, while the PRG was designed to review and coordinate interagency policy positions for the president’s consideration, taking the place of the earlier SIGs. This structure has been retained through the subsequent administrations. Although a number of presidents since 1947 have used deputy-level structures either for initial policy planning or implementation oversight, the PRG, or what George H. W. Bush and succeeding administrations called the “Deputies Committee,” would from this point on be an uninterrupted feature of the national security system.

Congress attempted to mandate a subcomponent of the NSC system in 1987. To accompany the creation of the assistant secretary of defense for special operations/low-intensity conflict position in the Defense Department, Congress established a low-intensity conflict coordinating board to support the NSC and improve interagency coordination. However, the president never used the board. This effort by Congress

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reflected growing concern with terrorism, insurgency, and other forms of conflict now referred to as “irregular” or “asymmetric” warfare.

In the Reagan administration, this concern manifested itself in heightened attention to terrorism and a revival of interest in insurgency and ways to both counter and support it. As terrorist attacks continued during the 1980s, the Reagan administration struggled to make the lead agency concept work. Eventually, the president’s interest in the issue led the NSC to take a bigger role. A small working group of officials at the assistant secretary level and below, coordinated by an NSC staff member, succeeded in improving cooperation and coordination among the various agencies involved in counterterrorism. Critical to this accomplishment was the priority given to countering terrorism by the president, the secretaries of state and defense, and the director of the CIA. This working group remains a part of the NSC system.

h. George H.W. Bush’s Tri-level NSC Structure

Based on his experience at the CIA and as vice president, President George H.W. Bush entered office with firm ideas about how the national security system should look and was determined to enact them. A central role was given to the NSC staff. On his Inauguration Day, January 20, 1989, President Bush issued National Security Directive One (NSD-1), which established three sub-groups within the NSC:

- The Principals Committee, composed of the secretary of defense, secretary of state, director of central intelligence, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, chief of staff to the president, and the national security advisor, who also chaired the committee

- The Deputies Committee, composed of second-ranking officials and chaired by the deputy national security advisor

- Policy Coordinating Committees, chaired by senior officials of the departments most directly concerned, with NSC staff members serving as executive secretaries

The Principals Committee synthesized knowledge from different agencies and focused on decision-making, while the Deputies Committee simultaneously passed information up to the Principals Committee and implemented any decisions made by the latter. This tripartite NSC structure continued largely intact through the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations.

President Bush asked Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft to return to the position he had previously held in the Ford administration and serve as his national security advisor. Under Scowcroft, who attempted to serve as an honest broker, the NSC had an informal but close relationship with the president and was able to maintain good relationships with the other government departments. The personal relationships of the NSC and Cabinet members facilitated information flows and coordination in policymaking and

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Through the unification of Germany and Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, which repulsed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the NSC worked effectively to facilitate the implementation of presidential policies. Nevertheless, interagency coordination challenges were a constant problem for the NSC. Operation JUST CAUSE, which sent American troops into Panama in December 1989, is often cited as one case where the Bush NSC failed to effectively integrate the efforts of diverse agencies.

i. Clinton’s System and the Inclusion of Economic Policy

Upon taking office in 1993, President William J. Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 2 (PDD-2). In this directive, President Clinton approved an NSC decision-making system that enlarged the nonstatutory membership of the NSC and placed a much heavier emphasis on economic issues in the formulation of national security policy. In addition to statutory members, President Clinton added to the NSC the secretary of the treasury, U.S. representative to the United Nations, assistant to the president for economic policy, and chief of staff to the president. Although not a member, the attorney general would be invited to attend meetings pertaining to the jurisdiction of the Justice Department.

The overall approach used in the last years of the Reagan administration and in the Bush administration was continued. According to James Steinberg, Clinton’s deputy national security advisor, the incoming administration believed that the Scowcroft-Baker [NSC] model was just quite successful. They didn’t agree with the policies, but they thought that this was the way people ought to do business. They felt that what went on between Vance and Brzezinski wasn’t helpful. And you had people there who had been on both sides.

The new position of assistant to the president for economic policy, which had been promised by Clinton during the election campaign, was intended to serve as a senior economic advisor to coordinate foreign and domestic economic policy through a newly created National Economic Council established by Executive Order 12835. NEC membership included the president and vice president; secretary of state; secretaries of the treasury, agriculture, commerce, labor, housing and urban development, transportation, and energy; various economic advisors; and national security advisor. In
2003, the secretary of homeland security was added to the NEC. The NEC was established to:

- Coordinate the economic policymaking process with respect to domestic and international economic issues
- Coordinate economic policy advice to the president
- Ensure that economic policy decisions and programs are consistent with the president’s stated goals and that those goals are being effectively pursued
- Monitor implementation of the president’s economic policy agenda

The Executive Order noted, however, that the secretary of the treasury would continue to be the senior economic official in the executive branch and the president’s chief economic spokesman. Although the NEC effectively coordinated international economic policy issues early in the Clinton administration, it was less active after Robert Rubin, the assistant to the president for economic policy, became secretary of the treasury in 1995, and it continues to be used, although less actively, in President Bush’s administration.

As noted, the NSC framework in the Clinton administration continued the structure of a Principals Committee and a Deputies Committee. The former discussed and resolved issues not requiring the president's participation; the latter served as the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for considering policy issues affecting national security and for reviewing and monitoring the work of the NSC interagency process. Interagency Working Groups established by the Deputies Committee were to convene on a regular basis to review and coordinate the implementation of presidential decisions in their respective policy areas.

Richard Clarke, a member of the NSC staff, chaired the Counterterrorism Security Group, the successor to the Reagan administration’s small interagency counterterrorism group. Clarke and his colleagues coordinated the Clinton administration’s efforts as a clearer picture of the threat from al-Qaeda began to emerge in the 1990s. Assigned the new position of national coordinator for counterterrorism, Clarke achieved an exceptional position in that he attended Principals Committee meetings and worked directly with Cabinet agencies including involvement in budgetary and operational issues spanning the

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243 Clinton resisted congressional efforts to establish two NSC committees—a Committee on Foreign Intelligence and a Committee on Transnational Threats—that were included in the Fiscal Year 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 104-293) on the grounds that “efforts to dictate the President’s policy procedures unduly intrude upon Executive prerogatives and responsibilities. I would note that under my Executive authority, I have already asked the NSC to examine these issues.” William J. Clinton, “Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 - 11 October 1996,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 14 October 1996, 2039.
Later, his position would be viewed as anomalous by incoming National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, who sought to have some of the issues transferred out of the NSC staff; Clarke was no longer invited to attend Principals Committee meetings but met instead with the deputies.245

Recognizing interagency coordination difficulties in relation to complex contingencies, Clinton promulgated PDD-56 in May 1997. The directive articulated a standard approach, including authorities and structures, to managing complex contingency operations based on lessons learned from Somalia and Haiti.246 The PDD required the Deputies Committee to establish interagency working groups to help manage complex contingency operations, including an Executive Committee (ExCom) with representatives of all agencies who might participate in an operation, including those not normally part of the NSC structure.247

Between 1997 and 2000, the Clinton administration used PDD-56 to guide planning on a number of complex contingencies, including the punitive bombing of Iraq (December 1998), Kosovo bombing by NATO (April–June 1999), and INTERFET (International Force for East Timor) intervention in East Timor (September 1999) led by Australia with support from the United States and other countries.248 Although a notable improvement from previous interagency planning efforts, the departments and agencies still resisted adhering to PDD-56’s approach. A typical Department of State complaint was that the PDD-56 planning template and process were too laborious and detailed to keep pace with events on the ground. For many participants, this criticism was borne out by the experience in applying PDD-56 planning in Bosnia peace operations. The lack of support from departments and agencies limited the efficacy of PDD-56, which never fully matured into a standard interagency approach to planning and executing complex contingencies.

During these years, interest in Congress grew in merging USIA, USAID, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) into the State Department. Although initial attempts failed to effect a merger, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 succeeded in establishing USAID as an executive agency and abolishing IDCA (an executive order implemented these portions of the act). At the same time, USIA and ACDA were eliminated and their functions transferred to the State Department on October 1, 1999. USAID avoided complete integration and survives under the direct authority and foreign policy guidance of the secretary of state. Specifically, USAID now

244 The Office of National Drug Control Policy was an earlier effort established by statute in 1988 to coordinate interagency policies and budget submissions, but it was independent and not part of the NSC organization.
245 Eventually, Clarke was assigned outside the NSC to a separate White House position for Critical Infrastructure Protection and Cyber Security. For Clarke’s version of these changes, see: Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror, (New York: Free Press, 2004) 229–238.
247 Ibid.
248 Len Hawley, Clinton Administration NSC Director for Multilateral Affairs, Personal Response, 7 July 2008.
formulates and executes U.S. foreign economic and development assistance policies and programs, subject to the foreign policy guidance of the president and the secretary of state. The USAID administrator serves as a principal advisor to the president and the secretary of state regarding international development matters, while administering resources provided under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and directing all USAID activities.

j. George W. Bush’s NSC, Homeland Security, and the Intelligence Community

The national security infrastructure in the George W. Bush presidency was modified by the effort to combat the threat of international terrorism that became the highest concern in the aftermath of 9/11. In October 2001, President Bush established the Homeland Security Council, composed of key Cabinet secretaries, within the Executive Office of the President. The HSC was subsequently given legislative standing in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which prescribed the HSC membership as including the president, vice president, secretary of homeland security, attorney general, secretary of defense, and such other individuals as may be designated by the president. The Homeland Security Act provided that the HSC would make recommendations to the president about the objectives, commitments, and risks in the interest of homeland security and oversee and review homeland security policies.

In addition to the creation of the HSC, and after resisting the creation of a homeland security department for nine months, the Bush administration agreed to work with Congress to create the Department of Homeland Security, which consists of former subcomponents of other departments and independent agencies. The administration also was involved in major reforms to the intelligence community, which centered on the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and other interagency coordinative mechanisms, such as the National Counterterrorism Center and the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive.

Other than these notable changes, Bush’s national security establishment sustained continuity with the preceding two administrations. President George W. Bush’s NSC organizational hierarchy of interagency committees and the role of his national security advisor were consistent with the model developed for his father by Brent Scowcroft. In addition to this continuity, President Bush selected a team of senior national security leaders who were expected to work well together. They all had served previously in the Ford, Reagan, or Bush administrations, and knew each other well. Nevertheless, disputes

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249 According to the White House website accessed on May 5, 2008, the HSC currently includes, in addition to the president and vice president, the secretary of homeland security, secretary of the treasury, secretary of defense, attorney general, secretary of health and human services, secretary of transportation, director of national intelligence, director of the federal bureau of investigation, and assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism. The secretary of state is not listed as a member of the HSC. A deputy assistant to the president and a special assistant to the president in the National Security Council, who also report to the national security advisor, report to the assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism in the areas of combating terrorism and intelligence programs and reform.
emerged between the secretaries of defense and state that the NSC system was unable to mediate:

Prior to September 11, there was increasing speculation that President Bush’s national security team “was split among those advocating a hawkish…unilateralist approach to world affairs (most often associated with…Secretary Rumsfeld) versus a more cautious, multilateralist approach (seen to be championed by Secretary of State Powell).”

This speculation disappeared after the al-Qaeda attacks, but resurfaced with respect to matters such as Iraq. In this regard, the Bush administration was not an anomaly. The history of national security teams over the past three decades is replete with examples of senior leaders disagreeing over policy and its implementation, including fierce internecine battles between Kissinger and [Rogers,] Melvin Laird or James Schlesinger, between Zbigniew Brzezinski and Cyrus Vance, between George Shultz and Caspar Weinberger, or perhaps worst of all, within the administration of George W. Bush between Colin Powell and Donald Rumsfeld.

Under the leadership of Secretary of State Rice and Secretary of Defense Gates, the differences between their respective institutions are less public but still endure.

The war on terrorism has contributed to the rapid growth of interagency planning and coordination processes, the effects of which are difficult to evaluate without the passage of time. At the national level, these newly formed planning processes include the Homeland Security Planning System for homeland security, the Interagency Management System for stabilization and reconstruction, the “F” process for prioritizing foreign assistance at the State Department, and the Strategic Operational Planning process at National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). At the regional, local, and country-team level, there has also been a wide range of efforts to improve interagency coordination and better link ends, ways, and means. These include restructuring combatant commands for improved interagency coordination, use of military-civilian provincial reconstruction teams to plan and execute reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan, creation of country-team level Mission Strategic Plans, and revision of national incident management through a new National Response Framework.

4. Conclusion

a. The Pursuit of a Unified Effort

The history of the national security system reveals a constant awareness of problems in the system and continuous efforts to correct them. All of these efforts aim to improve integration either within one functional area or among the departments involved in a specific mission:

250 Inderfurth and Johnson 105.
251 Rothkopf 14.
Functional Integration in One Department or Agency: The Department of Defense is an example of organizational change to improve integration in a functional area. The Central Intelligence Agency is another, as are the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Department of Homeland Security.

Interagency Mission Integration: The Special Group (Counterinsurgency) established by the Kennedy administration exemplified an organizational change to integrate capabilities for a specific mission. The Executive Committee of the Clinton administration’s PDD-56 process is another, as is CORDS or the Counterterrorism Subgroup that began to function in the later years of the Reagan administration.

Of the many reform efforts, the Department of Defense has been the most effective, but it took more than forty years and congressional intervention before “jointness” was accepted by the service cultures. The effort to integrate intelligence launched in 1947 never worked. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence represents a new start toward that elusive goal. The effort to improve integration for specific missions has generally fared worse than efforts to integrate within a functional area. CORDS and the Counterterrorism Subgroup worked, but often the various integrating committees and working groups of the national security system have not achieved even effective information sharing, let alone effective decision-making.

These enduring difficulties with integration and decision-making across departments and agencies in particular explain the tendency to draw authority and decision-making into the White House and the National Security Council staff. As previously noted, President Kennedy felt he could get more done in a day than the State Department, his lead agency for foreign affairs, could get done in six months. Yet the change from “integrate” to “advise” in the language authorizing the NSC left the president as the integrator. Unless the president can delegate authority for integration, he is left with an impossible span of control:

Inadequate Models of Delegated Authority for Integration: None of the many variations on the basic structures and processes of the national security system, often resulting from the differing management styles of presidents, has been consistently successful as a model of presidential delegation of authority. Neither lead agencies nor “czars,” for example, have been notable successes. The president can delegate his authority, but unless his careful attention follows this delegation, as it did with the successful CORDS and Counterterrorism Subgroup examples, the delegation is unlikely to produce the desired outcome. Because the president can closely follow only a few key issues, his formal span of control remains impossibly large compared with what he can actually manage.

Problems with integration and delegation have led to the development of various informal meetings designed for issue management (“Tuesday lunches”) and to the emergence of entrepreneurs who work around the formal system, either using a personal relationship with the president or a Cabinet official, or successfully building such a relationship because of their activities.
**b. A Changing Security Environment**

Although attention to terrorism has waxed and waned over the years as the activities of terrorists increased or decreased, overall terrorism and other forms of conflict-other-than-war gained increasing prominence in the decades after 1947. In the 1950s, the U.S. government undertook covert action and psychological warfare. In the 1960s, the Kennedy administration tried to make the national security system recognize counterinsurgency as a matter of importance equal to traditional warfare. In the 1980s, countering terrorism and insurgency were priorities for the Reagan administration. In the 1990s, as the U.S. government and its allies dealt with the collapse of the Soviet Union, complex contingency operations (often humanitarian endeavors in violent circumstances) became prominent. Then, arguably, terrorism emerged as the preeminent security issue.

Accompanying the increasing importance of conflicts other than war is a changing understanding of the relationship between war and peace. Seen before World War II as separate and distinct conditions that required no coordination between the State and Defense Departments, war and peace or politics and violence are now seen as blended dimensions of the security environment. The result is a growing recognition that we need a national security system that integrates functions and capabilities long thought separate and distinct.

**c. A Superficially Flexible National Security System**

The growing pressure for better integration of national security efforts induced by the emergence of conflicts other than war as salient national security issues illustrates another theme in the history of the national security system. Presidents and Congress have created new organizations and restructured existing ones to meet emergent needs or respond to failures, usually through the creation of new hierarchical structures or interagency committees.252 Illustrating both of these causes is the attention paid over the years to industrial mobilization, cooperation between the Departments of State and Defense, coordination of intelligence activities, strategic communication organizations, and aid and development functions. The most recent example of this theme is the changes made following 9/11.

Along with the less dramatic but never-ending adjustments administrations make, such changes give the impression that the national security system is flexible. But history actually reveals a rigid national security system that cannot generate new levels of performance so much as make innumerable minor adjustments that, once tried, are found wanting.

**d. Improving the System**

Both the changes in the security environment and the history of attempts to respond to those changes indicate that the limits of the current system have been reached, and that

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something different is now necessary. The next section of this report examines why better performance by the current system is required and why it is not possible.
PART III: ASSESSMENT OF SYSTEM PERFORMANCE

This section of the report raises and answers four basic questions:

1. By what criteria do we judge the performance of the national security system?
2. What can we learn by looking at a set of past cases of system performance?
3. What are the system’s most significant current performance limitations?
4. Is there any reason to believe that future security challenges will either exacerbate or ameliorate system performance?

Performance Criteria

The most important criterion for system performance is the ability to generate desired outcomes. The principal desired outcome of the 1947 national security system was the resolution of inter-state conflict on the United States’s terms. Today, that outcome exists alongside the need to prevail in intra-state conflicts and against nonstate actors. The rise of nonstate powers as competitors with state powers means that the national security system must excel at public diplomacy as well as traditional state or private diplomacy.

Efficiency and behavior are important supplementary criteria; even if the system produces a desired outcome, improved efficiency is always desirable. A system that fails to integrate its capabilities will be ineffective in some missions and inefficient in all, prone to duplication of effort and working at cross purposes. System behaviors can militate against efficiency and effectiveness by undermining cooperation and collaboration, which evidence suggests is currently the case. Competition and information hoarding between agencies and their personnel is often standard behavior.

Performance to Date

One hundred six PNSR case studies reveal a trend toward increasingly more frequent failures. They also indicate that when the system produces strong policy and strategy, implementation is still problematic. When the system produces weak policy and strategy, implementation is dreadful. Poor strategy appears to foster interagency competition and conflict. The case studies also provide a basis for the following hypotheses and findings:

- The U.S. national security apparatus is inconsistent and too rarely achieves integrated policy and unity of purpose.

- Analysis, planning, and implementation are driven by organizational equities, paradigms, and incentive structures that decrease interagency cooperation.

- The interagency system regularly filibusters policymaking, leading to informal structures and procedures.
• Resources are often neither timely nor adequate.

• Successful policy development, implementation, and outcomes often depend upon direct and sustained presidential engagement.

• There is no consistently effective mechanism to delegate presidential authority.

**Overarching Explanation for Current System Performance**

The environment for which the system was built—inter-state conflict—is changing faster than the system can adapt. The evolving security environment requires a system that can integrate and resource the full range of functional strengths resident in the system. The current national security system has five core problems that produce increasingly inadequate performance:

1. The system is grossly imbalanced, supporting strong departmental capabilities at the expense of integrating mechanisms.

2. Departments and agencies use their resources to support the capabilities they need to carry out their core mandates rather than national missions.

3. Presidential intervention to compensate for the systemic inability to integrate or resource missions centralizes issue management and burdens the White House.

4. A burdened White House cannot manage the national security system as a whole, so it is not agile, collaborative, or able to perform well.

5. The legislative branch provides resources and conducts oversight in ways that reinforce all of these problems and make improving performance difficult.

The system’s institutional and managerial limitations are most apparent when issues require integrated efforts across multiple agencies and departments. Problems arise all along the issue management chain—from policy, to strategy, to plans, to implementation and assessment.

**Future Performance**

Virtually all analyses of future security environments conclude that issues requiring more efficient and better integrated responses will become more salient, and good interagency and cross-jurisdictional (federal-state-local) working relationships will be essential. The current national security system does not provide this integration often or efficiently enough. In its current form, the national security system is not subject to strategic direction and thus is not manageable. Therefore system performance will continue to decline as the security environment continues to change unless major systemic reform is undertaken. Any reform of the current system must eliminate impediments to better integration and do so by encouraging behaviors compatible with greater efficiency and a level of effectiveness that allows the system to achieve desired outcomes consistently.
ASSESSMENT OF SYSTEM PERFORMANCE

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This section of the report raises and answers four basic questions. First, how would we know whether the national security system is performing well or not? In other words, by what criteria are we to judge the performance of the current national security system? Second, since we have over sixty years of experience with the basic system in use today, what can we learn by looking at a set of past cases of system performance? Comparing and contrasting even a large set of case studies cannot substitute for an analysis of the system and its performance. However it can support such analysis by substantiating trends and possible explanations for them. Third, what is the best overall explanation for how the current system performs? What are its most important current performance limitations? Finally, looking to the future, is there any reason to believe that likely future security challenges will exacerbate or ameliorate system performance?

A. Performance Criteria

This report uses three criteria to assess the performance of the national security system: 1) the system’s ability to generate desired outcomes, 2) how efficiently the system produces those outcomes, and 3) whether the system manifests the behaviors necessary for those outcomes. The most important criterion for system performance is the ability to generate desired outcomes. The report considers the other criteria, however, because the outcomes produced by the national security system depend on factors external to the system. Even if the system does everything right, the outcome might be other than the one desired because of chance or the actions of opponents. Efficiency and behavior provide relevant supplementary measures of effectiveness. Indeed, even if the security system produces a desired outcome, improving the efficiency with which it does so is always desirable as well.

1. Outcomes

Over the past sixty years, the national security system has generated some critically important outcomes. It deterred nuclear war, negotiated state-to-state agreements, won major conventional wars, and prevailed in a decades-long competition with the Soviet Union. Still, as the case studies commissioned by the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) illustrate, the system failed or delivered subpar performance on numerous occasions even during the Cold War. Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright identifies a fundamental reason for the failure, citing the U.S. response to the Iranian hostage crisis:
Years later, in my classes, I was able to cite the next events as an example of what happens when our government is divided. The key decision-makers at the White House, the National Security Council, the State Department, and the U.S. embassy in Tehran all had different sources of information, different understandings of what was going on, and different ideas about what to do. Until almost the end, the ambassador was convinced the shah could hold on to power. The State Department in Washington was preoccupied with finding a way to ease the monarch out and install, instead, a coalition of moderates. Brzezinski thought that the shah should use military force, if necessary, to put down the protests. Meanwhile, the CIA had little to contribute. At one crucial meeting, Stansfield Turner, then the agency’s director, was asked for his assessment of the Iranians protesting against the shah. He replied that he did not have one: the shah had prohibited the CIA from talking to any political opponents of the regime. As a result, no overtures sponsored by the United States were ever made to Khomeini, and efforts by Khomeini’s aides to contact U.S. officials were rebuffed. To the highest levels of American government, the Iranian insurgents were virtually anonymous—a band of religious reactionaries, whose membership and intentions were a mystery.  

Even during the Cold War the national security system poorly performed missions that required integrating multiple disciplines and developing and employing capabilities that do not fall within the core mandate of a single agency or department.

As the analysis of the case studies also shows, the security system failures have become more common in recent years. The security system has failed more frequently of late because it has confronted an increasing number of problems and issues it was not designed to deal with. In 1947, uppermost in the minds of those who designed the current security system was the greatest inter-state conflict in human history, which had just ended, and another inter-state conflict, with the Soviet Union, that was just emerging. National Security Council Report 68 (NSC 68) (1950), perhaps the preeminent expression of the understanding of the world that animated the National Security Act of 1947, speaks of “a system of sovereign and independent states,” of “a balance of power,” and principally of two states, the United States and the Soviet Union, as centers of power. It argued that “the cold war is in fact a real war” and emphasized the role of military power and diplomacy in America’s response to this war. In keeping with the written and unwritten conventions of inter-state politics, it understood war and peace as separate conditions, even as it understood the war with the Soviet Union to encompass both. Thus, diplomacy and military force had separate spheres (diplomacy ruled in peace and the military in war), even as they needed to cooperate at all times to preserve peace.

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and prevail in war. Accordingly, the principal purpose of the 1947 system was to better prepare the United States for conflict with the Soviet Union by providing “for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security.” The National Security Council (NSC) was the mechanism through which integration was to take place. Emphasizing the centrality of diplomacy and military force in the 1947 act, the statutory members of the council were the president, the vice president, and the secretaries of defense and state. By its own standards, the principal desired outcome of the 1947 security system was the resolution of the inter-state conflict with the Soviet Union on America’s terms.

That outcome was achieved. As the PNSR case studies demonstrate, since then (approximately 1990) the system has failed to achieve desired outcomes more frequently than it did before. It is not surprising that a system designed to deal with major inter-state conflict fails more frequently when confronted by intra-state conflict or conflict involving nonstate actors; the situation since the Cold War ended. Even before the end of the Cold War, whenever the security system confronted intra-state conflict or conflict with nonstate actors, it was more likely to fail. The reason for this increased likelihood of failure is that intra-state conflict or conflict with nonstate actors requires more than the coordinated efforts of the State and Defense Departments, which was a principal focus of the 1947 act:

The past decade of experience in complex contingency operations, from Somalia to Iraq, has demonstrated that success requires unity of effort not only from the military but also from across the U.S. government and an international coalition. In most cases, however, such unity of effort has proved elusive. Time and time again, the United States and its international partners have failed to fully integrate the political, military, economic, humanitarian and other dimensions into a coherent strategy for a given operation—sometimes with disastrous results.

Complex contingencies and other nonstate security challenges require the integration of multiple disciplines or functions and the development and employment of capabilities not

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257 Those concerned with America’s security in 1947 also recognized that there was conflict outside the state system. “Nationalist uprisings” or “nationalist turmoil” in imperial dependencies was part of the world that the United States had to deal with. But they believed this turmoil was subordinate to or contained within the inter-state security system dominated by the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. See Melvyn P. Leffler, The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48, (Washington: Wilson Center, International Security Studies Program, 1983) 365, 379.

resident in a single agency or department. The 1947 Act aimed to better integrate the military services and coordinate military and diplomatic efforts. It did not intend to integrate or coordinate the activities of multiple disparate agencies.\footnote{Stuart, Creating the National Security State.}

The increased salience of intra-state conflict and nonstate actors in America’s security environment was not, of course, caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of intra-state conflict and nonstate actors are both better seen as the effects of a common cause: the diffusion of power outside the traditional European state system. This trend manifested itself in the increased power and influence of nonstate actors in the system and the saliency of these actors and intra-state conflict as national security issues. Consider just two illustrative examples. In 1947, there were a few hundred nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), but today there are almost fifty thousand.\footnote{The World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (WANGO) 2008, 2 October 2008 <http://www.wango.org/about.aspx> .} In 1945, after an unprecedented engineering effort costing 24 billion dollars (in 2008 dollars), the United States was able to detonate a nuclear device in an inter-state war. Today, experts predict a 30 to50 percent chance that terrorists will detonate a nuclear device in the United States in the next ten years.\footnote{E.G. Matthew Bunn, “The Risk of Nuclear Terrorism – And Next Steps to Reduce the Danger,” Testimony for the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, April 2, 2008, 7–8.} The diffusion of knowledge and modern communications that render borders more permeable make it possible for small groups to conduct strategic attacks—threats that can be met effectively only with interagency responses and a fuller range of nonmilitary national security capabilities.

The diffusion of power outside the state system does not mean that states and conflicts between states are no longer important. States extract and spend today a greater percentage of national resources than they did in 1947 and nations have continued to seek formal acknowledgement of their sovereignty and place in the inter-state system, indicating that statehood remains valuable. States continue to wield formidable military power. Yet, at the same time, the resources that states extract depend for their most rapid increase on the unimpeded flow of goods, services, and people across state borders. Furthermore, international and NGOs operate both outside and alongside the inter-state system, as do a variety of violent nonstate actors, such as insurgents, terrorists, and organized criminals, producing effects inside states. The result of these changes is that the principal desired outcome of the 1947 National Security Act, the resolution on America’s terms of inter-state conflict, exists today alongside the need for the United States to prevail in intra-state conflicts and against nonstate actors. In addition, the rise of nonstate power as a competitor with state power means that the national security system of the United States must excel at public diplomacy, as well as traditional state or private diplomacy.
2. Efficiency

In the 1980s, Panama and its leader, Manuel Noriega, were an important security concern for the United States. The State Department responded by negotiating with Noriega over his departure from Panama, while Justice Department prosecutors investigated his involvement in drug trafficking. At the same time, pursuing a U.S. government priority, the Drug Enforcement Administration used Noriega as a source on drug trafficking. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), reportedly, was also in contact with him.\footnote{For this point and other information on this case, see Robert Pear and Neil A. Lewis, “The Noriega Fiasco: What Went Wrong,” New York Times 30 May 1988: 1.} The Department of Defense pursued another security priority, maintaining its bases and training in Panama. None of this activity was coordinated. All of it together merely helped persuade Noriega that he could outlast a confused United States. Ultimately, all these U.S. government efforts failed. For example, once the Justice Department indicted Noriega, negotiations with him collapsed because he feared that leaving Panama would result in his arrest. Finally, the United States invaded Panama to remove Noriega, at the cost of twenty-three American lives, at least several hundred Panamanian lives, and great damage to the Panamanian economy. In addition to the costs of the invasion, the final tally must include the waste entailed in the failed U.S. efforts that preceded and necessitated the intervention, as well as the damage to the Panamanian infrastructure and economy.

Even if the United States had somehow achieved its objectives without invading Panama, uncoordinated U.S. government activity would have meant achieving its desired outcome only with gross inefficiency. In conducting policies in line with their core mandates but at variance with those of other agencies, each of the agencies in effect countered the efforts of the other agencies involved—wasting their efforts. The possibility of such inefficiencies is inherent in complex undertakings, especially when a variety of autonomous agencies is involved, and always has been. Following the Civil War, the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the Interior Department and the U.S. military pursued separate uncoordinated policies with regard to the Indians, which led to cavalry troopers being shot with weapons supplied by the U.S. government.\footnote{Robert Wooster, The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865–1903, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988) 59, 81, 206–207.} In this case, as in Panama, the uncoordinated efforts of the U.S. government wasted lives and resources as well. In many other instances, the United States government’s inability to work to a common purpose and with unity of effort have led to gross inefficiencies and squandered resources.\footnote{See Appendix 8: An Evaluation of Proposed Reforms on Potential Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations.}

This type of inefficiency persists. Of our efforts in Iraq, the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction reported recently:

> The U.S. government was not efficiently organized to accomplish and manage its reconstruction programs in Iraq. From the beginning of reconstruction activities to the present, fragmented organizational
structures and management information systems have resulted in poor interagency coordination, management oversight, and program implementation. These problems contributed to the failure of projects and/or the failure to meet program goals and therefore, in a number of cases, have led to wasteful expenditures.\textsuperscript{265}

A system that fails to integrate its capabilities will be ineffective in some missions but inefficient in all, prone to capability gaps, duplication of effort, and working at cross purposes. When such a system fails to produce a desired outcome, it tends to increase its commitment of resources without a commensurate increase in effectiveness for lack of a unified effort,\textsuperscript{266} the very definition of inefficiency.

One might acknowledge that efficiency is not a hallmark of bureaucracy and that an overriding commitment to the equity and accountability of bureaucratic action leads to procedures that increase inefficiency.\textsuperscript{267} Even so, increasingly the United States must reduce such inefficiencies as much as possible. The economy of the United States continues to grow, but its share of global domestic product is projected to decline (see Figure 1). The U.S. share of world gross domestic product (GDP) declined from 27.3 percent in 1950 to 21.9 percent in 1998.\textsuperscript{268}

Government program projections also raise questions about the sustainability of current U.S. spending patterns. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) argues that without significant changes in spending and/or revenue generation, long-term deficits “will gradually erode, if not suddenly damage, our economy, our standard of living and ultimately our national security.”\textsuperscript{269} In a more competitive international economic environment, it is increasingly important that the national security system be able to generate desired outcomes efficiently rather than by overwhelming opponents with resources. Simply put, as the relative resource advantage held by the United States declines, and current expenditure levels become unsustainable, the inefficient use of resources will grow increasingly intolerable. The country will no longer be able to rely on superior resources to overcome poor policy development and implementation.

\textsuperscript{265} Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Key Recurring Management Issues Identified In Audits of Iraq Reconstruction Efforts,” SIGIR-08-020, 8.
\textsuperscript{266} PNSR Case Studies, see Panama, Vietnam, and Iraq.
3. Behaviors

Measuring system efficiency is a challenge because it is difficult to identify causal links between inputs (like the implementation of a development project) and outputs (like the stabilization of a country). Given this difficulty, many system theorists also evaluate system performance by assessing whether the system is producing the types of behaviors required to obtain desired objectives. A given set of organizational objectives will require that personnel in the organization behave in a certain way. For example, the National Security Act of 1947 says of the National Security Council that

The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.\(^{270}\)

In order to function as it was supposed to, the National Security Council requires that personnel who give advice do so with the overall national security of the United States in mind and that they cooperate with one another to develop and implement this advice.

\(^{270}\) Sec. 101 [U.S.C. 402] (a)
This implies that they will behave in a certain manner; that they will cooperate with one another, for example.

While such cooperation is not unknown, the evidence suggests that it does not predominate in interagency activities. Instead of cooperation, competition between agencies and their personnel is often standard behavior. Instead of information sharing, information hoarding is common, hindering assessment and collaboration. Departments and agencies husband their resources (fiscal, material, and personnel) to better execute their core mandates, and all too often do so at the expense of the broader national interest. Even with much at stake, the system does not often reward collaboration across organizational lines. The problem is not new:

> These days few staffs in any agency can do their work alone without active support or at least passive acquiescence from staffs outside, in other agencies, often many others. Yet no one agency, no personnel system is the effective boss of any other; no one staff owes effective loyalty to the others. By and large, the stakes which move men’s loyalties—whether purpose, prestige, power, or promotion—run to one’s own program, one’s own career system, along agency lines, not across them.²⁷¹

Incentives in the current system produce competitive, agency-centric behavior that leads to both ineffectiveness and inefficiency. Personnel in a properly functioning system, on the other hand, exhibit cooperative behavior, focused on achieving not the objectives of this or that agency but those truly of service to the national security of the United States.

In summary, the national security system’s ability to generate desired outcomes, how efficiently it produces those outcomes, and the presence or absence of the behaviors necessary for effectiveness and efficiency are appropriate criteria by which to assess the security system. By those criteria, the current system is not functioning well enough. As the following section makes clear, the national security system does not fail in every case, but it does not succeed often enough or efficiently enough across the range of issues and challenges the United States now faces.

**B. Performance to Date**

1. Introduction

One way to assess the past performance of the national security system is to review specific cases of its operation. The following findings on past performance derive from

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the study of 106 cases. All the case studies addressed four questions:

1. Did the U.S. government generally act in an ad hoc manner or did it develop effective strategies to integrate its national security resources?
2. How well did the agencies/departments work together to implement these ad hoc or integrated strategies?
3. What variables explain the strengths and weaknesses of the response?
4. What diplomatic, financial, and other achievements and costs resulted from these successes and failures?

The incidents and issues addressed in the case studies cross borders, transcend presidential administrations, and often encompass more than one clearly defined problem. Nonetheless, if the cases are classified by their primary focus, the following patterns emerge:

Figure 2. Security Challenge Diversity

Note: These percentages add up to 102%
Figure 3. Region Diversity

Figure 4. Administration Diversity
All together, the cases represent one of the most extensive collections of U.S. national security decision-making and policy implementation cases ever compiled. The cases span the early twentieth century (the U.S. response to the flu pandemic in 1918–1919) to the present. But, as Figure 5 shows, most of the cases occurred in the past two decades. More than half took place in the William J. Clinton and George W. Bush administrations.

The cases provide insights into the workings of the national security system and suggest a set of findings. Although the cases vary by type and date, both their nonrandom selection and their limited number—compared to the entire set of national security issues handled over the past sixty years—require caution when generalizing from them. PNSR used the cases mostly for heuristic purposes, to identify propositions for further inquiry. The following section summarizes and explains the case study observations that informed PNSR’s analysis of the national security system.

2. Findings

To develop findings from the case studies, the four guiding questions were subdivided into subquestions or categories. For example, the second question, which addresses implementation, gave rise to subquestions on procedures and information management, among others. These subquestions or categories of analysis allowed for a more discriminating judgment of whether the U.S. government had succeeded or failed in a given case and why it may have done so.
From this analysis, some general trends emerged. The cases were roughly balanced between successful and unsuccessful government responses, at least in terms of the last question—costs and benefits—used to evaluate the case studies. Considering costs and benefits (reputational and monetary, among others) comes closest to providing an overall standard of success or failure. The term “success” does not mean perfection. None of the cases obtained all positive scores.

Figure 6 displays the distribution of the cases in terms of their overall scores. Green indicates those cases that had net positive scores; red portrays those with net negative scores. The horizontal line runs from the lowest possible negative score to the highest possible positive scores.

As the figure suggests, the cases with the negative ratings tend to cluster deeper into the negative side of the scale. This reflects negative ratings in all of the four questions the authors used to evaluate their case studies. The cases that made it into the positive side did so in a more “shallow” way. They tended to have relatively high scores in “strategy formulation” that offset some of the negative drag of their scores in implementation. In contrast, the cases that ended up on the negative side of the scale tended to have problems across the four evaluation questions—when they were “bad” in the strategy phase, their implementation tended to be “horrid.”

The fact that positive implementation scores tended to follow positive policy/strategy-making scores suggests a correlation between policy and strategy on the one hand and implementation on the other. When good policy and strategy-making occurred, good implementation tended to follow. Conversely, when policy and strategy were “not so good,” implementation suffered. The link between negative strategy scores and negative implementation was stronger. Almost without exception, negative strategy scores were paralleled by negative implementation ratings. Looking at the subcategory scores suggests why this may be the case.

Negative strategy scores were usually accompanied by negative scores in the implementation subcategories of “competition-collaboration” and “information management.” In cases where strategy/policy formulation got negative scores, the implementation phase tended toward much greater interagency competition, information hoarding, lack of cross-agency communications, conflicting actions, confusion, and inefficiency. And in some cases (the Iran-Contra case is an example), the confusion in implementation appeared to reinforce the fragmentation at the policy levels. It was as if
an absence of unity, clarity, and agreement at the top energized cross-agency jealousies, ignorance, and “stove piping” at the middle and lower levels charged with implementation, which then reinforced the differences, lack of agreement, and fragmented understanding at the top.

While the cases roughly balanced between successes and failures, it is important to note that on average the overall scores for the cases that occurred between 1990 and the present are significantly lower than those for the cases prior to 1990. For example, 71 percent of the cases occurring in and after 1990 ended up with negative evaluations, reflecting both relatively high levels of interagency competitiveness as opposed to collaboration and high cost (financial and political) to low benefit ratios.

The case study analysis permits some more specific judgments. The case studies indicate that the performance of the U.S. national security apparatus is inconsistent. While some cases illustrate relatively clear, integrated strategy development and unified policy implementation; others depict flawed, divided, contradictory throughout and sometimes nonexistent strategy promulgation and execution. European Union (EU) Special Envoy to the Former Yugoslavia Carl Bildt noted such dysfunction during the Balkan crises of the 1990s when he stated that, “the so-called inter-agency process in Washington often took on all the characteristics of a civil war, the chief casualty of which was often the prospect of coherence and consistency in the policies to be pursued.” Similarly, the system can provide resources efficiently, but it also can do so inadequately and tardily. Unfortunately, flawed responses recur across issue areas and time. In other words, the post-Cold War organizational reforms enacted thus far have not consistently resulted in improved systematic policy outcomes.

Though instances of successful government responses demonstrate that the U.S. government can, under certain circumstances, generate relatively efficient and effective policy responses, the mercurial achievement of such outcomes points to underlying flaws in national security policy development and implementation processes. From the perspective of addressing immediate, medium, and long-term national security issues, the cases support the finding that the current system too rarely achieves integrated policy and unity of purpose.

Although the cases reveal a correlation between good strategy and good implementation, some cases characterized by generally sound strategies displayed implementation problems. Cases examining the initially effective U.S. military strategies underlying the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan clearly point to a strong U.S. capability to manage (and defeat) state threats, but they also demonstrate the U.S. government’s inability to follow through and achieve long-term objectives.

The case studies reveal the following answers to the guiding questions that all authors used:

1. **Did the U.S. government generally act in an ad hoc manner or did it develop effective**

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strategies to integrate its national security resources?

In evaluating various government responses in terms of policy development, the case studies demonstrate that ad hoc, unintegrated strategies are not rare products of the national security apparatus. Studies of the Iran-Contra affair, the U.S. government’s response to the Rwanda genocide, and the planning for post-war operations in Iraq reveal the tremendous costs of ineffective strategy development processes. As Dilip Hiro observes, the disclosure of the Iran-Contra affair “demonstrated acute schizophrenia in the American government with the state, defense, justice and customs departments actively pursuing anti-Iran policies, and the White House, National Security Council, and the CIA trying to woo the Khomeini government.”

American policy before and during the Iranian revolution and subsequent U.S. embassy hostage crisis revealed similar problems. In his discussion of the U.S. approach towards Iran prior to the 1979 revolution, Taheri concludes that there was “… no sign that the United States was pursuing a coherent policy aimed at well-defined objectives.” More recently, the U.S. Army’s official history of the Iraq war determined that Phase IV planning in particular was “poorly conceived and poorly coordinated.” The planning for the Bay of Pigs also illustrates the consequences of failing to develop effective strategies as does the recent U.S. government approach to counterterrorism intelligence and financing. Yet again, a senior Pentagon official described the China policy in the 1990s as “wholly reactive in its approach, and totally deferential in most respects to domestic interests, rather than responsive to foreign realities.” This arguably contributed to the multiple U.S.-China crises in that decade, the Taiwan Straits standoff in particular. A final case to note in which strategies were unintegrated to the point of working against one another was in the U.S. efforts to manage North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Mitchell Reiss points out that Robert Gallucci’s delegation, which had been tasked to negotiate with North Korea, “received conflicting instructions from the State Department, the National Security Council, and the Pentagon.”

Of course, negative outcomes did not follow all ad hoc responses. The U.S. response to the 1964 Alaskan earthquake shows how bypassing traditional structures and creating a temporary commission to coordinate the federal-state response facilitated resuscitating Alaska’s economy and infrastructure. In addition, the ad hoc approach of the first Bush administration toward Somalia encountered fewer problems than the more formal approach of the Clinton administration.

Nevertheless, most studies show that flawed or nonexistent strategy development

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276 Donald Wright and Col. Timothy Resse, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2008) 80.
decreases the system’s ability to achieve effective unity of effort and resourcing. For instance, the lack of a clear strategy regarding China and Taiwan during the Clinton administration led departments to pursue different policies based on their own priorities. Likewise, the absence of overarching, coherent policy toward Uzbekistan during the second Bush administration encouraged disunity of effort and the promulgation of mixed messages from the White House, State Department, Department of Defense, and Congress.

Several cases—notably studies detailing the U.S. interventions in East Timor, Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia, and U.S. planning for the post-WWII occupation of Japan—depict sound strategy development. In the case of Bosnia, however, a small group achieved this outcome only after bypassing standard interagency mechanisms and excluding some officials. In all these cases, moreover, delays in integrated strategy promulgation increased U.S. costs. In the case of East Timor, for example, the U.S. government responded with focused planning only after the president and the other principal policymakers realized the serious damage to U.S.-Australian relations resulting from the crisis and intervened to impose a coherent strategy on the bureaucracy. Until Clinton’s intervention, Australian interlocutors expressed increasing frustration with the different messages they had been receiving regarding the U.S. position toward East Timor, especially the support Washington would offer to the planned Australian-led military intervention.

Yet, overly rigid strategies that attempt to dictate all operational procedures can be equally damaging. Though numerous failings contributed to the U.S. government’s poor response to Hurricane Katrina, the perceived rigidity of the national response plan constrained local responders’ room to maneuver. In contrast, the success in the U.S. response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was in large part due to flexibility at the operational level combined with a well-defined strategic framework. Similarly, the U.S. government’s response to the Good Friday Earthquake in Alaska succeeded in large part because it was adaptable. After the earthquake, the Anchorage Daily News published an editorial which lauded the “remarkable” performance of the Commission staff.

Noting that the staff was “handed a job without guidelines, without precedent,” the editorial concluded that “The staff work performed by the federal Alaska Reconstruction Commission has been a display of government at its very best…In many cases the normal rules followed by federal agencies were sprung completely out of shape to fit the post-earthquake needs of Alaska.”

Flexibility in policy areas outside emergency response is equally critical. In June 2008 congressional testimony, Gina K. Abercrombie-Winstanley, the deputy coordinator at the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT), underscored the importance of adaptability stating, “While a priority list [for determining counterterrorism capacity building program participation] is necessary, flexibility is crucial to

responding to actual needs and opportunities on the ground.”

2. How well did U.S. government agencies/departments work together to implement these ad hoc or integrated strategies?

The cases evince a mixed record with regard to the system’s ability to generate unity of effort in developing and implementing strategies. A few cases saw various national security actors cooperate effectively to coordinate and execute policy in response to an international crisis, such as the outbreak of violence in East Timor and the 2004 tsunami. Other cases show instances when the U.S. government devised and instituted forward-looking strategies in pursuit of long-term objectives, such as those aimed at enhancing the counterterrorism capacity of foreign partners and the establishment of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).

Nevertheless, many cases displayed considerable disunity. A 2005 CIA Inspector General report notes, “... The Review Team found that Agency officers from the top down worked hard against the al-Qaeda and Usama Bin Ladin targets. They did not always work effectively and cooperatively, however.” With regard to the U.S. government’s efforts to counter human trafficking, the GAO has called for “greater collaboration” among agencies while a 2006 multi-agency Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Combat Trafficking in Persons underscores that “the U.S. Government, its state and local partners, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) need to improve coordination of services to victims.” Relatively weak interagency authorities were frequently unable to overcome institutional loyalties that undermined governmentwide coordination. At a strategic level, interagency cooperation was often insufficient. The authors identified frequent instances where analysis, planning, and implementation were driven by organizational equities, paradigms, and incentive structures that decreased interagency cooperation. This problem was apparent in the U.S. response to the crises in the former Yugoslavia, pre-9/11 intelligence sharing, democracy promotion in foreign countries, and management of North Korea’s nuclear program.

The problem was also apparent in the struggle to form a National Counterintelligence Executive and in the 2005 report of the Weapons Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission, which confirmed that, “U.S. counterintelligence is bureaucratically fractured, passive (i.e., focusing on the defense rather than going on the offense), and too often simply

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280 Gina K. Abercrombie-Winstanley, Statement for the Record, “Oversight of the Antiterrorism Assistance Program,” State Department Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism, before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, 10 October 2008 <http://nationalsecurity.oversight>


ineffective.” The creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), according to Helen Fessenden’s 2005 article in *Foreign Affairs*, “serves as a textbook case of Washington’s bureaucratic warfare undermining sound policy.” Fessenden suggests that the battle over the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act shows the “resilience of turf protection and bureaucratic self-preservation.” Many of these agencies chafed at the idea of creating a DNI. In particular, the Defense Department, which controlled about 80 percent of the intelligence budget, exhibited “ingrained opposition to a strong DNI who could divert resources out of the Defense Department into other agencies, including the CIA.”

Faulty incentive structures can also be damaging to U.S. national security and interagency cooperation. In the run up to the Iran revolution in 1979, U.S. government reports which deviated from accepted policy were repressed by superiors and the authors were “penalized by a non-career enhancing re-assignment.” Michael Scheuer relates a similar case where incentive structures led to interagency failure:

For most of a year the Bin Laden unit prepared for an operation in a foreign city that was set to come to fruition in late-summer 1997. The unit’s lead U.S.-based officer on this operation was an extraordinarily able analyst from another IC [intelligence community] component; she knew the issue cold. Days before the operation occurred the IC component ordered her back to its headquarters. She protested, but was told that she would not be promoted if she balked at returning. I protested to my superiors and to the three most senior officers of the IC component who were then in charge of terrorism. All refused to intervene. The operation was much less well exploited because of the loss of this officer. A year later, al-Qaeda destroyed U.S. facilities in the area near the foreign city of the under-exploited operation.

The cases further suggest that the U.S. national security system encounters difficulty when national policy and resources have to be coordinated with state and local governments. For example, the studies reviewing the U.S. government’s response to combating human trafficking, the Andrew Speaker tuberculosis incident, the 1970s energy crisis, the anthrax attacks, the California wildfires, and Hurricane Katrina support this finding. Bio-defense appears to be an area of particular concern here. According to the Congressional Research Service report, *Federal and State Quarantine and Isolation Authority*, “Federal authority over interstate and foreign travel is clearly delineated under constitutional and statutory provisions. Less clear, however, is whether the state police

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285 Helen Fessenden, “The Limits of Intelligence Reform,” *Foreign Affairs* 84.6 (2005): 120.
286 Fessenden 108.
287 Fessenden 107.
288 MacEachin, Nolan, and Tockman, *Iran: Intelligence Failure or Policy Stalemate? 2 and 9; Sick, All Fall Down: America’s Tragic Encounter with Iran*.
powers may be used to restrict interstate travel to prevent the spread of disease. In a public health emergency, federal, state, and local authorities may overlap.”

The lack of coordination between the federal and state governments actually exacerbated many of the difficulties during the multiple energy crises in the 1970s. Alfred Light points out that “the unwieldy and complex allocations system which Washington eventually devised had many flaws which only those who were close to the problems that the system created [the state and local officials] could see.” The 1964 Alaskan earthquake response emerges as the principal exception to the poor coordination record between national and local authorities, but the unification of assets and effort at the different levels of the U.S. government has been all too rare.

Insufficient interagency communication often renders it difficult to achieve unity of effort at the operational level. Many policy decisions are made without adequate consideration of operational conditions or the concerns and goals of other U.S. government agencies. This problem was clearly evident in the U.S. intervention in Somalia, but it was also evident in U.S. policy toward Iran before the revolution, the Balkans in the 1990s, and planning for the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq. Another Middle East crisis that demonstrated this inadequate consideration of operational realities was in Lebanon. Richard Parker reports on Secretary of State George Shultz’s surprise when he was confronted with skepticism pertaining to the chances of success of the May 17 Agreement, which he hoped would bring peace between Israel and Lebanon:

When Shultz arrived in Cairo on April 24, he may not have realized how slim the chances were for success. He appeared to be disagreeably surprised in any event when, on the afternoon of April 25, in a meeting with U.S. ambassadors and principal officers in the region, several of them told him that the proposed agreement would not work and that he should not let himself get involved with it. By all accounts he was visibly upset, abruptly terminated the meeting, and stalked out of the room.

A paper by the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy quoted one official saying that field experts are “typically and increasingly disenfranchised from the inner culture of Washington.” Another participant in the study noted that this exclusion remains the crux of the problem. That is still what is going on. The conversation remains in Washington…. We ignore the cultural contexts of

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our missions, situations and professional expertise of the people in the missions. Professionals in the field are ignored or marginalized.\textsuperscript{293}

PNSR’s analysis also found that interagency cooperation remains possible at the tactical level even without strategic and operational integration, but it requires serendipitous cooperative relationships, exceptional policy entrepreneurship, or other uncomfortably random conditions. The studies involving peacekeeping, as well as reconstruction and stabilization activities, support this contention. Regarding the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), one Foreign Service officer noted, “Despite all these setbacks, and after several months of infighting within the PRT, our civilian and military leaders had a meeting of the minds [and] with time, suspicions were laid to rest and collaboration became stronger.”\textsuperscript{294} However, this cooperation was episodic and only based on the personalities within particular PRTs. Another instance where tactical cooperation was evident despite poor prior coordination between home agencies was in responding to the 1998 Embassy bombings in East Africa. According to Col. James Geiling:

Interagency cooperation at the scene was excellent. Interaction between DoS [Department of State] medical staff and DoD [Department of Defense] staff from USAMRU [U.S. Army Medical Research Unit—Kenya] was especially complimentary. Each assisted one another, ensuring all aspects of patient care, tracking, evacuation, etc. were completed.\textsuperscript{295}

In those cases where unity is achieved, the analyst is likely to uncover the unpredictable forces of high-level policy attention, limited bureaucratic costs, or personal relationships at work. These factors helped facilitate cooperation in the conduct of counterterror capacity-building programs and in the East Timor intervention. Even when such tactical collaboration occurs, it rarely leads to the realization of broader U.S. strategic objectives, as shown by the case of the Vietnam-era Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program and the current use of PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq.

3. What variables explain the strengths and weaknesses of the response?

To better assess the variables that explain the strengths and weaknesses of the national security system, the major cases examined the explanatory variables listed in Table 4.
## Table 4. Explanatory Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Decision-Making Structures and Processes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interagency Decision Mechanisms:</strong> <em>Did existing interagency decision-making bodies (in the U.S., the region, and the field) produce compromise decisions that stymied or slowed progress?</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Clear Authorities:</strong> <em>Were standing and assigned authorities and responsibilities for interagency bodies and for each agency clear or ambiguous at the national, regional, and local levels?</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Interagency Authorities:</strong> <em>Were lead interagency bodies so constrained in their scope of authority (i.e., to policy decisions?) that they could not exercise effective control over implementation?</em></td>
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<td><strong>Lead Agency Approach:</strong> <em>Did existing interagency decision-making bodies assign implementation to a lead-agency that was unable to produce unity of effort with other agencies?</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Informal Decision Mechanisms:</strong> <em>Did informal and ad hoc decision-making bodies have to be established that took too long to become effective?</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Individual Agency Behaviors:</strong> <em>Did strong individual department and agency bureaucracies resist sharing information and implementing decisions from interagency bodies?</em></td>
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<th>2. Civilian National Security Organizational Cultures</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Interagency Culture:</strong> <em>Did different agency and department cultures, including leadership styles and behavior, reinforce competition or collaboration among organizations?</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Shared Values:</strong> <em>Did existing organizational cultures and personnel systems value and reward individual agency performance over U.S. government unity of purpose and effort?</em></td>
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<td><strong>Missions and Mandates:</strong> <em>Were civilian agencies unprepared to apply their expertise rapidly in a risky overseas environment?</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Expeditionary Mindset:</strong> <em>Did civilian agencies lack a culture that embraces operational activities, i.e., making success in the field as important as success in Washington or the U.S.?</em></td>
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<th>3. Base-line Capabilities and Resources</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Staff:</strong> <em>Were interagency staff capabilities sufficient to provide rapid policy, planning, and implementation direction?</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sufficient Resources:</strong> <em>Did civilian departments and agencies have sufficient resources to carry out their national security responsibilities?</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Congressional Resourcing:</strong> <em>Was Congress slow, unable, or unwilling to provide necessary resources and the authorities to permit their effective use?</em></td>
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<td><strong>Resource Management:</strong> <em>Were agencies and departments unable to effectively administer the resources and programs they did control?</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Information Management:</strong> <em>Were interagency bodies able to generate, find, and quickly access relevant information and analysis?</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Legal:</strong> <em>Were there any specific legal issues that affected decision-making processes and structures, organizational culture, or capabilities and resources?</em></td>
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While not all variables were relevant to each case, targeting these factors—in the initial guidance as well as during the revision of the case studies—successfully facilitated the process-oriented analysis of interest to the Project on National Security Reform.

Although generalizing across the range of cases is difficult, taken together the major studies indicate that serious flaws exist in each of these areas. For example, interagency decision mechanisms fail to produce unified strategic guidance in a timely manner and agencies often pursue independent strategies. The individual agencies cannot compel interagency action, while overarching authority in the national security system is often too ambiguous to do so. This condition creates space for—and often requires—informal decision-making, with mixed results.

While designation of a lead agency is rare in the case literature, de facto lead agencies are relatively common. Institution-specific cultures and values dominate the bureaucratic landscape and a sense of interagency culture remains limited. Interagency information sharing is not the norm. Agencies and departments tend to restrict communications to vertical channels. Though civilian agencies are not averse to applying their expertise in risky environments, they lack the operational capacity to do so—a partial consequence of the civil-military resource disparity. The ability of department staffs to conduct rapid policy planning varies widely depending on the scale of the initiative and the degree to which plans were developed in cooperation with other agencies that possess relevant expertise and information. Congressional resource allocation is uneven but generally less supportive of soft-power assets, especially public diplomacy, than of hard military power capabilities, while other regulatory and administrative procedures further hamper the timely provision and redistribution of resources for national security strategies.

Considered as a whole, the variables analyzed in the cases help explain a number of key trends that regularly influence the success and failure of the U.S. government’s response to national challenges.

**a. Interagency Competition**

*Of all the faults cited in the major cases, interagency competition is the most prominent.* From this one dynamic, a host of negative consequences emerge, including poor long-range planning, policy stagnation, redundancy of efforts, the tendency to centralize policy decision authority in the White House, lack of information sharing, and senior leader frustration resulting in the use of informal communications and decision-making channels in lieu of formal mechanisms. The negative effects of this interagency fratricide manifest themselves clearly in the cases regarding land-mine policy during the Clinton administration, many public diplomacy and democracy promotion efforts, and Operation Enduring Freedom-Horn of Africa, among others.

Inter-organization rivalry is not new. In the run up and response to the Soviet launch of Sputnik, it was inter-service rivalry that was the problem. As Michael Neufeld states, “All too often the entrenched interests of the services, seemed more important to their
commanders than the national interest."\textsuperscript{296} As a result, Mark Erickson notes, there "was confusion, chaos, and unnecessary duplication at the highest level."\textsuperscript{297} Eisenhower himself lamented that the intense inter-service rivalry prior to \textit{Sputnik} was "highly harmful to the Nation."\textsuperscript{298} Once National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) formed, the competition continued in an interagency venue until the Army gave up its missile program.

\textit{The ease with which policy can be filibustered in the interagency is extremely damaging to strategy development.} Speaking of the Bosnia policy process, a high-ranking official noted that the consensus system "makes it easy to be obstructionist and encourages hedgehog behaviors. A consensus approach tends to drive people toward the bureaucratic behaviors … it encourages turf battles."\textsuperscript{299} The same problem was evident in determining policy towards China during the Clinton administration. J. Stapleton Roy, the U.S. Ambassador to China at the time, noted that "even when the policy went to the NSC, the human-rights people in the State Department were able to stymie implementation of the policy through the human-rights angle."\textsuperscript{300} Decision-making processes that require consensus create excessive veto opportunities, encourage a search for least common denominator solutions, and typically yield policies that favor slow, incremental, and middle-of-the-road courses of action. The American response to the land-mine treaty and to crises in Bosnia, Somalia, Liberia, and Rwanda revealed these flaws. In these cases, U.S. policies lagged woefully behind developments on the ground. In other cases, most clearly illustrated by the Bay of Pigs operation, policies or plans that might have proved successful became so altered by the process of reaching consensus that they produced embarrassing failures.

\textit{In addition, policymakers' frustration with the delay in developing clear, integrated strategies encourages them to bypass established policymaking mechanisms and employ informal structures and processes.} This phenomenon of excluding key actors from decision-making processes—resulting in policy choices being dominated by a few key officials—occurred during the Liberia intervention and the Berlin airlift. A history of the Berlin airlift observes that because "routine procedures could not cope with the environmental change [of the Soviet blockade], which involved mounting threat as well as time pressure," the U.S. military governor of Germany, General Lucius Clay, felt compelled to act "swiftly and on his own initiative decided to launch the airlift."\textsuperscript{301} The tendency to exclude key actors also was manifest in less successful responses to the 1995 Chinese missile tests, East Africa embassy bombings, Iranian revolution, and 1970s

\textsuperscript{297} Mark Erickson, USAF, \textit{Into the Unknown Together: The DOD, NASA, and Early Spaceflight}, September 2005 (Montgomery: Air University Press) 63.
\textsuperscript{298} Ibid. 9–10.
energy crisis as well as in the Iran-Contra affair. The State Department seems particularly likely to being excluded from the process, as was the case in forming strategies for Iraq, the rescue operation for the Iranian hostages, Bosnia, and the diplomatic opening toward China. In these situations, the case studies indicate that the Department of Defense (DoD) or the national security advisor can assume a dominant role, as happened during planning for the Iraq War or in the case of Henry Kissinger’s China policy, respectively.

Frequently, a tradeoff exists between the desire for swift action and the integrated application of government expertise, bureaucratic support, and political approval that ideally results from the interagency process. Iran-Contra, the rescue operation for the Iranian hostages, and the controversy over the Dubai Ports World deal demonstrate the negative results that occur when the imperative of speed deprives policymakers of the benefits of the interagency process.

The cases highlight both the importance and the variability of the relationship between the Departments of State and Defense. Although the Pentagon recently appears the more dominant player for U.S. national security missions, the Department of State can effectively assume the lead role for these issues. During the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles exhibited tight control over the conduct of foreign policy, as seen in the case of U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia, in which the Pentagon assumed a supporting role. During the interventions in Bosnia and Somalia, DoD representatives had little influence in policy formation when the focus of U.S. government efforts was primarily diplomatic.

The State Department often mobilizes first in a foreign policy crisis, while Pentagon involvement significantly increases when the situation requires the application of its more extensive national security resources. Interestingly, recent cases, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom, reveal an inverse pattern, with the DoD dominating policy creation and DoS providing primarily reactive support. Regardless of the order, this typical mobilizing of U.S. government agencies at different stages of a national security crisis can weaken interagency integration.

Nevertheless, the cases also make clear that simultaneous effort is not necessarily unified effort. In the case of Bosnia, when the Pentagon was eventually granted a role in negotiations, it was not well integrated into the process, leading DoD to develop policies separately. The result was that diplomatic and military annexes and goals of the peace accords worked against one another. Similar disconnects occurred in the debates over whether and how to intervene in Liberia, Rwanda, and Lebanon.

Under certain circumstances, typically in programs or initiatives involving a limited number of officials and requiring minimal departmental resources, working relationships between agency representatives can mitigate bureaucratic competition and spur cooperation. For example, this was the case with the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program during the Vietnam War, which brought together representatives from the military, CIA, DoS, AID, and USIA to combine their efforts into a cooperative pacification movement in South Vietnam. This program
represented a “dramatic change from business as usual.”\textsuperscript{302} Unfortunately, the cases suggest that 	extit{bureaucratic turf battles and conflict over preferred strategic approaches to national challenges are frequent.} Interagency competition regularly centers on issues of resources, authorities, and priorities. These battles typically increase in frequency and ferocity in proportion to the institutional resources and interests at stake. This tendency was common in the interagency debate during the Balkan crises and has been endemic in the intelligence community from 1947, through 9/11, until today.

J.A. Bill’s account of U.S.-Iranian relations cautions “bureaucratic conflict and rivalry must be moderated in order to insure the more efficient determination of high-quality information and the more sensitive formation of policy.”\textsuperscript{303} Even the fear of turf battles can be damaging. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake initially failed to get involved and establish a clear direction for China policy, as he was apprehensive about encroaching on State Department “turf.”\textsuperscript{304} Differences over preferred approaches to problems can be just as damaging to U.S. security as power struggles. The difference in organizational priorities can cause large disconnects between policy and implementation. For example, some development experts, according to Peter Baker, are hesitant to engage in democracy promotion despite its articulation by the George W. Bush administration as U.S. policy, “not because they’re evil but because they’re development people.” One top official who works on democracy issues told the \textit{Washington Post}, “They want to inoculate children. They want to build schools. And to do that, they have to work with existing regimes. And [democracy promotion is] getting in their way.”\textsuperscript{305}

\textit{Competition among agencies often begins early in strategy development.} Within the policymaking process, bureaucracies regularly filter information through organizational perspectives and provide recommendations that reflect their core mission area or statutory mandate. While this tendency is not necessarily detrimental, policy development suffers when these recommendations distort the security environment or advance analysis on the basis of institutional interests. The cases illustrate that agencies use their authority to control interagency discussion and protect not only their budget allocations and policy preferences, but also their institutional prerogatives, from which budgets, status, and power are derived. This pattern—when preferences for organizational rather than national interests hamper unified strategy development—was evident in the cases on Bosnia, democracy promotion, China policy, and the Iran-Iraq war.

\textit{Overlapping agency mandates reinforce competitive inclinations.} U.S. government departments and agencies often have differing priorities, varying perceptions of national

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{302} John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005) 165.
\item \textsuperscript{303} J. A. Bill, \textit{The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations}, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988) 446.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
interest, and uneven definitions of national security. In the terrorism investigations of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 2001 anthrax attacks, some organizations focused on criminal prosecution, others prioritized intelligence gathering, and yet others considered the medical response paramount. Don Kash and his colleagues point out that the method to determine energy policy

suffers from all the problems associated with pluralism and fragmentation. Pluralistic politics requires an often difficult process of compromise between competing interests—a process which governmental institutions with fragmented and overlapping responsibilities and ad hoc modes of operation are often ill-equipped to handle.\(^\text{306}\)

In the past, the Departments of Commerce and State have vied over priorities in shaping international relations, as was the case vis-à-vis China, Iraq in the 1980s, and decisions made by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. Decisions regarding when and how to use force regularly bring the Departments of State and Defense into conflict. This dynamic also extends to the field, and was seen when the U.S. Ambassador to Laos under President Kennedy had authority for selecting bombing targets. *Shooting at the Moon*, Roger Warner’s Laos history, quotes a U.S. Air Force (USAF) pilot stationed at Udorn who describes coordination difficulties in planning air operations in support of the Hmong paramilitaries: “Neither the State Department nor the Air Force—nor the CIA, in fact—had an incentive, much less a responsibility, to fight the war the way anybody else wanted to fight it. Each institution had its own chain of command with competing interests and priorities…. Everywhere there were turf problems.”\(^\text{307}\)

This trend may surface again in response to the creation of AFRICOM. Isaac Kfir warns that with AFRICOM “focusing on non military issues… there is a possibility of interdepartmental tensions . . . . Experience has shown that such frictions emerge as departments seek to protect their own spheres.”\(^\text{308}\) Indeed, current operations in the Horn of Africa have already caused such tensions. To the Department of State, the Pentagon’s newfound interest in Africa has, according to Thomas Barnett, led State officials to “feel like their turf’s being invaded by the gun-toting crowd, hell-bent on opening a new front in a new war.”\(^\text{309}\)

Yet, some interagency competition is useful since it helps ensure that all relevant perspectives and resources are engaged in policy formation and execution. Mission mandates that are sufficiently broad to include actors having access to and knowledge of economic, military, and diplomatic tools of power are useful since enduring national security problems typically require integrated application of all these instruments. *Strategy execution that relies disproportionately on one policy tool often fails to yield*


long-term success. The effects of such imbalances are apparent in the cases regarding the Somalia intervention under the Clinton administration and the Iraq War under the George W. Bush administration. The result of America’s military focus in countering terrorism in the Horn of Africa, claims Robert Berschinski has been a series of high-profile, marginally valuable kinetic strikes on suspected terrorists; affiliation with proxy forces inimical to stated U.S. policy goals; and the corrosion of African support for many truly valuable and well-intentioned U.S. endeavors…. In the long run, such actions will harm, not further, American interests on the continent.310

A similar situation is evident in Pakistan. According to Robert Hathaway, “Washington’s preoccupation with the war on terrorism… has given the U.S. Department of Defense an insurmountable advantage in shaping the American aid program for Pakistan. This has ensured that the bulk of U.S. assistance would be military in nature, and would be directed toward the Pakistani military.”311 The results have not been good. Philip Gordon observes, that the situation in Pakistan “is precisely the type of explosive situation that Mr. Bush has argued produces ‘stagnation, resentment and violence ready for export’—and that his democracy promotion doctrine was designed to avoid.”312

Secretary Gates has affirmed that the military force cannot be too heavily relied upon:

The real challenges we have seen emerge since the end of the Cold War—from Somalia to the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere—make clear we in defense need to change our priorities to be better able to deal with the prevalence of what is called “asymmetric warfare.” . . . We can expect that asymmetric warfare will be the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time. These conflicts will be fundamentally political in nature, and require the application of all elements of national power. Success will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of shaping behavior—of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the people in between.313

The case studies show that achieving adequate cooperation between civil and military actors in developing and implementing policies is a persistent challenge. The differing institutional mandates and missions of military and civilian agencies create divergent bureaucratic cultures, which in turn produce perspectives that are particularly difficult to

311 Robert M. Hathaway 6.
reconcile. The troubles encountered by PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq are the most recent example of this. Although many teams eventually achieve at least cordial cooperation, overall “the fashionable fusion of military and development assistance is woefully miscalculated, exposing the dramatic and increasing gap between U.S. civilian and military capacities, and failing to address the root causes of violence and extremism in the region.” This trend also held true in the formation of U.S. land-mine policy during the 1990s. In combination with the resource disparities discussed below, this civil-military divergence makes coordinated policy development and implementation among military and civilian actors a consistent challenge. Civil-military conflict was notable in the cases examining the U.S. intervention in Somalia, the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Bay of Pigs intervention, and the conduct of U.S.-Uzbek relations, among others.

In yet another extension of the competitive norm, the cases demonstrate that when field officials maintain tight links to their home agencies in Washington, the incidence of bureaucratic conflict increases, especially between military and civilian officials. In writing about Ambassador Richard Holbrooke’s shuttle diplomacy team’s attempts to bring peace to Bosnia, Derek Chollet claims that, “To maximize the team’s bargaining flexibility and ability to make quick decisions, they had to circumvent the typical interagency deliberative process.” Holbrooke corroborated this, writing that “Complete trust and openness … was essential if we were to avoid energy-consuming internal intrigues and back channels to Washington.”

Conversely, civil-military cooperation in the field often improves when home institutions empower their in-country representatives. Many of the tactical successes of U.S. military assistance to Laos under John F. Kennedy can be attributed to this phenomenon, as can the triumph of the diplomatic team in Bosnia during the civil war. This dynamic also helps explain the occasional success of ad hoc strategies. If officials are sufficiently empowered to act independently, the cases indicate they can achieve degrees of successful strategy implementation, within their operational purview, even in the absence of a coherent national strategy. The ability of Foreign Emergency Support Teams to respond to the 1998 African embassy bombings and the effectiveness of the 1964 Alaskan earthquake recovery effort illustrate this pattern, though these limited successes did not necessarily improve U.S. government performance in subsequent national security challenges, even those of a similar nature.

b. Organization-Leadership Dynamic

Successful policy development, implementation, and outcomes are often associated with direct and sustained presidential engagement. For example, the study of American policy during the East Timor crisis found that it was only after President Clinton intervened to enforce a coherent U.S. interagency approach that the growing crisis in U.S.-Australian relations over their joint response to the post-independence violence

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dissipated. Richard Nixon’s diplomatic overtures toward China and Clinton’s engagement on the Northern Ireland issue are also representative examples of the importance of presidential leadership. A history of U.S. involvement in the Northern Ireland peace process notes:

It was President Clinton who put Ireland near the top of the list of U.S. foreign policy priorities, and entrusted it to the one senior official who spent “face time” with him every day. . . . From the time of the Adams visa, party leaders from Northern Ireland found they could walk into the White House to confer with the President’s most important foreign policy advisor.\textsuperscript{317}

These cases and others indicate that White House leadership is often critical to the operation of the national security apparatus. Unfortunately, presidential involvement does not guarantee positive outcomes, as the Iraq War and U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia under Eisenhower demonstrate. Even when the president successfully overrides bureaucratic conflict at the policy-development stage, implementation problems can arise if presidential attention wanders. Setbacks in the Northern Ireland peace process, for example, may be partially attributed to the decreased interagency attention the George W. Bush White House devoted to the issue compared with the Clinton administration.

\textit{The U.S. national security system’s reliance on direct presidential leadership reflects, and exacerbates, the weak nature of its interagency mechanisms.} In the absence of direct and constant presidential intervention, the development and implementation of integrated national security strategies becomes problematic as policy coherence suffers under the weight of bureaucratic infighting. Regarding U.S. policy in Lebanon, Agnes Korbani writes

Within each of the involved organizations there were disparities between high-level officials and bureaucrats at the working level concerning U.S. objectives in Lebanon. The bureaucratic warfare emerged as a result of the unwillingness of the White House to clarify and impose its priorities. Washington kept sending dual messages and conflicting signals that the protagonists later interpreted according to their own perceptions.\textsuperscript{318}

In his account of American Cold War military assistance to Laos, Charles Stevenson asserts that, “The Geneva Agreements of 1962 pushed Laos off the front pages of newspapers and, consequently, away from public concern. Presidential and bureaucratic energies shifted increasingly to the worsening situation in Vietnam.” He thus finds, “Decisions in Washington were not consistent, value-maximizing choices, but, rather, ad hoc responses.” Individual bureaucracies engaged in policymaking where, “Coordination


rarely went above the Assistant Secretary level.\textsuperscript{319} As another example, recent democracy promotion efforts in Egypt and Pakistan suffered when the State Department and the vice president’s office thwarted presidential guidance as promulgated in national security strategies. Although the national security advisor (NSA) is institutionally positioned to compel interagency consensus and ensure unified, efficient policy implementation, the NSA has sometimes lacked the authority to achieve these ends given the absence of a consistently effective mechanism to delegate presidential authority. When the NSA has succeeded in brokering policy and overseeing implementation, typically he or she has been personally empowered by the president, has worked around the bureaucratic machinery, or has managed to invoke the power or mystique of the White House to achieve desired ends.

Below the level of the National Security Council, authority for interagency integration is similarly anemic, despite the importance of mid-level officials in addressing urgent national security decisions. As a result, the cases depict actors working around established interagency processes to execute policy. \textit{Good leaders can achieve effective action, but they too often can do so only by bypassing the U.S. national security system.} Outside Washington, bureaucratic superheroes have been able to achieve positive policy outcomes, as seen, for instance, in the cases of CORDS, the 1964 Alaskan earthquake, and the Berlin blockade. In Washington, Henry Kissinger in his opening to China, as well as Richard Holbrooke and Anthony Lake in their attempts to end the Bosnian war, also felt compelled to circumvent traditional interagency processes to achieve desired policy outcomes. In the case of Kissinger, historian James Mann illustrates that at times Kissinger “treated [Secretary of State] Rogers in particular and the State Department in general as enemy powers. Rogers was kept out of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s meeting with Mao Tsetung [Zedong]; China was enlisted as the White House’s ally in plotting to make sure the State Department did and knew as little as possible.”\textsuperscript{320}

Yet, the relative ease with which the system can be bypassed by officials acting as policy entrepreneurs, whether or not explicitly empowered by their superiors, is problematic since these workarounds do not always yield enduringly positive results. \textit{Discarding established standard procedures can exacerbate systemic weaknesses of the U.S. national security system.} In particular, “workarounds” limit the availability of resources, entail the use of questionable legal authorities, result in policies based on faulty but unchallenged assumptions, and make poor use of subject experts and other institutional expertise. Richard Bissell and Oliver North were respected leaders, but their attempts to circumvent the national security system led to the Bay of Pigs and Iran-Contra disasters, respectively. With respect to Iran-Contra, Theodore Draper affirms the consequences of working around the system:

\begin{quote}
In effect, by cutting out Shultz and Weinberger after January 1986 and thus signaling to them that he did not want to hear any more of their opposition, Reagan gutted the National Security Council until he called it
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{320} James Mann, \textit{About Face}, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995) 40.
together in the very last days of his political crisis. He depended wholly on its misnamed staff under Poindexter and in fact on the latter alone. The Council had been intended to give the President the benefit of a structured system of advice from his two senior cabinet members, the heads of departments with ample, far-flung resources.  

Where successful leaders differ appears to be in their skill at building coalitions across agencies at the working level. Lucius Clay, Kissinger, and Holbrooke effectively worked with select individuals from other agencies to support their efforts. In contrast, Bissell and North’s attempts to bypass the restrictions placed on them by other actors (Department of State and Congress, respectively) suffered from their limited attempts at collaboration with elements outside their home organizations. Even in successful cases, however, bypassing the national security system has had adverse consequences. For example, achieving the goals identified in the Dayton peace accords was difficult since those charged with policy implementation had been excluded from U.S. decision-making during the initial negotiations. Similarly, Lucius Clay’s detachment from the Washington policy process at first limited the resources at his disposal during the Berlin airlift.

As illustrated by the preceding discussion, the case studies indicate that effective strategy development and policy execution are not due to leadership or organization alone, but rather results from the interplay of the two. Good organizations can empower individuals; however, bad organizations can easily thwart individual efforts to manage national challenges. For example, one analysis concludes that “prolonged ad hoc arrangements often result in taskings from different sources and can cause confusion at the operating level.”  

The attempt to rescue the Iranian hostages (Operation Eagle Claw) exemplifies how compartmentalization of tasks and information can subvert a unified organizational effort. The skills needed to conduct the mission were present in the U.S. government, but these could not be mobilized or integrated effectively to carry out the rescue. U.S. energy policy prior to 1973 is another example, at the strategic level, of an instance where poor organization weakened the government’s ability to respond effectively. At the time, responsibility for energy policy was distributed among eight Cabinet departments, as well as numerous agencies, offices, and commissions. Other cases where poor organization resulted in losses to U.S. security are the U.S. space programs before Sputnik’s launch and the organization of the U.S. intelligence community and counterterrorist financing prior to, and to a lesser extent after, 9/11.

On balance, the current U.S. national security system appears overly reliant on presidential leadership. Depending excessively on the president to enforce consensus in national security and to expedite policy implementation creates an unmanageable span of control requirement for the commander in chief, limiting the system’s ability to develop and implement effective policies. It is infeasible to expect presidents to oversee the complexities of strategy implementation. The National Security Council staff is too small and under-powered to ensure that all but the most important policies are undertaken.

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effectively or reflect optimal resource tradeoffs. The lack of White House surge capacity to deal with national challenges means that the president and his staff can address only a few issues at a time. As a result, many problems evolve into disasters before they receive adequate attention. This was the case with the Iranian revolution.

c. Resourcing

The U.S. national security system can potentially mobilize sufficient resources for almost any national security effort, but it is inconsistent in doing so. As depicted in the cases, the system demonstrates varying capacity to provide adequate, timely, and sustained resourcing for its strategies. At times, the system furnishes support quickly, as with the case involving the post-war occupation of Japan. In other instances, particularly when coherent planning and interagency unity are lacking, resourcing is slow, inadequate, and unpredictable. Studies investigating topics as varied as Hurricane Katrina, the response to the 1918–1919 flu pandemic, and the Iraq War provide telling examples of this weakness.

The U.S. national security system finds it easier to mobilize resources for hardpower assets (e.g., military capabilities) than for soft-power capabilities (e.g., civilian agencies or public diplomacy). Rep. John F. Tierney (D-MA), chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs pointed out this imbalance in a June 2008 hearing on the the State Department’s Antiterrorism Training Assistance (ATA) program stating: “While we continue to fund submarines at the cost of $2 billion apiece and a new fleet of fighter planes that will cost a quarter of a trillion dollars, efforts have proven to pay real dividends today too often have to fight for a few extra dollars here and there.”

Even when civil-military cooperation exists at the strategic level, the insufficient funding and staffing of non-DoD agencies engaged in international affairs makes operational integration difficult to achieve. The resource mismatch prevents the system from providing the full range of capabilities necessary for priority national missions, undermines surge capacity, and heightens interagency friction by reinforcing civil-military tension in the field and in Washington, where budgets are protected with fierce institutional loyalty. Such friction was evident during the Balkan crises where one defense official explained, “the perception of this building is that State runs around with their hand in our [DoD’s] pocket. State’s view is that if Defense has all the toys, why don’t they use them.”

Simply put, the cases suggest that national security policy will remain ineffective as long as civilian international affairs assets are underfunded and understaffed.

The case studies of the Iraq War, the disestablishment of the United States Information Agency (USIA), Bosnia and Kosovo, and U.S. policy toward Uzbekistan, among others, illustrate how inadequate reserves of soft-power resources have deprived the United States of the ability to employ all requisite elements of national power. The U.S. government’s inability to provide enough trained civilian officials, diplomats, and aid

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324 Vicki Rast, Interview with Principals Committee member.
workers especially inhibits U.S. capacity to conduct large overseas field operations. Such limitations have also subverted the recently much-touted 3D strategy of Operation Enduring Freedom-Horn of Africa, resulting in the mission emphasizing one D (defense) to the exclusion of the others (diplomacy and development). All too often, U.S. policymakers employ the military to address national security challenges simply because the Pentagon has the most readily available personnel, money, and other resources, even if their employment leads to inefficient and inadequate policies. Ironically, this process prevails even when DoD leaders would prefer that civilian agencies lead the response for missions that require the military to perform roles outside its core competence.

Within the executive branch, mobilizing resources for urgent crises is easier than for long-term objectives. Time and other resource limits make this tendency inevitable, especially at the presidential and White House level, but departments also tend to be reactive in their planning and resourcing. As a result, the U.S. government encounters great difficulty in constructing preventive strategies, as demonstrated by its belated response to the escalating civil strife in Rwanda, Bosnia, and East Timor. The case study of the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa offers another example. Attention to the security of overseas U.S. Missions waxes and wanes in response to terrorist attacks, a purely reactive approach to security assessments and resourcing. Prior to 1998, “funding was often systematically denied because of the priorities of the Congressional budgeting process.”

Congressional resourcing also exhibits a short-term focus in addition to a bias toward hard-power assets, as suggested by the investigation of the disestablishment of the United States Information Agency and the implementation of foreign counterterror capacity-building programs. All too often it is only after a conflict escalates to major proportions that it motivates the presidential action needed to induce a well-integrated and well-resourced U.S. government response. Yet, the ideal time to address crises is at their earliest stages, when they are most malleable and before they have created extensive damage. And if presidential attention wanders, so can the resources, as seen in the failure of the Treasury Department and CIA to resource the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center until three days after 9/11, despite the center’s being authorized and partially funded by President Clinton in May 2000.

Existing resource allocation processes complicate policy execution and sustainment. The military’s aversion to the 1990s intervention in Bosnia was at least partially due to concerns about disruptive supplemental appropriations. For instance, in January 1999 a State Department Principal complained that the Pentagon put budgeting ahead of strategy:

Every time now—food, northern Iraq, concise bombing in Bosnia—all are missions the military culture deems inappropriate. Their dissent is

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ASSESSMENT OF SYSTEM PERFORMANCE

growing stronger and stronger. It is still the way the Pentagon is organized … still no budget for contingencies, only readiness and training. It [funding] needs to be taken out of the budget as a whole. The building is still resisting the notion that these are appropriate military functions. The disconnect is greater now than during the Cold War! Look at Kosovo: The answer is “we are not designed to do it, not funded for it.”

Limited budget flexibility also constrained the initial U.S. response to Hurricane Mitch, as the disaster occurred early in the fiscal year and agencies were loath to spend money that they were unsure would be replenished. Program managers find it difficult to make long-term plans when future resource allocations are uncertain. The lack of dedicated interagency funds also constrains the implementation of national strategies. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan, for example, has suffered from its reliance solely on agency and department budgets, as do many anti-human-trafficking programs.

A related problem is that human resource systems are agency-focused. In many cases, interagency centers and activities are understaffed due to department-focused resource allocations systems, which favor core agency needs. Small bureaucratic bodies (such as the National Counterintelligence Executive in its early years) have trouble recruiting the best and the brightest people despite the importance of their missions, because career paths within such groups—especially opportunities for advancement—are naturally limited. The resource allocation process, as well as artificial personnel ceilings, also encourages reliance on outside contractors. The lack of accountability for these contractors has presented challenges for a number of U.S. missions, particularly those covering natural disasters.

d. Presidential Transitions

The major case studies also illustrate that the U.S. national security system is especially prone to disjointed policy development and implementation during transitions between presidential administrations. In the early part of an administration, steep learning curves, changes in information flows and other operating procedures, and lengthy confirmation processes at the Cabinet and sub-Cabinet level make policy development and implementation difficult. Toward the end of an administration, the departure of confirmed officials and other senior political appointees deprives agencies of experienced leaders, while political appointee resignations at lower levels result in staffing and skills shortages. The cases that cover presidential transitions—such as those addressing U.S. management of its crises with China or the handoff between the Bush and Clinton administrations of Somalia or National Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) policy—often find insufficient strategic direction, unclear authorities, and heightened bureaucratic conflict undermining effective government responses, especially by producing poorly integrated policies. The transition problem occurs regardless of the party affiliation of the incoming and outgoing administrations.

4. What diplomatic, financial, and other achievements and costs resulted from these

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326 Rast, Interview with Deputies Committee member.
successes and failures?

The case studies do provide examples of policy successes that resulted in better relations with other countries, diminished strategic threats, improved economic opportunities, and enhanced American prestige. Effective U.S. planning and engagement in post-war Japan demonstrates the enormous benefits to U.S. national security that result when integrated strategy development and implementation help a defeated adversary transition into a stable, affluent democracy and an enduring American ally. The U.S. contribution to the 1999 East Timor intervention helped restore peace in the territory, reaffirmed America’s security role in East Asia, and facilitated deeper U.S.-Australian cooperation after 9/11. The 2003 Liberia mission and the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami are also instances where small operations marked by comprehensive planning, adequate resources, and interagency unity of effort yielded large benefits to U.S. interests, including improved American standing, reduced regional instability, and better conditions for the affected nations. Finally, the post-Sputnik reorganization of U.S. science and space efforts, marked by a well-funded effort and a coherent strategy that decreased inter-service rivalries, resulted not only in a successful, manned landing on the moon but also the development of stealth technology, phased array radar, and other advanced military capabilities.

All too often, however, the case studies indicate that the U.S. national security apparatus lacks an effective system for developing strategies that connect available resources, desired end-states, and implementation procedures. Complex contingencies are undertaken without requisite capabilities; rigid plans inhibit field performance; and decisions are rarely timely, disciplined, or supported by adequate analysis of problems. Disunity of effort predominates. Consequently, the U.S. government often cannot achieve desired national security goals. Though initial combat operations in Iraq were highly successful, Phase IV troop deployments were such that by November 2004 Colin Powell concluded that, “we don’t have enough troops. We don’t control the terrain.”

According to the CIA Inspector General’s report on the Bay of Pigs, this Cold War debacle was exasperated by the fact that, “The Agency entered the project without adequate assets in the way of boats, bases, training facilities, agent nets, Spanish-speakers, and similar essential ingredients of a successful operation.” Regarding Pakistan, the General Accounting Office recently concluded that, “No comprehensive plan for meeting U.S. national security goals in the FATA [border area] has been developed, as stipulated by the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), called for by an independent commission (2004), and mandated by congressional legislation (2007).”

In some cases, such as the Clinton administration’s decision to intervene in Somalia, specific objectives were not well-articulated. In other instances, as in Bosnia, agencies pursued divergent aims. The case studies support the contention that, as

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presently constituted, the U.S. national security system fails to achieve systematic policy ends in a consistently efficient manner—inflicting corresponding security costs. The adverse consequences of resulting policy failures regularly include loss of American lives, money, and power, as well as harm to the national security enterprise itself.

The most tragic costs of flawed policy planning and implementation are unnecessary military and civilian casualties. Arguably poor interagency planning and communication during the Iranian revolution and its aftermath led to the 1979 U.S. attempt to rescue hostages held at the American embassy in Tehran, which resulted in the loss of eight U.S. service members. Absent a larger strategy and plan that would integrate U.S. capabilities, the ad hoc deployment of U.S. Marines to Lebanon in the 1980s rendered them vulnerable to attack, resulting in 241 deaths when terrorists detonated a bomb outside their barracks. Following this tragedy and the 1983 Beirut embassy bombing, Washington developed new security standards for U.S. overseas missions, but did not implement these regulations uniformly. Fifteen years later, al-Qaeda underscored the continuing vulnerability of U.S. foreign missions with the 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In Somalia, the U.S. government devoted too few resources in support of its poorly articulated objectives; the deaths of forty-two U.S. servicemen followed. In Iraq, inadequate planning for post-war operations and the government’s failure to recognize the budding insurgency created a post-conflict environment in which many people, including American soldiers, are still being killed or injured. In many of these cases local civilian casualties were also substantial.

Financial costs are also prevalent. According to the Congressional Research Service, the U.S. government has advanced more than 524 billion dollars in deficit spending for Operation Iraqi Freedom from March 2003 through June 2008. Today, the United States spends over 10 billion dollars per month on the war. This situation contrasts to the 1991 Gulf War, when the international community financed a large portion of Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Financial costs are not restricted to issues of war and peace, however. The Dubai ports fiasco demonstrates the difficulties the United States has in balancing foreign direct investment needs with national security requirements. Continuing problems in this area have decreased the attractiveness of the U.S. foreign direct investment climate. In the 1970s, the failure of American policymakers to recognize and respond to the changing dimensions of the global energy environment contributed to a protracted downturn in the U.S. economy.

Though difficult to quantify, the case studies suggest the opportunity costs of these systemic deficiencies could be significant. For example, a 2005 report to the National Institute of Justice quotes an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) official describing an instance where an absence of clear roles and responsibilities undermined U.S. government assistance to victims of human trafficking noting:

There’s only been two joint cases with the FBI and they didn’t turn out so well. The lead came to me (INS). I started to research it, but the FBI felt it should be their case. I disagreed because they’re not the experts on smuggling—that’s the INS’ job. It was sad to lose the case. In the end the victims didn’t get help. They could’ve been assisted if we got the case....
I’m sure we [law enforcement] could have done better if the case had been handled through a joint approach.\footnote{Kevin Bales and Steven Lize, \textit{Trafficking in Persons in the United States a Report to the National Institute of Justice: Final Report}, (Jackson: Croft Institute for International Studies, 2005) 132.}

In addition, the U.S. government response to the Iranian revolution led not only to the loss of a military ally but also to diminished American influence over Tehran’s oil export policies. The PNSR case study on Cold War public diplomacy concludes that U.S. efforts in this area contributed to the successful outcome of the Cold War but could have been much more effective with improved U.S. government strategic planning and resourcing.\footnote{See Appendix 4: The Costs of an Inefficient National Security System: Selected Vignettes from PNSR Case Studies for other examples of opportunity costs.}


More generally, a series of failures in American policy toward the Middle East has weakened U.S. power and standing in that region. An incoherent response to Arab nationalism in the 1950s, flaws in management of Iran from 1953 through 1979, ineffective balancing of the goals of democracy promotion and national security, an ad hoc policy toward Lebanon in the 1980s, mismanagement of the invasion of Iraq, and the absence of effective American regional public diplomacy throughout much of this period have all contributed to the unpopular image of the U.S. government in the Middle East. Similar credibility costs, which have decreased America’s moral authority, resulted from the ineffective responses to the civil wars in Somalia and the Balkans as well as the genocide in Rwanda. These failures were not, of course, entirely the result of failures to integrate policymaking and implementation but, as the case studies show, such failures of integration contributed significantly to the larger failures and their attendant costs.

\textit{When the U.S. national security system does achieve clearly defined objectives, it often fails to do so in an efficient manner.} Specifically, the cases show that delays in policy development and resourcing can eventually require more money, personnel, and other assets than might have been required had the response been more timely. This policy delay-inefficiency cycle was apparent in the U.S. approach to the Balkan crises, when repeated policy deadlocks reduced the credibility of the threat of force, prolonged the
crises, and increased the casualties and economic costs of the violence and the ultimately successful U.S. intervention.

3. Hypotheses

The case studies cover a necessarily limited number of national security challenges and analyze a correspondingly finite record of U.S. government performance. This limitation precludes extensive quantitative analysis. Even so, the issue, geographic, and historical diversity of the case studies, as well as the comprehensive range of scholarly discourse incorporated into their analysis, provide a foundation for generating the following suggestive hypotheses and findings:

Ad hoc, unintegrated strategies are common products of the U.S. national security apparatus:

- When strategy development is flawed, effective unity of effort and efficient resourcing are even more difficult to achieve.
- Overly rigid strategies often unduly constrain policy execution, especially in the field.
- Strategic planning typically focuses on immediate crises rather than long-range challenges; the urgent all too often displaces the important.
- The government does not effectively capture or implement strategic lessons learned from past failures.

The system evinces a mixed record in generating unity of effort during strategy development and implementation:

- Interagency conflict pervades the case studies, sometimes contributing to a broader review of alternatives, but mostly with negative consequences.
- Bureaucracies filter information through organizational perspectives and provide recommendations that reflect their core mission areas or institutional mandates.
- The U.S. national security system encounters difficulty in coordinating strategies, sharing resources, and otherwise cooperating effectively with foreign, state, and local governments.
- Limited interagency communication often results in strategy creation and policy implementation being addressed separately, impeding unity of effort at both levels.
- Interagency cooperation is possible at the tactical level even in the absence of strategic and operational integration, but requires leaders with good personal relations and other favorable but uncontrollable factors.
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- Even when such tactical cooperation occurs, its ability to contribute to operational and strategic success is limited.

The U.S. national security system demonstrates a varying capacity to provide adequate and timely resources:

- Resources often do not match goals and objectives.
- Resourcing is easier for urgent tasks than for enduring challenges.
- Sustaining constant support for long-term missions is difficult, complicating strategy implementation and policy execution.
- Even when sufficient funding is provided, the process of resource mobilization and allocation is often inefficient.
- The national security system recurrently fails to link ends (ideally determined at a national level by the president or NSC), ways (which are largely the purview of the operational departments and agencies), and means (resources provided through the Office of Management and Budget [OMB] and congressional funding mechanisms).

Interagency mechanisms are inadequate:

- There is no consistently effective mechanism to delegate presidential authority effectively despite its importance in overcoming interagency impediments.
- Agencies have numerous means and opportunities to impede long-term strategy development and policy execution.
- Major actors are easily bypassed in making urgent decisions, but policies determined by a few officials often neglect institutional knowledge and achieve only limited bureaucratic, congressional, and political support, making them hard to sustain.
- The U.S. national security system tends to mobilize institutional actors at different times, decreasing interagency integration and disconnecting policy commitments from operational planning.
- Achieving successful policy development, implementation, and outcomes becomes even more difficult during transitions between presidential administrations.

In short, the case studies suggest a U.S. national security system in need of comprehensive reform. The system produces integrated strategy and unity of effort all too infrequently. Consequently, positive policy outcomes become excessively difficult to achieve. Even when the government is successful in attaining desired ends, the manner
in which these outcomes are achieved is routinely inefficient, leading to wasted money, time, and lives.

C. Overarching Explanation for Current System Performance

1. Introduction

As the PNSR case study research suggests, the national security system operates inconsistently and increasingly poorly. In the broadest possible terms, the explanation for increasingly inadequate performance is that the environment for which the system was built is changing faster than the system can adapt. Numerous senior leaders, from both political parties, have reached this conclusion. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently underscored this growing consensus in testimony to Congress:

Over the last 15 years, the U.S. government has tried to meet post-Cold War challenges and pursue twenty-first-century objectives with processes and organizations designed in the wake of the Second World War…. Operating within this outdated bureaucratic superstructure, the U.S. government has sought to improve interagency planning and cooperation through a variety of means: new legislation, directives, offices, coordinators, ‘tsars,’ authorities, and initiatives with varying degrees of success…. I’m encouraged that a consensus appears to be building that we need to rethink the fundamental structure and processes of our national security system.

The general failure to keep pace with the security environment is reflected in the national security system’s inability to integrate and resource national security missions consistently or well. Studies, reports, and congressional investigations repeatedly identify two symptoms of these primary shortcomings:

- Multiagency missions are often poorly performed, even though missions primarily conducted within a single bureaucracy are typically performed better.

- Capabilities to carry out interagency activities and missions are frequently underresourced and thus not available in the quantity or quality needed.

These general problem assessments and their corresponding symptoms were the starting point for the PNSR analysis of overarching system performance. However, useful reform depends upon a deeper understanding of precisely how and why the system’s performance is inadequate. In the following section we present an overarching explanation for the system’s performance that builds on the rich set of hypotheses generated by the PNSR case studies. The investigation of the system problems and their symptoms is focused on national security objectives falling under the purview of the legacy National Security Council. There is less experience and data available for the

recently created Homeland Security Council (HSC), but since it is modeled on the National Security Council, it presumably faces issues and limitations similar to those identified below.\(^{336}\)

2. Core Institutional and Managerial Problems

Five core problems explain the increasingly inadequate performance of the national security system:

1. The system is grossly imbalanced, supporting strong departmental capabilities at the expense of integrating mechanisms.

2. Departments and agencies use resources they are allocated for capabilities required by their core mandates rather than those required for national missions.

3. Presidential intervention to compensate for the system’s inability to integrate or resource missions well centralizes issue management and burdens the White House.

4. A burdened White House cannot manage the national security system as a whole, so it is not agile, collaborative, or able to perform well.

5. The legislative branch provides resources and conducts oversight in ways that reinforce all of these problems and make improving performance difficult.

These basic problems explain why the system provides good core capabilities but poor supporting capabilities and poor unity of effort. Following is a comprehensive explanation of each problem, including symptoms, causes, and consequences of each.

a. System Design Emphasizes Core Capabilities over Mission Integration

The 1947 act took shape immediately following World War II while the conflict with the Soviet Union was just emerging.\(^{337}\) To correct the failure in strategic warning represented by Pearl Harbor and meet the need for strategic warning of attack from the Soviet Union, the 1947 act created the Central Intelligence Agency. To diminish the legendary lack of cooperation among the military services and between the military and the powerful Department of State, the 1947 act created the national military establishment, the post of secretary of defense, and, in the 1949 revisions to the act, the Department of Defense. To organize the domestic portion of future war efforts, the 1947 act created the National Security Resources Board to manage mobilization and civil defense. The National Security Council would coordinate all these and other

\(^{336}\) The Homeland Security Council considers security issues in a domestic rather than foreign context; however, it is no less complex as a diverse range of federal, state, and local agency cultures and legal authorities must be considered.

departmental and agency efforts to provide for a fully integrated defense of the nation. Interestingly, the National Security Council, which is now perhaps the best known component of the national security system, was not the primary focus of the legislation’s architects. It was the result of political compromises intended to reduce Navy resistance to the new secretary of defense.  

The proposal for a National Security Council raised questions as to whether the president might be bound by a council consensus in ways that would infringe upon his constitutional prerogatives. The Department of State objected that the NSC would limit the president and diminish the secretary of state’s traditional role in foreign policy. The concern was that it might dissipate the constitutional authority of the president for the conduct of foreign affairs. The Bureau of the Budget (the predecessor of today’s OMB) insisted on its own independence from the NSC, anticipating that the NSC could be dominated by those who would attempt to determine annual budgets largely based on military and diplomatic considerations.

President Harry S. Truman was also concerned that including the president as a member of the council might weaken the presidential office. Ultimately, this provision was left intact with the understanding that the president could not be forced to attend NSC meetings. A key goal of President Truman was to ensure that the NSC was advisory in nature and would not infringe on the president’s constitutional responsibilities to determine policy and command the military services. So while the architects of the 1947 act believed U.S. national security in the post-World War II era required more extensive, effective, and deliberate “integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies,” the integrating mechanism they created was intentionally not empowered to ensure such integration. At White House insistence, the language of the 1947 act was changed so that the National Security Council’s role would be “to advise the President with respect to the integration of...policies,” rather than “to integrate. . .policies.”

The 1947 act was a major step toward creating a functioning national security system, one that served well enough to prevail in the Cold War. Yet the legacy of the 1947 national security system design is an imbalance between strong national security instruments such as intelligence and defense and a weak mechanism for integrating and implementing national security policies. This basic imbalance has only been reinforced in the decades following the 1947 act. Since 1947, there have been numerous statutory modifications to the national security system, all of which reflect the basic pattern of consolidating, disaggregating, or creating new national security organizations dedicated to one area of expertise or another. From the Mutual Security Act of 1951, which created the Mutual Security Agency, to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of

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340 Ibid. 314–315.
2004, which created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, statutory changes to the national security system have focused on improving individual instruments of power rather than their integration.

Integration across disciplines is left to the president. Sometimes the president creates advisory mechanisms to supplement the NSC, such as in the 1956 Executive Order 10656, which established the Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities to give the president independent evaluations of the U.S. foreign intelligence effort. Otherwise, the executive branch uses various and sundry forms of interagency committees, ranging from the Psychological Strategy Board established by a presidential directive in 1951, to President Clinton’s 1993 Executive Order 12835, which created the National Economic Council for integrating national security policy and international economic policy,\textsuperscript{342} to the venerable country team used by ambassadors in embassies overseas and more recent interagency mechanisms like the National Counterterrorism Center.

Unfortunately, none of these integrating mechanisms is strong enough to consistently produce desired outcomes for the president: “Nobody is in charge is an often-heard refrain of the interagency process. By delegating responsibility, control becomes more diffused and the policy effort diluted.”\textsuperscript{343}

\textbf{Symptoms}

\textit{The Ineffectiveness of Interagency Committees:} The most prominent symptom of the imbalance between strong national security organizations and weak integrating mechanisms is the general ineffectiveness of interagency committees. Presidents can intervene personally to correct the systemic imbalance that favors semi-autonomous departments and agencies and impedes unity of effort. Since presidents daily face numerous competing priorities, they typically delegate responsibility for mission integration to one type of interagency group or another, such as ad hoc groups or the standing interagency committees described in Part II of this report, such as the Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, or the Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs).\textsuperscript{344}

The formal charters of these types of committees are established by each president toward the beginning of his term in office. Generally, their work is “fueled by the briefing papers and issue papers generated by individual agencies and interagency working groups.”\textsuperscript{345} Often the preparation of a paper is tasked to a PCC. PCC members are usually of assistant secretary rank and almost always include a member of the NSC.


\textsuperscript{344} The Principals Committee is “the senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security,” while the Deputies Committee pursues the same function at the sub-cabinet level; NSPD-1.

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staff. If a policy decision is made, the national security system can be notified through the promulgation of presidential policy directives, which, like executive orders, are binding on the executive branch and endure from one administration to the next. PCCs are then often used to monitor policy implementation. The Homeland Security Council and National Economic Council work in a similar manner.

None of the varied types and levels of interagency committees that presidents use to perform integration function well consistently. If an issue clearly falls within the mandate of one department and major support from other agencies is not required, the committees perform a valuable service by keeping everyone informed of activities. On issues that multiple agencies and departments care about, time-consuming and unproductive interagency meetings are legendary and a constant feature of the system across presidential administrations. In 1961, the Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery (Jackson Subcommittee) noted that

> department heads have traditionally tried to keep the product of coordination from binding them tightly or specifically to undesired courses of action. The net result has tended to be “coordination” on the lowest common denominator of agreement, which is often tantamount to no coordination at all.  

President Kennedy adopted the Jackson Subcommittee’s recommendations to reduce NSC staff size, but did not adopt other important recommendations. In the end, organizational behavior changed little and there remained a premium “on interstaff negotiations, compromise, [and] agreement,” which often led to “the ‘papering over’ of differences, the search for the lowest common denominators of agreement.” One senior participant described the typical PCC in the following terms:

The NSC staff representative, serving as executive secretary, typically joined the State chair in trying to move the meeting to action (on which they had usually agreed in advance). . . . When it came time for decision, most representatives, especially from the economic agencies, came armed with a mandate to defend at all costs their particular bureaucratic sacred cows. But otherwise they were unwilling to support any policy decision, in which they took no interest and voiced no opinion. No one from the Treasury could speak for anyone else. The Department of State would be represented by as many as ten or fifteen separate offices or bureaus, each claiming primacy within the department on at least a part of the action. Representatives of OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) and JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) typically engaged amiably in the debate but then refused to commit (or “reserved”) on any decision or even to disclose what course of action their superiors might wish to see adopted. The intelligence community’s role was to demonstrate that any possible course of action was fraught with danger or otherwise doomed to fail, while advancing the seemingly inconsistent view that

346 Ibid.
348 Neustadt and Allison 128.
events in the outside world were driven by deep impersonal forces not susceptible to human intervention.

These patterns, though offered tongue-in-cheek, represented very real concerns. They applied at every level but were particularly destructive of policymaking at assistant secretary level and below, where not even the most senior participants could speak authoritatively for their departments or agencies on large issues. The absence of a crisis or action-forcing event could be paralyzing even at cabinet level.349

The same tendencies have been evident in all administrations, including the most recent ones. The Clinton administration’s “interagency working groups with overlapping responsibilities disagreed on policy options, and senior NSC officials were reluctant ‘to butt heads’ to resolve the differences”350 which had to be referred “up the organizational hierarchy to the NSC/Deputies Committee, where the issue would be reworked almost from scratch.”351 The workload for the Deputies Committee increased significantly, which “slowed the decision process enormously, creating a backlog of issues that needed resolution and a pattern of postponed and rescheduled [Deputies Committee] meetings.”352 In the Bosnia crisis, Deputies Committee disagreements were supposed to be elevated to President Clinton. However, “if a clear consensus was not reached at these meetings, the decision-making process would often come to a temporary halt, which was followed by a slow, laborious process of telephoning and private deal-making,” since consensus views, “rather than clarity, [were] often the highest goal of the process…the result was often inaction or half-measures instead of a clear strategy.”353

The same tendencies were evident in the decision-making on whether and how to go to war in Iraq. The Department of State and Department of Defense could not agree on how to resolve issues,354 and interagency meetings led by NSC staff were exhausting and unproductive, consuming incredible amounts of time without reaching useful conclusions.355

Poor Information Sharing: Another symptom of strong individual organizations and weak integrating mechanisms is poor information sharing, which hinders governmentwide assessments of the security environment. The national security

351 Ibid.
352 Ibid.
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System’s ability to assess the security environment is fractured, despite recent reforms in the intelligence community designed to improve information sharing across organizational boundaries. Agencies and departments control information and assessment capabilities, and it is difficult and sometimes impossible to share information across classification boundaries (interagency, local authorities, coalition members). Proliferation of multiple but disconnected “Sensitive but Unclassified” designations across government agencies further complicates and delays information sharing. Even among classified information systems, information sharing is problematic. For example, law enforcement personnel often lack access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, and therefore are not able to share some terrorism information. Moreover, information systems are not interoperable—they cannot easily communicate due to mismatched protocols and assumptions regarding data or organization. Federal, state, and local entities also do not share information consistently within and among levels of government, and there are few incentives for private enterprise to share proprietary information with government organizations. As a result, the system fails to “know what it knows.”

Frustrated Leaders: Another symptom of ineffective integrating mechanisms at all levels is senior leader frustration. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld observed that

the problems we face in the world are not problems that come and fit neatly into one department or agency, they’re problems that inevitably require the involvement and engagement of more than one department or agency and we end up spending incredible amounts of time that just kind of suck the life out of you at the end of the day spending 4, 5, 6 hours in interagency meetings and the reason is, is because the organization of the government fit the last century instead of this century.\(^{357}\)

President Eisenhower’s formal NSC committee meetings were the most extensive and he was the president who most appreciated their value for generating information and inculcating a common appreciation across the administration for the range of national security problems confronting the nation. Yet they produced little substantive value for the president:

Indeed, the president often found the sessions burdensome, as evidence by a letter in which his private secretary remarked that the NSC meeting seemed to be the president’s most time-consuming task and ‘he [Eisenhower] himself complains that he knows every word of the presentations as they are made. However, he feels that to maintain the

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\(^{356}\) In fact, arguably there are disincentives. A private company that shares vulnerability information with the U.S. government risks that information becoming public through the Freedom of Information Act, and when vulnerability information becomes public, the vulnerable party is at a competitive disadvantage and may be liable to shareholder or customer lawsuits. We are indebted to Jim Kurtz for this observation.

interest and attention of every member of the NSC, he must sit through every meeting—despite the fact that he knows the presentations so well.\textsuperscript{358}

Presidents (and their subordinates) often avoid interagency committees, recognizing that they are not typically productive for making decisions, and only somewhat so for sharing information. Over time, formal meetings are called less frequently, not only NSC meetings (see Figure 7),\textsuperscript{359} which fell to near “zero” in the second Clinton administration,\textsuperscript{360} but lower level meetings as well. Formal meetings may decline in part to avoid leaks and official minutes of meetings. However, informal meetings also are avoided as officials at all levels begin to skip interagency meetings, sending their subordinates instead. Periodically, in response, the NSC staff will send out reminders of the importance of having the appropriate level of official attend interagency meetings.

\textbf{Figure 7. NSC Meetings across Administrations}

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Source: White House Historical List of NSC Meetings, available through the National Archives and Records Administration, see: \url{http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/historical/meetings.html} for access.
}
\end{figure}


\textsuperscript{359} Truman, Ford, and Carter used formal NSC meetings more over the course of their administrations. They were all one-term presidents. Ford and Carter are the only two presidents who did not take steps to further centralize policy in the White House (see pp. 44–47 of this report). Both perhaps preferred to exercise control over the departments and agencies through formal NSC meetings. Other presidents reduced reliance on NSC meetings and took steps to centralize policy through informal mechanisms.

\textsuperscript{360} Bradley H. Patterson, \textit{The White House Staff: Inside the West Wing and Beyond} (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000) 54.
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Working around the System: An even more prominent symptom of ineffective interagency formal structures is that decision-makers tend to seek informal advice to augment their formal decision-making structures and processes. This is true even in NSCs with a reputation for being well run. For example, one senior participant in the first President George H. W. Bush’s NSC notes:

What strikes me about the way in which the interagency process ran in the Bush administration was its informality. That is, the real work, the most work, the good work, when people got serious work, got...done informally. 361

There are many advantages to working through informal venues, including confidentiality, candor, and limiting participation to those needed to solve a problem. What is notable about the national security system is how its informal mechanisms actually supplant weak and ineffectual formal structures. Informal channels are used not to obtain alternative points of view to augment the formal system, which would be healthy, but rather to bypass it entirely.

Presidents use informal decision-making venues to actually get work done, and modern communications facilitate their doing so:

Modern technology has robbed the State Department—and the Pentagon—of important advantage in the power game. The two departments use to have exclusive global communications networks to American embassies or forces abroad. But in recent years, the White House had gained the technical capability to bypass State or Defense electronically. Its Situation Room has links to a worldwide network that lets the president get in touch with any leader in any country instantaneously. His national security staff can read the incoming electronic mail from around the globe and contact any embassy or CIA operation without ever informing State or CIA headquarters, as Oliver North often did. That means that White house can step into any issue at any time in any place. 362

Back-channel consultations and directives are one way to work around the formal system, but so too are regular breakfast or lunch meetings. President Nixon and Henry Kissinger used back channels extensively, but all administrations do so at one time or another. President Johnson’s “Tuesday Lunches” brought together the president, the secretaries of state and defense, the director of central intelligence, the national security advisor, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other invited advisors. President Carter held “Friday Breakfasts” with his vice president, secretaries of state and defense, national security advisor, and his domestic advisor. The presidents’ principal subordinates also use informal mechanisms. In both the Carter and Clinton (second term) administrations,

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the national security advisor and secretaries of state and defense held regular lunches to discuss and resolve policy differences. Other informal processes included meetings with all or most of the members of the NSC, such as George H. W. Bush’s “gang of eight” meetings, and non-Deputies Committee meetings chaired by the national security advisor with selected attendees depending on the topic to be discussed.

Informal working groups form around particular issues as well. In the last two years of the Reagan administration, the “haircut group” developed policy for relations with China:

A group of close friends across government who were both interested and knowledgeable regarding China policy met during periods blocked on their calendars as “haircut.” It is intriguing that these policymakers felt they needed to “work around” the formal policy process. This alternative practice grew from pre-existing personal relations these individuals shared. The practice exemplifies that personal relationships and networking play a crucial role in policy development, even going so far as to serve as a substitute for an officially structured, USG-sanctioned process. 363

In the George H. W. Bush administration, there was even an informal group named the “Ungroup” that concentrated on Russia and arms control in particular:

This group, as its name suggests, had no official status. Its membership was very ad hoc in the sense that it included individuals from various agencies of different rank (e.g., a State Undersecretary, DoD Assistant Secretary, ACDA Deputy Director [or even Director], NSC Senior Director, DoE rep whose level was comparable to an Assistant Secretary but who didn’t have the title), but who were included because of the personal trust they had acquired with senior leaders of the administration. While the “Ungroup” did not take the lead in policy formation, they were critical in its implementation, particularly in terms of interacting with the Russians on bilateral nuclear arms control efforts. 364

Officials below Cabinet level can also work around the system using informal mechanisms and methods, but the more distance from the president the more difficult it is to obtain cooperation and good results. “Policy entrepreneurs” can use their initiative and authority delegated by the president to overcome bureaucratic inertia by cajoling, threatening, and persuading others to collaborate. Sometimes the results are good. For example, Ambassador Robert Oakley acted as an entrepreneurial leader to execute the first phase of the U.S. intervention in Somalia in 1992–1993. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake acted as an entrepreneurial leader in developing Bosnia policy several years later:

364 Michael Moodie, personal vignette from a member, Project on National Security Reform.
What took place in the next few months was probably Tony Lake’s best moment in government . . . he began to make the bureaucracy work for him. He went to the president and explained what he was working on: a complete and comprehensive new strategy on Bosnia that would work toward a diplomatic settlement . . . . Lake intended to move the bureaucracy ahead by at first circumventing it [emphasis added]. He was going directly to the president, commit him if he could to a course of action without Lake’s peers knowing it, and once the president was committed, they would have to follow along. Otherwise, Clinton’s top advisers would continue to be as divided as they currently were—without the most important element to end the internal deadlock, presidential leadership.

Other times working around the system to engineer a solution outside of established decision-making mechanisms leads to disaster. When entrepreneurial leaders fail to overcome bureaucratic resistance to their efforts and cannot adequately control other agencies, their carefully conceived strategies can fall apart. This happened to Ambassador Lawrence Pezzulo when he tried to engineer a transfer of power in Haiti. Instead, the Pentagon balked and a humiliating withdrawal of the USS Harlan County from Port-au-Prince was the result. Another infamous example that involved attempts to circumvent congressional restrictions led to the Iran-Contra scandal.

_Frustrated Followers_: The inability to get work done in interagency committees is frustrating for staff members dedicated to high performance:

> It is more difficult for the NSC to define and guide policy and get cooperation from the agencies. . . . Not only does this produce less coherent policy, it also increases the level of frustration and dissatisfaction among NSC staff.

However, working around the formal system also discourages staff in the departments and agencies. Resorting to informal structures and processes reduces transparency and confuses the numerous parts of the system that must contribute to a solution in order for it to be effective. An opaque structure and process makes it difficult to know where and how to actually make a contribution. Even when invited into a problem-solving process, subordinates must question whether they are being asked to allocate time and resources to the “real” effort or just another of the many parallel efforts that the system tends to generate.

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Causes

The president and his integrating mechanisms always function with a significant handicap. The powerful statutory authorities provided to Cabinet level officials who control the national security bureaucracies are not counterbalanced with tools backed by law that would assist the president in integrating those capabilities to accomplish national missions. For example, following the terrorist attacks on 9/11, President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 8 making the new deputy national security advisor for combating terrorism his “principal advisor” on matters related to global terrorism. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld quickly objected and was able to cite statutory authorities that give the secretary of defense and chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff primacy in the chain of command for military operations. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice backed off and the newly empowered “czar” for counterterrorism, retired General Wayne Downing, a former commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command, resigned in frustration less than a year later.368

Since the functional national security bureaucracies control capabilities and resources, the president must work through the agencies and departments to implement policies. Since they are more likely to implement policies they helped develop, the president also needs to work through the national security departments and agencies when policy is developed. This state of affairs produces two noteworthy conflicts of interest that can be managed but not eliminated.

First, the powerful Cabinet heads are placed in fundamentally conflicted roles because their institutional mandate to build capacity for their individual departments is at odds with the requirement to sacrifice department equities when doing so will improve the chance of success for multiagency missions. Cabinet members must balance their roles as presidential advisors with their statutory obligations to build, manage, and safeguard strong departmental capabilities.369

Once in office, moreover, the Cabinet secretary is pulled away from the President by strong centrifugal forces. The duty to carry out the laws and to be responsive to Congress is accentuated by the dependency of Cabinet members on the career bureaucracies and the clientele groups of their agencies…. For a person to be able to be of use to the White House, he must also be trusted and accepted as a defender of the values represented by the agency and its mission. Because the White House must sometimes make decisions affecting the division of missions with other agencies, it is sometimes seen as a threat to the agency.370

One way for Cabinet officials to reconcile the tension in their roles is to convince the president that what is good for their department is good for the nation in any given

instance. This explains why so many accounts of internal decision-making document instances of Cabinet officials bypassing formal process to meet directly with the president.\textsuperscript{371}

Second, the national security advisor and his or her staff also must balance fundamentally conflicting roles. They serve as honest brokers, which fairly represent the positions of the different departments and agencies on any given issue but also as confidential advisors to the president and his primary source of “integrated” perspective:

There is, first of all, the inherent tension between the need of the national security adviser to be an effective and trustworthy honest broker among the different players in the decision-making process and the desire of the president to have the best possible policy advice, including advice from his closest foreign policy aide. The roles are inherently in conflict. Balancing them is tricky and possible only if the adviser has earned the trust of the other key players. As Sandy Berger argued, “You have to be perceived by your colleagues as an honest representative of their viewpoint, or the system breaks down.”\textsuperscript{372}

As former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted, this conflict of interest has been curtailed on only one occasion:

The mandate of the national security advisor is to make sure all the elements of our national security policies, including defense, diplomacy, and intelligence, move in the same direction. He (or she) is supposed to coordinate policy, not make or carry it out. In practice, however, these lines blur. It is a standard observation in Washington that the only time the NSC and State Department worked well was when Henry Kissinger was in charge of both.\textsuperscript{373}

Yet Henry Kissinger found that the more he was perceived as the controlling voice on policy the more likely the agencies and departments were to assert their prerogatives during implementation. After his first year, Kissinger noted it was easy making policy but not coordinating and implementing it.\textsuperscript{374} He concluded that when he was dual-hatted as both national security advisor and secretary of state and dominant on policymaking, he


\textsuperscript{373} Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary, (New York: Miramax Books, 2003) 88.

was worse off because the departments would resist the implementation of his preferred policies.375

Cabinet officials’ dual role of capability provider and advisor to the president for integrated national missions is not unlike the dual role played by military service chiefs until the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act provided a sharper division of labor between the service chiefs and combatant commanders.376 Similarly, the dual roles of national security advisors are reminiscent of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff position prior to Goldwater-Nichols reforms. Chairmen previously had to carefully balance the need for a fair representation of the chiefs’ positions with their own views.377

Finally, the national security system lacks a strong ethos and culture that could stimulate collaboration.378 In most organizations, one would expect to find weak integrating structures and processes balanced by a strong unifying culture and human capital system. However, the national security system complements its weak integrating structures and processes with an even weaker cross-cutting national security culture and personnel system. Strong and enduring department and agency cultures exert primary influence over behaviors, which is not conducive to collaboration.

In theory, individuals can work in multiple organizational cultures, but currently strong department and agency cultures largely penalize rather than reward such cross-agency proficiency. The agencies and departments, which give priority to their mandates and missions control not only the bulk of human capital assets but also almost all the capabilities for issue assessment and decision-making support, which further complicates the ability of the president to integrate policy.

Consequences

The most immediate consequence of the systemic imbalance between strong individual organizations and weak integrating mechanisms is that the system produces better core capabilities than integrated policies and implementation efforts. The different policy perspectives brought to interagency committees are helpful. What is hurtful is the inability to integrate them into alternative courses of action, each of which would represent a combined effort from multiple agencies, and make and implement the

376 It is important to note that Goldwater-Nichols reforms gave the combatant commanders authority to integrate operations but did not give them authority over the resources and capabilities needed to conduct operations. “But I also had to keep the Chiefs happy, because they provided my command’s troops, planes, and ships. And the individual services were responsible for funding the combatant commands. The Air Force provided CENTCOM’s funding; the Army financed European Command, while the Navy controlled Pacific Command’s budget. Hell of a way to do business, I thought. But I was a new CINC. I would soon become wise in the ways of the Title X world.” Tommy Franks, American Soldier, (New York: Regan Books, 2004) 208.
378 Macro Critique of the National Security System.
decision with unity of effort. Instead, the courses of action coalesce around agency positions and often cannot be resolved. Interagency committees typically are not productive unless the president is involved, and even if the president supervises or intervenes to ensure an integrated policy, its implementation usually is retarded by interagency disagreements, missing mission-essential capabilities, and resource allocation limitations and inefficiencies.

b. Resourcing Capabilities Not Missions

The second core problem is that the national security system provides resources for national security functions, not national missions. Budgets are developed and appropriated along departmental lines and then disbursed through departmental mechanisms. Departments and agencies typically shortchange interagency missions and non-traditional capabilities. As a result, the requirements for national mission success are often not met. In particular, resource allocation processes do not provide the full range of required capabilities, do not permit the system to surge in response to priority needs, and do not provide resource allocation flexibility in response to changing circumstances.

Symptoms

The symptoms of providing resources to departments and agencies without due attention to national missions are manifest in several respects. First, the lack of attention to mission performance complicates even the provision of core capabilities. This has proven true in development assistance, for example:

America’s foreign aid is now (mis)managed by an alphabet soup of no less than fifty separate units within the executive branch, pursuing fifty disparate and sometimes overlapping objectives ranging from narcotics eradication to biodiversity preservation. Poor coordination and lack of integration means that U.S. agencies often work at cross purposes—something which is not lost on recipient countries.379

In other areas, such as defense and diplomacy, the national security system provides capabilities to execute core activities well. However, the system cannot provide the full range of capabilities required by priority national missions, which degrades performance and exacerbates tension among agencies and departments:

In every overseas intervention the U.S. has undertaken since the end of the cold war, an integrated approach and an understanding of each organization's missions and capabilities have been woefully lacking. For years some in the military have criticized their interagency partners for not contributing enough to our efforts overseas, while some in the interagency have criticized the military for not providing enough security for them to do their jobs. . . . The real problem is that we lack a comprehensive

overview of what each military and interagency partner should contribute in conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead, there is a large gap between what we optimally need to succeed and the combined resources our government can bring to bear. This “capabilities gap” is not the fault of any single agency, but is the result of our government not having clearly defined what it expects each instrument of national power to contribute to our foreign policy solutions.\(^\text{380}\)

Mission-essential capabilities that fall outside the core mandate of an organization, which typically is codified in statutes, receive less emphasis and fewer resources. For example, the Department of State gives precedence to private diplomacy rather than public diplomacy. Similarly, the Department of Defense gives precedence to large force-on-force combat capability as opposed to irregular warfare capabilities. Mission-essential capabilities that do not fit nicely into any agency or department mandate are largely ignored. Some stabilization and reconstruction capabilities for post-conflict environments, such as deployable policing capabilities, fall into this category. Another example of a national mission that does not fall into the capabilities of any one agency is the need to map and influence traditional social networks, particularly in the context of complex contingencies and the war on terror.\(^\text{381}\)

Another symptom is poor surge capacity. National security agencies and departments are funded for routine operations, not for the disruptive challenges of today’s security environment. The Department of Defense has a short-term surge capacity but the State Department and other civilian agencies do not have the ability to surge in response to crises or priority requirements. Even organizations that are designed and empowered to respond to expected but contingent events, like the Federal Emergency Management Agency, have few sources of contingency funds.\(^\text{382}\)

Other than the Department of Defense, most departments and agencies find it as difficult to surge personnel as financial resources. For example, the Pentagon’s initial goal aimed to have 25 percent of AFRICOM’s staff be non-DoD personnel. But John Pendleton notes that, “According to State officials… this goal was not vetted through civilian agencies and was not realistic because of the resource limitations in civilian agencies.”\(^\text{383}\)


\(^{382}\) Unprogrammed contingencies have an adverse effect on programs even when their costs are reimbursed. In DoD, for example, operations and maintenance (O&M) appropriations pay for unit rotations to major training centers and also pay the costs of contingency operations. A training opportunity that is cancelled when O&M funds are diverted to real-world operations is more often than not lost forever, even when O&M accounts are replenished, simply because the passage of time closes the window of opportunity for affected units. Jim Kurtz, Personal Interview, 30 September 2008.

\(^{383}\) John Pendleton, “Preliminary Observations on the Progress and Challenges Associated with Establishing the U.S. Africa Command,” Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security and
Civilian agencies may still have difficulty in filling the reduced number of positions. Pendleton remarks:

AFRICOM is looking to civilian agencies for skills sets that it does not have internally, but many of the personnel who have these skills sets and experience outside of DoD are in high demand. Officials at the State Department, in particular, noted their concern about the ability to fill positions left vacant by personnel being detailed to AFRICOM since it takes a long time to develop Foreign Service officers with the requisite expertise and experience.  

Finally, a major symptom of funding core capabilities instead of national missions and priorities is heightened interagency friction. Interagency meetings frequently devolve into disagreements over who pays for an urgent activity even when everyone favors and acknowledges the activity is essential.

Causes

Funds are provided for departments and agencies with the hope that doing so provides sufficient capabilities to accomplish missions. For missions that require nontraditional capabilities, this hope is not realized for several reasons:

Inadequate Mission Requirements Analysis: The Office of Management and Budget cannot discern the necessary tradeoffs in a complex national security system. In addition, OMB does not have the analytic capability to identify interagency mission requirements. Individual organizations do not understand the resourcing alternatives that exist across the national security system. They could assist with requirements analysis to some extent but they do not have incentives to assist with identifying tradeoffs. They are understandably influenced by incentives to protect their own programs. Thus, OMB provides minimal cross-agency evaluation of spending for programs shared by agencies. Although the NSC and OMB do cooperate, this cooperation is limited, has historically not been institutionalized across administrations, and is inconsistent across policy issues.

Congressional Reservations: Congress resists approving money for unspecified expenditures, and its committees require notification and often advanced approval for any shifts out of or into previously settled programs. Congressional sensitivities are understandable in light of its oversight role, but consequential nonetheless. The few authorities available for emergency spending in the national security realm, including the Department of Defense Food and Forage Act and the humanitarian assistance accounts of the Agency for International Development, fall far short of funding requirements for major contingencies like the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia or major complex contingencies.
Even if contingency funding were included in federal budgets, response to those contingencies would still require adjustments in both the amount and the distribution of those funds across agencies. Contingencies cannot be predicted two years in advance, which is the time frame of the budget-building cycle. Once they occur, the current budgetary constraints do not allow for sufficiently agile reallocation or approval of funding.

*Disparities in Public Support:* Stronger support in Congress for defense programs compared to international affairs spending reflects congressional perceptions of public opinion. The resulting imbalance in national security system capabilities complicates interagency cooperation in difficult multiagency endeavors as civilian agencies typically have little surge capacity, even in the short term.

*Consequences*

The inability to resource missions in accordance with policy and strategy priorities has significant liabilities. It exacerbates the system’s weak integration mechanisms, making the fight over resources a constant impediment to better interagency collaboration. More importantly, complex contingencies are often engaged in without the requisite capabilities for success. This has been glaringly apparent with respect to the PRTs used in Iraq and Afghanistan:

The Pentagon and State Department cannot spell out who is in charge of PRTs, who they answer to and who provides logistical support on the ground. Funding shortfalls meant PRTs lacked computers, telephones, Internet access and even basic office supplies. Members either had to go begging for resources from local military commanders or pay for office equipment and other supplies out of their own pockets.  

Efforts to meet national priorities move slowly. When a new mission is identified, each department has powerful incentives to resist cuts in its ongoing programs while hoping for funds from other agencies or through supplementals. Accordingly, efforts to address new national priorities move slowly. If and when such priorities receive funding, they become ongoing programs and departments and agencies again resist pressure to cut or reduce them, whether or not they continue to be needed. To address issues more quickly, often leaders compensate by turning to the national security institution with the largest personnel system and the most flexible spending authorities, the Department of Defense. This often results in the Department of Defense taking the lead on many nonmilitary missions:

Even when civilian agencies were capable of providing PRTs with representatives, they lacked the necessary funding and resources to adequately support their staff in the field. . . . One civilian PRT member stated in an interview, ‘I do wish the Department of State provided more than just one person. I think that we’d be more effective if we had our
own interpreters, our own transportation, and some programming funds to be able to bring to the table.’ The added burden of providing resources for civilian representatives, which should have been supplied by their corresponding agencies, sometimes frayed interagency cooperation between military and non-DoD personnel.  

Senator Richard Lugar has concluded that insufficient resources for civilian foreign affairs agencies undermine effective conduct of the war against terror, and that “In fact, it can be argued that the disparity in the ratio between investments in military versus civilian approaches [see Figure 8] threatens U.S. success.”

Figure 8. Relative Size of National Security Institutions by Budget

Certainly the sheer disparity between Department of Defense and other department and agency resources often sends the wrong signals about American priorities and methods:


Spending on diplomacy had marched steadily downward for decades. Congress had slashed the State Department’s operations budget by 20 percent during the 1970s and 1980s. As the military expanded overseas, the State Department squeeze forced the closure of more than thirty embassies and consulates, and 22 percent of the department’s employees were cut from the payroll. . . . Instead of righting the imbalance, Washington came to rely ever more on the regional CinCs [commanders-in-chief] to fill a diplomatic void. . . . Officially, [General] Zinni was outranked at the meeting by the six American ambassadors to the Persian Gulf countries. But in any motorcade, the CinC rode in the lead car. Ambassadors wandered the hotel lobby, alone and unnoticed, and slept in regular-sized rooms. The CinC’s team occupied the entire hotel wing.  

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c. Systemic Deficiencies Burden the President with Issue Management

The preceding system deficiencies are intrinsic in the basic design of the current national security system, and they generate consequences that in turn become core problems for managing the national security system. When multiagency missions are not being performed well, the president can compensate for system integration and resourcing liabilities through personal intervention. Since his time is limited, the president looks for ways to delegate authority for integration, but they prove largely ineffective without his involvement. The system essentially demands that the president intervene to manage issues directly.

Symptoms

The two principal symptoms of a systemic inability to assist the president with the integration of multiagency policy, strategy, and implementation responsibilities are the absence of long-range planning and increased centralization of issue management in the White House.

Poor Long-Range Planning: As lamented by National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, the system does not do long-range planning well:

I always thought that the NSC, as the agent of the president, ought to have a long-range planning function. I tried it both times and it never worked satisfactorily. Either nobody had time to pay attention to it or you had to grab them when a fire broke out. That was one of the most frustrating things to me. Nobody else is in a position to do the broad, long-range thinking that the NSC is, but I don’t know how you do it.  

By comparison, the system seems to perform crisis management better than long-range planning, although it might be just as true to say it encourages crises by delaying action.

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until the problem is so severe that the president must make it a personal priority. Due to his severe time limitations, the president often intervenes only after it is evident that the system cannot resolve an issue and it has developed into a crisis.

**Increased Centralization:** Most administrations over the past sixty years have tended to centralize policy decision authority in the White House over time. Presidents begin with centralizing directives or with attempts to decentralize decision-making, but almost all end up asserting greater centralization. President Truman maintained centralized control over policy by making his decisions in consultation with, but outside of, NSC meetings. Eisenhower created the NSC Planning Board within the NSC system to produce policy options, although most of his policy decisions were made in the Oval Office. Initially, his implementation oversight function resided in the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) outside of the NSC system; but, in 1957, he further centralized by transferring the OCB into the NSC.

President Kennedy sought to decentralize policymaking by returning it to the State Department at the outset of his administration, but, after the Bay of Pigs debacle, he created the White House Situation Room to permit his NSC staff to monitor the cable traffic of departments and agencies. He also returned much of the State Department’s policymaking authority to the NSC staff after perceiving the bureaucracy to be unresponsive to his needs. President Lyndon B. Johnson created interagency groups in an attempt to balance the State Department’s role in the interagency system, but important decisions continued to be made in the president’s “Tuesday Lunches.” President Nixon further centralized policymaking in the White House, in part by installing Henry Kissinger as the chairman of most NSC committees. Kissinger explains that President Nixon did so in part to “avoid the bureaucratic disputes or inertia that he found so distasteful.”

President Ford inherited a strongly centralized system but made no further centralizing changes. President Carter consciously set out to return power to the departments and agencies, but also acted to centralize certain policy issues and decision-making in the White House and the Oval Office in particular:

Carter stated openly that foreign policy would be made by him and not by his secretary of state. In part this was in reaction to Kissinger’s perceived domination as secretary of state over Ford’s decision-making process. But in large measure it reflected Carter’s genuine determination personally to guide decision-making. Accordingly, Carter took the unprecedented step on his inauguration day of issuing a directive concentrating the policy process, especially for arms control and crisis management, within the White House. In these critical areas the national security adviser . . . would chair cabinet-NSC committee meetings.

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Moreover, President Carter reinforced White House centralization by making Zbigniew Brzezinski, his national security advisor, the chairman of the Special Coordinating Committee, which considered all cross-agency policy matters. President Carter also gave Brzezinski Cabinet rank, thereby further increasing his authority relative to the Cabinet secretaries. Brzezinski later asserted that President Carter’s NSC was “the most centralized” national security decision-making style of the post-World War II era.\(^{393}\) Interestingly, both the one-term Ford and Carter administrations bucked the trend among post-World War II presidents in that they used formal NSC meetings with increasing rather than decreasing frequency. Given the reputation of Kissinger and Brzezinski as strong national security advisors, the use of formal NSC meetings highlighted the role of the president in crisis decision-making.\(^{394}\)

President Reagan initially weakened the NSC advisor and staff’s role in the interagency process while trying to strengthen that of the departments and agencies. However, he ended up adopting many of the Tower Commission’s recommendations and moving towards greater policy centralization under his last two national security advisors—Frank Carlucci and General Colin Powell. President George H. W. Bush centralized policy within the White House through his staffing of the NSC with close, personal contacts. Clinton brought national economic policy into the White House through his creation of the National Economic Council. Informally, President Clinton’s NSC leaders later told new, incoming staff that trying to work major problems through the departments produced failure in Somalia, Rwanda, and the early portion of the crisis in Haiti.\(^{395}\) In response, President Clinton and his national security advisor paid more attention to integrating policy from the White House.

President George W. Bush decentralized policy and implementation through lead agencies in many cases. He began centralizing decision-making after the 9/11 attacks, creating the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council within the White House. Prompted by Congress, he helped create a new Cabinet level organization, the Department of Homeland Security, and the position of the Director of National Intelligence, who reports directly to the president. Yet, like previous presidents, George W. Bush moved to centralize policy in the White House when confronted with irreconcilable differences among subordinates that led to “bureaucratic warfare”:

> The result was an often fractured, disjointed process—policy incoherence caused by a collision of contradictory approaches from ideologically opposed officials whose combat was often unregulated. In order to get something done in this environment, the typical pattern in the administration was to centralize the decision-making process and cut people out of the loop. In the by now very well-publicized Iraqi case, it was the State Department that was cut out; in the North Korean case in the

\(^{393}\) Brzezinski, *Power and Principles* 74.

\(^{394}\) At least in the case of the *Mayaguez* during the Ford administration, the president’s political advisors were anxious to highlight the president’s role and stature as the leading decision-maker during the crisis.

\(^{395}\) Off the record conversation with former NSC staff member who served in the Clinton administration.
second term, hard-liners at the NSC and elsewhere were the ones brushed aside.396

Failures or implementation problems also motivated President Bush to centralize policy. In October 2003, he moved oversight of the war effort to the “Iraq Stabilization Group” under National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. Later President Bush further centralized war planning under Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute, the “war czar.”397

In short, presidents as different as Kennedy and Nixon or Johnson and Truman all came eventually to the conclusion that the most effective means of policymaking was to increasingly centralize the process in the White House.398 In foreign affairs, this means presidents increasingly rely on the national security advisor and by extension the National Security Council staff:

Since World War II, power has moved back and forth among courtiers [White House staff] and barons [department heads], not always predictably... Nonetheless, there has been a strong trend towards concentration of power in the primary Presidential foreign-policy courtier today, the national security assistant.399

Experience with the changing security environment over the last two decades just reinforces the trend toward centralization of national security issue management:

When something happens in the world—a military action in the Persian Gulf, a crisis in a foreign land, any kind of a crisis that is going to be a major international event—there is only one place that crisis can be managed from, and that is the West Wing of the White House, and it immediately flows into the National Security Council staff and the national security advisor. It can’t be managed at the State Department, it can’t be managed at Defense, it can’t be managed anywhere else for the simple reason that each one of those departments has a separate and distinct role to play and that role has to be coordinated with the West Wing staff, and the NSC advisor is the one who has that responsibility.400

Causes

The rigidly vertical structure of the national security system and its institutions fundamentally complicates the president’s ability to decentralize decision-making. Tools

available to the president to circumvent the rigid structure and delegate authority for integration do not work well. Specifically: 1) there is no consistently effective model of presidentially delegated authority and 2) lead agencies and lead individuals lack the authority to command integrated action without direct presidential involvement. These mutually reinforcing causes are described below.

**No Consistently Effective Model of Presidentially Delegated Authority:** The reason that the president is burdened with too much direct issue management responsibility is that there is no consistently effective mechanism for delegating his authority to others to undertake activity on his behalf. Some issues are so critically important and difficult that only the president can resolve them, and other issues are successfully managed by extremely capable individuals acting on the president's behalf, but not consistently. Evidence suggests presidents want the means to integrate department and agency efforts better and are frustrated by the centrifugal tendencies of the powerful departments and agencies. With their time limited, presidents look for ways to delegate authority for integration, but they prove largely ineffective without his involvement.

**Failure of Lead Agencies:** The most common formal integration mechanism is the lead agency because the departments and agencies are established, work well in their domains, and control resources. Prior to the 1947 act, the Department of State was the lead agency for national security policies. Creation of a formal interagency process—a reflection of the more complicated problems emanating from the security environment—diminished the Department of State's prominence as lead agency for national security affairs. Today, other departments and agencies are also likely to be designated as lead agency. The advantage to the lead agency model is that it affixes responsibility and uses existing organization. The disadvantage is that the lead agency approach does not work well. First, lead agencies lack the proximity to the president that the national security advisor enjoys.

In the game of bureaucratic warfare, the national security staff has great advantages over the State Department. Proximity gives it constant contact with the president, presence in almost all high-level meetings, the chance to put in the last word with the boss. Its job is to write cover memos critiquing positions of other agencies. Moreover, somebody has to mesh the competing views and the strands of diplomacy, defense, aid, propaganda, and intelligence. State would like to do that, but State is one of the partisan tribes, and therefore unacceptable to rival tribes as the sifter of options, the arbiter.401

This commentary also identifies another reason lead agencies prove ineffective; they cannot secure the cooperation they need from other organizations. As a longtime, senior participant notes:

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It’s very hard to have any player be both a player and the referee. The assistant secretary of state comes to the meeting to chair it and to represent the State Department. This puts him in an extremely difficult position, particularly when other agencies have equal or greater equities. It puts him in an impossible situation.402

Lead agencies lack de jure and de facto authority to command other Cabinet officials or their organizations to take integrated action. This is true even at the level of Cabinet officials, as Zbigniew Brzezinski explains:

Integration is needed, but this cannot be achieved from a departmental vantage point. No self-respecting Secretary of Defense will willingly agree to have his contribution, along with those of other agencies, integrated for presidential decision by another departmental secretary—notably, the Secretary of State. And no self-respecting Secretary of State will accept integration by a Defense Secretary. It has to be done by someone close to the President, and perceived as such by all the principals.403

The inability to ensure collaboration by a lead agency persists at lower levels as well, including the country teams led by ambassadors in overseas embassies.404 As a senior National Security Council official who served in four administrations has noted, lead agency really means sole agency as no one will follow the lead agency if its directions substantially affect their organizational equities.405 Moreover, those people who are assigned to support another agency often are not rewarded and may well be penalized in performance evaluations and assignment opportunities.

Failure of Czars: When the lead agency approach fails, presidents sometimes designate lead individuals, or “czars.” One comprehensive study of the White House staff found that using policy czars is a common practice:

[W]hen an overwhelming problem lands in the president’s lap or a new initiative is aborning, [the president] can bring in a White House assistant—perhaps a “czar” or “czarina”—to add the new, needed focus and energy to deal with it.406

406 Patterson 264.
However, czars, like lead agencies, lack authority to direct Cabinet officials or their organizations. As presidents recognize, czars “may be a pain to the cabinet and will appear to the cabinet secretaries to fuzz up their direct lines to the president.”

Presidents choose czars hoping they will be able to informally cajole or otherwise orchestrate a higher degree of collaboration, not because they are empowered to compel collaboration. The czar may lower his or her expectations and simply play an honest broker role, but they will still be viewed as interested parties because of their proximity to the president, much the same way Cabinet officials perceive the national security advisor.

**Consequences**

The trend toward centralized policymaking increases the burden on the White House, limits decision-making capacity, and inclines the system toward crisis management at the expense of proactive engagement and longer range policy and planning. Each of these consequences is described below.

**Limited Decision Capacity**: The problem with centralizing policy development and implementation in the White House is that the relatively small White House staff cannot cover the range of necessary issues. The George H. W. Bush administration focused on key national security issues like German reunification and international support in the first Gulf War, but neglected other issues as a result:

> You had a very small circle of people, both at the top and then in the immediate second tier in the Gulf War, who, from August [1990] until the end of the war, went through an unbelievably intense, emotional, physical, exhausting experience. . . . The ability to sustain a high level of intensity on something else after the kind of experience that went on as long as it did was very difficult. And, in my judgment, it affected not only Yugoslavia. It affected us on what we were trying to do on Soviet policy at the time. . . . We could not generate the interest at the top because, in a sense, they were spent.  

The same limited decision capacity was evident in the Clinton administration:

> Ideally in the policy process minor issues would be authoritatively settled by the NSC staff so that issues could be honed to the point that important decisions would be all that was on the table for the principals to decide. The lack of coordination at the lower levels was frustrating to participants at the Departments of State and Defense who had to wait until the

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407 Ibid.
President or [NSA] Anthony Lake could get around to making decisions.\textsuperscript{409}

China policy is one example of a key issue that suffered as a consequence of the limited decision capacity in the White House:

I agree with the point that there was not high-level attention to China in the White House the first couple of years. The president and Lake did not give this issue sustained attention until 1996. We tried to get the president to give major speeches on China for four years, and he never did. His—and the NSC’s—most egregious contribution was to let the economic agencies sabotage the president’s own [most favored nation] policy and leave [Secretary of State Warren] Christopher swinging in the wind.\textsuperscript{410}

Since presidents do not have sufficient time to personally integrate the many national security missions that must be undertaken, they look for ways to delegate that authority to others. However, the system generally responds poorly unless the president is personally involved. As the Tower Commission noted:

The NSC system will not work unless the President makes it work. After all, this system was created to serve the President of the United States in ways of his choosing. By his actions, by his leadership, the President therefore determines the quality of its performance.\textsuperscript{411}

Direct presidential interest, and often intervention, is required to compensate for weak structures and processes that cannot integrate problem analysis, solution options, and implementation plans. Since resources reside mostly in the departments and agencies, it is these institutions that must be used to execute all missions, even those requiring close integration. Getting these institutions to provide resources for cross-agency missions also requires presidential authority. As a result, the president is overburdened with the responsibility for integrating and resourcing priority national security missions.

\textit{A Burdened President:} Exceptional cases of particularly close presidential-national security advisor teams (e.g., Nixon-Kissinger and Bush-Scowcroft) may reduce, but do not negate, the requirement for presidential involvement to ensure integrated efforts. Cabinet officials often let the national security advisor know they will not take direction they disagree with unless it comes directly from the president.\textsuperscript{412} Lead agency and lead individuals lack de jure and de facto authority to command either Cabinet officials or their organizations to take integrated action without direct presidential involvement. This

\textsuperscript{409} James Pfiffner, \textit{The Strategic Presidency} (Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press, 1996) 159.
\textsuperscript{412} Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}, 28–29.
is true at all levels, from the national security advisor to the ambassadors leading country teams in overseas embassies. The consequence is an unmanageable span of control for the president, one which grows worse as the national security environment grows more complex. Each crisis tends to consume senior decision-makers and force them into a reactive posture:

Washington, I found, was a one issue, never-stop town. Whatever was current dominated the press and so hogged the dialogue on the Hill. The administration would find itself too often in the response mode, trying to coordinate testimony, issue press statements, and attend to urgent-response and long range considerations simultaneously. There were morning meetings of the deputies’ committee in the White House situation room to prepare for afternoon meetings of principals, and simultaneous interagency working groups trying to look ahead to the next day’s problems, with Sunday morning calls to coordinate before the Sunday morning talk shows.\(^{413}\)

Getting the president and his White House staff directly involved in managing key issues distracts them from managing the national security system more generally:

Moreover, when the President gets caught up in details, the traditional prescription for sensible policymaking gets stood on its head. He is supposed to set policy and make the big decisions. When trapped by time-consuming operations, when plunging into a few key enterprises, he becomes like an orchestra conductor who grabs the first violin and plays it vigorously, perhaps even brilliantly. The violin may sound terrific. But the other instruments are left without clear direction. And the conductor-turned-violinist becomes so absorbed in his personal performance that he loses his sensitivity to what the other instruments are doing. The President thus loses his capacity to see things whole.\(^{414}\)

Presidents sometimes begin their terms expressing a desire for a smaller National Security Council staff but most often end up with larger staff, as shown in Figure 9.

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\(^{414}\) Destler et al., *Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy* 257.
There are multiple reasons for the growth of the National Security Council staff, including the expansion of the foreign policy agenda in recent decades with more issues requiring coordination across multiple agencies. However, the upwards pressure on NSC staff is indicative of the burden that centralizing policy integration in the White House poses. Despite its growth, the attention of the National Security Council staff is consumed by day-to-day issue management. For this purpose, the 100–200-person staff (about half of whom are support and half of whom are policy professionals) is tiny compared to the multimillion-person national security establishment they work with and the multitude of issues they attempt to integrate. The Homeland Security Council’s staff is even smaller than the National Security Council’s, and together they represent only about 5 percent of the staff support for the Executive Office of the President.

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The staff-to-workload ratio is so poor that, according to former National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, “cutting the NSC staff [is] a mistake because people work so hard there that you fry them after a while if you don’t have a staff of sufficient size.” Indeed, working on the NSC is notoriously labor intensive, with long hours, seven-day work weeks, and burnout within two years the accepted norm. Former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft recalls:

The work is terrible. I told everybody I hired I would be amazed if they could stay longer than two years, because I was going to work them seven days a week, sixteen hours a day.\(^{416}\)

On the rare occasions when the size of the staff has been cut the results have not been favorable:

The expansion of the number of offices within the NSC staff, combined with the constraints on staff hiring, reduced the size of many individual

\(^{416}\) Brent Scowcroft quoted in Ivo Daalder and I.M. (Mac) Destler, “The Role of the National Security Adviser,” Oral History Roundtables, 25 October 1999. President Bush reportedly “created an award to honor the American official who most ostentatiously fell asleep in a meeting” with the president, and named it after General Scowcroft. Although mentioned as an amusing aside, the anecdote is revealing. The leaders and staff of the national security system often work to the point of utter exhaustion. Robert Gates, United States Defense Secretary, Speech to West Point Graduates, Published Monday, 11 August, 2008 - 17:36 at eGov Monitor.
NSC offices and produced a situation where the workload sometimes overwhelmed the staff. Attention to many issues was sporadic, and the paper flow slowed to a crawl; one State Department official remarked that an important cable to U.S. embassies in Europe, providing instructions for consultants and negotiations in the wake of the G-7 summit in June 1994, took two weeks to receive routine clearance from the NSC staff.\textsuperscript{417}

The president and his small National Security Council staff inevitably become a bottleneck, not by intent, but because only they can provide effective integration. As the president and his closest advisors intervene to correct the inability of the system to routinely integrate and resource priority missions well, they become indispensable to issue management success. They have no time to attend to the larger questions of how the national security system should operate, or what kind of strategic direction it requires. Instead, they are consumed with the many discrete issues that require urgent attention.

d. Burdened Leadership Cannot Direct and Manage the System

The fact that the president is burdened with issue management leads to another core problem for the national security system: the inability to provide strategic direction and management for the system as a whole. The president and his staff are too few to provide integration on the full range of important national security system issues, and too preoccupied with their difficult workload to manage the national security system. Burdened by the requirement to intervene on key issues and crises, the White House does not direct or manage the national security system as a whole.

The symptoms of inadequate system management are poor performance in the areas of strategic direction, communications, resource guidance, and performance assessments. These are described below.

\textit{Symptoms}

\textit{Missing Strategic Direction:} A system designed to support a chief executive and commander in chief requires strategic direction. A president’s strategic direction can be ascertained indirectly, through speeches, guidance from appointed leaders, national security directives, decisions, etc., but none of these mechanisms are disciplined and systematic. In a well-functioning system, the president’s staff would be assessing and reassessing near- and long-term changes in the security environment and providing a vision of national security system goals and the means to achieve those goals. They would help the president manage the system with a strategy for how all system components interact to provide the nation’s security, and they would help communicate that strategy to all system participants to encourage unity of purpose and effort.

Currently, the ability of national security professionals to collaborate toward common goals is hindered by the lack of fundamental strategic guidance, such as a defined scope of national security or a vision of a desired future security status for the United States.

Reactive Communications: To mobilize support, the president and the national security staff should communicate system goals and strategies to those inside the system, and national priorities and policies to other actors in the national security environment. The national security staff spends a great deal of time trying to ensure that external communications are consistent with current national policy. Yet, the pace of events and centrifugal forces in the system are so great, and the strategic direction function is performed so poorly, that communications tend to be reactive to external events rather than focused on strategic goals. Because of this, the external national security communications agenda is easily dominated by a near-term public affairs focus rather than a strategic communications perspective and the internal communication agenda is often delegated to the heads of department and agencies.

No Resource Allocation Tradeoffs: Another system management function of great importance is ensuring resources are allocated to the most important priorities. Since resources are limited, devoting more to one part of the system or a particular priority reduces resources available in other areas. The small NSC staff, consumed by daily activities and lacking requisite analytic support, does not have the time or means to present such issues to the president. OMB, which might be configured to provide such analytic support, does not currently work enough with national-security strategy and priorities to make such judgments. If system-level tradeoffs between national resources and national policy goals come to the attention of the president, it is more likely to be because of bureaucratic infighting or imminent mission failure (e.g., the choice of victory in Iraq at the expense of long-term damage to the Army).

President Eisenhower’s Project Solarium was a renowned attempt to produce integrated alternative courses of action for national security strategy with alternative resources allocation options. It eschewed the bureaucratic proclivities of the various agencies and departments in favor of truly national and integrated courses of action. For once, the president did not have to do his own careful balancing and integration of the various departmental positions; rather, he was presented a menu of integrated options with identified advantages and disadvantages. One scholar of the National Security Council called Eisenhower’s initiative:

[N]ot just the work of a good executive or a master bureaucrat or even a canny politician; it was a magisterial illustration of an effective president in action, perhaps one of the signal events of the past 60 years of the American presidency.

Other contemporary senior national security leaders also commend the initiative as a model for emulation. Unfortunately, costing integrated strategic courses of action and acting upon them is as rare as it is commendable.

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**Poor Performance Assessment:** Effective system management also requires the ability to assess system performance objectively. The system’s current assessment tools, such as the Government Performance and Results Act, are weak, with no strong incentives for accountability, and are geared toward individual agencies. There are few mechanisms for interagency accountability. Again, preoccupation with day-to-day exigencies undermines an important system management function. When the White House’s attention is engaged in performance assessment, it is often stimulated by external allegations of failure. Occasionally Congress will step in to provide an independent performance assessment and accountability, as was done in the case of the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction. The White House reaction is typically defensive, to limit damage and distance the president from failure. The White House can take corrective measures by requesting an independent review or cooperating with one, but it would prefer to be warned earlier of poor performance by the departments and agencies carrying out policy.

**Causes**

Neither Congress nor the president provides an organizational strategy for employing the national security system as a whole. Many presidents, especially those not familiar with national security issues, assume the system is largely “self-regulating” and will perform well with the right leaders and their periodic guidance on priorities and major issues. Prior to inauguration, they are more likely to give thought to the selection of their Cabinet officials than to organizational strategy for the national security system. Once in office, they are immediately consumed by the pressing demands of managing the government. By the time it becomes clear that the national security system will not integrate and resource the elements of national power well with only occasional guidance, the president and his national security advisor and staff are deep into crisis management mode on a range of national security issues.

**Consequences**

The consequences of a burdened White House and its inability to manage the national security system as a whole are system rigidity, frustrated allies, further decline in unified purpose during transitions from one administration to another, and basic system support functions performed poorly and without systemic corrections.

**Rigidity:** Contrary to conventional wisdom, the system is not flexible and adaptive. It gives the illusion of flexibility, as the interagency staff structures and processes respond to presidential styles and policy priorities. For example, following 9/11, the NSC...
established the Office for Combating Terrorism (under a new deputy national security advisor for combating terrorism),\textsuperscript{422} and other NSC directorates and PCCs are devoting more time to terrorist considerations and developments that may affect homeland security. This type of variability in the composition of NSC directorates is typical\textsuperscript{423} and superficial. Such changes help communicate presidential policy priorities and management styles, but they do not make much difference in the ability of the national security system to generate desired outcomes. In reality, the basic structure of interagency committees is rigid and its performance is not agile, which drives presidents and senior leaders to work around the system.

\textit{Frustrated Allies:} Other actors in the international environment are confused about who speaks with authority on a given national security issue in the U.S. system. At the same time, a dysfunctional interagency system either fails to produce policy or produces it so laboriously that taking other actor positions into account is difficult. Before U.S. representatives can effectively collaborate with foreign interlocutors, they must first negotiate a multiagency agreement on the U.S. government negotiating position and objectives, which can take time to sort out:

\begin{quote}
In the present Bush administration the logjam has assumed a different character with difficulties in planning and executing reconstruction efforts in fragile states like Afghanistan and Iraq. Donor pledging conferences for the former, aimed at getting commitments from Western allies and regional lenders such as the Asian Development Bank, had to resort to joint organization and then foundered until an overarching State Department coordinator was appointed as the clear U.S. government head. The official debt cancellation campaign for Iraq, targeting Paris Club and Middle Eastern creditors, was complicated again by dual overtures to the French Finance Ministry convening G-10 nations, as well as the appointment of James Baker, who [had] served as secretary in both [the State and Treasury] Departments, as a special envoy. While relations between the respective top deputies, for International Affairs at Treasury and Economic Affairs at State, were cordial by their accounts, the absence
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{422} The new deputy national security advisor was General Wayne Downing. See pp. 16 and footnote 33.  
\textsuperscript{423} For example, until 1997, the Clinton administration had a separate NSC directorate for “Gulf War Illness Affairs,” which dealt with questions of Iraq’s possession and possible use of weapons of mass destruction against the U.S. during the Gulf War of 1991–1992. As policy concerns shifted to other areas, this office was disbanded and its remaining policy issues merged with the Defense Policy and Arms Control Directorate. When the George W. Bush administration came into office, NSC Directorates responsible for Russian policy and for Southeast European policy (i.e., the Balkans) were merged with the European Affairs Directorate into a single European and Eurasian Affairs Directorate, reflecting the administration’s desire to deal with Russia and Central and Southern Europe within the larger context of interrelated European affairs. Alan G. Whittaker, Frederick C. Smith, and Ambassador Elizabeth McKune, “The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System,” \textit{Annual Update} (September 2004): 16.
of single negotiators and lead delegates may have undermined desired outcomes, as quick large-scale reduction efforts were delayed.\textsuperscript{424}

Thus, to the extent the national security apparatus of the U.S. government cannot quickly integrate interagency positions on any policy, strategy, or plan, it is difficult to make progress on multilateral collaboration. The tendency of the White House to centralize major multifunctional policy initiatives means policy is often provided to U.S. representatives in multilateral settings without much opportunity to provide input. In such cases, the U.S. representatives have little authority to negotiate previously decided positions despite the fact that negotiation among partners constitutes a significant portion of multilateral engagement. This helps explain why multilateral partners complain vociferously about lack of flexibility during consultations with the U.S. government.

\textit{Disarray in Transitions:} During political transitions, institutional memory and authority is absent and policy formulation is weakest. PNSR case studies suggest heightened competition between agencies and departments and greater lack of unified purpose during transitions from one administration to another,\textsuperscript{425} when the turnover of senior personnel was high. The departure and arrival of new senior officials disrupts the informal interaction patterns both within offices and across them. The professional bureaucracy—members of the military and civil and senior executive services—are prepared to provide continuity across administrations, but case studies suggest their ability to do so is limited. Confusion, disjointed policy formation, and inconsistent policy implementation in a transition is more pronounced and the government’s ability to respond to challenges during the transition—which lasts up to a year or more—declines markedly.

\textit{System Support Functions Perform Poorly:} Given that the White House does not have time for system management, it is not surprising that basic system support functions are performed poorly and without systemic corrections. In particular, management support to priority interagency efforts is poor, as is decision support:

- Management Support. The system provides excellent support to the Executive Office of the President, but responds slowly with human capital, logistics, and administrative support for White House priorities for interagency collaborative efforts. For example, the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive and the National Counterterrorism Center, both recent initiatives that were congressional and presidential priorities, struggled to obtain support. Bureaucratic resistance to the National Counterterrorism Center, which the


\textsuperscript{425} About a fifth of the cases occurred during the transition from one administration to another; e.g., the cases on land-mine policy, Cabinet selections, the Iraq conflict (1st and 2nd George W. Bush administrations), Asian financial crisis, Somalia, international terror, human trafficking, Strategic Petroleum Reserve, 1970s energy crisis, and the Bay of Pigs. The response to the Alaskan earthquake, which occurred in the transition between the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, was the prime exception to the pattern associated with the other cases. “Transition period” was construed to mean roughly the last half-year of the outgoing administration and the first half-year of the incoming administration, a period that historically covers the highest personnel turnovers in the two administrations.
president unveiled in his 2003 State of the Union Address, “never dissipated.” Even the National Security Council’s executive secretary can find it difficult to obtain staff from organizations that have alternative priorities. The same holds true for interagency bodies at the regional and country levels. Eventually personnel, office space, and administrative support are secured, but national priorities that must be executed through interagency bodies typically start slow and pick up momentum slowly.

- Decision Support. The system does not provide consistently excellent decision support to White House decision-makers for several reasons.

First, the system lacks the institutional memory necessary to support decision-making. To begin with, presidential transitions mark the wholesale retirement of national security documents under the Presidential Records Act. Surprisingly, a good deal of knowledge is lost as records are carted off to presidential libraries. For example, the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection sponsored many vulnerability studies at taxpayer expense. After 9/11, those working homeland security issues learned about the existence of the studies through personal contacts but getting access to the material from the Clinton library was a challenge.

Anecdotes from officials complaining about lost information are frequent and cover past and recent events:

- When Nasser closed the Gulf, Abba Eban came and read to Rusk a statement guaranteeing the United States would keep it open, which we gave them in the previous war. Rusk stormed out and said, ‘Where the hell is it? He wasn’t making it up.’ And they found it in Princeton in the library. . . . The lack of that institutional continuity in the U.S. government really can hurt your policies. There’s a famous—in famous—example in the China case where . . . the Chinese played a little game. They got the Carter people to agree [to] a critical modification of our position; it pushed us over the line in a significant way. This was a result of somebody not really holding that record of the past discussions in their heads and realizing what the Chinese game was.

Second, departments and agencies control analytic resources required for good decision support, and their priorities are more narrowly focused than those of the White House. The NSC staff can compare and contrast different department and

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426 Justin Rood, “Threat Connector—Two Years Ago, John O. Brennan Got the Nod to Build a New Kind of Intelligence Organization, but to Do It, He Had to Persuade the Most Powerful, Turf-Conscious Agencies in Government to Donate Staff and Money” Government Executive 38. 5 (2006): 40; Michelle Van Cleave, Project on National Security Reform Case Study 8.

427 Jim Kurtz, Personal Interview, 30 September 2008.

428 In the mid-1990s, officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense learned of an agreement between the United States and another country but no one could produce a copy. Apparently the only copy was in a Sultan’s safe. Ibid.

agency positions, but the workload militates against deeper analysis on specific issues:

Robert Pastor, a regional specialist, alone deals with issues covering all of Latin America and the Caribbean; Jessica Tuchman...copes with such priorities as nuclear proliferation, arm sales, human rights, the international environment, law of the sea and the International Labor Organization; Victor Utgoff is compelled to compete with the Defense Department in analyzing such complex issues as the B-1 bomber, the Seafarer communications project, the neutron bomb and the massive defense budget. One aide felt that although Brzezinski generally is available, neither he nor his deputy, Aaron, is able to give sufficient attention to each staff problem.430

Third, information sharing across the system does not support NSC staff analysis well. For example, during the Kosovo crisis, volumes of products on Serbian key leaders, strategy, and disposition of military forces were provided to decision-makers. However, it wasn't until the crisis was well underway that an integrated assessment of Serbian politico-economic relationships provided key insights into ways the United States could influence Serbian President Milosevic's decision-making.431 Serendipitously, the valuable product found its way to the White House from one of the many information and analytic nodes in the broader national security system, but not as the result of established processes.

Currently, the ability of the national security system to locate, integrate, and access all of its information and analytic resources is limited, and decision-making suffers accordingly. Busy NSC staff try to marshal sufficient analytic resources and information to produce integrated analyses in support of presidential decisions, but they typically cannot advise the president well on issues that cut across departments and agencies. Consequently, system decision support to the president is often not linked to the best analysis and all data, and NSC decisions are rarely timely, disciplined, or supported by comprehensive problem and solution analyses. In this regard, system output is less than the sum of its parts.

e. Congress Reinforces Institutional and System Management Problems

Congress mirrors and reinforces the strong individual structures but weak integrating mechanisms of the executive branch, as well as other problems. Committees are organized in parallel with executive branch departments and agencies. The defense committees review and legislate only on defense matters; foreign policy committees stay within their assigned jurisdictions. The government reform committees can investigate


431 Discussion with Leon Fuerth, former national security advisor to the Vice-President Al Gore.
and reorganize the executive branch, but ultimately no committee is devoted to
overseeing interagency mechanisms or multiagency operations.

A recent effort by Congress to bridge these jurisdictions has had mixed results. Section
1206 of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act authorized funds for training for
military forces for stabilization and counterterrorism missions. While the funding was
included within the Department of Defense budget, the program had a unique “dual-key”
arrangement requiring approval of both Defense and State Departments. An
administration report complained that there were still too many restrictions on spending
these funds—and a think-tank study noted congressional opposition to Department of
Defense operation of what was viewed as a traditionally Department of State program.432

In addition, the confirmation process for senior officials is arduous and complicated,
which can lead to gaps in leadership and difficulties in recruitment. There are
considerable tensions and disagreements between branches over the value and burden of
reporting requirements, which distracts both branches from strategic management of the
national security system. Congressional restrictions on spending and fund transfers
(“reprogramming”) limit executive branch flexibility for multiagency activities.
Congress often delays or even fails to pass routine legislation for national security.

**Symptoms**

Congress focuses almost exclusively on department and agency capabilities instead of
what might be particularly relevant to multiagency activities. Similarly, administration
submissions of agency budgets do not focus on interagency missions, nor do they even
typically note these requirements. This contrasts sharply with agency-specific needs,
which are routinely highlighted in congressional testimony and which are noted as
shortfalls in the president's budget.

Congress has no clearly assigned venue for oversight of the “interagency” space. The
appropriations committees could theoretically take a whole-of-government approach to
multiagency activities, but they typically act with a subcommittee focus. Congress
spends enormous amounts of time and effort considering the performance of the
individual agencies and departments, but not broader national security missions more
generally nor interagency efforts in particular. When it does, it provides valuable
insights. For example, one of the few congressional panels that has sought and achieved
some oversight over multiagency activities, the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Armed Services Committee, investigated the operations of
the provincial reconstruction teams in Iraq and Afghanistan by looking at the various
agencies involved and calling witnesses from several departments. Its report provided a
rare and valuable overarching analysis:

> The mission has not been clearly defined. There is a lack of unity of
command resulting in a lack of unity of effect. Funding is not

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consolidated . . . and funding streams are extremely confusing. Selection, skill sets . . . and training of PRT personnel continues to be problematic. Metrics do not exist for determining if PRTs are succeeding.\footnote{U.S. House of Representatives, the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan,” April 2008.}

Congress at times further constrains already limited executive branch ability to surge quickly and collaboratively in response to crises by insisting on compliance with existing notification and other fund transfer rules. Congressional restrictions on spending and fund transfers thus may limit executive branch flexibility for multiagency activities.

\textit{Causes}

The current committee jurisdictions remain nearly unchanged since 1946—the major exceptions being the creation of intelligence committees in the 1970s and homeland security committees following 9/11. Committees do not hear perspectives on the issues with which they are concerned from those outside their jurisdictions. Foreign relations committees examine relations with other nations and international organizations, while defense committees examine military matters, a pattern that remains largely unchanged even after 9/11.

Congress divides the functions of authorization and appropriations. The authorization panels like the defense and foreign policy committees establish, continue, and modify executive branch organizations and programs, and set restrictions of fund expenditures. Appropriations subcommittees draft the spending bills. The appropriations subcommittees are divided into foreign relations, defense, and homeland security jurisdictions. Starting in 2006, State Department and foreign operations appropriations were finally combined into a single bill before a single subcommittee in each chamber.

The division of functions limits areas of committee inquiry and focus and reinforces their “instinct for the capillaries,” which manifests itself in a focus on narrow aspects of policy rather than seeking or obtaining a strategic overview. For example, while policy toward China has had strong congressional interest since 1989, U.S. policy has been overseen by numerous congressional committees, each examining the narrow issues under its jurisdiction. The foreign policy committees have had a broad focus, but the trade committees had responsibility for the most contentious legislation affecting the two countries. The defense committees reviewed Pentagon responses to growing Chinese military power and mandated a regular report on the topic. The House even established a special committee in 1999 to study Chinese efforts to acquire U.S. technology. In recent years, legislation to force Chinese currency reform has been referred jointly to the trade, foreign policy, and financial services committees. No committee had jurisdiction to oversee U.S. policy coordination to be sure trade and human rights policies, military preparedness, and diplomatic engagement are all in proper balance.

Protection of turf and power occurs in the committees of both houses of Congress. The process for multiple committee consideration of multiagency matters is difficult,
confused, and inconsistent between chambers. Different House and Senate rules and precedents exist to handle matters outside chamber jurisdictions. Originating committees negotiate bills in conference, which excludes stakeholders and skews perspectives.

**Consequences**

The ways in which the legislative branch allocates funds and conducts oversight reinforce existing systemic deficiencies, making improvements in performance more difficult. Issues receive fragmented consideration and fragmented legislation. Congressional restrictions on spending and fund transfers may have longer term consequences of program failure or missed opportunities. A recent report cites some examples of problems created by the restrictions on allocating or shifting funds:

- A four-month delay in obtaining congressional approval for a police training program in Somalia in 1993 led to program failure since U.S. trainers were already slated to be withdrawn.\(^{434}\)

- Earmarking limitations constrained U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) ability to respond proactively to the signing of a 1996 peace agreement between the government of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front.\(^{435}\)

- U.S. sanctions on Sudan apply to the whole country rather than Sudan’s different regions, which need to be treated differently.\(^{436}\)

The foreign policy agencies fail to receive current congressional guidance, revised authorities, and timely funding. The failure to pass a foreign aid authorization bill for over twenty years means that the government is saddled by a cumbersome law that has a bewildering array of goals and directives.\(^{437}\) Even when the foreign policy committees produce legislation widely viewed as necessary for enactment, individuals and groups may seek to add controversial measures that prolong debates and may undermine support for the basic legislation.

The problem with how Congress is arranged contributes directly to the performance of the executive branch. The jurisdictional focus of congressional committees and fragmented oversight makes establishing accountability for interagency missions a peripheral activity. The reinforcement of department and agency preeminence impedes Congress as much as it impedes the president from comprehensive discussions of national security policy and the big questions the country faces regarding how it should act in the world. In other words, committee jurisdictional perspectives hinder collaborative efforts.


\(^{435}\) Ibid. 30.

\(^{436}\) Ibid. 29.

\(^{437}\) Ibid. 23.
3. Cumulative Effect of Core Problems

Key characteristics of the national security system’s basic design are ill-suited for an increasingly complex security environment:

The ‘legacy’ mode of organization of the executive branch is vertical . . . . This form of organization significantly impedes the ability of government to deal with complex problems. Authority to act requires detailed supervision from the top, mediated by large bureaucracies. Information about real-world conditions does not travel easily between field-level components of institutions and the policymaking levels. It flows even less readily between executive institutions.

The effects of the system’s institutional and managerial limitations are most apparent when a discrete issue or mission is undertaken. If the issue is largely under the province of a single agency or department, it is much more likely to be executed well. If the issue requires an integrated effort across multiple agencies and departments, problems arise all along the national security issue management chain—from policy, to strategy, to plans, to implementation and assessment. The system’s inability to integrate efforts across national security institutions becomes apparent at each of the following phases of issue management:

a. Assessment

The process of issue management begins and ends with assessment. The initial function of assessment is to provide policymakers with a context for understanding the international environment and the issue at hand. The system’s ability to provide integrated assessments is constrained because information is resident in institutional “stovepipes” and only unevenly shared, producing a skewed and sometimes erroneous picture of the security situation facing the policymaker. Knowledge management across the system is hampered by cultural factors (which produce disincentives to the sharing of information) and by technical misalignments. Individuals across departments and agencies do not trust sufficiently in the accountability and likely reciprocity of those with whom they ideally should be sharing knowledge. In addition, different departments and agencies have non-interoperable information management systems. Despite large amounts of data resident in the system, critical information is frequently lost or goes undiscovered in the labyrinth of competing data systems. Critical decisions are delayed while information sources are identified and integrated, sometimes as the moment for action slips away. Ultimately, effective assessment requires effective decision support.

b. Policy

The tendency of interagency decision mechanisms to stalemate over policy issues delays policy decisions, making the system slower and less nimble than desired. Individuals and agencies tend to view themselves at the interagency level as being in competition for

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438 Leon Fuerth, PNSR internal paper on the scope of national security.
power, influence, and resources. Interagency forums are characterized by conflicting agency positions, which produces a creative tension—one which cannot be effectively resolved. Representatives of agencies meet and express their respective agencies’ views and suggestions, but rarely do representatives step out of their assigned positions and discuss issues in a joint, coordinated, interagency rather than agency-centric way. If consensus is reached, it often is at the expense of clarity and accountability:

Consultations and discussion have many advantages of course, but the committee system also produces endless compromises, watered-down decisions, busywork, lowest common denominator solutions, and fear of creativity. ‘The system of diffused authority spreads outwards into a thousand branches and twigs of the governmental tree,’ wrote George Kennan. At every level, decision-making was made by consensus among bureaus and agencies, any of which could veto or delay action. The operative principle frequently voiced by officials becomes, ‘Anything you fellows can agree on is all right with me.’ Such methods, in Kennan’s words, produce ‘a hodgepodge inferior to any of the individual views out of which it is brewed’ and require enormous amounts of wasted time and paperwork.439

Watered-down policy diminishes its directive power. What results is vaguely worded “policy” that can be selectively interpreted by individual agencies according to their institutional biases. Policy therefore is often not clear, prioritized, and specific enough to be useful to drive strategy and plans. The interagency policy process is so onerous that policy is developed slowly, often only in response to crises or external forcing functions. Key leaders are consequently “in-box” driven, crisis-by-crisis, and have little time for longer range policy or systemwide national security management. They are reactive and unable to watch for and seize opportunities.

c. Strategy

In the current national security system, it is difficult to generate and objectively evaluate alternative strategic courses of action to achieve desired results. Opponents of a chosen course of action may leak their preference at the first signs of trouble, opening up political liabilities for the administration. According to David Gergen, a White House counselor in both the Reagan and Clinton administrations:

Something distinctly unhealthy has taken place in our public policy as of late. Fifteen years ago, I can well remember, aides to a president felt free to write candid memos and have serious, far-reaching disagreements with each other—and the president—on paper. Watergate put the first stop to that: One quickly learned never to write anything on paper that you would be unhappy to see on the front page of the Washington Post. By the time of the Reagan administration, leaks had become so bad that one learned

not only not to write things down on paper but never to say anything controversial in a meeting with more than one person.\textsuperscript{440}

The chilling effect on candor, combined with poor decision support and the tendency toward consensus building, obscure the links between objectives and the alternative activities, programs, and resources required to achieve them. Consequently, “strategy” tends to be expressed in terms of desirable objectives rather than specific courses of action with strengths and liabilities that must be mitigated, as critics have long noted:

The NSC spends most of its time readying papers that mean all things to all men. An NSC paper is commonly so ambiguous and so general that the issues must all be renegotiated when the situation to which it was supposed to apply actually arises. By that time it is too late to take anything but emergency action.\textsuperscript{441}

To the extent real strategy is formulated and acted upon, it is usually not captured in official documents but rather is the purview of a few key individuals. The remainder of the bureaucracy is often unclear about the strategic course of action and their own institutional roles in its execution. This only serves to reinforce the disincentives for multiagency cooperation. If failure looms for lack of integrated effort, it is easier for key leaders who direct the departments committed to the enterprise to dedicate more resources at the problem than it is to formulate and implement tightly integrated, multifunctional strategies. The lack of clear strategy sends mixed signals to external actors, including U.S. allies and adversaries, about the intent of American action which is then often misconstrued to the detriment of the nation’s long-term national security.

Because the NSC does not really produce strategy, the handling of day-to-day problems is necessarily left to the Cabinet departments concerned. Each goes its own way because purposeful, hard-driving, goal-directed strategy, which alone can give cutting edge to day-to-day tactical operations, is lacking. Henry Kissinger has well described the kind of strategy which is the product of this process: “It is as if in commissioning a painting, a patron would ask one artist to draw the face, another the body, another the hands, and still another the feet, simply because each artist is particularly good in one category.”\textsuperscript{442}

d. Planning

National security organizations do not have a strong history of routinely collaborating on plans. A primary reason for this is the deep cultural differences regarding the value of planning. These differences are especially prominent between the Departments of


\textsuperscript{441} Senator Henry M. Jackson, “How Shall We Forge a Strategy for Survival?” Address before the National War College, Washington, D.C., 16 April 1959, 55.

\textsuperscript{442} Henry Kissinger quoted by Sen. Henry M. Jackson in “How Shall We Forge a Strategy for Survival?” Address before the National War College, Washington, D.C., 16 April 1959, 55.
Defense and State, and between the functional and regional national security divisions within these and other departments and agencies. It was identified as early as 1949:

A major reason for the failure of NSC-4 and NSC-43 to produce interdepartmental agreement on psychological activities was the fundamental difference of concept between State’s planners and the military planners in Defense. . . . Defense planners, trained in the system of staff planning, developed long range, or strategic plans, to fit the most probable future contingencies. This was one aspect of the military which was at complete variance with attitudes of the civilian planners in State. State Department for generations had operated on the basis that political contingencies were so variable and intangible that long range political plans were impracticable, if not impossible. State planners had to wait and observe how situations developed and then improvise a policy and plan to fit that particular situation.\footnote{E. Lilly, “Short History of the Psychological Strategy Board,” 21 December 1951, National Security Council Staff Papers, NSC Secretariat Series, Box 6, Dwight Eisenhower Library 74-75; cited in David Tucker, “Confronting the Unconventional: Innovation and Transformation in Military Affairs,” Strategic Studies Institute, October 2006, 42.}

Law requires\footnote{Goldwater-Nichols legislation included provisions requiring the secretary of defense to prepare, for the president’s approval, written policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans. 10 USC 113(g) (2).} that the Secretary of Defense prepare Contingency Planning Guidance, which is drafted in the Department of Defense, approved by the president, and sent back to the Department of Defense for execution. Other departments or agencies need not be involved in these plans. Neither are they required to do their own planning, even though recently they have begun doing so. The intelligence community has strategic planning processes; the Agency for International Development is putting more emphasis on planning activities; and the Department of Homeland Security is inculcating a planning culture with the help of retired military officers. Even the Department of State, through its functional bureaus, is involved in planning more than used to be the case. However, personnel shortages, the lack of personnel trained in planning, and the natural reluctance of many non-Department of Defense organizations to embrace planning complicate these nascent efforts to improve interagency planning:

[W]e found that DoD and non-DoD organizations do not fully understand each other’s planning processes, and non-DoD organizations have limited capacity to participate in DoD’s full range of planning activities. . . . State does not have a large pool of planners who can deploy to DoD’s combatant commands. DoD officials noted that their efforts to include non-DoD organizations in planning and exercise efforts were stymied by the limited number of personnel those agencies can offer . . . both DoD
and State staff doubted that civilian capacity and resources would ever match the levels desired.\textsuperscript{445}

Another major reason that interagency planning is difficult is the lack of trust between agencies, which impedes the sharing of sensitive information. To the extent cross-agency planning is attempted, standard operating procedures often conflict, with the ability of each agency and department to support planning with relevant data and at the appropriate level of abstraction varying greatly. When interagency planning is developed according to one agency’s preferred model, the results are weak and often abandoned. The system as a whole does a poor job of providing all the relevant information in the system to build and amend plans.

e. Implementation

There are three immediate impediments to effective implementation of interagency national security missions. First, command and control functions are contested and confused in interagency operations, with multiple chains of command operating between Washington-based headquarters of diverse agencies and their representatives in the field. Moreover, command and control is further complicated by the fact that departments and agencies delineate regions differently, so that a single area of operation can span numerous regional offices and organizational elements that are involved in supporting interagency operations. Coordination difficulties are correspondingly more complicated.

Second, resource allocation is subject to all the systemwide impediments identified above that make it difficult to link resources with policies, strategies, and plans. Since the departments and agencies give priority to their core missions, capabilities required for executing nontraditional missions are frequently lacking or inadequate. Third, personnel system incentives reward agency-centric behaviors, consistent with the strong authorities, cultures, and career paths of the independent agencies and departments.

An overarching concern is that leadership accountability for implementation results is unclear. Since the system will not provide a clear mandate, resources, and supporting structures and processes for a designated leader and a supporting team to solve a problem or seize an opportunity, how can anyone be held accountable for failure? When things go awry, it is understood by all concerned that the effort was a hit-or-miss proposition given all the systemic impediments to success. Since the system currently saddles leaders with multiple chains of command directing activities in the field, particularly in “surge” environments like Iraq and Afghanistan, and does not provide the requisite authority and resources for success, it is difficult for senior leaders to hold anyone accountable for failure. This is especially true if they are unable to provide clear policy guidance, as sometimes is the case.

f. Evaluation

Post-implementation assessment suffers from the same knowledge management impediments that limit issue assessment prior to policy development. In addition, the system cannot constantly and objectively assess performance, as doing so both exceeds available resources and opens up political liabilities. Critical performance reviews could undermine the political support necessary for sustained engagement on a policy priority. Finally, for any given issue, difficult lessons learned concerning performance are often lost during political transitions as key leaders depart.

The cumulative effect of so many system limitations is periodic but increasingly frequent national security failures. Figure 11 below captures in a cause and effect chain how some of the system’s distinguishing attributes lead to national security failures. Organizational imbalances and weak integrating mechanisms have cascading effects that frustrate leaders and their staffs, instill dangerous cultural norms and impede performance in a complex and dynamic environment.
Figure 11. Cause and Effect in National Security Failures
4. Other Overarching Performance Limitations that Demand Reform

The preceding analysis identifies the core problems and causes impeding the performance of the national security system, explaining why it is not able to integrate and resource national security missions consistently or well. Several additional overarching observations about the system also are justified.

a. The system requires but also squanders available human talent.

The national security system performs as well as it does only because of dedicated efforts by the men and women who serve it. The system does not always perform poorly. When it does perform well, it typically is due to the extraordinary efforts of exceptionally talented individuals who work around the formal system. For example, on those occasions when the system innovated and produced effective interagency programs, there was usually an extraordinary leader pulling the effort together despite institutional resistance and with the help of the president or other Cabinet officials. Ambassador Robert Komer and William Colby’s leadership in the CORDS program used in Vietnam is a good example, and Ambassador James Pardew’s leadership of the Train and Equip program in Bosnia is another. Yet identifiable examples of innovative and effective interagency efforts are so uncommon and ephemeral that they merely reinforce the general assessment that the national security system is unable to integrate and resource all the elements of national power well.

b. The system is not agile, and unable to learn from success or failure.

The system learns and adapts poorly. For example, pioneering mechanisms developed in both CORDs and the Bosnia Train and Equip successes were quickly lost. The lack of institutional learning and knowledge helps explain the slow and limited performance of provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan and Iraq. The inability to learn from success or failure is typical of the current system. Thus, what we discovered too late from Vietnam, the energy crisis of the 1970s, Iran, Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and 9/11, we are now relearning in Iraq and Afghanistan.

c. The system cannot be reformed with limited measures that address only symptoms rather than core problems.

Inadequate performance is not simply ignored. Congress and presidents have made adjustments to the national security system, particularly following major setbacks. However, to date we have not succeeded in fixing the core problems. Since World War II, much organizational attention has been paid to fixing particular mission areas, such as strategic communications, military integration, and foreign development assistance, or, more recently, intelligence and post-conflict capabilities. In addition to improving performance in particular mission areas, there is also a pronounced and growing trend toward strengthening the ability of presidents to control the system and generate unity of effort, as illustrated in Figure 12.

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President Truman increased his use of the National Security Council after the start of the Korean War. The challenge of resourcing Truman’s NSC-68 strategy, and the perception that it was Department of State-centric, in part prompted Eisenhower’s reassessment during his Solarium exercise. The Sputnik launches stimulated the creation of NASA and contributed to the reorganization of the Defense Department, while the Bay of Pigs debacle convinced Kennedy to create the Situation Room and to use an interagency committee (the ExComm) during the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Johnson established the CORDS program to promote interagency collaboration in Vietnam while also generally seeking to provide the State Department with greater interagency power through new interagency structures, the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) and Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRGs). The Washington Special Actions Group was created in response to perceived crisis management process problems when a North Korean fighter shot down an American EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft over the Sea of Japan on April 15, 1969.

Several national security failures also helped pass the historic Goldwater-Nichols Act, which attempted to strengthen the president’s ability to produce unified efforts. The Iran-Contra scandal prompted NSC reforms, and the U.S. experiences in Panama, Somalia, and during the USS Harlan County episode in Haiti spurred the issuance of PDD 56 and related interagency reforms. Finally, the attacks of 9/11 and the U.S. experience in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom led to a variety of interagency reforms during the George W. Bush administration. The interest in interagency reform efforts over the past two presidential administrations (the last 16 years) is particularly notable and these reforms include new interagency processes as well as personnel, management, and training and education programs. Yet all these reforms have limited benefits because they do not address the core problems that actually drive dysfunctional behaviors.
Figure 12. Selected Security Events and Subsequent Reforms
As Senator John Warner noted recently, the core problems that impede system performance can be remedied only with systemic reforms:

Our mission in Iraq and Afghanistan requires coordinated and integrated action among all federal departments and agencies of our government. This mission has revealed that our government is not adequately organized to conduct interagency operations. I am concerned about the slow pace of organizational reform within our civilian departments and agencies to strengthen our interagency process and build operational readiness.447

Then, from Congressman Ike Skelton:

Interagency reform is critical to achieving the level of coordination among all agencies of government that is necessary to completely execute the Global War on Terror and to meet future challenges. . . . I’m convinced such reform can bring all the instruments of national power to bear more effectively on the challenges we face in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Global War on Terror and even here in homeland security. We must do it and we must get it right.448

**D. Future Performance**

**1. Changing Security Environment**

The preceding three sections make the argument that the system’s ability to produce desired outcomes is declining because its design and attributes have not kept pace with changes in the security environment. In theory, it is possible that the security environment will evolve in ways that reverse the current trend; that it will become more stable, more predictable, and more benign. PNSR examined the broad range of informed literature on environmental trends to determine if this might be the case. As might be expected given recent shocks like 9/11, there are many indications that the security environment will continue to evolve in ways that exacerbate rather than ameliorate the problems that currently inhibit system performance.114

Two fundamental traits are likely to define the global arena in the coming decades: 1) the security environment will be more complex than at present, or than was assumed in the design of the present security system, and 2) the pace of change in the international environment—the rate at which it grows more complex—is moving faster than ever. These two trends, increased complexity and increased speed of change, will expose the weaknesses of the present U.S. system more as time passes.

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Complexity in the international system stems from several factors. Complexity involves an increase in the number and the type of possible actors on the global stage; an increase in the range of means at their disposal for affecting U.S. security and that of our allies; and an increase in the economic, political, and technological interdependencies among the actors. Complexity is also evident in the interdependent problems that arise from the security environment (see for example Figure 13). As noted at the top of this section of the report, the faster-moving, more complex environment that emerged over the past few decades required the system to deal effectively with inter-state conflict, intra-state conflict, nonstate actors, and public diplomacy. Yet the 1947 system was designed primarily to allow the Defense and State Departments to deal with inter-state conflict. Other forms of conflict were assumed to be less important than or part of inter-state conflict, primarily the Cold War with the Soviet Union. Even if a competitor emerges in the future comparable to the Soviet Union, forms of conflict other than inter-state conflict will no longer be simply subordinate to or part of inter-state conflict. The diffusion of power outside the state system means that even small groups of nonstate actors will be able to pose significant threats to the security of the United States.

Figure 13. The Correlation Matrix

Consider the following examples of change since the current U.S. security system was established:

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• In 1970 more than 35 percent of the world population was illiterate. By 2015 the number will shrink to 15 percent, representing the highest rate of literacy in the history of the world.  

• According to World Bank data, in 1990 some 375 million Chinese citizens were living on less than $1 per day. In a decade that number had dropped to 212 million. By 2015 the number is expected to drop to a “mere” 16 million.

• In 1947 there were a few hundred NGOs; in 1975 there were about 3,000 international NGOs; and by 2008 there were some 49,633.

• The average speed of a locomotive in 1900 was 48.3 mph. Today commercial jets regularly cross the U.S. at speeds over 300 mph. In addition, there are approximately 87,000 commercial flights handled each day in the skies over the U.S.

• In 1980 an IBM 3380 computer could store 1,200MB of data at a cost of $200,000; by 2000 most servers could store 100,000MB of data at a cost of only $10,000. To put this information explosion in context, consider that researchers estimate that 5 exabytes of data were generated by humans in 2002, an amount equal to all the words ever spoken by all human beings who ever lived. Further, between 1990 and 2002 there has been in increase of 30 percent in the amount of information stored by human beings.

This short list of facts tells us several things about the likely future security environment. First, it illustrates the rapid increase in speed of communication of all sorts, for both physical goods and information. One way to answer the question, “Is the world more complex?” is simply to note that hardly anyone in the advanced world of 1900 (and few even in 1950) had a telephone. Today, hundreds of millions of people in advanced and developing societies carry cellphones that enable nearly instantaneous communication to any spot on the globe.

Second, it shows that the number of humans able to make use of transmitted information is greater than at any point in history, as is their access to diverse information. An international press, instantaneous global communication, and a twenty-four-hour media

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cycle provide a constantly evolving and information-rich environment that individuals and organizations can tap into as well as governments. Third, as in the case of China, the data illustrate how quickly modern economic structures can change the quality of life for millions of people. This is an unprecedented change in the human experience: where for most of recorded history epochal change took centuries or millennia, not single generations.456

Finally, it shows one result of the sum of the other three points: an explosion in the capacity of humans to organize themselves into new organizations able to effectively act at a global level. As these evolutionary changes continue, the international security environment is becoming crowded with more actors, both good and bad. Just as international NGOs are now an established presence in nearly every conflict zone or disaster situation, so are nebulous networks of illicit smugglers, warlords, druglords, terrorists, and pirates.457

Thus, the human experience is changing faster and with more variety than ever before. Newly literate peoples, a general lessening of global poverty, and a scientific and technological transformation have ushered in a new era where “the traditional strategic calculus” of states “no longer functions [because] it depends on certain assumptions about the relationship between the State and its objectives,” which are increasingly being thrown into doubt by the rise of new actors with new powers.458

Globalization is the general term used to describe this diffusion of power outside the traditional state system. In other words, the opening and integration of national economies has produced a world in which goods, wealth, ideas, technology, and people move with less and less state control. Globalization relies on a variety of licit and illicit trade and communication networks. Such networks make possible the increased and faster movement across borders, which is the hallmark of globalization. While globalization brings benefits, it also erodes the state monopoly on force and allows a range of quasi- and nonstate actors to employ force that had previously been exclusively the purview of national states. The most salient indicator of this trend is the risk that a small group of people might detonate a nuclear device in the United States.

Discussions of globalization sometimes imply that the decrease in state power is absolute and inevitable. It is neither. As this report has argued, by some measures (e.g., extraction of resources and conversion of those into military force), states are more powerful or capable now than before. Indeed, globalization is testimony to their strength. While humans have a natural tendency to communicate and trade, the integration of world economies has resulted from specific decisions made by states to open their economies and politics. Globalization is the result of state action, but part of that action necessitates some loss of sovereignty in the name of opening up greater avenues of

commercial and cultural communication. Once a state commits to opening, it gains competitive advantages that encourage other states to open as well. State and inter-state development and regulation of infrastructure (e.g., telecommunications, monetary systems) have been indispensable to globalization and its expansion. But this process, and therefore globalization itself, is not inevitable. At the end of the nineteenth century, the world economy had reached a level of integration that was subsequently destroyed by the catastrophes of the twentieth century, and only recently recovered. Twenty-first century catastrophes might similarly reverse the openness the world currently enjoys. Without such a reversal, however, the United States will face a world in which globalization is a fact of life and poses a number of challenges.

The most important of those challenges will come in the areas of environmental and demographic challenges, and energy constraints coupled with the threat of direct weapons proliferation and dual-use technologies which can be used as weapons by small groups or lone actors. In particular, there are two major global demographic trends of potential concern in the coming decades: 1) the macro-level question of population growth rate and 2) the movement of populations in response to a variety of factors including population growth, environmental change, economic aspirations, and political unrest.459

According to several measures, the planet’s population is projected to approach 9.3 billion by 2050, including more than 2 billion new people by 2025.460 This estimate represents the best middle-of-the-road consensus among population analysts. A further breakdown of the data reveals that the global population is projected to see 56 percent of the world living in Asia of which 66 percent will live in urban littoral regions by 2030. In addition, the Western Hemisphere will comprise only 13 percent of world population.

Sometime in the first quarter of the current century the majority of the world’s peoples will be living in urban centers for the first time in history. Most of these cities will constitute “mega-cities” of 10 million or more.461 The security effect of this concentration of population and simultaneous migration to coastal regions will likely mean that natural or man-made catastrophes will be exacerbated because of population clustering; floods, pathogens, and WMD effects will all be intensified by the concentration of population.

As global population continues to grow through the mid-century mark, and as developing regions like China and India pursue intense economic growth, global energy consumption will increase. Access to secure and affordable energy supplies will remain or more probably increase as a factor in potential security disputes. Technological innovation will

460 It is important to note that the 9.3 billion number is the UNs median variant and assumes a leveling off of the global fertility rate to 2.1 children per woman from 3 per woman in its 1990–1995 study.
bring with it the possibility for alleviating some of this pressure, but it will also bring a range of new capabilities for terror.

Dual-use technologies, especially in the biological sciences, will enable nonstate actors to acquire the means to threaten traditional national-states with levels of harm which before only other states could credibly deploy. Further, the increased reliance on sensitive information networks for controlling critical infrastructure (electrical plants, financial trading boards, traffic signal and air control centers, etc.) means that advanced states are open to major disruptive or destructive cyber-based attacks. Such attacks could come through a variety of means from denial-of-service hacking overloads to direct attacks on communications satellites. From 2004–2007 there was a 259 percent increase in computer attacks against U.S. government systems alone.

The worst of these emerging trends will expose the U.S. to unacceptable risks. The major inadequacies identified in the previous section point to the need for more efficient collaboration within the U.S. security system at all levels. Federal, state, local, and international coordination will become indispensable to managing the most likely security challenges which loom.

The current system provides poor mission integration across functional departments and agencies, and is too often ineffective in bringing in state, local, and NGO or significant allied help in dealing with problems which cross borders and functional specialties. In an environment where most threats are multidimensional and can rarely be confined to the traditional functional areas around which the major U.S. security departments and agencies are built, good interagency and cross-jurisdictional working relationships become more essential than ever. Cyberwarfare, counterinsurgency, and lone attackers with WMD capabilities all represent threats that plead for consistently efficient integration of the nation’s top civilian government, military, and private-sector capabilities.

Resource allocation processes will need to move material and personnel much faster in an environment where densely populated centers or globalized communication links risk allowing local issues to turn global in much shorter time-frames than the current system is designed to anticipate. For these same reasons, daily issue management will become increasingly difficult as the number and types of possible threats multiply. The current system has so far failed to show that it can consistently manage the speed and diversity of exigencies presented by this new environment.

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2. Future Performance and Systemic Reform

PNSR’s underlying thesis is that the national security system cannot currently integrate expertise and capabilities, and cannot resource those capabilities sufficiently to safeguard the vital interests of the nation. This thesis is widely accepted in the national security community. The research and analysis offered here explain why the thesis is compelling. What the brief survey of future security environmental trends offered in the preceding section suggests is that the core problems already limiting system performance are only going to get worse.

The persistence of the problems identified suggests the system cannot adapt without outside intervention, and that it will therefore remain resistant to strategic direction and management. Therefore system performance will continue to decline as the security environment continues to change unless major systemic reform is undertaken. Any reform of the current system must produce a system that achieves desired outcomes consistently and efficiently by encouraging behaviors compatible with both greater effectiveness and efficiency. This is not likely without an accurate and detailed understanding of the system’s core problems. Part IV of this report offers detailed explanations for the core problems identified in this section.

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PART IV: PROBLEM ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM

The previous section of this report examined the overall performance of the national security system and explained why it is not able to integrate and resource national security missions consistently or well. It identified five major impediments to system performance that explain 1) why the system can produce good core capabilities but poor supporting capabilities and poor unity of effort, 2) why it squanders available human talent, 3) why it cannot learn from success or failure, 4) why it cannot be reformed with limited measures that address only symptoms rather than core problems, and 5) why the security environment is continuing to change in ways that will exacerbate rather than ameliorate system performance problems.

Yet more detailed examination and explanation of the core problems with the current system is required. Symptoms must be distinguished from actual problems and their causes in order to formulate options for reform with a high degree of confidence that they will actually improve performance. Part IV of this report provides detailed explanations for the system’s core problems by examining the system through the lens of its major design elements: structure, process, human capital, knowledge management, and resource allocation. It also provides a review of congressional and other oversight of the national security system as well as missing elements of strategic direction.

These problem analyses typically do not describe missing features of the system because all too often doing so is seen as just another way of advancing prescriptions for reform, arguing in a roundabout way for desired changes. The Project for National Security Reform’s (PNSR’s) intent in the problem analyses was to identify what actually exists and happens in the system in order to explain its inadequate performance. Yet the very nature of the current system militates so strongly against strategic direction that it must be identified as a “missing” element and discussed as such.

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466 See Part III, page 192
Almost five years after 9/11, people are saying that interagency differences in culture, problems with communication, difficulties with integrated planning and operations still haven't been resolved to the extent they must be. Our forces in the field, as well as those who will be asked to operationalize our future national security strategies, deserve better. We want to know, here in Congress, how we can help. We need your insights, gentlemen, if a sweeping change, such as a new national security act or a Goldwater-Nichols type of reform is necessary to get this interagency integration right.

-- Rep. Ike Skelton (D-MO)
Chairman, House Armed Services Committee

A. Missing Prerequisites for Strategic Direction

1. Introduction

Most successful organizations find a way to communicate to all their members a strategy for success, including definitions of the challenges ahead and the best means of meeting them. A common understanding of the organization’s strategy and approach to problem solving is essential if the members of the organization are to work together with unity of purpose. Unfortunately, in the case the national security system, many essential prerequisites for generating unified purpose and effort are missing; so much so that the system is starved for strategic direction. The absence of strategic direction is noted in most national security reform studies, most of which argue strongly for more of it:

The President should personally guide a top-down strategic planning process…. Such a top-down process is critical to designing a coherent and effective U.S. national security policy. [The national security advisor and National Security Council] should translate the President’s overall vision into a set of strategic goals and priorities, and then provide specific guidance on the most important national security policies.467

Strategic direction is required as the basis for collaboration toward national goals. Absent strategic direction, each element of the system operates autonomously in pursuit of its narrow objectives.

2. The Current System

In order to work toward common goals, the national security system and its members require an understanding of what national security is and who is responsible for it—that

is, an understanding of authorities for providing national security, its scope and how the elements of national power come together to create national security—or a grand strategy for national security. These requirements in turn are more likely to be met if those involved in providing for the national security of the United States share a common vision of national security that they can work toward. All of these components of an effective national security system are—in the main—missing in the current system.

a. Missing Agreement on Authorities

The roles and responsibilities of individual departments and agencies are codified in law for the most part, and not always clearly. However, there is currently no well-defined set of roles and responsibilities throughout the national security system to guide departments and agencies when they must come together to work in unity. As internal Pentagon guidance notes, departments and agencies will “strive to maintain their interests, policies, and core values” in such situations, and can use knowledge of esoteric authorities to either seize or avoid tasks because “information equates to power in interagency coordination [and] provides those who possess it a decided advantage in the decision-making process.” Whatever the advantages for individual departments, the net effect for the nation of uncertain authorities is often confusion and lack of accountability. One recent review of national security authorities began with a few “rules about responsibilities” that appear at first glance to be facetious but actually underscore the lack of accountability in the current system:

- If nobody’s in charge of a mission or function, it won’t get done.
- If everybody’s in charge, nobody’s in charge.
- If nobody knows who’s in charge, nobody’s in charge.
- If everybody thinks somebody else is in charge, nobody’s in charge.

These rules actually express a fundamental truth, which is that an undertaking as complex as the national security of the United States requires a clear delineation of respective authorities for the many participating organizations. For any given function or mission, it needs to be clear that somebody is responsible for outcomes. Unfortunately, this is not always the case because statutes, executive orders, and presidential directives are confused. Given the shared responsibilities between the legislative and executive branches, the way laws are made and administrations come and go, it is not surprising

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468 See the discussion of the cumbersome law that mandates a “bewildering array of 33 goals, 75 priority areas, and 247 directives” in the Congress section of this report, p. 433.


470 This section draws directly from research provided by Jim Kurtz of the Institute for Defense Analyses, and in particular his research for the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), entitled *Roles, Missions and Organization* and prepared the QDR Integrated Process Team – 3.
that a large number of official documents prescribe the roles and missions for
government departments and agencies that overlap and even contradict one another.

The “laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by the
Constitution in the Government of the United States or any Department or officer
thereof” over the course of two centuries and now reside in United States Code, which
is divided into fifty Titles. Each Title covers a different subject: Title 10, for example,
covers Armed Forces; Title 6 covers Domestic Security; Title 32 covers National Guard;
and Title 50 covers War and National Defense. Titles may be further divided into
Subtitles, Parts, Chapters, Subchapters, and Sections. Subtitle A of Title 10, for example,
covers General Military Law; Subtitles B–D cover the Army, Navy and Marine Corps,
and Air Force; and Subtitle E covers Reserve Components. Chapter 15 of Title 50 covers
National Security; Subchapter I covers Coordination for National Security; Section 402
covers the National Security Council; and Section 402a covers coordination of
counterintelligence activities.

United States Code can change with virtually every authorization and appropriation act
signed into law. Keeping up with the changes is not easy. The actual code is published
every six years by the Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the House of
Representatives. Between editions, cumulative supplements are published annually.
Online versions are maintained by the Government Printing Office and the Legal
Information Institute at Cornell University, but they too lag behind the actual passage of
amendments by as much as years.

The executive branch adds to the complexity with its own set of documents assigning
responsibilities to government departments and agencies. The deputy national security
advisor recently circulated a list of presidential national security directives in effect as of
June 2005. Included are five National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs) from the
Nixon and Ford administrations, five Presidential Directives (PDs) from the Carter
administration, twenty-two National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs) from the
Reagan administration, ten National Security Directives (NSDs) from the George H.W.
Bush administration, thirty Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) from the Clinton
administration, and thirty-five National Security Presidential Directives (NSPDs) from
the George W. Bush administration. Not included are purely Homeland Security
Presidential Directives (HSPDs) issued by the George W. Bush administration.

In addition to the 107 presidential national security directives in force there are
presidential executive orders that limit or direct actions by federal departments and
agencies. Many executive orders simply amend earlier executive orders, making it
difficult to assemble a set that is complete and current. Executive Order 13383, signed

471 U.S Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, clause 18.
472 The number of presidential directives dates from a 25 June 2005 memorandum from the deputy
national security advisor which attempted to update the list of still active directives. This task was last
accomplished twelve years earlier, in January 1993. Jim Kurtz, Institute for Defense Analyses, Roles,
Missions and Organization, a research paper prepared for Integrated Process Team – 3 during the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review.
by President Bush on July 15, 2005, provides an example. It amends Executive Order 12139 of May 23, 1979, and Executive Order 12949 of February 9, 1995, to reflect the establishment of the Office of Director of National Intelligence. It does not reissue those earlier executive orders but instead directs line-in/line-out changes, such as “striking ‘(g) Deputy Director of Central Intelligence’ and inserting in lieu thereof ‘(g) Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; and’ and adding at the end thereof ‘Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.’” Keeping current on who’s responsible for what requires finding copies of the two earlier executive orders, one signed by President Jimmy Carter and the other by President Bill Clinton, and making pen-and-ink changes.

To adjust executive branch responsibilities when the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established took two executive orders. Executive Order 13284, signed by President Bush on January 23, 2003, amended seventeen prior executive orders, dating as far back as 1960. Executive Order 13286, “Amendment of Executive Orders, and Other Actions, in Connection With the Transfer of Certain Functions to the Secretary of Homeland Security,” was signed February 28, 2003. It provides line-in/line-out changes to eighty-four previous executive orders, the oldest of which was signed in 1927. Short of painstaking research on every executive order that is still in effect, and then checking to see how it has been amended, there does not appear to be a way to quickly ascertain what national security responsibilities have been assigned by presidents of the United States to the various departments and agencies. A research team from the Institute for Defense Analyses preparing a baseline of U.S. government national security responsibilities estimates approximately seventy executive orders still in effect have some bearing on national security issues.

The difficulty of wading through a mountain of frequently changing, poorly catalogued laws and presidential documents to discover who’s in charge of what is compounded by the slow start and short tenure of political appointees. As noted previously, it takes a new administration time to seat its team of political appointees in the departments and agencies that carry out the government’s business and those leaders turn over frequently. For example, when President Bush took office in January 2001, approximately 500 positions in the executive branch required Senate confirmation, including 14 cabinet secretaries, 23 deputy secretaries, 41 undersecretaries, and 212 assistant secretaries. At the start of October 2001, just over half the 500 had been confirmed. By January 2002, roughly a third of the Bush administration's Senate-confirmed appointments had yet to be announced, nominated, and confirmed. A high turnover rate compounds the problem. Historically, tenure among political appointees averages eighteen to twenty-four months, and replacements for those who leave are still subject to the same nomination-confirmation process.473

Given the slow start for many officials, which leaves little time for general orientation, and their relatively short tenure, it really is no wonder that people in charge aren’t always sure of their own responsibilities, much less those of other agencies that might overlap or conflict. This is particularly true for many national security missions of increasing

importance, such as post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, strategic communications, and cyber security. Such missions will inevitably require collaboration across organizational boundaries, but collaboration is much more difficult when there is confusion over basic roles and responsibilities.

Not having a general agreement on what national security missions and tasks departments and agencies are responsible for invites inattention when the mission is not a matter of national importance and conflict over who is in charge when the mission suddenly is thrust into the spotlight. Confused authorities also complicate congressional oversight. Often it is not clear who should be tasked with responding to congressional reporting requirements. State will pass requests for reports to Department of Defense (DoD) and vice versa, and policy questions that properly belong to the president and the National Security Council (NSC) staff will end up being sent to one of the departments or agencies. The lack of clear authorities, accountability, and reporting requirements are further complicated by a general lack of consensus on which missions are a matter of national security.

b. Missing Agreement on Scope

Delimiting the scope of national security means determining which of all the various activities carried out by government should be considered national security activities. Determining the scope of national security is inherently important. If the scope of national security is too narrow, the nation’s security interests may not be sufficiently safeguarded. Taking national security to mean today what it meant when the National Security Act of 1947 took effect (e.g., preventing military attacks such as Pearl Harbor) would ignore a variety of issues that today affect our security. If the scope of national security is rendered too broad, however, the term will lose its ability to focus attention and effort. If everything that the government does were understood to be a security issue, then nothing in particular would be.

Any effort to improve the ability of the United States to achieve national security requires a definition of national security. How can any structural or procedural reforms improve interagency coordination to achieve national security absent agreement on what national security is? If agencies and departments do not agree on what they are working for or where to put their collective attention and energies, tinkering with how they interact is unlikely to produce better collaboration. As is overwhelmingly demonstrated in the previous sections of this part of the report, departments and agencies see differently what must be done and how it should be done. For example, the section of this report on the history of the national security system quoted from a 1960s Joint Staff memorandum that described the unhelpful attitudes of different agencies toward national security planning, demonstrating the depth of the problem by its failure to understand that a focus on planning was characteristic only of the Department of Defense. Overcoming such inevitable differences and coordinating interagency activities to achieve national security requires some common understanding of what constitutes that security. Indeed, absent an

understanding of the scope of national security, it will not even be clear which agencies and departments should be involved in the discussion.

While specifying the scope of national security is necessary, it must also be acknowledged that this task cannot be definitively accomplished with one static definition of national security. Defining national security and hence the scope of national security activities is inherently political and evolutionary. For example, if one believes (as PNSR does) that America’s economic competitiveness is a national security issue, and that economic competitiveness depends on our leadership in technological innovation, then one might argue for a greater effort by the federal government to encourage technological innovation. If certain educational attainments are deemed necessary (as PNSR does) for our national security, then the federal government might involve itself in education as a national security issue, as it has in the past, for example, in response to the Soviet Union’s launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957.  

Evoking the power of the federal government for these purposes may be good or bad, but arguments for or against them are not simply technical arguments. They are political as well, even predominantly so. They rest on assumptions about what threatens American life, how American political life should be organized, and what it should try to achieve, all of which is the stuff of political debate. In fact, the scope of government in the lives of Americans has been one of the principal animating questions of our political life. The inherently political nature of the definition of national security explains why it is so seldom defined in official documents, unless as an expression of general notions such as protecting the interests of the United States or its constitutional order (see Table 5 below).

Table 5. How the U.S. Government Has Defined National Security in Legislation, Presidential Directives, and Department and Agency Official Definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Security Act of 1947</td>
<td>“National security” is used, but without a definition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949 Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947</td>
<td>No definition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson Subcommittee Papers</td>
<td>No definition, but expanding mission set explored.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“New dimensions of national security make the proper exercise of the President’s responsibility more difficult… The line between foreign and domestic policy, never clear to begin with, has now been almost erased. Indeed, foreign policy and military policy have become virtually inseparable. The tools of foreign policy have</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


476 For the difference between NSAMs, NSDMs, PDs, etc. and other presidential national security documents, see the table in Part II, p. 60.
## Problem Analysis of the Current System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NSAM 341</td>
<td>No definition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSDM 2</td>
<td>No definition, but designated agencies/tools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSDM 326</td>
<td>No definition, but agencies/tools and mission set implied.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD 2</td>
<td>Indirect definition, mission set implied.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSDD 2</td>
<td>No definition, but designated mission sets and agencies/tools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSD 1</td>
<td>Definition with designated mission sets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDD 2</td>
<td>Repeats NSD-1, but definition adds the National Economic Council and elevates the United States ambassador to the United Nations to NSC principal status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSPD 1</td>
<td>Repeats George H.W. Bush/William J. Clinton definition, but references Constitution and U.S. interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current version of 50 USC 401a</td>
<td>Definition of “national security” intelligence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Problem Analysis of the Current System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DoD dictionary definition</td>
<td>“A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by: (a) a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; (b) a favorable foreign relations position; or (c) a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Justice definition</td>
<td>“National security encompasses the national defense, foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, international security, and foreign relations.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even though the scope of national security can not be resolved with a static depiction, means must be found to clarify the scope of national security in order to permit strategic direction of the national security system. National security reform can be based on a current consensus about what constitutes national security, just as the 1947 National Security Act was. Arguably, for example, there is sufficient political consensus to accept, as this report argues, that national security now encompasses not just inter-state threats but also threats from nonstate actors and those that arise from intra-state conflict. An effective national security system must be able to deal equally effectively with these three threats. It is also important to note that such a system will be well positioned, and without question better positioned than the current one, to address an even broader array of issues (such as health problems) should the president propose and a consensus develop that they are indeed national security issues.\(^{478}\)

In addition, there are technical dimensions to the question of scope that could contribute to the development of methods and mechanisms for determining the scope of national security in a more disciplined way. Questions of scope can and should be distinguished from other important national security issues, for example:

- **Scope is not importance:** The importance of an issue does not make it a matter of national security. The United States addresses many important problems and opportunities that are not matters of national security and are best addressed without relying on national security powers and resources.

- **Scope is not national interests:** U.S. interests are broader than national security, and include many goals that are laudable but not security matters. Occasionally, authors divide national interests into “first order” or “vital” interests, “second order” or “critical” interests, and “third order” or “serious” interests, and then link national security to vital or first-order interests. However, tying national security to national interests begs the question of what interests are vital.

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\(^{478}\) For evidence of the current consensus on national security issues and the place outside it of issues such as environmental problems, see Appendix 6: Current National Security Processes, which provides the results of work done on this question for PNSR.
Problem Analysis of the Current System

- **Scope is not proactive or reactive security posture:** It is not true that a broad scope is equivalent to a proactive approach to national security. National security experts often favor heading off problems before they grow larger, but this can be done irrespective of how scope is defined. For example, one could argue that attacking Iraq was a proactive measure that narrowly relied on the military instrument (and thus a narrow scope) of national security. Thus, scope and policy preferences for proactive or preventative measures are really separate issues.

Once it is clear that the scope of national security is fundamentally a political issue that is resolved through the political process over time, working definitions based on current political consensus and even technical means of assisting the president with methods and mechanisms for rallying the public and the national security system around a practicable delimitation of the scope of national security are possible.

c. Missing Agreement on Grand Strategy

A strategy is a way of using means to achieve ends. A grand strategy is a way of using all the means available to a nation to achieve its most comprehensive ends. Grand strategy is

- the art of using all elements of power...to accomplish a politically agreed aim, and the objectives of a nation or an alliance of nations in peace and war. A grand strategy comprises the carefully coordinated and fully integrated use of all political, economic, military, cultural, social, moral, spiritual and psychological power available.\(^{479}\)

If a grand strategy coordinates and integrates the elements of national power, then it is easy to see that an effective national security system, which aims to coordinate and integrate national power, requires a grand strategy. Such a strategy would guide decision-making by those at various levels of government tasked with carrying out day-to-day activities. It would drive how the legislature and executive branches structure the national security bureaucracy, how heavily the country relies on each of the national levers of power, and how resources are allocated across and within those levers of power. In contrast, it is impossible to ensure that all the elements of national power act in concert without a set of principles guiding operations; instead, they are likely to work at cross-purposes as each source of power pursues its own objectives.

The shock of the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and the response to those attacks have stimulated much discussion on a grand strategy for defeating terrorists. While there are differences of opinion about the best grand strategy, few commentators doubt the value of having one to mobilize the nation and its national security system for unity of purpose and effort:

- The essential ingredient for victory is something different—a comprehensive strategy that draws together all the resources of the U.S.

government and that has enough public support to endure from election to election and administration to administration.\textsuperscript{480}

Some may question whether the dynamics of representative government preclude the development and execution of grand strategy. Such a strategy, one could argue, would require relatively consistent development and application of means across administrations and Congresses. Some observers might argue that representative government lacks the rational decision-making processes necessary to prioritize interests and allocate resources accordingly.\textsuperscript{481} These critics might assert that the democratic process encourages compromises that are optimal for the interest groups that forge them rather than for the problems they are meant to address.

In addition, the regular electoral cycles of a democracy discourage national leadership from adopting the long-term perspective inherent in grand strategy. Decision-makers in both the executive and legislative branches find it difficult to accept short-term costs essential to achieve long-term goals when doing so provides opportunities for criticism from those vying to take their jobs. However necessary it might be, convincing one’s constituents to endure personal sacrifice for some far-off collective reward is a daunting challenge for many politicians.

Such pessimism is overstated. America’s experience under the 1947 National Security Act suggests that representative government is able to develop and implement grand strategy. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States followed a grand strategy of containing Soviet power. Within the broad idea of containment, successive administrations, acting on their differing political preferences, devised various versions of that strategy. None was problem-free; each generated difficulties as it tried new versions of containment to address the problems that its predecessors encountered or created; but an evolving approach to an acknowledged problem was pursued for several decades.\textsuperscript{482} Similarly, even prior to 9/11, the United States pursued a long-term struggle against international terrorism, integrating diplomatic, economic, informational, legal and military power.\textsuperscript{483} Not only did the United States pursue a long-term, consistent, integrated strategy against terrorism, it eventually integrated that strategy into the containment strategy.

The formulation and execution of grand strategy for containment of the Soviet Union and countering terrorism were not as rational as one might wish. Compromises occurred that were less than optimal for dealing with the threats but were reasonable from the viewpoint of those involved in the compromises. This process of compromise and accommodation is not necessarily a bad thing, even without considering its connection to free government. The need for compromise can be “a wise constraint on the naïve


arrogance of anyone who presumes to know what is good for everyone.” There can be virtue in “pluralist rationality and the wisdom of compromise.”

Even if something like a strategy or grand strategy emerged during the Cold War from the pushing and pulling of democratic and bureaucratic politics, the case studies done for PNSR make clear that in many of these cases the current national security system was unable to implement that grand strategy effectively. It simply was unable to employ or resource the elements of national power consistently well in an integrated manner. Since the strategic character of representative government does not preclude grand strategy but does ensure a vibrant debate as to its best formulation, it is especially important that the national security system be able to communicate and implement the strategy as efficiently and effectively as possible. Minimizing errors in execution and maximizing learning during the process would help inform the evolution of the debate on the best strategy and its modification over time.

If we believe there can be wisdom in compromise, then the American political system can produce in the future, as it has in the past, the grand strategy that an effective national security system requires. Past experience suggests that a sustained external threat is important for stimulating and sustaining a grand strategy, just as our democratic system is important for making that strategy flexible. Terrorism remains a salient threat, and the administration that follows President Bush’s will learn from the experience of the Bush administration, just as it will provide opportunities for successors to learn from its efforts. In the process, the United States may be deflected into new strategic paths by the emergence of state competitors or other security challenges. In retrospect, the sum of these varying efforts may well show the coherence of a grand strategy, as do the various versions of containment. Any reform to the national security system must provide the means to generate and communicate grand strategy while being flexible enough to support the results of consensus grand strategy.

d. Missing Agreement on Vision

A vision describes the ideal aspirant operation of an organization, institution, country, or other complex entity at a given point in the future. It is a depiction of some length in which all members of the organization can see themselves working together in a detailed collaboration of time and resources. A properly constructed vision describes an organization functioning successfully in a future state. It details at least one future scenario and can describe several alternative futures and the successful role of the organization in the future. In developing a vision, hoped-for or ideal attributes are the quarry and, as such, visions can remain unchanged over long periods of time. The Declaration of Independence, an example of a national vision, has stood the test of time.

Although the National Security Strategy (NSS) is often cited as a national strategic vision, it is not. The NSS does outline major national security concerns and describes generally how the administration plans to deal with them, but it is not a description of a future state. The NSS does not describe how the parts of the U.S. government will come

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484 Betts 42, 45.
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together as a whole to achieve an overarching purpose in the future. Though the word “vision” is mentioned six times in the current NSS (2006), four in the context of a U.S. vision, in no instance does “vision” refer to a single overarching vision for the United States. Instead, the NSS refers to a U.S. “vision” for a particular country such as South Korea, or an issue such as the global economy.

Without a holistic vision, the national security system can neither clearly articulate its ultimate purpose, nor design inputs (resources) and processes (methods) necessary to achieve its ultimate purpose. The lack of a common vision exacerbates the incompatibility of goals, strategies, plans, and procedures that is currently characteristic across the national security system.

There are several reasons for the lack of a shared vision in the security system. First, with the exception of the Department of Defense, the individual organizations that make up the system do not have strong traditions of long-term planning. The yearly budget cycle encourages short-term thinking and spending and a focus on outputs (visas issued, weapons procured) rather than on outcomes (beneficial foreign relations, enhanced deterrence). This is the antithesis of thinking about the future and how it might be shaped. Only in 1993 did Congress mandate “the establishment of strategic planning and performance measurement in the Federal Government” and the government has found it difficult to implement the mandate in useful ways.

Accompanying the neglect of long-term planning in the individual national security organizations is a lack of resources to do it. Again, with the exception of the Department of Defense, government organizations do not have the overhead in time or staff size to participate in “visioning” activities. Agencies and departments such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the State and Justice Departments employ their personnel full-time on current activities. They do not have the resources to employ personnel in the scenario-based planning necessary to develop a vision.

Vision development does not take place outside the departments for the same reasons that it does not take place within the departments. The National Security Council is the only place outside the departments and agencies where long-term planning or visioning might take place, but the council’s personnel are, like their colleagues in the departments, consumed in the management of current activities. No resources are available to the council for long-term planning. Virtually all of the resources in the national security system are controlled by individual departments and agencies, which are autonomous and focused on their own activities. Consequently, there is at present no established whole-of-government process and no forum for the development of a common vision for the U.S. national security system.

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485 See Appendix 6: Current National Security Processes for an overview of the current processes relevant to vision.
Problem Analysis of the Current System

A system designed to support a chief executive and commander in chief requires strategic direction. A president’s strategic direction can be ascertained indirectly, through speeches, guidance from appointed leaders, national security directives, decisions, etc., but none of these mechanisms is disciplined and systematic. A more systematic approach is possible. The intelligence community already periodically produces scenarios describing the world decades in the future. These accounts of possible futures could be the starting point for the visioning briefly described here. In a well-functioning system, the president’s staff would use these scenarios to provide a vision of national security. Based on this vision, a strategy would explain how the system’s components should interact to realize it. Communicated to all system participants, this vision and strategy would encourage unity of purpose and effort and might even increase the rationality of strategy development in our representative government. Currently, the ability of national security professionals to collaborate toward common goals is hindered by the lack of fundamental strategic guidance, including a defined scope of national security and a vision of a desired future security status for the United States.

3. Conclusions

Strategic direction can be concrete, immediate, and specifically directive. It can also be broad and visionary, contributing to a common culture that informs decision-making throughout the organization. Some organizational experts distinguish between first-order control, second-order control, and third-order control of organizational members. First-order or “behavioral control” is when a leader closely directs the specific behavior of his or her subordinates; it is expensive and can create large errors when the supervisor is overwhelmed by workload or changing conditions. Second-order control or “output control” is in effect when a supervisor creates objectives that can be delegated to subordinates. Output control is less expensive than behavioral control, but can create agency problems in which subordinates focus attention on attaining rewards or avoiding punishment, not on maximizing organizational effectiveness. Third-order control or “control over decision premises” is exercised when supervisors select or socialize people to think a certain way, and/or communicate strategic intent to shape how people think.

Strategic direction can take the form of first-, second-, or third-order control. The current national security system provides authoritative first-order control only when the president has time to intervene, does not provide effective output control at all, and encounters too many impediments to third-order control to produce any semblance of it. The national security system does not communicate strategic intent to shape how members of the system think about national security for two overarching reasons. First, the White House is too burdened with issue management to provide sustained strategic direction. Second, the absence of general agreement on the scope of national security, grand strategy, and vision for the national security system limit the ability of the president to provide strategic direction. The absence of these prerequisites both reflects and contributes to the lack of strategic direction.

Unless reforms of the national security system better enable the president and Congress to establish clear authorities and communicate the scope of national security, the Republic’s security strategy, its vision for the future national security of the United States, and unified purpose within the national security system will be haphazard and fleeting. In fact, without reforms permitting better strategic direction, reforming other elements of the national security system will generate few benefits. This is certainly true for the system’s structures, which are the most visible and frequently adjusted organizational element.
B. Structure

Summary

The structure of the national security system discourages integration at the national, regional, multilateral, country team, and state and local levels. There are two principal causes of this problem. First, the system consists of autonomous organizations that, as all organizations do, put their interests first. This means that roles and missions not clearly assigned to any particular department or agency receive inadequate attention and insufficient resources. It also means that even if a mission is clearly assigned to a specific department or agency, it may not receive attention and resources if the mission does not fit neatly into the main functional responsibility of that department or agency.

Second, only the president has the authority to integrate across these autonomous agencies, but the president has no effective way to delegate his authority. Interagency working groups, lead agencies, and even czars lack the authority to guarantee interagency coordination and attention to new or non-traditional missions. Consequently, over time, issues that require a “whole of government” response gravitate to the White House. This centralization leads to an unmanageable presidential span of control. Some new administrations try to delegate more authority for integration to agencies and departments, but the results are never satisfactory as the autonomous agencies attend to their interests and core mandates. While the national security system has the reputation for flexibility, this flexibility is largely superficial. The underlying structure of the system does not change and is dominated by autonomous agencies that stymie coordination and effective responses to interagency issues and non-traditional missions.

Problems and Causes

The following table summarizes the complete set of major problems and causes for this section.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problems</th>
<th>Causes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Inability to integrate department and agency efforts well</td>
<td>- Departments and agencies seek to maintain their autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- There is no effective model of presidential delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Cabinet officials have conflicting roles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Inability to fix accountability for some missions</td>
<td>- Departments and agencies seek to maintain their autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Poorly defined responsibilities and authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Weak integrating structures</td>
<td>- The president’s span of control is</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The autonomy of the departments and agencies of the national security system derives to a significant degree from the fact that they are established in law and funded directly by Congress. The chapter on resource management discusses this issue.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problems</th>
<th>Causes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>dominated by strong functional organizations</td>
<td>unmanageable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The president’s main instruments for integration—NSC and Homeland Security Council (HSC) staffs—are small and weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Strong functional organizations control policy implementation</td>
<td>- The system provides resources for national-level functions, but not missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The Executive Office of the President is not able to direct resources to mission capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Aggressive oversight of implementation is regarded as micromanagement and politically dangerous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Bifurcated efforts to integrate regional national security</td>
<td>- Regional structures are dominated by individual departments and their cultures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Country-level unity of purpose and effort is limited by the perception that ambassadors are State Department rather than presidential (i.e., national) representatives</td>
<td>- Strong functional organizations reward their personnel for protecting the organization’s equities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Dual chains of command in large “surge operations”</td>
<td>- Dual chains of command are codified in law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Cultural resistance to integrated political-military command in the field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Ineffective interagency mechanisms confuse multilateral actors and leave departments and agencies discretion to interpret U.S. policy and strategy</td>
<td>- The Department of State’s lack of authority over the full range of activities in the U.S. government’s conduct of foreign relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Authority and responsibility for federal homeland security coordination remains unclear</td>
<td>- Current relationships among representatives of federal agencies managing catastrophic disasters is unwieldy and inefficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- No federal agency has authority to marshal interagency resources for prevention and protection missions to collaborate with state and local authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Collaborative decision-making relationships among federal, state, and local authorities remain unclear</td>
<td>- State and local authorities, and their expertise, are not adequately represented in homeland security policy development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Introduction

One core problem with the national security system noted in the preceding section of the report is that the system’s design emphasizes core capabilities over mission integration. This problem is largely, but not exclusively, a structural problem. A system or an organization’s structure should serve its strategy, which in turn should aim to achieve an organization’s objectives in the most efficient manner possible given the organization’s environment. While structure is subordinate to strategy, it is important to understand because a properly functioning structure is indispensable to achieving an organization’s objectives.

Organizational structure serves strategy by dividing and coordinating labor. For example, the national security system provides a division of labor between the DoD and the CIA, giving the former responsibility for military activities and the latter responsibility for intelligence activities. It coordinates labor between those and other national-level organizations through the NSC. Size, span of control, specialization, centralization, and departmentalization all characterize structure. Structures often take the form of one of five primary models—functional, divisional, matrix, horizontal, and modular. A variety of hybrid models are possible and, in fact, almost all organizations are hybrids (see the Table 6 on page 212).

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While today’s challenges are vastly different from those of the Cold War, the structures and mechanisms the United States uses to develop and implement national security policy remain largely unchanged. Cabinet agencies continue to be the principal organizational element of national security policy, and each agency has its own strategies, capabilities, budget, culture, and institutional prerogatives to emphasize and protect….The national security agencies can bring a wealth of experience, vision, and tools to bear on security challenges, but more often than not, the mechanisms to integrate the various dimensions of U.S. national security policy and to translate that policy into integrated programs and actions are extremely weak, if they exist at all.

-- Beyond Goldwater Nichols: Phase 2

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PROBLEM ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM

2. The Current System

a. Overview

The form of the national security system is predominantly functional, dividing national security activities by major disciplines, for example, diplomatic (Department of State), intelligence (Director of National Intelligence and Central Intelligence Agency), military (Department of Defense), financial (Department of Treasury), homeland security, (Department of Homeland Security), counterterrorism (Department of Justice and Department of Defense), emergency management (Federal Emergency Management Agency), etc. However, like most organizations, the national security system is a hybrid. For example, it uses matrix and modular structures. As Table 6 notes, a country team in an embassy overseas is ostensibly a matrix structure, while the International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, is a modular structure. The structure of the national security system also operates at different levels of geographic proximity, that is, national, regional, country, state and local, and multilateral (involving relations between the United States and more than one country or international entity).491

Most of the national-level structure resides in Washington, D.C., and focuses primarily on policymaking, but also oversight of implementation. Because national-level structures cannot exercise sufficient day-to-day control over all subordinate activities, supporting regional-level structures often spring up with the intent of facilitating interagency collaboration at that level. For example, early in the war on terror, the Pacific Command created an Interagency Coordination Coordination Group for Counterterrorism.492 Country-level structures, particularly the country team, are used by U.S. ambassadors overseas. However, there are other in-country entities for U.S. policy implementation, such as cultural centers, military commands, and provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs).

The federal government operates the national, regional, multilateral, and country-level structures of the national security system. However, the federal government also works with state and local governments in the United States on national security, particularly homeland security matters. The National Security Act of 1947 does not define the appropriate roles of the state and local governments in formulating and executing national security policy. Nevertheless, state and local governments share security responsibilities with the federal government when threats to the homeland arise, including catastrophic natural disasters as well as threats posed by adversaries. In many national security crises, National Guard, police, fire, emergency medical, hazardous material, and other emergency capabilities will be the first to respond, and the structures dedicated to coordinating their responses are important topics for investigation.

491 See the “Description of the System” part of this report, p. 48-91. For a better understanding of various structure-related terms and the Structure Working Group’s division of analysis between the national, regional, country, state/local, and multilateral levels of engagement, see Appendix 6: Current National Security Processes.

Finally, the United States also has some national security structures dedicated to multilateral relations, such as the Bureau of International Organization Affairs in the Department of State, the mission at the United Nations, and delegations to other international organizations. The international system has no formal governmental structure, and nations participate in it based on their own calculus of costs, benefits, fears, and ambitions. Nevertheless, international law and multilateral organizations and processes do form the basis for relations among states “on most issues or most of the time.” The U.S. government has a number of multilateral missions where interagency cooperation is important (e.g., United Nations, NATO, and European Union). Given that the increasing pace of globalization means an increasing role for multilateral activity, many predict a heavier workload for U.S. multilateral structures in the future.

Table 6. Organizational Structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure Typologies</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Functional</strong></td>
<td>Subdivided by task/discipline; centralized decision-making</td>
<td>Exploits economies of scale; deep specialization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Divisional</strong></td>
<td>Subdivided by product or market; decision-making decentralized to divisions</td>
<td>Focus on product quality or customizing products to markets</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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493 We define the term multilateral organizations (MLOs) to include international organizations (e.g., ICRC), intergovernmental organizations (e.g., UN, EU, NATO), and nongovernment organizations (e.g., MSF).


496 The depictions of structural models in these charts are illustrative diagrams adapted from: Mary Jo Hatch, *Organization Theory: Modern, Symbolic, and Postmodern Perspectives*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) 182-188. The graphic for a typical matrix structure is from Visitask, an online project management resource center run by Remy de Bernady -- see http://www.visitask.com/matrix-organization.asp


### Structure Typologies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>National Security System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Matrix</strong></td>
<td>Functional and divisional units join to form teams</td>
<td>Balance between product/ market focus and specialization</td>
<td>AT&amp;T Network Wireless Systems(^{499}) Country teams represent a weak matrix organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Horizontal</strong></td>
<td>Subdivided by workflows to accomplish an “end-to-end” process (mission)</td>
<td>Fast and nimble</td>
<td>Xerox(^{501}) CORDS (from Vietnam) and Joint Interagency Task Force—South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Network</strong></td>
<td>Groups of organizations collaborate (e.g., companies A, B, C, D)</td>
<td>Exploits diverse competitive advantages</td>
<td>Android - Open Handset Alliance Project(^{499}) International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the National Security Act of 1947 created the National Security Council, Department of Defense (originally the National Military Establishment), and Central Intelligence Agency, successive administrations and congresses have instituted new and modified existing national security structures. Often, failures have prompted the creation of new structures, as have new missions. For example, President Dwight D. Eisenhower created the United States Information Agency to help compete with Soviet propaganda, and President John F. Kennedy created the interagency “Special Group (Counterinsurgency)” to coordinate and oversee U.S. government attempts to counter insurgencies in countries friendly to the United States.

Reasons for changing structure have included improving industrial mobilization, State-DoD cooperation, intelligence community cooperation, strategic communications, homeland security, and aid and development functions (the United States Agency for International Development). A number of structural developments also have resulted

\(^{499}\) Robert Kramer, op. cit.  
from a need for information sharing, especially related to intelligence and assessment functions. Less frequently, structural adjustments have aimed specifically to improve unity of effort across different functional organizations. The National Security Council is itself an example of such an adjustment. More recent ones include provincial reconstruction teams and the National Counterterrorism Center.

All of this structural change appears to confirm the commonly held view that organizational structure is the easiest organizational component to change and the least effective for generating improved performance, whereas culture is the hardest to change but yields the greatest results. Certainly the long history of major structural change to the national security system, compared with the far less frequent adjustments to its other components of organizational design, for example, organizational strategy, culture, and processes, suggests that organizational structure is easier to comprehend and manipulate. Some of the many structural changes were superficial, such as a reshuffling of National Security Council directorates or interagency committees. Other structural changes, such as the creation of large new bureaucracies like the United States Information Agency or the Department of Homeland Security, were major political and organizational endeavors.

b. A General Assessment of Performance

The structure of the national security system does a better job of dividing labor than coordinating it. It thus encourages specialization rather than integration. Specialization, or division of labor, is reflected in the national security system’s overall structure, which is dominated by its powerful functional organizations dedicated to building, maintaining, and employing functional expertise (diplomacy, military force, intelligence, development assistance, etc.). However, even the system’s division of labor is complicated by two factors.

First, roles and missions not clearly assigned to any particular department or agency receive inadequate attention and insufficient resources. Second, even if a mission is clearly assigned to a specific department or agency, it may not receive attention and resources if the mission does not fit neatly into the main functional responsibility of that department or agency. Post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization is an example of both problems. Prior to the U.S. intervention in Iraq, this mission was not clearly assigned to any organization and the United States lacked the capability to conduct the mission well. Now, however, responsibility for the mission is clearly assigned to a lead agency, the Department of State, but many believe the Department of State has prepared

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poorly for the mission and has given primacy to its core mandate, the conduct of diplomacy.

The current national security system’s structure has a much greater problem coordinating labor well. In fact, the primary deficiency in the national security system’s structure is the system’s inability to routinely coordinate and integrate efforts across functional departments and agencies, even when the mission clearly requires it. National security departments and agencies act autonomously; in many cases, they have even duplicated the capabilities of other departments to allow them to operate even more independently. Complex, overlapping, functional, and regional sub-structures within and between bureaucracies encourage more competition for missions than collaboration. In an attempt to facilitate integration, small additional structures have been tacked onto the existing departments and agencies, but these offices have limited authority, are prone to neglect—especially without White House attention—and cannot overcome the rigid basic structure of the national security system, which favors the independence of the functional departments and agencies.

As a result, the system as a whole is better at establishing and implementing policy when the mission clearly falls in the domain of a single national security organization, and when the mission requirements align closely with the core mandate of that institution. The structures that coordinate effort across the system’s functional domains—primarily interagency committees—are weak. Histories and analyses of the national security system repeatedly emphasize the tendency of interagency decision structures to retard, stalemate, or dilute decisive decision-making. This is so much the case that leaders often feel compelled to work outside the formal decision-making system in order to solve problems—with decidedly mixed results.

Thus, overall, the structure of the current system is not flexible, which hinders nimble and adaptive performance. The literature often notes that the structure of the National Security Council staff is quite malleable, and reflects the decision-making style and policy preferences of the president. While the size, number, and subjects assigned to the various committees and working groups of the National Security Council vary with each administration, the basic structure of the NSC and the national security system as a whole has not changed. Since 1947, the overall structure has remained constant, characterized by a strong, functional organization with weak cross-cutting, integrative capabilities.

In the following section, this general assessment of the national security system’s structure is explained in detail. Core problems and their generally recognized symptoms are identified. Identifying these symptoms is important for two reasons. First, the symptoms are markers for the structural problem. That they are generally recognized suggests the problem is chronic and significant. Second, the symptoms must be distinguished from the underlying problem as, all too often, the symptom is confused for the problem itself. Some solutions may temporarily alleviate the symptom without

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addressing the underlying problem. After presenting the symptoms, the section examines
the underlying causes of the problem. Succeeding sections then examine problems that
characterize the different levels of structure in the system.

3. Problem Analysis

There are both general structural problems that impede the performance of the national
security system at all levels, and there are variations on those problems and additional
problems at different levels of the system: national, regional, country, and in the
multilateral, state, and local authority levels.

a. General Structure Problems

1. Inability to integrate department and agency efforts well

The major problem with the national security system’s structure is the system’s inability
to routinely coordinate and integrate efforts across functional departments and agencies,
even when the mission clearly requires it. 507 There are two principal symptoms of the
national security system’s general inability to integrate department and agency efforts
(i.e., “coordinate labor”) that surface at all levels of the national security structure. The
first is the failure of the “lead agency” approach to integration, which is the most
common means employed for dealing with the problem of integration. Assigning a
mission that needs integrating to a lead department or agency and asking the other
departments and agencies to be supportive is common
place. As the history section of this
report discussed, 508 presidents often come to office with the intention of not using their
national security advisors for integration but rather relying on Cabinet government; that
is, “empowering” their Cabinet officials to take the lead. By the end of their
administrations, however, presidents typically abandon the lead agency approach and
resort to greater centralization.

For example, and again as noted in the history section of the report, when terrorism
became a problem for the United States and it was clear that dealing with it would require
combining the expertise resident in several different agencies, interagency working
groups were set up for this purpose. They proved too weak to accomplish much,
however. The next step was to break the terrorism problem down into different aspects
(domestic, airborne, foreign) and give one agency (Justice, the Federal Aviation
Administration, and the State Department, respectively) responsibility for coordinating
U.S. government activities for that aspect. Lead agencies proved little better than
working groups as an integrative mechanism, however.

For example, during the Italian Red Brigades’ kidnapping of Brigadier General James
Dozier, “the interests of the various departments and agencies asserted themselves…. [T]he Defense Department…wanted to take charge and get its man back,” but the
Department of State “resisted this because, according to the lead agency concept, [it] was

507 Ibid.
508 See Part II, History, p. 48.
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in charge of managing terrorist incidents overseas.... Although the lead agency concept had been part of the U.S. government counterterrorism response for years, clearly it was not working as effectively as its proponents hoped. As “a senior National Security Council official who served in four administrations noted... lead agency really means sole agency as no one will follow the lead agency if its directions substantially affect their organizational equities.”

The second major symptom of the national security system’s general inability to integrate department and agency efforts (“coordinate labor”) well that surfaces at all levels of the national security structure is the tendency to centralize policy in the White House. By definition, the trend takes place in Washington but it is done to solve problems at all levels—national, regional, and country—of the system. A recent example of centralization is the Bush administration’s decision to shift the authority for continuity of government plans away from the Department of Homeland Security to the White House. The history section of this report provides many other examples of centralization, and notes that the amount of centralization depends upon the president and his management style. However, the general trend is strong and consistent.

The net observation is that over the past sixty years, there has been a trend toward greater centralization of the decision-making process. With respect to “almost all important foreign and domestic issues today, the formulation, coordination, articulation—and, in some cases, the implementation—of policy are being drawn away from the line departments and centralized in the White House and its large and energetic staff.”

With respect to national security, this observation explains the increasing prominence of the national security advisor and the number of people working at the NSC over the last six decades.

Giving the NSC or the White House increased responsibility and authority is not the only way to centralize. An example of greater centralization is the tendency of presidents to grant special authority or prominence to a personal representative who attempts to solve the problem on the president’s behalf. Frequently, the person is referred to as a “czar” or “czarina,” an individual designated to integrate the U.S. government’s efforts when the normal means of doing so do not seem to be working. A proponent of czars makes the case for them as follows:

Almost any significant national security issue now involves numerous departments and multiples of that number in terms of component agencies.

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509 David Tucker, Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire: The United States and International Terrorism (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997) 29.
513 Ibid 264.
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Understanding what they are all doing, ensuring that they are all doing what the President’s policy requires, creating new policy options, performing quality control oversight of decisions, and having a holistic view of an important complex issue requires a czar. Yet, as one astute observer notes, the frequent cries for a czar to lead the assault on policy problems does not take into account that the U.S. “form of government…does not lend itself to czars.” Czars do not have the power to compel Cabinet officials or their organizations to collaborate, so they mostly cajole and exhort:

White House czars, however, have usually been ineffective. With no resources or agencies of their own, such czars must usually cajole cabinet departments into doing what the czar prescribes. The czar’s instructions inevitably compete with other needs and tasks of the department, and the final outcome of the competition is determined by the cabinet secretary (invoking legal authorities, usually of long standing) and the relevant committees of Congress, not the czar. After the czar is overridden a few times, lower-level bureaucrats conclude that they can ignore the czar’s directives. As the Washington, D.C., saying about czars goes, “The barons ignore them, and eventually the peasants kill them.”

Some czars are more successful than others, and sometimes their proximity to the president gives their exhortations more weight. However, if they must repeatedly ask the president to back them up on issues of Cabinet officer compliance, they may wear out their welcome with the president. It is both time-consuming and politically damaging for presidents to repeatedly override concerns of Cabinet officers. Sometimes czars resign in frustration for lack of presidential support and/or inability to marshal support from departments and agencies.

Presidents may use czars on occasion to create the impression that something positive is being done for a problem more than with the expectation that the czar will actually be able to engineer integration across departments and agencies. The practice of appointing czars is common enough that when integration appears to be a problem, the White House can be subjected to criticism for failing to appoint a czar. In any case, the existence of

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“lead individuals” illustrates the problem of integration. Such individuals may address the political problem that the president must be seen to be doing something in response to insufficient progress on a problem, but if the security system’s integrating mechanisms were more effective, it would be less necessary to create this appearance. In fact, it has often been necessary to create this appearance, which suggests that even on high national priorities, integration is a persistent problem.

Another manifestation of the tendency toward centralization is recommendations for super-Cabinet officials or super-Cabinet departments. The 1947 act and its subsequent amendments created such a department (i.e., DoD) through the subordination of the military services to the secretary of defense. The Jackson Subcommittee considered, but then rejected, a proposed super-Cabinet official for other national security matters.\(^{518}\) The Department of Energy Organization Act (1977) created the Department of Energy and rolled up several agencies’ responsibilities into the new organization.\(^{519}\) More recently, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of Homeland Security, which subsumed entire agencies and components of several other departments and agencies.\(^{520}\) Similarly, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 established the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to oversee and manage the intelligence community.\(^{521}\)

There are several dominant causes for the national security system’s general inability to integrate department and agency efforts:

*Cause: Departments and agencies seek to maintain their autonomy*\(^{522}\)

The national security system is built on functional organizations because they generate the expertise necessary for the U.S. government to achieve its objectives. Once established, these organizations operate according to a fundamental principle of organizational life. “Organizations seek autonomy; that is, they seek to be as independent as possible from higher authority and safe from threats to their missions and capabilities,”\(^{523}\) and thus are “wary of joint or cooperative ventures.”\(^{524}\) Departments and agencies seek to maintain the autonomy necessary to develop their mandated core competencies, and they do so at the expense of interagency cooperation:

When an agency concentrates on its core mission, it tends to neglect its peripheral missions…where cooperation is most likely to be necessary.


\(^{522}\) The autonomy of the departments and agencies of the national security system derives to a significant degree from the fact that they are established in law and funded directly by Congress. The chapter on resource management discusses this issue.


That Foreign Service Officers do not take seriously enough the demands of security complicates the job of the CIA’s Directorate of Operations. That the CIA does not take counterintelligence seriously enough complicates the job of the FBI….that the Justice Department does not take our foreign relations seriously enough as it focuses on apprehending and prosecuting someone who breaks our laws, even if he is a head of state, complicates the job of the State Department. As the U.S. Attorney in Miami said, explaining why Manuel Noriega was investigated and indicted while the State Department was negotiating with him about how he would resign, “the investigation resulting in the Noriega indictment was initiated and pursued without any consideration whatsoever to factors extraneous to law enforcement.” As a State Department officer put it, with typical diplomatic understatement, “the Justice Department did not have much perception of or sensitivity to the foreign policy implications of what it was doing.” Defending mandates and focusing on core missions and the particular skills necessary to accomplish them impedes interagency cooperation.  

Cooperating with other agencies threatens an organization’s autonomy. It might mean that a department would have to subordinate serving its mandate (diplomacy, military force) to the requirements of another department. Hence, these autonomous organizations cooperate reluctantly, if at all. In no case is it part of the core mandate of one of these organizations to integrate its efforts with other organizations. This explains why unity of purpose and effort is hard to achieve in all levels of the national security system. It explains the symptoms of integration failure discussed above. The symptoms are the various ways in which the functional departments prevent cooperation in order to defend their autonomy.

Cause: There is no effective model of presidential delegation

In the security system as currently constituted, only the president has the authority to integrate or coordinate the efforts of the autonomous departments. However, the president has neither the time nor the expertise to control the daily efforts of interagency participants. There is simply too much going on for one person to control. The president, therefore, must delegate his authority. The president attempts to delegate his authority to the national security advisor, to other czars, to ambassadors, or to lead agencies. None of these models work consistently well.

The national security advisor, or the NSC more generally, is often the principal recipient of the president’s delegated authority. A series of memoranda during the first years of the Nixon administration illustrates the limits of the authority delegated to the NSC. In October 1969, President Richard Nixon’s military assistant wrote to Kissinger that despite “established ground rules for minimum coordination of policy matters across a broad spectrum of foreign policy issues,” the State Department fails “to cooperate with

525 David Tucker, Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire: The United States and International Terrorism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997) 114.
this office, to adhere to broad policy lines approved by the President and to abide by [the] established ground rules.”

The memorandum further stated that “[d]espite continued efforts by the NSC staff,” the personnel to whom President Nixon delegated interagency management authority, “State adamantly refused to accept White House guidance until the issue was finally resolved between Dr. Kissinger and the Under Secretary of State.”

A month and a half later, a memorandum from an NSC staff director to Kissinger indicated that the NSC staff’s “official relationships with DoD continue to deteriorate…. Since I last discussed this problem with you, we have received new and disturbing evidence of DoD’s unwillingness to cooperate with NSC activities.”

Almost a year later, an NSC staff member reported,

State is still resisting the basic interagency concept of the NSC mechanism: specifically, papers prepared for the NSC or its subordinate bodies by…groups chaired by State are, in many cases, being “approved” by the Secretary or an Under Secretary before they are sent here. Papers have often been seriously delayed, or even blocked, by this device…. In addition, State has taken the position that these papers, once blessed by the Secretary, are no longer open to interagency dissent.

As established above, other forms of delegated authority—czars, lead agencies—also do not consistently work well. This explains why several presidents have commented on the difficulty of controlling the national security system. President Harry S. Truman identified the problem of “how to prevent career men from circumventing Presidential policy.”

President John F. Kennedy noted that “[g]iving State an instruction…is like dropping it in the dead-letter box.” President Gerald Ford commented on the “number of people who will scream bloody murder when the [president’s] decisions are announced.”

And President Bill Clinton remarked that his “options were constrained by the dug-in positions [he] found when [he] took office.”

**Cause: Cabinet officials have conflicting roles**

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527 “Memorandum from the President’s Military Assistant” 179.


As expounded on at greater length in Part III of the report,\textsuperscript{534} in the national security system as currently constituted, Cabinet officials play dual roles. They are both advisors to the president on overall policy integration, and they are champions of their departments and agencies and those organizations’ equities and agendas. Delegation of presidential authority does not work well because “[t]o a degree—a large degree—the needs of any President and those of ‘his’ officialdom are incompatible.”\textsuperscript{535} They are incompatible because Cabinet members must balance their roles as presidential advisors with their statutory obligations to build, manage, and safeguard strong departmental capabilities. Therefore, Cabinet officials bring their and their agencies’ issues up to the president for settlement, while the president must try to impose a cross-cutting vision through his own “personal initiative, his mastery of detail, his search for information, his reach for control.”\textsuperscript{536} The U.S. government since World War II “has often tried…tinkering with structure” to reduce the tension between the president and his Cabinet officials, but to little effect. Both presidents and their Cabinet officials remain frustrated.\textsuperscript{537}

The problem of delegation and control is not new. Presidents have grappled with it prior to and since the implementation of the 1947 act structures. However, as the security environment has grown more complex, the need for “mingling operations along programmatic lines, cutting across vertical lines of authority, breaching the neat boxes on organizational charts,”\textsuperscript{538} has become increasingly apparent. Nevertheless, “our formal organizations and their statutory powers…remain much as ever: distinct, disparate, dispersed.”\textsuperscript{539} Although this observation was made in 1971, it continues to hold true since “the structures and mechanisms the United States uses to develop and implement national security policy remain largely unchanged” from the Cold War.\textsuperscript{540} That “[t]he U.S. government does [not effect]…horizontal coordination between agencies well”\textsuperscript{541} also remains unchanged.

2. Inability to fix accountability for some missions

A great strength of the current national security system is its strong, functional, core capabilities. The segregation of labor in functional organizations that recruit, train, and reward their personnel for excellence in their functional areas is what gives the U.S. government the expertise it needs to accomplish its objectives. Futhermore,
the division of tasks between the State Department and the Department of Defense reflects not just bureaucratic history, but the fact that people who must be highly competent in combat operations are different in their skills from those who are diplomats. The type of training and the sense for what is important at a fundamental level are different. Homogenizing them in one agency would risk marginalizing their skills in a way that makes each less effective.542

However, it is not the case that all mission capabilities are equally well assigned and prepared for:

The U.S. government’s level of experience with and capabilities to execute important missions such as stability operations, homeland security, counterterrorism, and combating WMD vary widely.… Among the four mission areas, there is little agreement on how to define the challenges and major issues. Various Cabinet agencies define the missions differently and use different terms to discuss the critical issues. As a result, agency representatives, subject matter experts, and stakeholders outside the federal government, such as state and local governments or nongovernmental organizations, frequently talk past each other… in most instances there are still considerable debates about which Cabinet agencies have lead responsibilities in what areas, what constitutes effective coordination, and what programs should reside in which Department budgets.543

The ability of the national security system to assign responsibilities (i.e., divide labor) is particularly limited in new or non-traditional mission areas. Departments and agencies both fight over and neglect key missions.

First, in areas of overlapping responsibilities, or where the politics and resources make an emerging mission area attractive, departments and agencies may vie for primacy, fighting over missions that should be shared. This tendency is long observed, and commented upon, for example, in Graham Allison’s classic study of the Cuban missile crisis:

In the face of well-founded suspicions concerning offensive Soviet missiles in Cuba that posed a critical threat to the United States’ most vital interest, squabbling between organizations whose job it is to produce this information seems entirely inappropriate. But for each of these organizations, the question involved the issue: “Whose job was it to be?” Moreover, the issue was not simply, which organization would control U-2 flights over Cuba, but rather the broader issue of ownership of U-2


543 Murdock et al. 31–32.

544 The firestorm over Department and Defense and Department of State personnel assignments to leadership positions in Iraq is an illustrative example. Douglas J. Feith War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (Harper Collins: New York, 2006) 386-8.
intelligence activities—a very long standing territorial dispute. Thus though this delay was in one sense a “failure,” it was also a nearly inevitable consequence of two facts: many jobs do not fall neatly into precisely defined organizational jurisdictions; and vigorous organizations are imperialistic.545

Decades later, the same problem was evident during President Ronald Reagan’s administration when different national security organizations vied for control of an important counterterrorism mission responsibility:

Dispatching an Emergency Support Team (EST) would seem to be a routine matter; either a country wanted assistance or didn’t. But nothing in the war against terrorism was simple. Much of the past four and a half years had been wasted on bureaucratic wrangling over who would be in charge of the team. The CIA had argued it should run the EST on the grounds that the advance part was nothing more than an augmentation of the intelligence capabilities of the local CIA station. Besides, CIA personnel invariably made up the bulk of the teams. The Pentagon, which provided transportation and communications for the teams, did not like the idea of taking orders from the CIA. The State Department had insisted that it be in charge since it had been designated the “lead agency” for all terrorist incidents overseas. The issue had gone all the way to the President without ever being satisfactorily resolved.546

Fighting for missions that could or should be shared is the natural result of a system built on strong organizations that compete for resources with each other. Sharing a mission or letting one get away will lead to reduced resources and a net loss of strength and influence.

This “fear of sharing” also explains two other symptoms. The first is that departments and agencies refuse to share information and expertise. Information and personnel are power, and a manifestation of the strength of the system’s constituent departments is that they resist giving up their power. The war on terror is replete with examples of interagency friction over turf issues:

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, meanwhile, led by Louis Freeh, pushed to expand its role in criminal cases with international connections, including terrorism cases. Freeh wanted to place FBI agents in U.S. embassies worldwide. Some CIA officers resisted the FBI’s global expansion, seeing it as an incursion into the agency’s turf.547

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Another symptom is the creation of shadow organizations that duplicate the skills of other organizations. By duplicating, departments avoid having to share information and personnel to accomplish missions that are not central to their understanding of their roles in national security. At the same time, it allows them to increase their strength or at least their bulk. For example, the Departments of Defense has developed its own small capacity to engage in the State Department’s functional area. The Department of Defense’s Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs is often referred to as a “mini-State Department.” It is organized to include regional offices and country-specific desks, just like the State Department. At the same time, the State Department has a political-military assistant secretary and smaller political-military offices within its regional bureaus. As the General Accounting Office noted in 2002, our previous work has found fragmentation and overlap among federal assistance programs. Over 40 federal entities have roles in combating terrorism, and past federal efforts have resulted in a lack of accountability, a lack of a cohesive effort, and duplication of programs. As state and local officials have noted, this situation has led to confusion, making it difficult to identify available federal preparedness resources and effectively partner with the federal government.

In addition to fighting over some missions, and just as importantly, the national security system has difficulty fixing responsibility and ensuring accountability for missions no department or agency wants. Usually, such problems arise in what might be referred to as nontraditional mission areas, that is, any missions that are not part of the mainstream core mandate assigned in law to a department or agency. When national security missions do not fall neatly within the bounds of a single organization’s core mandate, the system’s ability to divide and assign labor often is compromised as strong functional “stovepipes” lead agencies to eschew responsibility for anything that detracts from their core responsibilities. In short, the departments and agencies tend to focus on their core capabilities rather than broader “whole of government” missions or missions that sit on the periphery of an organization’s mandated responsibilities. The principal symptom of this problem is the general lack of readiness to conduct nontraditional missions, a point that is reinforced in the resources section of this part of the report.

There are numerous examples of this phenomenon. For example, post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction is rejected by the existing functional stovepipes. Thus, no arm of the U.S. government is formally in charge of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction overseas. Policy and implementation are divided among several agencies, with poor interagency coordination.

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549 See p. 391-403.
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misalignment of resources and authorities, and inadequate accountability and duplicative efforts.\textsuperscript{550}

President George W. Bush attempted to fix responsibility for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction with a national security directive (NSPD-44) and to delegate sufficient authority for conducting the mission to the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. However, most observers believe the problem remains unresolved.\textsuperscript{551}

Another example is irregular warfare and the Department of Defense. Although the services have been directed to include irregular warfare as a core competency, they are not disposed to embrace any nontraditional missions. The secretary of defense noted that future conflicts would include challenges from irregular forces—insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists—and argued that the Department of Defense needed to build the capacity for dealing with such challenges.\textsuperscript{552} However, he also has admitted the services are reluctant to devote resources to meeting such challenges. This reluctance to develop and integrate these capabilities stems from the fact that these capabilities detract from the more traditional warfighting focus of the services and the Department of Defense.

The tendency to avoid missions that are peripheral to an organization’s principal mandate is a problem that has been identified repeatedly, especially since the end of the Cold War:

Throughout the national security establishment there are systemic managerial and organizational problems. For example, critical post-Cold War national security missions…are being accomplished in \textit{ad hoc} fashion by unwieldy combinations of departments and agencies designed half a century ago for a different world…. Too many of these new missions are institutionally “homeless”: nowhere are clear authority, adequate resources, and appropriate accountability brought together in a clear managerial focus. Although it is widely understood and accepted that we need the means to accomplish the homeless missions…at this time the government is not well organized or managed to accomplish them when we choose to do so.\textsuperscript{553}

Some primary causes for the national security system’s limited ability to assign and fix responsibility for some mission areas, particularly nontraditional missions, overlap with the same causes that impede mission integration:


Cause: Departments and agencies seek to maintain their autonomy

The same organizational autonomy that complicates mission integration also limits the ability of the president to assign missions and fix responsibility. Cabinet officials have considerable leeway over how they implement presidential guidance, and they can and must work with powerful constituencies on Capitol Hill.\footnote{Richard Neustadt, \textit{Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: the Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan} (New York: The Free Press, 1990) 34.}

Once in office, moreover, the Cabinet secretary is pulled away from the President by strong centrifugal forces. The duty to carry out the laws and to be responsive to Congress is accentuated by the dependency of Cabinet members on the career bureaucracies and the clientele groups of their agencies…. For a person to be able to be of use to the White House, he must also be trusted and accepted as a defender of the values represented by the agency and its mission. Because the White House must sometimes make decisions affecting the division of missions with other agencies, it is sometimes seen as a threat to the agency.\footnote{James Pfiffner, \textit{The Strategic Presidency} (Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press, 1996) 35–36.}

Just as the Department of Defense defied as best it could President Kennedy’s determined efforts to assign it responsibility for a stronger counterinsurgency capability, the Department of State now reluctantly embraces President Bush’s assignment to conduct post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction.

Cause: Poorly defined responsibilities and authorities

Some major national security departments’ responsibilities and authorities for national security missions are not adequately defined in statute or executive orders. The National Security Act of 1947 established what was then considered a comprehensive national security system. However, the 1947 act did not provide institutions for “foreign policy, foreign assistance, public diplomacy, mobilization, emergency preparedness, arms control, or atomic or nuclear energy.”\footnote{\textit{Interim Draft: Legal Underpinnings of National Security Arrangements,} Project on National Security Reform Legal Working Group, June 2008, 71.} Such institutions have since evolved statutorily and now comprise the bulk of the current U.S. government framework. Consequently, over the sixty-year history of the current system, a number of layers of statutory adjustments have been added, some of which elucidate and others that confuse the roles and responsibilities of the departments and agencies.

For example, the basic mission of the Agency for International Development (USAID) is torn between assisting the neediest and promoting American foreign policy interests—objectives that are sometimes complementary and sometimes not. In the realm of U.S. public diplomacy, the Broadcast Board of Governors (BBG), whose role is defined by Congress, is one of a number of entities (including the State Department and USAID) across which U.S. public diplomacy efforts are distributed. In 2004, the BBG and the
State Department shared a combined annual budget of nearly $1.2 billion, whereas the USAID and DoD possessed “relatively small budgets explicitly devoted to public diplomacy activities.”\textsuperscript{557} A 2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report observed the “crossing of wires” in all of these statutory roles:

We found that BBG, as required by Congress, is coordinating with the State Department at the policy level through a variety of means. BBG officials stated that they work cooperatively with other agencies to develop and broadcast suggested program ideas and content that BBG deems appropriate to its mission. However, some USAID and DoD officials commented that BBG has not been receptive to considering suggestions on programming content.\textsuperscript{558}

Since so many national security problems now require multiagency responses, it is not surprising that sixty years of layered statutes sometimes provide inadequate clarity on the division of labor between the departments and agencies.

The problems and causes discussed so far operate in varying degrees in all levels of the national security system. Other problems are specific to one level or another, or reflect the general problems differently. Some problems are independent of one another, but most are mutually reinforcing. Below we enumerate core problems at each level of the national security system, specifying the extent to which they are variations on the general problems noted above or unique to that level. For each problem, we again identify symptoms and then examine the associated causes.

b. National Structure Problems

The national security system’s general inability to integrate department and agency efforts well is true at all levels of the system’s structure, but particularly true of national structures—primarily interagency committees—that coordinate effort across the system’s functional domains. One of the causes for the general integration problem noted above was that there is no consistently effective model of presidential delegation. This might seem to imply a lack of integrating structures, but that is more the case at the regional level. At the national level there are integrating structures, but they are weak and dominated by strong functional organizations. In other words, the National Security Council and its system of interagency committees, and even new more specialized national structures like the National Counterterrorism Center, are weak. This assertion runs contrary to some opinion that at the national level, interagency structures integrate policy well, and it is only during policy implementation at lower levels that there is a major integration problem.

3. Weak integrating structures dominated by strong functional organizations


\textsuperscript{558} \textit{U.S. Public Diplomacy} 18.
Interagency committees “are common because the problem of coordination is pervasive,” but “they rarely are effective because a President…cannot give his or her personal and frequent attention to more than a handful of such entities and because few…can alter agency tasks.” Interagency working groups typically become arenas in which to protect department or agency prerogatives rather than to work collectively to solve problems.

In an attempt to facilitate integration, small additional structures are sometimes tacked onto the existing departments and agencies, but these offices have limited authority, and suffer neglect—especially without White House attention. The Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) is an example. In February 2003, President Bush announced the TTIC was a national priority, saying, “This joint effort across many departments of our government will integrate and analyze all terrorist threat information, collected domestically and abroad in a single location.”

The biggest challenge to making TTIC a success…was establishing it as the primary integrator and analyzer of terrorist threat information. The squabbles over territory that started when the White House first convened a working group never dissipated. Homeland Security had a congressional mandate to consolidate terror intelligence that arguably trumped the center’s presidential direction. The [Federal Bureau of Intelligence] FBI always had primacy over domestic terror threats; how could it be sure constitutional protections for Americans would be respected? Perhaps the most aggressive competitor was the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center [CTC]. It had done TTIC’s job, and officials there saw no reason to give up turf. The bureaucratic battle escalated. Despite having several hundred of the most qualified counterterrorism analysts in the government, CTC refused to give TTIC an adequate number of assignees, according to a 2004 White House inquiry. Instead of building a joint capacity to share and analyze terror intelligence, each player was developing its own intelligence capabilities, undermining TTIC’s ability to succeed.

In December 2004, the TTIC was replaced by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). However, the NCTC is also underpowered to fulfill its mandate:

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 established the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in part to conduct ‘Strategic Operational Planning for the Global War on Terror for the entire U.S. Government.’ Strategic operational planning was not defined in NCTC’s enacting legislation, but its meaning has come to be understood as

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559 Wilson 270.
560 See discussion of interagency committees in Part III, Assessment.
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providing the linkage between policy direction from the National and Homeland Security Councils and the conduct of operations by U.S. government departments and agencies with responsibilities for addressing terrorism. In June 2008 NCTC issued a classified National Implementation Plan for Counterterrorism (NIP WOT). This might seem like progress. But the NIP WOT has been criticized for cataloguing activities better than it prioritizes and integrates agencies’ efforts across them. NCTC itself identified several key challenges to its effectiveness early in its planning process, highlighting the confusion about agencies’ roles and responsibilities, the need to reconcile its statutory mandate to integrate across the counterterrorism mission set with existing departmental authorities, and the uncertainty of its own human capital and funding stream.\(^{563}\)

Existing national structures like interagency committees or even recent specialized and high-priority institutions like the NCTC cannot overcome the basic rigid structure of the national security system, which favors the independence of the functional departments and agencies at the expense of integrating mechanisms. Numerous symptoms indicate the problem of weak integrating structures. One of the primary symptoms is the tendency of interagency bodies to stalemate over policy or dilute it through lowest common denominator agreements, or making consensus the primary goal or papering over differences as departmental interests “come into conflict with one another on national security issues.”\(^{564}\) Policy stalemates might appear somewhat benign since the status quo is maintained until a decision is finally made. Nevertheless, the national security system may lose valuable implementation time as it awaits a policy decision. For example, in the context of Haiti, “While strategic planning took place under NSC leadership, concrete decisions were postponed to the last minute, so policy guidance could not be communicated effectively to the operational level commanders.”\(^{565}\)

Lowest-common-denominator policies, on the other hand, permit policy agreement action. However, weak policies that can accommodate all views are by definition less than optimal. Moreover, having built in escape clauses to avoid policy direction they do not want to take, the departments and agencies charged with policy execution are provided with considerable leeway to avoid taking action they do not favor. As a result, organizations refuse to take important steps or actually work at odds with each other.

As pointed out in the previous section of the report, the tendency for stalemate or watered-down consensus is observable across administrations. President Kennedy adopted recommendations from the 1961 Senate Subcommittee on National Policy


Machinery (Jackson Subcommittee) that criticized the Eisenhower national security system for producing such products, but organizational behavior changed little. There remained a premium on “interstaff negotiations, compromise, [and] agreement,” which often led to papering over differences in the search for the lowest common denominators.”

Other administrations changed their decision structures and styles, but the problem of interagency committees producing stalemate or least common denominator products persists, as the following commentaries illustrate:

- President Carter’s effort to create a new nuclear doctrine, “concerted State Department opposition slowed progress on the project.”

- Confronting the Iran-Iraq War during the Reagan administration, several “federal departments competed to shape policies…. Department leaders rarely were able to reach consensus on important policy decisions, and when they did, integration was often ineffective.” And “the State Department, Department of Justice, and the customs authorities pursued policies that were completely opposite to those of the DoD, CIA and NSC.”

- President George H. W. Bush’s administration, the first presidency to follow the Iran-Contra scandal and the Tower Commission’s recommendations, instituted an NSC system that has generally remained intact since. Nevertheless, the new system was not without problems similar to those experienced by earlier administrations as “sheer numbers inhibited action, which is why interagency Policy Coordinating Committees (PCC) rarely served as vehicles of decision.”

- A study of Persian Gulf and Bosnia policy failures notes that compared to the Principals and Deputies Committee levels, a higher level of interagency conflict exists at the Interagency Working Group (IWG)-level. One principal affirmed this finding, saying, “First, it is designed that way for [a] useful purpose: Each agency is assigned certain responsibilities and authorities—the process is designed to look after those. Second, the process has an underpinning of good sense in that it forces the bureaucracy to seek compromise rather than having a ‘first among equals.’ It forces people to stay within their boundaries rather than directing them to…compromise rather than dictate.”

- Such policymaking tendencies were visible in the “‘fetish for consensus building’ among the [Clinton] administration’s foreign policy principals,” which produced

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566 Neustadt and Allison 128.
569 Gurtovnik 18.
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two results—“lengthy meetings, especially at the working group and Deputies Committee levels, where no decisions were taken,” and “the failure to ‘sharpen the options’ presented to the President.”

- In the case of Somalia, “The United States was not able to closely integrate the elements of national power well in crafting policy for UNOSOM II or in implementing the UNOSOM II mission. The interagency decision-making system repeatedly failed, both in Washington and in the field, even when circumstances begged for a sober reconsideration of policy alternatives.” This reconsideration did not take place. Instead, “the NSC papered over a fundamental mismatch between objectives and resources in the May 19 presidential decision directive that guided policy on Somalia and which never was corrected.”

- In general, during the Clinton administration “IWGs quickly became very large and unwieldy; different IWGs with overlapping responsibilities disagreed on policy options, and senior NSC officials were reluctant ‘to butt heads’ to resolve the differences.” This had two side effects. First, differences had to be referred “up the organizational hierarchy to the NSC/DC [Deputies Committee], where the issue would be reworked almost from scratch.” As such, Deputies Committee members saw their precious time wasted on matters that the system was supposed to decide at lower levels in order to preserve the deputies time for the most important issues. The second side effect, stemming from the first, was that the Deputies Committee members were now forced to consider additional issues, which “slowed the decision process enormously, creating a backlog of issues that needed resolution and a pattern of postponed and rescheduled NSC/DC meetings.”

- Indecision, inaction, and papering over were also apparent in Bosnia policymaking. Senior officials would meet without the president to decide on policy recommendations for him. Although their disagreements were supposed to be elevated to President Clinton for final arbitration, “if a clear consensus was not reached at these meetings, the decision-making process would often come to a temporary halt, which was followed by a slow, laborious process of telephoning and private deal-making,” since consensus views, “rather than clarity, [were] often the highest goal of the process.” As seen under previous administrations, “the result was often inaction or half-measure instead of a clear strategy.”

573 Christopher J. Lamb with Nicholas Moon, “Somalia: Did Leaders or the System Fail?” Project on National Security Reform Case Study (2008).
574 Lamb and Moon.
576 Auger 60.
577 Auger 60.
579 Holbrooke 81.
A participant also identified this symptom in George W. Bush’s interagency decision-making process. Former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith notes that “on issue after issue, where there were disagreements they were not brought to the surface to be presented to the President for decision. Rather, basic disagreements were allowed to remain unresolved—as long as a degree of consensus could be produced on immediate next steps.” An outside observer also records this aspect of decision-making in Iraq, observing that the “NSC didn’t force the departments to reconcile a known disagreement that was very deep between the two agencies. They kind of papered over the differences instead of dealing with them.”

Given the persistent tendency to paper over differences or water down products to achieve consensus, it seems fair to conclude that these practices are not an indictment of the interagency participants involved in the various policy decisions over the last fifty years, but instead indicate a deeper problem in the national security system that those leaders were forced to use. That deeper problem, again, is the weakness of the mechanisms used to integrate the activities of strong functional departments and agencies.

The symptom of consensus-driven decision-making leads to another persistent symptom of structural distress in the national security system. The system is so slow and produces such watered-down results that leaders often feel compelled to work outside the formal decision-making system in order to solve problems. Sometimes the effects of working around the system are good. For example, Ambassador Robert Oakley acted as an entrepreneurial leader to execute the first phase of the U.S. intervention in Somalia in 1992–1993. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake acted as an entrepreneurial leader in developing Bosnia policy several years later, and was assisted by Ambassador Hobrooke who took similar iniative:

Moreover, the US-led-through-NATO, military operation was augmented by an immense US diplomatic effort, carried out by the Under Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke following the deaths of members of his previous US negotiating team. Indeed, Holbrooke, out of personal frustration following the accidental loss of his colleagues coupled with his activist personality, performed successfully what some theorists have described as ‘entrepreneurial leadership’, where emphasis is given to the skills of the negotiator to reveal and navigate around the working subtleties of a

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581 George Packer, The Assassins’ Gate: America in Iraq, 11. Packer’s source for this observation is only identified as a senior Pentagon official.
desired contract. Henceforth, the bringing around of the warring parties to the negotiating table became entirely Washington’s affair.  

At other times, working around the system is less productive. For example, in the Eisenhower administration, Secretary of State Dulles circumvented Eisenhower’s highly formal NSC system of deliberation:

The Department of State engaged in territorial behavior as Secretary Dulles stymied policy review and discussed policy privately with the President. Department of State actions thus limited interagency information sharing and consultation.

Similarly, Ambassador Bremer is reported to have demanded latitude and taken initiative in running the post-war strategy and activities in Iraq, but by general consensus not to good effect:

In his Oval Office interview with President Bush, Bremer had made it clear that he wanted complete control of the reconstruction and governance of Iraq. He didn’t want Washington, as he would say later, to micromanage policy “with an eight-thousand-mile screwdriver.” A few weeks after he landed in Iraq, Bremer informed Hadley that he didn’t want to subject his decisions to the “interagency process,” a bureaucratic safety valve that allowed the State Department, the Pentagon, the CIA, and the NSC to review and comment on policies. Bremer said he couldn’t wait around for approval from the home office. Rice and Hadley were reluctant to remove Bremer’s very long leash, but he was the man on the ground. After the Garner debacle, the White House wanted a take-charge guy. All right Hadley told him, you don’t have to go through the interagency process. But make sure you run the big stuff by us first. Bremer told confidants in Baghdad he didn’t want to “deal with the Washington squirrel cage.” He was a presidential appointee who reported to the president through the secretary of defense. He had no obligation to answer to anyone else. When Paul Wolfowitz or Doug Feith sent messages to him, Bremer directed his deputies to respond.

In retrospect, it is easy to believe that leaders work around the formal system as a means to avoid inconvenient questions about a pet project or approach. This is an argument from effect to intent. Certainly avoiding the formal system has the effect of avoiding tough questions from other organizations, but the intent is mostly to avoid bureaucratic stalemate or delay. Most leaders are confident their perspective (and their organization’s perspective) is right; they just know that the formal interagency committee system is not

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584 Fotini Bellou, “Direct and Indirect Leadership: The Case of the US in Bosnia” (Greece: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy) 13.
likely to get authoritative resolution of issues; hence they try to bypass it. A former participant’s comment on the lead-up to the Iraq war is straightforward on this point:

When Cabinet consensus was required to bring forward a particular proposal to the President (for example, the proposal to convene a political conference of Iraqi oppositionists), it was easy for State officials to block the initiatives for weeks or months—without having to explain themselves to the President. The interagency process reinforced the bureaucracy’s innate bias in favor of inaction.\(^{587}\)

Senior leaders complain that no one is in charge of interagency committees and that results are few and far between. This is so much the case that obtaining the right level of attendance at interagency committee meetings is often a problem.\(^{588}\) Thus, there are major incentives for working around the formal system.

While bypassing the formal system can expedite decision-making, it also can produce poor results. An entrepreneurial leader’s carefully conceived strategy can easily fall apart for lack of important information and different perspectives, or if in the implementation phase other disgruntled agencies refuse to cooperate. The latter happened to Ambassador Lawrence Pezzullo when he tried to engineer a transfer of power in Haiti. Instead, the Pentagon balked and a humiliating withdrawal of the USS *Harlan County* from Port-au-Prince was the result.\(^{589}\)

Least common denominator decision-making and working around formal structures and processes contribute to another symptom of poor integration: broader dissatisfaction among participants. Leaders and followers alike are often frustrated by the systemic inability of the national security system to solve problems in a collaborative fashion. When a leader from one organization successfully works around the system, he or she frustrates other department and agency representatives who feel their perspective was inadequately represented. When someone unsuccessfully works around the system, all concerned are frustrated by the wasted energy and poor results.

The same causes that explain the general lack of integration in the system—the autonomy of the department and agencies and the fact that their leaders play conflicting roles for the president—also explain the weak national-level integrating structures. Whenever a strong integrating structure is proposed, the departments and agencies object to it.\(^ {590}\) To these causes another may be added that is mostly specific to the national level:

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\(^{588}\) See the discussion in Part III of the report, pp. 139-149.


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cause: the president's span of control is unmanageable

The president has an unmanageable span of control. By one count, twenty-nine departments, agencies, councils, and commissions report directly to the president. If the president’s span of control were more manageable, or the pace of events considerably slower, or the U.S. role in the world less prominent and complex, the president might have time to personally enforce a level of integration in at least the national-level structures located in Washington. This does not happen, however, and has not even been given passing pretence by a president since Eisenhower. There simply is too much to do, and the president’s lack of availability is a major impediment to integrating strong functional organizations with weak mechanisms at the national level.

cause: the president’s main instruments for integration—NSC and HSC staffs—are small and weak

The small National Security and even smaller Homeland Security Council (HSC) staffs that are the natural locus of integration do not have the authority to direct the large semi-autonomous bureaucracies and cannot control them well. The juxtaposition of a miniscule, ephemeral, “non-headquarters” staff sitting on top of large, rigid, powerful functional bureaucracies is a striking and paradoxical feature of the current national security system. The weak “advisory” nature of the security staffs has been highlighted in preceding analysis. Here the complementary point is that they are too small as well.

This comment runs counter to the conventional wisdom. Often the size of the NSC staff and its growth over the past few decades is lamented by commentators who suppose that keeping the staff small will better serve the president. Yet, organization and management theorists are not surprised that the president and his personal staff have trouble controlling the national security system. The national security system is primarily a functional structure; its main departments are identified with certain kinds of work such as diplomacy, intelligence, and warfare. Functional structures typically require large powerful corporate headquarters to integrate the different parts of the organization, and this is true of the national security system.

Yet the NSC and HSC are historically small compared to the size of the national security establishment they oversee, roughly 150–250 staff coordinating the activities of approximately several million national security professionals—not counting the Central Intelligence Agency—at best, perhaps a ratio of 1/12,000 or at worst, a ratio of more than 1/25,000. By comparison, a 50,000-employee corporation would have approximately a 1,000-person corporate headquarters staff—a ratio of 1/50. The small,

593 According to OPM figures from September 2007, the traditional national security system workforce (Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security) consists of 3,176,883. The population of the Central Intelligence Agency is classified.
hard-working NSC staff must exercise an incredible span of control. They attempt to coordinate a huge, complex national security establishment that covers a multitude of complex, bilateral, regional, transnational, functional, and global issues. They cannot do so well and they invariably are exhausted in the process.

4. Strong functional organizations control policy implementation

The national security system’s previous problem has a corollary at the national level, where the focus is on policy formulation. Strong functional organizations not only dominate weak integrating mechanisms in policymaking, they also have a virtual monopoly on the means for implementing policy. Normally there is little choice other than to delegate responsibility for implementation to existing functional organizations.

This means that even if organizations lose or must compromise on a policy position that the NSC, for example, promulgates, they can still stymie or influence the way the policy is carried out. Even presidents find it hard to control the way their direct orders are implemented, and rarely have the time to monitor implementation in any case. The weak national structures available to assist presidents integrate the implementation of policy cannot do so. They try mightily to stay informed on implementation. For example, the Bush administration’s national security advisor, Stephen Hadley, relates how his staff had to innovate in order to keep abreast of how the different agencies were implementing national policy in Afghanistan and Iraq:

A second focus that we have brought in under this president is that we concentrate heavily on implementation and execution. The NSC has traditionally been about policy development. We still do that, on our interagency basis, but we are now very focused on: once you have a policy, what is your strategy and plan for carrying out that policy? What are the tasks? Who’s responsible for each task? When are they due? And what is the mechanism for tracking performance? . . . We have a ‘Stoplight Chart’ that says ‘Green: You’re on track’; ‘Yellow: You’re at risk of going off track.’ And, you know, ‘Red: You’re off track!’ If you’ve got a red light on your implementation/execution chart, it means that you need to get your interagency committee back together, figure out what’s the problem and how to fix it.594

Tracking implementation is important, and allows the NSC to identify areas where progress is stalled, but notice the next step is to return the issue to the ineffective interagency committee system.

Thus, at the national level, complete delegation of implementation to existing organizations is the norm, whether those organizations have the capability or the inclination to complete the mission well or not. As noted previously, organizations often eschew missions, and thus programs and capabilities that are considered tangential to the

organization’s main mandate. Occasionally, new temporary organizations like the Train and Equip program for the implementation of the Bosnian peace accords are created, but they are by far the exception.

**Cause: The system provides resources for national-level functions, but not missions**

The system is generally unable to budget for national-level missions, such as counterterrorism, counter-proliferation, or post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. Instead, the system budgets for national-level functions, such as defense, diplomacy, foreign assistance, intelligence, and other statutory core mandates of individual departments and agencies. Congress budgets by individual department and agency without a view to cross-cutting missions.

**Cause: The Executive Office of the President is not able to direct resources to mission capabilities**

The division and coordination of labor in the Executive Office of the President (EOP) for linking resources, programs, capabilities, and missions is confused. Arguably, the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB’s) mission is to save money, and it spends far less time on management. When it does focus on management, OMB is concerned with the performance of individual agencies in achieving their legislative mandates rather than on integrated national security matters. Moreover, OMB staff lack the capabilities needed to conduct mission costing and must turn to departments and agencies for assistance. For its part, the NSC staff generally focuses on short-term policy matters and crisis management. Long-range interagency strategic planning, in which ends, ways, and means are matched, suffers as a result. OMB sits outside of the policy and strategy process.

**Cause: Aggressive oversight of implementation is regarded as micromanagement and politically dangerous**

One finding from the Tower Commission on the Iran-Contra scandal was that the departments and agencies had been bypassed by an overzealous NSC staff:

> The NSC staff assumed direct operational control. The initiative fell within the traditional jurisdictions of the Departments of State, Defense, and CIA. Yet these agencies were largely ignored. Great reliance was placed on a network of private operators and intermediaries. How the initiative was to be carried out never received adequate attention from the NSC principals or a tough working-level review. No periodic evaluation of the progress of the initiative was ever conducted. The result was an unprofessional and, in substantial part, unsatisfactory operation.

Ever since the Iran-Contra scandal, it is generally considered axiomatic that authorities in Washington should never directly control the details of policy implementation. All too often in practice this means that national-level structures content themselves with policy

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and strategy formulation and hope for the best when it comes to implementation. When failure inclines the NSC to look more intently at implementation, the leadership and staff are still compelled to voice their concerns through the existing committee system.

c. Regional-Level Structure Problems

5. Bifurcated efforts to integrate regional national security

The Department of State focuses on policymaking; the Department of Defense focuses on operational concerns in the regions. The problems discussed so far—particularly weak integrating structures and ineffective presidential delegation—recur at the regional level. The NSC system currently includes regional Policy Coordination Committees, which work with the State Department’s regional bureaus and the regional representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the intelligence community, and other Washington-area organizations to develop and coordinate regional policy. However, like other interagency committees, PCCs are incapable of producing interagency unity of effort or facilitating collaborative information sharing and strategic planning. Instead, departments tend to operate independently within regions, and even define regions differently, complicating cooperation efforts.

Thus, the problem of delegating presidential authority replicates itself in regional issues. There is no effective regional interagency authority below the president. Two or more departments or agencies may agree to cooperate in formulating and implementing regional policy, but in the absence of agreement, there exists no authority short of the president that can force integration. The current geographic PCCs, and the Clinton administration’s geographical IWGs, whose respective purposes were to manage “the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the United States Government” and “to review and coordinate the implementation of Presidential decisions in their policy areas,” are usually chaired by designated lead individuals of undersecretary or assistant secretary rank from the State Department. They operate in effect with delegated presidential authority but, as noted, this does not make PCCs effective. Confronted by departments and agencies, each with its own statutory authorities, PCCs and their predecessors have difficulty reconciling disagreements between participants. Although legislation related to the National Command Authority covers military command and directive authority at the regional level, there is no comparable interagency legal authority. The result is that there is no authority or effective mechanism to integrate U.S. government efforts to deal with regional issues.

Other than the PCCs, there are no formal, coordinating, or integrating structures at the regional level to implement a “whole of government” approach to national security. Current regional interagency structures are dominated by and housed in a department or agency, typically the Department of Defense. It has established regional Joint

Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) at each of its regional commands. In addition, two Department of Defense regional combatant commands, U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Africa Command, are being designed to foster greater interagency cooperation and coordination. But other departments and agencies view these structures unfavorably, as tools of the Department of Defense. At best they are considered vehicles for useful information exchange (as long as DoD pays the bill), but certainly not as decision-making bodies that can bind department or agency behaviors. An exception is the Joint Interagency Task Force–South, which manages to conduct collaborative interagency planning.598

As occurs throughout the security system, resourcing reinforces these problems of weak integration and ineffective presidential delegation because resourcing flows through functional organizations. The relevance of this problem to the regional level is that the functional organizations spend their resources according to their mandates and no functional organization has a regional mandate. The Department of Defense comes closest, perhaps, since its approach to warfighting emphasizes the operational or theater level of warfare, which tends to be regional or at least to extend beyond one country. The Department of State focuses on bilateral relations or relations with individual countries, a point discussed below. The chapter of this report on resource management covers regional resourcing issues in detail.

These problems give rise to two symptoms specific to the U.S. government’s regional activities. First, the Department of Defense has better regional representation than the Department of State. The Department of State has regional bureaus. The assistant secretaries who run them have responsibilities to represent the State Department in the Washington interagency process and to represent State overseas. The assistant secretaries are forced to make a choice—focus on Washington and its interagency policy battles or focus on relationships in the region. Regional combatant commanders find greater time and energy to focus on regional relationships, since the Department of Defense maintains representation in interagency regional fora through the Joint Staff and officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Combatant commanders, therefore, often emerge as lead individuals (and their commands as lead agencies) by default in regional policy implementation. Of course, the disparity in the resources controlled by a combatant commander and an assistant secretary are important in the regional preeminence of the former, but a security system that was better at integrating all U.S. capabilities would not result in the predominance of one agency.

A result of the regional predominance of the Department of Defense, and another symptom of the failure of interagency coordination in regional matters, is the tendency to incorporate interagency components within combatant command structures. The political advisor (POLAD) system used in the Cold War grew out of the U.S. experience in World War II. Similarly, the more recent JIACGs sprang up to support the war on terror. They exist in each regional combatant command headquarters and are designed to “support…day-to-day planning at the combatant commander headquarters and

598 See comparison of regional interagency structures in Appendix 5: Structure Comparison Charts.
advise...planners regarding civilian agency operations, capabilities, and limitations."\textsuperscript{599} There are also ongoing attempts to further align interagency representation within the combatant commands.

The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and efforts underway at U.S. Southern Command illustrate this point. For example, AFRICOM incorporates “a more integrated staff structure...that includes significant management and staff representation by the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development...and other U.S. government agencies involved in Africa.”\textsuperscript{600} It is significant to note, however, that representatives from other agencies on these military staffs have no directive authority over their agencies’ activities and their advice to the combatant commanders can be plausibly denied by their superiors in the parent agencies. Moreover, departments and agencies often resist assigning personnel to each other and the newly created coordinating mechanisms in regional coordinating bodies. Often the Department of Defense must cover the costs of such liaison elements in order to secure participation.

A related symptom of failed integration in regional matters is the degree to which the U.S. government’s efforts wear a “military face.” When crisis situations demand the deployment of U.S. national security capabilities, the default response is often the deployment of military forces as the only readily available interagency capabilities. The response to AFRICOM is typical in this respect:

“Is the face of a baseball cap or a helmet?” asked Samuel A. Worthington, president of InterAction, the Washington-based umbrella for many development and relief organizations. “We told the military—do what you're good at. Stay in your lane.”\textsuperscript{601}

Despite the fact that each regional commander has a JIACG and is cultivating a “whole of government” approach for receiving advice from the nonmilitary interagency community, U.S. national security policy often appears as “hard power” when “soft power” would be more appropriate in the eyes of affected nations.

A final symptom of failed regional integration can be referred to as the creation of separate regional networks by U.S. government agencies. At the regional level, there has been a proliferation of multiple, cross-cutting functional programs in geographic areas (e.g., foreign assistance). At times, however, these programs are not coordinated, resulting in part from the absence of effective regional integrating mechanisms. Departments and agencies engage in regional programming activity within their separate stovepipes. Each organization naturally divides the globe into geographic regions that best fit its operating mandates or traditional areas of interest. Ultimately, such divisions create a U.S. interagency system that is comprised of various regional networks, which are visualized via regional maps that do not align with each other. For example, U.S.


government engagement with the African Union requires two regional PCCs, two of the State Department’s regional bureaus, three combatant commands (although AFRICOM is expected to replace them in October 2008), two USAID bureaus, and the U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia. 602

Cause: Regional structures are dominated by individual departments and their cultures

The cause of these symptoms and their underlying problems is that regional authorities exist only within individual autonomous organizations, none of which has regional responsibilities as part of its mandate. As noted, the Defense Department does recognize some regional responsibilities but only as a byproduct of a focus on the requirements of warfighting and its regional map does not coincide with any other department’s. The Department of State recognizes some regional responsibility, and its structure reflects this. As noted, regional assistant secretaries of state are in charge of regional bureaus in the State Department. But the State Department’s culture, certainly among its Foreign Service officers (FSO) who control the department, focuses not on regions but on bilateral relations. The traditional and still dominant role of the ambassador, the pinnacle of a FSO’s career, is to represent the United States in the capital of another country. That role dominates the State Department and makes regional integration of U.S. policies and activities, at best, a secondary matter.

d. Country Team Structure Problems

The problems and needs of country teams vary greatly. In smaller embassies (and when there are no emergencies), the current structure works relatively well—though it is subject to the personalities, training, and experience of the ambassador and agency heads. Cooperation among the different organizations represented at the embassy occurs. In larger embassies, or when there are man-made or natural emergencies, important programs involving a number of different agencies and/or a sizeable military role with high-level Washington attention, promoting unity of effort is difficult, as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice testified to Congress. 603

The key issue for ambassadors is not so much the failed or defective policy formulation described above as the issue of presidential delegation of authority. When ambassadors attempt to integrate the work of various agencies represented on the country team, they are sometimes seen to be asserting authority they do not have. The ambassador is often viewed as a State Department rather than as a presidential representative. The president delegates authority to the ambassador through a presidential letter; however, the letter does not provide for true unity of effort by spelling out responsibilities of other agencies vis-à-vis the ambassador. In addition, other agencies often fail to provide adequate guidance to their representatives in the field on relationships with the ambassador and

other agencies, and do not ensure that their representatives receive thorough briefings on the presidential letter and its intent.

6. **Country-level unity of purpose and effort is limited by the perception that ambassadors are State Department rather than presidential (i.e., national) representatives**

The problem of inadequate presidential delegation of authority gives rise to characteristic symptoms. Since ambassadors are often not recognized as the president’s representative (despite the de jure authority conferred by the president’s letter) and are often not backed by higher powers in Washington, denying them de facto authority, ambassadors often adopt a laissez-faire approach to management, leaving the assorted agency representatives in the embassy to pursue their own agendas. Understanding the limits of their ability to integrate the work of various agencies, the ambassador concentrates on Department of State activities which he can control more easily.

*Cause:* Strong functional organizations reward their personnel for protecting the organization’s equities

While ineffective presidential delegation may cause most of an ambassador’s problems, ambassadors must sometimes deal with the problems generated by autonomous functional agencies. The stovepipes extend down, so to speak, through U.S. embassies, compromising the ability of the ambassador to integrate U.S. government activities in-country.

7. **Dual chains of command in large “surge operations”**

When the U.S. military has a “heavy footprint” or presence in a country, the formal chain of command over U.S. personnel in-country is split between the ambassador and the joint force commander. The ambassadors encompass all non-DoD U.S. government personnel in the country, while the joint force commanders encompass DoD personnel. Often, there are also separate entities conducting overlapping U.S. civil-military operations. A symptom of this problem is the tendency of organizations in a surge environment to pursue different strategies and assign different levels of importance to interagency activities. DoD, focused on military objectives, and State, focused on political objectives, are particularly prone to pursuing different strategies in the field when large military forces are present.

Dual civilian and military chains of command in the field complicate unity of purpose and effort in complex contingencies that require close civil-military cooperation. There is almost always confusion over the question of who is in charge. A former Marine colonel dispatched by the Pentagon to help set up the Iraqi civil defense corps recalls the

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604 In Iraq, there is a military command structure—MNF-I—which does not have a civilian parallel. Civil-military activities are carried out by PRTs, embedded PRTs, and other U.S. military unit commanders and USAID and State Department authorities. There are also those activities funded and carried out by the Iraqi government. Resources come from many sources (Iraq, U.S., other governments, international organizations).
difficulty of forging cooperative effort between competing military and civilian chains of command:

It was Alice in Wonderland…I mean, I was so depressed the second time we went there, to see the lack of progress and the continuing confusion. The lack of coherence. You’d get two separate briefs, two separate cuts on the same subject, from the military and from the civilians.  

Similarly, an Institute for Defense Analyses literature review conducted for PNSR notes several studies which conclude civilian and military command and control relationships “need clarification within the U.S. government and agreement with our multinational and multilateral partners so that joint, combined, and interagency operations can be planned and conducted effectively and efficiently, and within the legal authorities that the terms establish.”

Recently, Congress also has lamented the convoluted chain of command for provincial reconstruction teams depicted in a Department of Defense briefing and noted:

Rather than having unity of command, PRTs in both Iraq and Afghanistan operate under complicated, disjointed and, at times, unclear chain(s) of command and receive direction from multiple sources.

**Cause: Dual chains of command are codified in law**

A dual chain of command at the country level is codified in U.S. law. Title 22 of U.S. Code gives the chief of mission

responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all
Government executive branch employees in that country (except for . . . employees under the command of a United States area military commander).....

The Chief of Mission is required to “keep fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations of the Government within that country”, and “insure that all Government executive branch employees in that country (except for . . . employees under the command of a United States area military commander) comply fully with all applicable directives of the chief of mission.”

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According to a PNSR Legal Working Group review of this code:

Based on these statutory provisions, the Chief of Mission oversees every executive branch employee in his or her country, with the key exception of military personnel under the command of an ‘area military commander.’ Although the term ‘area military commander’ is not defined in the U.S. Code, it most likely encompasses the combatant commander. Therefore, the Chief of Mission probably cannot exert any “direction, coordination, and supervision” over military personnel under the authority of a combatant commander.

 Cause: Cultural resistance to integrated political-military command in the field

In addition to legal impediments, there are cultural challenges to an integrated chain of command. The American public tends to view war and peace as separate, discontinuous states. So do diplomats and military officers, who are recruited and prepared for different activities and different approaches to problem solving:

There is the problem of differences in approach between the soldier and the diplomat. By training and experience the soldier seeks certainty and emphasizes victory through force. The diplomat is accustomed to ambiguity and emphasizes solving conflicts through persuasion. The soldier’s principal expertise is in operations, and the diplomat’s is in persuasion.

The thought that diplomats should be in charge of activities during peace and generals and admirals in charge of military operations is commonly accepted; who is in charge when operations require a delicate balance of civil and military activities is much disputed.

e. Multilateral Structure Problems

Multilateral activities are a subset of interagency coordination activities in general. Given that the primary instrument for pursing multilateral obligations or opportunities is diplomatic negotiation, the State Department has traditionally had the leadership in formal multilateral relations. To implement this responsibility, the department has a formal bureaucratic entity, the Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO), to manage multilateral relations and to consider the role of multilateralism in the conduct of foreign affairs. The IO bureau is therefore the designated institutional advocate for multilateralism in the Department of State, and the department is the designated institutional advocate in the broader U.S. government.

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610 It seems self-evident that the “area military commander” him/ herself must also be excepted from the chief of mission’s control, though the statute is not explicit to that effect.

611 This section of Title 22 was enacted in 1980, six years before Goldwater-Nichols, and therefore Congress would not have defined the chief of mission’s powers in reference to the combatant commander. See Foreign Service Act of 1980, P.L. 96-465, 17 October 1980.

The problems of integration and ineffective presidential delegation found in other areas of the national security system operate in its multilateral activities as well. Since most multilateral policies cut across functional areas, effective multilateralism requires national security system participants to develop integrated policies to be brought into a given multilateral venue. In the absence of effective integrating mechanisms and delegated authority, the interagency system is generally incapable of producing integrated policies. One result is that other international actors who might like to collaborate with the United States often find it difficult to determine what U.S. policy and strategy really is and how they might collaborate with the United States.

8. **Ineffective interagency mechanisms confuse multilateral actors and leave departments and agencies discretion to interpret U.S. policy and strategy**

Although the origins of the structural problem that impede multilateral collaboration are not unique, they produce some symptoms specific to the U.S. government’s multilateral activities. First of all, the inability to manage the interagency system or authoritatively provide it with strategic direction means that a long-term value such as building multilateral cooperation often gets short shrift. Instead, U.S. government departments and agencies tend to view multilateralism as a “tactic” by which to pursue their organizational or parochial missions and views. This lack of commitment to multilateral institutions undermines the willingness of others to collaborate with the United States in multilateral fora.

From the viewpoint of international partners who might like to collaborate, it is often difficult to determine the real locus of decision-making on some issues. Secretaries of state make this point in criticizing the power of the national security advisor:

> Many secretaries of state have resented the increasing power lodged in the National Security Council staff, and officials of allied countries have reportedly expressed confusion about who actually speaks for the American Government in foreign policy: the national security advisor, the Secretary of State, or both.\(^{613}\)

In response to a questionnaire that the Project on National Security Reform circulated to representatives of U.S. multilateral partners, some respondents felt that while the Department of State was the primary multilateral point of contact within the U.S. government, the department does not always appear able to perform that role and that therefore collaboration with the United States sometimes is unproductive. It is likely that in a more integrated system, the Department of State would find it easier to assert its responsibility for multilateral affairs.

The lack of clear and authoritative integrating mechanisms creates other problems for multilateral collaboration as well. Other respondents to the PNSR survey noted that if they do not get the feedback they desire from one U.S. department or agency, they seek out other agencies since each agency has its own voice, priorities, and prerogatives when

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interacting with multilateral organizations. As such, U.S. interagency collaboration difficulties invite other multilateral actors to use the different U.S. decision-making chains against one another, “shopping around” for a more sympathetic response.

Another telling symptom is the lack of flexibility during U.S. government consultation with other multilateral actors. The difficulties associated with developing an interagency position in Washington reinforce the tendency not to deviate from those positions, an inflexibility that undermines multilateral collaboration. Policy is often provided to U.S. representatives in multilateral settings without much opportunity for those representatives to provide input. In such cases, the U.S. representatives have little authority to negotiate previously decided positions despite the fact that negotiation among partners constitutes a significant portion of multilateral engagement. This helps explain the previously observed symptom of insufficient flexibility during U.S. government consultation with other multilateral actors. This symptom has been noted by a broad cross section of foreign representatives. For example, a representative from the European Commission noted that often the U.S. government will come to the table with a well-devised plan, position, or policy, from which it cannot deviate, while other actors come to the table in order to discuss the issue as a prelude to developing their positions.

*Cause: The Department of State’s lack of authority over the full range of activities in the U.S. government’s conduct of foreign relations*

Unlike other areas of U.S. government activity, in multilateral affairs the cause of integration problems is more a matter of policy than of structure. The U.S. government has an inadequate strategic appreciation of multilateral institutions. The rapid growth of multilateral organizations in scope and sophistication has outpaced any effort to grapple with them efficiently and effectively, which in turn has created an uncertainty of the role of multilateral organizations in achieving U.S. interests. In addition, the U.S. government views the United Nations and other international organizations as marginal for U.S. interests. This cause is related to the fact that the United States is accustomed to leading missions that relate to international security. Oftentimes, the U.S. government will prefer working unilaterally or bilaterally, due to the fact that it often seems a more direct and timely way to achieve its goals. Weak domestic and congressional constituencies for multilateral engagement reinforce this preference.

Nevertheless, the same root causes of failure to produce integrated policy in other areas are also contributing causes of multilateral collaboration problems. Autonomous agencies and no effective delegation of presidential authority leave the State Department with no chance to integrate all the multilateral activities and interests of the U.S. government. The president, various departments, Congress, and public interest groups all have some authority when it comes to representing the U.S. government in international organizations. Rarely do these entities coordinate amongst themselves, and many of them can have differing interests and goals that benefit them, not the U.S. government at large.
The national security system has typically addressed problems arising outside the United States. In the late 1960s, the system began to address terrorism as an internal as well as external threat, while maintaining a predominantly external orientation. Since 9/11, homeland security has become a more salient concern, leading to the development of separate homeland security structures.

The effective management of homeland security missions—prevention, protection and mitigation, and response and recovery activities—requires unity of effort among traditional national security structures and the new homeland security structures at the federal, state, and local levels of government. The constitutional distinction between federal and state authority complicates a unified approach to homeland security, because it prevents the federal government from having directive authority over state and local organizations. Thus, the optimal political and practical goal among all levels of government is collaborative, agreed-upon, and unambiguous policies, doctrine, and operational capabilities.

The net assessment for all homeland security missions—prevention, protection and mitigation, response and recovery—is that we still rely on creative ambiguity and the hope that all concerned will do the right thing in a crisis. The best way to alleviate the concern is to better integrate mechanisms for federal officials with homeland security responsibilities, and improve decision-making mechanisms required for collaboration between federal, state, and local authorities.

9. **Authority and responsibility for federal homeland security coordination remains unclear**

What might be called weak horizontal integration among organizations of the federal government is a particular problem for homeland security. Although the secretary of homeland security is the principal federal official for managing domestic incidents and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the lead federal agency for coordinating federal emergency support functions, neither is able to control the activities of other federal departments. As noted above, the lead individual and lead agency models are not effective in national security, so its ineffectiveness in homeland security should not be a surprise.

The problem, noted at all previous levels, is still operative: weak integrating structures dominated by strong functional organizations. As we have seen, not only do departments involved in homeland security fail to cooperate, they also compete over missions. The Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice compete over terrorism prevention and response; DHS and the Department of Energy compete over preparing cities against nuclear or radiological attack, and over which agency should have primary
PROBLEM ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM

responsibility to safeguard U.S. bioterrorism research facilities from rogue employees.\textsuperscript{614} This kind of competition is a symptom of weak or failed integration.

Symptoms of weak vertical integration are also apparent among federal, state, and local organizations, such as poor information sharing. The Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, Defense, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Homeland Security Council, and other federal entities with homeland security mission responsibilities—along with their state and local partners—have failed to institutionalize a comprehensive and workable information-sharing structure.

Since 9/11, much work has been done to improve cooperation between federal, state, and local authorities in a response to one of the homeland security missions: a catastrophic domestic incident. The National Response Framework and National Incident Management System, derived from widely accepted incident command system principles, should aid collaboration between federal, state, and local authorities. However, the ability of the federal government to organize its response activities is suspect, including whether the primary agents of the federal government—the principal federal official, senior federal law enforcement official, federal coordinating officer, and military Joint Task Force commander—can all work together effectively. In a catastrophic event, the respective authorities among these agents for coordination of on-scene federal support assets are not clear.

\textit{Cause: Current relationships among representatives of federal agencies managing catastrophic disasters is unwieldy and inefficient}

The roles and authorities of the commander, Joint Task Force, who ultimately reports to the secretary of defense; the senior federal law enforcement official (SFLEO), who ultimately reports to the attorney general; federal coordinating officer (FCO), who reports to the Federal Emergency Management Agency administrator; and the principal federal official (PFO) in the field, who reports directly to the secretary of homeland security, among others, perpetuate federal stovepipes in the face of directives which purport to facilitate federal coordination. While Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5) “Management of Domestic Incidents” designated the secretary of DHS as the principal federal official for domestic incident management, the directive bestows no additional authority to the secretary to execute that mission and does not affect existing statutory authorities vested in other Cabinet secretaries, in particular, the secretary of defense and the attorney general.

\textit{Cause: No federal agency has authority to marshal interagency resources for prevention and protection missions to collaborate with state and local authorities}

Authorities and responsibilities for homeland security prevention and protection missions are even less clear than those for emergency response missions. Some progress since 9/11 has been made, for example for top-down development of the supporting plan for the National Capital Region’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ), where the

responsibilities are primarily federal, but there is still no clearly assigned lead individual or agency for prevention and protection missions.

10. Collaborative decision-making relationships among federal, state, and local authorities remain unclear

The federal government’s coordination problem is compounded by the inclusion of state and local authorities. The constitutional division of power between federal and state and local authorities precludes the federal government exercising “command and control” over state and local authorities. Therefore, unified effort depends upon collaborative arrangements, including shared and agreed-upon policy, doctrine, and operational capabilities among all levels of government. However, collaboration is undermined by the fact that there is no standardized process to solicit and receive state, local, and private sector input into the development of national policy. Despite the language of such foundational policy documents as the National Security Act, Homeland Security Act, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act and others such as National Response Framework (NRF), only advisory, not collaborative, mechanisms exist for input from state and local authorities and the private sector and nongovernmental organization communities.

Cause: State and local authorities, and their expertise, are not adequately represented in homeland security policy development

While the failure of the HSC to engage meaningfully state and local authorities mirrors the failure of the NSC to control or integrate organizations at the regional and country level, the situation of the HSC is different. Unlike the NSC, the HSC must coordinate with organizations that have their own independent legal status as sovereign governmental entities sharing the same territory. This fact points to a structural cause of failed integration that is unique to the state and local level. The current practice of using a Homeland Security Advisory Council composed of state, local, and private sector representatives, along with others, replicates a device from the early years of the NSC that failed. The council is advisory and does not participate in a collaborative process.

4. Consequences

a. Immediate

There are several primary and immediate consequences of the national security system’s structural problems. First, not all critical policy integration issues reach the president. Often, policy issues rise to the White House for consideration only when there is department conflict. National-level interagency goals and plans may otherwise reach the president or his closest staff for consideration only when he initiates such planning or demonstrates an interest in a specific matter. Even when the president is interested and involved, policy is difficult to integrate consistently. The absence of an effective model

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of presidentially delegated integrative authority means the system generally performs better in traditional functions that clearly reside in one organization’s area of responsibility compared to cross-functional activities. For example, the reason the system is better at formulating policy in traditional state-to-state negotiations and warfighting is that the Department of State and Department of Defense are well recognized as the lead agencies for these activities and do not require that their activities be closely integrated with other disciplines. The reason the system is better at short-term crisis management than “steady-state” or long-term policy and strategy formulation (including investment in multilateral institutions) is that the president’s full attention is engaged during an acute crisis.

Second, policy implementation agencies often pursue their own objectives to the detriment of cross-cutting missions, which leads to a lack of unity of effort and purpose. As agencies and people try to preserve organizational autonomy, they often opt out of the formal system or resist execution in retaliation for policy created by policy entrepreneurs working around the formal system. Since agencies and departments control the resources and capabilities to implement policy, it is not hard for them to thwart policy that they do not support. This is true at the national level, including the ability of the federal government to marshal resources for state and local government responses to catastrophic events, and at the regional and country levels. Inadequate authority at the country team level means weaker bilateral representation in support of U.S. interests. When the military has a “heavy footprint,” dual chains of command, running through the ambassador and the joint force commander, makes unity of effort dependent on personalities, visions, and physical working locations. As a result, unity of purpose and effort often breaks down.

Third, the overall difficulty the system experiences with integrating and implementing policy means it performs poorly in regional and multilateral venues as well. Absent unity of purpose and effort from U.S. government organizations, regional institutions and multilateral actors from other member states perceive the United States not as an accepted leader, but as an unreliable actor.

Fourth, the system’s inability to fix accountability for nontraditional missions in particular means the nation is unprepared for them. If mission success depends on programs and capabilities that lie outside the mainstream of activities considered part of an organization’s core mandate, they are not developed well or at all. Thus, even high-priority national missions that require nontraditional means and their integration and application are performed poorly. For such missions, the national security system fails to integrate ways, means, and ends. One result is that putative national strategies really are not strategies but lists of goals. While they may express desired end-states, they provide the interagency with little guidance on how to achieve such goals. This is as true for homeland security as it is for foreign affairs.

Finally, concerning homeland security, the consequences of insufficiently clear authorities and federal interagency conflict include the following:

616 Unity of command is achieved when subordinates all have a single superior.
Problem Analysis of the Current System

- Insufficient information sharing in general may preclude successful collaboration and outcomes across the range of homeland security missions.

- The possibility that in a catastrophic crisis, coordination efforts may give way to departments and agencies relapsing into go-it-alone support strategies, which will undermine state- and local-level unified command structures under the National Response Framework.

- In the area of protection, the absence of clear authorities for the Department of Homeland Security means an absence of authoritative requirements and standards that may lead to inadequate, inefficient, and inappropriate investments in infrastructure protection.

b. Extended

The structural problems identified above manifest themselves immediately, but some also have a cumulative impact with deleterious, longer term consequences. Because it is unable to integrate and resource all the elements of power well, the United States may rely too heavily on the largest, best organized, and most operational institution—the military. In doing so it risks being perceived as an actor that views the world through a military lens and which can be counted upon to use military force as its first and enduring response to regional national security issues rather than “soft power,” which might be more appropriate. This weakens the United States’ efforts to exercise leadership and hinders opportunities to achieve long-term as well as short-term national security goals.

Combined with the tendency to focus on short-term problems rather than the benefits of longer term commitments to multilateral institutions, the perception that the United States is prone to overuse military force creates hostility in the international environment. When multilateral partners feel a sense of mistrust and hostility toward the United States or that the U.S. is inappropriately applying “hard power” to influence a situation, they are less likely to support U.S.-led missions when their support is crucial to our national security. Again, the reaction to AFRICOM is typical:

“I think everyone thought it would be widely greeted as something positive,” the Africom officer said. “But you suddenly have wide publics that have no idea what we’re talking about…. It was seen as a massive infusion of military might onto a continent that was quite proud of having removed foreign powers from its soil.”

In addition, the failure to resolve impediments to cooperation on homeland security missions may have significant long-term implications. In the short term, the legislative and executive branches of the federal government may feel pressure to federalize

617 Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS Commission on Smart Power: a smarter, more secure America, Cochairs, Richard L.Armitage, Joseph Nye, Jr., 2007.
emergency management in an attempt to appease expectations that are practically and logistically unobtainable without willing cooperation from state and local authorities. In the longer term, such a response would be detrimental to shared sovereignty under the Constitution and if deemed to have failed catastrophically would jeopardize public confidence in constitutional governance.

5. Conclusions

The following three findings depart from conventional wisdom documented in PNSR literature reviews:

1. Contrary to the view that the national security structure is highly flexible, and that this is an inherent strength of the system, the structure of the current system is rigid and essentially unchanged since 1947. It provides relatively strong functional capabilities but poorly integrates them. The majority of changes to the structure are merely adjustments to division of labor and span of control within functional domains, that is, collapsing or expanding functional organizations in response to the rise or fall in perceived need for various capabilities. Structural adjustments address symptoms of performance instead of the underlying problems—they have not strengthened integration across functional domains nor have they addressed the core impediments to integration.

2. Contrary to the view that presidents simply get the structure they desire and can command it at their will, presidents inherit a rigid structure and in fact find it difficult or impossible to completely control, even when they give it their undivided attention, which is rare.

3. Contrary to the view that structure is not important compared to the influence of individual leaders other than the president, good organizational structure is critically important. Good or even great leaders cannot work around a formal system consistently to produce good results. As PNSR case studies demonstrate, for reasons beyond their control, leaders fail as often as they succeed when they try to circumvent formal decision structures.

Despite the checkered record, structural adjustments to the national security system are popular. System behavior seems to suggest that structural adjustments alone will produce consistently better system performance and many recommendations for reform focus on structure as well. However, the broader organizational literature is consistent on the point that structure is only one factor explaining system performance, and may not be the most important factor at that. In this regard, structural reform may be a classic case of the necessary but not sufficient condition for better performance.
C. Process

Summary

The processes of the national security system are assessment, policymaking, strategy-making, planning, implementation, and evaluation. Arguably, the U.S. national security process is the largest organizational decision-making system in the world. Its sheer size suggests the critical need for the most effective and efficient processes. Unfortunately, current processes are fragmented, ad hoc, personality and issue specific, and unable to harness the wide range of talent within the system, or to learn from failure or success. Without presidential intervention, the national security system centralizes processes at the level of senior Cabinet officials. Processes are not coordinated or integrated across the system.

This lack of coordination leads to problems in each of the system’s processes. Assessments tend to be static, heavily qualified, tailored and restricted to senior leaders who are overburdened and not in a position to use them. Strong departments water down, abandon as too difficult, or promulgate uncoordinated policies. Real “course of action” strategy is infrequent and limited to key high-level officials, so the system cannot fully support strategy formation or implementation. Interagency planning is irregular, resisted by individual agencies, and too slow and laborious to keep pace with the environment. Implementation is often poorly resourced and poorly integrated. The system militates against rigorous evaluations. The net result is a significantly reduced ability to adapt and respond to a rapidly changing world.

Problems and Causes

The following table summarizes the complete set of major problems and causes for this section.

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<th>Problems</th>
<th>Causes</th>
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| 1. Assessments tend to be static, heavily qualified, tailored and restricted to senior leaders who are overburdened and not in a position to use them. | - Highly formalized process with premium on static, bottom-line assessments  
- Product driven by senior leader demand, which is issue-management-oriented and not focused on examining the whole environment  
- Current information systems limit information sharing  
- The nature of national security events is growing more complex |
| 2. Often strong departments and agencies thwart clear, well-coordinated policy. | - Senior leader attention is often unavailable  
- Bureaucratic positions in interagency meetings lead to paralysis, diluted policy or policies that |
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<th>Problems</th>
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<td>are insufficiently coordinated</td>
<td>- Insufficient attention to the full range of relevant organizations</td>
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<td>3. Real “course of action” strategy is infrequent and limited to the informal deliberations of senior officials.</td>
<td>- An excessive focus on near-term issues precludes mid- and long-term strategy</td>
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<td>- The need to reconcile different department and agency objectives militates against strategy formulation and in favor of lists of objectives</td>
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<td>- “Leak Culture” militates against “real strategy” being recorded and distributed</td>
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<td>4. Interagency planning is irregular, resisted by individual agencies, and too slow and laborious to keep pace with the environment.</td>
<td>- When policy/strategy are not clear, there is little basis for unified planning</td>
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<td>- Strategy, to the extent it exists, is poorly communicated to planners</td>
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<td>- Departmental cultures complicate cooperation on planning</td>
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<td>- Departments and agencies do not sufficiently value training and exercising plans</td>
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<td>5. Implementation is poorly integrated and resourced.</td>
<td>- Lead agencies and individuals cannot secure integrated effort</td>
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<td>- Resources are not linked to national security goals across department and agency lines</td>
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<td>- The Executive Office of the President has insufficient means to provide oversight</td>
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<td>- Departments and agencies interpret policy, strategy, and plans through their organizational perspectives when conducting implementation</td>
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<td>- Insufficiently broad range of required capabilities</td>
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<td>6. The system militates against rigorous evaluations.</td>
<td>- The information flow necessary for basic organizational learning processes is impeded by system attributes</td>
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<td>- Reliable metrics are not available</td>
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<td>- At the national level, there is little infrastructure for investigating, capturing, disseminating, and retrieving knowledge of value to the national security system</td>
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<td>- Powerful incentives to protect the president from blame inhibit learning</td>
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1. Introduction

The “national security process” animates the entire national security system. The fundamental nature of a process is that it converts inputs into outputs. National security inputs come in diverse forms—environmental jolts, resource allocations, human capital, knowledge inputs, strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats, and weak signals. National security outputs include policies, strategies, and plans, for example, but only one form of outcome—events shaped by the national security system that either increase or decrease the degree of national security for U.S. citizens. A “national security success” is an outcome that markedly increases the national security of U.S. citizens (e.g., the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989); a “national security failure” is an outcome that markedly decreases the national security of U.S. citizens (e.g., the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001).

For most people, including many who work within the national security system, the national security process is a black box that transforms national security inputs into national security outputs:

America's warlike but unmilitary society frustrates the national security rationalist. Disorder characterizes “process” from which policy emerges, although the country has performed steadily on national security fundamentals. It is difficult to comprehend why the preeminent guardian state of the West, with its wealth of competence in analytical techniques, makes and irregularly unmakes decisions on matters of peace, war, and survival in an undisciplined and deeply astrategic manner.

There are literally hundreds of processes within the black box that constitute the overall national security process, and different labels that can be applied to them (e.g., sensing,

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sense making, interpretation, data collection, intelligence, formation, formulation, policy development, decision-making, issue management, system management, strategizing, strategic thinking, policy translation, operations, operationalization, tactics, and execution). For purposes of clarity and consistency with current theory and practice, the analysis here is organized around six primary national security processes that are reviewed in linear fashion but which are, in reality, iterative and interrelated: assessment, policy, strategy, planning, implementation, and evaluation. Analyzing the problems associated with these activities reveals the contents of the “black box” of national security process.

2. The Current System

a. Overview

National security processes have evolved substantially since 1946. In the first fifteen years after World War II, the nation saw a progressive strengthening of formal, relatively centralized mechanisms for coordinating and integrating policy. This formalized approach, led from the White House, drew significant criticism from a Congress concerned with the reach of its oversight and the perception of a slow and layered bureaucracy. As a result, the next two administrations witnessed a reactionary movement toward informal processes for national security decision-making and a decentralized approach toward policy implementation and its oversight. Since the 1970s, the pendulum has continued to swing between formal and informal and centralized and decentralized processes, with the Nixon administration most tightly coupling formal and centralized approaches. In 1987, the Iran-Contra affair brought into stark relief a third axis of national security processes extant since the Truman administration: an operational National Security Council staff role versus a coordinating role. These three variables—formality, centralization, and power of the Executive Office of the President—continue to define the process choices of each administration.

Each president and his national security team have attempted to tailor processes for managing the burgeoning national security system and its demands. These demands can be roughly categorized in four areas:

1. Domestic threats and emergencies, such as domestic terrorist attacks, intelligence gathering, and natural disasters

2. Foreign crises and military operations, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan

3. Transnational challenges, such as terrorism, narcotics, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

4. Long-term cooperation and capacity building with foreign and domestic partners, both private and governmental

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621 The authors are indebted to Len Hawley for articulating this framework.
Processes for managing these challenges often differ, as do the statutes and constitutional principles governing them. No president has left his process approach unchanged during his tenure, though each has borrowed from his predecessors.

The diversity and details of current national security processes are thus marked by variation and defy easy description. They include formal and informal measures. A formal description of current processes is provided in Appendix 6: Current National Security Processes. While formal processes are followed in the main, actual decision-making often takes place through informal processes. But in formal and informal processes, six processes need to be undertaken to manage a national security issue:

1. **Assessment Processes** comprise the active sensing, searching, and discovery of emerging issues. They include identifying early warning signals before issues become larger and less manageable.

2. **Policy Processes** comprise the development of national positions on issues and the long-term prioritization of issues as expressed in terms of national interest.

3. **Strategy Processes** comprise the self-conscious choice of a course of action that will coordinate operations and missions, or issue management, in articulation of policy and national interests.

4. **Planning Processes** comprise the formulation of a program for accomplishing a given strategic goal to further broad national policy.

5. **Implementation Processes** comprise the actual activities that are undertaken to achieve policy, strategy, and planning objectives.

6. **Evaluation Processes** comprise the process of reviewing and, when necessary, reforming the assessment-to-policy implementation chain as needed to achieve better outcomes.

b. **A General Assessment of Performance**

It is no secret that most national security experts are dissatisfied with the current national security process. The phrase commonly heard within the national security community is that the national security system is broken. For the massive amounts of resources that are being expended, American citizens are receiving low returns on their national security investments. Collectively and individually, the six primary national security processes are not working well. Overall, the national security process rarely produces timely, distributed, or integrated decision analysis.

There are multiple symptoms suggesting systemic process limitations. One symptom of an ineffective overall national security process is that it is putatively rational but actually not able to link decisions to behaviors well:

Even if Kissinger persuaded the chief executive that ‘his whole bureaucracy was wrong and I was right,’ the president would still not be
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able to implement those suggestions…. So, since ‘management of the bureaucracy takes so much energy and … changing course is so difficult,’ important decisions could best be made in ‘a very small circle while the bureaucracy happily continues working away in ignorance.’

Decisions are actually more accurately characterized by bureaucratic politics (especially non-crisis decisions) wherein the departments challenge each other for the favor of the president and have strong perspectives shaped by their mandates, cultures, and available information. Even the president’s personally appointed Cabinet level officials often represent their departments’ agendas:

The life lines connecting presidents to the Cabinet departments are longer and perceived to be more porous than those that link presidents to the executive office. This perception undoubtedly is fortified by the belief that under most circumstances Cabinet secretaries would as soon push their departmental perspectives or even their own special agendas than those of the White House.

Presidents often make a sharp distinction between their immediate advisors in the White House and their Cabinet level departments, which they do not completely trust and instead see as “torpid, bureaucratically self-interested, and often uncommitted or skeptical of presidential initiatives [and] an uncontrollable source of hemorrhaging to the press.” This mistrust creates a tendency for insular rather than more inclusive decision-making:

At least one well-placed observer, who was present at nearly all the National Security Council meetings during the last twenty-seven months of the administration, felt that the informal office meetings were much more important than the council sessions: ‘As a matter of fact, I think the Boss regarded both the Cabinet and the National Security Council meetings as debating societies…. His real decisions were in the Oval Room, with a small select group.’

Another symptom of current national security processes is that they are often opaque, chaotic, punctuated by external “forcing” events, easily thwarted, and tiring. The system is designed as a centralized decision-making process, but in practice is very chaotic. The president does not have the time to run the system and the national security advisor can be out-powered by the Cabinet level officials who run the major national security

organizations. Standard procedures do not permit the vast expertise resident in the system to be brought to bear on any but the most pressing problems. Issues are not addressed in a timely, disciplined, or integrated fashion:

When process makes bureaucratic and personality considerations dominant, this may produce the populist nightmare vision of icy, isolated men flinging around continents or playing global chess. More often, reality coincides with the insider view of overworked, harassed people trying to cope with an endless Chinese-firecracker series of problems. ‘This was the almost invariable pattern: a crisis occurs, and everybody stays up all night and fires off cables around the world and worries like hell,’ a former undersecretary of state recalled. ‘This goes on for two or three hectic days. Another crisis occurs two months later, then the third and fourth, and after you have about five crises, you have a policy.’

The schedule is driven by harried NSC officials who typically do not allow sufficient lead-time for preparation. The meetings are attended by senior officials who refuse to divulge what happened. Since no one in the meetings has authority to direct the behavior of anyone else, the meetings frequently end in frustrating impasse:

[T]he NSC was a huge committee, and suffered from all the weaknesses of committees. Composed of representatives of many agencies, its members were not free to adopt the broad, statesmanlike attitude desired by the President, but, rather, were ambassadors of their own departments, clinging to departmental rather than national views. Moreover, the normal interagency exchanges and cross-fertilization that should have taken place outside the NSC were cut off in favor of action within the Council system, where members engaged in negotiation and horse-trading in a process essentially legislative rather than deliberative and rational. The result, as former Secretary of State Dean Acheson charged, was ‘agreement by exhaustion,’ with the ponderous NSC machinery straining mightily to produce not clear-cut analyses of alternative courses of action, but rather compromise and a carefully staffed ‘plastering over’ of differences.

‘Agreement by exhaustion’ may be overly optimistic since agreement is often not reached, but recent senior officials confirm that the process is still tiring.

Yet another general symptom of current processes is the high level of frustration experienced by national security leaders throughout the system who feel stymied by the

\[\text{\footnotesize 626 B. Rubin.}\\ 
\text{\footnotesize 628 Secretary Donald Rumsfeld candidly admitted that “we end up spending incredible amounts of time that just kind of suck the life out of you…spending 4, 5, 6 hours in interagency meetings.” Remarks at the Eisenhower National Security Conference, 25 Sept 2003, 30 Sept 2008 <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030925-secdf0712.html>.}\]
requirement for senior leader approval before taking action. In this regard, the system’s processes are overcentralized as the White House struggles to generate unity of effort by taking over issue management. One result is that lower level leaders are encouraged not to take action without prior approval from the top of the organization.

**Cause: Authority is centralized in Cabinet officials**

In the absence of a direct and forceful intervention by a president in a crisis situation, the tendency of the U.S. national security system is for authority to centralize at Cabinet level departmental officials. The presidential national security team is able to force cross-departmental collaboration in times of crisis at the Cabinet level. When the president injects himself into an issue, individual and organizational incentives can align to support the president’s decision. However, span of control, competing priorities, and poor support tools impede the president’s ability to engage directly on most issues.

The Executive Office of the President has attempted in recent years to use performance measurement devices as a tool to force interagency collaboration. In the past decade, there has been a notable evolution in performance accountability approaches for individuals, units, departments, and agencies within the executive branch. The National Security Personnel System in the Defense Department is a recent example of an effort to reward individual performance that advances an agency’s goals. The Government Performance and Results Act and the President’s Management Agenda are recent examples of efforts to link agency and departmental performance to presidential goals. Today, these efforts are inadequate for creating accountability within agencies, and for measuring and holding accountable performance across agencies.

These efforts, though, have not made much of a dent in the power of Cabinet level secretaries to pursue department agendas at the expense of integrated national security agendas. Neither the staff of the Executive Office of the President nor the NSPD-1 and HSPD-1 processes have a clear mandate to provide accountable linkages between the articulation of national-level ends and a whole-of-government delineation of supporting ways and means.

**Cause: Departmental identification**

Departmental employees view participation in interdepartmental national security processes as a lesser priority. They often identify more with their department’s interests than with the national security system’s mission as a whole. This occurs for three reasons: competitive leadership styles, competing cultures, and geographic distances.

The leadership style that is often ascribed to effective department secretaries is that of “bureaucratic infighter.” A bureaucratic infighter knows that he or she is in a competition for resources and influence from the president and Congress, and perceives they are in a zero-sum game. Employees working for a “strong” departmental leader will take particular pains to protect their department’s equities in interagency deliberations. More generally, departmental identification for personnel is reinforced by department and agency cultures, which for those with less interagency experience, can amount to
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“psychic prisons”629 in which representatives of an agency are unable to conceptualize value in another department’s set of approaches to a problem, for example, the FBI’s psychic prison of law enforcement and the CIA’s psychic prison of intelligence operations.630

Departmental identification is also strengthened by the absence of geographic co-location.631 It is still typically the case in Washington that diplomats are situated in Foggy Bottom not far from Embassy Row, defense officials in the large Pentagon complex, intelligence professionals in their campus at Langley, and homeland security people increasingly comfortable in their new neighborhood by the vice president’s mansion. When federal employees are co-located in project team environments, distrust and departmental identification breaks down more quickly.

Cause: System participants tend to think of process as a top-down effort

The presumption of presidential top-down process management limits initiative and slows processes. Intelligence is routed immediately to the presidential top management team, rather than equally distributed to leaders at the regional, departmental, or issue level. The presumption of top-down strategy creates incentives for policy developers to skew analysis so that their preferred option is chosen.

In July 2002, Sir Richard Dearlove, Britain’s head of foreign intelligence, reported back to Tony Blair and his top officials about meetings in Washington. According to a secret memo made public in May 2005, Sir Richard told his colleagues: ‘Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s record.’632

The presumption of top-down strategy also can create an incentive to wait until senior leader preferences are clear. It is not uncommon for an assistant to the president for national security affairs to portray his or her role as merely producing options for the president and then implementing the president’s strategy. Finally, the presumption of top-down strategy reduces the likelihood that national security professionals in the field will “close the loop” between implementation and assessment since doing so might seem like criticism of senior leader decisions.

Cause: The end-to-end process is fractured

630 Mark Riebling, Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and CIA (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994).
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The end-to-end process across the national security system consists of distinct and only loosely connected phases. Assessment is done primarily within one national security subculture, that of the intelligence community. The White House and the National Security Council staff run the policy and strategy process from a unique perspective—a combination of confidence that comes from working directly for the president, a lack of institutional memory that comes from the ephemeral nature of the National Security Council staff, a short-handedness that comes from the extremely small size of the staff, and a constant state of urgency. Policy conducted in Policy Coordination Committees populated by representatives of strong departmental cultures tends to be slow, consensus-driven, and leads to less coherent and less directive policy documents. Planning and implementation are generally delegated to the specific departments and agencies.

For these general reasons, the overall national security process tends not to produce timely, distributed, or integrated decision analysis. The net effect of the systemic limitations is to impede each of the six primary national security processes:

1. **Assessment.** Assessments tend to be static, heavily qualified, tailored for and restricted to senior leaders who are not in a position to use them.

2. **Policy.** Strong departments and agencies thwart clear, well-coordinated policy positions, which are watered down, abandoned, or promulgated without sufficient coordination.

3. **Strategy.** Real “course of action” strategy is infrequent and limited to key high-level officials.

4. **Planning.** Interagency planning is irregular, resisted by individual agencies, and too slow and laborious to keep pace with the environment.

5. **Implementation.** Implementation is often poorly resourced and poorly integrated.

6. **Evaluation.** The system militates against rigorous evaluations.

The following section explains this summary evaluation of processes in greater detail.

3. **Problem Analysis**

   **a. Assessment**

   1. **Assessments tend to be static, heavily qualified, tailored and restricted to senior leaders who are overburdened and not in a position to use them.**

   The current, formal national security assessment process is static instead of dynamic, focuses on bottom-line statements instead of context-rich analyses, and is targeted to a small, high-level group of strategy makers instead of a distributed network of strategic actors throughout the national security system. First, the nature of the current national security assessment process does not lend itself to narrative rationality (which includes time—hindsight, insight, foresight) or if-then scenarios (which allow for an exploration
of likely outcomes of various courses of action). Instead, the current formal assessment processes rely on argumentative rationality (which strips the analysis of time-based phenomena) and single-point prognostications (which strip the analysis of rich projections of future scenarios). National Intelligence Estimates are often answers to specific and static questions, such as “Does Iran intend to build nuclear weapons?”

Another feature of the assessment system is that it is designed to feed information directly to the president’s top national security team. If the primary sensing mechanism of the U.S. national security system is imagined to be the National Security Council staff, there is not enough bandwidth or “requisite variety” in the assessment system. The strategic apex of any organization is not qualified to be the primary sensing mechanism for that system. Yet the U.S. national security assessment system is designed to flood assessment products directly into the presidential national security team.

One indication that the assessment system leads to an overburdened presidential national security team is that the assessment system suffers from failures of imagination that make it a reactive system. The intelligence community defines its job as nonoperational as far as assessment is concerned. Yet research shows that organizations learn from the environments by interacting with them, stimulating them, or changing them. Intelligence officers are not often seen as “co-located” or “elbow-to-elbow” with other members of the national security system working in teams on complex problems. The cooperative relationship between CIA, CENTCOM officers, and Special Forces officers in Afghanistan demonstrates the high degree of informal learning that can take place between assessment specialists and implementation specialists. However, most of the intelligence community is not in interaction with implementation components of the national security system. Instead, they are often seen as isolated, whether at their headquarters in Langley, in their offices in embassies, or on large intelligence-collection campuses at Fort Meade, Maryland, or in Northern Virginia.

**Cause: Highly formalized process with premium on static, bottom-line assessments**

The assessment system relies heavily on formal processes because it is designed to serve the president, it relies primarily on written text as its output, and it is not linked to strategy implementation processes. A national security assessment system that defines one person, the president, as its primary customer is likely to construct a different organization than a national security assessment that defines itself as an organization that contributes to hundreds of national security decision-making teams spread around regions, throughout departments and agencies, and across multiple issues. Porter Goss reported that when he was director of the Central Intelligence Agency he spent over five hours a day preparing to brief the president. This task was passed to Ambassador John Negroponte as the first director of national intelligence (DNI), and then to Admiral McConnell as the second DNI.

The intelligence community is designed primarily around written documents, going back to its founding in 1947. There is a widespread belief that the President’s Daily Brief and other written documents produced by the intelligence community are not as timely, as visual, as compelling, or as public as CNN. One new direction that has generated
excitement within the intelligence community is the classified “Intellipedia,” in which distributed analysts and operators are able to rapidly collaborate in the creation of a new and perhaps more engaging intelligence product.

*Cause: Product driven by senior leader demand, which is issue-management-oriented and not focused on examining the whole environment*

The strategic apex of the U.S. national security system is often preoccupied with short-term issue/crisis management, not with long-term strategic system management. There are some standing processes specifically designed for crisis management. The National Response Framework is used in response to domestic emergencies. National Security Presidential Directive-44 articulates general roles and responsibilities for conducting stabilization and reconstruction operations overseas, vesting the State Department with coordinating U.S. government reconstruction activities with the Defense Department. Despite these two examples of anticipated crisis management structures, crisis management is usually handled through ad hoc processes. These arrangements are largely the result of presidential leadership style, the quality and character of relationships between senior administration officials, and relationships between Washington and the field, be that overseas or at home. The George W. Bush administration, like many of its predecessors, often elevates crisis management quickly outside of its formal NSPD-1 or HSPD-1 systems. The consequence of this crisis management mode at the top of the national security system is that assessment processes are targeted toward the successful resolution of short-term crises at the top of the organization, rather than to the identification of new and long-term threats.

*Cause: Current information systems limit information sharing*

There are significant information-sharing problems among the diverse departments and agencies that constitute the U.S. national security system. One indicator of these information-sharing problems is the lack of interoperable geographic divisions with the national security system. Each foreign policy-oriented government agency divides the world into different geographic arenas, which makes it difficult to transfer information across departmental and agency boundaries. In the cases of State and DoD, these particularized interests are diplomacy and defense, respectively.\(^{633}\) State Department has six Regional Bureaus: Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Eurasia, Near East, South and Central Asia, and Western Hemisphere. The Defense Department has six different regional combatant commands: U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Pacific Command. The six regions for State and Defense are not demarcated.

along the same lines. These differences complicate collaboration and information sharing between the two departments.

Geographic seams occur in some of the most strategically important areas for maintaining U.S. national security. For example, the State Department’s Bureau of South Asian Affairs coordinates with U.S. Pacific Command for India and other subcontinent countries, but with U.S. Central Command for actions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia. U.S. Central Command coordinates with State’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs for interagency activity from Iran to Egypt, and Near Eastern Affairs coordinates with the new U.S. Africa Command for the rest of North Africa.

The inconsistent geographic maps between State and DoD are further complicated by different demarcations for the intelligence community, the National Security Council staff, and other important components of the U.S. national security system. These geographic inconsistencies, gaps, seams, and overlaps create communication, information sharing, and strategy confusion for the national security system throughout the world.634

Cause: The nature of national security events is growing more complex

One explanation for ineffectiveness of assessment processes is the growing complexity of national security inputs or events. The national security inputs faced by the national security system are described by experts as “bewildering” because they require interagency cooperation:

We face bewildering challenges today—proliferation of nuclear technology, terrorism, energy dependencies, global poverty, failed or recovering states, ethnic and religious conflict, drug, human, and arms trafficking, infectious disease, and global warming. All of these challenges involve more than one agency’s programs, but our foreign policy and national security agencies still operate in their own stovepipes. And every time we encounter a major priority that more than one agency needs to handle (terrorism, proliferation, drug trafficking) we take up our ad hoc cudgel.635

During assessment processes, national security professionals must routinely fuse information from a wide variety of organizational sources: departmental capabilities (such as the Department of Energy’s 300-person intelligence team), agency capabilities (such as a hypothetical bioterrorism agency that combined resources from the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Health and Human Services),

634 The creation of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has served to resolve some uncoordinated delineations in its area of operations. Initially, State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs coordinated with U.S. Pacific Command for Madagascar, Comoros, and Mauritius; U.S. Central Command for Sudan, Kenya, and the Horn of Africa; and U.S. European Command for the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. Today, State’s Bureau of African Affairs needs to coordinate with only one Unified Combatant Command—AFRICOM.

and regional capabilities under the control of the federal government (such as the Africa Command).

b. Policy

2. Often strong departments and agencies thwart clear, well-coordinated policy.

There has always been some degree of conflict among the diverse organizational components of the U.S. national security system. As a noted authority explains with telling vignettes, the national security bureaucracy is apt to work at cross-purposes:

As Kissinger put it somewhat later, ‘The nightmare of the modern state is the hugeness of the bureaucracy, and the problem is how to get coherence and design in it.’ It is a bureaucracy which could neutralize an explicit order by President Kennedy that our obsolete and provocative Jupiter missiles be removed from Turkey, simply by not implementing the order. It is a bureaucracy which could at the same time pursue delicate negotiations with North Vietnam and unleash bombing attacks on Hanoi which destroyed any chance of the negotiations succeeding. It is a bureaucracy which could locate a blockade around Cuba in October 1962 not where the President wanted it in order to minimize the danger of a rash Soviet response, but where the Navy found it most consistent with standards blockade procedures and the military problems as the Navy saw them. It is a bureaucracy which can provide unbalanced or incomplete information, continue outmoded policies through its own inertial momentum, and treat the needs of particular offices and bureaus as if they were sacred national interests.636

It is important to clarify, however, that the problem is not the different viewpoints organizations bring to the decision-making table. Decision-making would suffer if the national security policy process did not bring together differing viewpoints. The problem is that strong departments and agencies are able to stymie interagency policy processes so that the end results are either watered down, abandoned as too difficult, or promulgated without sufficient coordination. Departmental and agency perspectives on the same policy problem can be substantially different due to each department’s and agency’s desire for greater autonomy, but those desires are often in turn based on the very important substantive differences in the agencies’ mandates, which are codified in law.

When policy debates among components of the national security system lead to stalemates, inertia, and inaction, it becomes more likely that a single department or agency will be tasked to “own” a specific national security issue, even though the national security issue requires expertise and capabilities that are not part of that designated lead agency. The policy of invading Iraq and managing its post-war administration is one of the most obvious examples of how stalemated debates can

produce lead agency approaches that undermine effective unity of effort. The Department of Defense was given the lead agency role, but it was not as concerned with post-conflict operations and objectives as other departments were.

*Cause: Senior leader attention is often unavailable*

The national security system is not led by a large corporate headquarters, but by a small, ephemeral group that advises the president. The president is too busy to manage the many issues that the national security establishment must tackle, and so too is the president’s security staff. The large size of the national security system and the complexity of the multiple national security events that it seeks to manage overwhelm the security staff:

> The most compelling challenge for the executive is to retain policy control. Since presidents don’t have the time and expertise to oversee policymaking in detail (though Jimmy Carter tried), they delegate responsibility.\(^{637}\)

Often presidents delegate responsibility to their national security advisors, but they too are too busy to manage an issue day to day. As the secretary of defense remarked when President Bush assigned a czar to run the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, “this is what Steve Hadley [the national security advisor] would do if Steve Hadley had the time, but he doesn’t have the time to do it full time.” In addition to being busy, the national security advisor’s authority is just that—merely advisory—so their ability to lead the process is limited. They must defer to powerful Cabinet secretaries who are themselves too busy to manage issues until they become crises. The consequence is that senior leader attention is not devoted, in a systematic way, to the monitoring of policy development processes throughout the national security system.

*Cause: Bureaucratic positions in interagency meetings lead to paralysis, diluted policy or policies that are insufficiently coordinated*

Many national security authorities note a link between interorganizational conflict and poor policy decision-making. The former senator and secretary of defense, William Cohen, while noting that “the State Department and Defense Department have always engaged in territorial chest-beating,” argued that the interagency policymaking process “has become dysfunctional—way too much ego and turf protection.”\(^{638}\) Inter-organizational conflict inhibits effective decision-making in several ways. When powerful organizations refuse to compromise on firmly held positions, the policymaking process comes to a halt. Alternatively, policy positions can be watered down through constraints, provisos, and ambiguity, producing a lowest-common-denominator decision that is not directive or produced in a timely manner.


In the months leading up to the war, there had been a vigorous debate between the Pentagon and the State Department over the scope of de-Baathification. State advocated a policy of “de-Saddamification,” which entailed purging two classes of Baathists: those who had committed crimes and those at the very top of the command structure. Defense had a more expansive view…. The CIA agreed with State, while the Vice President’s office weighed in with the Pentagon. The dispute made its way to the White House, where the National Security Council tried to strike a compromise…. The decision lacked specificity.\textsuperscript{639}

Such policy ambiguity, and poor policy making in general, is rooted in fundamental organizational behavior:

Senior decision makers expect lower-level actors to protect their respective agency’s bureaucratic equities throughout the interagency policymaking process. When lower-level actors feel limited in their ability to protect institutional equities, they push the issue up to the next level for decision.\textsuperscript{640}

As this excerpt suggests, some believe the problem is worse at lower levels of the decision-making process:

A higher level of interagency conflict exists at the IWG-level when compared with the deputies and principals levels… One principal affirmed this finding, saying, ‘First, it is designed that way for [a] useful purpose: Each agency is assigned certain responsibilities and authorities – the process is designed to look after those.’\textsuperscript{641}

Yet innumerable examples indicate the similar decision-making problems arise at higher levels of the interagency committee system as well:

Decisions go unmade at the deadlocked “deputies” meetings or get kicked back or ignored by the president’s “principals,” his top advisers. The principals themselves tend to revisit unresolved issues or reopen decisions already made by the president, forcing him to decide all over again.\textsuperscript{642}

Finally, if the interagency decision-making process defaults to a lead agency or lead department, the resultant decision-making process is likely to circumvent other department and agency perspectives.

\textit{Cause: Insufficient attention to the full range of relevant organizations}


\textsuperscript{640} Vicki J. Rast, “Interagency Fratricide: Policy Failure in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia.” \textit{Air University Press} (Maxwell AFB, AL) June 2004. (pp. 249-50).

\textsuperscript{641} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{642} Thomas, Evan. “The Real Condi Rice.” \textit{Newsweek}. December 16, 2002. (p. 28)
An effective policy decision-making system begins with an inclusion of all organizations that can contribute knowledge to the issue under investigation. Within the executive branch, the current NSPD-1 process does not appropriately reflect the necessity of broader solutions across traditional and nontraditional departments, agencies, and organizations required to address the proliferation of transnational threats in a globalized world. For instance, threats of bioterrorism require the participation of the Department of Health and Human Services; aviation security issues demand the commitment of the Department of Transportation. Such inclusions are typically handled on an as-needed basis. The result is that many domestic civilian departments and agencies do not receive adequate support and resources to facilitate their involvement. In addition, some departments, such as Commerce and Agriculture, are involved only in national security decisions pertaining to discrete areas of focus, and thus fail to build a larger appreciation for the full range of security issues that they might be able to help resolve.

c. Strategy

3. Real “course of action” strategy is infrequent and limited to the informal deliberations of senior officials.

Absent explicit controlling strategic direction, agencies and departments pursue their own strategies, some but not all of which link resources and activities to goals. The most convincing evidence that the U.S. national security system is unable to support strategy formation and strategy implementation is the widely acknowledged disconnect between the espoused National Security Strategy document and the actual U.S. national security strategy. Since the enactment of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, the president has been required to produce and annually submit to Congress a National Security Strategy document that includes the following elements:

- U.S. goals, objectives, and interests relating to national security
- Foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and defense capabilities needed to deter aggression and implement the strategy
- The uses of political, economic, military, and other elements of national power to protect or promote U.S. interests
- An account of the adequacy of U.S. capabilities to meet these goals, including the needed balance among elements of national power

The manner in which this law has been implemented provides an excellent window into the current national security strategy process. First, although the enacting legislation specifies both classified and unclassified versions of the National Security Strategy, the executive branch has produced it only in unclassified form. In practice, the NSS is a

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public relations document, setting forth broad U.S. foreign and national security policy objectives without providing detailed information on the means required to achieve them.

Second, the NSS is typically released far less frequently than the Goldwater-Nichols legislation envisioned when it required the NSS to be published annually. The last National Security Strategy was issued in 2006. Third, each president and his National Security Council staff set a different process for developing the National Security Strategy. In the last ten years, the National Security Council staff has typically produced the NSS in-house, although the State Department (particularly the Policy Planning Office) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense have, at times, played significant roles. In recent years, interagency coordination of the NSS prior to publication has varied widely, with formal vetting occurring through twenty-plus agencies and departments in the mid-1990s and “eyes-only” coordination at the Cabinet level in 2006. Fourth, although departments and agencies at times reference the NSS as a capstone document on which their own internal planning rests, there are no formal mechanisms for ensuring consistency.645

For these reasons, the current National Security Strategy is seen by most observers to be a document that is disconnected from the actual national security strategy of the United States. Supporting this supposition is the lack of actionable detail in national security strategy documents. The inability to trace the connection between the activities and budgets of national security actors and many presidential objectives is a significant symptom of strategy that is not directive in any practical sense. Further, the nation’s strategy documents do not drive strong unity of purpose and action among departments and agencies. Departments conduct strategy development to varying degrees, but even where strategy development processes are well-honed, there is little significant coordination with outside stakeholders.646 There is confusion among agency and department actors as to how the increasing number of published strategies and directives relate to one another. Most fundamental is the failure to create a strategic management framework to drive clear outcomes through a rigorous linkage of ends to ways and means.647

Occasionally a meaningful long-range planning effort that truly integrates the perspectives of different departments and agencies takes place. A recent example is Project Horizon, created by the Department of State’s Office of Strategic and Performance Planning in 2005, in coordination with the Department of Homeland

644 “Eyes-only” means to be seen only by the select person to whom the material is presented.
Security, the Department of Defense, and other interagency organizations. The purpose of the ongoing project is to develop options for investing in strategic interagency capabilities, a scenario-planning toolset that can be used to support planning and to pioneer an institutionalized interagency planning process. Limited action has been taken on the project’s recommendations to date, but the effort stands out both for its demonstrated potential and for its rarity.

_Cause:_ An excessive focus on near-term issues precludes mid- and long-term strategy

One cause of impaired strategy process is the tendency for all presidential national security teams to become engulfed with short-term issue management. The first factor contributing to the short-term focus is the accurate, but always-controversial, observation that any president of the United States can be only a part-time national security professional. A president is a commander-in-chief, and all presidents since 1947 have affirmed that this is their highest priority, but they are also professional politicians. All presidents spend at least some of their time working on party politics and other activities unrelated to national security projects. The president is the nation’s premier national security strategist, but not a full-time one.

Even the president’s advisors are driven toward short-term issue resolution. Since 1953, the president has been able to designate a trusted advisor to serve as the assistant to the president for national security affairs, and that person can serve as a nearly full-time national security professional. Yet even the president’s national security advisor is likely to be pulled off task in support of the president’s other agenda items. For example, Condoleezza Rice attended Karl Rove’s political strategy meetings, and more recently Stephen Hadley was pressed into service to help the White House lobby members of Congress to pass the Central America Free Trade Agreement. The national security advisor’s own personal agenda can have similar effects on short-term issue resolution, as well:

Further, as Kissinger’s dominance increased, and his preoccupation with the president’s immediate foreign policy agenda became almost total, the NSC system itself received less attention. There were less frequent formal meetings of the Council; the NSC committees chaired by Kissinger, with few exceptions, became moribund; and those issues not on Nixon’s policy...
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front-burner, like international economic concerns, were given scant attention.\textsuperscript{652}

Multiple behind-the-scenes factors can increase greatly or decrease slightly the pace at which short-term events overtake a new presidential administration.

In general, the constant press of media, public, and congressional attention creates strong incentives for presidential national security teams to focus on the issues and crises of the moment. Long-range national security thinking and planning is almost always driven off the stage under the press of current events:

Experts constantly point out that America’s adversaries operate on a strategic timeline of years, if not decades, while senior U.S. officials find it almost impossible to break the tyranny of the inbox and find time for strategic planning. Because the budget process remains largely focused at the Cabinet agency level, even policies that do result from strategic planning in one agency can founder because their objectives may not be reflected in critical resource decisions in another.\textsuperscript{653}

\textit{Cause: The need to reconcile different department and agency objectives militates against strategy formulation and in favor of lists of objectives}

As noted in Part III of this report,\textsuperscript{654} national security advisors rely on departments and agencies for policy implementation. They must be perceived as honest brokers of the interagency process, fairly representing each major department’s position on an issue. Therefore, high-level interagency committees have department and agency positions on their agendas, not integrated strategy choices, that is, alternative integrated courses of action to make progress against a policy objective. When national security advisors go beyond mere coordination of different agency positions, they are resisted by powerful Cabinet officials. Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright recalls the tension between her position and that of the national security advisor:

\begin{quote}
I fully agreed and found Sandy [national security advisor Sandy Berger] to be very fair, but during my own four years, I sometimes became irritated by what I saw as the NSC’s attempt to micromanage. At first I blamed myself, because my default drive is always to cooperate. Then I blamed the male dominance of the system. The truth is that problems arose when Sandy and I tried to occupy each other’s space. Although the NSC’s job was supposed to be limited to coordinating the actions and policies of the departments, proximity to the President sometimes tempted Sandy and his staff to assume an operational role. My objections were undercut by my association with the very operational Brzezinski. During the Carter years,
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}


\textsuperscript{654}See p. 147-149.
\end{flushright}
Zbig’s NSC had driven the State Department crazy. So when I complained, Sandy – who had been in the State Department at that time – said he was only doing what Brzezinski had done.\textsuperscript{655}

National security advisors are criticized for abandoning the “honest broker” role\textsuperscript{656} and for also not doing so.\textsuperscript{657} The real point is that they are walking a tightrope and are conflicted. If they abandoned the honest broker role for more aggressive policy development, the powerful Cabinet officials and departments will resist them on implementation. If they do not abandon the honest broker role, they can only organize and clarify department positions for the president.

\textit{Cause: “Leak Culture” militates against “real strategy” being recorded and distributed}

Fears of leaked information inhibit transparency across agencies, up and down the chain of command, and with Congress.

The fact is, leaks of sensitive information to the press, even by the President’s highest and most trusted advisers (for example, verbatim notes from a meeting of the National Security Planning Group, whose members are the President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the National Security Adviser), had achieved such epidemic proportions that the inner circle was afraid to take notes lest they read them next day in the newspapers or hear them broadcast over the networks.\textsuperscript{658}

One result of the ease with which leak warfare can be used is that strategy formation discussions must be very tightly held.

Advance planning on sensitive and controversial policy issues is especially vulnerable to leaks. When the U.S. is surprised by a foreign development, the demand arises for better contingency planning. Yet

\textsuperscript{655} Madeleine Albright, \textit{Madam Secretary} (New York: Miramax Books, 2003) 348.


officials shy away from such planning, in large measure for fear of disclosures that would create problems with both domestic constituencies and foreign governments. The fear of leaks has also led to the making of policy in smaller and smaller circles. When any sensitive issue is to be discussed, the president and the secretary make certain that the smallest number of people possible is involved.\textsuperscript{659}

Restricting access to the real decision-making process is sometimes necessary, but has deleterious consequences. Most notably, it excludes insights and information that might be critical for making the best-informed decision. Second, without records of the decisions, it is difficult to communicate the real strategy to the organizations that must implement it. Finally, “leak warfare” can lead to the abdication of strategy-making responsibility altogether. Meetings take place, but decisions are not made and instead are left to be worked out informally when circumstances force the matter to the point of urgency. Then it is handled ad hoc rather than as a matter of deliberate strategy.

\textbf{d. Planning}

\textit{4. Interagency planning is irregular, resisted by individual agencies, and too slow and laborious to keep pace with the environment.}

To the extent strategy is made, its implementation can be improved with good planning. As noted above, most “strategy” produced by the national security system is not actually strategy. When real strategy is produced, it is captured in the minds of senior leaders rather than formally documented in ways that would support planning. Nevertheless, the senior leaders working policy and strategy implementation can oversee the planning process in order to investigate the advantages and disadvantages of alternative implementation options. Assuming they understand the actual strategy choices and the preferred course of action, their close involvement in the planning process will increase the value of the planning. Yet even with senior leader attention, it still proves difficult to conduct interagency planning, as former Combatant Commander Anthony Zinni recalls:

\begin{quote}
Our day-to-day strategy – what we then called the Theater Engagement Plan – was supposed to be a theater approach to implementing the Clinton national security strategy. As out staff went through the process of developing our plan, it seemed wise indeed to integrate our efforts with the State Department and other government departments and agencies to bring to bear all the capabilities of the United States in a focused way to achieve the administration’s goals. Integration never truly happened. I never found a way to join forces effectively with the State Department and link their plans with mine. I had no way to get answers to questions like,
\end{quote}

What’s the diplomatic component of our strategy? What’s the economic component? How is aid going to be distributed? And yet we tried!\textsuperscript{660}

In recent years, however, the national security system has redoubled its efforts to improve stand-alone planning. In fact, over the past several years, the federal government has seen an explosion in national security planning efforts. The U.S. military has a long-standing culture of planning that encompasses two basic types of activity:

1. Strategic planning that links overarching long-term objectives to plans, activities, capabilities, and resources

2. Operational planning that links the objectives in a specific operation to capabilities and forces needed to execute that operation\textsuperscript{661}

National security events since 9/11 and innovations in the broader organizational and business communities have convinced federal stakeholders, including government departments, agencies, and the U.S. Congress, of the need to increase emphasis on operational planning. Since many of these efforts are nascent, describing them as fixed processes is misleading. Nevertheless, understanding the current array of national security planning activities is critical to identifying fundamental planning deficiencies in this field. These include:

- Adaptive planning system (Defense)
- Integrated planning system (Homeland Security)
- Interagency management system (State/Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction)
- Mission strategic planning (State)
- Strategic operational planning (National Counterterrorism Center)

The burgeoning array of planning efforts tends to be divorced from senior leader participation and direction. Instead, the planning is typically driven by subordinate organizations and not conducted on an interagency basis. The intervention in Haiti, for example, demonstrated that good interagency strategy could not be translated into operational planning and implementation:

Interagency dialogue was adequate at the strategic planning level, particularly once all relevant players were in attendance, but interagency


\textsuperscript{661} Operational planning conducted well in advance of an actual event is known as “deliberate planning.” When undertaken immediately before an event or in response to it, such planning is called “crisis action planning” and may entail modifications to deliberate plans. Both are components of the “adaptive planning” process described in this section.
discussions were not carried through to the operational level and linkages between the strategic and operational levels were deficient.  

Some departments and agencies undertake internal planning for missions they are assigned, and some attempt to involve other stakeholders in their efforts. By and large, though, planning processes and capabilities are neither interoperable nor transferable between agencies. Existing planning cells serve as “islands” in a sea of planning inactivity. Divergent departmental views and approaches are later revealed during operations. Lacking a common vocabulary to describe how national security strategy should be translated into operations, different components of the national security system find themselves disagreeing over the correct course of action or the right procedures for subsequent rounds of planning.

Thus, national security planning is not driven by a consistent planning methodology from the top. Instead, departments and agencies develop a diverse set of bottom-up processes. On the positive side, this has created a vibrant and rich discussion of effective departmental planning procedures. This potential advantage is outweighed, however, by the significant incoherence a bottom-up-only approach has produced across the diverse planning efforts, including the failure to identify gaps between them and overlaps among them.

Cause: When policy/strategy are not clear, there is little basis for unified planning

The relationship between strategy and planning requires clarity. If strategy is not clearly articulated and communicated to planners, the utility of planning plummets. To the extent that addressing the national security contingency requires interagency collaboration, the current system is unable to conduct interagency planning in part because it cannot produce interagency strategy. This is a long-standing problem. A PNSR study of President Woodrow Wilson’s administration’s response to the 1918 pandemic influenza notes that “agencies often found themselves working at cross purposes, or worse striving for a common goal (i.e., winning World War I) but ignoring one of the greatest threats to achieving the objective, a debilitating illness that sapped more manpower than the enemies’ bombs and bullets.” The shift in the world order that has followed the collapse of the Soviet Union poses a similar dilemma for the relationship between interagency strategy and planning:

Fifteen years after the Cold War, the United States still lacks a comprehensive interagency process that takes into account both the character of the international security environment and its own ability to deal with future challenges and opportunities. Today, the United States is

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engaged in conflicts that will, whether by success or failure, completely transform both the broader Middle East and the U.S. role in the world; yet there is no integrated planning process from which to derive the strategic guidance necessary to protect national interests and achieve U.S. objectives. 664

Clearly, planning, no matter how technically proficient, cannot compensate for the lack of clear strategy that properly encompasses the full range of relevant variables.

*Cause: Strategy, to the extent it exists, is poorly communicated to planners*

The current explicit national security strategy document explicitly defines the United States’ national security ambitions, but only vaguely explains the methods of achieving these goals. Sometimes specific goals within the national security strategy are translated into planning processes. For example, the Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 21, on biodefense, provides requirements for many departments and agencies, particularly for the Department of Health and Human Services and its subordinate agency, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, including clear timelines. 665 Nevertheless, the guidance makes no reference to resource allocation. Thus the directive, as written, does not align policy, actions, and resources (i.e., ends, ways, and means).

In general, the national security system is not able to link broad objectives to ways and means in sufficient detail to permit useful planning. In this regard, most administrations focus more on strategy formation than strategy implementation processes. This is true at the grand strategic level as well as at the level of specific activities and operations. There are exceptions. President Eisenhower’s “policy hill” concept did attempt such a systematic linkage. However, subsequent administrations have tended to focus more high-level attention on articulating national security policies than on detailing how they can best be achieved.

*Cause: Departmental cultures complicate cooperation on planning*

Planning is most valuable for what is learned through the process, not for the plans themselves which must change when applied to an actual situation. Surfacing otherwise hidden issues and developing trust networks among involved stakeholders is the most important output from planning. Today, many agencies have a limited understanding of operational planning and existing planning lexicon. There is no common interagency answer to the question “What is in a plan?” For example, if DHS were the lead for a response and asked for planning support from several interagency partners, would all understand the so-called “ICS/NIMS construct” and their role in the process? Likewise, if DoD led an effort, would all supporting agencies understand the elements of an “OPLAN” or the department’s contingency planning system more generally? Without


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ready and common understanding of planning terms and approaches, meanings and context are lost and integrated approaches suffer.

Absent agreed-upon processes for interagency planning, the strong tendency of departments and agencies is to go their own way on planning:

Successful innovation and favorable circumstances on the ground made the war in Afghanistan easier than the one in Iraq, but the planning problems in both cases have had much in common with other complex contingencies, such as Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. All of these cases have demonstrated the limitations of stove-piped, single-agency planning systems. 666

As was noted in Part III of this report, 667 and discussed at greater length below in the section on Human Capital, 668 departments and agencies have strong cultures that influence their understanding of the value of planning and how it can be best conducted. DoD has a long-standing and proven planning process; however, it may not be readily adaptable to all cross-agency national security needs. Many civilian agencies, such as the State Department and the Department of Treasury, do not have a strong history of operational planning and are not geared to the conduct of operational programs. The National Security and Homeland Security Councils’ staffs have no clear system of planning either. USAID, which coordinates development projects abroad, is perhaps the only civilian agency to have a long-standing planning culture.

This dominance of individual departments and agency cultures over planning approaches is beginning to change. Several new institutions, such as the Department of Homeland Security, the State Department’s Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction, and the National Counterterrorism Center, are attempting to build an interdepartmental and interagency planning culture where none has existed before. All three have been given the mandate to conduct interagency planning and are beginning to develop planning units, cultures, and processes. Absent greater empowerment, capabilities, and resources, however, their ability to succeed in unifying operational planning even within their discrete mission areas is questionable. Their planning efforts have been stifled on occasion by their parent organizations’ cultures and priorities. 669

The planning process overseen by the National Counterterrorism Center is emblematic of this dilemma. The National Counterterrorism Center is tasked with overseeing the


667 See p. 178.

668 See p. 314.

669 For more information on the building of interagency planning culture, particularly within DHS, see Christine E. Wormuth and Anne Witkowsky, “Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe: Ready (or Not)” (Washington: CSIS). For more on S/CRS processes, see United States, Stabilization and Reconstruction Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps: Report to Congressional Requesters (Washington:U.S. Government Accountability Office) 2007, 30 Sept 2008 <http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS90207>.
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strategic operational planning process for counterterrorism across the interagency community. Nevertheless, it has no directive authority to alter the implementation plans of Cabinet agencies or to adjust resources as necessary for best integrated effect. In addition, the center’s enacting legislation prohibits the Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning from directing operations. Prohibiting an end-to-end process approach to mission management renders the planning exercise artificial and diminishes the value attached to it by departments and agencies.

In sum, the long-standing presence of multiple, distinct, and strong departmental cultures still inhibits collaborative planning processes, as does the lack of a common approach to planning, from an appreciation of its role to agreement on its basic methods. Thus, despite the wide range of planning efforts now underway, supporting processes vary greatly in form and substance. Without a common planning vocabulary, it is proving difficult for divergent departments to coordinate and create effective interagency plans, which is restricting the ability of the national security system to implement those plans. On balance, strong department and weak interagency planning processes still impede interagency planning and its value to participants.

**Cause: Departments and agencies do not sufficiently value training and exercising plans**

Exercising plans allows planners to test assumptions, determine whether the full range of likely possibilities have been considered, and improves the ability of departments and agencies to interoperate in a seamless manner. Two examples of where exercising of plans has been successful are prior to operations in Haiti and more recently in DHS-sponsored exercises for senior officials. Prior to 1995’s Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, for example, interagency deputies met in secret to review their planning for a coordinated operation. Major shortfalls were identified that were able to be corrected prior to the actual operation several weeks later. More recently, the Department of Homeland Security has sponsored exercises such as Top Officials (TOPOFF) to determine the nation’s ability to respond to a catastrophic domestic incident. The exercises require federal, state, and local authorities to collaborate under the rubric of the National Response Framework. They have resulted in important modifications to existing plans and enhanced understanding between federal departments and agencies as well as between federal and nonfederal stakeholders. The U.S. Joint Forces Command has likewise sponsored interagency exercises through its Unified Action series. These exercises have resulted in improved coordination and understanding across the nation.

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671 Section 143 (h)(4), A Bill to Reform the Intelligence Community and the Intelligence and Intelligence-Related Activities of the United States Government and for Other Purposes, P.L. 108–458, 17 Dec 2004.
Although progress has been made in training and exercises, many departments and agencies lack the processes or means to participate meaningfully. Many agencies still undervalue, or do not understand, the contribution of training and exercising to their preparedness and response capabilities. Additionally, conducting these sorts of activities require appropriate resources with each of the organizations in terms of people, time, and dollars that are currently not always available across national security departments, agencies, and organizations (to include nongovernmental or public institutions).

**e. Implementation**

5. **Implementation is poorly integrated and resourced.**

Part of the dilemma behind the ineffective implementation of policy decisions has been that they were taken without sufficient attention either to their budgetary or their implementation requirements.\(^{673}\)

The implementation of policy, strategy, and plans is overseen at the department or agency level because authorities and appropriations flow through those organizations. Integrated interagency implementation is rare because such organizations do not exist for the most part. The longest standing mechanism for interagency implementation is the country team. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy clearly designated the ambassador as the chief of mission, with responsibility and authority over all nonoperational U.S. government personnel in a given country. However, as noted in the structure section of this part of the report, the chief of mission does not have de facto ability to integrate policy implementation.

When policy implementation is well integrated, it is not because structures and processes facilitate the integration, but because extraordinary individuals compensate for the lack of effective integration structures and processes. In Iraq, recent efforts by Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus have significantly improved the integration of national efforts over that demonstrated in the early years of U.S. occupation. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Lieutenant General David Barno had previously demonstrated the value of such integration in Afghanistan. These efforts have required heroic effort from the individuals involved, and are atypical in a national security system that defaults to functional agencies as policy implementers.

Today, as in the past, no arm of the U.S. government is formally in charge of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction overseas. Policy and implementation are divided among several agencies, with poor interagency coordination, misalignment of resources and authorities, and inadequate accountability and duplicative efforts.\(^{674}\)

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When coordinating structures and processes are established, their operators must compete with vertical stovepipes for control on the ground. Departmental incentives to control resources and personnel further complicate the unified implementation of national security policy. Thus, while unified implementation occurs in some cases, best practices are not rigorously applied to other interagency efforts.

Implementation also is impaired or fails for lack of resources. Those responsible for implementation have little control over resources. For the most part, they must encourage departments and agencies to contribute the resources necessary to accomplish interagency missions. Reflecting the absence of a strategic budgeting process for national security, resources are often mismatched with goals. Civilian agencies in particular are underfunded for the national security mission set and lack necessary authorities to respond in an agile manner to the environment. This becomes a major problem in successful policy implementation, as recent experience in Iraq attests:

An article in the Foreign Service Journal…notes that, ‘establishing the teams in Iraq has been challenging, in part because of high-level wrangling between State and the Defense Department over who would provide security, support, and funding. No memorandum of understanding was in place to delineate each agency’s responsibilities.’

The lack of funds and authorities for using them exacerbate interagency friction. The net result of such limitations is that all too often the national security system is unable to apply all of the elements of national power in a coordinated implementation effort.

Cause: Lead agencies and individuals cannot secure integrated effort

The national security system appoints lead agencies to direct the process for managing a particular issue because they have authority and resources. The lead agency approach can sometimes prove an acceptable process choice in a narrow and well-defined operation, as with the Department of State’s coordination of recovery and response efforts from the bombing of two U.S. African embassies. For broad and complex operations, the “lead agency” model is not an effective method for integrated implementation. The State Department Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction


has the lead for complex contingencies overseas and the Department of Health and Human Services for pandemic influenza. However, many other departments and agencies would have to provide support for these two missions to be a success. These lead departments cannot compel cooperation from other agencies (or sometimes even participation), nor can they compel them to make significant resource allocations. Lead departments have to rely primarily on the resources they control.

Securing sufficient integration and resources sometimes leads to the appointment of a lead individual instead of a lead agency. Such a lead individual tends to ignore the NSPD-1 and HSPD-1 coordination and decision-making processes, or has been directed to work outside of them, provoking resentment from the various departments and agencies involved in policy, strategy, planning, and implementation and assessment processes. The “drug czar” and “war czar” model are examples of this phenomenon. The director of national drug control policy has the best codified czar mandate and authorities, including the creation of a unified drug control budget, and thus the best performance record to date. Nevertheless, like NSC staff and other czars, the director relies on the president’s support. This authority is frequently tested by departments and agencies that have the mandates and resources for constituent mission elements. Processes established by czars to coordinate national security missions and/or functions thus wax and wane in their effectiveness depending on the support from the president and Congress.

Czar-led processes can improve integration for a time, but as noted in the chapter on structure, have not proven a reliable means for integrated and well resourced implementation. The continued reliance on ineffective implementation processes—whether headed up by lead agency or lead individuals—can only be explained by the lack of viable alternatives. Like the person searching for lost keys near a lamppost because the light is better there, implementation processes rely on lead agencies and individuals because they control resources or have more authority, not because they can produce integrated and well-resourced implementation efforts.

_Cause: Resources are not linked to national security goals across department and agency lines_

Ineffective implementation is also caused by a balkanized resource allocation process. Today, national security policy, strategy, and planning processes, to the extent they exist, are not tied to a holistic resourcing approach. Thus resources do not migrate to where they are needed to include having the people and leaders capable of executing national security missions, the processes and tools in place for timely decision-making, the capabilities to execute missions or request capabilities in the event that the situation

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requires additional resources, and the fiscal authorities to execute the missions that have been assigned. Moreover, in the current national security system, most civilian organizations are not resourced in a way that can support national security implementation processes. There is little cross-agency evaluation by the Office of Management and Budget on programs that are shared between agencies. Although the National Security Council and OMB do cooperate, this cooperation has historically not been institutionalized across administrations or consistently across policy issues to ensure the president’s priority missions are well resourced.

Cause: The Executive Office of the President has insufficient means to provide oversight

There are very few established interagency processes for follow-up or monitoring the collective progress of actions directed to the interagency. Monitoring national security programs and operations is labor intensive for the president’s national security advisor, and can be mounted only for the most important priorities. The White House has only one Situation Room. It is a key capability for monitoring implementation, but falls short of serving as an operational center as would be found at the Department of State or Department of Defense. The differences can best be described by comparing a single organization situational monitoring facility with a command operations center with capabilities for developing a common picture of ongoing situations, decision support processes and tools, and the ability to direct actions and assess outcomes.

The lack of such NSC oversight capabilities has doomed the implementation of policies that require close interagency coordination:

The CIA proposed an extensive set of covert actions in Central America designed to counter Cuban subversion and meet the challenges of local conflicts. These proposals were subject to interagency review, prior to presidential approval. The embassy was not consulted about, nor privy to, these proposals or deliberations, although the Station may have been. State Department Counselor Bud McFarlane…sent a memo to Secretary Haig regarding this initiative, emphasizing that ‘the key point to be made now is that while we must move promptly, we must assure that our political, economic, diplomatic, propaganda, military and covert actions are well coordinated.’ That was excellent advice although, in light of McFarlane’s later performance at the NSC, rather ironic. Such coordination proved largely unattainable. The pursuit of separate agendas, primacy of ideological considerations, lack of interagency and interpersonal trust and the absence of effective oversight and coordination mechanisms sowed the seeds that later grew into the Iran-Contra scandal.682

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Moreover, since the Iran-Contra affair, there has been an increased reluctance to involve the National Security Council in monitoring interagency implementation because it suggests the possibility of interference or “conducting operations” that the NSC staff should leave to others. The subsequent Tower Commission Report included an emphatic and influential refutation of the concept of a directly operational NSC staff, and many subsequent reports reinforce this conclusion.

At the interagency planning level, monitoring mechanisms tend to be reinvented for every new operation, often with little regard for lessons learned or best practices from previous experiences. While some of this is understandable given the range of forms an intervention may take, more should be done to identify what has and has not worked in past operations and to strengthen implementation monitoring mechanisms for interagency in the future. The Government Performance and Results Act and other efforts to improve monitoring and performance accountability, though far from perfect, have helped create internal departmental mechanisms for tracking implementation of agency goals. Nevertheless, none of these tools looks across agencies to determine how the president’s priorities are being met by the national security enterprise. Without such feedback mechanisms, priorities fall through the cracks, departments and agencies can “slow roll” undesirable guidance, and task assignees do not have a routine means to request and receive support from other agencies.

There are some nascent attempts to monitor implementation processes. Two examples of processes aimed at improving integrated implementation include programs used to develop and track implementation of the national implementation plans for counterterrorism and pandemic influenza. Another example is OMB reviews of cross-agency missions like homeland defense. Early evidence, however, suggests that these experiments do not yet effectively coordinate implementation activities.

Cause: Departments and agencies interpret policy, strategy, and plans through their organizational perspectives when conducting implementation

For many national security missions, implementation takes place in separate departmental stovepipes with little coordination. For example, the Foreign Assistance Process within the State Department attempts to guide, measure, and oversee coordinated implementation of foreign assistance across the globe, regionally, and at the country team level, but its reach has yet to extend beyond the Department of State and USAID.

However, as more national security missions emerge that stretch or cross traditional agency boundaries, the likelihood that little, poor, or inefficient implementation will take place greatly increases. Examples of this phenomenon are apparent in recent complex operations, such as reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq. Ambassador Paul Bremer’s departmentally, locally, and chronologically bounded decision to stand down the Iraqi military and outlaw the Ba’ath party is a widely cited indicator of the need for more effective interagency coordination before, during, and after implementation processes.683

“Bremer didn’t ask State what it thought, or the CIA and he didn’t consult with Rice or Hadley at the NSC. Most CPA staffers were in the dark too.”

Similar indicators emerge in a wide variety of ongoing implementation processes, such as pandemic influenza preparations and preventing terrorist use of nuclear weapons against the United States population. There is a strong tendency for national security plans to unravel as they encounter the fragmented cultures, priorities, and structures of diverse national security subunits.

At times, presidential intervention and strong subordinate leadership have successfully integrated the implementation processes of the various departments and agencies. In 1964, after a massive earthquake hit Alaska, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration created the Federal Reconstruction and Development Planning Commission for Alaska, which encouraged the nonhierarchical participation of most federal agencies and quickly alleviated conditions for many Alaskans affected by the earthquake. During the Vietnam War, President Johnson intervened directly in the effort to eliminate the Viet Cong counterinsurgency threat from South Vietnam. Under the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Support (CORDS) Program, the Johnson administration oversaw the efforts of the various agencies in CORDS, including CIA, Department of State, Department of Agriculture, and the U.S. Information Service. The close integration of civilian and military personnel under a single manager was an important factor in the program’s success.

Nevertheless, these examples tend to be exceptions, not the rule, and were driven by the exercise of strong presidential prerogatives.

**Cause: Insufficiently broad range of required capabilities**

Implementation also suffers from an insufficiently broad range of required capabilities. One constraint on developing capabilities is the lack of a statutory mandate for new national security roles. Some domestic agencies with control over a repertoire of expertise that could be required by complex national security missions currently lack the mandate for national security preparedness and response capabilities. Absent the statutory mandate to participate in national security missions, many Cabinet departments will not invest resources for national security missions or plans for hypothetical contingencies that are tangential to their primary responsibilities.

For example, a Department of Commerce official recently acknowledged her agency’s difficulty in providing qualified representatives to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq because the department was not designed to do so despite the undeniable need for such expertise. Not having prepared for such missions, many civilian agencies

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684 Chandrasekaran, 75–76.
discover they are constrained from allocating personnel to such activities by technical issues like appropriate insurance, travel, medical benefits, and career paths. Lieutenant General Karl Ikenberry has routinely complained about the lack of U.S. Department of Agriculture representatives in Afghanistan. In 2007, there were only two Department of Agriculture representatives in Afghanistan. In 2008, that number had tripled to six, still far too few to execute a reconstruction program in the largely agricultural country.\textsuperscript{688} The Defense Department’s human capital systems are designed to cover concepts such as combat pay, career advancement, and medical programs related to risks such as landmines and hostile fire; the Agriculture Department’s human capital systems are not.

\textbf{f. Evaluation}

\textit{6. The system militates against rigorous evaluations.}

The national security process currently includes only a weak capacity for self-reflection, self-renewal, or self-reform. New administrations do not typically begin with the thought that they have a lot of learning to do. After all, they have just won the popular mandate and are ready to sweep out the old and bring in the new. Even basic ideas about how to improve performance, commonplace from an organizational perspective won through bitter experience and at some cost to the nation, typically do not survive from one administration to another. One example widely lamented by many career national security professionals, is the fate of Presidential Decision Directive 56, an effort to improve interagency planning. Clinton administration staff members who learned the value of such planning after a series of failures pleaded with the incoming Bush administration members not to discard the process, but incoming officials reasoned that they would not make such obvious errors of judgment and did not need a formalized process for interagency planning. After the failure of post-war planning in Iraq, the Bush administration adopted a new interagency planning system. If history is any guide, it is unlikely to survive the arrival of the next administration.

A unit within the Executive Office of the President that might be expected to perform the self-questioning function is the Office of Management and Budget. OMB, together with individual federal departments and agencies, is responsible for conducting resource performance assessment in the executive branch. The processes by which OMB oversees performance assessment have evolved over time. In 1993, Congress passed the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA)\textsuperscript{689}, which requires each agency to submit a strategic plan and to prepare related annual performance plans and reports. The intelligence community is excluded from the GPRA requirements.\textsuperscript{690} The Government Performance and Results Act approach has met with criticism for its failure to markedly improve the efficiency and effectiveness of federal programs.

In 2004, OMB itself called attention to these inadequacies:

\textsuperscript{688} Marina Kielpinski, Personal interview, 29 Apr 2008.  
\textsuperscript{690} Others excluded are the General Accountability Office, the Panama Canal Commission, the United States Postal Service, and the Postal Rate Commission.
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Unfortunately, the implementation of this law has fallen far short of its authors’ hopes. Agency plans are plagued by performance measures that are meaningless, vague, too numerous, and often compiled by people who have no direct connection with budget decisions. Today, agencies produce over 13,000 pages of performance plans every year that are largely ignored in the budget process. 691

OMB is not a component of the national security system, but a component of the Executive Office of the President, and to the extent that it provides a rigorous self-questioning role, it does so at the level of the entire federal bureaucracy, not at the level of the national security system. Although perhaps as many as fifty members of OMB are seen as competent analysts of national security organizations, this does not seem to directly translate into an OMB capability to perform a self-questioning role for the national security system as a whole. The OMB national security experts are under the supervision of the director of OMB, not under the direction of the assistant to the president for national security affairs. So, by definition, they cannot participate in self-questioning of the national security system, because they are not an official component of the national security system.

Symptomatic of the national security system’s poor self-evaluation capabilities is how often Congress and the executive branch resort to outside assessments of national security system performance. The 9/11 Commission staff believed that they were the 641st attempt to reform the U.S. government and U.S. national security system through special commissions outside the system. 692 Some of the current national security system’s current structures and practices can be traced back to the national security reforms instituted in the wake of the Tower commission’s report on the Iran-Contra affair, and the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. The system also learns with the help of academia, although the results tend to be incident specific and take years to produce. Scott Snook’s analysis of the shoot-down of two Army helicopters by the U.S. Air Force was of a single incident and took six years to publish. 693 Diane Vaughan’s analysis of the Challenger space shuttle explosion was also a study of a single incident and took ten years to publish. 694

Today, review and evaluation of current policy decisions tend to be conducted ad hoc, on single issues. For example, much attention has been paid to the recent revision of the nation’s approach to counterterrorism. Meanwhile, national security priorities that are not making headlines may nevertheless merit review. The creation of a policy document is a decision process, and decisions can be evaluated retrospectively as ineffective or

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effective, based on the outcomes they help generate, positive or negative. Isolating a policy document as a small fragment of the overall national security strategy, and judging its effectiveness later could lead to better policy decisions in the long run, but there does not yet seem to be a metric for evaluating the effectiveness of policy decisions.

Systematic strategy reviews at regular intervals are frequently advocated but rarely executed. The most common approach, at best, is to conduct a single comprehensive review at the outset of an administration. Strategy is subsequently reassessed on an individual rather than a comprehensive basis, according to how well each performs. Day-to-day demands and crises erode strategy review discipline.

In an ideal setting, the planning process would begin with identifying the intent for an operation along with the goals and objectives that support the achievement of the vision, polices, and strategies that have been articulated. These goals and objectives would then directly relate to programs that would be implemented. All goals, objectives, and programs would be measurable with well-defined measures of success and potential corrective actions that could be undertaken in real time to ensure that the programs made sense given the operational vision. Again, though, there do not seem to be metrics in place for evaluating the effectiveness of operational planning exercises.

Finally, national security operations do not seem to be measured on a standard set of metrics or feedback mechanisms to achieve successful implementation processes. The metrics that do exist are not universally shared by all departments and agencies, so each agency is not currently able to gauge the success of its efforts in contributing to the implementation of the national security plan. Each department or agency is left to determine success based on its own implementation, such as through its Government Performance and Results Act-directed agency goals, rather than on overarching outcomes. In some respects, the national security system never knows whether success has been achieved in a particular operation as a result.

Cause: The information flow necessary for basic organizational learning processes is impeded by system attributes

For a large network to learn, it is necessary for information to flow throughout the system. Unfortunately, there are many bureaucratic blockages to information flow in the national security system. Compartmentalization of knowledge is one source of information blockages. One conviction found in the competitive intelligence communities is that 80 percent of the information necessary to make a decision already exists somewhere within the organization, but is often inaccessible due to internal knowledge boundaries. When knowledge is compartmentalized—as in the infamous “unconnected dots” preceding the 9/11 terrorist attacks—it is difficult for the national security system to adjust its behaviors appropriately in order to meet system goals.

The current system provides incentives for leaders and bureaucratic managers seeking to gain power by withholding information from other organizations. A large field of power


research is based on the observation that the people with access to a critical resource have increased power.\textsuperscript{696} When the key task is presidential decision-making, the person’s power is increased if he or she has knowledge that the president needs to make a decision; “knowledge is power.”\textsuperscript{697} It should not be surprising, then, in a president-centric system to discover compartmentalization and hoarding of knowledge, which may be advantageous for the individual but deleterious to the larger system:

There is no doubt that Kissinger was a brilliant negotiator, and that the system of double tracks, of secret maneuver behind the screen of public charade, particularly suited his style of diplomacy. It was efficient. It reduced the possibility of leaks. Perhaps not coincidentally, it also offered tremendous bureaucratic advantage. But there were costs as well. When the National Security Assistant, on these and other issues, begins to do State’s business and doesn’t inform the Department of what has been said, everyone—including our foreign interlocutors—can become confused. And as the practice has continued, many State officials have found themselves, when meeting with foreign diplomats, in the embarrassing position of guessing about their own government’s position on serious issues…. When State Department experts are excluded, the benefits of their knowledge is lost; an apolitical voice is not heard; policy continuity beyond the current administration and institutional memory are endangered; the morale and therefore loyalty of the bureaucracy suffers; and foreign officials can play State off against the NSC staff.\textsuperscript{698}

Another explanation for poor information sharing is the prevalence of knowledge boundaries that inhibit knowledge flows. As noted in the section of the report on knowledge management, departments and agencies do not willingly share information as a matter of course. As chronicled by Amy Zegart, the U.S. national security system was blind to the 9/11 attacks because of a crippling number of bureaucratic impediments.\textsuperscript{699} Compartmentalization of knowledge makes it difficult for a large network to unlearn less effective habits and learn more effective habits.

\textit{Cause: Reliable metrics are not available}

The national security system is missing reliable metrics at all five stages of the national security process: assessment, policy, strategy, planning, and implementation. For many national security issues, the process problem is exacerbated by the difficulty of directly measuring the effects of our efforts. For example, how is it possible to determine the effectiveness of the U.S. policy towards Cuba? There do not seem to be measures in

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{697} M. Crozier, \textit{The Bureaucratic Phenomenon} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
place to evaluate whether U.S. actions are productive in working toward the intended outcomes the national security system is trying to achieve. In this case, the ultimate goal might be seen as the liberation of Cuba. The national security system has used a number of programs to implement policies it believed would lead to this overall objective. There does not seem to be an effective way to determine whether these policies contributed in a positive or negative way to achieving an ultimate goal.

A measurement system that provided a minute-by-minute readout of changes in the overall national security of the country has been discussed by experts outside the system, but dismissed as impractical by people within the system. Strategic managerial accounting research shows the value of a balanced scorecard approach that creates a complex algorithm—unique to each organization—that can produce a dashboard indicator of successful progress or unsuccessful regression. For many organizations, this number is a stock price. An equivalent metric for tracking the ups and downs of U.S. national security does not yet exist, except perhaps metaphorically, as in the statements that Richard Clarke’s hair was on fire in 2001, or George Tenet’s assertion that the system was blinking red in 2001. The Department of Homeland Security’s five-color method of tracking the level of threat to the United States does not qualify as a useful metric because it rarely moves up or down.

Cause: At the national level, there is little infrastructure for investigating, capturing, disseminating, and retrieving knowledge of value to the national security system

The national security system as a whole has little infrastructure for investigating, capturing, retrieving, and disseminating valuable knowledge throughout the system. Although the Department of Defense, especially the Department of the Army, has a proud tradition of military history and lessons learned processes, there is no equivalent established best practice for instituting interagency process change. An acknowledgment of this deficiency has led to nascent feedback processes in the U.S. Government’s Information Sharing Environment, the State Department Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization’s initiatives, and at other levels for various national security policies.

Generally, today’s government learns during the course of an operation but seldom applies these process lessons to new operations. “The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned,” released by the White House in 2006, mentions the need for processes to ensure that deficiencies are corrected and emphasizes feedback and remedial procedures when deficiencies are identified. Such processes are still largely absent. Developing lessons learned is extremely important, especially for improving process, to gain a more complete understanding of what worked well, what did not work well, what changes to the operational scheme are required, and to serve as a record of a particular operation. Even where an administration makes changes to streamline national security processes, these adaptations normally do not migrate to the next administration or become institutionalized as part of the national security system.

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Cause: Powerful incentives to protect the president from blame inhibit learning

One of the phrases heard frequently in Total Quality Management literature is that a customer complaint is a gift because it can provide organizations the opportunity to set in motion a series of learning opportunities that can increase the quality of a product. In the Federal Aviation Administration, the creation of a “near-misses” database by Chris Hart and his colleagues, in which attention was focused on catastrophes that did not occur, is seen as an important source of organizational learning. Karl Weick and Kathleen Sutcliffe labeled this aggressive organizational learning posture as a characteristic of high-reliability organizations. High-reliability organizations are “preoccupied with failure.” Organization theorist Sim Sitkin, at Duke University, argues some organizations are forgiving of small failures, treating them as learning opportunities, while other organizations punish small failures, treating them as errors.

In contrast to many organizations, however, the national security system seems designed to protect its leaders from the acknowledgement of national security failures, because failure carries political liabilities. The political cost of public admission of error invariably seems higher than its learning benefits. President Kennedy, for example, encouraged the CIA to take their early data on the possible presence of Soviet weapons in Cuba in the summer of 1962 and “nail it tightly into a box” because it could create political costs for the mid-term elections in November 1962. Political logic argues in favor of damage avoidance (e.g., keep the error secret), damage limitation (e.g., distance the organization from the error), damage deferral (e.g., appoint a blue-ribbon investigation commission to report as far into the future as possible), and damage control (e.g., create an impression of accountability through punishing low-level people). These types of defense mechanisms serve to protect the leaders of the system from criticism, blame, and accountability, but they make it difficult for the national security system to adapt to changing environments.

4. Consequences

The consequences of process problems can be categorized by the same six primary processes discussed above: assessment, policy, strategy, planning, implementation, and evaluation. Some consequences are immediately visible, and some are steadily accumulating in the background in ways that make the national security system increasingly less reliable.

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703 United States, The Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Documents (Washington: Brassey's, 1994).
704 These activities are sometimes called “organizational learning defensive routines” and “self-sealing behaviors.” C. Argyris, Knowledge for Action: A guide for overcoming defensive behaviors (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1993).
a. Immediate

One immediate consequence of ineffective assessment processes is a reduced ability to sense, interpret, and respond to weak signals in the security environment. An assessment process that is disconnected from the rest of the national security process—reporting to the president national security team instead of enriching the entire decision-making system—is not reliably able to respond to the weak signals that are precursors of emerging national security events. The problem is not weak signals but the weak management of responses to weak signals, as the 9/11 Commission Report and other investigations of 9/11 illustrate.\(^{705}\)

Policy problems tend to make the national security system reactive rather than anticipatory,\(^{706}\) prone to consider issues as they become crises. The result is a flurry of activity in the form of National Security Council-led Deputies and Principals Committee meetings to consider actions that should be undertaken to manage and alleviate the current situation, but little integrated activity to get out in front of emerging national security challenges. The tendency toward crisis management, plus the limited capacity for decision-making that must be centralized in the White House to obtain effective integration, slows down overall decision-making.

Being “slow” and “fast” is a function of context: a football player on a Thanksgiving morning pick-up game of middle-aged, overweight neighbors might be seen as effectively fast, but the same player injected into a game in a professional football stadium might be judged as dangerously slow. The current national security system is developing policy too slowly across the range of issues it confronts, so the system remains behind the curve of rapidly evolving world events.

Concerning strategy formulation, when the entire U.S. national security system is asked to focus on a salient, visible, and urgent threat, the system is capable of pouring attention, energy, and resources into a specific large-scale project. The national security establishment faced down the Soviet Union and the George H. W. Bush administration managed the reunification of Germany and the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. In general, however, the national security strategy processes are not capable of producing the strategic guidance that is directive and useful for interdepartmental problems. As a result, planning and implementation activities suffer as the analysis of PNSR case studies powerfully illustrates.\(^{707}\) Being unsure of the preferred strategy in any given instance, subordinate leaders are less willing to take initiative in support of strategy objectives.

Poor interagency planning means the implementation of operational plans is left up to the individual departments, a lead federal agency, or the states to execute. Thus,


\(^{707}\) See p. 109.
implementation results are uneven, uncoordinated, and underresourced during implementation. Even when the Executive Office of the President is able to integrate national policy and some semblance of a strategy and plan, implementation is often left unmonitored in the hands of the diverse departments and agencies. Without a system of performance accountability and a national security culture, departments often fail to implement key decisions when they are at odds with the agency’s sense of mission or culture. Moreover, objectives that require coordination across bureaucracies are even less likely to be implemented, due either to cultural rifts or the processes’ failure to clarify roles and responsibility. A consequence of ineffective implementation processes is the continued cacophony of dispersed, undercoordinated and contradictory national security projects.

Another consequence of fragmented processes, particularly those that reinforce the gap between policy and strategy priorities and the allocation of resources, is that the system lacks the requisite capabilities to carry out national security missions:

For years some in the military have criticized their interagency partners for not contributing enough to our efforts overseas, while some in the interagency have criticized the military for not providing enough security for them to do their jobs. What I’ve come to realize is that this finger-pointing wastes time and misses the mark. The real problem is that we lack a comprehensive overview of what each military and interagency partner should contribute in conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead, there is a large gap between what we optimally need to succeed and the combined resources our government can bring to bear. This “capabilities gap” is not the fault of any single agency, but is the result of our government not having clearly defined what it expects each instrument of national power to contribute to our foreign policy solutions. Lacking such guidance, we have failed to build the kinds of organizations we need today.\(^\text{708}\)

Collectively, the most important consequence of process problems is the increased likelihood of national security failures. When there is a national security failure, the entire system is indicted, yet the tendency is to scapegoat a particular component of the system. President Kennedy observed after the Bay of Pigs fiasco that failure is an orphan, but success has many fathers. Historically, failure is not an orphan for very long. However, in recent years, the realization that the entire system is inclined to produce poor performance is growing.\(^\text{709}\) The national security system connects numerous organizations into a single system, and each operational failure is a failure of the national security system as a whole, not of one component organization within the system. For a


system notoriously poor at organizational learning, this is perhaps, for the moment, the most important lesson to be learned.

b. Extended

The cumulative impact of fragmented and problematic policy-to-implementation processes is increasingly inadequate systemwide performance. Two common management techniques for ensuring effective process management are managerial tasking for end-to-end responsibility and managerial metrics for tracking process performance. Neither technique is currently in use in the overall national security process. The artificial walls between assessment communities, policy/decision-making communities, strategy communities, operational planning communities, and implementation communities could be described by organization theorists as sequential interdependence (as in a 1950s automobile assembly line). A common way to manage sequential interdependence is to move people “downstream” with a new product from R&D, to manufacturing, to marketing—the product manager becomes responsible for all processes associated with that product. The current national security system, with its heavy emphasis on stovepipes, does not have “issue managers” who move from assessment, to policy, to strategy, to planning, to implementation processes, nor does it have issue managers who control the end-to-end process.

The result is a fragmented set of processes that produce far less effective decision-making and implementation. The extended consequences are obviously deleterious, but not completely fathomable. One certainty is that it is not possible to use the skills and resources within the system to best effect. The current national security system can be thought of as a group of organizations and processes that function largely autonomously on a daily basis and come together, at best, on an ad hoc, “as needed” basis. As a recent Congressional Research Service report states, “The ‘national security system’ is a descriptive term, rather than a legal one …”710 This results in an incomplete system that has some of the relevant structures and processes, but is left to be executed in an ad hoc manner which varies greatly between administrations and even by issues within administrations. In such a system, it is hard for individuals to know how to make a contribution, or to be motivated by the relative certainty that sacrificial efforts will make a contribution to good outcomes.

More generally, an extended consequence of such an inefficient system, one that squanders human talent but resources as well, is the threat of financial ruin. At some point, scholars will question whether the Iraq War accelerated the financial crisis that consumed Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, and AIG in 2008, or whether the Global War on Terror accelerated the rise of China as a long-term economic competitor. It is expensive to run the current national security system, and it siphons off resources that could be allocated for other priorities, including debt reduction. Such inefficiency translates into lost opportunities and lost leverage. Large investments in national security structures and

programs do not currently yield optimal results because of the lack of much smaller investments in national security processes.

5. Conclusions

Arguably, the U.S. national security process is the largest organizational decision-making system in the world. Its sheer size suggests the critical need for the most effective and efficient processes. Unfortunately, current processes are fragmented, ad hoc, personality and issue specific, and unable to harness the wide range of talent within the system, or to learn from failure or success. A summary comment from the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction about the intelligence community could be applied to the entire national security system:

A former senior Defense Department official described today’s Intelligence Community as “not so much poorly managed as unmanaged.” We agree. Everywhere we looked, we found important (and obvious) issues of interagency coordination that went unattended, sensible Community-wide proposals blocked by pockets of resistance, and critical disputes left to fester. Strong interagency cooperation was more likely to result from bilateral “treaties” between big agencies than from Community-level management.711

It is equally true to say the national security system as a whole is “unmanaged.” The hundreds of thousands of well-trained, hard-working, and patriotic members and friends of the U.S. national security system distributed widely throughout the world are not used to good effect. The likely consequence of inefficient processes is a significantly reduced ability to be adaptive, nimble, and agile in response to a rapidly changing world environment.

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D. Human Capital

Summary

The national security system cannot generate or allocate the personnel necessary to perform effectively and efficiently agency core tasks or the growing number of important interagency tasks. Autonomous organizations manage the system's personnel, serving their organizational needs rather than the system's. The current rules that govern personnel within these organizations, however, discourage flexible, creative management of personnel. Thus, although focused on their needs, the individual agencies are not always able to meet them. When the functional agencies address interagency problems, they must do so with personnel less well prepared than they should be to perform the core tasks of their agency in an interagency setting. In addition, within the personnel system based on the autonomous agencies, there are no incentives to encourage interagency work, so personnel do not have an interagency perspective or much interagency experience. Nothing in the selection, indoctrination, and career progression of individuals prepares them to cooperate with personnel from other organizations. Moreover, senior leaders pay insufficient attention to interagency missions, in part because their role as champions of their agencies often overshadows their role as advisors to the president (concerned with national missions). In any case, their ability to affect personnel is restricted to their organization. Yet the system's senior leadership has no time or incentive to build institutional capability, and that includes organizational changes that would reward initiative at lower levels. As it is, lower level leaders respond to current incentives by trying to make a difference politically rather than manage the system better. Given the increased saliency of issues that require interagency solutions, human capital tools that are primarily agency-specific are increasingly inadequate to the tasks at hand.

Problems and Causes

The following table summarizes the complete set of major problems and causes for this section.

<table>
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<th>Problems</th>
<th>Causes</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. The system is unable to generate the required human capital.</td>
<td>- Limited flexibility in current laws and regulations</td>
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<td>2. The system is unable to allocate required human capital.</td>
<td>- Incentives and interests of agencies discourage cooperation or sharing personnel - Departmental and agency disincentives for interagency assignments</td>
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<td>3. Dominant department and agency cultures inhibit unified effort.</td>
<td>- Separate and unconstrained department and agency cultures</td>
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## Problem Analysis of the Current System

<table>
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<th>Problems</th>
<th>Causes</th>
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<td>- System attributes militate against national security culture</td>
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<td>4. Leaders pay insufficient attention to building institutional capacity.</td>
<td>- No time or incentives for institution building</td>
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<td>- Institution building is difficult and progress is hard to measure</td>
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<td>5. Leaders pay insufficient attention to interagency missions.</td>
<td>- Senior leader roles are conflicted</td>
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<td>6. Subordinate leaders are disinclined to take initiative.</td>
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<td>- Preference for policymaking over management</td>
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<td>- Poor communication of senior leader goals</td>
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<td>- Inadequate investment in leadership skills</td>
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1. Introduction

People are an organization’s most valuable and, frequently, its most expensive asset. Their capabilities and character influence the organization’s culture, affecting its ability to carry out its missions. They are the source of an organization’s knowledge and its leadership. Ultimately, people are the force that determines the will of the organization and its ability to change. Therefore, strategic human capital management laws, policies, programs, and procedures determine how an organization acquires, uses, develops, and rewards its human talent, and significantly impact an organization’s ultimate success. As a result, human capital management is the cornerstone for organizational improvements and reform efforts.

2. The Current System

a. Overview

The national security system’s human capital is a subset of the larger federal government personnel system that is large, varied, and complex:

The current Federal workforce is made up of more than 1,886,238 employees—more than 90 percent of whom work under some form of merit system. They staff more than 107 Government departments and agencies. They are stationed throughout the United States and its territories, and in many foreign countries. Federal agencies range in size from the 680,000-employee, worldwide Department of Defense civilian staff to the White House Commission on the National Moment of Remembrance, with 1 paid employee.\(^{712}\)

The Classification Act of 1949 established the basis for the personnel system that still governs the personnel in the federal parts of the national security system, and the principles of the 1949 act are now common in the state and local portions of the system as well. The 1949 act based compensation mostly on longevity—not performance—and tied it to positions and levels within the organizational hierarchy. This means that those

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who either serve the longest in an organization or occupy a higher level of authority tend to be paid more.

The system has undergone numerous adjustments since 1949. One such adjustment was the creation of the Senior Executive Service (SES), which the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 created to cover what had been the three highest grades in the civil service. Contrary to the Classification Act of 1949, the SES emphasizes performance over longevity “by replacing time-based pay advancement with the opportunity to earn substantial cash awards.” Even with such adjustments, though, the system established in 1949 remains largely in place.

One notable trend in the personnel system has been the growth of excepted service personnel in the system. In 1998, more than 80 percent were competitive and over 19 percent excepted (personnel in noncompetitive positions). In 2007, 52.3 percent of federal personnel were competitive while 47.7 percent were excepted. There are two principal differences between excepted and competitive positions.

1. Organizations with authority to hire excepted personnel do so according to criteria and procedures differing from those standardized by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (i.e., the regular civil service). Evaluation, promotion, and retention practices may differ as well.

2. Individuals in excepted positions may have fewer rights of appeal in cases of disciplinary or termination actions than do civil service members. The merit principles of civil service apply to both competitive and excepted positions, and the compensation of those in excepted positions often, but not always, follow the model of the 1949 Classification Act. Using excepted positions allows agencies to hire personnel for particular tasks or to meet the particular circumstances of the agency’s work.

Another notable aspect of the national security system’s human capital is the existence of professional cadres built around specific disciplines; for example, military officers in the Defense Department and Foreign Service officers in the State Department. The military and Foreign Service personnel systems are notable because they attach rank to the person and not the position, tie promotion to personal evaluation, and require individuals to be available for system-wide assignment. These professional cadres sometimes dominate their departments and agencies, possessing more authority, greater longevity, and more influence than the political appointees for whom they work. Military officers are largely self-regulating and self-perpetuating in that they determine who among them gets


715 Ibid.

promoted or otherwise rewarded for performance. This comprises most of what makes them professionals. Longevity or time-in-grade is a factor in the promotion of professionals, but performance, as understood by the profession, is ultimately a more important consideration. Other professional personnel cadres that largely dominate their agencies are case officers in the national clandestine service and special agents in the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  

For human capital purposes, the national security system consists of departments, agencies, and interagency structures (e.g., Principals Committee) with national security missions and functions. Although the current human capital system was designed to work in the traditional vertical structures of the departments and agencies, assessing the performance of this system requires considering the human capital systems of both the departments and agencies and the interagency structures that are so essential to successful national security mission performance.

While no central list or census of interagency organizations and positions exists, more than seventy different current interagency groups have been identified. These groups range from the committees of the National Security Council, to the interagency groups of such departments and agencies as State, Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, and the Environmental Protection Agency. That list includes an equal variety of such independent groups as the Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative and the Center for Complex Operations. At any point in time, moreover, a variety of formal and informal ad hoc interagency groups exist to deal with specific issues that require the input of multiple agencies within the national security system. A conservative estimate of the positions constituting all of these interagency entities numbers in the thousands.

b. A General Assessment of Performance

The current national security system does not have an agreed-upon mission or vision or set of articulated values. Nor does it have strategic, business, and operational plans or similar documents that focus the organization and its human capital on critical work to be accomplished. Furthermore, it has no common culture that its political and career leadership knows and embraces—culture that is inculcated, shared, and valued across the entire national security community. The national security system’s human capital programs are, as a result, largely failing the critical test of attracting and retaining a well-qualified workforce to achieve the strategic goals, objectives, and outcomes of the national security function. There are many talented employees throughout the national security community who devote their lives to assuring America’s security, but their achievements occur despite—rather than because of—the system’s human capital policies, programs, and procedures.

3. Problem Analysis

a. The Talent Management System

The talent management system ensures the availability of high-quality people with competencies to achieve mission critical functions. It includes such programs as recruiting, hiring, developing, promoting, and retaining a well-qualified workforce. It also includes all sources of talent acquisition—direct hire, contracted, volunteer, and any other sources that provide talent to accomplish the work of national security organizations and entities. Its primary objective is to assure that departments, agencies, and interagency functions have “the right people, at the right time, with the right set of competencies in the right place” to accomplish the work of the organization.

Numerous studies on the effectiveness of federal personnel programs have identified major problems with the talent management system. The National Commission on Public Service issued one of the most important and complete studies of public service in recent years, Urgent Business for America: Revitalizing the Federal Government for the 21st Century, in January 2003. A former chairman of the Federal Reserve System, the Honorable Paul A. Volcker, chaired the commission, which consisted of such public service luminaries as Charles Bowsher, Frank C. Carlucci, and others who had distinguished themselves either as members of Congress or as outstanding performers in senior positions in the executive branch. The report argued that the notion of public service and the organization of the U.S. government are in disarray. The report made that argument by asserting that government is unable to attract or retain many talented personnel, and that its structure and operations are “a mixture of the outdated, the outmoded and the worn.”

With few exceptions, noted below, that conclusion certainly applies to the national security system.

1. The system is unable to generate the required human capital.

Generating the human talent that the national security system requires is increasingly difficult. To begin with, requirements are much different today. In describing the changes that have taken place in federal personnel systems, the Office of Personnel Management remarked that “by 2000, the ‘government of clerks’ that existed in 1949” was “no more.” The most heavily populated grade was GS-12—more than halfway up the scale. This change in the nature of the federal workforce composition has reflected such socioeconomic changes as the evolution of the knowledge economy and specifically


information technology that changed the skills needed to perform tasks. Maintaining and managing information technology have become increasingly important tasks. Hiring the people to perform these tasks has become a challenge because of a parallel increase in competition for these skills in the broader labor market.

The changing environment has also produced challenges more specific to national security. The threats and opportunities that the United States faces today are more complex, varied, and numerous than those of previous decades. Personnel in the security system must now perform, on a regular basis, a set of tasks that is broader than that their predecessors contended with. For example, in addition to their traditional duties, “today’s military personnel [must] also take on the role of diplomats, humanitarians, and rebuilders.” Similarly, the intelligence community requires employees with such crucial skill sets as scientific and technical expertise and advanced foreign language capabilities. That community, however, is facing challenges in recruiting and retaining high-quality talent to meet these requirements and “has not adapted well to the diverse cultures and settings in which today’s intelligence experts must operate.”

Diplomats also face a changing environment; for example, one which accords higher priority to public diplomacy and the need to deal directly with the media and public opinion. A crisis of talent, along with a depreciation of and decrease in quality, is coming.

The set of tasks facing diplomats has also broadened. They must now operate not only in foreign ministries but also in liaison with diverse non-governmental organizations; for example, in villages where there is no established government—only an array of tribal and religious authorities—and where violence is not an anomaly but an accepted part of daily life. Staffing deficiencies at the State Department are therefore compounded by the need to fill war-zone positions while many on the current workforce remain untrained on how to work in harm’s way. One study asserted that the State Department needs an additional 1,079 positions for “training, transit, and temporary needs” and another 1,015 to fill vacancies at home and abroad. Despite the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (2001), the staffing shortage persists.

Other symptoms of the system’s inability to generate the requisite talent pool for the national security system include difficulty in recruiting the right people, a heavy reliance on contractors, and the growing number of excepted service positions. Patricia

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725 Reasons for this reluctance vary—from job expectations, to concerns about conditions, and even disagreement with policies.


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Bradshaw, deputy undersecretary of defense for personnel, highlighted the difficulty of recruiting the right people:

We are competing for people with skill sets that are in demand far beyond DoD, and we don’t produce a lot of those in this country…we’ve never been good recruiters, we wait for people to knock on the door, and as a result, people don’t appreciate the jobs we have to offer…if you want to recruit new, younger people, they’ll look at the pay and benefits and career track. You’ve got to give them positions they’ll be able to move up into.\(^\text{728}\)

When government departments lack the right staff, they are forced to look to contractors to fill roles that government employees previously held. Departments must also look to contractors to perform functions that closely support inherently governmental functions such as intelligence analysis, program management and engineering, and technical support for program offices. The Department of Defense spends over $314 billion annually on these goods and services, with increasingly larger contracts being offered for increasingly more functions.\(^\text{729}\) The Department of Homeland Security also relies heavily on contractors, leaving the short-staffed Office of Procurement Operations to handle over $4 billion to pay for contracting support in interagency contracts.\(^\text{730}\) USAID has also relied heavily on contractors, especially since the beginning of the reconstruction missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2007, USAID was unable to estimate how many contractors work for the agency’s reconstruction missions in Iraq, which are worth over $5 billion.\(^\text{731}\)

The increase in the use of contractors has considerably enhanced the competition that the national security system faces for talent. For example, the Director of National Intelligence has observed that it is not uncommon for contractors to lure trained individuals away from the intelligence community only to return them to a similar job through a contract—usually charging the government more than it would have cost to employ a direct hire. In August 2008, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence estimated that their per-capita costs per contractor for fiscal year 2007 were upwards of $207,000, versus only $125,000 for direct hires.\(^\text{732}\) The cost is even more significant when considering the costs of training and of achieving security clearance for individuals.


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in such positions. Other agencies and departments face similar challenges, especially with regard to trained specialists.

Such developments make it conceivable that the government’s need to improve work conditions and rewards in order to retain individuals in the system will increase, resulting in increased cost of government employees as well. While retention is never aimed at 100 percent, it is increasingly harder for the government to keep highly valued individuals—especially since becoming a contractor does not necessarily mean a loss of interest or connection to policymaking or implementation.

On the positive side, a recent report by the Office of Personnel and Management found that, from fiscal 2004 to fiscal 2007, federal agencies were increasingly using a variety of hiring flexibilities. The number of employees hired under eight special authorities went up more than 48 percent, from slightly less than 30,000 to more than 43,000.

A State Department job fair illustrated what can be done. In 1999, the department needed to hire several hundred information technology professionals for both domestic and overseas positions. Patricia A. Popovich, the deputy chief information officer, Bureau of Information Resource Management at the Department of State, designed and executed a recruitment and hiring model—including an initial security screening (a process that normally takes months)—that allowed offers to be extended the same day as the candidate was interviewed. A check with supervisors after the individuals reported to work showed that those hired were competent professionals.

The weekend event attracted 1,100 candidates to FSI [Foreign Service Institute] where State hiring officials made 122 conditional job offers in the Foreign Service and Civil Service on the spot, 65 for information management specialists and 35 for information management technical specialists in the Foreign Service. Another 22 were identified for Civil Service computer and telecommunications specialist jobs. The fair compressed into one day a recruitment and staffing process that typically takes the Department months to complete. Security personnel, for example, were present to fingerprint candidates on the spot. There were so many applicants, in fact, that about 75 additional interviews were held during the weeks following the job fair. The job fair, according to its sponsors, marked several firsts for State. It was the first time, for example, that recruitment bonuses up to 25 percent of annual base salary were offered for information technology skills the Department desperately needs, and that officials could recall a Department job fair being held on a Saturday.

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*Cause: Limited flexibility in current laws and regulations*

The principal reason that the talent management system cannot generate human capital is the set of laws and regulations that govern the management of personnel in the national security system. All of the reform efforts of the last fifty years—including the Federal Salary Reform Act of 1962, the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, and the Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1990—have left the twentieth century federal compensation system essentially intact.

The most recent federal human capital survey indicates that government personnel know this. The survey revealed that only 29 percent of federal employees believe that the current system and its managers take steps to deal with poor performance and only 30 percent believe that differences in performance are recognized in a meaningful way. In short, a system that emphasizes position and longevity over performance is still in place and contradicts the concept of performance-based government. David Walker, former comptroller general of the United States, has argued that the “federal government’s classification and compensation systems [need] to be more market-based and performance-oriented.”

Title 5 of the United States Code, which prescribes civil service functions and responsibilities, contains rules and regulations that are no longer effective in today’s workplace—certainly not in the marketplace of the knowledge economy. Consequently, Congress has had to adjust the law and make exceptions for more flexibility. For example, the final section of Part III of Title 5, Miscellaneous, grants special human capital authorities to such agencies as the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Homeland Security, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Defense, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to meet their human capital program needs.

An example of the broadest flexibility is found in 5 U.S. Code Section 9701(a), which provides the following authority to the secretary of homeland security:

> Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, the Secretary of Homeland Security may, in regulations prescribed jointly with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, establish, and from time to time adjust, a human resources management system for some or all of the organizational units of the Department of Homeland Security.

The secretary of defense has similar legislative authority. These two departments have been working to establish new human capital management systems consistent with the...
requirements of the legislation. As a result, both the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security human capital management systems now have a pay-for-performance component. Other agencies within the national security community—particularly the intelligence community—are developing this type of program as well. In May 2008, the director of national intelligence announced the intelligence community’s pay-for-performance plan.

During the next year, 10 of the 16 intelligence agencies will be implementing the new system, known as the National Intelligence Civilian Compensation Program, with employees receiving their first performance-based payouts in fiscal 2010. The remaining agencies, which include the CIA and ODNI, will begin conversion in fiscal 2010. Implementation of the system in the community’s domestic agencies, such as the State, Energy, Treasury and Justice departments, is planned for the end of fiscal 2010, pending statutory approval. “Think of this as a merit-based system that rewards high performers,” McConnell said. “You get the behavior that you reward.”

The impact of the pay-for-performance reforms is not yet clear. The more broadly accepted the reforms are, the more likely they are to succeed. Reforms, or special authorities for obtaining personnel, that are applied narrowly may not provide a large enough base to accomplish their intent, as the executive of the new counterintelligence fusion center discovered.

Congress sought to address this problem [hiring qualified people] by giving the NCIX [National Counterintelligence Executive] direct hire authority. Exercising that authority, however, proved extremely difficult. First, we needed to establish a new career service to hire people into (one of the many costs distinguishing government from private enterprise), which took nearly a year to work through the CIA personnel system. But a career service implies a career: what kind of upward mobility can a career government servant expect to find in a mini-organization like the office of the NCIX? A total billet structure of 80 to 100 (including detailees) doesn’t give much latitude for career progression. Moreover, the head of such an elite office must be extremely careful in making hiring decisions. All sales are final: there is no return to sender option when it comes to direct hire employees, and given the strictures of the career service, firing someone for other than clear cause is very, very difficult. Once an organization has an established reputation for the quality and value of its work, I believe it is possible to recruit and retain a talented core staff—but that happens over time, not over night.

In summary, a primary reason for the trend toward contractors and excepted service is that the one-size rules and regulations of the competitive service no longer address the increasingly unique and different missions of the bureaus and offices of the various departments and agencies of the federal government. Some parts of the national security system are taking advantage of special authorities and extraordinary efforts to obtain the right kind of human capital, but in doing so they are working against the norms of the current human capital system.

2. The system is unable to allocate required human capital.

It is important to note that changes in the workforce and the nature of work performed since 1949 require not just new ways of generating human capital but also new ways of allowing it to work. The hierarchical structure of carefully delineated and ranked positions assumed in the Classification Act of 1949 made sense for the government model of the time. Hierarchy and top-down direction was an efficient way to direct a workforce with a larger portion of unskilled workers. Today, such a structure does not get the maximum advantage from the current workforce, which has powerful information management tools and other technologies at its disposal.

Hierarchical bureaucracies do not exist to empower their employees, however. They are instruments of political control and were designed to ensure accountability and equity in the use of public resources. The structure and processes that dominate our national security organizations also affect the way they allocate human capital.

Cause: Incentives and interests of agencies discourage cooperation or sharing personnel

Symptomatic of the national security system’s problem with allocating human capital is the failure of departments and agencies to fill positions for interagency missions quickly and with appropriately qualified personnel, even when the missions are recognized as high national priorities. The experience of establishing PRTs provides the most prominent recent example.

In some cases, civilian positions remained vacant when individuals completed their tours and were not immediately replaced by their home agencies. Other times, positions were filled with contractors or junior personnel [who] could command few resources from their home departments…. The lack of training has been compounded by the difficulty of finding experienced and appropriately qualified personnel. In reference to this problem, Deputy Special Inspector General Cruz described interviews with PRT personnel where she “met a veterinarian developing agriculture programs and an aviation maintenance manager co-leading a PRT.”

The PRT experience also illustrated the tendency of departments and agencies to allocate personnel only for short rotations:

These problems were sometimes compounded by short tours of duty for civilian personnel, as brief as 90 days, which precluded the formation of effective long-term relationships between both military personnel and local officials…. These issues have been alleviated, although not entirely resolved, with extended tours of duty, generally ranging from six months to a year.  

In another case, the executive of a new national intelligence fusion center set out to establish the center and immediately encountered problems when she sought the best people for her staff:

One of the enduring problems we encountered was in recruiting capable personnel to work in the new CI office. All national “centers” have an inherent personnel problem: you want and need the best and the brightest, but there are never enough of those to go around. The national office draws its staff from the several departments and agencies, who in turn want to keep the most talented personnel in place. Even if a given individual is personally disposed to take an assignment with the national office, getting their line management’s okay is far from easy. (‘No. You are needed here.’) Additionally, the national office must contend with the well-recognized problem of detailees looking out for their home agency (or their future careers back at the home agency).

The problem that this executive encountered is common. Consider another example, the effort to set up the U.S. Africa Command. “Early administration rhetoric envisioned AFRICOM as a transformational experiment providing a whole-of-government interagency approach to U.S. national security strategy,” said Rep. John Tierney, D-Mass., chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs. “It appears that ambitions for AFRICOM have been scaled back.” The reason why:

Developing an integrated interagency command structure has proved much harder than planners expected, witnesses told the panel. Africa Command’s architects originally expected to staff as much as a quarter of the command with experts from the State, Treasury and Agriculture departments, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and other civilian agencies. But that goal proved too ambitious…. As a result, AFRICOM reduced its interagency representation to 52 notational interagency positions, or about 4 percent of the staff. But even that substantially reduced goal will be difficult to achieve. “Personnel systems among federal agencies were incompatible and do not readily facilitate

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742 Kobayashi.
Interagency staffing is therefore difficult because departments and agencies hoard their people. They hoard them because there are no incentives in the talent management system for individuals to leave their agencies, or for their departments or agencies to share them.

First, individuals do not have incentives to join interagency teams because the promotion, evaluation, and reward components of the talent management system all focus on an individual in a particular position. The most prestigious awards granted a federal employee illustrate this emphasis.

Members of the senior executive and other senior career services are eligible to be nominated for sustained outstanding performance and achievement by their departments, evaluated by boards of private citizens, and approved by the President to receive a Presidential Rank Award. The top five percent can be recognized as Meritorious Executives and the top one percent can be recognized as Distinguished Executives. These awards are usually given at departmental ceremonies—most years Distinguished Executives receive their awards from the President. The awards, granted to individuals, provide cash equal to 20 percent of salary for Meritorious Executives and 35 percent of salary for Distinguished Executives.

This type of individual recognition is expected and required in a results-based, pay-for-performance environment, promoting competition among employees and providing incentive to excel over one’s colleague. However, the way it is constructed currently discourages an individual’s willingness to engage in team problem solving, since that type of performance is not measured and is not directly incentivized. That unwillingness subsequently undermines group achievement, information sharing, and collaboration, which are critical ingredients for intragovernmental collaboration and fulfilling the mission of the national security community.

Second, departments and agencies lack incentives to share individuals. Although the talent management system follows governmentwide rules, the rules are applied by human capital offices within specific departments and agencies. These offices focus on their departments or agencies and not on the interagency. Hence, talent management programs—recruitment, assignment, promotion, performance management, development, rewards, and incentives—emphasize core department or agency capabilities rather than mission integration across different departments and agencies.

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745 Peters.
This organizational focus is so strong that it impedes cooperation even when different departments or agencies share a common mission. Consider, for example, the intelligence community. Failure to collaborate and share information was one criticism of the intelligence community after the 9/11 attacks. Various members of the community had pieces of information that were not shared and vetted throughout the intelligence community. Striving to move the intelligence community from a group of individual organizations to a more collaborative team, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence has since identified the goal of establishing a National Intelligence “Service.”

The ODNI plan states:

The [intelligence community]’s professionals, both military and civilian, must begin to see themselves not just as employees of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the National Security Agency (NSA), but also as part of something larger—an overarching national intelligence “service,” unified by high standards and performance, common mission, and shared core values.  

The extraordinary efforts required by the ODNI to build a team of intelligence professionals out of individuals focused on individual performance in specific agencies further illustrates the lack of incentives in the broader national security system’s talent management structures and processes. The ODNI is attempting to overcome bureaucratic resistance that doomed earlier efforts to achieve the same thing:

[CIA] assignments to other agencies (such as OSD or State), fellowships, faculty positions at war colleges, etc., were never considered “career enhancing.” This was due to concerns about being ‘out of sight’ and therefore ‘out of mind’ within the parent directorate. Robert Gates (the current secretary of defense) attempted to make a rotation assignment a prerequisite for selection to Senior Intelligence Officer when he served as DCI, but this innovation was subsequently discontinued at the urging of the directorate heads as unworkable.

The CIA’s disinclination to assign officers to other agencies is not unique, but rather a general tendency that holds true for all departments and agencies. Doing a tour with another agency or showing sympathy for or acceptance of its approach to problems, is likely to have an adverse effect on promotion. Working in another agency or in the interagency deprives the officer of the opportunity to gain the experience that the officer needs to excel at his profession. It might also suggest deficient loyalty to the independence of the home service and organization. This dynamic was at work in a prominent example. General Wesley Clark collaborated with Richard Holbrooke, a seasoned diplomat, in dealing with Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic. In doing so, they formulated an integrated and effective diplomatic and military approach. However,

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General Clark’s collaboration with Holbrooke irritated his parent organization, the Department of Defense.750 These factors and examples help explain why, according to a survey by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), “only 9% of the Senior Executive Service [who are not supposed to “belong” to any particular agency] has worked in more than one agency, although nearly half (45%) think such mobility would substantially improve their job performance.”751 These examples also belie a common prejudice that interagency collaboration is not a problem once personnel reach the upper echelons of the national security establishment.

The opposite assertion is also popular—that at the tactical or operational level, “in the field” cooperation across agencies occurs. Anecdotal evidence suggests that cooperation does occur in the field on occasion. The explanation for this is focus on the mission. If success in the mission requires cooperation among the personnel from the core functions, then it may occur because mission success is a requirement for promotion in the services. Yet, if the issue is the resources or authorities that permit an organization to carry out its core individual mandate, then competition is more common. In fact, if a mission fails because an officer was defending his organization’s resources or authorities, this can be grounds for promotion. This is one effect of putting an organization’s core capabilities ahead of mission accomplishment. At senior levels, particularly in Washington, where resources and authorities are always in question, cooperation is even more constrained by departmental and agency equities.

Cause: Departmental and agency disincentives for interagency assignments

Currently, the laws and regulations that govern human capital address most directly the hiring and management of personnel within a specific agency. They have far less effect, if any, on interagency assignments. A review of the current human resource management system governing the civilian population of the national security community does not reveal legislative or systemic barriers to assigning employees to other agencies. The barriers arise from the departments and agencies that make up the interagency and that control the working lives of their employees. Currently, there are no incentives for departments and agencies to provide human talent for interagency work and several distinct disincentives for doing so.

The national security system and its personnel are dominated by strong autonomous departments and agencies. Congress allocates funding for these departments and agencies specifically, and seldom makes provision for allocating either dollars or positions to interagency functions.752 There is, consequently, no incentive to develop

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strategic plans with goals and outcomes that consider the needs, in human capital or otherwise, of both individual organizations and interagency missions and activities. Thus, there is also no incentive to develop strategic human capital plans as a mechanism to help assure that scarce human resources are allocated to the highest strategic program priorities of departments, agencies, and the interagency functions. Similarly, there are no laws or regulations that require departments and agencies to budget for interagency functions that require human capital allocations.

Part III of this report presents the case that the world has changed since 1947 in ways that require the national security system to operate with more agility, flexibility, and adaptability than previously. For example, the spectrum between war and peace has widened and within it there is now an increased need for civilian and military personnel to work together. This complexity demands that the system work cohesively, involving different agencies based on a given set of circumstances. Meeting this demand requires greater efforts to reform the personnel system, which is still based on the 1949 Classification Act. It will also require devising a human talent system that can readily deploy human resources from across the national security community to the most important national security missions as needs and presidential priorities dictate.

b. Culture

3. Dominant department and agency cultures inhibit unified effort.

Organizational culture is composed of the shared values, beliefs, and assumptions that enable an organization to achieve its ends. The culture of an organization is “a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships within an organization.” As bureaucratic professionals become indoctrinated in their organizations, they are learning an organizational culture. They are being told what is important and how to see the world and respond to its problems. When these officers then come into contact with officers or personnel from other agencies, they do not see the world or respond to its problems in the same way. This makes interagency cooperation more difficult for several reasons.

First, as previously shown, departments and agencies seeking to preserve their autonomy and therefore control over their resources—including human capital—do not value the allocation of human capital to interagency work. Similarly, when such work is unavoidable, the dominant cultures of the departments and agencies militate against the collaboration. In fact, much of the friction among representatives from different national security organizations is symptomatic of the strong organizational cultures resident in the national security system.

Examining these cultures more closely, it is not surprising that personnel from different agencies do not routinely cooperate—military officers, Foreign Service officers, and case officers, for example, are, to one degree or another, representative of professionals and

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754 Wilson, Bureaucracy, 91.
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civil servants throughout the national security system. These officers enter their respective services when they are young, selected by their services because they have distinctive qualities and interests. Their services then indoctrinate them in the particular beliefs and attitudes of their respective professions, further heightening their differences from personnel in other agencies. By word and deed, in training and assignments, young officers learn what makes a good military officer, diplomat, or spy. If they display the required qualities, they win promotion and the esteem of their fellow professionals.

This process takes time because each of the core professions is more art than science. Mastering the art requires accumulating experience to season judgment. Thus, each profession has a career progression ladder, each rung of which provides the officer with increased responsibility. If an officer performs well at a particular level, then the officer can advance to the next, having gained the experience necessary for increased responsibilities. At each level, officers must display not only the appropriate professional skills but also the appropriate professional attitudes, as well as devotion to the core missions of their service and loyalty to it. This devotion and loyalty mark an officer as someone who will defend the service and its organization, should the officer become a senior leader.

Ultimately, the most successful officers achieve senior leadership. They become ambassadors and assistant secretaries, generals or admirals, or at the highest level, undersecretaries for political affairs, chiefs of important stations, division chiefs, or directors of operations. In doing so, they embody what their organizations consider the essential and distinguishing qualities of their different professions. They become role models for the next generation of officers. Yet little in the selection, indoctrination, and career progression of these officers encourages them to cooperate with other organizations.

The contrast between military officers and diplomats provides a much studied and clear example of the differences between organizational cultures. The differences between these two professional groups have been represented as the difference between Martians (military officers) and Venutians (diplomats):

Martians value competence, efficiency, and achievement. They are professional, conservative, goal oriented, time conscious, and detail driven. No plan is too complete if there is time remaining before crossing the line of departure. The eighty percent solution can always be improved upon, tweaked, and refined. They are early to everything; believe in rehearsals and more rehearsals; are mission/task oriented, autonomous, self-motivated, “give me a mission and get out of my way” type of people—bottom-line problem solvers.

Venutians value competence, intellectual ability, and individual achievement. They are analysts who report world events—much less interested in “facts” than in how what happened relates to a larger picture. They believe in intuition and psychology. Planning is anathema to most Venutians. They see so many different paths, depending upon how future
events will play out, that they are hard-pressed to come up with one plan that they feel has any validity. They generally prefer a more fluid approach that is event-driven. They are goal-oriented, but the goals they strive to achieve are often broadly defined, rather than specific. To see how these cultural differences affect interagency cooperation, consider again Richard Holbrooke and General Clark. One reason that the Defense Department disliked Holbrooke, and therefore General Clark for going along with him, was that Holbrooke acted like a typical diplomat. Of his efforts to negotiate peace in the Balkans (before he was working with General Clark), Holbrooke said, “If I can get a cease-fire, I’ll take that. If I can get some constitutional principles, I’ll take them. If I can get a corridor to Gorazde, I’ll grab it. If I can settle Sarajevo, I’ll do it. We’re inventing peace as we go.” In describing his activities in this way Holbrooke was demonstrating that diplomacy is a process of suggesting, testing, considering, and reconsidering proposals and counterproposals. It would be difficult if not impossible to write a contract that specified in advance what the firm (Diplomats, Inc.) should do in each case, in large part because the government itself does not know; its preferences are formed by the process of negotiation.

Making up peace as you go may be good practice in diplomacy, but it is not a good way to plan military support. In fact, it makes planning almost impossible. Hence, from the military’s viewpoint, it makes failure much more likely. As one Joint Staff memo noted, the “State Department shies away from specific planning projected too far into the future since it could infringe upon their flexibility and runs counter to their traditional policy of reacting to daily changes in the situation.” While famously no military plan survives contact with the enemy, the military is so committed to planning that it plans for the failure of its plans by planning for contingencies and variations on contingencies. The State Department, because its core task requires it, makes it all up as it goes along. This explains a good deal of the difficulty that the State and Defense departments have in working effectively together.

Cause: Separate and unconstrained department and agency cultures

Each agency in the national security system has its own culture (and subcultures), developed over years of socialization. The CIA, FBI, and other organizations participating in national security have cultures that reflect their core tasks. Core tasks—warfighting, diplomacy, spying, policing—give rise to particular cultures. These cultures tend to be exclusive and even tribal. They are deeply entrenched belief systems that

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757 Wilson, Bureaucracy, 358.
reflect the divergent mandates that guide how organizations select, train, and reward their personnel. Since no organization has interagency activity as a core task, no organization has an interagency culture. Nor is there a shared culture among departments and agencies involved in national security because each is singularly devoted to fulfilling its separate mandate. What predominates is the individual organizational cultures generated by the different mandates of the different departments and agencies. No one has been able to identify a culture for interagency activities. Operating without a whole-of-system culture, individual agencies focus on their specific activities and tasks at the expense of overarching missions.

*Cause: System attributes militate against national security culture*

It is possible and often desirable for personnel to operate in more than a single professional culture. This happens frequently within departments and agencies. A military officer, for example, might be equally at home in the Department of Defense culture, the Air Force culture, and the fighter pilot culture. There is no reason why personnel from different national security departments and agencies could not operate effectively in their home agency cultures but also in a broader interagency or national security culture.

Unfortunately, the current system does not support the formation of such a culture. To begin with, the national consensus on what national security requires has eroded since the 1960s, when the Vietnam War and intelligence community scandals undermined the cohesion that marked the struggle with the Soviet Union and containment strategy. Other trends since then have further undermined what might have passed for a post-World War II national security culture. Moreover, the current system pulls the White House toward issue management and away from system management, where the steps to create a common interagency culture might be taken. Not since President Eisenhower has the White House had the time and inclination to take steps designed to inculcate the upper echelons of the national security establishment with the rudiments of a common process experience that might generate cultural cohesion. The weak interagency education initiatives currently offered on a voluntary basis are certainly inadequate for this purpose.

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759 The PNSR organizational review of the national security system found that the overarching national security culture is very weak. In contrast, the system subcultures resident in departments and agencies that reflect their organizational mandates rather than overall national security policy are very strong. We also found a diverse array of rich subcultures within the departments. Many of these cultures are not only strong, but contribute greatly to high performance (e.g., some military service subcultures). Some small interagency groups, such as the counterterrorism coordinating committee during the Reagan administration, also develop strong collaborative cultures, but this is not the norm. Typically, individuals who immerse themselves in different departmental cultures find it difficult to combine their strengths as the cultures tend to be exclusive. Christopher Jon Lamb, James Douglas Orton, and Rei Tang, “Organization and Management Theory Analysis of the U.S. National Security System,” (Washington: The Project on National Security Reform) 1 April 2008.


762 See Part III, p. 149.
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While some of the reasons for the missing overarching national security culture are evident, in the abstract it is a puzzle for organization and management theorists. Organization and management theorists expect that strong cultures are matched with weak structures, and strong structures are matched with weak cultures. Personnel committed to performing common tasks in specified ways can operate without a strong structure to guide them—and are more efficient because of it. Conversely, if that commitment is not present, then a strong coordinating structure will be necessary to direct personnel to work together effectively. It appears that, currently, the security system has neither strong structure nor strong culture. This significantly increases the potential for failure.  

It certainly helps explain why interagency activities are difficult.

c. Leadership

Leadership can be defined differently. Some leadership theories are unabashedly “transformational” in nature. David Abshire makes a strong case in his 2008 book, A Call to Greatness: Challenging Our Next President, for the next president to take full advantage of the present period of turbulence and lead the United States into a new direction, modeling himself or herself after the nation’s first and perhaps most revered leader, George Washington. Notice Abshire’s persuasive call in the text below for the application of a heroic, “great man,” or transformational theory of presidential leadership:

George Washington, along with cabinet members Thomas Jefferson (secretary of state) and Alexander Hamilton (secretary of the treasury), practiced what leadership experts call “transformational leadership.” Rather than improving society at the margins—‘transactional leadership’—he produced revolutionary change in the very way that Americans understood themselves and their nation. This is literally true—Washington was the great leader of the Revolutionary War—but true in a deeper sense as well. Following the break with Britain, his leadership gave stability, credibility, and guidance to an experiment in liberty, which could easily have collapsed from infighting or European interference….

At certain turning points, Presidents have the opportunity to change the national landscape with bold new strokes. Our current moment in history is one such turning point….

Indispensable to our next leader will be a courageous nature tempered by a healthy wariness against hubris, an organized Executive branch and talented, focused cabinet of advisors, and a transformational vision backed up by a comprehensive, long-term grand strategy.  

James Loy, though, has a different definition of leadership, one built from a forty-five year career in building an organization that can rapidly respond to widely distributed local catastrophes. Philips and Loy, in their 2003 study of Coast Guard leadership

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763 Orton and Weick.
processes, provide an alternative to both the transformational model of leadership and the top-down model of leadership practiced in the Department of Defense. Instead, Philips and Loy describe a “distributed” leadership model:

"The inevitable question, of course, is "How does the Coast Guard do so much, so efficiently, with so few people, and so little money?"

First, it’s the people. There are no spectators in the Coast Guard. Everybody performs several jobs. It is an organization filled with inspired, dedicated people of character and humility who, as it happens, do great things every day. In a very literal sense, there is a hero around every corner. And, what’s more, every single member knows the Coast Guard missions and their own role in those missions.

Second, the United States Coast Guard lives and breathes leadership. It pervades every aspect of an organization where every person is a leader.

Most studies of leadership involve a single person—one leader who has made a difference in an organization. But this is the story of an organization that has made a difference in the success of a nation. The roots of the Coast Guard go back to the birth of the United States of America. It was a service organization imbued with proper leadership thinking and behavior by the nation’s founders. That leadership has endured for more than two and one-quarter centuries, uncorrupted by the “business management” thinking of the industrial age, tested by war, and tempered by terrorism in the homeland.765

Rather than assuming that leadership is a task performed by people at the top of the organization, Philips and Loy are adamant in treating every member of the Coast Guard organization as leaders. In a capstone case study that knits together their sixteen characteristics of Coast Guard organizational leadership/management processes, Phillips and Loy present an account of the Coast Guard’s agile response to the 9/11 attacks that demonstrates the value of distributed leadership and initiative at multiple levels of the organization:

The events of 11 September 2001 and its aftermath demonstrated the formidable leadership capabilities of the United States Coast Guard. Through resolute decisiveness, a strong bias for action, and effective communication, the organization was not only able to rush to the nation’s rescue during the crisis, it was also able to shift gears and change the entire organization on a dime…. The organization’s building of alliances and forging of relationships was also brought to bear in the crisis…. The concept of “team over self” and the principle of “leveraging resources” were also brought to the forefront…. All around the Coast Guard, young

people in the field were empowered to use their best judgment, make their own decisions, and take appropriate actions.\textsuperscript{766}

These two very different views of national security leadership—presidential, transformational on one end of a continuum, and immediate, distributed on the other end of the continuum—can be reconciled. Joseph S. Nye uses his new book, \textit{The Powers to Lead}, to flesh out a definition of “leaders” and “leadership” that bridges the two views. Several excerpts from those pages convey a “scalable” theory of leadership as the ability to mobilize other people to accomplish an emergent, shared objective:

1. **Leadership is mobilizing people for a purpose.** “A quick look at the dictionary shows that many definitions of leaders and leadership exist, but our most common usage focuses on a person who guides or is in charge of others, and that implies followers who move in the same direction. Leadership means mobilizing people for a purpose.”

2. **Leadership is helping a group create shared goals.** “I define a leader as someone who helps a group create and achieve shared goals. The shared objectives are important. The children of Hamelin followed the legendary Pied Piper to oblivion when he wreaked his revenge upon the town in the thirteenth century, but he was not a leader in the sense of helping a group set and achieve shared goals.”

3. **Leadership is an organizational process outside of a single person.** “The leader need not be a single individual, and the goals may be derived from the group, but leadership is the power to orient and mobilize others for a purpose.”

4. **Leadership is the exercising of a portfolio of managerial skills.** “Leadership is not just who you are but what you do. The functions that leaders perform for human groups are to create meaning and goals, reinforce group identity and cohesion, provide order, and mobilize collective work.”\textsuperscript{767}

5. **Leadership is tightly intertwined with “followership.”** “Not only are leaders and followers often interchangeable in small groups, but in large groups and organizations, most people wind up leading from the middle, serving as leaders and followers—principals and agents—at the same time. Such followers help their bosses to lead as well as to provide leadership for their own followers. Leadership can be broadly distributed within groups and can shift with situations.”

6. **Leadership and “followership” are tightly intertwined with context.** “We can think of leadership as a process with three key components: leaders, followers, and contexts. The context consists of both the external environment and the changing objectives that a group seeks in a particular situation. As we have seen,

\textsuperscript{766} Phillips and Loy 164–165.
the traits that are most relevant to effective leadership depend on the context, and
the situation creates followers’ needs that lead them to search for particular
leaders.”768

Nye’s theory of leadership, broad enough to encompass a wide range of leadership
type, is suitable for investigating the concept of leadership in the national security
system:

I define leaders as those who help a group create and achieve shared goals.
Some try to impose their own goals, others derive them more from the
the group, but leaders mobilize people to reach those objectives. Leadership
is a social relationship with three key components—leaders, followers,
and the contexts in which they interact.769

This definition brings together Abshire’s view (more consistent with “some try to impose
their own goals”) and Loy’s view (more consistent with “others derive them more from
the group”). In addition, it recognizes the importance of context: the high-end
international context described by Abshire, and the immediate environmental jolts at the
local level described by Loy.

Recognizing that leadership occurs at multiple levels informs an analysis of leadership in
the national security system. The president, Cabinet officials and their deputies, under-
and assistant secretaries, their deputies and office directors all represent different levels
of leadership. The problems and incentives that individuals face at each level are not
identical, or at least the intensity with which they operate is not. It is also important to
distinguish between political appointees and those individuals, typically members of the
Senior Executive Service, who form the permanent leadership cadre in the national
security system. Agencies differ in the number of their political appointees and also with
regard to the level at which they serve. Historically, for example, the Defense
Department has had more political appointees and more serving at lower levels than the
State Department.

Broadly speaking, leadership problems in the national security system parallel the
problems identified in human talent management. In human talent management, the
problems are generating the required human capital and then allocating it across
departments and agencies to address national security missions. In leadership, we find
problems both in generating institutional capacity more broadly, and then in sharing it to
accomplish interagency missions. In both respects, Cabinet officials find it difficult to
balance the tension between national and departmental interests. Thus, the conflicting
roles of Cabinet officials that contribute to national security system’s inability to integrate
department and agency efforts well also are manifest in the system’s human capital
problems.770

4. Leaders pay insufficient attention to building institutional capacity.

769 Nye x–xi.
770 See the discussion on conflicting cabinet roles in the section on structure, p. 221-222.
Leaders in the national security system are not committed to building institutional capacity. Symptomatic of this problem is their nearly exclusive focus on short-term policy issues. Political appointees are political people. Their primary interest is policy. Conversely, managing their bureaucracy—building its institutional capacity, for example—is not a major interest. This is not to say that senior leaders do not understand the importance of building institutional capacity or have no interest in it at all. It is only to say that it is unlikely to be their primary interest. Michael Blumenthal commented about his tenure as treasury secretary that “you learn quickly that you do not go down in history as a good or bad Secretary in terms of how well you ran the place.”

Senior leaders are sometimes willing to build general capacity by requesting more resources, if doing so is consistent with the president’s agenda. However, building the strength of the organization through more effective organization and management is rare and difficult: rare because the short tenure of political appointees militates against the undertaking, and difficult because success is so uncertain.

*Cause: No time or incentives for institution building*

Senior leaders in the national security system are short-timers. On average, political appointees serve fewer than two years. Since building a strong organization is generally recognized to be a long-term activity, it is an unlikely one for short-timers. Any measures senior leaders take to build institutional capacity will yield results, if they do, only years after they have left office. By contrast, the pressing policy issues of the day require immediate attention and deliver immediate feedback. It is not surprising that political leaders tend to focus on tasks that can be accomplished in the near term. Politically and personally, doing so is more rewarding. One student of the federal bureaucracy noted that “the short tenure and small rewards of much public service mean that for many political executives the chance to influence policy is a major incentive for taking a government job.”

In addition, the very nature of national security organizations tends to sidetrack senior leaders from building institutional capacity. The goals of many national security organizations are ambiguous and inherently political or controversial. For example, the *U.S. Government Manual* says that the State Department advises the President in the formulation and execution of foreign policy and promotes the long-range security and well-being of the United States.

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771 Wilson, *Bureaucracy*, 196.
773 Wilson, *Bureaucracy*, 205
The Department determines and analyzes the facts relating to American overseas interests, makes recommendations on policy and future action, and takes the necessary steps to carry out established policy.\textsuperscript{774}

Beyond survival, what is the long-term well-being of the United States? What are America’s overseas interests and what steps will secure them? The answers to these questions are political and controversial. This means that the leaders of these organizations must attend constantly to political issues and problems that occur largely outside their organization, although they may be caused by actions their organizations and personnel take. This is another reason why management or capacity building is not a high priority for senior leaders or, if it is when they come to office, it ceases to be when they occupy office. Their time is taken by policy-advising and external political struggles.

\textit{Cause: Institution building is difficult and progress is hard to measure}

Not only are the goals of national security organizations ambiguous and controversial, but the contribution of their personnel to achieving them is difficult to measure or assess. How much does a meeting or a series of meetings with foreign leaders contribute to a favorable change in their country’s policy? And what exactly were the skills of the diplomat that led to the favorable outcome? Similar questions can be asked about the activities of military officers and case officers, with appropriate substitutions given the work they do. If the necessary institutional capacities themselves are unclear, building them is likely to be an ambiguous and potentially unrewarding activity. Certainly it is a long-term activity as a general rule, and thus a difficult undertaking for a political appointee.

Because there is little incentive to build institutional capacity in national security organizations, and it is difficult to do so with much certainty about the results, political leadership tends to focus first on policy issues and little at all on institutional capacity building. The result of the various incentives and problems with capacity building outlined here is to discourage attention to capacity building among senior leaders.

5. \textit{Leaders pay insufficient attention to interagency missions.}

Senior leaders in the national security system see themselves—and are encouraged to see themselves—as policy advisors to the president. Both in providing advice and in implementing any policy decisions that result from it, senior leaders act out of loyalty to the president. As political appointees, they are expected to do so. From this perspective, their attention should be on accomplishing the missions that are the priority of the administration in the most effective and efficient way possible.

Yet, at the same time, senior leaders must respect the preferences of their departments or agencies. Indeed, a senior leader’s ability to implement presidential policy depends on his ability to control his organization so that he can bring its capacities to bear on the

mission. Controlling the organization requires that the senior leader respect its preferences and defend its interests. If the president’s agenda works against the interests of his organization and he pursues that agenda, he is likely to face leaks to the press or malicious implementation within his agency or other measures of bureaucratic resistance. As these occur, the senior leader’s relations with his organization are likely to become an issue in Congress and the press. At this point, the senior leader loses not only control of his organization but the confidence of the president and thus his hold on his office.

As a result, one perverse symptom of the current system’s impact on senior leadership is that a senior leader’s loyalty to the president can lead to the president’s lack of loyalty toward him. Something like this happened to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld prior to the attacks on 9/11. Rumsfeld aggressively sought to implement the president’s military transformation agenda, including reorganization of the Pentagon. The result was grave discontent in the military and among career civil servants. Rumors reported in the press in the days prior to the attack on 9/11 speculated that Rumsfeld would be the first Cabinet official in the Bush administration to resign.

The fates of several directors of central intelligence also illustrate the full spectrum of the loyalty/disloyalty dynamic. As DCI, James Woolsey was criticized for being bureaucratically captured by the agency’s Directorate of Operations (DO), the part of the agency that does espionage. Woolsey handed out punishments to DO officers that several interested parties considered too lenient. This created political problems for the Clinton administration and was one factor that led President Clinton to replace Woolsey. John Deutch, his replacement, was determined not to be captured by the DO and to implement the changes to it that the Clinton administration wanted. He brought to the CIA a number of his own loyalists, people to whom he gave important positions in the CIA’s bureaucracy, particularly in the DO. He also reprimanded or in other ways punished some DO officers. Fairly soon, stories begin to appear in the press about Deutch’s mismanagement of the CIA, particularly the DO. The stories aired complaints and contained information from DO officers. It soon became clear that Deutch had lost the confidence of DO personnel. This became an issue in Congress. Deutch’s tenure as DCI was shorter than Woolsey’s. George Tenet was DCI for nearly seven years in large part because he succeeded in balancing loyalty to the presidents he served and respect for the preferences of the DO.

The need to maintain control of their agencies makes senior leaders less attentive than they might want to be to interagency missions. Whether in pressing for more resources for their organizations or pushing its capabilities or policy preferences as the solution to national security problems, senior leaders need to further the interests of their organizations even at the expense of better interagency solutions. If they fail to do so, they risk losing control of their organization and their ability to accomplish anything.

*Cause: Senior leader roles are conflicted*

Senior leaders, and particularly Cabinet officials, are given fundamentally conflicting roles. They have an institutional mandate to build institutional capacity and manage their departments well. This responsibility conflicts with their role as a presidential advisor, in
which they must be ready to sacrifice department equities when doing so will improve the chance of success for multiagency missions. Cabinet members thus must balance their roles as presidential advisors with their statutory obligations to build, manage, and safeguard strong departmental capabilities:

Generally, cabinet officials become champions of the bureaucratic legions below, the advocates of their agencies—localities, in Washington lingo. Exceptions do occur, but usually policymakers identify national security with the programs, actions, budgets, roles, and functions—the very essence—of the agency they run. Their instinct is to influence presidential policy to foster the growth and importance of their own agencies. Typically, the policy options they promote are the ones which they will carry out if the president approves.\\footnote{Hedrick Smith, \textit{The Power Game: How Washington Works} (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989) 571.}

Thus, a Cabinet official is the leader of an organization that has specific tasks to perform and must be led in such a way that it is capable of performing those tasks. Leaders must defend the interests and prerogatives of their organizations, at the expense of interagency solutions that endanger the interests and prerogatives of his/her organization. On the other hand, a Cabinet official is a senior advisor to the president on how best to perform missions that his agency alone cannot perform. Successful interagency missions serve the interests of the president and of the nation. But the Cabinet officials have a strong incentive to believe the missions are best accomplished either through the singular efforts of his/her agency or, at a minimum, by assigning their agency the lead role for accomplishing these missions.

In summary, senior leaders face a choice between defending their organization’s interests and deferring to broader interagency solutions or the president’s agenda. Generally speaking, in the current system, incentives and political dynamics incline senior leaders to sacrifice interagency approaches and push their organizations’ capabilities instead. This is particularly true since working through interagency councils tends to produce either a stalemate over controversial policy issues or watered-down, consensus policies that avoid hard decisions. As Cabinet officials work policy issues from their organization’s perspective, their personal interest in policy and their short tenure in office encourage them to use, rather than to build, their organizations’ capacities.

6. \textit{Subordinate leaders are disinclined to take initiative.}

The discussion of senior leadership, which focused on Cabinet officials, applies to their deputies and, in some cases, perhaps even to the undersecretaries. Below that level, among assistant and deputy assistant secretaries and office directors, another problem emerges. Lower ranking officials tend not to take initiative and responsibility. As one analyst notes:
Career professionals recognize that political appointees serve in the most influential executive positions and make decisions for their organization throughout the interagency process. In this manner, those with the most extensive experience (career professionals) may feel that they have the least influence on their agency’s policymaking approach.\footnote{Vicki J. Rast, \textit{Interagency Fratricide: Policy Failures in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia} (Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 2004) 170.}

This is a real limitation on decision-making capacity, because at the Cabinet or undersecretary level, the span of control is quite broad. If issues could be resolved at lower levels, the national security system would be more responsive to strategic direction and exhibit greater problem-solving capacity. Decades ago, Secretary of State Dean Rusk noted that he had to “delegate the overwhelming bulk of decisions to hundreds of Foreign Service officers, authorized to act upon his behalf. The world has become so complex…that junior officers in the State Department now make decisions which before World War II would have been made by the Secretary.”\footnote{Anton K. Smith, \textit{Turning on a Dime: Diplomacy’s Role in National Security} Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, 2007) 10.}

The need for senior leaders to delegate responsibility has only grown since Dean Rusk made his observation. The world continues to prove increasingly complex, particularly given the range of U.S. global interests and responsibilities. Yet it is common to hear senior officials complain that the assistant secretaries who lead and populate the third tier of the interagency system (in the Policy Coordination Committees) are passive. A former NSC official, describing the crippling lethargy of interagency committees in general, noted they were dysfunctional “at every level but were particularly destructive of policymaking at assistant secretary level and below, where not even the most senior participants could speak authoritatively for their departments or agencies on large issues.”\footnote{Robert Hutchings, \textit{Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider’s Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989-1992} (Washington: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997) 22–23.} Even leaders in what are reputed to be the best run NSC staffs nonetheless agreed that PCCs are not effective.\footnote{Ivo Daalder, I.M. Destler, and Karla J. Nieting, \textit{The Bush Administration National Security Council: April 29, 1999} (College Park, MD: CSIS at Maryland, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland, 2000).}

Ineffective PCCs are a symptom of the problem of insufficient subordinate leader initiative. The real problem is that there are few incentives for subordinate leaders to take initiative, and several powerful disincentives for doing so. Issues are not resolved at the assistant secretary level and below because, as at higher levels, these leaders are focused on policy advice. Rewarding those who effectively advise their seniors rather than those who effectively manage their subordinates stunts initiative and reinforces centralized decision-making. Since senior leaders do not have the time to determine the policy and strategy approach for every issue they confront, many issues remain unresolved.

\textit{Cause: Bureaucratic control impedes initiative}
One explanation for the lack of incentives for subordinate leaders to take initiative is the nature of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is an instrument of political control, and part of that control is the direction that the senior political leadership in a department gives. Waiting for their guidance is in accord with the spirit of bureaucracy. Doing otherwise can easily lead to reprimand, as one student of the subject has documented:

A State Department desk officer, Richard Johnson, was impressed with the ability of US satellites to produce uncommonly good photos of what Serbs were doing in Sarajevo….Johnson wrote a one-page memo to Tom Niles, the assistant secretary for European and Canadian affairs, describing what he had learned and how easy it would be to obliterate the guns of Sarajevo. He did not hear back on it. Instead his immediate boss, Mike Habib, who had been out of town when the briefing took place, rapped Johnson’s knuckles for having sent out the memo, scolding him for trespassing outside the proper boundaries of State and venturing into territory that belonged to the military. 780

It is also typically the case that lower level appointees must gain the confidence of their superiors. This too encourages caution in taking the initiative and counsels waiting to get guidance from higher levels. A close observer of the powerful and centralized Kissinger NSC observed that “in all the elaborate series of NSC channels and committees, only some 30 key officials are estimated to be involved in making critical decisions.” That was Kissinger’s preference, but apparently he hoped it would stimulate subordinates to better performance:

Despite his perfectionist impatience with the State Department, Kissinger realizes that his unique personal role tends to weaken the institutional role of the permanent bureaucracy. He has frequently said that he would consider a signal achievement if his NSC system goaded the State Department into “better and better” performance. The more effective State became, the less the White House staff would have to do. 781

Dominant senior leadership may or may not be a goad to better policy analysis, but it is doubtful that it stimulates more initiative from subordinates. On the contrary, Cabinet level officials with strong reputations for running their organizations are typically also known as leaders who are territorial—and who should not be crossed on policy issues (i.e., not the types of leaders likely to stimulate initiative in their subordinates). 782

As the history and structure chapters indicate, the system does produce policy entrepreneurs. But they exist in spite of the system or rather in response to its general passivity. A lack of initiative is a desired outcome in bureaucracy in so far as bureaucracy exists in part to insure accountability and equity. Strict obedience to rules

and regulations and attention to the guidance of politicians help ensure both accountability and equity. Nevertheless, the general sense of those who have worked at the higher levels of the bureaucracy is that there was too much passivity below them. Diminishing this passivity, while respecting the requirements of accountability and equity, would make the national security system more responsive.

**Cause: Preference for policymaking over management**

Another practical disincentive for taking initiative is political. Subordinate leaders, like senior leaders, are for the most part political appointees, and they are most interested in policy. Personal preference for policy development over management, therefore, reinforces institutional disincentives for taking initiative. The tendency to stress policy development over good management is exacerbated by trends in political appointments. In the past three decades, presidents have systematically increased the number of political appointees in Senate-confirmed positions and Schedule-C appointments. As the Volcker Commission pointed out in its 2003 study of federal public service,

> When President Kennedy came to office in 1960, he had 286 positions to fill in the ranks of Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, and Administrator—the principal leadership positions in the executive branch. By the end of the Clinton administration, there were 914 positions with these titles. Overall in 2001, the new administration of President George W. Bush confronted a total of 3,361 offices to be filled by political appointment.

**Cause: Poor communication of senior leader goals**

As noted above, senior leaders tend to ignore building institutional capacity and to concentrate on policy problem solving. They will soon be gone, so they have few incentives to devote themselves to improving the organization. Instead of communicating their goals and encouraging and training subordinates to take initiative to solve associated problems, senior leaders all too often neglect their organizations.

Some results from the Federal Human Capital Survey of 2006, which covers the breadth of the federal government, illustrate this tendency. It is notable that only about half the respondents had a high level of respect for their organization’s senior leaders, agreed that managers communicate the goals and priorities of the organization, or were satisfied with the information they received on what was going on in their organizations. Only 38 percent agreed that “in my organization, leaders generate high levels of motivation and commitment in the workforce.” Leaders in the military, by way of contrast, spend their lives in the system and come from the ranks they lead and recognize their duty for

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784 “Presidential Transition Guide.”
785 National Commission on the Public Service 18.
786 It was not possible to disaggregate the results for national security departments, agencies, and interagency functions.
communicating goals and expectations. The morale in military organizations is consistently high, as is respect for leadership.

**Cause: Inadequate investment in leadership skills**

The Senior Executive Service was to be the centerpiece for the sustained development of a well-trained cadre of civilian agency leaders. However, the legislation did not provide a funding mechanism to assure that resources were made available, nor were the foundation structures of the civil service, such as the strong emphasis on technical and programmatic requirements, changed in ways that emphasized leadership development. Thus, when the GAO placed human capital on its *High Risk* list in 2001, it identified leadership as one of four significant components of the analysis, stating specifically:

Today’s (2001) nonpostal civilian federal workforce is smaller than it was a decade ago. From approximately 2.3 million federal employees in fiscal year 1990, the number was reduced to fewer than 1.9 million by fiscal year 1999. But what happened—or more importantly, did not happen—as this downsizing was being accomplished was just as significant as the downsizing itself. For example, much of the downsizing was set in motion without sufficient planning for its effects on agencies’ performance capacity. Across government, federal employers reduced or froze their hiring efforts for extended periods…. This helped reduce their numbers of employees, but it also reduced the influx of new people with new knowledge, new energy, and new ideas—the reservoir of future agency leaders and managers. Further, anecdotal evidence tells us that as agencies tried to save on workforce-related costs, they cut back on other human capital investments, such as performance rewards, enabling technologies, and the training and professional development programs they would need if their smaller workforces were to compensate for institutional losses in skills and experience. These curtailed investments in human capital took place even as a smaller federal workforce remained to oversee larger federal budgets.787

4. **Consequences**

Human capital management in the national security system suffers from several problems: the system does not generate or allocate the required human capital; the cultures of functional organizations so dominate the system that it impedes unity of effort; senior leadership pays insufficient attention to capacity building and interagency missions; and subordinate leaders rarely take initiative. A number of consequences follow from these problems.

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PROBLEM ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM

a. Immediate

The most immediate consequence of these problems is that interagency missions are hampered in two ways. First, the focus at all leadership levels on policy advice rather than management means that the capacities of the functional agencies are less fully developed than they might be, at least in some agencies. In particular:

- Departments, agencies, and interagency functions are unable to acquire the talent needed to meet system performance demands.
- The scarce resource of education and training dollars is individually focused and thus essentially wasted, rather than directed to achieve a set of systemic career development objectives based on the needs of the organization.
- The recruitment, assignment, education, and training dollars spent fail to help acquire and assure a well-prepared workforce for national security assignments.
- Civilians are facing growing challenges in operating in unknown situations, and they are often not as well-equipped as their military counterparts to perform in contingencies and/or crises.
- Since civilians are often considered to be in a weaker position than their military counterparts in dealing with contingencies, there is a tendency to rely on the military to perform what have historically been civilian roles. These are roles which the military is poorly prepared to perform and which communicate a preference for “hard power” to other nations.

Thus, when the functional agencies address interagency problems, they do so with personnel less well prepared than they should be, even to perform the core tasks of their agency. Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte pointed to this problem recently in congressional testimony. “For too long, insufficient numbers of trained, prepared and supported civilians have obliged us to resort to the military for such missions more than might otherwise have been necessary.” 788

The growing trend favoring political appointments also is producing consequences. If civilian career professionals are not expected to be policy leaders in higher levels, then the agencies do not emphasize leadership in their development, education, and training programs, or in their promotion policies. This “glass ceiling” also causes higher level of attrition among individuals who aspire to leadership positions (since political appointees

tend to have more diverse experience, including from outside the government\(^{789}\), as well as affect motivation in mid- to senior-levels.\(^{790}\)

Another effect of the increased use of political appointments is on organizational continuity and effectiveness. The reliance on political appointees as the primary source of leadership causes agencies to be increasingly vulnerable to a loss of institutional memory and to an inability to function effectively during administration or position transition. Most political appointees’ tenures tend to be short. Experts with broad experience from different parts of the government have repeatedly highlighted the phenomenon that shorter tenures result in the holders of those positions focusing more on “leaving a mark” than on leading and managing. Frequent turnovers also exacerbate the inability to develop and implement strategic long-term vision—at the agency and interagency levels alike.

b. Extended

One extended consequence of the national security system’s human capital problems is a mismatch between the current leadership model, which is conflictual and emphasizes top-down direction, and the kind of leadership required for an increasingly complex security environment. In a more dynamic environment, tightly centralized leadership is inadequate and the need for distributed initiative more acute. As Margaret Daly Hayes describes in her discussion of networked organizations:

> The particular challenge to achieving information superiority, decision superiority, and response agility in the homeland defense/security environment is the **unprecedented degree of collaboration required across a diverse range of domestic and international civilian and military agencies and organizations to achieve the rapid response and coordination needed to successfully address the current, uncertain, asymmetric national and homeland security environment.** The well-instrumented information domain is the enabler of information sharing, facilitator of collaboration across disparate organization boundaries, and the bridge to shared situation awareness and more rapid, collaborative decision-making between and among agencies and levels of government.….  

Current thinking about networked organization response to complex challenges refers to these challenges as “complex endeavors,” or situations in which a large number of disparate entities share a purpose or related purposes. Joint and combined military operations, inter-agency collaboration, Local-State-Federal coordination and collaboration, public-private partnerships and others may tackle complex endeavors.

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In a complex endeavor, while participants may have a shared goal or purpose, they do not have a single leader (individual or organization); there is no “unity of command,” and independent entities must coordinate and collaborate in order to achieve the shared goal. Each element must bring its specific outlook and expertise to the community and activities of all actors must be synchronized (arranged purposefully in time and space). The synchronization of effort will involve deconfliction, coordination, collaboration, information sharing, synchronization across communities, and a shift from hierarchical organization to networked organizations.\footnote{Margaret Daly Hayes, “An NCO Primer: An Introduction to Networked Enabled Organizations and Its Application to Homeland Security/Defense, Evidence Based Research,” (Washington, September 2005) 1.}

If this is the future of effective organizations, then team-based leadership competencies that enable successful functioning in such organizational environments are essential.

In this regard, the national security community retirement wave presents both opportunity and consequence. Within the next ten years most of the “baby boomer” generation, which currently holds the majority of leadership and senior technical positions, are expected to retire. (Some agencies estimate that as many as 90 percent of their senior officers will retire in the next five to ten years.) When organizations have sound workforce planning, there are well-qualified candidates who can move into senior positions. The shortage of such individuals in many national security agencies can result in either staffing executive-level positions with less experienced personnel, or with filling those positions with external candidates. External candidates can bring new ideas and perspectives to organizations, but they will have a learning curve for which agencies need to plan.

The exact effect on system performance is not clear, since many of the senior appointments increasingly are done through political channels from outside of the agencies. However, this may result in management challenges and in institutional memory challenges. Nonetheless, this generational change can have an extended consequence of the creation of a new culture for the national security system. This can happen as long as it is accompanied by strategic workforce planning that defines needed competencies and requirements for recruitment and systematically linked to a strategically focused career development system.

5. Conclusions

The human capital laws, regulations, programs, policies, procedures, and tools currently employed within national security community organizations, and more particularly across the entire community, are inadequate. They are inadequate for assuring that the United States government will be able to attract and retain the well-qualified workforce needed to produce the leaders, the managers, the supervisors, and the individual professional performers required to assure security for America’s citizens. For the most part, the human capital laws, regulations, policies, programs, procedures, and tools are still based in concepts of work and rewards appropriate to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Problem Analysis of the Current System

They are rooted in specific positions, held by specific individuals, within specific organizations and thus will continue to reinforce a culture of specific agency interests trumping national security community interests. Obtaining necessary talent would be much easier, and therefore consistently more likely to happen, if the laws and regulations governing human capital were more flexible.

Outside of the current efforts of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, there is little evidence that strategic human capital planning, leadership identification and development, culture development and implementation, recruitment, education and training, or managing the all-source workforce have been occurring on an interagency basis across the entire national security community. Given the predictions of increased levels of threat, increased complexity of national security issues, and the assumptions of the speed and coordination with which these issues must be handled, human capital tools that are primarily agency- and individual-specific—rather than community-specific as well—will continue to be inadequate to the tasks at hand, as is the overly centralized leadership model that currently dominates the national security system.

The analysis here departs somewhat from the conventional wisdom in that it underscores the inadequacy of the current individual and agency-centric framework for human capital laws, regulations, policies, programs, and procedures. Until that framework is readjusted to encompass the national security community’s collaboration across agency boundaries, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to establish a commonality of culture and shared mission, vision, values, and interests that are essential in the national security environment of the twenty-first century. Because these changes run counter to the current national security system’s structure and processes—and perhaps to American culture, which tends to prize the individual above the collective good—these issues will be more difficult, rather than less difficult, to resolve.


E. Knowledge Management

Summary

Knowledge is the interaction of information for better decision-making, innovation, and adaptation. It is learning your way around a city by using the experiences of a taxi-driver (i.e., knowledge), rather than using a map (i.e., information). Knowledge management is managing the interaction of information in an organization. The knowledge management limitations of the current system contribute to its declining performance. In general, the system has three knowledge management problems. First, it shares knowledge poorly at all levels. Knowledge is power, and both reside in autonomous organizations inclined to preserve their autonomy. Thus, information technology, terminology, and classifications are often agency specific, and information and knowledge hoarding are common. While the current national security system has many ways of sharing information, it does not do so effectively, and developing, sharing, and retaining real knowledge is uncommon. Second, the system does not learn easily or retain lessons that have been learned. In part, the system has difficulty learning from experience because it tends to generate consensus at the expense of critical assessments of alternative courses of action. The information lost during presidential transitions is just one example of the national security system’s poor learning infrastructure.

Third, the national security system lacks a true global situational awareness. Traditional management models that are prevalent in the national security system assume linear causality and event predictability, which may help a decision-maker impose order but often are inappropriate for managing complex environments. Thus the system cannot interpret the environment rapidly or well. In addition, because of poor information flow within the national security system, it fails to “know what it knows.” Attempts to improve situational awareness have limited impact because the investments in technologies are not matched by concomitant changes to management, organizational processes, and culture. Poor information management practices reinforce all three primary knowledge management problems, restricting information sharing, limiting learning, and exacerbating poor global situational awareness. Nevertheless, there are examples of effective knowledge management, which the report describes, that suggest knowledge management reform is possible.

Problems and Causes

The following table summarizes the complete set of major problems and causes for this section.

\[792\] David Snowden, Lecture
### Problem Analysis of the Current System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problems</th>
<th>Causes</th>
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| 1. Sharing information across organizational boundaries is difficult.   | - Agency cultures discourage information sharing  
- Poor interoperability on the classified side  
- Overclassification  
- The proliferation of the “sensitive but unclassified” designation |
| 2. Organizational learning is thwarted.                                  | - The tendency toward consensus decision-making undermines vigorous debate at the highest levels of the national security system  
- Political and bureaucratic influences impede organizational learning  
- The system often abandons institutional memory—particularly in the transition between presidential administrations  
- The worldviews of incoming administrations encourage the discarding of institutional memory |
| 3. The national security system lacks true global situation awareness.  | - Organizational perspectives filter inputs to senior decision-makers, skewing interpretations of the security environment  
- The “common operational picture” (COP) demands continuous updating  
- Cognitive biases interfere |
| 4. Current data systems do not provide or are not employed in a manner that promotes optimal knowledge sharing. | - Confusing technical connections with collaboration  
- Information systems are missing common data abstraction, protocols, and compatible business logic  
- Inability of systems to understand business limitations and context of data |

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1. Introduction

At least forty-three definitions of “knowledge management” appear in existing literature, ranging from rebranded information management to more sophisticated definitions grounded in philosophy, organizational theory, sociology, and business studies. Thomas Stewart, in one classic definition, defines knowledge management by the goal that every person in an organization be able to lay his hands on the collected know-how, experience, and wisdom of all of his colleagues.793 Stewart’s treatment of the field relies on his focus on managing the elements of intellectual capital, declaring:

Intelligence becomes an asset when some useful order is created out of free-floating brainpower—that is, when it is given coherent form (a mailing list, a database, an agenda for a meeting, a description of a process); when it is captured in a way that allows it to be described, shared, and exploited; and when it can be deployed to do something that could not be done if it remained scattered around like so many coins in a gutter. Intellectual capital is packaged, useful knowledge.794

Tracing the evolution of knowledge management highlights three apparent origins: ubiquitous computing, globalization, and a knowledge-centric view of the firm.795 The antecedents of these are both intellectual (economics, sociology, philosophy, and psychology) and practicable (information management, quality movement, and human capital movements). The evolution of knowledge management over the years, some have explained, has included movement from “knowledge lives in documents” to “knowledge

794 Ibid. 67.
lives in people” to “knowledge lives in organizational networks.” Others have agreed with this evolution yet believe that all three remain valid.

Three generations of knowledge management have been observed since its inception:

1. **Information for decision support:** The need for decision-support information—spurred by the technology revolution, which the perceived efficiencies of process engineering dominated—spawned solutions in business intelligence and data mining. As organizational data were increasingly stored in digital form rather than file cabinets, tools were developed to conduct analysis and automate “workflow.”

2. **The socialization-externalization-combination-internalization (SECI) model:** A construct by which the knowledge of an individual is developed and combined with that of others to integrate into an organization’s knowledge base, this model attempted to “make tacit knowledge explicit” through technology and improved processes.

3. **Knowledge is paradoxical:** The view that knowledge is a flow (context) as well as a thing (content), and that knowledge management is enhanced but not solved by technical means, has been gaining traction among businesses that have invested in the previous two solutions, only to find themselves frustrated regarding their original knowledge management goals.

Generally speaking, “information management” concerns data and documents, their content, and information systems, whereas knowledge management focuses on what people know, how they learn and apply it, and organizational culture and relationships. This distinction is critical: information is considered to be “at rest,” while knowledge occurs as a “flow.” Movement of knowledge among stakeholders is the measure of organizational knowledge—like learning the way around the city by using the experiences of a taxi-driver (i.e., knowledge) vice using a map (i.e., information).

Conventional organization models, originally popularized during the industrial age, treated human behavior as uniform. Contemporary management theorists frequently embrace organic models, treating the management landscape more as ecology than machine. Complex environments are inherently unpredictable, may operate best far from what is considered equilibrium or stability, and demonstrate emergent properties that are a result of interactions rather than a simple combination of elements.

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environments force people individually and in organizations to constantly adapt their behavior to events and their surroundings.

In recent years, knowledge management has become a useful field of study and practice, and understanding its precepts has become increasingly important for organizations in both the industrial and knowledge economies. A holistic approach to organizational knowledge—that is, treating such knowledge as an asset—invites attention and investment from across the private and public sectors. Yet a common understanding of what constitutes “knowledge management” is as elusive as it is essential:

What we should not do is to force researchers and practitioners to agree on a definition of knowledge management through premature efforts at standardization. While this might bring about the consensus we need in order to do evaluations of knowledge management’s track record, any consensus forged in the political atmosphere of standard organizations may well be a consensus constructed around a compromise that has no conceptual unity, and which results in a version of “knowledge management” that is bound to fail.  

Recognizing the inherent complexity of national security components and problems, this study defines knowledge management broadly as “managing component elements from which knowledge can emerge and be used to enhance decision-making, spark innovation, and understand weak signals in the information environment.” In this definition, “component elements” refers to culture, infrastructure, sense-making (interpreting the environment), cognitive abilities, individual experience and bias, all of which come together in unpredictable patterns to generate “knowledge.” In this regard, knowledge management is not limited to managing knowledge itself; rather, it is the positive interaction of the component elements that can be managed to lay the foundation for better decision-making, innovation, and adaptation.

Construed this broadly, knowledge management is inextricably tied to several disciplines. A sample of knowledge management subdivisions with their respective disciplines includes:

- Decision-making processes—ethnography, process analysis
- “Nature of the firm”—organizational theory, complexity
- Information management—organizational informatics
- Individual and group sense-making and cognition—cognitive science

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The inherent complexity of national security components and problems demands knowledge management that effectively uses all component elements of knowledge. Increased complexity leads to increased uncertainty, and decisions made under conditions of uncertainty cannot be subject to the same validation processes and evidence-based approaches that might be expected in a more structured environment. Rather than fail-safe interventions, decision-makers may have to adopt experimental approaches just as militaries use probes to determine what may or may not be happening under complex battlefield conditions. Being alert to unpredictable patterns can increase understanding of “weak signals,” spark innovation, and increase the integrity of decisions by raising the decision-maker’s awareness of the information environment. Failure to accept the complexity of the security environment and adopt appropriate knowledge management techniques can severely limit the performance of the national security system, as the following analysis argues.

2. The Current System

a. Overview

The distinction and relationship between information and knowledge management explained in the introduction is crucial for the problem analysis offered in this section of the report. First, knowledge management, construed broadly here to encompass organizational culture, infrastructure, sense-making (interpreting the environment), cognitive abilities, and individual experience and bias, involves all the organizational dynamics that affect human decision-making. In that regard, the structure, process, and especially the human capital problems identified in preceding sections of the report are interwoven with knowledge management problems in the national security system.

For example, it is quite common for histories of the National Security Council to emphasize the impact of interpersonal relationships, that is, an “administration’s personality”

...that comes down to relationships, experience and capabilities, beginning at the top, but extending down to every member of the inner circle. These interpersonal networks can afford access, speed, and efficiency that are not available even in a well-designed system if the relationships aren’t there. 804

802 Also referred to as “structuring the unknown,” this refers to how individuals and organizations interpret the surrounding environment. There are different schools of thought in “sensemaking,” most captured well in Karl E. Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations, Foundations for Organizational Science, ed. David Whetten (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995).
804 David J. Rothkopf, Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2005) 269. This emphasis on the personalities and sociologies of the presidential administration impacting sense-making and information management is echoed in nearly every historical and organizational account of the National Security Council, see for example: Karl Inderfurth and Loch K. Johnson, Fateful Decisions: Inside the National
Informal human relationships affect the way knowledge is created, shared, and used in decision-making, but so do organizational strategy, structures, and processes. For example, the system’s inability to learn from experience unavoidably harkens back to the discussion of the evaluation stage of national security process.\(^{805}\)

Given the complex links between knowledge management and other elements of the national security system, we just highlight the most important systemic knowledge management problems that currently inhibit system performance rather than reprising all previously identified problems from a knowledge management perspective. However, illustrating these problems and identifying their causes unavoidably requires reference to some problems identified in previous sections of the report.

Second, and separately, the specific tools employed by the national security system for information management are evaluated; a difficult endeavor given the many changes in information management following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Since that momentous event, numerous reforms, which include major changes to information management practices, have been enacted. For example, the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 ("FISMA", 44 U.S.C. § 3541) is intended to enhance computer and network security within the federal government and relevant parties.\(^{806}\) Another milestone reform, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, was intended to improve the integration of policy and planning in large part through a number of electronic information management systems.\(^{807}\) Also, since 9/11, greater emphasis is being put on sharing information from all sources with the Department of State so it can better adjudicate visa applications from those who might want to harm the United States. More recently, the Department of State’s Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) has been attempting to create a database of all U.S. government capabilities relevant to stabilization and reconstruction.\(^{808}\) The Department of State also is creating “Diplopedia,” a collaborative website based on “Wiki” (i.e., Wikipedia) technology that users can employ for sharing knowledge and experiences, as well as Communities at State—a web portal that hosts forty-four live blogs or communities.\(^{809}\)

\(^{805}\) See p. 287-292.


\(^{809}\) State Department eDiplomacy Team, Personal Interview with the Knowledge Management Working Group.
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Information sharing within the intelligence community is a topic that has been accorded special attention since 9/11. The Information Sharing Strategy for the U.S. Intelligence Community notes:

The Intelligence Community’s “need-to-know” culture, a necessity during the Cold War, is now a handicap that threatens our ability to uncover, respond, and protect against terrorism and other asymmetric threats. Each intelligence agency has its own networks and data repositories that make it very difficult to piece together facts and suppositions that, in the aggregate, could provide warning of the intentions of our adversaries. \(^{810}\)

Despite the numerous reforms to extant information management practices, the way the current national security system manages data still inhibits the creation and sharing of knowledge and significantly limits the knowledge management capacity of the system. This portion of the analysis is unavoidably technical, but an effort was made to summarize and explain the origin and impact of technical problems rather than reprise the debate on technical issues. What becomes apparent is that information management problems reinforce the broader knowledge management limitations of the current national security system.

b. A General Assessment of Performance

The knowledge management limitations of the current system contribute to its haphazard performance. In extreme cases, we interpret the environment incorrectly, employ the wrong tools for problem solving, and fail to learn from mistakes. When we do learn from experience, often it is only how to improve in similar circumstances, as if the future will unfold predictably from present trends. In general, the system has three knowledge management problems.

First, it shares information poorly at all levels. The current national security system has many ways of sharing information but few ways of doing so effectively, and developing, sharing, and retaining real knowledge is uncommon. Knowledge that does exist in the system is ephemeral: corporate memories retire, archives move, and institutions struggle to capture experiences, all of which make for a “now you see it, now you don’t” dynamic. The system remains highly stove-piped, a common expression used by national security practitioners and organizational experts more generally. It simply means that authority and information flow vertically within departments and agencies rather than horizontally (i.e., across the system itself)—with minimal coordination between them. Furthermore, jurisdictional or “turf” wars inhibit information sharing and integration. Principals and staffers in the national security system work toward the goals of their own agency, rather than for the benefit of the government and of society as a whole.

Second, the system does not learn easily or retain lessons that have been learned. In part, the system has difficulty learning from experience because it tends to generate consensus at the expense of critical assessments of alternative courses of action. As discussed in the

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sections on structure and process, interagency committees either stalemate over organizational differences or weaken analytic and decision-making rigor by working toward consensus products. Consensus guarantees that the proposal with the broadest approach will win—in some cases over what is the best proposal. According to Rothkopf, “the bias toward consensus…can lead directly to mistakes.”811 The tendency toward “group-think” is just one of several decision-making pathologies that undermine the ability of the system to learn quickly from experience.

Third, and most fundamentally, the national security system lacks a true global situational awareness. It cannot interpret the environment rapidly or well and fails to “know what it knows.” Traditional management models that are prevalent in the national security system assume linear causality and event predictability, which may help a decision-maker impose order but often are inappropriate for managing complex environments. Thus the system cannot interpret the environment rapidly or well and fails. This basic decision-making limitation is exacerbated by poor information flow within the national security system, which fails to “know what it knows.” Case studies, analyses of the literature, and interviews with senior leadership confirm that, far too often, the U.S. government fails to use relevant knowledge when crafting or executing national security policy. Attempts to improve situational awareness have included investments in technologies without concomitant changes to management, organizational processes, culture, and learning.

The U.S. government has access to a vast amount of information. When databases not usually thought of as “intelligence,” such as customs or immigration information, are included, the storehouse is immense. But the U.S. government has a weak system for processing and using what it has. In interviews around the government, official after official urged us to call attention to frustrations with the unglamorous “back office” side of government operations.812

Anecdotal evidence from the private sector indicates that information technology initiatives fall short because far too often these related areas are ignored. In this regard, the way the current national security system manages information reinforces all three primary knowledge management problems. Inadequate tools and interoperability complications restrict information sharing, limit learning, and exacerbate poor global situational awareness.

3. Problem Analysis

a. Systemic Problems

1. Sharing information across organizational boundaries is difficult

One of the most obvious challenges to effective decision-making in the national security system is sharing information across organizational boundaries: within a federal agency,

811 Rothkopf, 2005, 495.
between federal agencies, between different levels of government, or among governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Because there “is no system in place to hold collectors accountable for inappropriately withholding information,”813 the incentives to not share information often outweigh the best interests of the nation. The benefits of sharing information are not immediately apparent, but the costs are apparent and also immediate.

The failure to share information starts at the top, where it often is difficult for subordinate leaders and organizations to find out what senior decision-makers have decided. In 1986, following the Iran-Contra scandal, the Tower Commission suggested that the national security advisor “ensure that adequate records are kept of NSC consultations and Presidential decisions…to avoid confusion among department staffs about what was actually decided.”814 Efforts to record formal decisions improve thereafter; but, since so much decision-making occurs informally, the problem with communicating basic decisions remains. The lack of authoritative decisions communicated quickly is often filled with organizational friction that further undermines information sharing and collaboration.

Friction between the Departments of State and Defense is often emblematic of basic breakdowns in information sharing during informal decision-making. Operation Just Cause was complicated by poor relations between the departments, especially during the post-conflict phase of the Panama operation.815 In Bosnia, State and Defense again had totally different ways of viewing the situation and different conceptions of what end-state was feasible.816 In Somalia, General Joseph Hoar (commander-in-chief, Central Command) did not have a strong relationship with an equivalent regional lead policymaker at State.817 During the crisis in East Timor, the lack of coordination between DoD and DoS in policies and in approaches to their Australian counterparts caused consternation and confusion in Australian leadership and policy circles.818 Following Operation Iraqi Freedom, State and Defense did not work well with one another: “People, who had to work with and trust each other, did not do so.”819

815 It is unclear whether this uncertainty was a result of either the DoD leaving State out of the planning or an organizational construct that made planning and cooperation between DoD and State difficult. PNSR Case Study—Post-Conflict State-Building in Panama, 1989–1990.
817 Christopher J. Lamb, “Did Leaders or the System Fail?” Project on National Security Reform Case Study (2008).
819 Collins.
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Trust networks and personal relationships dominate informal methods of information sharing and decision-making. Access to the president is the overriding predictor of power in the White House; “there is no more important source of power in the executive branch than that afforded by genuine connection with and the respect of the commander-in-chief.”  

Presidents make decisions based on guidance from advisors whom they know and trust, even if those advisors are dealing with topics that are beyond their purported realm of expertise. The Clinton administration’s handling of Bosnia provided one example of this:

Further hampering efforts to respond in the Balkans was that while [National Security Advisor] Lake had regular access to the President (unlike other foreign policy principals), he was not close to Clinton and at times only learned of the President’s shifts on Bosnia policy from other senior officials.

The importance of trust networks and their ability to override formal information sharing does not stop at the level of the president. The National Security Council and hierarchy of interagency committees that support it often functions well only if the principals have good working relationships—relationships that are often formed through informal meetings outside of the formal NSC decision-making process. Numerous examples of such meetings exist, as in the following case from the George H. W. Bush administration:

The principals group, while important, did not meet often either, because its structure did not consider an important factor—the interest of the President. And since a meeting was no longer simply a principals committee meeting when the President joined and since George H. W. Bush was a very hands-on President when it came to foreign policy—another mechanism needed to evolve. As in past administrations, what filled the gap was an informal group that become exceptionally influential because of the comfort level of the key members with it and also with each other [Emphasis added].

While trust networks are important at all levels within and among agencies, the lack of trust between agency components and headquarters often complicates information sharing. A House Armed Services Committee assessment of PRTs illustrated this when they found that “neither the Department of Defense nor the Department of State can provide basic information about what each provincial reconstruction team is attempting to do or what progress PRTs are making individually or collectively.” Some elements

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820 Rothkopf 227.
821 For example, spouses often have a significant impact on presidential decision-making. See Rothkopf 214.
822 Rothkopf 365.
823 Rothkopf 267.
within DHS, for example, existed as independent bodies for decades or longer and still view themselves as separate from the agency.\textsuperscript{825}

The lack of interoperable information-sharing systems complicates the sharing of knowledge across boundaries. The use of classified versus unclassified information is one factor contributing to this difficulty. Problems with sharing information also occur inside of both the classified and unclassified information domains. On the classified side, as military officers stationed in Iraq have been experiencing, it is difficult to combine information from different sources due to the need-to-know restrictions from the various agencies.\textsuperscript{826} Need-to-know concerns about intelligence sharing have also kept the government from giving commercial airlines complete terror suspect lists.\textsuperscript{827}

On the unclassified side, during the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia, no open source database existed to give responding organizations information about the scene on the ground. There was also no formal mechanism for sharing information between the U.S. government, non-governmental organizations, government organizations (NGOs), and foreign governments.\textsuperscript{828} U.S. management of information flow and coordination with NGOs was also noted as a distinct challenge in the environment immediately following the disaster.\textsuperscript{829}

\textit{Cause: Agency cultures discourage information sharing}

Integration never truly happened. I never found a way to join forces effectively with the State Department and link their plans with mine. I had no way to get answers to questions like, ‘What’s the diplomatic component of our strategy? What’s the economic component? How is aid going to be distributed?’\textsuperscript{830}

As noted in previous sections of the report, organizations often wield information as a powerful weapon in bureaucratic conflicts waged to achieve desired policies and prevent the implementation of inimical policies. This is true both within and between major departments and agencies, and has been for decades, as examples from military, diplomatic, and intelligence organizations attest. For example, the earliest PNSR case study documents how, during World War I, the Army censored news reports on the growing influenza epidemic in order to conceal the weakened state of U.S. military manpower from the Germans. This served the Army’s specific goal of denying Germany

\textsuperscript{825} DHS officials, Personal Interview.
\textsuperscript{826} Based on interview with Army officer who served in Iraq from October 2006 to January 2008.
\textsuperscript{827} National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 392.
\textsuperscript{828} "International Interagency Response to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami," Project on National Security Reform Case Study.
\textsuperscript{829} "Interagency Response to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami."
useful intelligence but made it much harder to diagnose and ameliorate the effects of a devastating epidemic.831

Another historic example of inadequate information sharing between the military and civilian organizations is the practice of tightly classifying contingency plans.832 Prior to the invasion of Panama in 1989, the Department of State was excluded from the planning process. The practice of excluding non-military organizations from the DoD planning process even though the success of the plans often require cooperation from outside organizations for effective execution is a longstanding problem.833 In the early 1990s, the Joint Staff classified war plans as code-word level documents to sharply limit civilian access, leaving only a small number of civilians able to see those plans.834 Over the course of the 1990s, the classification of such plans was reduced and shared more broadly within DoD. Over the past decade, even more progress has been made on sharing information about plans within DoD and with other agencies, but not enough to negate the general finding.835 For example, in the buildup to the Iraq invasion, few planners who were not directly involved in military operations had access to the war plan,836 and even recent reforms have not improved the situation:

State generally does not receive DoD military plans as they are being developed, which restricts its ability to harmonize reconstruction and stabilization efforts with military plans and operations as required by NSPD-44. DoD does not have a process in place to share, when appropriate, information with non-DoD agencies early in plan development without specific approval from the Secretary of Defense. DoD’s hierarchical approach limits interagency participation while plans are being developed by the combatant commands at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. NSPD-44 working groups are developing a process for reviewing military plans, when appropriate, but are not yet ready to use it.837

DoD is not the only organization that carefully protects and limits distribution of its products. More recently, one lesson from 9/11 is that consular officers adjudicating visas applications would benefit from greater access to other government databases. Some of the nineteen terrorist hijackers who legally entered the United States on nonimmigrant

832 Knowledge Management Working Group Interview, 13 March 2008.
835 See Appendix on current processes, p.650-680.
837 Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps. GAO report to Congressional requesters Nov. 2007.
visas might have been denied entry if consular offices had better access to records from law enforcement and intelligence services databases.

The Department of State has internal information sharing challenges as well. The same 2005 GAO report that recommended consular officers have greater access to other government databases also noted problems in coordination between the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) and the Office of the Coordinator for Diplomatic Security, Office for Antiterrorism Assistance (DS/T/ATA). S/CT provides quarterly policy guidance to DS/T/ATA through a tiered list of priority countries, but the list does not include information on each country’s counterterrorism-related program goals, objectives, or training priorities that would facilitate DS/T/ATA’s implementation of country-specific programs. The GAO also notes that State’s antiterrorism planners do not pursue evaluation methods with regard to the sustainability of their country-level programs. Senior officials in both S/CT and DS/T/ATA were not aware of departmental-level planning documents that included numerical targets—as well as past results regarding countries that had attained advanced levels of sustainable counterterrorism capability—nor were they aware of any existing metrics of sustainability.  

Information sharing is also a major impediment to performance in the intelligence community, which deserves some extended comment given the numerous post 9/11 initiatives to ameliorate the problem. Current leadership is promoting a transition from a need-to-know culture to one where the responsibility to provide or the need to share information is a core tenet, and progress has been made. For example, the National Counterterrorism Center attempts to address knowledge management issues within the intelligence community. The National Counterterrorism Center Online enhances the ability to share terrorism-related information across the federal government. National, state, and regional fusion centers, along with such other information-sharing initiatives such as the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) and Field Intelligence Groups (FIG), have also helped to bring together different levels of government to focus on specific missions.

More generally, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence recently released 100- and 500-day plans for integration and collaboration across the intelligence community. The National Strategy for Information Sharing identifies four focal points for the intelligence community (in addition to continued concerns over privacy and legal rights):
information sharing at the national level; among state, local, and tribal entities; with the private sector; and with foreign partners. Yet issues persist in all four areas.

For example, the stovepiping or hording of information within agencies remains an issue at the national level. A former Chief of Plans and Policy in the Office of Intelligence Support at the Department of Treasury\textsuperscript{841} notes that few incentives for information sharing within the government exist, and those employees that are talented at sharing information often find themselves marginalized rather than rewarded.\textsuperscript{842} A former deputy assistant secretary of defense for intelligence echoed these concerns, noting that there are multiple instances of agencies holding information that another agency does not have. Part of this, he argues, is because intelligence remains balkanized across agencies, with different standards and processes prevailing and no one leading or coordinating between them.

The security classification process also remains a major impediment to interagency information sharing. A contractor working on black operations programs for both the National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office would need two different Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) permissions—even though he would be operating at the same level of clearance for both agencies. Attempts to reconcile clearances have failed because there was no one agency with the authority to force compromise, leaving more than thirty-eight different agencies that can grant security clearances.

The ODNI’s Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan identifies problem areas that accentuate the information-sharing challenges facing the intelligence community and the fact that much necessary progress remains to be achieved:

1. **Policies:** Because there is no overarching, cross-community policy for information access, contrasting and conflicting policies evolve from the department and agency levels. Inconsistent procedures for handling sensitive but unclassified (SBU) information result, and are further complicated by the variety of forums handling that information between federal and local government and private organizations.

2. **Procedures:** In the absence of a single framework that operates across federal, state, local, tribal, and private-sector lines, a wide variety of systems for alerts, tips, advice, situational awareness, and warning grow from the bottom up and are not well understood outside of their individual agencies or communities.

3. **Programs:** There is no integrated, communitywide, comprehensive training program for information sharing.

\textsuperscript{841} PNSR personal interview with a former Chief of Plans and Policy in the Office of Intelligence Support at the Department of Treasury, March 31, 2008.

\textsuperscript{842} Ibid.
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4. **Systems:** Wide variations in system-specific interfaces inhibit, and in some cases prevent, the indexing of information that would lead to easier research and retrieval.

5. **Architectures:** Although agencies have made progress in developing enterprise architectures, it is difficult to know whether individual agencies have sufficiently focused reengineering efforts on cross-organizational information sharing.

6. **Standards:** Although various ODNI directives have set in motion a continued alignment and consolidation of standards across the intelligence community, much standardization remains to be achieved.

In sum, although the intelligence community in particular has embarked on numerous reforms designed to change organizational culture over time, the general rule still holds that there is far more reward for withholding information and protecting one’s organization than for sharing it. A review of organizational literature suggests there are at least six reasons why the dominant cultures in the national security system still discourage information sharing:

1. **Turf:** Knowledge is viewed as proprietary; data are viewed as related only to individual operations and anyone requesting it is interfering.

2. **Misinterpretation:** Misinterpretation of data by other agencies is feared.

3. **Security:** Sharing information may compromise sources that must be protected.

4. **Sensitivity:** Information sharing may weaken the organization and ruffle feathers of those not consulted before the data were exposed.

5. **Embarrassment:** Sharing information may expose inaccuracies or gaps in the data and cause embarrassment.

6. **Power:** Having information makes the organization powerful and sharing it is perceived as weakening that power.

**Cause:** Poor interoperability on the classified side

Each intelligence agency has maintained different standards, processes, and systems for generating, labeling, storing, releasing, and destroying classified information. For example, even though the intelligence community has reduced the restrictions governing the dissemination of intelligence products without the consent of the originator, the “inconsistent application of dissemination restrictions, such as ORCON (originator controlled) continues to impede the flow of useful terrorism information.”

Likewise, a former senior DoD official noted that sometimes the classification of material in the Pentagon is the result of insufficient resources to evaluate whether and how highly

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material needed to be classified. “In my office we routinely classified [material as] secret because we didn’t have the time to think about the harm of disclosure.”

Security policies also exacerbate this interoperability problem. Most enterprises have a number of networks that are not physically connected to each other, with information traffic and operations updates traveling across the different networks by other means. Since security policies dictate that no information can flow from a higher classification network to a lower one, traffic flows “up” to the higher classification in any connection across networks of disparate classification. By limiting bidirectional data flows, the internetworked application cannot include interactive features that information-sharing mechanisms such as web portals offer. Data aggregation can occur with the use of technology guards, but security policies prevent network connectivity from the NIPRNet and Internet (networks cleared only for unclassified information) to “system-high” networks (those certified to transmit and store classified information).

Organizations must accommodate each other’s data sharing policies, while at the same time addressing those which may inhibit the effective delivery of data. Some agencies require data-level security to allow for auditing and tracking; to know where their data are used while retaining the ability to retract or update as needed. The variation in practice is simply noted here to illustrate the concern that other agencies who do not share the same risk assessment cannot be trusted to secure certain information.

Cause: Overclassification

Poor information sharing can be exacerbated by the related problem of overclassification. Few penalties exist for classifying documents that need not be protected. On the other hand, the possibility that the release of an unclassified document would cause harm justifies a policy of classifying in any case raising concern. Furthermore, to decide not to classify a document entails a time-consuming review to evaluate if that document contains sensitive information. Former officials within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, for example, who often work under enormous pressure and tight time constraints, admit to erring on the side of caution by classifying virtually all their pre-decisional products.

Cause: The proliferation of the “sensitive but unclassified” designation

While sharing classified information in general is a major obstacle for the national security system, the “sensitive but unclassified” (SBU) designation is particularly problematic. According to Executive Order 13292, only “national security” information can be formally controlled through the classification system. There is no formal governmentwide policy for protecting information that falls under the narrow “national security” umbrella found in EO 13292. This has led government organizations at state, local, and federal levels to create a plethora of designations, each with its own rules and

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844 For an excellent discussion of the issues raised in this paragraph, see Office of the Director of National Intelligence, United States Intelligence Community Information Sharing Strategy (Washington: February 22, 2008).
guidelines. For example, in 2006 the GAO conducted an assessment of federal government sharing of SBU information and found the following:

The agencies that GAO reviewed are using 56 different sensitive but unclassified designations (16 of which belong to one agency) to protect information that they deem critical to their missions—for example, sensitive law or drug enforcement information or controlled nuclear information. For most designations there are no government-wide policies or procedures that describe the basis on which an agency should assign a given designation and ensure that it will be used consistently from one agency to another. Without such policies, each agency determines what designations and associated policies to apply to the sensitive information it develops or shares. More than half the agencies reported challenges in sharing such information.  

The use of many different SBU designations has diminished the flow of important information across the national security system. In early 2008, the Bush administration took steps to solve the proliferation of SBU designations—issues of organizational history, culture, resources, and process all came into play in crafting the presidential directive. Even in a problem as “simple” as generating a single SBU designation across the executive branch, the effort required input from several domains and its ultimate success is not yet evident.

2. Organizational learning is thwarted.

An organization with good leadership, appropriate structure, strong culture, and effective strategy and decision processes can still fail if it is unable to learn from its environment and experiences. Learning from experience is particularly important in a complex and dynamic environment. Organizational experts have distinguished learning capabilities by levels of sophistication, differentiating between Single Loop, Double Loop, and Triple Loop learning:

- Single Loop describes a condition, often referred to as a thermostat, in which an organization holds stable goals and adjusts its behaviors to achieve those goals.

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- Double Loop describes a condition in which new factors or experiences can change the organizational goals—and the organization adjusts its behaviors to achieve them.\textsuperscript{848}

- Triple Loop describes a condition in which the organization manages changeable goals—changing ways and means iteratively—and builds upon them, doing so in part by changing the organization itself in response to those requirements.\textsuperscript{849}

The impediments to information sharing noted in the previous section militate against the information flow necessary for even basic Single Loop organizational learning in the national security system. For example, when the National Security Council at times excluded State Department experts from policy discussions during Kissinger’s era, institutional memory was lost and the Department of State did not implement Kissinger’s policy well, making the overall system less responsive to major environmental changes.\textsuperscript{850} More generally, there are pockets of institutional learning in the system, as well as exogenous sources of learning about the system, but the system as a whole does not invest in learning capacity. For example, the information lost during presidential transitions exemplifies the national security system’s poor learning infrastructure.

**Cause: The tendency toward consensus decision-making undermines vigorous debate at the highest levels of the national security system**

To increase an organization’s quality in interpreting changing environments, social structures are important. Organizational perspective is not an individual activity, but a social activity; people within an organization shape their perspective of complex environments through discussion within social structures.\textsuperscript{851} Minority influence, in which an organization member voices dissent, is one form of such discussion, the presence of which can increase “cognitive effort”—forcing others to think more deeply about the situation.\textsuperscript{852} To increase cognitive effort, the minority influence, or “devil’s advocate,” must be taken seriously:

In some cases, a devil’s advocate is designated or emerges who is known not to accept the shared images that shape a policy or at least agrees to act as if he or she does not accept it. George Reedy, who served in the Johnson White House, explained the phenomenon of token opposition:


“Of course, within these councils there was always at least one ‘devil’s advocate.’”

George Ball’s role in the Vietnam War and Colin Powell’s role in the second Iraq War have been similarly observed:

Secretary of State Colin Powell was institutionalized in the role of dissenter by the second President Bush, as he prepared for the attack on Iraq. While Powell succeeded at least briefly in drawing the administration back into negotiations at the UN in the months before the attack, he did not have any influence on the President when he described the dilemmas the United States would face in taking responsibility for a post-Saddam Iraq. Powell’s arguments, however, made it possible for the President to say that he had considered the potential negative consequences thoroughly.

Devil’s advocates vary in their ability to attack a misguided dominant position. In general, since interagency committees do not meet on a sustained basis and their representatives’ positions often represent organizational interests, it is easy to overlook the principled objections of those with a minority viewpoint. The absence of sustained, principled, rigorous debate undermines organizational learning.

**Cause: Political and bureaucratic influences impede organizational learning**

Organizational learning researchers place a high value on the maintenance of multiple perspectives within an organization. Having multiple perspectives, though, is not enough—the organization must be organized in a way that allows it to use those multiple perspectives to adapt to external events—events both positive, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and negative, such as the 9/11 attacks. The U.S. national security system, it has been noted, was blind to the 9/11 attacks because of a crippling number of bureaucratic impediments.

As noted in the chapter on process, the current system provides incentives for individuals to withholding information from other organizations. The bottleneck created by the small National Security Council, for example, constitutes one bureaucratic impediment, as staffers and principals both hoard and have trouble finding relevant information. This impediment is exacerbated by the lack of dedicated infrastructure at the national level to investigate, capture, disseminate, and retrieve knowledge of value to the entire national

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854 Halperin and Clapp 160.
856 Huber.
858 See the discussion in the Process Chapter on how “The information flow necessary for basic organizational learning processes is impeded by system attributes,” p. 389-390.
security system. When knowledge is compartmentalized, it is difficult for the national security system to adjust its behaviors appropriately in order to meet system goals.\textsuperscript{859} As a recent study concluded, “over compartmentalization in both the Executive and Legislative Branches remains an impediment to new thinking as well as to innovative and comprehensive approaches.”\textsuperscript{860}

\textit{Cause: The system often abandons institutional memory—particularly in the transition between presidential administrations}

Although there are pockets of institutional memory in various components of the national security system, there is little investment in or enforcement of the maintenance of an organizational memory at the overarching system level.\textsuperscript{861} As David Abshire notes, “The White House lacks a meaningful institutional memory.”\textsuperscript{862} As documented earlier,\textsuperscript{863} the system even has trouble keeping track of its own directives:

A senior NSC staffer, Navy Captain Joseph Bouchard, Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control, remarked in 1999 that one could not be sure about whether a directive from a previous administration is still in force because for security reasons no consolidated list of these documents is maintained. Moreover, directives and other presidential documents are removed to the presidential library and the archives when a new president takes over. A senior Defense Department official stated that directives are rarely referred to after they are final, are usually overtaken by events soon after publication, and are rarely updated.\textsuperscript{864}

General Brent Scowcroft has observed that after an election, a new team arrives at the offices of the National Security Council staff to find empty safes.\textsuperscript{865} At the end of the Gerald R. Ford administration in January 1977, fourteen moving vans of paper were moved out of the White House, eventually to be archived at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Many of those papers were from the National Security Center staff and remained classified, unprocessed, and inaccessible to researchers for twenty-five years after the presidency ended. The institutional memory of the U.S. national security system is either missing, in long-term storage, or slowly cobbled together by scholars long after the national security environment has moved on.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{860} \textit{Afghan Study Group Report}, Second Edition, Center for the Study of the President, 30 January 2008.
\item \textsuperscript{863} See the discussion titled “Sharing information across organizational boundaries is difficult,” pp. 341-350.
\item \textsuperscript{865} Brent Scowcroft, Personal interview, 7 May 2007.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
to other situations. It is not easily accessible to busy senior leaders who are immediately thrust into managing day-to-day crises.

The temporary but critical loss of institutional memory during presidential transitions is actually encouraged by the Presidential Records Act which mandates that archivists deposit presidential records in a presidential archival facility operated by the United States government. Eventually, the records become available to the public, but not until after a substantial delay as the director of presidential libraries see to their care and preservation. The Presidential Records Act does permit current administrations to obtain special access to records that remain closed to the public for security reasons, following a thirty-day notice, but the special effort required is discouraging.

Non-governmental entities work to facilitate more rapid access to national security records, but cannot close the gap in a timely or complete way. For example, the National Security Archive on the seventh floor of the Gelman Library at George Washington University is staffed by a team of devoted lawyers and archivists who use Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to obtain often-sanitized documents from various components of the U.S. national security system. Their documents are then organized around primarily country-based collections, such as Cuba, Iran, or China, and made available electronically to research libraries around the country.

More serious than the loss of recorded information is the knowledge resident in human beings that leave the system. Poor human capital practices require newer civil servants to staff positions originally designed for personnel with greater experience and seniority. For example, a 2005 GAO report noted that normal personnel attrition and increased demands on visa-processing routines led to a severe shortage of experienced consular officers. As a result, new and junior officers routinely fill midlevel consular positions in certain offices—a staffing problem that is consistent across the Foreign Service, especially in the placement of experienced officers in hardship posts. More generally, the inability to record and maintain knowledge from experienced individuals in a problem for the national security system, including military expertise. Beyond Goldwater-Nichols criticizes the military for not methodically tracking the experience of officers who have served joint tours. There is no system for tracking who serves in what capacities and gains experience with what issues. As a consequence, it is “difficult to locate and leverage an individual officer’s experience, and likewise difficult to match joint skills with requirements.”

Cause: The worldviews of incoming administrations encourage the discarding of institutional memory

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866 See [http://www2.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode44/usc_sup_01_44_10_22.html](http://www2.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode44/usc_sup_01_44_10_22.html). PNSR is indebted to Jim Kurtz for this observation.


869 Murdoch 113
Incoming presidential administrations have high confidence in their worldviews, which initially dominate the system’s sensemaking efforts.\(^{870}\) Unlike other organizations that promote new leadership from within and emphasize stability, the campaign for the presidency emphasizes changing worldviews with each new candidate. This is true not only because the international security environment is challenging and could always be better, but because candidates expend a great deal of energy differentiating themselves from the incumbent administration. Then the two-and-a-half month gap between the election victory and the first day of office—the “transition period”—is usually filled with a large number of new political applicants and appointees providing highly positive feedback on the wisdom of the incoming administration’s worldview. All these factors tend to reinforce an incoming administration’s confidence in its worldview. There have been numerous instances in the U.S. national security system where a strongly held view within an administration restricted the ability of the system to make sense of changing environments. Leaders in the national security system, like people in general, resist evidence that goes against their strongly held belief, either ignoring the evidence or reinterpreting it so as to “change what it seems to mean.”\(^{871}\)

3. The National Security System lacks true global situation awareness.

“The biggest impediment to all-source analysis—to a greater likelihood of connecting the dots—is the human or systemic resistance to sharing information….. The U.S. government has a weak system for processing and using what it has.”\(^{872}\) One knowledge management task of the national security system is to move knowledge to the decision-makers from the innumerable sources of expertise resident in the system. Since that knowledge encompasses the international security environment, national security decision-making involves maintaining a situational awareness that spans the globe. Investments in a global situational awareness capability often focus solely on visualization and connectivity technologies, with insufficient attention paid to analytic techniques, policy disconnects, organizational culture, and a variety of issues that can frustrate the achievement of true situational awareness.

Providing knowledge to multiple decision-makers across separate agencies in a timely manner to support a contingency or to illuminate a situation anywhere in the world is an enormously complex endeavor. The endeavor is complicated by multiple factors, one of which is that decision-makers in a group setting are often slow to absorb new and disruptive information—a delay that can complicate time-critical decision-making for a course of action.

Yet another constraint on knowledge sharing is the reluctance to voice dissenting views for fear they will be leaked. A former NSC official noted that dissenting voices were sometimes excluded from decision circles because of a fear that rejected points of view may find their way into the press. This unfortunately excluded discussions of alternative

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\(^{871}\) Halperin and Clapp.

\(^{872}\) National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 416–417.
options that may have enriched certain decision processes. Some believe this change began after Ellsberg’s leaking of the “Pentagon Papers” to the New York Times in 1971—an event that produced, anecdotally, a lasting effect on DoD leadership for a generation. This concern is not limited to issues of policy development or planning:

The 9/11 Commission noted that providing financial institutions with information concerning ongoing investigations opens up the possibility that the institutions may leak sensitive information, compromise investigations, or violate the privacy rights of suspects. 873

The need to involve state, local, and private sector interests in the national security interagency information flow increases the concern about leaks, as people who have not sworn a secrecy oath are exposed to information that they need to fulfill their role in implementing national security. The explosion of interactive publishing, where anyone on the Internet can quickly publish information (weblogs, Wikis, web sites, discussion fora) for global consumption, exacerbates this concern.

Likewise, the hoarding of knowledge within national security system components further restricts the flow of information.

Inter-unit knowledge flows are important...for organizations that seek to maintain consistent work processes, technological environments, and product quality levels across units. Whether the products of interest are semi-conductors, pharmaceuticals, software applications, or government services, knowledge is required to perform the work processes and such knowledge must flow between units to ensure consistent organization-wide performance. 874

Since knowledge management involves creating the conditions for a shared context for information, the lack of a shared situational awareness is distinctly a knowledge management problem.

Information mobility is the dynamic availability of information which is promoted by the business rules, information systems, architectures, standards, and guidance/policy to address the needs of both planned and unanticipated information sharing partners and events. Information mobility provides the foundation for shared situational awareness. Trusted information must be made visible, accessible, and understandable to any authorized user in DoD or to external partners except where limited by law or policy [Emphasis added]. 875


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**Cause:** Organizational perspectives filter inputs to senior decision-makers, skewing interpretations of the security environment

The interaction between the strong, centralized worldviews of presidential administrations and the bureaucratic interpretation processes of the intelligence community is one example of how organizations can filter inputs—and skew intelligence—to decision-makers. The structure of the national security intelligence community includes a presumed wall between the intelligence community and the policymakers, forbidding intelligence analysts from making explicit policy recommendations and likewise discouraging policymakers from interfering in the production and analysis of intelligence. However, this wall between the intelligence and policy communities conflicts with the “intelligence cycle.”

A policymaker tasks the intelligence community with a requirement, then the intelligence operators collect intelligence to support that requirement, after which the intelligence analysts make sense of the incoming intelligence, and, finally, the intelligence disseminators deliver the “finished” intelligence back to the policymaker. The intelligence community wall presumes a linear relationship between intelligence and decisions, while the intelligence community cycle presumes a cyclical relationship that circulates from the decision-makers, through the intelligence taskers, collectors, analysts, and disseminators, then back to the decision-makers. The policymakers in the intelligence cycle—and the presence of their own strongly held worldviews—therefore manifest some degree of skewing of the data or the intelligence.

**Cause:** The “common operational picture” (COP) demands continuous updating

Updates to data streams vary according to several factors, and decision-makers must remain acutely aware of the lags in their particular data streams. For example, while footprint coverage for certain intelligence assets may be updated in near real time, operational reports regarding a ground battle situation may be delayed for minutes at a time. COP users must be aware of this artificiality in their snapshot view that shifting time windows create.

The enduring importance of the White House Situation Room further illustrates the inferiority of a COP based on selected intelligence that circumstances quickly render irrelevant if the picture is not updated continuously. The [White House Situation Room] was established by

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878 George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2007).

879 This “wall” relationship has been described as “sequential interdependence,” whereas the “cycle” relationship has been described as “reciprocal interdependence.” James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967).
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President Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs disaster in 1961. That crisis revealed a need for rapid and secure presidential communications and for White House coordination of the many external communications channels of national security information which led to the President.\(^880\)

After President Kennedy established the NSC’s Situation Room, the White House for the first time was connected to all the communication channels for the Departments of Defense and State and some channels for the Central Intelligence Agency.\(^881\) The inability of the State Department to effectively manage the Bay of Pigs invasion was considered the cause of the invasion’s failure, which convinced the principals that access to real-time information would militate against similar failures in the future.

More than anything else, the [Situation] Room allowed [Kennedy national advisor McGeorge] Bundy and his NSC staff to expand their involvement in the international activities of foreign affairs community and become, in essence, ‘a little State Department.’\(^882\)

The White House Situation Room continues to be the hub of national security information and communications—a development that is mirrored for domestic security. The House and Senate Appropriations Committees were briefed on the current status of Department of Homeland Security “situation rooms” in the spring of 2007:

> The National Operations Center incorporates the 24/7/365 National Operations Center-Interagency Watch (NOC-Watch), the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s National Response Coordination Center, and an office called the Planning Element. The National Operations Center also shares responsibility for the National Infrastructure Coordination Center which is co-located and integrated as a watch function at the Transportation Security Operations Center.\(^883\)

Despite the advances in information sharing since the creation of the White House Situation Room and more recently, the National Operations Center, a common view of current operations remains limited. The COP was envisioned as a picture that allows a hierarchy of command centers to have the same information inputs, from major command down to the lowest decisional level in military hierarchy. Yet local commanders still must make decisions using information that only they have in the time needed to decide.

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\(^882\) Ibid.

Inappropriate centralization of decision-making authority is an unintended consequence of presumed access to a true common operational picture.

In the Afghanistan campaign of 2002, higher headquarters (and legal) staff began asserting their hierarchical prerogative over local operations without true situation awareness. In one instance, Special Forces troops were ordered to conform to conventional military appearance and uniform. This would have involved shaving beards, and essentially reverting to a Western look—unhelpful steps for troops trying to win the trust of their local allies among Afghan tribes.\(^{884}\) Another example concerning rules of engagement in the war on terror has attracted much attention: “It was a JAG lawyer who effectively blocked the missile attack against the Taliban leader Muhammed Omar as his convoy escaped Kabul in November 2001.”\(^{885}\)

**Cause:** Cognitive biases interfere\(^{886}\)

Decision-makers point to “the right information at the right time” notion as pivotal to their decisions, but research indicates internal bias as more prevalent than decision-makers appear to recognize. This is one reason that capturing an expert’s approach to decision-making falls short of capturing core elements that remain unarticulated and often unexamined. Based on limited information, decision-makers and supporters alike in the national security system tend to identify patterns and form hypotheses, and with that limited perspective comes a significant downside: “The same facility is also a significant liability when we use it to create patterns and beliefs that are based on limited information and we continue to act on them in the false belief that they represent ‘the whole truth.’”\(^{887}\)

Consider a large meeting in an office building where a fire alarm suddenly sounds. Despite training and warnings, a group of adults will not, as one, spring from their chairs and depart the building. Instead, they will subtly reinforce each other’s expected patterns (i.e., there is no danger), eventually going so far as to say, “This is probably a test.” This is decision-making or cognitive precision permeated by an internal bias. Cognitive precision is

about individuals and teams being well-aligned to reality—possessing the most accurate, unbiased perspective of the problem by taking into account

\(^{884}\) Mike Mount, Close shave of special ops forces in Afghanistan, CNN.com, 13 September 2002, 1 October 2008
relevant weak signals before arriving at an unbiased hypothesis or solution to the problem.  

Cognitive precision, in other words, is about how accurately an individual or a group perceives its environment—a perception that devolves into cognitive bias when internal biases such as groupthink enter the decision-making. Cognitive bias is a powerful influence in both group and individual thinking. Cognitive biases in the national security system include the selective perception of departments and agencies—perceptions that not only fragment a true picture of the reality of the system itself, but also skew interpretations of the environment in which the system exists.

b. Inadequate Tools

4. Current data systems do not provide or are not employed in a manner that promotes optimal knowledge sharing

Information technology efforts in the national security system today focus on enhancing searching capabilities with the goal of increasing the effectiveness of decisions—ultimately, more effective group decisions. Improved searching is a necessary prerequisite in this process, but that is but one small step toward effective collaboration. “Collaborating is an enhanced form of interaction, whereas information sharing, cooperation, or coordination are enablers, important but not sufficient.” 

Put another way, collaboration is two or more humans cooperating in such a way that the result is a mutual creation reflecting notable insight, skill, or intellect. Thus, popular connecting and interactive technologies that are revolutionizing information technology do not automatically produce better reasoning. In fact, the “infoglut” problem can result in an unfavorable signal-to-noise ratio—actually reflecting a decreasing ability to extract relevant information from an increased volume of information. The kind of collaboration that would exploit information sharing, enhance learning, and support global situational awareness requires technical support but also requires interpersonal trust among participants, shared cultural norms, enabling management, and other factors. Too often in the current national security system investments in information technology do not include parallel initiatives to address these process and personnel issues for the following reasons.

Cause: Confusing technical connections with collaboration

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888 Wiig.
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With the availability of online communication systems and the globalization of enterprises, some information technology vendors represent their wares as encouraging collaboration. These information systems use synchronous and asynchronous communication technologies to support informal social networks. These networks cross organizational boundaries and enable the workforce to maintain contact and remain cognizant of events in their field. The recent explosion of “Web 2.0” technologies—which enable an increased ease for providing content or feedback online—has resurfaced interest in connecting informal or emergent networks using virtual technologies. Technology vendors can leave decision-makers with the impression that connection is equivalent to collaboration. Far too many decision-makers believe that merely connecting through collaboration tools will help them realize “group wisdom,” the ability to realize the apparent synergies observed from some group decisions. However, the fallacy of such thinking has been well documented.

Cause: Information systems are missing common data abstraction, protocols, and compatible business logic

Many information-sharing technologies acquired as “collaboration tools,” have no shared language. Moreover, these technologies do not facilitate a common understanding of the problem from all entities’ perspectives, a common understanding of the information available for decision-making and the criteria for those decisions, and agreement on success metrics for all engaged. A great deal of concern, time, money, and effort has been put into linking information systems within and across national security entities. The system has come a long way as a result:

In 1918, there was no system in place to track influenza. There was no method in place for the medical community to share information between countries. The lack of an established reporting and surveillance system combined with the paranoid desire to obscure the details to maintain support for the way destroyed any hope for cooperation between nations or communities. Without the free flow of information on the disease, the leaders and medical community in the United States did not know where or when the disease would hit. Additionally, there was no advance notice on the identity or nature of the virus.

While the nation has since created medical information-sharing systems—a profound improvement over that early twentieth century era—current systems are still not where they need to be for the complex twenty-first century environment:

Because of inherent complexities, we have not yet built a national strategy or unified systems for addressing catastrophic and infectious events that,

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892 David C. Gompert, Irving Lachow, and Justin Perkins.
by definition, stand little likelihood of being confined within a single state, as our public health operations are constitutionally organized. An aggregate of 3,000 local and 50 state agencies, the public health sector lacks a nationally coherent effort and centralized authority. Vigorous and ongoing debate has illuminated the tensions between public health’s traditional community-based responsibilities and its preparedness for global health threats to the nation, as well as the different skill sets, authorities, and resources needed to address these distinct missions.

The lack of common data abstraction protocols and compatible business logic throughout the national security system impedes information sharing. Legacy information systems were developed by individual entities to meet their specific needs. Information sharing and, in many cases, multiagency security were not included in the base requirements. The data structures used to build the system were unique to that system, which means that a mapping of the data from one to the other—without losing the information embedded in the legacy data structures and business logic—must occur first if the two systems are to share information. In systems that are within the same domain, this is generally a straightforward process of cross-mapping the data elements.

When crossing domains, the task becomes much more difficult. The receiving system, having been designed for a different purpose, often has no place to store the fields from the sending system. Engineers may add database tables to store this information, which eventually results in synchronization and data maintenance problems. Determining if the receiving system has the most current, authoritative data is nearly impossible unless a complete resend of the information is processed.

Major efforts have been undertaken to try to standardize data structures and methods of data exchange. One of the largest within the national security system was DoD’s Corporate Information Management or CIM program, the goal of which was to create a common data model for all the information within the enterprise and to impose standard representations and values for those data elements. CIM also attempted to create common data models (representations of the relationships between the data elements), and process models describing the business logic of the enterprise and the data associated with those activities. While the ambitious program resulted in standardizing a lot of data, CIM was not complete nor was it applied outside of DoD. More recent efforts include the joint Department of Justice/DHS National Information Exchange Model (NIEM)

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and Global Justice XML Data Model (GJXDM) from the Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs.  

While efforts like this provide a means for common data structures, they do not ensure common mechanisms for complete interoperability. For example, the NIEM effort covers the domains of emergency management, immigration, infrastructure protection, intelligence, international trade, justice, and person screening, while the GJXDM is specific to justice. This presents a dilemma in deciding which model is to be used for tracking immigration court cases within the Department of Justice. Standards and models such as NIEM and GJXDM provide a common approach to sharing data but do not provide a common mechanism. In some cases, an automated direct connection is still not possible because the translation from one system to the other may require human interpretation and involvement. Developing automated direct connections is a first important step in connecting systems, but it is still a far cry from completing a connection.

Another promising yet problematic approach to conveying data in context is the Semantic Web. This project, started by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), involves a number of technologies, some of which are still in their infancy. The goal of the Semantic Web is to enable computers to search for information on the World Wide Web (and by extension to Intelink, JWCCS, LEO, and other government networks) more intelligently. The Semantic Web encompasses many technologies, but at their core are:

- **RDF** (Resource Description Framework) models objects and their properties. In the RDF language it is possible to represent “France has President Sarkozy.” Both France and Sarkozy are identified as proper nouns, the position President is denoted and the RDF creates a relationship between France and Sarkozy.

- **OWL** (Web Ontology Language) is one standard for ontology descriptions. Through an ontology, one can describe things and the relations they have to others, making it possible for computers to gain a primitive understanding of possible relationships between items in a database.

- **XML** (Extensible Markup Language) enables a computer to read the information in a document. An XML document includes a document header that describes how to interpret the remainder of the document—essentially providing the grammar of the document.

Some supporters of the Semantic Web approach to knowledge representation hope it will usher in the computer understanding that artificial intelligence once promised. There are, however, problems with the Semantic Web approach. One example is that ontologies are not easily modified on the fly—one can modify the standard relatively easily, but re-
tagging all existing data against this new standard is a monumental task. Also, ontologies work with natural language, which is constantly in flux. For example, in the early days of Operation Enduring Freedom, most intelligence cable traffic referred to Osama bin Laden, which drifted over time to Usama Bin Laden and then to “UBL.” Such language evolutions are difficult to synchronize with ontologies. Humans had no difficulties understanding the texts, but natural language processing tools viewed the three terms as three unique persons. Almost all natural language processing tools have features to enter synonyms for entities, but this is done retrospectively. In other words, the natural language processing tools and ontologies are, by definition, always out-of-date.

Another difficulty is that ontologies describe the world as the author views it. Prior to 9/11, an ontology based on knowledge of the real world would not likely presume that a hijacker would seize an aircraft then use it as a bomb. Hijacking would have been related to extortion, not terror; aircraft would have been a weapons platform, not a weapon, and hijackers would be presumed as wanting to remain alive and negotiate toward some goal. An ontology would never have made the link to requiring immediate action to avert tragedy. Ontologies are rigid and offer no chance for insight or intuition. They can be useful as information interchange tools, and they may be very applicable to known repetitive issues. However, when novel situations arise, it is conceivable that, rather than helping an analyst make sense of the situation, they will actually confuse things. For this and many other reasons, semantic webs will be a good tool for reducing the manual drudgery of data entry, but final analysis will still require alert, intelligent, humans.

These issues aside, a national security enterprise-wide data model, related ontologies, and standards for representing them are useful and necessary steps in information integration. They are just not sufficient.

*Cause: Inability of systems to understand business limitations and context of data*

A data model will show relationships between elements in a database and convey some rules—such as that there must be only one office responsible for every budget line item. A data model will also convey relationships among the values of certain fields such as budgeted, committed, obligated, and expended. However, it does not let the reader or the computer know if the budgeted field is the original budget request from the agency, the submission from the OMB, the recommendation from the House committee, or the amount that Congress appropriated. Without knowing how the host agency uses the data fields—and exactly what the timing of the data updates might be—outsiders can draw incorrect conclusions from otherwise authoritative data.

The context of received data presents another problem in information-sharing systems. Organizations will often employ systems differently depending on which business operations are active. For example, most corporations will “close the books” at the end of their fiscal year. In general, this means that transactions to the accounting files are either suspended—until the financial office determines that they are to be applied to the previous fiscal year—or applied to the current fiscal year’s ledger. Drawing data during this transition period without knowledge of the possibility of incomplete information could lead the reader to incorrect conclusions. Another example is the DoD Status of
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Resources and Training System (SORTS), which was used to determine unit fitness and readiness for operations. Once a unit deploys, SORTS is no longer the authoritative source for that unit’s readiness and capability. Instead, that information has to be found in the daily Situation Reports (SITREP). A user looking at SORTS information without knowledge of this business process would be led astray.

While it is desirable to integrate systems at the data level as much as possible, it must not be viewed as a panacea for all information-sharing problems. Today, there is no metadata or modeling tool that captures these sorts of business conditions and exceptions in a machine readable, understandable, and actionable way. XML provides an excellent standard method to describe the information in the body of the exchange, but it does not capture this sort of business behavior. Thus the integration of information today still requires someone to learn about the intended uses and the decisions that will be based on requested data, and to provide the data useful to that context based on their knowledge of the data, business rules, and operations of the source systems.

4. Consequences

The first and most notable consequence of poor knowledge management practices is gross inefficiency. Throughout the national security system, innumerable hours are wasted in meetings where no decisions will be made, where organizational and cultural constraints do not even permit full and ready information sharing, and where incentives militate against learning. It is impossible to calculate the amount of talent expended to little effect as personnel attend meetings to increase awareness of what other organizations are doing that might affect the equities of the participant’s organization and to ensure that no decisions harmful to their organization are reached. Such meetings are common, however, and the wasted time is substantial and a source of frustration to many system participants. Beyond sheer inefficiency, poor knowledge management practices have many other consequences, both immediately relevant to knowledge management and with implications for the performance of the larger national security system.

a. Immediate

The national security system’s knowledge management problems have several immediate consequences, most notably impairing its decision support functions and contributing to disarray during presidential transitions. First, analytic support for decision-making is weaker than it otherwise would be. The impediments to information sharing limit access to all relevant information, which by definition constrains good analysis and by extension, good decision-making. Improving information sharing is therefore essential for good decision-making and thus for maintaining American power:

The importance of maintaining America’s lead in information systems—commercial and military—cannot be overstated…. The entity that has greater access to, and can more readily apply, meaningful information will have the advantage in both diplomacy and defense…. Given the importance of information—in the conduct of warfare and as a central force in every aspect of society—the competition to secure an information
advantage will be a high-stakes contest, one that will directly affect the continued preeminence of U.S. power.\textsuperscript{900}

Knowledge management problems, and particularly the fact that there is no dedicated infrastructure at the national level to investigate, capture, disseminate, and retrieve knowledge of value to the entire national security system, means that institutional memory suffers even as information systems proliferate. The view that national security decision materials belong to the specific presidential administration (and ultimately the presidential library) contributes to the systemic loss of institutional memory. Even the increased use of computing technologies that could facilitate institutional memory, militate against it when they are used as a convenience for individuals whose knowledge is then lost when they separate from their organization. Thus, despite the information revolution, public and private firms have been learning the costs of workforce attrition on organizational knowledge:

A senior nuclear weapons designer retires from the Los Alamos National Laboratory after 30 years, leaving no one in the lab who understands the design of missile built in the 1950s and 1960s, which are still deployed in military bases worldwide … [W]hen government officials talk about returning to the moon, few mention the simple and startling fact that the U.S. space agency has forgotten how to get here. The $50 billion-plus price tag put on returning to the moon quietly ignores the fact that NASA has forgotten how they did it in the first place. That’s because sometime in the 1990s NASA lost the knowledge it had developed to send astronauts to the moon. In an era of cost-cutting and downsizing, the engineers who designed the huge Saturn 5 rocket used to launch the lunar landing craft were encouraged to take early retirement from the space program. With them went years of experience and expertise about the design trade-offs that had been made in building the Saturn rockets. Also lost were what appear to be the last set of critical blueprints for the Saturn booster, which was the only rocket ever built with enough thrust to launch a manned lunar payload.\textsuperscript{901}

Another consequence is that the system is insensitive to weak information signals that can turn into large-scale events for which the system is unprepared. The national security system’s ability to process information signals, weak or strong, can be likened to that of humans, who typically process information against internal patterns. Information that falls outside of those preferred patterns—or which does not easily fit into expected patterns—is often discarded from the conscious mind.\textsuperscript{902} Similarly, information that

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
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falls outside the national security system’s internal patterns (i.e., weak signals) proves easy to discard—and often is—particularly when an organization designed to serve upward, along a hierarchy to the centralized worldview at the top, might not have the necessary resources focused downward to empower diverse sensors.

It can be difficult for decision-makers closer to problems to get the attention of those higher up and toward whom the system pushes an avalanche of information, only a fraction of which can be absorbed and assessed well:

Washington thought of [Central Asia] as the periphery of U.S. interests; [General] Zinni considered it the frontline. Zinni had come to Central Asia five times during his CinC tenure. ‘I wish I could get someone from the State Department to pay this much attention,’ quipped [Ambassador] Presel. The general’s staff made dozens of trips here during his tenure as CinC. So did the one-star generals under Zinni’s command. His persistence convinced the directors of the CIA and the FBI, and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, to visit Central Asia in 2000. The agencies had put together a working group on the Central Asian problem of border security; monitoring the porous, disputed border was key to stopping radical Islamic fighters and teachers who easily slipped across it. But Zinni couldn’t get his civilian boss to come out. ‘Too busy,’ Cohen’s people told him. Zinni always felt like he was outside, tapping on the window, waving his arms, trying to get Washington’s attention.

If it is hard for a four-star combatant commander to galvanize macrostrategic sense-makers to focus on new information, it is much more difficult to get them to pay attention to microstrategic sense makers, who skillfully work the front lines of information gathering:

Career diplomats tend to see the world in terms of day-to-day problems to be coped with by clever mediation. Longer-term strategy, much less solutions, are impossible to formulate because of the large number of factors that are quite virtually impossible to predict and harder to control.

Rather than holding an alternative set of hypotheses open in the form of competing narratives and constantly weighing them in light of incoming information, the diplomatic and intelligence systems are geared to render static collective judgments at periodic intervals—a practice that increases the odds that the system will either lose or process too late these weak but critical signals.

which we the perceivers are largely responsible...as perceivers we select from all the stimuli falling on our senses only those which interest us, and our interests are governed by a pattern-making tendency, sometimes called a schema.”

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904 Rubin 148.
The practice also squanders one advantage inherent to a national security system as vast and multifaceted as that which the United States possesses: the innumerable information nodes that are able to capture diverse, weak, and ambiguous signals. As complex, knowledge-intensive organizations face voluminous number of weak signals, small events or “data anomalies” reverberate and produce nonlinear effects—with repercussions far more significant than immediately assumed. In the case of the national security system, the global security environment has been pressing the system to gear itself to make sense of “minor events” in case the minor becomes major. Understanding how a minor occurrence may impact a major strategic contingency:

...enables us to grasp how an accidental drowning in Hong Kong intensified demonstrations against China, how the opening of a tunnel in Jerusalem could give rise to a major conflagration...how an “October surprise” might impact strongly on an American Presidential election.⁹⁰⁵

b. Extended

Knowledge management problems compound other problems in the U.S. national security system, further impairing the system’s management and decision support, limiting its decision-making capacity, and causing disarray during transitions. The system fails to know what it knows, to make sense of information and trends in order to understand an increasingly complex global environment, to make effective and informed decisions, and to learn over time what works—and what does not work. If the U.S. national security system perpetuates disconnected information systems, byzantine information flows, agency cultures that encourage local success at the expense of holistic improvement, and the expectation that leaders can always break through cultural and organizational barriers to force a reluctant system to work, the likely cumulative effect of knowledge management limitations over the longer term will be failure to anticipate problems and slow and ineffective responses to them.

5. Conclusions

When it comes to knowledge management, the U.S. national security system is broken. Making sense of a dynamic environment requires setting aside static worldviews and limiting the skewing effects of bureaucratic information processing. These are difficult propositions since the current system is structured to safeguard organizational equities and is focused on and tailored to supporting a few senior leaders’ decision-making. Senior leaders rarely prize ambiguity when presented with information, and instead demand a clarity that is often elusive and only truly available in hindsight. As a result, we often fail to understand the environment well and employ the wrong tools or employ the right tools poorly. We learn slowly from error, and when we do learn from mistakes, we learn only how to improve in similar circumstances, as if the future will unfold predictably from present trends.

Redesigning the national security infrastructure to cope with the new challenges of the 21st century has to start with recognizing how the world has changed. We have left a period when our most serious security problems were by nature ‘stove-piped,’ when information about these problems was linear and management was hierarchical. We have entered a period when the problems we face are themselves networked: Information about them is marked by complex interaction, and organization for dealing with them must become flattened and integrated. The solution we require demands organization that is geared towards flexibility and speed.906

Effective knowledge management and cross-agency coordination is possible for the national security system, however. In an exceptional and illustrative case, the Departments of State and Defense...established an interagency team in called the Interagency Coalition Working Group (ICWG), which met several times a week at the Pentagon. The group’s purpose was to coordinate military requirements, diplomatic strategy, and strategic support to build and maintain coalition support throughout the conflict. The group initially coordinated diplomatic communications with foreign countries through the Political-Military Action Team (PMAT) located in the Political-Military Bureau of the State Department. The PMAT received requests from the ICWG and the Joint Staff, routed them for coordination through the various regional bureaus at the State Department and translated them into diplomatic instructions. U.S. ambassadors then made formal requests (‘demarches’) to each country’s foreign ministry, and embassies reported the official responses to the PMAT and regional bureaus. The PMAT tracked the responses and translated the ‘diplomatic language’ of offers of troops, equipment, funds or other support into a plain-language computer spreadsheet easily understood by diplomatic and military personnel.907

From this diplomatic message traffic, the ICWG began matching the lists of international offers for military equipment and soldiers with the needs articulated by CENTCOM.908 The interagency group became so engrossed with this work that the Political-Military Bureau of the State Department temporarily assigned one of its senior officers, Andrew Goodman, as a special assistant to work continuously with the Joint Staff.909 This team

908 The State Department and CENTCOM maintained a coordinated list of offers and requirements coordinated through the JIACG.
909 Andrew Goodman, special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for political military affairs, interviewed by the author, 6 Nov. 2003.
quickly built a coalition, demonstrating the benefits of close State-Defense collaboration and shared knowledge.

The process of coordinating coalition military support involved many levels of State-Defense cooperation and became standardized after a few weeks. If the ambassador to a nation offering support believed that the country’s offer of help was sincere and authentic, the ICWG consulted with the Joint Staff and CENTCOM to determine if the country’s help might be needed or to potentially ask for some other contribution. If the conditions were met, the ICWG via the State Department instructed the U.S. ambassador to request that country to send a military representative to work with CENTCOM in Tampa, Florida.\footnote{The growing number of coalition country offices led to the construction of a multinational trailer park behind CENTCOM headquarters.}

This illustrative example of how trust networks can improve the flow of knowledge across organizational boundaries is a template for improving knowledge management in the national security system. Eliminating cultural and technical impediments to better knowledge management will not be easy or accomplished quickly, but as the PMAT example illustrates, the knowledge management problems that currently limit national security system performance can be overcome.
F. Resources Management

Summary

The effective allocation of resources is the single greatest determinant of success in the execution of any policy. However, the resource allocation process of the national security system does not make it easy to find resources for national security actions. First, it does not connect to any national security strategy in ways that are reflected in budget choices. Nor does it address long-term national security needs in an integrated fashion across agencies—it is simply not designed to address interagency needs. Agencies do not routinely provide funding for interagency needs in their base budgets. Congress rarely changes that. There are no formal mechanisms within Office of Management and Budget or the Executive Office of the President to address the linkage of interagency strategy to national security funding. For example, because the DoD budget review is conducted largely by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and not by OMB, it is nearly impossible to create a national security interagency tradeoff review at the OMB/EOP level.

The existing federal resource allocation system has been in place for decades, and its phases and processes are well defined and well documented. In the past, certainly during the Cold War and perhaps up until 2001, the performance of the system in developing, defending, and executing the federal budget was adequate. Some underlying problems have always existed, though, including difficulties in aligning resources to broad policy and strategy, a lack of any process for formal prioritization or tradeoffs among agencies, and an inability to provide funding for interagency activities, either planned or emerging. Additional problems have been revealed since 2001 and, in some cases, solutions (e.g., emergency supplemental appropriations) have generated problems themselves. As interagency issues become more salient, the current resource allocation system becomes more inadequate.

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### Problems and Causes

The following table summarizes the complete set of major problems and causes for this section.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problems</th>
<th>Causes</th>
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| **1. Strategy and policy priorities do not drive resource allocation and tradeoffs.** | - Lack of decision mechanisms and analytic support in OMB or the EOP to link interagency strategy to national security funding decisions  
- The current standard procedures reinforce the absence of a clear link between interagency strategy and resources  
- Insufficient regard for the cost of implementing decisions  
- Lack of integrated, broad long-term planning |
| **2. The system is unable to resource the full range of required capabilities for national priority missions.** | - The current allocation system actively discourages agencies from budgeting for external or contingent purposes, even for national security  
- No common understanding of the scope of national security  
- Budget assessments operate on the belief that there will be sufficient flexibility and hidden excess to cover any imbalance  
- Resource allocation is not connected to the successful execution of previous budgets |
| **3. It is difficult to provide resources for interagency response to crises.** | - OMB belief that appropriated funds are sufficient to cover contingencies or that existing funds should be exhausted before any additional funding is made available  
- Varying limits on reprogramming and transfer authorities available to agencies in response to contingencies  
- Congress has historically resisted providing funding for contingencies  
- Difficulty identifying major emergency resource needs in advance |
Although our defense, foreign affairs, homeland security, intelligence, energy budgets are carefully examined from the incremental perspective of where they were in the previous year, our budget process gives neither Congress nor the executive branch the ability to adequately evaluate whether the money flowing to these areas represents the proper mix for the 21st century.

-- Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN)
Ranking Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

1. Introduction

The relationship of the resource allocation process to assessment, policy guidance, strategy, planning, execution, and evaluation is fundamental to the national security system. Of those activities, only one—execution—links automatically to resource allocation, whereas the other functions are connected to resource allocation issues only when leaders demand such interaction. Therefore, the focus in this analysis is on how the national security system 1) links strategy and policy to resources and 2) how execution and evaluation of policy and strategy cause adjustments in subsequent resource allocation cycles.\footnote{For purposes of this assessment, the term “resource allocation process” means the budget process. Other resources, such as people, equipment, technology, or intellectual property, are in part the result of budgets. To a large extent, these resources are covered elsewhere in this report and in the recommendations.}

The allocation of resources is the single greatest determinant of success in the execution of any policy.\footnote{Joyce, Lee and Johnson.} The policy-resources connection must be tracked through a federal budget process that is cyclic. The federal government develops and produces a budget every year, regardless of the state of strategy, policy, or assessment of success. Left unattended, resources will determine policy more than policy will determine resources.\footnote{See Robert F. Turner, “The Power of the Purse,” The Constitution and National Security, ed. Howard E. Shuman and Walter R. Thomas (Honolulu, Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific, 2002) 73–93.} While providing resources does not guarantee success, the failure to provide adequate resources increases the likelihood of failure in execution.

In addition, strategies and policies are often developed and issued without regard to resources and budgets. Not only does this make it hard to assess whether budgets will support the president’s priorities, it could mislead officials into thinking policies can be carried out when the resources to do so have not been provided. It is easy to see the potential danger of this situation. For example, a promulgated strategy might proclaim the need to be able to fight two and one half major wars simultaneously, but if the
resources are not sufficient to carry out the strategy, it could simply mislead the president as to the nation’s actual military capabilities.

The provision of resources in the federal budget, for virtually every activity, requires that Congress authorize and appropriate funds and the president approve them by signing the legislation. The institutional basis for this process predates the settlement of the colonies, was refined in the legislatures of those colonies, and was then codified by the first two articles of the U.S. Constitution. The roles of the president and Congress are loosely spelled out in those articles—Congress is responsible for providing funds and the president is responsible for expending funds in the manner for which they were appropriated. The looseness of those roles was because of the framers’ intent to establish a system that could evolve over time; it also reflected their confidence in the existence of a stable process already in place. Colonial legislatures acted consistently with basic constitutional procedures for more than a century before the Constitutional Convention ever convened.915

2. The Current System

a. Overview

Over time, the role of the president and his staff in the budget process has grown substantially, but the overall federal budget process role has been stable for nearly forty years.916 There are four phases of the budget and resource allocation process:

1. Agencies prepare their budget requests during the summer, with guidance from OMB, and submit budgets to OMB in September. The DoD and the intelligence community follow a parallel but somewhat different schedule.

2. OMB and the Executive Office of the President evaluate agency budget requests, aggregate them with projected income and revenue, prioritize presidential policies with input from the White House and other offices within the EOP, make final decisions, and submit one integrated budget request (including DoD) to Congress for the next fiscal year.

3. Congress reviews the president’s budget request and appropriates funds, sometimes with new accompanying authorizing legislation.

4. The executive branch executes the functions for which funds have been appropriated.

These four phases occur in succession every fiscal year. However, at any time, there are three parallel processes under way simultaneously for resource allocation: defining,


916 The PNSR Resources Working Group produced a separate history of the resource process, some of which is summarized in Part II of this report.
defending, and executing the budgets. Participants in each of these parallel processes focus primarily on their own process, paying attention to the other two only when their own institutional roles dictate that they be involved. During August 2008, for example, agencies were defining their budget request for fiscal year (FY) 2010, defending their budget requests for FY 2009, and executing their appropriated funds for FY 2008, as shown in Figure 14.

These parallel processes can affect each other, sometimes dramatically. For example, execution issues for FY 2008 affected congressional actions in considering the FY 2009 appropriations; programs in trouble in FY 2008 sometimes found their funds for FY 2009 reduced by Congress. The FY 2009 amounts that Congress considered become the baseline for the FY 2010 budget development; when known, the FY 2009 appropriation would normally be the starting point for the FY 2010 funding level. Congress will not approve some final appropriations bills until after the presidential election, or even after the inauguration of the next president. So, the completion of congressional action for FY 2009 will be too late for agencies to include in their baseline budget requests for FY 2010 (except for DoD, DHS, and Veterans Affairs, which received FY 2009’s full appropriation by October 1, 2008).

As a result, agencies project budgets two years ahead with little knowledge of what they are getting for today’s expenditures. Such projections are unlikely to have significant precision and will not predict emergencies or contingencies. Still, the perceived disconnects between projected and actual budgets and allocations are usually regarded as acceptable. This happens because both Congress and the White House generally consider agency budgets to be large and flexible enough to handle internal reprioritizations in a given fiscal year. If an unexpected challenge is critical—and too large to fund within existing account resources—then the administration may request (and Congress may approve) reprogramming and/or emergency supplemental funding. In those cases, some agencies may define, defend, and execute new additional funds in emergency supplemental appropriation requests, in addition to the parallel process described above.

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Problem Analysis of the Current System

Figure 14. Parallel Budget Processes

The Four Phases of Budget Allocation

Before assessing problems with the current system, it helps to define the system in more detail. The overall federal budget process still follows the basic pattern described below:

Phase 1: Agencies prepare budget requests.

Most agencies (e.g., the Departments of State, Justice, Treasury, Veterans Affairs, or Homeland Security) develop their budget proposals in the summer (sometimes starting in the spring). These budgets follow guidance issued by the OMB, including limits on total funding and on funds for specific agency activities and functions. This cycle is the first phase of the national security resourcing process, and it is the first opportunity for consideration of interagency national security requirements.

Historically, each agency builds a budget to fund its own programs. Little thought is given to funding interagency activity, either planned or contingent. It is not the norm for agencies to include funds in their budgets for interagency tasks. Efforts to do this include counterdrug initiatives in the 1990s and interoperable communications for homeland security in the past six years.918 The success of these rare efforts does not provide a good model for broader implementation. In the case of interoperable communications for first responders, for example, the Department of Homeland Security leads the state and local efforts, the Justice Department leads the federal law enforcement ones, and the budget justification materials for each set of programs make few references to one another.919 In addition, the two budgets are reviewed by different appropriations subcommittees, as noted in the description of Phase 3 below.

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919 See DHS Budget Justification Documents for Fiscal Year 2008.
OME can also include direction for interagency funding in its guidance, as was done in preparing the FY 2003 president’s budget to fund homeland security as an interagency budget. This interagency funding predated the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. The White House position at the time was that such a department was not needed, in part because the funds could be provided in a cross-agency manner. However, such guidance at a comprehensive, multiagency level was both rare and short-lived. Once the DHS was established, OMB guidance for and review of interagency homeland security funding was reduced.

Some national security documents do purport to cut across agencies in their scope and direction. These documents include the National Security Strategy (mandated by Congress), the National Homeland Security Strategy, and at least nineteen other national strategy documents. However, these strategic documents do not provide guidance with sufficient detail to compel departments and agencies their budgets to change to reflect the strategies.

Phase 2: OMB and the president decide final budgets and submit them to Congress; DoD and the intelligence community deviate from this process.

Most agencies submit their budget requests to OMB by the typical deadline of early September. It is not unusual for agencies to submit a request that goes beyond OMB funding guidance, as each agency assumes that its needs are more important than others’. Agencies also frequently build into their budgets a “cushion” (i.e., extra funding request) to protect their own higher priority programs from OMB reductions. OMB budget examiners assess the requests, and agency officials meet with OMB officials to present

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920 See congressional testimony on the FY 2003 budget by OMB Director Mitch Daniels in February 2002.


922 See [http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/eop.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/eop.html). In addition to national security and homeland security, there are national strategies for victory in Iraq, combating terrorism, combating weapons of mass destruction, combating terrorist travel, maritime security, aviation security, counterintelligence, information sharing, the physical protection of critical infrastructure and key assets, securing cyberspace, public health and medical preparedness, public diplomacy and strategic communication, internationalizing efforts against kleptocracy, and pandemic influenza. A careful reading of these strategies shows that they do not provide guidance that can be used for building budgets or making tradeoffs.

923 See United States, Government Accountability Office, *Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism* GAO-04-408T, 3 February (Washington: GAO, 2004). GAO found considerable variation in the extent to which the seven strategies related to combating terrorism and homeland security address the desirable characteristics. Even where the characteristics are addressed, improvements could be made. For example, while the strategies identify goals, subordinate objectives, and specific activities, they generally do not discuss or identify priorities, milestones, or performance measures—elements that are desirable for evaluating progress and ensuring effective oversight. On the whole, the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* and the *National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets* address the greatest number of desirable characteristics, while the *National Security Strategy* and the *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* address the fewest.

additional information and to respond to OMB requests for additional justification for the requests.

OMB divisions present their findings and recommendations to the OMB director in “Director’s Review” sessions, which are also attended by top OMB officials and relevant EOP offices, including the NSC for traditional national security sessions. Guidance going into these reviews and decisions coming out of them aim to align spending and policy targets at the presidential level.

These budget reviews focus on narrow assessments. One of the most important outcomes of the OMB budget process is ensuring that no questionable funding remains in the president’s budget, which would invite Congress to cut those funds and reallocate that budget authority for other purposes, not the president’s. That is a primary reason why budget reviews focus extensively on obligation and expenditure rates as a measure of program success.

In late fall, OMB “passes back” to each agency the EOP decisions on its budget request. Agencies may appeal, as the “passbacks” usually contain reductions or changes to the agency budget requests. Generally, however, OMB passbacks form the basis of the president’s budget request and appeals are sustained only a small percentage of the time. Cabinet secretaries traditionally take their most important appeals directly to the president. However, since 2001, the first line of appeal for Cabinet secretaries has been a committee headed by the vice president, called the Budget Review Board. There have since been no recorded instances of appeals being reversed past the vice president.925

Because OMB can direct the coverage of a particular priority in its budget review, it is possible for this second phase to expand the resources budgeted for national security interagency activities beyond the levels proposed by each agency. If a program is a priority of the president, interagency resources can be provided. One such example is the 1989 National Drug Control Strategy.

The National Drug Control Strategy involved all basic anti-drug initiatives and agencies, and received the largest dollar increase in the history of the drug war. The president and the senior officials in the EOP deemed it important enough to increase funds above agency request levels for several agencies, including the Departments of State, Justice, and Interior, by nearly $2.2 billion—or 39 percent above the fiscal 1989 level.926 The Office of the Secretary of Defense increased DoD funding during the same budget cycle, shifting funds to the proposed budgets of the military departments.

Sometimes the failure to provide resources has consequences beyond the budget dollars saved. For example, proposals to increase funding for levee construction and to consolidate levee management under one federal agency have been proposed more than

once, but these proposals have been rejected during budget reviews. Congress has acted but has not provided funds to support legislation. Following the levee collapses in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina in 2005, a similar case was made, but as shown by the preparation for Hurricane Gustav on September 1, 2008, proposed enhancements have not yet been implemented.

Another example of resource shortfalls is in homeland security. The GAO regularly identifies funding shortfalls in homeland security areas. In just one month in 2008, GAO found that DHS funds were inadequate for nuclear detection, biosurveillance, and aviation cargo screening. While there is no written evidence that the budget review reduced agency-proposed funding—because internal review documents are not made public—it is clear from the GAO assessments that the president’s budget did not include sufficient funds to support the programs in place or under development. The consequences of failure of any of these programs would clearly exceed the savings in budget dollars.

Perhaps most significantly, many believe that the entire Department of Homeland Security has been underfunded since its inception. The initial White House proposals for establishing the new department argued that consolidation could save money. While the consequences of this initial underfunding have not been explicitly documented, subsequent budget proposals have validated the need for additional funding, and Congress has established additional offices at DHS. For the most part, however, the administration has successfully resisted additional funding.

Phase 2a: OMB reviews the final budget for the Department of Defense and the intelligence community.

Deviating from this process, the DoD components (the military departments, defense agencies, and other DoD entities) develop their budgets as part of a six-year projection of programs and budgets, known as the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). The FYDP, accompanied by a detailed first-year budget, is submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and OMB. OMB participates in a “joint review” of the DoD budget

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led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In effect, DoD reviews its own budget. In recent decades, reductions in OMB staff have made it increasingly difficult for OMB to participate as an equal partner in this review. In the early 1980s, OMB had nearly as many budget examiners as did the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but the ratio now favors the Office of the Secretary of Defense.934

This does not mean that OMB does not affect defense budgets; OMB guidance typically sets the overall funding level for DoD. Significant impact on DoD budgets can result. For example, on December 23, 2004, OMB directed DoD to reduce overall funding by $6 billion for the FY 2006 budget, with “out-year” (i.e., beyond the current fiscal year) reductions of $30 billion through FY 2011.935 In 2007, OMB approved increases for the Army’s budget of more than $7 billion above the levels set by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.936 OMB passbacks for DoD generally cover more modest territory, however, establishing inflation rates (which, for many years, were set differently for DoD than for the rest of the government) to be used in budgets. They also may allocate a target amount of anticipated savings, such as savings from public-private competitions to outsource government work.937

The U.S. intelligence community also deviates from the standard budgeting process. Following the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, the newly established position of director of national intelligence gained authority over the budgets of all sixteen intelligence agencies, residing in seven different federal agencies.938 Procedures for developing and integrating the intelligence budget are still evolving, but because the vast majority of intelligence funding resides in the DoD budget, the process parallels that of DoD with regard to OMB oversight, and the undersecretary of defense for intelligence is dual-hatted as the deputy DNI for national security.

The results of these parallel processes are combined, and regardless of whether a portion of the national security budget is developed in DoD or in another federal agency, the president submits to Congress all of those portions as part of his budget. That submission occurs at the end of January or in early February each year.

Phase 3: Congress appropriates funds.

Over the course of the session, Congress produces the appropriations bills to fund and operate the government based on the president’s budget request. Congress passes a budget resolution directing targeted mandatory funding levels for each of the authorization committees. It also allocates a share of the discretionary budget to the twelve appropriations subcommittees, using the 1974 Budget Act’s section 302(b) as the

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934 The 1982 data are from an unpublished review conducted by David Berteau for DoD. Data for 2008 were provided by former OMB and OSD officials, Personal interviews, May and June 2008.
937 OMB Circular A-11, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget, June 2008.
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basis for such allocations. The agencies provide volumes of material justifying their budgets; that material supplements OMB’s justification to Congress and it further accompanies the president’s budget request. However, much of the agency justification material is not ready for delivery on the day the budget request is announced and delivered to Congress. In some cases, the material arrives weeks or even months later.

Congressional committees conduct hearings, mark up bills, bring them through committee to the floor, pass those bills, go to conference, and vote on the conference results, sending enrolled bills to the president for enactment. In some cases, the authorizing committees also produce annual legislation. The National Defense Authorization Act, for example, authorizes the appropriation of funds for national defense, including DoD, intelligence community agencies, and the national defense part of the Department of Energy. It also provides separate statutory authorities for DoD to carry out its functions. Perhaps most importantly, authorizing committees can conduct oversight of agency activities and missions and can look beyond the one-year horizon of appropriations. However, while DoD gets an authorization bill every year, other departments and agencies do not.

In fact, the Department of Homeland Security is unique in that it has never received an annual authorization. A brief look at its creation illustrates how convoluted the congressional review, budgeting and oversight processes can become for an individual agency:


- The House of Representatives established a Select Committee on Homeland Security on June 19, 2002, but it did so with the proviso that the committee would cease to exist “after final disposition of a bill.” That occurred when the Homeland Security Act was signed into law on November 25, 2002.

- Ten standing committees in the House acted on the Homeland Security Act, making it one of the most referred bills in the 107th Congress. The Senate used an existing committee, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, for its committee actions on related Senate bills. At the time of its creation, eighty-six

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940 For an excellent and detailed analysis of these processes, see Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process, 7th edition (Washington: CQ Press, 2007).


committees and subcommittees had some form of jurisdiction over part of
DHS.\footnote{944}

- For the next two years, the House established a new Select Committee for
  Homeland Security. It had no legislative jurisdiction and no control over the
  budgets or the actions of DHS. The Senate did not establish a committee for
  homeland security. This proved problematic in that some of the authorities
  contained in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 were deliberately set to expire in
  one year. The statutory authority for limiting air carrier liability in the event of
  terrorist acts was one example; it was set to expire at the end of 2003. For this
  and other such authorities stemming from P.L. 107-296, there was no committee
  with jurisdiction to propose legislation to extend those authorities. Ultimately,
  these and other authorities were included in the National Defense Authorization
  Act for FY 2004—a pattern that has continued in subsequent years.

- In 2005, the Homeland Security Committee became a permanent committee of the
  House, and the Senate added the words “Homeland Security” to the
  Governmental Affairs Committee. However, in the six years since DHS was
  created, a Homeland Security Authorization Act has yet to be enacted.\footnote{945}

In the absence of authorizing legislation, the appropriations acts of federal agencies often
extend the expiring legislative authorities that those agencies need. Statutory authorities
that need legislation independent of funding will usually be found either in stand-alone
bills, appropriations acts, omnibus reconciliation acts, or continuing resolutions that
substitute for appropriations.\footnote{946} Authorizing committees for agencies may also pass new
mandatory and discretionary legislation not considered in either the congressional or the
president’s budget. These legislative authorizations cover a wide range of essential
operating authorities for agencies—from civilian employment end-strength levels and
reenlistment bonuses to contracting laws and organizational arrangements—that are
difficult to include in annual appropriations acts.

The difficulties encountered over the relatively simple issue of authorizing legislation for
separate agencies provides evidence for the greater difficulty Congress faces in
undertaking national security issues that cut across multiple agencies. In essence, the
structure of the congressional actions on the president’s budget is the structure of the
twelve appropriations acts, as separate bills or incorporated into omnibus reconciliation
acts or continuing resolutions.\footnote{947}

\footnote{944} Center for Strategic and International Studies and Business Executives for National Security,
Untangling the Web: Congressional Oversight and the Department of Homeland Security (Washington:

\footnote{945} See The Department of Homeland Security Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, House

\footnote{946} For an exhaustive description of the challenges and difficulties surrounding these issues, see

\footnote{947} For a list of all 12 appropriations acts and their current status for Fiscal Year 2009, see
<http://thomas.loc.gov/home/approp/app09.html>.}
Therefore, for the national security budgets, much of the congressional activity in Phase 3 occurs on appropriations. In this phase, there is little opportunity for consideration of cross-cutting funding issues. Each agency has its own appropriations subcommittee, with some overlap across committees for some functions (for example, DoD’s military construction budget is covered by the House Military Quality of Life and Veterans Affairs and Senate Military Construction and Veterans Affairs appropriations subcommittees rather than the defense subcommittees948). While agencies may share an appropriations subcommittee with other agencies, each subcommittee guards its jurisdiction and its allocated share of the budget.

Phase 4: The executive branch executes the approved budget.

Once appropriations are enacted, the execution phase of the resource allocation process begins. The president’s signing of appropriations acts may be accompanied by signing statements, which indicate the executive branch’s intentions for implementation.949 OMB apportions funds to the agencies. The agencies distribute the funds according to the appropriations acts, then obligate and expend those funds. This complex procedure is designed to ensure that appropriated funds are not spent for purposes other than those for which they were appropriated, in accordance with the Constitution and in compliance with the Budget Act of 1974.950 This also ensures that funds proven to be unnecessary for any item in an appropriated account are identified and reallocated for other higher priority, underfunded tasks. There are restrictions on such reallocation; in addition, agencies may not “impound” funds by refusing to spend them on the accounts in the year for which they were appropriated.

Reprogramming, the transferring of funds across agency accounts, must be requested through OMB and approved by Congress. In some instances, a reprogramming also may require new statutory authorities.951 However, in the interest of preserving funding in future budgets, agencies prefer to keep funds appropriated to their accounts, regardless of whether some other, higher priority for those funds might exist elsewhere.

Unobligated funds can be used for emerging priorities, and interagency needs might be such an emerging priority. In some cases, agencies have statutory authority to reallocate funds for purposes other than those for which they were appropriated. This authority is known as “transfer authority” and is limited by statute. Different agencies have different authorities and flexibilities, sometimes in permanent statute, other times in annual

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appropriations acts. Agencies may also request reprogramming of funds, which requires approval by the relevant congressional committees before the funds can be moved to new accounts for different purposes. \textsuperscript{952}

In most cases, every effort is made to obligate and expend funds as quickly as possible. \textsuperscript{953} By June, as the end of the fiscal year approaches, agencies begin to identify accounts with unobligated balances, collect funds from those balances, and redistribute those funds within the agency to the extent that it can under specific appropriation language or law. The surest way for an agency to have its budget cut by OMB (or by the Office of the Secretary of Defense) is not to spend its prior year funds. Having an agency’s funds transferred to another agency would have the effect of reducing its own funding in the next fiscal year. \textsuperscript{954} The same holds for components within a Cabinet department (the U.S. Coast Guard within DHS, for example, or the Defense Information Systems Agency within DoD).

\textbf{b. A General Assessment of Performance}

The resource allocation process does not make it easy to find resources for national security interagency actions. Agencies do not routinely provide funding for interagency needs in their base budgets. Congress rarely changes that. As a result, funding during budget execution does not typically go to unmet interagency needs. Other reasons contribute to the lack of available funds for interagency national security needs. Little focus on execution at senior levels—at any of the agencies or at OMB—is one reason. Senior management time is more often spent defining and defending budgets than understanding either how funds were spent or what was obtained by those expenditures. Moreover, funding execution reviews are done by agency comptroller and congressional appropriations committee staff, who tend to focus on obligation and expenditure rates, rather than outcomes from those expenditures. This happens, in part, because expenditure rates are more measurable. This is not to say that such staffs do not look at outcomes, but such information may be limited or not timely.

With regard to congressional oversight and approval of national security funding, it is worth noting that Congress has called for national security strategic documents to provide the basis for an overall national security budget. In 1986, as part of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Congress mandated an annual National Security Strategy. \textsuperscript{955} Every president since that act has submitted at least one such document to Congress, but none has produced a strategy that provides any detailed guidance for resources. \textsuperscript{956}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{953} Joyce 86–101.
\textsuperscript{954} Ibid.
\end{footnotesize}
Similarly, Congress enacted the requirement for a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in 1996. Three such reviews have been conducted since then. DoD attempted to reflect some of the recommendations from the most recent QDR in 2006 into guidance for the budget, but the QDR remains a DoD document and has no broad applicability across the national security spectrum. However, these congressional attempts to support a national security strategy and policy process were not intended to create a new basis for budgets or appropriations. Rather, they reflect the difficulty of clearly linking policy and strategy to resources. Budgets may refer to strategy documents, but there is no way to map from the budgets back to strategic priorities, nor is there any process for forcing tradeoffs between budgets and strategy.

**The Base Budget**

The primary purpose of the federal budget process is to provide funds to operate the government, in accordance with the statutory missions of the agencies and as modified by the president’s priorities and passed by Congress. Public administration scholars have assessed the performance of this process against that purpose for a century, noting that some improvements have been implemented, beginning with the Keep Commission in 1905 and the Commission on Economy and Efficiency in 1910. Still, scholars broadly agree that linking federal budgets to actual, measurable results is difficult.

Budget allocations support *capability*, defined here as including roles and responsibilities, competence, and capacity—some of which are difficult to measure. It is even harder to determine the marginal value of different budget allocations for each of these three elements or the tradeoffs in strategy or policy necessitated by different budget levels. Even without clear measures of capability, there is a visible and significant difference in the basic purpose of budgeting for the Department of Defense and for the rest of the federal government. In DoD, budgets provide basic capability but are limited in their funding for *using* that capability. For the past decade and more, that additional funding has been provided by supplemental appropriations, which may be exactly as policy makers and Congress prefer it. Madeleine Albright, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, captured this idea succinctly in 1993 when she was reported to have asked then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell, “What’s the point in having this superb military you are always talking about if we can’t use it?”

Virtually all other agency budgets do the opposite, funding payroll and daily operations but providing less for human and material infrastructure and capability. They do not reflect an integrated long-range budget plan. Some agencies, such as USAID, assemble long-range budget projections, rolling up country-level projections into an agencywide

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plan. But these plans are not integrated across the national security arena. In most cases, investments—especially in the form of new capability—must come at the expense of operations. This has been true particularly in the Department of Homeland Security. Few of the agencies consolidated to make up the new department brought related investments to the consolidation. In many cases, ownership of equipment did not transfer when the DHS was created.  

This dichotomy in most federal agencies between building capabilities and funding operations manifests itself in those agencies’ reaction to emergencies, where one agency’s request of another for assistance is often met with “Who is paying for this?” That is the essence of the interagency resource allocation problem. Rather than focus attention on planning and executing responses to crises, officials must often focus on the source of the money to pay for those responses, sometimes before they even know the range of response options. Equally important is the possibility that agencies may use the issue of who is paying as a way to avoid participating or responding at all. This reportedly occurred under Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, when pressures to assign active-duty troops to the global war on terrorism led DoD to either delay or reject requests for assistance across the national security spectrum.

Nowhere in any agency’s internal budget development process (Phase 1) is there any incentive to allocate internal funds for external purposes—either for interagency requirements or the needs of another federal agency. For example, DoD does not include funds in its budget to respond to Coast Guard requests for DoD assistance. Because there is no interagency budget-building process at any phase, the central player in the interagency resource allocation process is OMB. Agencies, even DoD, must build their budgets in accordance with OMB guidance. When that guidance ignores interagency needs, as is usually the case, it is unlikely that agency budgets will meet those needs. In fact, those needs are rarely even recognized in the historical performance of the system.

Historically, then, White House strategies and guidance, coupled with OMB’s budget guidance and congressional action, have not produced a budget that is documented to be balanced and integrated to achieve interagency tasks and missions:

Each national security department and agency currently prepares its own budget. No effort is made to define an overall national security budget or to show how the allocation of resources in the individual budgets serves the nation’s overall national security goals. The Office of Management

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961 National Security Management Course outbrief to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 29 April 2003 (unpublished briefing).
962 See problem analyses for Structure (pp. 208-253) and Process (pp. 254-296) in Part IV; as well as the overview of themes from the PNSR case studies in Part II (pp. 108-133).
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and Budget (OMB) does on occasion consider tradeoffs in the allocation of resources among the various national security departments and agencies, but this is not done systematically. Nor are department budgets presented in a way that Congress can make these tradeoffs as it fulfills its responsibilities in the budgeting process.964

Therefore, the current resource allocation system does not meet its purpose of providing sufficient funds for the base budgets in national security. In recent years, it has become clear that inadequate funding has been provided for every agency in the federal national security system. These funding shortfalls are evidenced by the problems identified in numerous case studies and in the other working group analyses of the current system. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s recent request for a doubling of the number of Foreign Service officers illustrates this shortfall dramatically.965 Similarly, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted the need for additional funding for what he called “the non-military instruments of national power.”966 Despite these testimonies before Congress, funding constraints prevail each year within the OMB budget process, especially in the absence of any guidance from the president to the contrary. Appeals, as noted above, are rarely made and even more rarely upheld.

Supplemental Funding

Congress has provided supplemental appropriations since the second session of the First Congress in 1790. Even after the 1974 Budget Act established controls over supplemental appropriations, some years saw levels up to 8 percent of the total budget (higher than the current percentages for Iraq and Afghanistan).967 (Most of those large “supplementals” were driven by economic conditions and included payments to individuals for programs such as food stamps and unemployment.)

The process for obtaining supplemental funds is similar to the phases of the normal budget process described above and is addressed in OMB budget guidance.968

1. Each agency assembles its own request. For example, the supplementals for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom are assembled by DoD, the State Department, and USAID.

2. OMB coordinates the process of reviewing the requests and deciding on both the final total and the allocation of the request.

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968 OMB Circular A-11.
3. The president submits the supplemental appropriations request to Congress; the agencies provide justification; the appropriations committees assess and mark up the bills; and Congress passes them.

4. Execution follows normal OMB apportionment procedures, except that emergency supplemental funding often does not automatically expire at the end of the fiscal year. As with all emergency supplementals, the funding in these bills does not count against any budget constraints or deficit calculations—but the funds create a higher deficit and accelerate the need to raise the debt ceiling.

Supplementals generally provide funding only for programs in the current fiscal year, even if funds do not expire at year’s end. This limits the ability of agencies to initiate or sustain a program with longer term objectives or requirements, thus creating a shortfall in future fiscal years. For example, overall agency funding ceilings for future years preclude DHS incorporating supplemental programs into the base budget without drastic cuts elsewhere.\(^969\) Also, there is very little tracking or reporting on execution, with supplemental funding not even being reflected in basic budget documents as such the DoD annual budget report (known as the Green Book) until they are expended or unless they are projected at the time of the president’s budget request.

In some cases, Congress initiates its own supplemental appropriations legislation. Following Hurricane Katrina’s devastation of New Orleans and the Mississippi Gulf Coast, Congress introduced and marked up supplementals in advance of any presidential request. Similar congressional supplementals were enacted within days of the attacks on 9/11. For more traditional national security purposes, however, Congress has responded to White House requests rather than initiate its own bills.

The large supplementals for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (more than $850 billion since 9/11)\(^970\) have evolved into an entirely new resource allocation process for national security. Despite the application of normal OMB budget guidance, the emergency supplementals of recent years possess several characteristics that distinguish them from normal budgets and appropriations. The following is a summary of these characteristics:

- Supplementals include billions of dollars for expenses that are not related directly to the war effort. Nearly two-thirds of Army procurement funding is now included in the supplementals, and over half of Army military personnel costs.\(^971\) Across DoD, supplementals fund 40 percent of total annual procurement. Procurement expenditures are widely regarded as investments, not operating costs.


\(^{971}\) Department of Defense, Green Book (Washington: Defense Department, 2008).
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- Agency requests are reviewed, and decisions on supplemental funding levels and allocations are made, without any formal update or appeal process for the agencies.  

- Justification material does not meet the same standard as for the base budget.  

- The timing of both the president’s requests and Congress’s legislative action does not follow any regular order, but is instead driven as much by political as by budgetary schedules. 

These characteristics raise several concerns—the issue of repeated resort to supplements, in particular. The practice of relying on supplemental appropriations for many expenses that should be properly funded in the base budget presents significant challenges to the next administration. However, given the history of the need for supplemental appropriations, it is not likely that they will cease to be used. Funds in the base budget never provide exactly for unforeseen needs.

Funding for Interagency Contingencies and Emergencies

Unforeseen events can demand funding, and fast. Yet each year action on hundreds of smaller, less critical demands is usually delayed until the source of funding is clear. Delays in response are the result of a resource allocation process that is not oriented toward funding for contingencies. With the exception of agencies such as FEMA, the very mission of which is to respond to unexpected events, nondefense agencies have limited surge capacity—few workers or equipment on which to call in emergencies. As such, a request for assistance immediately raises the question of what will be the source of funding, as agency budgets generally allot funds for internal purposes, not interagency work, especially contingencies. Providing funds for emergencies and contingencies can be done, but it requires extraordinary effort, the existence of superior individuals prepositioned and ready to act, and a significant event that creates a serious funding shortfall. The following four cases, both successes and failures, illustrate such characteristics for contingencies.

1. 1964 Alaska earthquake. In late March 1964, an earthquake devastated southern Alaska, leaving more than half the population homeless and wreaking havoc on every aspect of the physical infrastructure. Alaska had to be rebuilt fast, or its residents would need to be evacuated to the lower forty-eight states for the winter. President Lyndon Johnson, barely four months in office, established a Cabinet level committee to support the rebuilding of Alaska, and he took the unprecedented step of naming a sitting senator as chairman of the committee. A senior career civil servant from the Atomic Energy Commission, Dwight Ink, was made executive director of the committee. The temporary

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973 Murtha interview.  
organization obtained funds rapidly (in 1964 the fiscal year still began on July 1), secured significant additional resources (people and commitments from the Cabinet and other agencies), and implemented decisions in a timely manner. Alaskans, for the most part, were back home by November.976

2. Military intervention in Haiti. In numerous military interventions, funding shortfalls slow planning and retard execution. Haiti is an example. “Without appropriated resources, agencies could only contemplate what they would do…. It further contributed to initial confusion on the ground in Haiti when the military units expected to find civilian agencies ready to begin operations from the outset…. “977 The experience in Haiti is typical of military intervention where civilian agencies are not able to marshal resources to carry out their assigned tasks. As a result, “the Department of Defense is often given the de facto lead in undertaking and managing the full range of tasks associated with stability operations.”978

3. 1972 Pennsylvania floods. Hurricane Agnes came ashore in the southern United States in the late summer of 1972, eventually settling over Pennsylvania and West Virginia, dumping historically high amounts of rain, and causing unprecedented flooding. President Richard Nixon created a federal task force to coordinate rescue and recovery efforts, placing Frank Carlucci, then deputy to director Caspar Weinberger at OMB, in charge of the interagency effort. The efforts were complicated by the governor of Pennsylvania, who seemed not inclined to help Nixon succeed and intended to distinguish between federal and state responsibilities. Operating in an election year, with FY 1973 having begun without most agency final appropriations bills in place, Carlucci used the coordination power of OMB to identify needs and to secure funding and other resources rapidly and effectively. The recovery, like the Alaska earthquake recovery, was widely viewed as a successful operation. The National Academy of Public Administration, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, conducted a review of this effort.979

4. Hurricane Katrina. The difficulties encountered by the federal government in executing a response to the destruction in New Orleans and along the Gulf Coast in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama have been well documented. From a resource allocation point of view, however, the system response was overwhelming and included significant flexibility. In this case, unlike the 1964 and 1972 disasters noted above, the lead role in the early aftermath of the devastation came from Congress, not the executive branch. Congress introduced emergency supplemental funding bills and increased

emergency funding available to FEMA, appropriating more than $100 billion after Hurricane Katrina came ashore in late August 2005.\textsuperscript{980} However, the allocation of funds and the execution of the funded programs left a lot to be desired; some FEMA trailers were never occupied and some housing recovery funds never disbursed.\textsuperscript{981}

These examples of emergency action across agencies illustrate the following lessons in funding emergency operations and contingency operations:

- Agencies do not include sufficient funds in their base budgets to provide resources for contingency and emergency use. This is inherently difficult to do, of course, as one does not know when a 9/11 attack or a Hurricane Katrina will occur. As one solution, some in Congress have proposed funding at the five- or ten-year rolling average of past expenditures as a way of dealing with this unpredictability.\textsuperscript{982}

- Agencies have limited flexibility to reprogram or otherwise reallocate funds.

- Funding required for current-year operations above and beyond the base budget are not adequately reflected in budget projections.

- Success demands the participation of capable leaders ready to act, extraordinary effort, and an event of sufficient magnitude to galvanize those efforts.

3. Problem Analysis

Overall, many who have served in OMB and at senior positions in the White House believe that the system performs well enough as it is currently structured. If a program is a priority of the president, they argue, interagency resources will be provided in a manner that is balanced, adequate, and integrated. If such resources are not provided by the OMB budget review, it is because other, higher-priority issues are being addressed instead.\textsuperscript{983}

Yet as the general assessment above indicates, the exceptions prove the general rule: mismatches in plans and strategies are rarely identified and addressed in the resource allocation process, by individual agencies, OMB, or Congress. This is true for projected and actual budgets, reprogramming, and emergency supplemental funding. The national security leadership is burdened by managing a broad range of discrete issues and is unable to direct and manage the system effectively, including the way it allocates resources. The national security system, including Congress, provides resources to separate departments and agencies, not to missions, per se, as a general rule. The current resource allocation process is rigid and a tightly contested race to win and maintain


\textsuperscript{981} Reports from the House Government Oversight and Reform Committee, including \textit{Waste, Fraud and Abuse in Hurricane Katrina}, House Government Oversight and Reform Committee, Aug. 2006.

\textsuperscript{982} Congressional Budget Office, \textit{Supplemental Appropriations}.

\textsuperscript{983} Former officials, Personal interviews, April – July 2008.
funds, which is not conducive to tradeoffs and inherently limits capabilities and the ability to meet emergencies with a surge of capabilities. It both reflects and exacerbates friction between departments and agencies.

Three major problems help explain the poor overall ability of the national security system to allocate resources in support of policy priorities: strategy and policy priorities do not drive resource allocation and tradeoffs; the full range of required capabilities for national priority missions is not resourced; and there is difficulty in providing resources for interagency response to crises.

1. **Strategy and policy priorities do not drive resource allocation and tradeoffs.**

Underpinning the majority of the shortfalls in the resource allocation system is an inability to clearly link broad national strategy at an interagency level with the concomitant resources. Strategy documents are typically prepared by staff at the EOP and agency-level staff who are not core budget personnel, and rarely does the process of drafting strategies entail a detailed budget assessment. Furthermore, there is no process for injecting cost realism into the development of strategy or to force tradeoffs between goals and affordability.

For instance, it is difficult to connect the president’s budget to specific strategic priorities other than in the most general sense. It is equally difficult to say whether strategic priorities should be adjusted because they are unaffordable. Insiders argue that funds are nearly always made available either in the base budget or in response to emergencies if the stakes and priorities are high enough, which consequently implies that a lack of funds or interagency imbalance indicates a conscious decision to make an activity a lower priority. There is no overarching strategic priority document to verify this; the president’s budget reflects separate and individual priority decisions, independent of any strategy or policy stating otherwise.

Strategies are worded loosely enough to enable insiders to argue that whatever the level of funds made available for an interagency action, it has been judged by the president or his staff to be sufficient. From a budget perspective, subsequent problems are concerns of management and execution, not the result of an inadequate linkage to strategy or policy.

There are multiple symptoms of this problem. First, programmatic issues rather than a strategy-to-resource mismatch are cited as the basis for budget or appropriations adjustments and appeals. Budget issues raised at the agency level, in OMB appeals, or in administration appeal letters based on congressional action all tend to cite program-specific issues as the basis for a budget or appropriations adjustment or appeal. Participants are not able or do not judge it wise to make the case for a mismatch between strategy and resources.  

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984 See, for example, the nine appeal letters from DoD to Congress on the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act.
Second, the resource allocation process reflects the national security system’s structural emphasis on functions rather than strategy or missions. It is a formalized set of procedures focused on separate agencies and departments, with a matching structure on the congressional committee level. This approach, institutionalized and persisting across administrations, highlights the national security system’s relative lack of interest in determining whether the budget adequately supports strategies.

Another symptom of the strategy-resource mismatch is the fact that there is no integration of long-term resource plans across agencies. Most non-DoD agencies budget without regard to long-term fiscal plans. While some agencies do have long-term resource projections, there is no integration of these plans across agencies. Most agencies therefore budget for their own operations for the current year without regard to any long-term or cross-government plans. The NSC contributes to this shortfall by neither providing budget-level guidance nor engaging with OMB in a systemwide national security review of agency budgets. This becomes of greater concern when decisions with funding impacts (e.g., NSPDs, HSPDs) are made without full awareness or assessment of budget impacts. Agencies struggle to find funds for execution, because new funding rarely accompanies new directives. While interagency tradeoffs for resources during budget allocation phases 1 and 2 have been made in limited cases to compensate for limited funds, historically tradeoffs have occurred either because an agency forces them on a particular issue or because the personalities in the EOP make them happen by dint of personal effort and will.

In short, the president cannot determine what capability his budget will deliver or whether his budget will meet his goals. The funding level provided for each agency, task, or mission in the president’s budget becomes, by definition, the level needed to execute those tasks. Exceptions to this are reflected in the DoD Unfunded Priority Lists, emergency supplemental requests, and occasional testimony seeking funds above the level of the president’s budget, such as Secretary Rice’s April 15, 2008, appearance before the House Armed Services Committee. For the most part, however, whether or not the budget meets national security interagency needs, it is defended as if it does.

*Cause: Lack of decision mechanisms and analytic support in OMB or the EOP to link interagency strategy to national security funding decisions*

There are no formal mechanisms within OMB or the EOP to address the linkage of interagency strategy to national security funding decisions. The relevant EOP offices have neither the capacity nor the competence to supply such mechanisms today, and the day-to-day stress of running the government makes it hard even to recognize that such mechanisms are needed. Further, insufficient transparency in budget submissions and weak OMB analytic support make it difficult even to identify the requirements that link programs and budgets to national priorities.

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Cause: Current standard procedures reinforce the absence of a clear link between interagency strategy and resources

The budget guidance provided to agencies does not reflect a set of strategic priorities that can be used to make budget decisions and tradeoffs. Because of the lack of a clear link between strategy and resources for national security, the structure of OMB’s internal budget review process does not permit the assessment of relative national security priorities or tradeoffs for interagency activities across agencies throughout the federal government.

Likewise, the structure of the congressional appropriations committees possesses and exacerbates these same shortcomings. Each committee’s jurisdiction determines what tradeoffs it considers. The allocation of shares to each subcommittee, using the 302(b) allocation process described in the first paragraph of the description of phase 3 above, provides no incentive for any subcommittee to reduce spending in its jurisdiction to fund a higher priority under another subcommittee. If an increase in DHS spending on interoperable communications for first responders were to lead to a decrease in the need for funds for the Justice Department’s programs, it would be very difficult to get the relevant subcommittees to agree to such a reduction.

In addition, committee chairs and ranking members often determine the priorities of the committee. When Senator Jesse Helms chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it was exceedingly difficult to secure the committee’s support for additional funding for USAID, in part because of Senator Helms’s beliefs about limits on the role of USAID. The causes lie not with Congress, however, but with the executive branch. Congress cannot create a strategy to drive budgets; only the president and his staff can do so.

Cause: Insufficient regard for the cost of implementing decisions

Decisions are made with insufficient regard for the cost of implementation, sometimes creating failures, but it is difficult to know whether the policy is at fault or the execution. In some cases, it appears the policymakers are simply overly optimistic about the level of effort required to implement policies, and in other cases it appears they are insufficiently attentive to feedback on rising costs or are unable to secure trustworthy assessments of implementation costs. In addition, as noted above, policymakers tend to assume funds can be identified.

Cause: Lack of integrated, broad long-term planning

The lack of integrated, broad long-term planning reflects different agency-level approaches to problem solving. Because strategic initiatives typically require more than a single year to execute, long-term planning must drive resources in order to align effort with those longer term initiatives. Guidance from OMB does nothing to connect budgets to long-term plans.

Beyond the question of long-term planning, there are few efforts to integrate budgets across agencies. Because of the way that DoD’s budgets are built independently of OMB central review, there is inherent difficulty in integrating the review of the DoD budget by the Office of the Secretary of Defense with the OMB review of the remaining federal budget. This again reinforces the point that for national security interagency issues there is no serious attempt to link strategy with resources.

A new administration begins with resource allocation actions that perpetuate and exacerbate the gap between strategy and resources. The first few months of a new administration demand the submission to Congress of a new or amended budget, which is built on the proposed budget of the outgoing administration. The new administration has neither the understanding of the detail nor the policy framework to assess that detail. This amended budget cannot be consistent with the new administration’s priorities, because those priorities are still largely being formed. Regardless, this budget becomes the baseline for the rest of the term. Recent guidance from OMB on the FY 2010 budget directs agencies to develop their current services budgets and to have them ready for the next administration when the transition begins in November. This is standard procedure for the end of an administration, but that approach only reinforces the absence of a clear link between interagency strategy and resources.

The process not only fails to build a link between interagency policy and strategy and the associated budget requirements, it also can strengthen the individual agencies’ positions with regard to any integrated budgets—making it even harder to create that link of policy, strategy, and resources. For the next administration, unless Congress and the president can reach agreement soon, it is possible that this difficulty will be exacerbated by the need to finalize the FY 2009 budget for many agencies, extend the FY 2009 supplemental, and amend the FY 2010 budget submission.

2. The system is unable to resource the full range of required capabilities for national priority missions.

Agencies claim to have insufficient resources (funding, people, or equipment) to commit to supporting interagency decisions and actions. In part, this helps them to support priorities in their more traditional core functions. In a broader view, however, resources are clearly not balanced among agencies (i.e., for interagency) or within agencies (i.e., for emerging or non-traditional capabilities). The result is an inability to resource the full range of required capabilities for national priority missions.

The structure and incentives of the resource-allocation system result in a real or perceived shortage of resources allocated to national security activities, including interagency planning and implementation. Agencies focus on gaining resources for their core missions and responsibilities, at the cost of not seeking sufficient funding for perceived peripheral or interagency activities. Consequently, some missions—both interagency and non-core intra-agency—are underfunded, with the implication that others receive more resources than needed. This creates a perceived imbalance in the allocation of total

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resources for interagency planning and implementation among agencies, including the Departments of Defense, State, Homeland Security, and the intelligence community.\textsuperscript{987}

Claims of insufficient resources are difficult to prove in a public setting—especially because the president’s budget implicitly indicates that agencies and the White House agreed that the requested funds reflect the proper balance of needs and priorities. Symptoms of this problem, however, are readily observed in the operation of the national security system. At the core of the apparent resource imbalance are differences in funding methodologies. Each agency is funded for its own internal purposes and builds its own budget with little attention to interagency activity or funding. DoD builds capacity based on the six-year FYDP; other agencies mainly fund current-year operations and ongoing programs. This creates a focus very much on individual agency functional priorities. Funds for missions across agencies are not provided.

As a result, the components of the system lack the perspective necessary to focus resources on missions, and interagency operations are overlooked by both OMB and appropriations committees. Funding for national security interagency missions is not widely discussed as part of the OMB budget reviews for agencies, and rarely do passbacks increase funding for these needs.\textsuperscript{988} Likewise, such funding is not widely considered in appropriations committee hearings that review agency budget submissions. It is not surprising, then, that funding for national security interagency missions is rarely the subject of specific language or attention in appropriations committee markup activities.

Departments and agencies fail to resource and maintain capabilities that are not directly tied to their core mandates. Non-core agency functions, such as post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction in the State Department or cyber-security in DHS, have difficulty securing funding within their own budget or from OMB or Congress. In most cases, new programs must find offsets elsewhere in order to gain adequate new funding. This process means that less-traditional programs will have to challenge older, more established programs in order to obtain critical funds. The same holds true for mission capabilities that the United States has never developed, such as deployable international policing capabilities, and for mission capabilities not traditionally considered “core” by national security organizations, such as public diplomacy and irregular warfare:

- \textit{International policing}: Despite repeated lessons from interventions that the United States needs a robust deployable international policing capability, the national security system does not fund one. The practice of policing differs significantly from warfighting, and because the nation has no separate deployable cadre of national personnel with local policing experience, the military continues to be put in situations ill-suited to its operational routines. The interventions in Panama, the Balkans, Haiti, and large parts of the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have made it clear that a deployable civilian police capacity is a major


\textsuperscript{988} One exception, for counter drug programs, has been discussed earlier.
element missing from the current national security system. Possible options to address this include private contractors, a reserve system, and training others—sometimes in international cooperative frameworks—to conduct the policing. The national security system has been slow to solve the problem through any of these mechanisms, however.\textsuperscript{989}

- \textit{Public diplomacy:} The central purpose of public diplomacy, as articulated in a 2005 GAO report, is to “increase understanding of American values, policies, and initiatives and to counter anti-American sentiment and misinformation about the United States around the world.” The GAO suggests that as much commitment must be made to public diplomacy as to other security focuses, such as “traditional diplomacy, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security.” Numerous reports before and since the terrorist attacks in 2001 have emphasized the importance of public diplomacy and the need to provide the discipline with more resources.\textsuperscript{990} However, the resources allocated for public diplomacy do not match its purported importance, as blue ribbon panels have concluded.\textsuperscript{991}

- \textit{Irregular warfare:} During the Cold War the military repeatedly “vigorously and successfully opposed assuming a prominent counterinsurgent role.”\textsuperscript{992} To this day it is reluctant to devote resources to counterinsurgency and other forms of irregular warfare. Recently Secretary of Defense Robert Gates acknowledged issues with resourcing irregular warfare over more traditional forms of conflict, noting that

in a world of finite knowledge and limited resources, where we have to make choices and set priorities, it makes sense to lean toward the most likely and lethal scenarios for our military. And it is hard to conceive of any country confronting the United States directly in conventional terms—ship to ship, fighter to fighter, tank to tank—for some time to come.…. The implication, particularly for America’s ground forces, means we must institutionalize the lessons learned and capabilities honed from the ongoing conflicts…. What we must guard against is the kind of backsliding that has occurred in the past, where if nature takes it course, these


The armored-Humvee program is an example of the backsliding the secretary lamented. As a result of lessons from the 1992–1993 intervention in Somalia, the Army initiated the armored-Humvee program to improve force protection in irregular warfare. However, shortly thereafter the program was abandoned because the Army was not interested in a “peacekeeping” vehicle. As a result, the Army found itself scrambling for more of the vehicles before the actions in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and particularly in Iraq.\footnote{Gates, Robert. “Remarks to the Heritage Foundation.” Colorado Springs, Colorado. 13 May 2008 <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1240>.


The tendency of major national security organizations to focus exclusively on their primary functions at the expense of integrated missions means the United States often conducts nontraditional missions without properly resourced capabilities. More generally, national security mission capabilities and activities requiring interagency cooperation or coordination clearly receive lower priority in the resource-allocation system. Agencies request insufficient funds to engage in missions and tasks beyond their core budgeted functions, and there is not enough overall funding for contingencies or to support other agencies’ needs. The resulting imbalance in resource allocation can itself exacerbate problems of interagency cooperation and mission resourcing. All three levels—agency, OMB, and Congress—contribute to this core problem.

\textit{Cause: The current allocation system actively discourages agencies from budgeting for external or contingent purposes, even for national security}

Conventional wisdom holds that OMB will likely reject requests for funding for interagency missions and activities, and congressional appropriations subcommittees will do the same, especially if the proposed funding benefits agencies from a different appropriations subcommittee’s jurisdiction. In each case, the agency will not only be unsuccessful in its request, it will be unable to use that funding for its own alternative purpose. Instead, either OMB or Congress will apply that funding to other purposes. This was the case, for example, in 1993, when the president’s budget request for FY 1994 included a $3 billion fund for global initiatives. Congress rejected the proposal and redirected the funds toward its own priorities.

\textit{Cause: No common understanding of the scope of national security}

There appears to be no common understanding of the scope of national security, which makes it difficult for any central budget guidance to address national security interagency mission needs. More importantly, without a basis for a much more precise assessment by national authorities, no one can say what balance is needed in interagency funding. Today, we may be able to identify individual program shortfalls; we are much less able to identify systemwide or even individual program requirements.
Cause: **Budget assessments operate on the belief that there will be sufficient flexibility and hidden excess to cover any imbalance**

This belief supports a willingness by OMB and Congress to fund less than the full request of any agency, and it is seen as offsetting the natural tendency of agencies to request more than they need or than is permitted by their fiscal guidance targets.

**Cause: Resource allocation is not connected to the successful execution of previous budgets**

Without sufficient detail on results from earlier budgets, decisions cannot focus on measurable outcomes or predict what contribution the proposed budget will make toward those outcomes. The cycles of the budget are such that agencies begin to assemble their requests for future budgets without knowing the levels or details of the prior year’s appropriation and without knowing the results of the current year’s spending. As a result, imbalances which could become apparent as the current fiscal year’s funds are executed will not affect future budgets as much as they could.\(^9\)

3. **It is difficult to provide resources for interagency response to crises.**

Regardless of how well the base budget links to strategic priorities and provides funding for national security activities, events will still arise that require significant additional funding. In an emergency, agencies never seem to have enough resources. The most recent national security examples are the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the national response to the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Yet, even in emergencies, some level of fiscal constraint and management discipline must be maintained. Standard methods are in place for finding and reallocating funds, including reprogramming actions, moving funds via transfer authorities, and accessing contingency funds.

Sometimes those standard methods fail to provide adequate funding, and additional funds must be requested from Congress in supplemental appropriations. Congress may take months to act on requests—the FY 2008 emergency supplemental was submitted to Congress more than a year before it was passed, nine months into the fiscal year in which it will be spent. This failure to provide funds means either that needed actions are delayed while funds are located, or that funds must be found elsewhere, delaying other actions instead.

Symptomatic of the systemic difficulties allocating funds for emergencies is the lack of readiness for such activity. The EOP staff would have to be poised and prepared to react swiftly, decisively, and appropriately to work with Congress to obtain necessary allocations. Unfortunately, the EOP staff as it stands is not prepared or postured for such activity. It may be too few in number or have the wrong skill mix when particular crises are in full swing, and there are few ways to augment such staff quickly and with depth. The limited flexibility to reprogram funds and in some cases, requirement for new legislation before Congress can approve sufficient funding, are also symptomatic of the

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system’s general lack of preparedness for acting on emergency funding needs. Of course, Congress also may be slow to respond for reasons independent of the nature of the emergency (as with the FY 2008 supplemental).

Another symptom of the problem is the fact that some agency budgets, particularly that of DoD, are structured deliberately to require supplementals (e.g., to support combat operations in Iraq or Afghanistan). On the other side of the coin, civilian nondefense agencies tend to have limited surge capacity, and are thus reluctant to provide funds from their own accounts to support requirements in other, emerging areas. They feel this will show OMB and their own internal budget examiners that the transferred funds were less critical in the first place, making those funds vulnerable in subsequent budgets. Further compounding that reluctance, OMB and Cabinet agency budget officers are themselves reluctant to make funds available before need is amply demonstrated and existing funds nearing depletion.

Across the system, at the EOP, OMB, and congressional levels, there is also difficulty in determining the requirement for such funds and the duration of the contingency or emergency. Insiders from previous administrations of both parties say that if an interagency emergency or contingency is a high priority for the president and his Cabinet, then they will force a way to make funds available. The case studies cited above point to symptoms and consequences that demonstrate that more than just presidential priorities are needed to make adequate funding available in a timely manner. They show that, even if something is a presidential priority, it is still more difficult than it should be to allocate resources to it.

Cause: OMB belief that appropriated funds are sufficient to cover contingencies or that existing funds should be exhausted before any additional funding is made available

As with the base budget, OMB believes that appropriated funds are at a level sufficient to cover funds for contingencies, or at least that such funds should be exhausted before any additional funding is made available. This belief is complicated by the difficulty of estimating the full funding requirement for a complex contingency of long duration.

Cause: Varying limits on reprogramming and transfer authorities available to agencies in response to contingencies

Congressional committee rules and the rules of the House and Senate, as well as statutory provisions, provide widely varying limits on reprogramming and transfer authorities available to agencies to respond to contingencies. This increases the time required to make resources available and requires a level of familiarity and expertise with agency and congressional procedures that is not always widely available. Past attempts by executive branch agencies to modify these limits to a more common basis have been rejected.

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996 See in particular the Anti-Deficiency Act and Title 31, United States Code.
997 See, for example, the DoD legislative proposals for FY 2006 on rationalizing reprogramming thresholds. None of that year’s authorizing and appropriating legislation addressed the request.
Problem Analysis of the Current System

Cause: Congress has historically resisted providing funding for contingencies

Funds proposed for contingencies in the president’s budget are likely to be applied to other categories by Congress in the face of immediate needs. The president’s veto of the FY 2008 omnibus reconciliation bill on the basis of a difference of less than 1 percent between his preferred funding level and that of Congress shows that the political stakes can be very high over relatively small amounts of funding.

Cause: Difficulty identifying major emergency resource needs in advance

One ineluctable complication is the reality that it is difficult to identify major emergency resource needs in advance. Experience and trend analysis could suggest the need for investment in certain types of surge capabilities, but they would still remain hypothetical needs for many department and agency leaders. Agencies thus struggle to identify in advance major investments that might be needed, creating a need for supplementals. Until we can better predict the future, this problem will remain.

4. Consequences

The current system’s base budget imbalance among agencies and the inadequacy of funding for contingencies and emergencies leads to immediate and extended consequences.

a. Immediate

At the front end of the budget process, budgets are projected far in advance of appropriation and execution. This is one cause of the imbalance in interagency resources for national security. The inadequate precision in these projections coupled with the parallel processes of defining, defending, and executing three different budgets at the same time, produces a budget and an appropriation that do not meet real needs. The immediate consequences of this are wasted resources, duplicate or redundant efforts, unaddressed needs, and missed opportunities to take timely action on the front end of programs.

The lack of consideration of interagency needs in the resource allocation process produces insufficient resources dedicated in the budget for cross-agency contingency activities. As a result, when a crisis arises, there are long delays, first in deciding who will pay for what rather than what will be done, and then in applying the limited flexibility in reprogramming or reallocation of appropriated funds. Even if funds are identified and agreed upon, the process of making those funds available takes time and is not automatically approved by congressional committees. This delays response, missing opportunities for timely action.

In the case of agencies that depend on annual emergency supplementals to support contingency operations, including the Departments of State and Defense, funding has now become completely intertwined between supplementals and the base budget. Some have referred to this as an “addiction” to supplementals, making it even harder to identify
needed resource levels for any given course of action or to determine the outcomes obtained for a given funding level.

Because the front end of the budget process provides so little opportunity to make cross-agency tradeoffs or to match resources to plans and strategies above the agency level, neither the president and his team nor Congress can say with certainty how well the budget meets their interagency priorities or implements their strategies across agencies. As a result, decisions are not focused on measurable interagency outcomes.

b. Extended

As noted at the outset, policy success depends on adequate resourcing. If resource allocation decisions in the base budget or in supplemental requests are not driven by an interagency strategy or planning framework, policy and strategy priorities are not likely to be successful over the long term. It is also more difficult for the executive branch to defend budget requests against congressional desires to change those requests when they are not linked to policy and strategy priorities. Without clear links to strategy, it is difficult to justify any given level of funding on its own merits, and impossible to determine whether budgets have been developed in the best way to support presidential priorities in national security. Taken together, the core problems simply do not support a “whole of government” approach. Over the long run, the inability to provide the proper balance in resources across agencies produces shortages in needed capabilities, not just in current operations funding. Thus, failure to provide adequate resources for the full range of national security mission capabilities means poorer performance, which in turn creates greater needs and a more difficult challenge to meet those needs.

5. Conclusions

Overall, the resource allocation process fails to meet primary national security purposes in two ways. First, it does not connect national security strategy to budget choices. Second, it does not address long-term national security needs in an integrated fashion across agencies—it is simply not designed to address interagency needs. The current system does not provide adequate funding flexibility, particularly for contingencies, and is not derived from any coordinated plan cutting across all agencies. It also does not provide clear tradeoffs among priorities across agencies, and any broad interagency funding that an agency might seek to include in its budgets would be hard to defend in appeals and hard to defend before Congress. Finally, because the DoD budget review is conducted largely by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and not by OMB, it is nearly impossible to create a national security interagency tradeoff review at the OMB/EOP level.

The existing federal resource allocation system has been in place for decades, and its phases and processes are well defined and well documented. In the past, certainly during the Cold War and perhaps up until 2001, the performance of the system in developing, defending, and executing the federal national security budget was adequate. Some underlying problems have always existed, though, including difficulties in aligning resources to broad policy and strategy, a lack of any process for formal prioritization or
tradeoffs among agencies, and an inability to provide funding for interagency activities, either planned or emerging. Additional problems have been revealed since 2001, and, in some cases, solutions (e.g., emergency supplemental appropriations) have themselves generated problems.
G. Congress’s Role and Effective Oversight

Summary

Oversight is the review, monitoring, and supervision of federal agencies, programs, activities, and policy implementation. Congress, the Government Accountability Office, and inspectors general in each organization, as well as others, conduct oversight of the national security system. Congress conducts oversight to promote efficiency, economy, effectiveness, responsiveness, and accountability. Congress focuses its oversight on individual agencies and departments. No congressional committee has jurisdiction over the national security system. National security missions in general and interagency efforts in particular lack needed attention. In addition, the provision of resources by Congress is inflexible, in part because Congress sees the grant of discretionary funding to the executive as undermining its constitutional power over the public purse. Finally, foreign affairs and even national security issues often lack the high political profile that would focus the attention of Congress.

Many impediments exist to changing the current oversight system. Many lawmakers prefer the status quo. Senior leaders have acquired power and expertise they do not wish to jeopardize, and junior members have often chosen their committee ladders and issue specialization in order to maximize their constituent service and therefore reelection chances. Executive branch agencies have developed working relationships with people in the current structures, which is often mutually beneficial. Just as campaign reform legislation must confront the fact that every member understands and was successful under the current rules, proponents of changes in committee arrangements and legislative processes must face the reality that the current system is sustained by reinforcing mutual benefits. The conventional wisdom judges that the impediments to change make the problems of the oversight system irremediable, but comforts its exponents with the belief that the problems are not significant. The conventional wisdom is wrong on both counts. Oversight problems contribute to the inability of the United States government to provide security for the American people and can be fixed.

Problems and Causes

The following table summarizes the complete set of major problems and causes for this section.

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999 This point, citing congressional action on various laws in 1946 and subsequently is developed by David H. Rosenbloom, Building a Legislative-Centered Public Administration: Congress and the Administrative State, 1946-1999 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2000) xi.
1000 For a good summary, particularly of committee membership and jurisdiction, see E. Scott Adler, Why Congressional Reforms Fail: Reelection and the House Committee System (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).
### Problem Analysis of the Current System

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<th>Problems</th>
<th>Causes</th>
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<td>1. No routine oversight of interagency issues, operations, or requirements.</td>
<td>- No committee has jurisdiction over the national security system&lt;br&gt;- No congressional jurisdiction over national security system management&lt;br&gt;- Jurisdictional legacies reinforce narrow oversight focus&lt;br&gt;- Protection of “turf” and power</td>
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<td>2. Congress lacks interest and confidence in the executive branch’s management of foreign affairs.</td>
<td>- Perception of public resistance to aid programs&lt;br&gt;- Defense programs have strong domestic constituencies&lt;br&gt;- Congress sees the Defense Department as more capable and efficient than the State Department&lt;br&gt;- Inherently controversial national security topics</td>
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<td>3. Allocation of resources tends toward inflexibility.</td>
<td>- Constitutional prerogative&lt;br&gt;- Legacy of past problems and distrust</td>
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<td>4. Slow confirmation process for presidential appointees leads to inaction and bureaucratic drift on many issues.</td>
<td>- Confirmation process increasingly politicized&lt;br&gt;- Paperwork requirements&lt;br&gt;- Large number of officials requiring confirmation</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Failure to pass legislation on time has become endemic.</td>
<td>- National security legislation is controversial, and foreign affairs committees are weak&lt;br&gt;- Dilution and distribution of power</td>
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<td>6. Legislative and executive branches are too confrontational.</td>
<td>- Reports are multi-purpose tools&lt;br&gt;- Executive-legislative tension is inherent to the political process&lt;br&gt;- Legacy of past disputes</td>
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1. Introduction

While congressional oversight is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, scholars agree that it is an implicit power. Indeed, some political theorists place oversight in a preeminent role. John Stuart Mill wrote that “the proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government; to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them which anyone considers questionable; to censure them if found condemnable.”

Woodrow Wilson, before becoming president, wrote that “vigilant oversight of administration” is “even more important than legislation.” For the purposes of this report, “oversight” is defined using the language of the Congressional Research Service:

Oversight is the review, monitoring, and supervision of federal agencies, programs, activities, and policy implementation.

Congress made oversight an explicit duty in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, which ordered standing committees “to exercise continuous watchfulness” over programs and agencies under their respective jurisdictions. In 1970, that duty was broadened to “review and study, on a continuing basis, the application, administration, and execution of those laws” within each committee’s jurisdiction. During this time, Congress took additional steps to increase its staff capacities and support organizations to conduct vigorous oversight.

Congressional oversight performs several important functions with regard to the national security system. It provides the means to:

- Ensure compliance with the laws passed by Congress and the orders issued under the authority of the president

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1002 Woodrow Wilson q. in Schlesinger xviii.
Problem Analysis of the Current System

- Test the effectiveness and efficiency of government programs
- Expose problems and provide incentives for solutions
- Provide senior officials with alternate sources of information about the performance of subordinate personnel and organizations
- Stimulate good performance and deter misconduct
- Ensure accountability and consistency with America’s goals, values, and laws

Ideal oversight—as mandated in the legislative reorganization acts and favored by many analysts—should be ongoing, systematic and thorough, coordinated, formal, for purposes of better governance (not merely for reelection, or intimidating of the bureaucracy being overseen), forward-looking (anticipatory) as well as retrospective, and focused on strategic issues. Ideal oversight should follow a regular timetable of program and agency review as well as a standard protocol for reporting, investigating, and conducting hearings.

Ideal oversight occurs when diligent members work with talented staff to find areas of useful inquiry and then fashion ways to get helpful answers and actions in response. Ideally, better governance should be a strong motivation for oversight. However, individual motivations may be entwined with governance concerns—whether those interests are personal, partisan, ideological, institutional, electoral, or representational.

Lawmakers should uncover problems and legislate solutions (rather than punishments), create incentives and rewards for better performance, and develop organizational capacities to cope with emerging problems. Lawmakers should invest in fact-gathering before publicizing, and provide the executive branch with a fair hearing as well as opportunities to respond with actions and information. Moreover, hearings and reports should deal with strategic issues rather than administrative minutiae; members should subordinate scoring political points to promoting better governance; and the executive branch should be fully forthcoming in providing information.

Ideal oversight is often not realized for political reasons. Absence of oversight is a political act. Legislation is a political act. Everything Congress does is suffused with political considerations and pregnant with political consequences. Politics is about power, or in Harold Lasswell’s famous phrase, “who gets what, when, and how.” Political motivation takes many forms—desire for personal power and reelection notably, but also interest in expanding the institutional power of a committee or a legislative chamber, as well as in the growth of partisan, ideological, or regional power. These political considerations influence the purpose, timing, techniques, venues, and subjects of oversight activities, as well as the responses from the executive branch and other lawmakers.
2. The Current System

Congress conducts oversight to secure the managerial values of efficiency, economy, and internal organizational effectiveness and imposes such higher values and principles as representativeness, participation, openness, responsiveness, procedural safeguards, and public accountability. Lawmakers view agencies as extensions of Congress, especially when administrators engage in rule making.

A Congressional Research Service manual lists thirteen techniques that members and staff use to conduct oversight. Academic studies have shown that the most widely used and effective form of oversight is through member and staff contacts with government agencies, rather than formal hearings and investigations. Lawmakers have created several legislative support organizations to investigate, audit, and analyze government programs. In addition, they have empowered quasi-independent inspectors general in various departments and agencies to help perform oversight. All of these techniques and venues can be drawn upon for oversight, but most can be used for purposes other than oversight as well.

While analysts prefer that oversight focus on big issues and major problems rather than minor administrative malpractice, lawmakers often think differently. The processes of government and politics often use symbolism and “synecdoche,” that is, taking parts to illustrate the whole. The focus on poor-quality food (“embalmed beef”) given U.S. troops during the Spanish-American war exemplified much broader contracting and logistical problems, just as the “body armor” hearings did in the Iraq war. Sometimes the best way to improve future performance on a broad scale is to investigate past failures in narrow instances or to look ahead and ask big questions. No single way is necessarily ideal.

On the whole, congressional oversight of national security matters has been competent but limited, adequate in quantity but often too narrow in scope. Lawmakers tend to be concerned more with narrow questions of spending and management than broad strategic issues. Since oversight is both driven and constrained by partisan political motivations, it reflects changes in partisan comity and legislative-executive tensions. Ultimately, oversight is bounded by the expertise and jurisdictions of the overseeing committees, which focus primarily on the organizations within their purview.

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1006 This point, citing congressional action on various laws in1946 and subsequently is developed by David H. Rosenbloom, Building a Legislative-Centered Public Administration: Congress and the Administrative State, 1946-1999 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2000) xi.

a. Overview of Oversight by Congressional Committees

Congressional oversight of national security matters got off to an unconventional start when the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments handled the National Security Act of 1947—doing so not because of their respective mandatory responsibilities, but because of the advantage each could yield by passing the legislation. That is, the Senate Armed Services Committee participated because the main thrust of the bill was deemed to be the integration of the armed forces. The House Committee on Expenditures participated because it was more sympathetic to the legislation than the House Armed Services Committee.\(^\text{1008}\)

Political considerations still influence committee jurisdiction over national security topics, but today the general division of labor among committees is well recognized. Eight congressional committees have significant oversight jurisdiction for national security matters: the appropriations, foreign policy (Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs), defense (Senate and House Armed Services), and intelligence committees in each chamber. Many other committees are involved with issues tangential to national security, such as trade legislation and agreements (House Ways and Means, Senate Finance) and export and import controls.

**Interagency and cross-governmental issues**

There has been little analysis of oversight of national security matters involving multiagency activities. Oversight of these activities faces the additional hurdles of fragmented committee jurisdictions and complex procedural and financial issues. Currently, no single committee in either chamber is responsible for overseeing the interagency process for national security or the broad policy issues and legal authorities for the Executive Office of the President or the National Security Council.

Proposals for reorganizing government agencies are the responsibility of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (a separate House standing committee oversees the Department of Homeland Security). Thereafter, the various departmentally focused committees have jurisdiction. The House committee has a subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, but the Senate panel includes the subject under its subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security. As a result, formal jurisdiction over interagency operations is limited to issues relating to government reorganization rather than oversight of ongoing activities.

Congressional oversight of the DHS is very complicated, with eighty-six congressional panels having jurisdiction over some DHS programs. Two standing committees have departmental oversight; numerous other panels have “legacy” oversight of DHS programs that have additional responsibilities (such as Customs and the Coast Guard).

\(^{1008}\)Committee jurisdictions are set forth in Senate Rule XXV and House Rule X.
Interagency and foreign affairs

The foreign policy committees have broad jurisdiction over relations with other countries and “intervention abroad and declarations of war” (House Rule X and Senate Rule XXV include identical language), while the defense committees are vaguely limited to the Department of Defense and “common defense” issues. Since 1977, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has had a special mandate to “study and review on a comprehensive basis, matters relating to the national security policy, foreign policy, and international economic policy as it relates to the foreign policy of the United States.”

Oversight of foreign economic policy matters, which often have major national security consequences, is unusually fragmented among congressional committees. For example, trade committees oversee trade and tariff questions; the foreign policy committees oversee foreign aid, international financial institutions, and the foreign policy aspects of economic relations; export controls are handled by the Banking Committee in the Senate and the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House; agricultural imports and exports are under the agriculture committees; and import quotas can be voted by the Commerce, Interior, and environmental committees.

Appropriations

Generally, authorization committees set policy and funding priorities, while appropriations committees determine the spending details. Twelve subcommittees handle appropriations, each reporting a separate bill. Defense spending is largely covered by the defense appropriations bill and subcommittees, except for military construction funds, which are included with veterans’ programs. Foreign operations funding, including foreign aid, is now part of a money bill for the State Department and international organizations. (State Department funds, until 2006, competed with the Commerce and Justice Departments in a multiagency bill and subcommittee.) Funds for the president and the National Security Council are appropriated through the Financial Services and General Government funding bill.

The defense committees have reported annual authorization bills since the 1960s. These measures now cover all areas included in the regular defense appropriations bill. While the foreign policy committees attempt to pass authorizations for the State Department, no foreign aid authorization bill has been enacted since 1986. As a consequence, international affairs programs and legislation are now largely influenced by the appropriations subcommittees and included in their bills.

Historically, supplemental appropriations bills have been enacted to cover unforeseen emergencies, bypassing the regular authorizing committees. Under the budget process rules, these emergency funds are exempt from spending caps and other restrictions imposed on regular appropriations measures.

Since the 9/11 attacks, Congress has appropriated several hundred billion dollars in emergency supplementals for military and related operations that have not been subject to programmatic review by the usual authorizing committees. Legislators have demanded
that war funding be included in the regular defense budget, but strong incentives remain for the executive branch to use emergency supplementals instead. 1009

*Intelligence*

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence develop an annual authorization bill covering most but not all intelligence programs and oversee most intelligence activities. Tactical intelligence activities for the armed forces are handled by the defense authorizing committees. Congress has viewed the compartmentalization of intelligence information as more important than whole-of-government national security oversight. 1010

**b. Overview of Other Oversight Mechanisms**

In addition to congressional committees, there are other oversight mechanisms within both the legislative and executive branches. Most are limited in their ability to provide oversight contributions to interagency coordination and multiagency operations due to fairly narrow mandates, either in terms of subject matter or department, and limited time, resources, and ability. Legislative organizations are often tasked by congressional committees to support oversight activities.

The most active legislative organization is the Government Accountability Office, which regularly reviews and investigates government programs, partly on its own initiative and partly in response to congressional requests. Other agents of the legislative branch are the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), which analyzes programs in terms of their costs and alternatives, and the Congressional Research Service (CRS), which prepares reports on topics of current interest to lawmakers. Inspectors general report to both legislative and executive branches, focusing largely on self-identified matters of waste, fraud, abuse, and administrative inefficiency. Congress has created outside panels, like the National Defense Panel, the Hart-Rudman Commission, and the Iraq Study Group, for independent assessments and conducts a periodic review of some national security policies through the Quadrennial Defense Review. Presidents use permanent or temporary groups such as the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) to review and report on agency activities.

While all of these mechanisms (described in further detail below) have value for informing both branches about programs and policies, they also have inherent limitations in supporting the ideal of regular, comprehensive oversight.

The *Government Accountability Office*, the principal oversight arm of Congress, is an approximately 3,000-person organization tasked to investigate public expenditures and

1009 A discussion of the funding for military operations is in Congressional Budget Office, “Analysis of the Growth in Funding for Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Elsewhere in the War on Terror,” 11 February 2008.

1010 A recent discussion of these issues and the process can be found in Frederick M. Kaiser, “Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Current Structure and Alternatives,” CRS Report for Congress, RL 32525, 1 April 2008.
“evaluate the results of a program or activity the Government carries out under existing law” when ordered by either house or requested by a committee of jurisdiction. The GAO is very sensitive to committee jurisdictions, as indicated in its “Congressional Protocols”:

With respect to setting priorities, GAO also considers the subject matter of the requested work in light of Senate and House rules governing the committees’ jurisdiction over a program or activity, including their authorization, appropriation, budgetary, and oversight jurisdiction. When jurisdictional issues arise, GAO will encourage Members and staff to consult with each other to resolve any related issues through established Senate or House procedures.

This protocol constrains GAO by the same stovepipes that affect direct committee oversight of multiagency activities. Some officials also contend that GAO effectively audits expenditures but is less capable at evaluating complex interagency matters. Given its traditions and expertise, GAO tends to apply a programmatic model to political issues, focusing on management minutiae rather than strategic issues.

The Congressional Budget Office provides “objective, nonpartisan, and timely analyses to aid in economic and budgetary decisions on the wide array of programs covered by the federal budget and the information and estimates required for the congressional budget process.” By design, its focus is on cost estimates and economic analysis rather than program implementation or effectiveness, that is, on funding rather than performance.

The Congressional Research Service performs research on areas of congressional interest, primarily from unclassified sources and in response to short-term requests. Its products are widely viewed as factual and nonpartisan, but are based primarily on unclassified sources and on library-type research, since CRS lacks the staff and resources for field investigations, especially outside the capital area. Its products also tend to have an immediate, short-term legislative focus.

Inspectors general were established by Congress in more than sixty federal departments or agencies. While these offices have relative independence, substantial powers to investigate, and are required to keep both their agency head and Congress “fully and currently informed,” they are limited to programs within their agency. To gain a multiagency focus, Congress created special inspectors general for Iraq and, more recently, for Afghanistan. The special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction (SIGIR) has oversight responsibilities for “all obligations, expenditures, and revenues associated with reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in Iraq,” producing quarterly reports,

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testimony before Congress, and lessons-learned reports on reconstruction contracting and management.\textsuperscript{1014}

Inspectors general are fundamentally limited by their agency focus and available manpower. Like the GAO, even the SIGIR tends to focus on narrow issues of spending, rather than on interagency coordination or broad policy design. A recent report, based on surveys of current inspectors general, concluded that many lack sufficient resources and authority to function independently within their agencies. The report also recommended enacting a statutory basis for the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency to address integrity, economy, and effectiveness issues that transcend individual government agencies.\textsuperscript{1015}

Special commissions may be created by Congress for oversight and policy recommendations. Two recent examples are the 9/11 Commission and the Iraq Study Group. Sometimes NGOs conduct studies with active government participation, such as the Afghanistan Study Group organized by the Center for the Study of the Presidency. While such panels can provide valuable insights and recommendations, they are necessarily limited to one-time reports with a specific focus, leaving the follow-up to other oversight entities. Often they reflect a compromised consensus and rarely express unconventional views.

Mandated reviews, such as the Quadrennial Defense Review, are mandated by Congress as another technique for policy review. The QDR is a comprehensive study of defense strategy, force structure, modernization plans, and budgets due the year following each presidential election;\textsuperscript{1016} in 2008, Congress added a requirement for an assessment of the roles and missions and core competencies and capabilities of the armed forces.\textsuperscript{1017} The review process involves major internal effort and sometimes bitter disputes. Outside analysts give the benefits of studies like the QDR mixed reviews. Such techniques are limited to the reporting agency and thus offer little toward the oversight of multiagency activities. Less comprehensive studies can be criticized for adding to the burden of reporting requirements for the national security organizations. Moreover, the reviews are often superseded by other processes, such as regular budget reviews.

Nongovernmental organizations are an important but often overlooked source of information on national security activities. NGOs include the news media, lobbyists and other advocacy groups, think tanks, international organizations, international service providers of humanitarian relief, and other groups involved in matters relevant to national security. NGOs provide a different perspective on U.S. activities and can offer insights and recommendations free from bureaucratic self-protection. U.S. policymakers have limited use for reports from NGOs because such organizations usually have limited access to official, especially classified, information. Moreover, many NGO reports are

\textsuperscript{1014} U.S. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2 October 2008 <http://www.sigir.mil>.


\textsuperscript{1016} 10 U.S.C. § 118(a).

one-time efforts, and the organizations cannot be tasked with follow-ups. Of these, the news media and lobbyists tend to have the most frequent impact.

- The news media, through investigative reporting and frequent receipt of information which official sources prefer to keep secret, spark congressional oversight inquiries. Impact of the news media is tempered in that news judgments may differ significantly from lawmakers’ interests.

- Lobbyists, representatives of groups with particular policy interests, are frequent sources of information on executive branch programs and activities. These groups tend to be policy advocates with information stressing a particular point of view, though their claims are weighed against those made by competing groups.

Advisory boards and study panels within the executive branch can engage in oversight, but may not necessarily share findings with Congress. Among these are the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (recently renamed the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board), the Defense Policy Board, the Defense Science Board, and the International Security Advisory Board. These panels of former officials and outside experts are confined to their areas of jurisdiction but can perform useful studies for their parent organizations.

Of these boards, the most prestigious is the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board, which was created in 1956 and continued by every subsequent president except President Jimmy Carter. The board is empowered to assess U.S. intelligence activities and report to the president and the director of national intelligence. Over the years, it has reportedly provided useful oversight of many intelligence matters. In February 2008, President George W. Bush issued an executive order making changes in the board’s operations. Some analysts criticized the changes as limiting its ability for independent action. Whether or not these criticisms are valid, it remains true that advisory panels are only effective insofar as they maintain close relations with the president.

c. A General Assessment of Performance

Congress spends enormous amounts of time and effort considering the performance of individual agencies and departments, but national security missions in general and interagency efforts in particular lack needed attention; the focus is almost exclusively on funding functions instead of missions. In response, agency budgets do not focus on interagency missions, nor do they even note these requirements. This contrasts sharply with agency-specific needs, which are routinely highlighted in congressional testimony and which are noted as shortfalls in the president’s budget.

When oversight does manage to encompass interagency activities and concerns, it provides valuable insights. For example, one of the few congressional panels that sought and achieved some oversight over multiagency activities, the Subcommittee on Oversight

1018 United States, Executive Order, 29 February 2008, 1 October 2008
and Investigations of the House Armed Services Committee, produced penetrating insights on the performance of PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{1019}

Strong functional structures and weak integrating mechanisms of the executive branch are mirrored by congressional committees, further hampering interagency and cross-mission coordination. A recent congressional investigation into executive branch performance makes this point emphatically:

In some ways, our investigation validated common perceptions among national security professionals that the interagency process is broken, but not just in the executive branch. Congressional oversight of national security programs is divided among many different committees, including the Armed Services Committees, the Select Committees on Intelligence, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and the Committee on homeland Security, among others. In addition, interagency national security planning and execution mechanisms defy easy categorization within the existing Congressional budget and oversight structure, sometimes affecting Congress’s ability to exercise effective oversight. In many ways Congress is as “stovepiped” as the agencies and functions we oversee.\textsuperscript{1020}

Organized in parallel with executive branch agencies and departments, the committees mirror and thereby reinforce structural impediments; that is, the defense committees review and legislate only on defense matters and foreign policy committees stay within their assigned jurisdictions. The government reform committees can investigate and reorganize the executive branch, but ultimately no committee is devoted to ensuring and providing accountability for the success of interagency missions.

National security legislation has often been delayed and complicated by procedural or extraneous matters. Considerable tensions and disagreements between branches over the value and burden of reporting requirements distract both branches from strategic management of the national security system. In addition, the confirmation process for senior officials is arduous and complicated, thereby affecting the quality and availability of senior leaders. Finally, congressional restrictions on spending and fund transfers (reprogramming) limit executive branch flexibility for multiagency activities.

\textsuperscript{1019} U.S. House of Representatives, the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan,” April 2008.

\textsuperscript{1020} US House of Representatives: Committee on Armed Services (Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations). \textit{Agency Stovepipes versus Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need To Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams}. April 2008
3. Problem Analysis

Measuring the effectiveness of oversight is difficult. The effectiveness of congressional oversight cannot be judged solely by managerial criteria like efficiency and compliance. Often, Congress influences executive behavior through the “law of anticipated reactions,” whereby expected congressional preferences constrain executive branch decisions. An investigation may lead to corrective action, or corrective actions may have occurred in anticipation of or completely independent from congressional involvement.

While formal committee oversight hearings can be monitored, they constitute only a limited fraction of total oversight. Much occurs in connection with other committee hearings, through staff inquiries, executive branch preparations, member questioning, and legislative follow-up. Routine program hearings, field hearings, crisis briefings by senior officials, overseas trips, and even confirmation hearings for nominees can all be occasions for productive oversight, even if that is not the formal purpose of the event. Since so much oversight occurs informally or outside of public view, it is ultimately impossible to measure the frequency, quality, or effectiveness of congressional oversight.

Rigorous quantitative evaluation of oversight is impossible, but that does not preclude qualitative judgments. Measured against the ideal oversight described in the introduction to this section, many observers and analysts find much room for improvement. Criticism of congressional oversight of national security matters has come from many quarters, particularly in the past decade. Blue-ribbon commissions and other analysts identified structural inadequacies in the committee system, complained about the neglect of important issues, and lamented both qualitative and quantitative shortfalls in congressional oversight:

- The Hart-Rudman Commission criticized the executive branch for “often treat[ing] Congress as an obstacle rather than as a partner,” and blamed Congress for “sustain[ing] a structure that undermines rather than strengthens its ability to fulfill its Constitutional obligations in the foreign policy arena.”

- The 9/11 Commission declared that “Congressional oversight for intelligence—and counterterrorism—is now dysfunctional.”

- The Center for Strategic and International Studies “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols” project report said, after consulting numerous current and former officials in both branches of government, that “practically all agree that there has been a

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significant and disturbing degree of erosion in the quality and structure of Congressional oversight of the [Defense] Department in recent years.\textsuperscript{1023}

These criticisms are consistent with the other studies of congressional oversight across the policy spectrum that conclude either that little or no oversight is done, or when done, that it is “uncoordinated, unsystematic, sporadic, and usually informal, with members of Congress (or groups of members on narrowly based committee units) seeking particularistic influence or publicity for purposes of reelection.”\textsuperscript{1024} Even defenders of Congress agree with critics that formal oversight activities are not very common, that informal activities are more common, and that congressional behavior is best explained by member incentives, especially reelection.\textsuperscript{1025}

Some analysis paints a more encouraging picture: many committees conduct regular oversight hearings on defense and policy matters, perhaps two-thirds to three-fourths of which are of the “police patrol” variety rather than the problem-driven “fire alarm.” The volume of defense and foreign policy hearings has fluctuated somewhat over the decades since 1946, but averages around 10 percent of all congressional hearings. It is noteworthy—and a sign of the fragmentation of committee jurisdiction—that about 40 percent of House hearings on defense and foreign policy since the 1960s have been held by committees other than appropriations, armed services, or foreign policy panels.\textsuperscript{1026}

Still, little doubt exists that there are fundamental shortfalls in the execution and effectiveness of oversight of the national security system. Six core problems with the oversight mechanisms and the manner in which they currently function are examined below. Each problem is characterized by the way it is manifested, including specific symptoms. Then the principal causes of each problem are identified.

\section*{1. No routine oversight of interagency issues, operations, or requirements exists.}

The lack of routine oversight of interagency issues is most glaringly evident when compared to the committee focus on specific departments and agencies. Symptomatic of the problem is the fact that there is no congressional review of important, overarching guidance documents for the multiagency national security activities like the congressionally mandated National Security Strategy document. This is in part due to the fact that no single committee is in charge of the interagency process or multiagency operations. Instead, committees focus almost exclusively on individual departments and agencies—the foreign policy committees oversee the foreign policy agencies and rarely hear from witnesses from other agencies, likewise the defense committees deal primarily with the Department of Defense and rarely hear from foreign policy officials.

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\textsuperscript{1025} Aberbach 187, 189.
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Problem Analysis of the Current System

Cause: No committee has jurisdiction over the national security system

While the government reform committees have broad investigative powers and frequently conduct oversight hearings into national security matters, they have no legislative powers except over bills to reorganize the executive branch. Thus, no panel has the authority, expertise, and abiding interest in planning for and executing multiagency activities. The lack of any panel with a clear jurisdiction over interagency coordination issues and activities reinforces the relative autonomy and narrow focus of national security organizations.

Committee jurisdictional perspectives also hinder collaborative efforts, as evidenced by a recent effort by Congress to bridge jurisdictions: Section 1206 of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act authorized funds for stabilization and counterterrorism training for military forces. While the funding was included within the Defense Department’s budget, the program’s “dual-key” arrangement required approval by both Defense and State Departments. An administration report complained that there were still too many restrictions on spending these funds, and a think-tank study noted congressional opposition to Department of Defense operation of what was viewed as a traditionally Department of State program.1027 These divisions in Congress mirror and reinforce the divisions within the executive branch, thus inhibiting integration of national security programs and legislative oversight.

Cause: No Congressional jurisdiction over national security system management

Congress lacks formal access to and thus accountability from the National Security Council staff and has no authority to confirm or summon for testimony the most powerful appointed official in national security policymaking—the president’s national security advisor. Thus, there can be no formal hearings with officials overseeing the integration of national security programs, nor even high-level testimony on congressionally mandated presidential reports.

The National Security Act of 1947 that created the National Security Council also provided for a “civilian executive secretary” to head its staff.1028 That position has never been Senate-confirmable and is currently ranked Executive Level I, the same as assistant secretaries of departments. Starting with President John F. Kennedy’s administration, one of the assistants or special assistants to the president has been the effective head of the National Security Council staff—now usually called the national security advisor. Presidents have asserted, and Congress has generally accepted, that they need privileged access to advisors who cannot be required to testify before Congress.

The national security advisor frequently communicates informally with members of Congress and holds informal briefings on national security matters, but the only formal testimony sanctioned by the president has been in two cases of alleged lawbreaking.

Since the advisor functions as an interagency coordinator and acts in the name of the president—as well as providing advice—it seems anomalous that there is no regular procedure for confirmation of the national security advisor or oversight of such key executive activities. One notable exception was Henry Kissinger, who testified forty-three times while he simultaneously held the posts of secretary of state and national security advisor. In his confirmation hearing, Kissinger pledged to answer questions, except when they concerned his advice to the president.

Nevertheless, since the national security advisor holds a position within the Executive Office of the President and one not created by law or subject to Senate confirmation, the White House can contend that this official cannot be summoned to testify before Congress, a privileged status which is said to extend to the entire NSC staff.

Although the National Security Act of 1947 prohibited officials not confirmed by the Senate from membership on the National Security Council and designated only that a “civilian” with the title of executive secretary would “head” the NSC staff, Congress did not challenge the creation of the position of special assistant to the president for national security affairs, nor the demand by subsequent presidents that such an official could not testify before Congress.

Lower ranking defense officials have appeared before the foreign policy committees at least a dozen times since 2000, usually on regional issues. Conversely, prior to the 110th Congress, few State Department officials were called as witnesses before the armed services committees (only six times from 2001 to 2006). The Petraeus-Crocker hearings on Iraq in 2007 and 2008 and the four hearings on provincial reconstruction teams by the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations mark a notable departure from the practice of departmental segregation in defense committee hearings.

Since the 9/11 attacks, testimony given to Congress regarding the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq has remained mostly stovepiped. For example, from 2001 to 2007, the secretary of state never appeared before the armed services committees, but did testify before the foreign policy, appropriations, and budget committees, as well as four other committees. In the same period, the secretary of defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff appeared only once before a foreign policy committee—to testify on an arms limitation treaty with Russia in 2001—though both officials did testify before the military, appropriations, and budget committees. In September 2007, the House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees met jointly to hear from General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker regarding Iraq, but their counterpart Senate committees met separately with the same witnesses. In April 2008, the hearings were separate in both chambers.

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A promising exception occurred in April 2008, when the secretary of state joined the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a hearing on “Building Partnership Capacity and Development of the Interagency Process” before the House Armed Services Committee.

_Cause: Jurisdictional legacies reinforce narrow oversight focus_

Jurisdiction for the major national security committees has remained essentially the same since 1946. Congress began establishing standing committees in order to divide the legislative workload and provide ongoing expertise and oversight of the executive branch. Those divisions give each committee a special, and necessarily narrow, focus for its activities. Committees rarely hear officials outside their traditional jurisdiction, so they don’t hear multiagency perspectives on multiagency activities.

During the Vietnam War, for example, the foreign policy committees tended to focus on the broader diplomatic aspects of the conflict while the military committees oversaw the activities of the U.S. armed forces. Interestingly, the only significant oversight of the White House-driven, combined civilian-military reconstruction programs, CORDS, was conducted in two rare and isolated multiday sessions by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1970 and the House Government Reform Committee in 1971, though the programs had been in operation since 1967.

Congress followed the creation of the Department of Homeland Security with the creation of a new standing committee in the House and the assignment of homeland security jurisdiction to the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. DHS funds were included in newly named Homeland Security Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees. Committees that previously oversaw activities of the components merged to form DHS retained jurisdiction for non-homeland security activities, leading to the unwieldy situation of having to report to eighty-six different congressional panels.  

A key division in jurisdiction is between authorization and appropriations processes. From the late nineteenth century until after World War I, several congressional committees, including those for the Army and Navy, had jurisdiction over both authorizations and appropriations for their respective departments. In the 1920s, spending power was consolidated in the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, where it remains. The armed services and foreign policy committees are authorization committees, responsible for drafting the basic law for their agencies and for writing legislation establishing, continuing, or modifying both the organizations and their various programs.

Rules in each chamber prohibit “legislation” on appropriations bills and limit language on those spending measures to restrictions on the expenditures of funds. In practice, however, these functional divisions are not always followed, and agencies sometimes face laws that authorize unappropriated programs, fund unauthorized programs, or otherwise mandate conflicting provisions. In recent years, the role of authorizing

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1030 See Secretary Michael Chertoff, Letter to Congressman Peter King, 4 September 2007.
committees in national security has been undercut by the failure to enact foreign policy authorizations and by the funding of major military operations through emergency and supplemental appropriations requests that bypass the armed services committees.

Appropriations panels have much smaller staffs than the authorizing committees, which limit their ability to properly oversee cross-jurisdictional matters. The Senate Appropriations Committee had only seven staff members on its defense subcommittee during the 1980s and 1990s; the figure has now climbed to eleven. The Armed Services Committee had approximately twenty staff members during the same period and now has twenty-one. The staff reviewing foreign operations appropriations has stayed at three or lower throughout the period, while the Foreign Relations Committee staff has varied from fifteen to eighteen and now is twenty-eight. In the House, defense appropriations staff was ten to thirteen during the 1980s and 1990s and now is at sixteen. The House Armed Services Committee staff averaged around thirty and now is thirty-nine. Only four staff members worked on the foreign operations subcommittee during the same period, and that number now is eight.\textsuperscript{1031} Panels with small staffs face the added problem of eroding expertise and loss of institutional memory of government programs and legislative practices when staff senior members depart and turn over responsibilities to people with much less government experience.

Though the appropriations committees could, theoretically, review multiagency activities as a full committee, in practice they tend to hold hearings by subcommittees and report bills sequentially. Their jurisdiction is limited to spending bills; they have no jurisdiction regarding departmental authorities or organization. Starting in 2006, State Department and foreign operations appropriations were combined into a single bill before a single subcommittee in each chamber.

\textit{Cause: Protection of turf and power}

When measures covering more than one committee’s jurisdiction are proposed, the process for multiple committee consideration of multiagency matters is difficult, confused, and inconsistent between chambers. One reason is that the Senate and House have different rules and precedents for handling measures that transcend one standing committee’s jurisdiction. In the Senate, bills are referred to one committee on the basis of the predominant subject matter; multiple referrals are rare (just 0.4 percent of all bills in the 108th Congress) and usually require unanimous consent. In the House, the speaker must designate a committee of primary jurisdiction, but can name secondary committees for sequential referrals; multiple referrals are much more common (20.7 percent of all bills in the 108th Congress).\textsuperscript{1032} Bills covering multiagency matters would likely be reviewed by different sets of legislators in each chamber, with no assurance of consistency of expertise or oversight.

Similar problems affect conference committees established to resolve differences between the chambers. In the Senate, conferees are generally selected only from the one

\textsuperscript{1031} Figures from the \textit{CQ Congressional Staff Directories}.
committee that originally considered the bill. In the House, usually only the primary committee can negotiate on the entire bill, though other committees can be recognized as having a valid claim for representation, in which case they get three conferees—two majority and one minority. These differences and leadership discretion can lead to skewed representation of standing committee expertise on measures involving more than one department. In both original referrals and conference committees, some important stakeholders may be excluded.

2. Congress lacks both interest and confidence in the executive branch’s management of foreign affairs.

Weak foreign policy and authorization committees are symptomatic of the relative lack of congressional interest in national security management. The foreign policy committees have residual prestige in the Senate and House, but their inability in recent decades to produce and manage major legislation from committee consideration to presidential signature has eroded their power. They can still conduct important oversight hearings and investigations but have difficulty enacting changes in the laws to improve programs they review. Their weakness is also apparent in the reluctance of leadership to schedule floor time for their legislation and in the willingness of others to try to load foreign policy bills with measures that may prevent approval of the underlying legislation. Finally, the lack of congressional confidence in executive branch management of foreign affairs is also manifest in the far greater support Congress provides for defense programs in comparison with foreign policy activities.

Cause: Perception of public resistance to aid programs

International affairs programs have low public approval, especially when compared with defense programs. Public opinion surveys regularly find high support for defense spending and high opposition to “foreign aid.” The public also misperceives the size of foreign aid spending. Surveys have revealed great ignorance and misperception regarding some international programs: most Americans vastly overestimate how much of the federal budget goes to foreign aid, with median and average estimates ranging from 15 to 26 percent when the actual figure is under 1 percent.

Lawmakers are well aware public opinion shows enormously high regard for the U.S. armed forces and widespread opposition to programs labeled “foreign aid.” Thus, it is no surprise that committees reviewing and authorizing foreign policy tend to be weak and international affairs legislation and funding routinely faces opposition and obstacles while military spending legislation is treated as “must pass.”

Cause: Defense programs have strong domestic constituencies

The Defense Department’s huge budget creates numerous domestic constituencies: communities with military bases, civilian and military personnel and their families,

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companies with current or expected defense contracts and their communities and employees. The international affairs agencies have tiny budgets by comparison, and far fewer people who are financially linked to them.

**Cause: Congress sees the Defense Department as more capable and efficient than the State Department**

Especially on Capitol Hill, the Defense Department is perceived as more capable and efficient than the State Department and other international affairs agencies. The Department of Defense’s budget seems more logical, and its purposes are simpler and clearer than the numerous diplomatic and developmental goals of the international affairs agencies.

**Cause: Inherently controversial national security topics**

Much national security legislation is inherently controversial. There is no consensus on the proper mix of carrots and sticks for dealing with potential adversaries. Presidents may want diplomatic maneuvering room just when Congress wants to draw a bright line. Disputes in such policies can slow down or prevent action on broader defense and foreign policy measures.

3. **Allocation of resources tends toward inflexibility.**

Still on the books from the 1933 Economy Act (31 USC 1535) is the broad authority for one department to pay another department for goods or services for its activities. Despite this legislated flexibility, executive branch officials believe that the restrictions sometimes delay or prevent timely responses to urgent situations.

The most common allocation controls are spending ceilings (“not to exceed” provisions) and earmarks for specific programs and recipients. Though many lawmakers see these as necessary tools for oversight of public expenditures, some executive officials see damaging inflexibility. When both branches agreed on the urgency and importance of flexibility in the first few years following the 9/11 attacks, Congress relaxed many of its restrictions. But as Iraq policy became more contentious, lawmakers grew more concerned about exercising close oversight.

Transfers of funds, called reprogramming, are a symptom rather than a cause of legislative-executive conflicts over national security policy. Reprogramming requires prior congressional committee approval in certain cases and notification in most cases. The Department of Defense has the most elaborate system governing reprogramming. Prior approval by the defense committees is required for “special interest items” identified by those committees, for new program starts, and for transfers exceeding certain dollar figures, such as $20 million for procurement programs, $10 million for research and development programs, and $15 million for operations and maintenance activities.

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1034 See Gerry Land, “Teaching Note: Budget Execution,” Defense Acquisition University, April 2006.
Spending on international affairs is even more complex. For foreign aid programs, the committees of jurisdiction generally demand notification followed by fifteen days in which to decide whether to place a hold on the transfer. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 [P.L. 87-195], as amended, has basic transfer authority of up to 15 percent from any account (section 109) and up to 10 percent for military aid (section 610). The president is given broad authority (section 614) to furnish assistance without regard to current law provided that he consult in advance with and provide written justification to the foreign policy and appropriations committees. The annual appropriations bills tend to have specific additional restrictions on the use of these and other transfer authorities, often including a fifteen-day prior notice requirement. As the HELP Commission on foreign aid reported:

At present, the interpretation, management, and operation of these [reprogramming, congressional notification, and legislative holds on fund shifts and transfers] procedures is at best unwieldy and at times unworkable. … Within the legislative branch itself, the authorizers and appropriators follow different procedures, and the House and Senate obey their own distinct processes.1035

Shifts in State Department funds generally require congressional notification and written committee approval. Foreign aid funding is subject to different procedures, depending on which of the various sections of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is the basis for the change. In general, there is consultation with congressional committees prior to formal notification; failure to reach agreement delays the notification.1036

In recent years, Congress has shown increased flexibility, particularly for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The total general transfer authority for Defense funds has been increased from $2 billion in FY 2002 to $3.5 billion in FY 2005 to $5 billion for FY 2008. Congress also allowed broader authority for special programs in Afghanistan and Iraq. As the administration reported to Congress:

Since 9/11, Congress, working closely with the Administration, has provided substantial resources in, among others, the Emergency Response Fund [ERF]; several emergency accounts in the first and second Iraq and Afghanistan supplemental appropriations acts, including: Iraq Freedom Fund, the Coalition Support Fund, and the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program [CERP]; and separate funds first designed to train and equip Afghan and Iraqi military and now expanded to all security forces of both countries, the Iraq Security Forces Fund and the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund.1037

Cause: Constitutional prerogative

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1036 State Department Officials, Personal Interviews, April 2008.
PROBLEM ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM

Congress views its power of the purse as a core constitutional requirement and responsibility and has been historically reluctant—except in major wars—to grant much flexibility to the executive branch.

Cause: Legacy of past problems and distrust

Past experience convinces many lawmakers that loose controls and limited oversight lead to waste and mismanagement. In national security matters, many lawmakers are still concerned that executive branch commitments may preclude or preempt congressional review and approval of actions that may involve the risk of war. Restrictions are also imposed when members of Congress lose trust in the president.

Past problems and concerns have contributed to the complexity and rigidity of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which has been frequently amended but not really overhauled. USAID currently has a checklist of sixty-five statutory provisions that must be considered when determining country eligibility and budget amounts as well as funding allocations.\(^{1038}\)

4. Slow confirmation process for presidential appointees leads to inaction and bureaucratic drift on many issues.

The average time from a president’s inauguration to the confirmation of senior officials has nearly tripled, from 2.4 months in the Kennedy administration to 8.1 months for the elder Bush’s administration and 8.5 months for the Clinton administration. A study of Defense Department appointees found a similar 8.5 months average in recent years. Delays in the Senate have also increased, from a median of thirty-eight days between receipt of nomination and confirmation in 1989–1990 to sixty-seven days in 1997–1999. A different study showed a less consistent pattern, with a spike during 1991–1996, and then a drop to the upper thirties for Defense Department nominees. The latter study also notes a rise from around thirty days for State Department nominees to a high of seventy-nine days during 1995–1998, then dropping to forty-four days.\(^{1039}\)

Cause: Confirmation process increasingly politicized

The confirmation process has lengthened both because of more extensive financial and security reviews and because nominees have increasingly become hostages to extraneous legislative/executive disputes. The process is also made more lengthy and difficult when administrations conduct ideological screening and when senators impose holds rather than allowing up-or-down votes. The arduous confirmation process has led to delays in filling key posts at the start of new administrations, creating gaps in leadership when successors are not quickly named and confirmed. These problems could reach acute levels as a new administration takes power in January 2009.


**Problem Analysis of the Current System**

*Cause: Paperwork requirements*

Congress and the White House insist on FBI clearances of senior appointees, as well as the preparation of detailed financial and ethics reports. Often, committees require different or additional materials, such as divestiture or recusal reports for senior Defense officials.

*Cause: Large number of officials requiring confirmation*

Currently, 115 officials in national security positions, other than ambassadors, require Senate confirmation. There are forty-four in the State Department, forty-five in the Defense Department, eight at CIA, and eighteen in Homeland Security. This problem besets other departments of government at times as well, but the consequences are especially severe in the case of national security.

**5. Failure to pass legislation on time has become endemic.**

Congress rarely passes national security funding legislation in a timely manner. In four of the past ten years, Congress has failed to pass a completed budget resolution to set limits on federal spending; no foreign aid authorization bill has been enacted since 1986; and no State Department authorization bill has been enacted since 2002. While there has been a defense authorization bill each year, the measure has been enacted before the October 1 start of the fiscal year only five times since 1985.

Even the defense appropriations bill has been passed before the start of the fiscal year only ten times in the past thirty years. The situation is even worse for the appropriations bills for the State Department and Foreign Operations—neither bill has been passed before the end of the fiscal year since 1996. The Foreign Operations bill has been passed on time four times in the last twenty years, and State Department funding only three times. Even worse, three times in the past ten years, neither bill passed until January or February.\textsuperscript{1040}

Since the 9/11 attacks, military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have been funded largely out of emergency supplemental appropriations, which are not considered by the authorizing committees. Despite repeated congressional demands that nonemergency military requests be funded through the regular authorization and appropriations process, the administration continues to submit supplemental requests containing funds for what many analysts consider routine programs. As of 2007, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that 40 percent of all military procurement was being funded through emergency supplemental measures rather than the regular defense appropriations bill.\textsuperscript{1041}


National security legislation has often been delayed and complicated by procedural or extraneous matters. The authorization process is supposed to set policy and funding priorities, while appropriations determine the spending details. The defense authorization bill, which routinely was enacted prior to the defense appropriations bill throughout the 1970s and 1980s, has passed prior to appropriations only five times since 1990.

*Cause: National security legislation is controversial, and foreign affairs committees are weak*

Only money bills are truly “must pass,” being granted privileged status on the legislative calendar and under the rules. There are also limitations on measures that can be attached to them. These factors facilitate passage of appropriations bills, whereas authorization bills face numerous and often controversial amendments that can delay or prevent passage. Compounding this, each foreign policy committee is currently weak in its respective chamber, and weak committees get their legislation pushed to the back burner, especially if their bills are controversial or threatened with extraneous matters.

*Cause: Dilution and distribution of power*

Repeated congressional failure to pass routine legislation on many national security programs leads to avoidable inefficiencies in defense and foreign policy activities and sometimes to administrative complications when needed authorities have not been enacted.

**6. Legislative and executive branches are too confrontational.**

In recent decades, strong partisanship has made bipartisan cooperation on national security matters difficult. Reflecting on more than three decades of following Congress, Thomas E. Mann of the Brookings Institution and Norman J. Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute lament what they call “the broken branch”:

> The rise of a sharper and more corrosive partisanship, bordering on tribalism, was driven by the permanent campaign, the higher stakes in elections with majorities regularly at stake, and the growing role of more fundamentalist forces in politics, with issues framed in starkly black-and-white terms and adversaries transformed into enemies. This deeply partisan era was also shaped by the changing nature of individuals coming into the elective arena, characterized by fewer politicians—a term we view with respect, not disdain—who care about compromise, product, and institutional health and more individual activists, ideologues, and entrepreneurs interested in purity and personal advancement.  

Roll call analyses by *Congressional Quarterly* also demonstrate increased partisan divisions. The number of votes on which a majority of Democrats were on the opposite side from a majority of Republicans has increased: 37.4 percent in the President Richard Nixon-President Gerald Ford years, 42.6 percent in the Carter years, 57.5 percent during

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the Clinton administration, and 52.1 percent during George W. Bush’s presidency. On defense and foreign policy issues, there has been a sharp difference in the degree of support for presidential positions by Congress, depending on whether the president’s party controls at least one chamber. When the White House and Capitol Hill were both controlled by the same party, support for the president on defense and foreign policy issues was high (83.5 percent during 1993–1994, 75.8 percent during 2003–2006). Under years of divided control, presidential support was much lower (61.3 percent in 1989–1992, 52.1 percent during 1995–2002, 44 percent in 2007).\footnote{1043}

Tension between the executive and legislative branches, historical and structural in origin, has grown dramatically in the last quarter-century. President Lyndon B. Johnson’s “stealth” move to war in Vietnam is cited by many as the departure point for a decrease in congressional trust of the executive branch on security issues. Compounding this, during the second Nixon term, the relationship between the branches grew demonstrably worse as Congress was drawn into intra-executive squabbles (e.g., the conflict of dual reporting requirements). Post-Watergate, the Democratic Congress strengthened the role of Congress as a whole (winning cases on the impoundment of funds and passing the War Powers Act), thereby strengthening the majority party’s power to obstruct when there is a split government.

This same pattern has been replayed in subsequent conflicts, such as Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti, as the executive has asserted a strong prerogative to use force with only a minimum of congressional consent. The increase in congressional oversight of the executive branch is well documented,\footnote{1044} though the George W. Bush administration has continually claimed an expansive view of executive authority known as the “unitary executive” theory, which holds that the president, and only the president, may control executive branch duties provided for in the separation of powers.\footnote{1045} Limitations on this control by Congress are viewed by the unitary executive as unconstitutional.

Symptomatic of extant cross-governmental tension is the increasing irritation over reporting requirements. Many executive departments and agencies are required to report to both the White House and Congress, creating a conflict of priorities and opening the door for either branch to meddle with the finer details of what the other branch claims are its sole prerogatives. Considerable tensions and disagreements between branches result over the value and burden of these reporting requirements.

Congress has enacted numerous standing requirements for reports on national security matters, and these are supplemented each year by additional one-time reports. One of the

\footnote{1043}{“Party Unity History,” CQ Weekly Report 14 January 2008 148; Congressional Quarterly Almanacs.}
most significant, at least potentially, is the annual report required from the president on national security strategy (50 USC 404a). Regrettably, no president since the provision was enacted in 1986 has provided those reports with the frequency or detail that Congress desired, and, conversely, the absence of a panel with jurisdiction over this report has meant that Congress had few means to oversee or act on these reporting inadequacies. There are also major annual reports required on such subjects as human rights, drug control efforts, and religious liberty. Such reports can give U.S. diplomats leverage over the countries mentioned in the reports; provide executive branch officials with information on ongoing activities they might otherwise not obtain; and stimulate dialog between the branches, especially over the expenditure of funds.

A common complaint from executive branch officials, however, is that requiring so many reports has become an administrative burden that frequently complicates our relations with friendly governments. Many are never read by members of Congress; many remain on the books and must continue to be submitted long after the departure of their original sponsors and after any rationale for them has vanished. The sheer volume of reports from disparate sources also makes it hard for the executive branch to understand congressional priorities. Though requirements in the Goldwater-Nichols Act purported to drastically reduce the number of these reports, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, during his tenure, produced a white paper containing data showing that reporting requirements had actually increased after Goldwater-Nichols was passed. The Defense Department, which keeps detailed data on these reporting requirements, says that the number of annual reports averaged slightly more than 700 from 1986 to 1995, then dropped to slightly more than 500 by 2000. Informal conversation with Defense Department officials indicated that, in the years since the 9/11 attacks, the volume has climbed to nearly 600.

Although Congress has repeatedly tried to clear the underbrush by passing legislation to repeal unnecessary or duplicative reports, those efforts have proved short-lived. Whatever gets repealed has been soon replaced by new requirements as new issues gain prominence and new members seek to specialize. These tensions ultimately lead to numerous reports of uneven quality and a climate of mutual distrust over the value of some products. Congress also rarely follows up on submitted reports with constructive reactions.

Cause: Reports are multipurpose tools

Congress has many motives for imposing reporting requirements: to monitor programs of interest, to obtain information not otherwise provided, to empower officials who share congressional policy concerns, to impose criteria or conditions on U.S. policies, to embarrass officials or undermine programs by forcing the acknowledgement of troubling news, to obtain departmental advice before enacting binding legislation, and to sidestep contentious issues by passing the buck to the executive branch. Obviously, some of these motives reflect a struggle for power between branches, regardless of the administrative burdens or advantages involved. Since the reports serve so many purposes, there is no easy way to limit reports by purpose or number, nor is there any easy way to give guidance to the executive branch as to congressional priorities. Deadlines become the surrogate for importance, and over time, officials infer approximate priorities on the basis
of congressional complaints regarding lateness and the vigor of congressional follow-up to the submitted reports.

*Cause: Executive-legislative tension is inherent to the political process*

Legislative-executive tensions are inherent in the constitutional structure. They can be exacerbated by partisan differences, which become part of current electoral strategies and are rooted in the campaign and election system. Tension is necessary to some extent to preserve a check on governmental power. As James Madison declared in Federalist #51, “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition…. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.” This important attribute of the system has varied to some degree over the decades. Most experts assert that during the nineteenth century, Congress held the upper hand, while from Franklin Roosevelt’s administration to the present executive has been the stronger branch. What is important is that this tension can become excessive, impeding the process rather than providing a check on powers.

*Cause: Legacy of past disputes*

National security issues have contributed to these confrontational behaviors because of strong partisan disagreements, especially over military interventions during the Clinton administration and more recently over the conduct of the war in Iraq.

4. **Consequences**

The increasingly confrontational nature of executive-legislative relations exacerbates all of the preceding problems. The entire set of problems identified above has both immediate and extended consequences, ranging from inconvenient to detrimental.

**a. Immediate**

*The Department of Defense takes on civilian missions.*

Stronger congressional spending support for defense programs than for international affairs has the immediate result of increasing the use of the Defense Department for essentially civilian missions and relying on military personnel who have not been specially trained for civilian responsibilities.

Another consequence is greater cuts or smaller increases for international affairs programs than those for defense, even when the president proposes added funds. As congressional actions on the 050 (defense) and 150 (international affairs) budget functions show, lawmakers routinely cut presidential requests for international affairs programs, often by percentages five to ten times greater than legislative cuts in defense spending.

During President Ronald Reagan’s administration, Congress reduced defense requests by an average of 2.73 percent while cutting international affairs by 7.07 percent. In the George H.W. Bush administration, defense requests were cut an average 2.08 percent.
each year, while international affairs spending was slashed by 12.62 percent. In the
Clinton administration, Congress added an average 1.55 percent to defense requests while
cutting international affairs by 14.49 percent. In the George W. Bush years, Congress
added 0.4 percent to basic (nonemergency) defense requests on an average annual basis
while cutting international affairs by 2.0 percent.\textsuperscript{1046}

\textit{Important national security activities do not benefit from oversight.}

The lack of formal access by Congress to the NSC staff and in particular to the national
security advisor means that Congress hears no testimony by National Security Council
staff on their efforts to plan and execute key policies. Nor is there, or can there be,
testimony on key presidential documents like the National Security Strategy Report,
which is prepared by the NSC staff and issued by the president. The lack of formal
access to the NSC staff ultimately results in a lack of accountability for the multiagency
activities that the NSC staff routinely manages. None of these powerful officials is
subject to Senate confirmation or to any obligation subsequently to answer questions by
Congress on the effectiveness of current policies.

Even when execution is largely within the purview of a single department and its chain of
command, only the NSC staff, acting on behalf of the president, has the interagency
perspective on the policy. The de facto director of the NSC staff, the president’s national
security advisor, is the only senior policymaker in all of government not subject to Senate
confirmation. That official frequently talks to the press and appears in media interviews
explaining and defending administration policy—but never before the committees
charged with oversight of national security. Infrequent and informal sessions with key
interagency managers—particularly the national security advisor—cannot produce the
sustained exchange of information required for adequate oversight.

\textit{Congressional restrictions on spending and fund transfers limit flexibility and impose
delays while approval is obtained.}

Sometimes the congressional notifications have to be carefully negotiated with the
committees of jurisdiction to secure favorable action. Within the executive branch, the
funding limitations and requirements may also lead to lengthy meetings convened just to
sort out which agency should pay for urgent and agreed-upon programs. Congress
imposed strict administrative requirements and spending controls in response to public
resistance to many international programs, which complicates efforts to include these
programs and personnel as part of multiagency operations.

\textit{Avoidable inefficiencies, complications, and costs are rampant.}

Redundant committee structures and the often onerous reporting requirements they
impose waste time and resources and divert attention and capacity of national security
entities from their core functions. There are multiple, redundant reporting requirements

\textsuperscript{1046} Figures based on congressional action in annual budget resolutions as reported in \textit{CQ}
Almanacs.
imposed by often competing congressional committees which may hold hearings for reasons only tangentially related to providing accurate oversight. In addition, executive agencies may require essentially identical reports to be produced, further adding to the bureaucratic burden and time wasted at the expense of concentration on core missions.

**Political gridlock ensues.**

The confrontational and highly partisan behaviors observed in recent decades have often affected oversight, leading the president’s partisans to resist investigations that might prove embarrassing and prompting the opposition to search and subpoena frantically. As members of the president’s party insist on strict loyalty and unwavering support, the opposition demands similar unity of its members even on procedural and relatively noncontroversial matters. This partisanship has stymied cooperation on important national security matters.

**b. Extended**

*Committee structure reinforces executive branch divisions and inhibits integration.*

The structure of congressional committees reinforces executive branch divisions and complicates efforts to provide oversight of multiagency efforts. The fact that no committee has formal jurisdiction over the interagency space means that any panel wishing to oversee activities can find it difficult to get access to key personnel and timely responses to its inquiries.

*Civilian capacities erode.*

Stronger congressional support for defense programs compared with international affairs ultimately erodes civilian capacity. This shortfall becomes much harder to overcome if and when funds are increased. In a classic chicken-or-egg dilemma, Congress is reluctant to increase funding until the agencies prove they have the capacity to spend it.

*Congressional restrictions on spending and fund transfers limit flexibility and impose delays while approval is obtained.*

Program inefficiencies related to spending and fund transfers may have longer term consequences of program failure or missed opportunities. A recent report cites some examples of problems created by the restrictions on allocating or shifting funds:

- A four-month delay in obtaining congressional approval for a police training program in Somalia in 1993 led to program failure. By the time funding was approved, U.S. trainers were already slated to be withdrawn.\(^\text{1047}\)

\(^{1047}\) A Steep Hill 15.
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- Earmarking limitations restricted USAID’s ability to respond proactively to the signing of a 1996 peace agreement between the government of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front.\textsuperscript{1048}

- Sanctions on Sudan do not allow for the flexibility to deal with a country that requires different policies in different regions.\textsuperscript{1049}

Departments are deprived of oversight benefits.

The foreign policy agencies, in particular, fail to receive current congressional guidance, revised authorities, and timely funding. The failure to pass a foreign aid authorization bill for over twenty years means that the government is saddled by a cumbersome law that has a bewildering array of 33 goals, 75 priority areas, and 247 directives.\textsuperscript{1050} Even when the foreign policy committees produce legislation widely viewed as necessary, individuals and groups may seek to add controversial measures that prolong debates and may undermine support for the basic legislation. Defense committees tend to finish their bills long after they might have served as guidance and limitations on the appropriations committees. The net result is a weakening of the authorizing committees compared to the appropriations committees and thus a weakening of the policy perspectives and basic legislation which those committees provide.

Arduous confirmation process.

Many talented people are deterred from accepting key posts because of the delays, disclosures, and other requirements inherent in the congressional confirmation process. Many observers say that this leads to lower quality officials than might otherwise be the case. A survey in 2000 of an elite sample of possible top-level appointees (corporate and university leaders and state and local officials) found 59 percent called the presidential appointments process “confusing”; 51 percent called it “embarrassing”; and 66 percent said that the Senate process was too demanding an ordeal. A RAND study of the Department of Defense found that “political appointee positions are vacant some 20 percent of the time today, up from nearly nil 50 years ago.”\textsuperscript{1051} The net effect of the delayed and often discouraging path to office is a longer hiatus between functioning administrations and greater vulnerability during presidential transitions.

5. Conclusions

Reducing the barriers to interagency collaboration in the executive branch requires a reduction in the institutional and procedural barriers to oversight of multiagency activities in the legislative branch. This will not be easy. Many lawmakers prefer the status

\textsuperscript{1048} A Steep Hill 30.  
\textsuperscript{1049} A Steep Hill 29.  
\textsuperscript{1050} A Steep Hill 23.  
Problem Analysis of the Current System

quo.\textsuperscript{1052} and widespread comfort with the current system and anxiety regarding possible damaging, unintended, or unforeseen consequences of reforms is a roadblock to change in congressional oversight. Senior leaders have acquired power and expertise they do not wish to jeopardize, and junior members have often chosen their committee ladders and issue specialization in order to maximize their constituent service and therefore reelection chances. Executive branch agencies have developed working relationships with people in the current structures, which is often mutually beneficial. Just as campaign reform legislation must confront the fact that every member is familiar with and has been successful under the current rules, proponents of changes in committee arrangements and legislative processes must face the reality that the current system is sustained by reinforcing mutual benefits.

The conventional wisdom is that the problems identified above are insignificant and, in any case, probably not remediable. The conventional wisdom is wrong. In national security matters, the oversight problems identified here are serious and significant. The lack of quality oversight of multiagency activities, delays in confirming senior officials and in passing routine legislation, interbranch tensions hindering effective governance, and political and substantive disagreements undermining the common goals all contribute to the inability of the United States government to provide security for the American people.

Collectively, these problems are grave concerns; their understandable but parochial causes are impediments to sorely needed national security reform. The comfort and benefits of the status quo must be weighed against the values of strategic oversight, whole-of-government responses to major threats and opportunities, and more effective congressional of national security activities. An increasing number of congressional leaders recognize the problems and are willing to address them despite disincentives for doing so. But until their views hold a majority, systemic national security reform will not be possible.

\textsuperscript{1052} For a good summary, particularly of committee membership and jurisdiction, see E. Scott Adler, \textit{Why Congressional Reforms Fail: Reelection and the House Committee System} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).
**Problem Analysis of the Current System**

**H. Conclusions: Underlying Assumptions of the Current System**

We are again faced with a new and dangerous global threat, the rise of jihadist terrorism. But more than five years after the Sept. 11 attacks, we have not yet responded with the creativity displayed at the outset of the Cold War. Instead, we are either disparaging Cold War institutions or, at best, tinkering with them to make them play a role for which they were never designed.

-- Walter Isaacson
President and CEO of the Aspen Institute

1. **Underlying Assumptions**

Every system operates on the basis of some underlying assumptions. The current national security system is the result of a many interventions executed through a political process, so the assumptions on which it is based are not always explicit and must often be surmised from the collective design and behavior of the system. Highlighting the underlying assumptions of the current system and their validity is an effective way of summarizing the cumulative impact of the problems with the current national security system, and also points the way toward their remediation.

Perhaps the most important underlying assumption of the system is that the environment will produce only periodic challenges that require the temporary, undivided attention of the president and security councils with static, statutory membership. In reality, the environment is producing numerous, subtle, constantly evolving security challenges and opportunities that require careful integration of multiple department and agency efforts and that defy merely periodic central management. Further, the design and attributes of the system seem to assume that the president:

1. *Has the time to manage the national security system.* Since the structure seems built to support the president’s decision-making, and the president is the sole authority capable of integrating the diverse functional organizations in the national security system, it is assumed that the president has sufficient time for integration activities.

2. *Can effectively delegate integration responsibilities.* Even presidents who are interested and active in managing national security issues have very limited time to spend on those matters. Therefore, the president must delegate presidential authority to a committee or Cabinet official (e.g., lead agency) or other individual (e.g., national security advisor) who will effectively integrate national effort.
3. **Can effectively manage the national security system with his or her preferred style and approach.** The system responds to the president’s preferred leadership style and management approach. In doing so, it demonstrates that it is adaptable to the chief executive; it does not, however, demonstrate ready adaptation to the security environment.

4. **Can effectively organize the system for unity of effort with periodic general guidance on national security structure and process.** Presidents and their senior advisors value general guidance such as NSPD-1 and HSPD-1 because they are low-cost—as measured in congressional oversight, creation of new entities or staffing requirements, or time to implement. Such guidance provides a seemingly ready means for achieving integration in selective areas of importance. Moreover, it is flexible enough to be altered in mandate, scope, or the frequency and discipline of use, depending on the president’s interest.

All these assumptions are false, as demonstrated in preceding analyses. The president does not have the time to intervene on all the important security issues that require integration of multiple departments and agencies and does not have consistently effective mechanisms for delegating integration responsibilities. Neither is the system effectively managed through conformance with presidential management preferences or with periodic guidance on the number and type of interagency committees.

Below the level of the president, the current system seems to assume that subordinate leaders:

1. **Understand how decisions are made and what information is required to make those decisions.** The system as it stands now assumes that decision-makers understand 1) what information is needed to make each decision, 2) that, in most cases, information for those decisions is available somewhere within the national security system, and 3) how to evaluate the validity of incoming information.

2. **Can and will routinely integrate the insights of all relevant departments and agencies into alternative courses of action.** This assumption would mean that the head of any interagency committee can routinely forge unified courses of action from multiple organizational perspectives, dispassionately evaluating the merits and disadvantages of each rather than simply forwarding up the chain a set of alternatives that reflect the preferred positions of different national security organizations.

3. **Readily voice their opinions on poor courses of action and false assumptions—even in the face of differing opinions.** Senior members of the national security system have a long track record of making tough decisions. Because of that, it is assumed they are interested in, willing to, and have forums for voicing dissenting opinions on national security-level issues. It is further assumed that candid views will not be misrepresented in public through leaks to the press, and that leaders who voice dissenting opinions will be rewarded for leavening the debate.
4. Act in the best interests of the system once decisions are made. It is assumed that, in making or executing decisions, members of the national security system will work in the best interests of the approved policy. That is, they will work in the best interests of the system and of the nation. It is assumed that they will do so even if it is contrary to their personal opinions or contrary to the benefit of their home organization.

5. Provide sufficient information for adequate oversight. President Kennedy thought Cabinet meetings were “simply useless” and instead asked for weekly reports from Cabinet members outlining their activities and proposals. Whether through direct examination or written report, all effective oversight of the national security system, whether by Congress or the president, assumes leaders will provide timely, accurate, and sufficiently detailed information.

Again, all these assumptions are false. Most subordinate leaders do not understand how their superiors make decisions or fully understand what information is required to make those decisions. Interagency committee chairs responsible for producing and evaluating integrated courses of action cannot do so, believing instead that the system requires that they faithfully represent the differing views of the departments and agencies. Officials often are reluctant to voice their opinions on courses of action and faulty assumptions since it is not clear that such candor will be received well and treated confidentially. In fact, fully sharing information is as likely to enable a bureaucratic opponent as it is to inform and leaven debate. Since the way decisions are made is poorly understood and respected, and the resulting guidance is often ambiguous, decision implementation is often carried out to the benefit of an individual’s parent organization.

The current system’s structure and processes seem to assume:

1. Strong core functional competencies are more important than effective integration of those capabilities. The history of structural adjustments to the national security system demonstrates it is both easier and more common to manipulate the functional departments and agencies than it is to create new structures that effectively integrate their work. Building good capabilities, in other words, is assumed to be more important than integrating them well.

2. Responsibility for major process components can be divided among organizations without deleterious consequences. Currently, for any given national security issue, the national security system tends to assign responsibility for assessment, policy, strategy, planning, implementation, and evaluation to different organizations. There are no authoritative end-to-end process owners. The assumption is that the disaggregated expertise in each area is more important than the rapid and iterative integration of the expertise.

As virtually all other organizations confronting a dynamic and complex environment have discovered, rapid integration of diverse, needs-specific capabilities is as important,
or even more important, than building strong baseline capabilities. Rapid, coherent, and iterative integration of those capabilities is unlikely without some process manager for the entire end-to-end process. So these system assumptions also do not accurately reflect the demands of the current security environment.

The current system’s approach to human capital and knowledge management assumes that:

- **Personnel principles and practices are largely timeless and subject to only minor change.** Title 5 rules and regulations—the foundation of these principles and practices—are still applicable today. Chapters 95 through 101 of Title 5 are examples of different executive agencies and Congress attempting to amend the law to allow agencies to establish procedures that are consistent with current practices, such as pay based on performance and mission contribution, results-based performance management, and market-based compensation. There has not been a major revision of Title 5 legislation since the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.

- **Individual performance is more worthy of recognition and encouragement than collaboration.** While team problem solving, information sharing, and collaboration are critical to fulfilling the mission of the national security community, the promotion, evaluation, and reward components of the current talent management system focus on individual achievement.

- **Investments in electronic data connections alone will yield a common understanding of the security environment for decision-makers and enable collaboration.** All parts of the national security system are heavily invested in new linking information systems within and across national security entities. Given the time, money, and effort invested in such technical improvements, the assumption seems to be that they are sufficient in themselves to enable rapid and effective decision-making and collaboration.

In reality, personnel practices must keep pace with the evolution of work and labor availability. In this regard, the private sector is discovering that collaboration, and therefore group and team incentives and performance, are critical for success and that the same is true for the national security system. Similarly, simply keeping pace with technical improvements to data sharing is not sufficient for actually enabling interoperability and collaboration, which require a more holistic appreciation of how knowledge is developed and shared among people.

Concerning resource management and strategic direction, the current system assumes that a small, overburdened staff in the White House can quickly determine national priorities and the resource and capability requirements for their success, and that it can rapidly find and transfer resources from the less important to the most important programs among the more than $700 billion per year in national security programs. It also assumes that one key leader with limited tenure—the president—overseeing a White House staff that increasingly must centralize issue management to achieve integrated effort, can devote
the time and resources to generate agreement throughout the national security system on the scope, grand strategy, and vision for the future of the national security system. Yet none of these assumptions is true.

2. Conclusions

As the problem analysis revealed, the performance of the current national security system is inadequate and based on assumptions that are no longer true, if they ever were. Before World War II, the argument was made that “war and peace were mutually exclusive conditions that called for distinct institutional responses.”1054 This peculiarly American idea ran counter to much historical experience, but whatever justification it had passed away as American interests and influence expanded:

By the 1930s, however, America had developed global interests and had become increasingly vulnerable to distant enemies. Under these circumstances, the argument was inappropriate, then anachronistic, then dangerously irresponsible.1055

Seventy years later, we are at the same juncture. Maintaining the current system in the face of the current environment is anachronistic, and even dangerously irresponsible. Reforming the system, removing impediments to better performance, and eliminating core problems with due attention to their causes and their implicit underlying assumptions is long overdue. Part V of this report offers detailed options for solving the problems of the current system that are based on a new set of systemic imperatives; that is, assumptions that are based on a twenty-first-century environment.

1055 Stuart 35.
PART V: ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS FOR REFORM

In addition to providing the means to improve presidential direction and system management, national security reforms must empower integrated issue management across organizations and offer the basis for a new legislative-executive branch partnership on national security.

The Definition and Scope of National Security

The scope of national security must be broadened beyond security from aggression to include security against massive societal disruption as a result of natural forces and security against the failure of major national infrastructure systems and to recognize that national security depends on the sustained stewardship of the foundations of national power. PNSR adopted the following definition of national security that encompasses the expanded scope:

National security is the capacity of the United States to define, defend, and advance its position in a world that is being continuously reshaped by turbulent forces of change.

The definition of national security must be complemented with a process for determining the scope of national security that provides a clear delineation of the national security roles and responsibilities of the executive branch departments and agencies, and it should do so at three levels:

- **Core National Security Institutions**: those organizations that spend the preponderance of their time building and employing capabilities to meet threats

- **Mission-Specific National Security Roles**: other government organizations that do not devote a preponderance of their time and effort to national security but have important and well defined roles in particular national security missions

- **Contingency Planning and Capability for Exceptional Cases**: those government organizations that do not have roles in standing missions but do have responsibility for some contingency planning and reserve capability building for unlikely but potentially catastrophic threats

A new national security act should involve the president and Congress agreeing on these three categories of roles and responsibilities. Without some organizational delimitations of security roles and responsibilities, the core reforms will not work. Recommendations for integrated budgets, personnel and knowledge management reform, for example, do not make sense unless the affected organizations and programs can be identified.

Core Reforms

Department and agency autonomy must be complemented with the capacity for whole-of-government solutions.
Analysis of Options for Reform

- **Strategic Direction and Processes**: A series of guidance documents to provide strategic direction; a more powerful National Security Council (NSC) executive secretariat to manage an interagency human capital plan; a National Assessment and Visioning Center and an Office of Decision Support and system; improved budgeting processes to complement enhanced strategic direction.

- **Human Capital**: A National Security Professional Corps to complement department personnel with professionals able to move easily among agencies and into positions requiring interagency experience.

- **Knowledge Management**: A chief knowledge officer, heading an Office of Decision Support, to manage common information technology, terminology, and classification systems.

- **Congress**: Senate and House committees for interagency matters; consolidated oversight of the Department of Homeland Security and the intelligence community; strengthened oversight capabilities of supporting organizations (e.g. the Government Accountability Office) and the appropriations committees; the Senate confirmation of an executive secretary of the NSC.

These core reforms give the president and his advisors the tools to direct and manage the national security system, while establishing a culture that supports interagency collaboration. Decentralizing issue management is still necessary to alleviate the president’s span-of-control problem, but could be done with three alternative options.

**Option One: White House Command**

Replace the NSC and HSC with the President’s Security Council. Create a director for national security (DNS) with super-Cabinet authority on interagency issues and have his/her staff run the hierarchy of Washington-based interagency committees.

This approach is familiar, using the ultimate authority of the president to integrate and coordinate, and optimal for an environment dominated by the rivalries between great powers. However, it relies on a talented DNS and staff, would work best with a president skilled in foreign policy and bureaucratic politics, and still leaves the president and DNS with a possibly unmanageable span of control.

**Option Two: Integrated Regional Centers**

Shift the existing system’s emphasis to the regional level with regional directors heading integrated regional centers (IRCs), which act as interagency headquarters for national security policy. The President’s Security Council replaces the NSC and HSC, convening Cabinet members and integrated regional directors based on issues, not statutory membership. The national security advisor and a small staff focus on national strategy and system management, as integrated regional centers manage issues. The departments and agencies support IRCs by providing capabilities.
This option builds on the success of the regional military commands while correcting the current civil-military imbalance by providing a civilian counterpart to the regional commands; it allows Washington to focus on global and long-range policy and strategy; and it gives embassies clear authority to coordinate their country plans. However, global issues would require IRCs to work across their seams on a regular basis. Despite mechanisms to facilitate this, the tendency of IRCs to become independent fiefdoms focused solely on regional issues would be a liability.

**Option Three: A Hierarchy of Decentralized Teams**

A hierarchy—national, regional, country—of empowered cross-functional teams manage issues at all levels for the president, conducting issue management on a day-to-day basis.

This option is the most decentralized and collaborative, leaving long-range strategic direction, setting priorities and aligning resources, and moderating issue team efforts as the primary activities of the White House and the president’s security advisor and staff. Empowered teams provide for truly integrated courses of action, fix accountability (on the team leader), concentrate expertise, and afford the most flexible response to diverse security challenges. However, teams are management-intensive, and slower to make decisions; their focus on mission accomplishment means they will sacrifice other national objectives to meet their mandates. In addition, teams would work best under the authority of strong structural hubs. Team efforts would have to be carefully delineated, closely monitored, and deconflicted.

**Supporting Options: Structural Consolidation**

The three additional reforms offered below are primarily, but not exclusively, structural consolidations. All three would be politically challenging but could substantially improve the efficacy of any of the preceding options:

- An integrated civil-military chain of command in the field when large numbers of U.S. military forces are present
- A new Department of International Relations to provide better unity of purpose for soft power
- An empowered Department of Homeland Security to unify effort across the federal government in collaboration with state and local authorities

**Conclusion**

Considered separately or as a whole, these reforms are robust; even radical. They need not be adopted in toto, and hybrid solutions drawing upon some or all of these options are possible. However, the United States will need to adopt some combination of the reforms offered in this paper if it wants a national security system that consistently produces unified purpose and effort.
ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS FOR REFORM

✧ ✧ ✧
How do we reorganize our government, along the same lines as we did in 1947 with the National Security Act, to create the Department of Defense, the CIA, and reorganize Congress? And how do we complement that with the global strategy to work with our allies, to talk about economic and educational programs, to have a message that is going to beat the seductive message of Osama bin Laden to the world's youth and the Muslim youth in this world? We have a long way to go on those fronts.

-- Rep. Timothy Roemer
Member, 9/11 Commission

A. Introduction

If maintaining the current system does not make sense given the current and projected security environment, options for reform must be considered. Four primary sources of insights on alternatives were used by the Project for National Security Reform (PNSR). First, we examined the parts of the existing system that work well to determine whether they could be used more extensively. For example, we considered whether the attributes of informal teams that have proven productive could be institutionalized. Second, we examined the results of the many other excellent national security reform studies to determine whether any of their recommendations would solve problems identified by PNSR.

Third, we conducted research on the experience of other nations that are considering or have enacted reforms to update their national security systems. Some of the reforms surveyed contain valuable lessons and exceed anything comparable in the United States—for example, the Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning process used by Singapore. Others simply move those countries closer to the current model employed by the United States. For example, the French creation of a national security council, the Australian experimentation with lead agency concepts, various intelligence community (IC) reforms, and the more general interest in use of public policy and private-sector knowledge centers are all examples of other countries following in the footsteps of the U.S. experience.

Fourth, options for reform considered by the Project on National Security Reform drew upon organization theory and practice, including the trend in the private sector toward greater reliance on horizontal organizations like cross-functional teams and team decision-making in general. While the stakes are higher and many of the accountability and evaluation tools and techniques are different, there are many lessons that the national security system can adapt from the private sector and organizational

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theory and practice more generally. The results of the research on trends in other countries and the applicability of lessons from the private sector are summarized in Appendix 7: Sources of Insights on Alternatives.

Using a diverse array of sources on alternative solutions underscored the fact that there are many options for reforming the current national security system. As a matter of general principle, the options reviewed in this section of the report are robust. Difficult reforms to eliminate impediments and improve performance were chosen over weaker alternatives that merely ameliorate problems by addressing the symptoms of problems. Moreover, all options for reform had to satisfy criteria. Options had to make a direct contribution to solving the core problems with the current national security system and reflect a set of system imperatives that would meet the demands of the future security environment.

1. Principles for Eliminating Impediments to Performance

At a minimum, reform must rectify the impediments to system performance already identified in preceding sections of the report. In that regard, the following principles were used to generate options for reform:

- **Mission Integration**: Since the current system is grossly imbalanced, supporting strong departmental capabilities at the expense of integrating mechanisms, the new system must have a more flexible management structure that permits better integration. Such structure must facilitate better collaboration and knowledge management, and must be supported by human capital systems that can match talent with needs and that reward collaboration and initiative. Solutions providing better mission integration must not undermine the national security system’s present ability to generate world-class core competencies.

- **Aligning Resources with Missions**: Since the current system allocates resources to departments and agencies that give priority to capabilities required by their core mandates rather than those required by national missions, the new system must have the means to link resources to priority national security missions and their requirements, both in the near and long term. It must be easier for the system to develop and improvise new capabilities based on mission needs, to transfer resources between departments and agencies and between missions, and to allocate resources flexibly without diminishing accountability. Solutions providing better mission resourcing must not undermine core capabilities or other necessary requirements for success and must not eliminate surge or other supporting capacity.

- **Strategic Direction**: Since the current system burdens the White House with issue management because it is not able to integrate or resource missions well without direct presidential intervention, the new system must free the president and his advisors for strategic direction by providing effective mechanisms for decentralizing national security issue management. Decentralized issue management would require corresponding knowledge management, personnel
incentives, and training and education reforms. Solutions allowing the president
to delegate authority for mission integration should not constrain the president’s
traditional options, which include using a lead agency approach.

- **System Management:** Since the current system so burdens the White House that
it cannot manage the national security system as a whole to ensure it is
sufficiently agile, collaborative, and able to efficiently execute presidential
transitions, the new system must provide the president and his advisors with the
tools that enable strategic direction and system management. Solutions
improving the president’s ability to direct and manage the national security
system cannot, on balance, provide a greater management burden for the
president. Thus, options for more senior advisors reporting directly to the
president should be avoided unless more than offset by large increases in
effectively delegated responsibilities.

- **Oversight:** Since the legislative branch’s current methods of providing resources
and conducting oversight reinforce executive branch problems and hamper efforts
to improve performance, the new system must establish a new partnership on
national security between the two branches of government that is mutually
beneficial to their respective constitutional roles. Congress must be able to
provide better oversight of executive branch national security mission
management, and the executive branch must have more flexibility to transparently
resource and manage national security missions. One should not happen without
the other, and both must allow collaboration without sacrificing accountability.
Solutions improving the cooperation between the president and Congress on
national security matters must acknowledge the congressional role in national
security and avoid making the system more opaque or contributing to
jurisdictional confusion among congressional committees.

National security reforms must:

1. Provide the means for effective strategic direction and system management
2. Decentralize and empower integrated issue management across organizations
3. Offer the basis for a new legislative-executive branch partnership on national
security

**2. System Imperatives for the Future Security System**

Beyond solving the problems inherent in the current system that impede system
performance, reforms should be based upon principles that will ensure the system is
responsive to the emerging and future security environment. Using updated assumptions
about the twenty-first-century security environment, PNSR developed a new set of
systemic imperatives intended to ensure the resultant system would have the foresight
and flexibility to quickly adapt to changing national or international circumstances.
Drawing on literature reviews, case studies, in-depth analyses of the working groups, and
input from national security experts and policymakers, PNSR identified seven key imperatives for resilient national security system performance:

1. Effective leadership
2. Effective strategic management of the system
3. Comprehensive and flexible investment strategy
4. Unified national security workforce and culture
5. Flexible and agile structure
6. Effective management of information and knowledge
7. Comprehensive oversight and accountability

Today’s national security system does not match up well against these imperatives. A new system, built around these imperatives, would require changes in structures, processes, and the ways our national security leaders, workforce, and oversight institutions think about security. No single imperative is a sufficient measure of success; progress against all is necessary for a resilient system that will serve the United States well in the years ahead.

**a. Effective leadership**

The national security system requires skilled leadership from the White House down through its subordinate units. Leadership must be deliberately developed and exercised and supported. Leaders must be perceptive of emerging trends, and proactive in providing timely strategic direction to shape and manage the national security system. Leaders must provide vision and guidance for effective policy development and execution, but also engage the organizational management of the national security system’s constituent components. To achieve genuine unity of effort within government, national security leaders must cultivate and empower partnerships across the U.S. government. These leaders must also be adept at forging links and fostering partnerships with state and local governments, the private sector and key international players.

**b. Effective strategic management of the system**

To ensure coherence and efficiency, the leaders of the national security system need to think and act strategically in the immediate and extended future. Organizations and teams must be capable of accurately assessing major trends and key issues in world events, and able to anticipate problems and opportunities. The system needs a clear methodology for considering both alternative explanations for the trends and alternative solution paths. Finally, the system needs a process to articulate objectives; to balance ends, means, and ways; and to integrate the instruments of national power. That process must produce plans for security strategy, but also be able to manage the different parts of
the national security system in order to orchestrate human capital, decision support, and other resources.

c. **Comprehensive and flexible investment strategy**

The system must comprehensively identify the human and financial resources needed for national security activities, and then generate those resources. Strategic plans, with long-term goals and clear requirements, should drive current activity. National security leaders should nurture required capabilities and use them creatively and efficiently. To overcome one of the major deficiencies identified in the current system, the national security system must contain a process to prioritize national missions and associated capabilities rather than default to sustaining ongoing functions that may not be justified by projected priorities. While incorporating a long-term strategic focus, the system must remain flexible in allocating resources to immediate needs and able to adapt rapidly to future challenges and opportunities.

d. **Unified national security workforce and culture**

A workforce that shares a common culture and is able to navigate established departmental and professional cultures must characterize the national security system. Building that workforce requires an effective recruitment process and a robust education and training system, reinforced by career incentives that reward cooperation and collaboration. The system must clarify how each person contributes to collective goals and efforts, and then must value and support those who perform well, take initiative, demonstrate teamwork, and are adaptable. If national security leaders effectively develop and nurture such personnel, the resulting shared interagency culture should enable broader trust, streamlined processes, and better executed objectives.

e. **Flexible and agile structure**

A rigid system will ultimately fail, particularly in this era of rapid and widespread change. The new national security system must employ flexible and agile structures that will be responsive to future challenges. The tests for flexibility and agility include employing global awareness in the application of regional or local capabilities and policy; providing strategic direction and addressing issues at the appropriate level; and emphasizing the integration, cooperation, and coordination of public and private tools and capabilities. An adaptive system will accelerate creative thinking across levels of the system to promote innovative solutions and also generate collaboration among institutions, teams, and personnel working on interrelated issues.

f. **Effective management of information and knowledge**

The national security system must acquire, link, and share knowledge throughout its components. To be versatile, effective use must be made of expertise wherever it resides and decentralized decision-making must be supported. Interpersonal networks within the national security workforce that span organizational boundaries must be augmented and enhanced. The system must exploit the full range of human and technological opportunities, and develop mechanisms to counter bias, selectivity, and inflexible
mindsets in policy development analysis and assessment. The system must also maintain an awareness of new, emergent, or incongruent information, the relevance of which may not immediately be apparent but which can augur important future developments.

g. Comprehensive oversight and accountability

The current national security system focuses oversight on each separate component; an effective system demands oversight and accountability of the whole system as well as its constituent parts. Such oversight and accountability is a joint responsibility of Congress and the executive branch; both assess effectiveness, efficiency, and compliance with laws and norms. Just as the American people hold Congress and executive branch officials accountable for high performance, Congress and executive branch officials must hold all national security system participants responsible for appropriately high ethical standards and integrity. Those providing oversight must seek first and foremost better performance, not political advantage. Congress should organize itself to provide oversight of national security missions as well as organizations, and it should grant greater flexibility to the executive branch for resource allocation in exchange for better access to executive branch decision-making, which is necessary for more informed oversight.

3. Overview of Reform Options

The national security system can be more or less centralized, but it cannot run autonomously. It requires strategic direction, which is the basis for collaboration in pursuit of national security goals. Absent strategic direction, departments and agencies will operate more autonomously in pursuit of their own immediate objectives. The national security system must receive strategic direction from the president, who, as established in the Constitution, is the chief executive and commander in chief. In this regard, the national security system is inescapably a president-centric system. If it is to receive strategic direction in the form of unifying vision and grand strategy, it must come from the president and his immediate advisors. Yet for reasons explained in the preceding parts of the report, the current national security system is not easily managed by the president and in fact tends to frustrate efforts to provide strategic direction. Therefore, one clear prerequisite for a better system is removing the impediments to strategic direction and providing the president with the means to more easily manage the system.

A set of core reforms are required to establish the means for effective strategic direction and system management and a new legislative-executive branch partnership on national security. The core reforms establish a foundation for the succeeding options and rely heavily on changes in process, human capital, resource management, and congressional oversight. While variations on these core reforms are possible, they are largely foundational and should be implemented as an integrated set. Over time, implementing the recommendations in the core reforms would substantially improve system performance, but alone they would be insufficient. They must be complemented with additional reforms to permit decentralized issue management.
The following table facilitates comparison of 1) the reform requirements for eliminating current system shortcomings, 2) the corollary imperatives for ensuring the system can meet future challenges that build upon them, and 3) the impact of the core reforms proposed below. In actuality, the effects of most core reforms extend across many if not all system requirements. However, they are artificially segregated in the chart to illustrate their alignment with reform requirements.

Table 7. Core Reforms Compared with Reform Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principles for Eliminating Impediments to Performance</th>
<th>Mission Integration</th>
<th>Aligning Resources with Missions</th>
<th>Strategic Direction</th>
<th>System Management</th>
<th>Oversight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>System Imperatives for the Future Security System</td>
<td>Flexible and Agile Structure ### Unified Workforce and Culture</td>
<td>Complete and Flexible Investment Strategy</td>
<td>Effective leadership</td>
<td>Effective Strategic Management ### Effective Knowledge Management</td>
<td>Oversight and Accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core Reforms: Key Features</td>
<td>Unified human capital system supports a common culture.</td>
<td>Policy development and resourcing links ensure priority missions are resourced with the right capabilities.</td>
<td>Supported by new strategy, planning, &amp; budget processes Assessment and visioning center supports long-range planning. Unified human capital system supports leadership development.</td>
<td>Executive secretary provides system management support, including institutional knowledge. Enhanced decision support improves decision-making and speeds transitions.</td>
<td>Congress organizes for better mission oversight and grants greater flexibility to the executive branch.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Requirements not met by Core Reforms</td>
<td>No structure for decentralized integration</td>
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As the chart makes clear, the core reforms are not primarily structural, but rather leadership, process, human capital, resource and knowledge management reforms; they are necessary but not sufficient for system reform. The basic structure of the national security system must also be modified to allow better integration of the elements of power in a manner that decentralizes mission and issue management and allows the system to be more responsive to the security environment.

Such structural adjustments will be particularly difficult. Leaders of existing organizations will resist new organizational constructs not under their control for parochial reasons, but also because they doubt the value of tinkering with basic national

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1057 The PNSR literature review for organizational structure and the history of structural reforms in the national security system make it clear that such resistance must be expected.
security structures. Their prejudice is widely shared. As Carnes Lord points out, a “preoccupation with formalistic organization charts is a common failing in many studies of the U.S. national security bureaucracy, and justifies to some degree the dismissive attitude toward organizational questions that is frequently encountered among knowledgeable observers of executive branch behavior.”  

Skepticism about the value of structural adjustments is most pronounced among those who believe individual leadership is far more important than other elements of organizational effectiveness, including structure. At all levels of the interagency system, from national level interagency committees to country teams headed by ambassadors overseas, it is frequently observed that success depends on effective leaders rather than on their supporting organizations. The problem with this perspective, as Lord notes, “is not only that ‘good people’ can be rendered neutral or even actively dangerous by dysfunctional forms of organization, but also that ‘good people’ as such are rarely available.” In other words, good leaders and structure are interrelated and both are important to a well-functioning organization.  

Accordingly, a set of additional, alternative options is offered, all of which make structural and process changes that would decentralize issue management to varying degrees. These three options assume and build upon the core reforms. Implementing one of these three options, or some combination thereof, is necessary. After reviewing three alternative structures for the decentralization of integrated issue management, a set of supporting options for structural consolidations is offered. Each of the structural consolidations would further assist the decentralization of issue management from the White House. All of these options for structural consolidation could be executed in conjunction with the core reforms and any of the previous alternatives offered.  

Before considering the reform options in detail, we must raise and resolve one key prerequisite for national security reform: reaching agreement on the scope and definition of national security. Strategic direction presumes a modicum of agreement on the scope of national security. Without agreement on the range of activities that constitute national security, there is no basis for collaboration in pursuit of national security objectives. Therefore, addressing the scope and definition of national security is a key enabler for strategic direction and a prerequisite for national security reform.  

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1059 Id.  
B. The Definition and Scope of National Security

Without agreement on what is or is not a matter of national security, the national security system cannot be defined, adapted, or reformed. Agreement on scope must take two forms: a definition and a process. The definition is required because those proposing reform must offer a boundary for the scope of the reform, and because those participating in the implementation of reforms and in the national security system more generally must understand the basis for their common interests in order to cooperate with one another.

Definitions of national security are typically broad for several reasons. Since a definition is static, those providing the definition are at pains to ensure that the scope of national security encompasses all the potential threats to the nation’s security interests so that they may be sufficiently protected. Moreover, the security environment has demonstrated a wider range of threats to national security over the past few decades, and a general consensus exists that the scope of national security needs to be broader than traditional defense, diplomacy, and intelligence concerns. Some sense of how the security environment has expanded the traditional boundaries of national security can be gleaned from a comparison of the original National Security Council membership and advisors as set forth in the National Security Act of 1947 (prior to its first amendments) with a list of organization addressees in the George W. Bush administration’s presidential directive organizing the National Security Council system,\textsuperscript{1061} and the agencies and departments referenced by the 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy (see chart below). Finally, there is the foundational truth that the security of the nation is rooted in multiple disciplines that generate the elements of national power we ultimately draw upon for collective security. Whereas it used to be common to think of national security as a subset of foreign relations, now foreign relations are a subset of an expanded national security concept. Hence the Department of State is now referred to as a national security institution. All these factors support a broad baseline definition for national security.

Table 8. Expansion of National Security Effort

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1947</th>
<th>2007</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of State</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Military Establishment*</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
<td>Intelligence Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Security Resources Board</td>
<td>Office of the Vice President</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Department of the Treasury</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Justice Department/FBI</td>
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<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<td>Department of Agriculture</td>
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<td>Department of Commerce</td>
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<td>Department of Health and Human Services</td>
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<td>Department of Energy</td>
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<td>Environmental Protection Agency</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Office of Management and Budget</td>
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<td></td>
<td>U.S. Trade Representative</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Council of Economic Advisers</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Office of Science and Technology Policy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Export-Import Bank</td>
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<td>NASA</td>
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<td>Nuclear Regulatory Commission</td>
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<td>Peace Corps</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Overseas Private Investment Corporation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Federal Communications Commission</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Including the service secretaries and secretary of defense.

In keeping with the need for a broad definition, the Guiding Coalition for the Project on National Security adopted the following definition of national security:

National security is the capacity of the United States to define, defend, and advance its position in a world that is being continuously reshaped by turbulent forces of change.

The Guiding Coalition also agreed that the objectives of national security policy are:

- Security from aggression against the nation, by means of a national capacity to shape the strategic environment, to anticipate and prevent threats, to respond to attacks by defeating enemies, to recover from the effects of attack, and to sustain the costs of defense

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Security against massive societal disruption as a result of natural forces, including pandemics, natural disasters, and climate change

Security against the failure of major national infrastructure systems by means of building robust systems, defending them, and maintaining the capacity for recovering from damage

With this scope, it is clear that success in national security matters depends on integrated planning and action and on sustained stewardship of the foundations of national power: sound economic policy, energy security, robust physical and human infrastructure (including health), and strong educational systems (especially in the sciences and engineering). Success also depends on the example the United States sets for the rest of the world through its actions at home and abroad.

1. A Process for Determining Scope

For several reasons, the scope of national security cannot be resolved with a mere definition. First, the scope of national security continuously evolves. The security environment is unpredictable, and the nation may be challenged in unforeseeable ways that even a broad definition does not sufficiently capture. Second, when the scope of national security is construed very broadly, it is clear that virtually all government organizations and all levels of government play a role in national security. A process is needed in order to determine the nature and extent of each organization’s role and, more specifically, their missions and crisis activities. A blanket statement to the effect that all of government must support national security is not discriminating enough to define desired behaviors or hold any element of the bureaucracy accountable. As previously noted, if everything the government does is considered a security issue, then nothing in particular can be specified as a priority security concern. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the scope of national security and the associated government activities and collective sacrifice required to safeguard the nation’s security are inherently political, and political issues can be resolved only through the political process.

The practical outcome required from the political process for determining the scope of national security is a clear delineation of the national security roles and responsibilities of the executive branch departments and agencies. They must be required and enabled in law to perform their national security functions. In general, three levels of national security roles and responsibilities must be delineated:

- **Core National Security Institutions**: Those organizations that spend the preponderance of their time building and employing capabilities to meet threats to national security should be designated as core national security institutions (e.g., the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, and the intelligence community). Without a core set of institutions demarcated, there would be no foundation for common human capital and decision support programs, national security strategy, planning and budgets, or national security community values and processes. By designating core national security institutions, it would be possible to begin building a national security culture that complements the
Currently dominant department and agency cultures and permits collaboration among them. The common culture would be based on common values, beginning with the oath both military officers and diplomats take to “protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”

- **Mission-Specific National Security Roles**: Government organizations that do not devote a preponderance of their time and collective effort to national security nonetheless would have important and well-defined roles in particular national security missions. A clear example would be Treasury’s role in helping track terrorist financing around the globe. Having specific national security missions codified in law would ensure that the leadership and personnel in such organizations fully understand that some subset of their activities is a matter of national security and must be addressed accordingly. Currently, some organizations want to execute national security missions but have inadequate capacity, or their organizational cultures actually militate against conducting these missions. Having such a mandate written into law and such missions resourced would increase governmentwide preparedness for this mission set.

- **Contingency Planning and Capability for Exceptional Cases**: Those government organizations that do not have roles to play in standing missions might nonetheless be required to do contingency planning and reserve capability-building for a set of unlikely but potentially catastrophic cases. In such cases, the point would be to execute a hedging strategy. The government would not devote huge resources or pull organizations away from routine activities to prepare for improbable emergency operations. Instead, it would devote small portions of resources and organizational energy so that if the event became more likely or we were surprised by a sudden event, a core capability would already exist to organize a response. Examples might be health issues like a pandemic, widespread crop failures, sudden and extreme environmental hazards to large portions of the population, or massive refugee flows from instability in neighboring countries.

A new national security act should envision the president and Congress agreeing on these three categories of roles and responsibilities so that the relevant organizations would have a general description of their national security responsibilities written into law. From time to time, organizational national security mandates could be altered at the initiative of either the executive or legislative branches. The larger point would be to authorize and resource a standing capability to participate in national security missions that could be expanded or contracted as needed. This practical delineation of the scope of national security is flexible and political, and thus meets the requirements of both the security environment and the American political system. Without some process for formal delimitation of organization’s security roles and responsibilities, the core reforms proposed below will not work. Recommendations for integrated budgets, personnel, and knowledge management reforms, for example, do not make sense unless the affected organizations and programs can be identified. Otherwise it will not be clear which organizations and programs are included in such reforms.
It also should be noted that making a distinction between government organizations that are largely dedicated to national security, those that have specific roles in ongoing missions, and those that prepare for unlikely but important cases in no way precludes departments and agencies from collaborating across these categories. On the contrary, it is presumed that effective cross-agency collaboration is required in all three areas. Core national security missions can require collaboration between core and noncore agencies, and the same holds true for the standing interagency missions and exceptional cases. Thus, no matter where a government organization falls within the three categories, the point is to facilitate management of the national security system, not inhibit the flexibility required for collaboration across organizational boundaries.

2. A Process for Codifying Roles and Responsibilities

A new national security act that codifies a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities would provide a general depiction, but many details would need to be clarified in executive orders and presidential directives. As argued in Part IV of this report, roles and responsibilities for national security missions are currently confused in an array of statutes, executive orders, and presidential directives. One clear requirement for unity of effort in executive branch departments and agencies is an authoritative, consistently updated, and easily accessible register of all statutes, executive orders, and presidential directives currently in force. In addition to the provisions codified in a new national security act, the career staff in the White House should maintain an electronic database of such authorities for easy reference by all national security system participants. The recommendations in the next section on core reforms provide for this function.

C. Core Reforms

1. Overview

The basic structure of the national security system is not going to change, nor should it. It will remain a large and diversified set of core competencies with individual departments and agencies building and employing specialized capabilities in diplomatic, military, intelligence, and numerous other disciplines. What can and must change is the ability to direct, manage, and most of all, integrate these core competencies. The semi-autonomy of the departments and agencies must be replaced by the capacity for holistic—or whole-of-government—solutions to complex problems. People, knowledge, resources, and processes must be able to move across organizational boundaries and combine organizational competencies for greater effect.
The core reforms offered here give the president and Congress the means to achieve those objectives. Without these reforms, it will not be possible to improve the performance of the system as a whole. No matter who inhabits the White House, no matter what policy prescriptions they offer, no matter how brilliant the two to three hundred security advisors who support the president are, without these core reforms the system will continue to resist strategic direction, put departmental interests before national interests, and employ scarce resources to poor effect. The core reforms feature the following changes to the current system:

**Strategic Direction:** The solutions improve the ability to systematically link ends, ways, and means from policy development to implementation and assessment, both for the short and longer term.

**Structure:** A new White House organization is required to support the other reforms that facilitate integration and collaboration and decentralization of issue management across departments and agencies. The strengthening of the existing NSC executive secretariat will support governmentwide collaboration, decentralize issue management, facilitate institutional memory, ease presidential transitions, and permit long-range planning.

**Processes:** A common framework on interagency processes will enable end-to-end management of policy, strategy, planning, and short- and long-term implementation and feedback. New processes that will ensure integrated national security strategy and planning are tied to effective implementation.

**Resources:** Better visibility and understanding of resource allocation choices will enable strategic direction of the system. Resource reforms will ensure the U.S. government has a clear and continuous linkage of resources to mission requirements so that: 1) the federal budget is transparent across all national security agencies and components; 2) budgeted dollars are aligned with missions and demonstrably adequate for assigned tasks; 3) resources for unforeseen contingencies or opportunities are available in a timely fashion; and 4) current and projected budgets are linked to longer-term priorities, and execution of those budgets is tracked and assessed.
Human Capital: A strategic approach to the management of human capital for the national security system will ensure that 1) the right talent is recruited, retained, and allocated to the highest priorities; 2) a shared national security culture transcends specific departments and agencies and facilitates rather than impedes collaboration; 3) leadership is accountable and encouraged to take initiative throughout all levels of the national security system. Getting the right people in the right place at the right time requires a cadre of national security professionals who move among the agencies and occupy positions for which interagency experience is a prerequisite.

Decision Support: Enhanced knowledge management across all components of the national security system will 1) stimulate information sharing without compromising the ability to protect it; 2) improve the quality of knowledge available to support decision-making; 3) generate new sources of knowledge for use by the national security system; and 4) allow for increased collaboration through flexible organizational and social networks. Few of the other proposed reforms can be achieved without integrating information services where appropriate and encouraging and resourcing knowledge management across the government.

Congressional Oversight: A legislative-executive branch partnership for better policy development, resourcing, and support will improve oversight and the overall performance of the system. The new strategic partnership between the branches of government requires an exchange. Congress must grant the executive branch more flexibility in resource allocation, and the executive branch must offer Congress better and more persistent access to national security management information. The measures will require Congress to reform some of its own processes.

2. Organizational Elements

a. Strategic Direction, White House Structure, Process and Resources Management: Core Reforms

Better strategic direction and management through new organizational design, alignment of authority, and processes

The United States falls far short in managing its national security capabilities strategically. The nation must have end-to-end systematic processes that link desired objectives with the key approaches and necessary means to achieve them. Like any chief executive officer, the president must have the means to identify priorities that support his or her policies, and the management tools and resources to hold leaders, departments and agencies, and federal employees accountable for advancing those priorities.

This revised national security system would have a series of guidance documents that would serve to inform the community of the strategy to be followed; the policies that would undergird the strategic direction, requirements and guidance for planning; and the capacity to execute the planning, including the allocation of national security resources. The result would be strategically informed execution and the capacity of the system to learn and adapt based on assessments and a formal lessons learned process. The three
foundational documents are the National Security Review (NSR), the National Security Planning Guidance (NSPG), and the National Security Resource Document (NSRD).

**Figure 15. New Security Processes**

- *National Security Review (NSR)*: The importance of an integrated and expedited review of all national security missions, activities, and budgets at the beginning of the next administration cannot be overstated. Conducted prior to other security reviews by individual departments, this initial review would allow the president to set the strategic direction for the entire national security system. The process would be designed to reduce the president’s management burden and needless bureaucratic effort by making presidential priorities and the actions

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needed to achieve them clear, directive, and measurable. The Congress should require the president to undertake this review and report its conclusions as early in the first year of a new administration as possible. Absent a congressional requirement, the next president should himself initiate the review process to engage all national security agencies and non-federal government stakeholders in prioritizing national security objectives, capabilities, and resources. The National Security Review should facilitate the creation or improvement of strategy and planning competencies within the Executive Office of the President and federal agencies. It would also provide unifying direction to the several mission-specific strategic reviews currently required by statute, such as the quadrennial defense, homeland security, and intelligence reviews. In order to be timely and effective, the NSR should be a strategic exercise. It must be completed in a limited period of time, deal with major issues only, and include active participation by the heads of departments and agencies with national security responsibilities themselves. If it becomes lengthy, detailed and bureaucratic, it will consume huge staff resources and have little effect.

- **National Security Planning Guidance (NSPG)**: Based on the results of the National Security Review, and continual strategic reassessment processes set in motion by it, the president should annually issue a National Security Planning Guidance in addition to the currently required report on National Security Strategy (NSS). Both documents must expand to encompass the full scope of national security activities, including homeland security. The NSPG would be developed jointly by the NSC/Homeland Security Council (HSC) staffs (or a combined staff if later recommendations for a President’s Security Council are adopted) and the Office of Management and Budget. Whereas the NSS report provides an opportunity to articulate and routinely update the public and foreign audiences on national strategy, the NSPG would provide specific directives and measures of performance to executive branch organizations on high-interest NSR priorities. In particular, the NSPG would serve two critical functions. First, it would clarify the president’s priorities for departments and agencies contributing to national security objectives. Second, it would direct the creation of a select number of integrated interagency plans to support those objectives, thereby linking strategy to planning to resources.

- **National Security Resource Document (NSRD)**: Based on the strategic and planning guidance from the NSR and NSPG, the NSRD would be developed to enable the alignment of the ends, ways, and means of our national strategy. The NSRD would project strategy-linked resource allocations over a six-year period, and it would serve as guidance for national security departments and agencies in developing their own more-detailed six-year budget projections. Although

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departments and agencies would have control over their budgets, the NSRD would provide a holistic view of national security spending and allow the White House to examine funding of discrete programs and priority mission areas. OMB and the NSC would prepare this document jointly and it would be provided to Congress with the president’s budget.

- **Expanded and Empowered Executive Secretary and Secretariat**: The president and the small portion of the White House staff that advises the president on strategic direction and national security system management needs more support. The responsibilities of the executive secretary of the NSC should be increased. The Executive Secretariat should provide continuity across administrations and have the authority to rapidly obtain talent, knowledge, and logistical support for White House decision-making. The executive secretary would be responsible for managing the interagency national security human capital plan and personnel system, the National Security Assessment and Visioning Center, and the Decision Support Office and system, which are described below. The executive secretary’s collective functions would contribute to a common and cohesive strategic culture in the national security community in which the leadership and teamwork of talented individuals is emphasized over bureaucratic control by departments and agencies. More specifically:

  - **Reporting Chain**: The executive secretary would report to the president through the national security advisor, if the latter is a confirmed position.
  - **Status**: The executive secretary would be a presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed civilian career civil servant who holds the position for four years beginning and ending in the middle of every presidential term.
  - **Size and Composition**: The executive secretary’s staff (i.e., the executive secretariat) would have approximately 100 full-time employees who would be career civil servants.

- **National Assessment and Visioning Center**: Within the Executive Secretariat, a National Assessment and Visioning Center would support the integration of the nation’s national security planning based on pragmatic assessments and aspirational visions of what the future could be. The majority of the staff would be full-time civil servants, to provide continuity between administrations. The center would support the president’s security advisor(s) as they translate policies into plans. The assessment and visioning process can be

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1065 In a subsequent publication PNSR explains the visioning process in more detail, including the methods the study team used to explore recommendations made in this report.

described in four stages (two of which are conducted at the center): 1) assessment; 2) policymaking by the president’s security staff; 3) planning; and 4) visioning, which would be approved by the president upon the advice of his security staff.

In the assessment stage, the center would support the national security review process and develop a common view of the national security system as well as a common view of the external environment that encompasses, space, global issues, regions, specific countries, and U.S. domestic trends. The assessments would include both geographic and functional dimensions. After policy and planning guidance is produced by the relevant EOP offices, the center would be able to feed the guidance into the visioning process. In visioning, the center would produce pragmatic “what-if” scenarios to test the assumptions, ends, ways, and means of long-range plans. The center would constantly be evaluating data trends and how they support or question the value of alternative scenarios. The center would include various inputs from the U.S. intelligence community, homeland security, private industry, and international entities as required. The center would provide the president with an ability to immediately take stock of the status of both the internal system and the external environment, as well as to understand the decision points necessary to maintain his/her policy objectives across the whole of the national security system. The center would support the decision support element of the Executive Secretariat with lessons on implementation, exercises, and testing of hypotheses and courses of action when requested to do so by the security council staff.

- **Security Staff Augmentation**: To conduct the processes identified above, the White House would need to increase the size of the staff supporting the president on security matters. The size of the security staff in the White House is small compared to the overall size of the Executive Office of the President, the importance of their functions, and the size and range of national security organizations they help the president oversee. Increasing the size of the new Executive Secretariat staff is necessary and acceptable in exchange for better system management and continuity across administrations.

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1067 Prior reports have similarly called for an increase in size of the White House staff in national security measures. See *Organizing for National Security* (Jackson’s Subcommittee), 1960, 15; *Transforming Defense* 66; *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols*, Phase 1 Report 63.
Better integration of policy development and resourcing

The reorganization described above cannot work effectively unless and until there is a clear and continuous linkage of government resources to national security mission requirements. This requires a sustainable national security resource allocation system with the following attributes:

- Budgeted dollars aligned with missions and demonstrably adequate for assigned tasks
- The federal budget integrated across all national security agencies and components
- Resources for contingencies available in a reasonably short time

An integrated budget system must link current and projected budgets to longer-term priorities, track execution of those budgets, and respond quickly and effectively to contingencies and emergencies. Furthermore, it must provide sufficient transparency that policymakers can understand and make resource-allocation decisions across the whole of the national security system. It must show decision-makers what results can be expected.
for a given level of expenditure and what resources a given mission requires. This transparency requires close coordination between the NSC, HSC, and OMB, which together must assess the budgets put forward by agencies and departments to determine how effectively they will address the priorities set forth in the NSPG. These priorities, in turn, must shape longer-term plans and budgets for each national security agency.

This can be done, using existing budget processes and existing statutory authorities, by adopting the following steps:

- **Longer-Range Budget Planning**: Based on guidance from the NSPG and the NSRD, each national security agency should develop a detailed planning program derived from the NSPG that creates internal longer-term budget projections. These longer-term budget projections should be similar to the Department of Defense (DoD) Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). An NSC-led review, in conjunction with OMB, will assess each six-year plan’s compliance with the objectives in the NSPG and the NSRD. Each agency in turn will update its six-year budget projection accordingly. Then annual agency budgets, after appropriate review and adjustment by OMB and the NSC, are aggregated and become the basis for the National Security Budget.

- **Executive Budget Review Process**: Budget reviews by OMB in close collaboration with the NSC staff should be conducted at each stage to assess whether submissions are consistent with presidential guidance (i.e., the NSPG and NSRD). This budget process should identify the resources needed to achieve the national security strategy objectives and the tradeoffs necessary to provide those resources within overall federal budget constraints established by the president and Congress. Such tradeoffs in the longer term budget projections should be both across agencies and within each agency.
  - **Budgetary Leadership and Integration**: The review of budget submissions by the many agencies playing a role in national security is an important way to promote coordination and coherence for the national security establishment. As a supporting and preliminary measure, a central budget screening process can be instituted by the key agency\(^{1069}\) that is given responsibility for providing central direction of national security strategy on behalf of the president. Under this approach, the central authority would be empowered to screen agency budget requests to certify their compliance with strategic goals and plans. This approach would be similar to the current roles played by the Office of National Drug Control Policy and the Homeland Security Council in the EOP. Such a role can enhance governmentwide planning and synergies across agencies, but also strengthen the leverage of central leadership over the disparate federal

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\(^{1069}\) The “key agency” depends upon the options selected in subsequent sections of the report, but assuming recommendations in Part VI are adopted, would be the director for national security supported by OMB and core institutions, including a Department for International Relations.
establishment responsible for national security and foreign affairs. The budgetary screening role can also be assigned to other entities playing crosscutting leadership roles across agencies under the various models.  

- **Budget Transparency**: The president’s annual budget submission to Congress should contain an integrated national security budget display, along with integrated budget justification material that reflects how each agency’s budget and the overall budget align with NSS objectives and the NSPG. In consultation with the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), OMB should develop a comprehensive National Security Budget display, to include homeland security, with expenditures grouped by mission rather than department or agency. This would allow Congress—and the executive branch—to see overlaps and deficiencies as well as alternatives and comparisons for pursuing national security objectives.

- **Congressional Budget Review Process**: Congress should conduct a thorough review of the administration's multiyear strategic plan and budget for the entire national security budget (i.e., the National Security Resources Document). The budget committees should develop their recommendations based on a whole-of-government assessment of the national security requirements. Committees should look beyond regular jurisdictional areas to the broader objectives. Authorizing committees should collaborate across jurisdictional boundaries. Appropriations subcommittees should meet jointly to assure consideration of relevant tradeoffs.

- **Budget Execution Oversight**: Once Congress appropriates funds for an integrated national security budget, OMB/NSC staff should develop a consolidated view of execution status across all national security agencies. This consolidated view must link directly to presidential guidance, to the updating of each agency’s longer term budget projections, and to the ongoing preparation and support of subsequent detailed annual budgets.

- **Contingency Funding**: When major interagency contingencies arise such as natural disasters or stability and reconstruction operations that cannot be covered by existing budgets, there must be a process to pass timely and flexible supplemental funding bills. Especially in the early stages, the requirements of the contingency will be known only in general terms, so there must be a process for the interagency task group leader to communicate quickly with Congress to move funding to accomplish the mission. As the contingency matures, it will be

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1070 For instance, the proposed Department of International Relations can be assigned budget clearance and certification roles for those programs related to the foreign affairs mission that are not absorbed into the new department. This would enhance its capacity to project national security goals and priorities on behalf of the president across the executive establishment.


possible to predict requirements more accurately so that less reprogramming will be needed. Measures to meet these objectives are included below in the section on “funding flexibility under core reforms for Congress.

b. Human Capital: Core Reforms

A unified national security human capital system which supports a common culture for national security functions and organizations

The unified human capital system would have two components: 1) a set of unifying human capital principles and strategic goals based on the NSR results, which each department and agency within the larger national security system would then tailor to its own priorities and needs and 2) the National Security Professional Corps (NSPC) which will be the human capital system for those who seek interagency national security work as their chosen profession, either permanently or temporarily.

This proposal is not intended to replace the department and agency personnel systems, but would 1) impose some common requirements, 2) develop and reinforce a common culture for national security work based on collaboration and interagency assignments, and 3) create a cadre of national security professionals who could move more easily among the agencies and into positions requiring interagency experience. Toward these ends, the Executive Secretariat could direct the rapid filling of interagency personnel positions; mandate education, training, and interagency personnel requirements; and manage a cadre of national security professionals groomed for interagency positions, including requirements for some types of promotion.

For example, developing the human capital principles and strategic goals based on the NSR would be the responsibility of the Executive Secretariat in consultation with the departments and agencies making up the national security system. The NSPC human capital system should be run by the executive secretary and the enlarged and empowered Executive Secretariat. Therefore, the Executive Secretariat would absorb the current National Security Professional Development Integration Office, eliminate the requirement for the current National Security Professional Development Executive Steering Committee, and absorb the current National Security Professional Development Integration Office. The empowered executive secretary and secretariat should perform the following functions.

- **National Security Strategic Human Capital Plan**: The executive secretary should lead the development of a National Security Strategic Human Capital Plan aligned with national security strategic goals, objectives, and outcomes. The plan should be reviewed periodically but no less than every four years in conjunction

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with the national security strategy and planning process or the National Security Review. The plan should be based upon supporting analyses and plans, to include:

- **Competency Analysis**: To identify competencies needed to achieve the nation’s national security goals, objectives, and outcomes.

- **Periodic Workforce Analysis**: To identify the needed competencies that are resident in the workforce and those that need to be developed, as well as identify the needs for personnel based on training and rotational assignments requirements (similar to the military’s personnel “float”). The analysis should include a review of the contracted workforce; a review of which positions should be direct-hire (based on which functions are “inherently governmental” and which would be more cost effective to be outsourced); and, if needed, a review to determine needed oversight/managerial capacity to manage a possible all-source workforce.

- **Recruitment, Assignment, Training, and Education Plans**: To close the competency gaps identified and prepare personnel for additional responsibilities.

- **Mission-Critical Occupation Analysis**: To identify positions requiring worldwide availability, limited worldwide availability, or domestic availability as a condition of employment and design incentives to support these commitments.

- **Interagency Incentive Plans**: To develop incentives for interagency collaboration (e.g., awards that are tied to interagency team projects, competitions, etc.).

- **Training Plans**: To periodically review training programs and decide which agencies should lead which training programs. Redundancies would be eliminated and new courses would be created as necessary. Eliminating redundancies should also increase the interaction among employees from different agencies who would come together for training courses.

- **Education Plans**: To periodically review education programs and decide which ones provide the most programmatic and cost-effective curricula to achieve the competencies needed.

- **Core Values**: The executive secretary should lead the effort to achieve consensus on core values for the national security system. The core values should be translated into core competencies. Core values and competencies are means—not ends—to achieve national security objectives and would form the basis for a performance management system that better evaluates productivity.
Human Capital Advisory Board\textsuperscript{1074}: The executive secretary should appoint an Advisory Board to support the work of the Executive Secretariat, including public and private experts on human capital policies, training, and education. The objective of the Advisory Board is to provide independent, informed views on human capital conditions and issues in the general labor market and their potential impact on the human capital needs of the national security system. This additional source of information provided by public and private sector leaders in human capital will give the Executive Secretariat information from outside the system that it can consider along with all other information as it formulates human capital plans, programs, and actions to support the mission needs of national security.

National Security Professional Corps\textsuperscript{1075}: The executive secretariat would manage a National Security Professional Corps created by the president. A strong and coherent culture is an essential successful factor of the national security system. The proposed NSPC is a key ingredient for establishing this culture and for assuring that employees who choose national security as their profession can work, permanently or temporarily, within a human capital system that supports national security values, missions, and strategic programs. And importantly, it will also provide human talent that has the competencies, experiences, incentives, education, and training essential to ensuring a workforce able to carry out national security strategic objectives successfully, particularly those requiring an interagency breadth of experience. Most importantly, since the NSPC is specifically directed at identifying and assigning people for interagency work, it would eliminate the problem of departments’ and agencies’ reluctance to give up personnel for interagency positions.

Employees should be able to opt in to the corps (and receive incentives to do so) at any point in their career. A curriculum for training and education, and experience requirement of rotational/joint assignments, should be a prerequisite for entry into the corps. The executive secretary should designate positions to which only NSPC members can apply. NSPC members can also serve as the needed “surge capacity” for the national security system. NSPC status should be tied to individuals and not based on the position they hold (for example, an NSPC officer should be able to serve in non-NS positions, but could be called to duty if needed and should be able to apply for NS positions). Other attributes of the NSPC would include:

\textsuperscript{1074} Transforming Defense 66–67.
Promotion Requirements: Rising to senior positions (Senior Executive Service, flag, or similar ranks) should require the completion of at least one joint/rotational assignment of significant duration outside of their home agency/department. In addition, rotational and joint assignments should be encouraged for entry- and mid-level employees. These assignments should be tied to the employee’s performance assessment. Individuals who take on rotational/interagency assignments must face promotion rates that are at least equal to those who do not take such assignments. Interagency assignments would also be encouraged at the entry and mid-career levels.

Performance Incentives: A variety of options for monetary and non-monetary incentives will be built into the NSPC to support the culture and performance essential for mission success, as well as the institutionalization of a five-year trial period for individuals at the entry/mid level. The trial period allows both the organization and the employee to assess the fit between the individual’s talents and career aspirations and the needs of the organization.

Mandatory Orientation Program: Any individual entering a position with the national security system (political appointees included) would attend a mandatory orientation program. The orientation should provide an overview of the national
security community’s mission, organizational components, and values. The program should educate new employees regarding career paths, performance management, compensation, and incentive systems as well as standards of conduct and other organizational expectations. This program would also include information regarding principles and technologies for knowledge management.

- **National Security Fellowship Program**\(^{1076}\): This program would recruit highly qualified individuals into the system and provide them with training (curriculum to be developed based on the core competencies identified) and rotational assignments in different national security agencies. At graduation, the fellows would be placed in a host agency that fits their skills. This program can be phased in, beginning as a pilot program, and increase in size based on effectiveness assessments.

- **Comprehensive Education and Training Program**: In a world where knowledge doubles every few years, professional staff charged with protecting the nation’s security must continue their education and training to assure they have the competencies required to perform successfully. To support comprehensive education and training of NSPS personnel, the executive secretary should oversee the strengthening of the current National Security Education Consortium established by Executive Order 13434 ("National Security Professional Development"). A common curriculum for national security professionals would be instituted, including how to provide oversight of private sector and contractor personnel. The goal would be to create a comprehensive and thoroughly professional education and training program that spans the life cycle of national security civilian and military employees. It would provide practical training for employees in junior and middle-management positions and provide shift to a broader (long-term strategic and interagency oriented) leadership program for individuals identified as having potential to attain senior ranks.

  - **Interdisciplinary Curriculum**: The program would be multidisciplinary, for example integrating the skills of diplomacy into those of program management, human resource development and management, as well as critical leadership skills necessary to work with other agencies and assist them in creating a foreign-policy and national security program that promotes U.S. interests while working with other countries.

  - **Common Skills and Culture**: This program would bring employees from departments and agencies and allied governments together in common program management courses and build a common culture, a sense of common interest, and analytical skills to bond the national security functions and agencies together.

\(^{1076}\) *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Phase 2 Report 39; Transforming Defense 66–67.*
ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS FOR REFORM

- **Lessons Learned:** The education and training consortium would be the repository of lessons learned and would serve as the leadership, management, policy research, and concept development arm of the national security system.

- **National Security University System Alternative**\(^{1077}\): If the strengthened National Security Education Consortium proves inadequate for accomplishing these functions, Congress should create a National Security University with interagency leadership to develop and administer the curriculum. One possibility would be to combine National Defense University and the George Schultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center under a common administration responsive to the objectives in the National Security Review and the National Security Strategic Human Capital Plan.

- **Confirming and Training Political Appointees**\(^{1078}\): We need a faster and simpler confirmation process and preassignment training in order to minimize gaps in transitions between administrations and prepare incoming political appointees to better work within and direct the national security system. Several reforms need to be implemented:
  
  - **Reduction in Senate-confirmable Appointments:** Congress should significantly reduce the number of national security positions requiring Senate confirmation. One approach might be to limit confirmation to assistant secretaries and above in the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, and to only two top officials in each military department. This would reduce the number from the current 115 to a more manageable eighty-two, not including the few additional Senate-confirmable positions created in these reform recommendations.
  
  - **Common Prescreening Procedures:** For those requiring confirmation, Congress and the White House should develop a common set of financial and other forms required of nominees. This would help expedite the process of background investigations and paperwork. Simpler paperwork requirements could speed the confirmation process for both branches of government and improve the prospects of attracting the best talent for appointive positions.
  
  - **Exception Rule:** The Senate should adopt a rule giving the president the right to designate up to, say, ten nominees in each national security department whose nominations would be referred to committees of jurisdiction for up to thirty days of legislative session and then would be placed on the executive calendar with or without a committee recommendation. This does not prevent full Senate filibusters or individual holds, but does force quick committee consideration.

\(^{1077}\) See Transforming Defense 66.

\(^{1078}\) See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 422.
o **Prescreening Ambassadorial Appointments:** The president and Congress should create an independent commission to identify the minimum qualifications of envoy positions. A second possible function of the commission would be to review the qualifications of both career and political candidates for these positions and to offer judgments on those deemed qualified for the anticipated position. Commission assessments would not be binding on the president, but they should be made public prior to Senate consideration.

c. **Decision Support: Core Reforms**

*Enhanced information services, knowledge management, and decision support across all components of the national security system*

We include several measures in the core reforms necessary to strengthen decision support and knowledge management throughout the national security system. As our approach is systemic, these measures rely on other core solutions (e.g., unified national security culture) and are vital for success in other solution areas. These elements provide a foundation for serendipitous discovery and purposeful management of information across the national security system, but must not be allowed to inhibit creativity and responsibility for information sharing and analysis throughout the system. Sometimes when a function is centralized, the workforce begins to assume that that function is no longer their responsibility. Instead, they wait for standards, procedures, mandates—behavior that will ossify the system, stifling the natural emergence of interpersonal trust networks. At the same time, the central group’s separation from the larger workforce can grow over time. In this regard, decision support and knowledge management are better shepherded than engineered. For example, it is in this spirit that the reform recommendation for a Council of Agency Chief Knowledge Officers is made. Its charter would be to enable effective but not excessive control over knowledge management activities across the national security system.

- **Office of Decision Support.** With the above caution in mind, we recommend new and existing cross-Agency initiatives to enhance decision support be provided budget and personnel authorities and located in the Executive Secretariat under a new “Office of Decision Support.” These reform initiatives would include the Director of National Intelligence Special Security Center (SSC) and the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) but also the position of historian and other responsibilities explained below. Initiatives currently focused on the intelligence community should be applied across the national security system to realize benefits identified in Executive Order 13356, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004, and related authorities. While the focus for these authorities has been enhancing the U.S.

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1080 ODNI’s Information Sharing Strategy identifies four strategic goals for resolving knowledge management issues that are excellent and should be adopted more broadly by the national security system: 1) Institute Uniform Information Sharing Policy and Governance; 2) Advance Universal Information
ability to counter terrorism, the enhanced decision support benefits all national security missions – and should be more broadly enforced. The purpose of the office is not to dispense wisdom for national security decisions but rather to enable knowledge flow across the national security system.

- The Information Sharing Environment was established as “A trusted partnership among all levels of government in the United States, the private sector, and our foreign partners, in order to detect, prevent, disrupt, preempt, and mitigate the effects of terrorism against the territory, people, and interests of the United States by the effective and efficient sharing of terrorism and homeland security information.”

- “The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Special Security Center (SSC) is the Intelligence Community (IC) source for security policies, advice and guidance on security practices and procedures, security-relevant issues, and security tools. It is the Center for security expertise, analysis and the tools that the IC relies on to balance the need to protect with the need to appropriately share intelligence information.”

- National Security Historian/Librarian to Manage Authoritative Systemwide Information: One underlying theme for national security reform is the need for continuity of information across administrations. No database or technology will completely replace the historians and library scientists who manage information across departments and decades. In cooperation with legal counsel, the Historian/Librarian would keep meticulous track of national security roles and responsibilities as codified in law, executive orders, and presidential directives, those in effect as well as those retired, and the rationale for each. The Historian/Librarian would also keep a record of policy positions and decisions, position papers on topics of importance, lessons learned from past experiences, recommendations from outgoing senior political appointees, etc. The objective is a superlative supporting service and institutional information base for incoming administrations—a focused and sustained archival capability. In addition, policy and procedural changes would be rapidly and authoritatively communicated throughout the national security system. The Decision Support Office would also promote a collaborative environment for collection of narratives and anecdotes across departments and agencies by growing the capability for interagency information discovery and sharing.

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• **Common Security Clearance Approach**\(^{1083}\): Security clearance procedures across agencies and missions, including homeland security, must be consolidated so that national security information and personnel are managed under a single classification and access regime. Aligning individual security clearances would end the current practice whereby departments and agencies do not respect one another's clearances and refuse access to critical information to personnel who have not gone through the agency-specific credentialing process. It would also prevent duplication of effort (background checks), information hoarding (from agencies with separate classification regimes) and significant delays (sometimes on the order of years) in the deployment of valuable human resources. The Special Security Center within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence currently works to establish uniformity and reciprocity across the intelligence community – an initiative that should be expanded to include the entire national security system.

• **Common Security Classification Approach**\(^{1084}\): Compartmentalized and obfuscatory classification procedures must be revised.\(^{1085}\) There is no penalty for overclassifying information by the analyst or manager, but there is a significant penalty for underclassifying information. As reflected elsewhere (such as within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence Special Security Center), classifications such as “ORCON” (Originator Controlled) reinforce the concept that information belongs to and is rightfully managed by the originating analyst. Moving to a common approach for information classification will increase transparency, improve accessibility, and reinforce the overall notion that personnel in the national security system are stewards of the nation’s information,

\(^{1083}\) Expands on Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRPTA), which states in part: “ensure that security clearances granted by individual elements of the intelligence community are recognized by all elements of the intelligence community, and under contracts entered into by those agencies” Relevant subsection: “(c) PERFORMANCE OF SECURITY CLEARANCE INVESTIGATIONS.— (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall, in consultation with the head of the entity selected pursuant to subsection (b), select a single agency of the executive branch to conduct, to the maximum extent practicable, security clearance investigations of employees and contractor personnel of the United States Government who require access to classified information and to provide and maintain all security clearances of such employees and contractor personnel.” Also, in comments regarding the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) 500-day plan, Former Rep Timothy J. Roemer remarked in testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: “Another area that I think we’re lacking progress, we’ve not made sufficient progress is in information sharing, especially horizontally, not only inside Washington, D.C., but with our 50 states, our different state laws, our sheriffs, our local community leaders. Clearance issues, I think, are key here, and I would hope the DNI would come to the opinion of breaking the china on this particular culture.” 7 October 2008 <http://www.dni.gov/Panel%202%20Transcript%202%20HPSCI%20%20%2012-06-07.pdf>.

\(^{1084}\) Both the 9/11 and WMD Commissions recognized the disjointed nature of classification procedures and their impediment to effective information sharing. The 9/11 Commission noted that the current incentive structure favored over-classification and excessive compartmentalization at the expense of information sharing. The long-term costs of overclassifying information were born by no one whereas grave risks were at hand for those that inappropriately shared. The WMD Commission criticized the implied belief that collectors “owned” intelligence and the resultant diffuse information ownership that caused inconsistent and arbitrarily applied standards to how information could be disseminated.

\(^{1085}\) The procedures should include the new Controlled Unclassified Information designation.
not owners thereof. Again, the Special Security Center within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence currently works to establish uniformity and reciprocity across the intelligence community, but this approach should be expanded to include the entire national security system.

- **Information Security Processes That Enable Risk Management Rather than Risk Reduction Regime.** There is often a tension between information security and operational effectiveness. The latter is enabled by easy access to information and the free flow of information both within and across organizational boundaries. The former often requires tight controls on information access and sharing based on a wide range of parameters (e.g., classification level, organizational affiliation, “need to know” requirements, etc.) in order to minimize risks such as unauthorized access to data, data theft, and data manipulation. Historically, national security organizations have placed more emphasis on information security requirements than on the imperatives of information access and sharing. The result has been a culture of “risk avoidance” that has limited the ability of key people and organizations to work collaboratively.\(^\text{1086}\)

  - Tension between the competing demands of information security and operational effectiveness (enabled by information access, sharing, and dissemination) has been well-known for some time. In order to address this problem, Congress inserted a provision in the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) that requires federal agencies to develop “risk based policies and procedures that cost-effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level…”\(^\text{1087}\) This was a good step in the right direction, but two key problems remained unsolved. First, the person responsible for implementing the risk-based policies and procedures described above, the chief information security officer (CISO), usually reports to the agency chief information officer (CIO). In most organizations, these executive-level positions are support functions and are not part of operations. This is especially true in the national security community. According to FISMA, the CISO is responsible for “assessments of the risk and magnitude that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information or information systems.”\(^\text{1088}\) This risk assessment must be used to determine what level of risk is “acceptable” to the organization. However, the CISO is also responsible for preventing the risks that he/she is assessing. Thus, it is in the CISO’s best interest to avoid information security risks to the greatest extent possible. This is also true of the CIO, who is often ultimately responsible for the information and information systems of an agency.

\(^\text{1086}\) This was yet another key finding of the 9/11 Commission.


\(^\text{1088}\) Ibid.
On the other side of the equation, the biggest concern of the organizations’ operators is the risk of mission failure and that they will often be less concerned about information security risks than about doing what it takes to get the job done. Ideally, these needs would be equally balanced with those of the CIO and CISO in order to reach an acceptable level of risk. However, this often does not happen. Those focused on operations are not formally charged with participating in the information security risk assessment process, and even if they were, these individuals often do not have the time or expertise to make substantial contributions. As a result, the operational needs of the organization may not be formally included in the initial stages of the risk assessment. The result is often a bias toward the protection of information assets at the expense of mission needs.

It is for this very reason that the Director of National Intelligence released a new directive on September 15, 2008. This directive begins by stating: “The principal goal of an IC element’s information technology risk management process shall be to protect the element’s ability to perform its mission, not just its information assets.” It goes on to provide clear guidance on the steps that must be taken to reach this goal, including the statement that information sharing and collaboration must be treated as “mission essential capabilities.” This policy and methodology must be applied, with appropriate modifications, across the national security community. This will result in a well-balanced risk management process that considers information security and operational needs equally.

Common Information Services: The president and Congress should establish a federal Information Services (IS) center to coordinate and operate information services across the federal government. The objective is to eliminate the incompatible architectures that impede information sharing and discovery across the national security system. Our current approach, allowing agencies to build their own information technology infrastructures, relies on patchwork solutions to link information across them—resulting in separate and incompatible information architectures. By centralizing federal information services, system interoperability would become a core principle. Information technology (IT) procurements would be routed through this agency and a common infrastructure would enable IT training, familiarization, data storage, and related functions. This effort should begin with a working group and a charter to establish

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1091 Related recommendation from WMD Commission: “The DNI should set uniform information management policies, practices, and procedures for all members of the Intelligence Community” 442. Also, ODNI vision 2015 states: “By 2015, we will migrate to a common ‘cloud’ based on a single backbone network and clusters of computers in scalable, distributed centers where data is stored, processed, and managed.”
“cloud” computing services for one or more functions (e.g., email, portal, collaboration services, expertise location, etc). The vision for this center is to replace the programmatic procurement that characterizes existing information services, even those that can be classified as “commodity services.” This IS center would not replace higher-order information processing, but permit agency IT departments to focus on these rather than the maintenance of servers, operating systems, desktop applications, and other commodity IT services. This effort would accelerate existing EGovernment initiatives aimed at establishing common payroll, financial, and portal services across agencies. The office should be located within the Office of Management and Budget, as a third branch, consolidating the existing EGovernment office into a branch that exercises budget and personnel authorities. The executive should be confirmable by the Senate, as a result of the broad interagency responsibilities this office will require. In addition to operating commodity computing, the executive will absorb and expand on existing OMB initiatives regarding IT policy standardization.

- Existing information sharing initiatives are stymied for several reasons. First, the office responsible lacks budget or personnel authority and therefore cannot enact reforms that agencies would not otherwise embrace. Second, existing efforts that are restricted to the “white space” between agency authorities will not succeed in establishing whole-of-government approaches, a theme that is found throughout PNSR’s research. Thus, the reform to establish a centralized office for information services is a governmentwide reform—it addresses national security problems for information sharing, but unless it is focused across federal agencies, it will fail to realize efficiencies needed to rationalize funding, and simply become another stovepiped program.

- **Federal Chief Knowledge Officers (CKOs) and Council**: Each national security department or agency should establish a chief knowledge officer to implement agency knowledge management and coordinate cross-system knowledge flows. These officers should follow the model of the Federal Chief

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1092 Cloud computing is a computing paradigm in which tasks are assigned to a combination of connections, software and services accessed over a network. This network of servers and connections is collectively known as "the cloud." “Cloud Computing,” Search SOA Definitions, 4 November 2008, 5 November 2008 <http://searchsoa.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid26_gci1287881,00.html>.

1093 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Section 1018, “Presidential Guidelines in Implementation and Preservation of Authorities. The President shall issue guidelines to ensure the effective implementation and execution within the executive branch of the authorities granted to the Director of National Intelligence by this title and the amendments made by this title, in a manner that respects and does not abrogate the statutory responsibilities of the heads of the departments of the United States Government concerning such departments…”

1094 The WMD Commission recommended the establishment of chief information management officers, with responsibility to “to make the difficult decisions that ensure uniform information sharing and security policies across the Intelligence Community.” In addition, senior officials from the Environmental Protection Agency and the Social Security Administration went on record over nine years ago calling for the establishment of agency CKOs 7 October 2008 <http://www.fcw.com/print/5_120/news/67992-1.html> 437.
Information Officer Council and form a Federal Chief Knowledge Officer Council to enhance cross-system knowledge flows, information management policy, etc. The CKOs are responsible for maintaining an awareness of knowledge in their agency, as well as information and knowledge across the federal national security system. The chief knowledge officers would be augmented by data librarians who understand national security databases, information systems, etc. These civil servants would provide a layer of professionals who would be able to identify critical agency information and maintain an awareness of cross-system information systems and databases. Knowledge officers should build on successes with Terrorist Watch Lists and expand that model to other disparate data stores in order to allow for searches across federal databases. They should also encourage data cleansing to improve integrity of information in these data stores. The CKO Council should have resources available to provide services (including consulting) to departments and agencies on request to support creation and development of team and group-specific knowledge management tools and processes and to support knowledge elicitation projects and other specific techniques that may not be in the core knowledge management training but that may be necessary for specific situations.

d. Congress: Core Reforms

*Legislative-executive branch partnership for better policy development, resourcing, and support of national security missions*

Instead of the confrontational posture of recent decades, both branches must find ways to collaborate so that America can respond effectively to national security challenges. We envision a grand bargain in which Congress eases some of its restrictions on executive actions in return for closer consultation and better accountability. Both sides can preserve their core constitutional responsibilities and prerogatives while engaging in step-by-step confidence-building measures that build and reward trust between the branches. Senators need to recognize the importance of prompt action on key nominations so that leadership gaps do not inhibit policy development and execution. All lawmakers need to grant greater spending flexibility when actions are based on appropriate consultation and well-developed plans. In return, senior national security officials must be responsive to lawmakers and accountable to oversight panels. Congress itself must find ways to subordinate traditional turf consciousness to whole-of-government responses to national security challenges.

The core reforms include some changes to congressional processes and steps to build strong legislative and executive partnership for national security matters, including:

- **Interagency Select Committees**\(^{1095}\): The Senate and House of Representatives should each create select committees for interagency national security matters specifically responsible for reviewing and making recommendations for basic legislation governing interagency coordination and multiagency activities. These

\(^{1095}\) *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Phase I Report 65.*
panels should begin as select task forces and should be composed of members especially interested in the subject matter and should include some members from the standing committees on defense, foreign policy, and homeland security. In addition to making recommendations for legislation affecting the executive branch, the panels should also recommend how to assure adequate congressional oversight of interagency national security issues and multiagency activities. If these task forces perform adequately, the Senate and House should approve creating permanent select committees for interagency national security activities with oversight and legislative powers.

- **Senate Confirmable Executive Secretary**: Given the expanded authorities of the executive secretary explained above, and to overcome the lack of formal access by Congress to national and homeland security process and functions, Congress should elevate that position of executive secretary to Executive Level IV rank and require Senate confirmation. Doing so would require amending the National Security Act of 1947, which currently provides for an NSC staff headed by a civilian executive secretary. This change would create an NSC official accountable to Congress on national security management and interagency coordination.

- **Stronger Foreign Policy Committees**: Congress should strengthen its foreign policy committees by empowering them to develop and enact annual authorization bills. Initially, the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees should undertake a comprehensive revision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961—and the House and Senate leadership should work to facilitate passage of such legislation. Simply clearing the underbrush of the numerous and conflicting programs and priorities would greatly enhance both the nature and the implementation of U.S. foreign assistance programs. Successful enactment would mark the first time in over two decades that Congress has passed a foreign assistance authorization bill, which could lead the way to consideration and enactment of an annual authorization bill—the single best way to strengthen the foreign policy committees. Thereafter, the annual authorization process could be enhanced by the two procedural changes:
  
  - **New Rules**: The Senate and House of Representatives should adopt new rules for handling national security budgets and authorizing legislation. To strengthen the congressional budget process for national security funds, the Budget Committees should recommend section 302(a) allocations for all national security budget function components. To improve the prospects for timely passage of routine authorizing legislation for defense and foreign affairs, the House and Senate should change rules to limit debate and amendments on such measures. The House should change its rules so that a supermajority vote is required to waive the current rule requiring passage of authorizing legislation prior to consideration of appropriations bills for defense and foreign policy. The Senate should

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1096 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 416.
adopt a rule imposing limitations on debate on national security authorization measures similar to those currently in place for the budget resolution—something like fifty hours of debate and a strict germaneness rule on all amendments. Agreement of the majority and minority leaders should be required to designate a particular measure as a privileged national security authorization bill.

- **Funding Flexibility**: Congress should make transparent and codify its restrictions on reprogramming and fund transfers in order to provide greater flexibility for multiagency activities. The numerous and inconsistent provisions regarding notifications in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, should be revised to establish standard procedures for notifications and committee responses. Where possible, procedures to expedite congressional reviews in special cases should be included. If the executive branch should propose contingency funds for special circumstances, Congress should consider limited authorities that provide flexibility, subject to reviews that would enable Congress to gain confidence that the authorities are properly and effectively used. Increased flexibility should depend on satisfactory performance under limited flexibility.

- **Consolidated Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security**: Congress should consolidate congressional oversight of DHS homeland-security functions into one authorization committee and one appropriations subcommittee per chamber.

- **Consolidated Oversight of the Intelligence Community**: Congress should create a joint committee based on the old model of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy or establish a single committee in each house of Congress, combining authorizing and appropriating authorities, to oversee intelligence activities. The new committee(s) should conduct continuing studies of the activities of the intelligence agencies and report problems relating to the development and use of intelligence to all members of the House and Senate.

- **Stronger Oversight Mechanisms**: Congress should increase the budgets and staff for the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Research Service, the Congressional Budget Office, and the appropriations committees for better oversight of national security matters. The panels that ultimately have jurisdiction over the interagency process and multiagency activities should consider creating special oversight units modeled on the Surveys and Investigations Staff of the House Appropriations Committee.

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1097 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 421.
1098 Ibid. 399–400, 420.
3. Conclusions on Core Reforms

Fundamentally, these core reforms provide the president with the tools for strategic direction and system management. They enable the president’s staff to offer the president choices that better align resources with priority national security missions, both in the short and long term. They give the president and his advisors immediate access to talent and knowledge throughout the system, both to support strategic decision-making and to better pursue national security missions that require diverse talent and expertise.

Most importantly, these reforms establish the foundation for a new culture that supports collaboration across organizational boundaries, particularly within the executive branch but also between the executive and legislative branches, and between the federal and state and local authorities. The changes in the core reforms clearly signal to leaders and their subordinates that the system will acknowledge and reward collaboration across organizational boundaries. In this regard, the core reforms enable the president to exert first-, second-, or third-order control over the national security system, that is, direct command, management by objectives, and cooperation through a common culture. Today, at best, the president can achieve unity of purpose and effort in the national security system only through direct intervention and command.

However necessary the core reforms are, alone they are not sufficient. Without decentralizing integrated issue management, mission integration will suffer and produce poor outcomes; the president’s security staff would still be forced to pull issues into the White House for intensive management; and the overall decision capacity for the national security system would remain constricted and focused on crises or near-term issues. In fact, implementing the core reforms without providing means for decentralized issue management might mislead the president’s security advisors to believe they can personally manage the full array of pressing issues, and thereby exacerbate the system’s proclivity for crisis management rather than strategic direction. Accordingly, one of the options for decentralized issue management offered in the next three sections, or some combination thereof, is also required. The three options range progressively from less decentralization and collaboration to more.
D. Option One: White House Command

1. Overview

One way to decentralize issue management is to simply modify the existing system of Washington-based interagency committees. It is the least decentralized and collaborative option offered, but nonetheless better in both respects than the current system. The national security strategy and policy processes would be highly formalized and explicit, guided with heavy participation by a “director for national security” (DNS) and his or her staff. The director would replace the national and homeland security advisors and would use the strategic planning processes provided in the core reforms to set objectives, plans, and allocate resources for the long term. In the short term, the director would help the president determine which issues and missions should be assigned to lead agencies and which should be designated by the president as multiagency national security matters. In the latter case, the director and his or her subordinates would have legal authority to directly manage the issue or mission for the president, including running the interagency committees that work the issues and providing direction to all other executive branch departments and agencies.

Whether the issue is broad or narrow, short- or long-term, this model is designed so that decisions are produced by a highly deliberative process. Clear authority for tight control over disciplined processes would improve decision-making support in comparison with past and current committee decision-making. In such a system, every presidential administration would find it easy to develop a distinctive theme for its time in office, empowered to push a bold vision using directive strategic planning processes and the Office of the Director for National Security (ODNS) to implement national security goals. Strong presidential control weakens the autonomy of departmental and agency cultures, ensuring that responsibility for activity in the national security system is attributable to the presidential administration. Brent Scowcroft observed that “the NSC system was really developed to serve an activist president in foreign policy,” and the White House Command model would enable to the president to tightly control all major policy initiatives through his immediate advisors and their control of the hierarchy of interagency committees.

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2. Organizational Components

a. Strategic Direction: White House Command

This alternative frees the president from day-to-day oversight of the national security system so he can consider, clarify, and communicate long-term strategic direction for the nation’s security. It does this by creating a stronger hub for direction of national security activity. Strategic direction for the national security system would be enhanced by centralizing the coordination of national security under a director for national security with super-Cabinet status. Support for the DNS would be provided by a robust Executive Secretariat. Together, these two mechanisms would allow subordinate and decentralized interagency decision mechanisms, particularly Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs), to use clear centralized direction and authority to organize whole-of-government policy and its implementation, planning, and capabilities development. This alternative enables the president and his chief advisors to run the system. It creates a clear chain of command with authorities over all security matters. The president would benefit from a system that forces “the various departments and agencies to do what the [military] services did two decades ago—give up some of their existing turf and authority in exchange for a stronger, faster, more efficient government wide joint effort.”

b. Structure: White House Command

The reality in today’s national security system is that a president’s span of control suffers because of the multitude of direct reports and Cabinet officials vying for time, decisions, and delegated authority. By elevating one official to run the day-to-day details of the system for the president under delegated authority, the president benefits from strong integration of subordinate activities and planning. By freeing up critical time to consider longer-term strategy and priorities, the president enhances his ability to provide strategic direction. At the same time, Cabinet officials, freed from responsibility for integration that they are powerless to effect, can easily call upon a centralized hub to direct and integrate the networked elements of national power as they relate to the strategy, policy, planning, and execution of national security missions.

In this option, Congress establishes a President’s Security Council (PSC) that would replace both the NSC and HSC. The current and foreseeable security environment demands a broader scope of national security than traditionally has been the case. Security challenges can arise in unpredictable ways that require the integration of national capabilities from across the spectrum of the United States government. Consequently, attempting to codify by statute which Cabinet officials should be members of the national or homeland security councils is futile. The president ends up inviting those who are relevant to the problem anyway. Consequently, a new national security act should enhance the president’s flexibility to convene the leadership from across the federal government relevant to the security issue on the agenda.

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ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS FOR REFORM

- *President’s Security Council*: The PSC replaces the NSC and HSC, but not the National Economic Council (NEC). The president convenes the PSC as needs dictate, inviting the Cabinet officials and any other agency heads that control expertise and resources required for effective decision-making. Convening the PSC would still be a formal act, but the membership would fluctuate with the agenda rather than be mandated by statute (as currently is the case). Both agenda and membership would be formally specified prior to the PSC convening. In the White House Command option, the director for national security can recommend that the president convene the PSC to consider issues elevated by the Principals and Deputies Committees or to issue guidance that merits direct presidential involvement.

Congress also should create an Office of the Director for National Security with super-Cabinet status. This structural reform has two major subcomponents including the establishment of the Senate-confirmed position of the director for national security and an Office of National Security. The DNS would be a single individual, but deputies could be added by executive order if the span of control for the DNS becomes too challenging, presumably for major areas of specialization (e.g., external security, homeland security, and economic security). The DNS replaces both the national security advisor and the homeland security advisor, and would be Senate confirmable.

- *Director for National Security*: The DNS would have two principal functions: exercising direct authority over national security functions and supervising the office. The authorities of this position would include overseeing and wielding directive authority for all national security activity requiring interagency integration.

  - **DNS Functions**: The DNS would chair Principals Committee and Deputies Committee meetings and advise the president on national security policy, drafting and overseeing implementation of presidentially approved policy. The DNS would direct the implementation of national security missions identified by the president as inherently interagency. The DNS would also oversee and advise the president on capabilities development by departments and agencies, although exclusive agency missions would continue to exist.

- *The Office of the Director for National Security*: The director’s office would work directly for him/her, and is a large interagency entity. DNS subordinates, called office directors, would replace NSC staff directors and run PCCs. They would either oversee other agency support for lead agency efforts or wield directive authority for missions approved by the president as “inherently interagency” efforts. The directors

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1102 *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Phase 2 Report* 66–68, recommends folding the Homeland Security Council into the National Security Council to form a single council.

1103 *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Phase 2 Report* 45, recommends establishing a new NSC senior director and office dedicated to integrating interagency planning for complex contingency operations. Also recommended is creating an NSC senior director and office dedicated to strategic planning, 27–30.

1104 *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Phase 1* 63, recommends designating a deputy assistant to the president on the NSC with lead responsibility for integrating agency plans and ensuring greater unity of effort among agencies during execution.
would be end-to-end process managers for all PCCs, running the interagency committee process. Ambassadors and country teams report directly to regional PCCs but the Department of State continues to provide daily administrative support. ODNS would work with the Office of Management and Budget to assemble a national security budget.

- **Size and Composition:** The ODNS would be a robust organization of approximately 500 people. The office directors would be senior individuals with demonstrated technical expertise and leadership capacity that would allow them to lead and manage security issues and the interagency staff that is within their purview. ODNS directors would be politically appointed and Senate confirmed. The ODNS would be an addition to the existing national security system and therefore would not replace any existing structures except the professional NSC and HSC staff, which would be subsumed by the ODNS.

- **Executive Secretary of ODNS:** The DNS and ODNS would require support from the executive secretary of ODNS. The executive secretary would have the same functions as identified in the core reform option: managing the human capital (including education and training), decision support, and long-range planning support policies for the national security system and their infrastructure. (See Empowered Executive Secretariat in the Core Reforms section for more detail.)

To further centralize and empower White House control over the national security system, another option was considered, noted here because it is consistent with the overarching theme of centralizing White House control. This option could not be codified in law, and could be implemented only as a matter of presidential preference:

- **Vice President as National Security Manager**: The president has the option of assigning system management oversight to the vice president. This option cannot be dictated by statute as it would infringe upon the president’s prerogatives as chief executive, but it might be an attractive voluntary option to reduce the president’s span-of-control problems in running the federal government. This might create confusion if the vice president were perceived to have different policy perspectives than the president—if the president did decide to delegate national security responsibilities to the vice president, the vice president could use the DNS and the ODNS for system management.

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1105 Stephen A. Cambone, A New Structure for National Security Policy Planning. (Washington: CSIS, 1998) 55–57, recommends instituting a deputy director, National Security Directorate, possibly the vice president, of Cabinet rank who would oversee day-to-day activities and would serve as the coordinator of the principal members of the National Security Directorate.
c. Process: White House Command

The ODNS would provide the president the means to ensure disciplined management of the national security bureaucracies. Much as President Dwight Eisenhower and President Richard Nixon created strong national security coordination mechanisms within the White House for both policy development and operational oversight, the ODNS would serve as the president’s focal point for national security strategic management in all its stages. This includes the coordination of strategy and policy and the continual review and assessment of its timely and effective execution by federal departments and agencies.

ODNS would ensure that clearly integrated courses of action are generated, as opposed to watered down compromises or merely comparing and contrasting the positions of departments and agencies. As one former NSC staffer noted:

The quality, perforce, not because of the brilliance of the NSC staff officers, necessarily—the quality of a paper drafted by one individual with a couple of assistants is bound to be better than a State Department
However, to avoid the ODNS’s becoming a bureaucratic hurdle in routine interactions between the president and Cabinet officials or interfering with the timely conclusion of national security decision-making and execution, the president should ensure “interagency” decisions approved by the DNS are accompanied by dissenting opinions from department and agency leaders. By carefully balancing Cabinet officials’ decreased independence with mechanisms to prevent groupthink and needless bureaucracy, the president and the nation would enjoy more coherent policy, planning, and execution than exists today.

The executive secretary of the ODNS would assist the DNS and the president in establishing their preferred processes, typically set forth in national security directives early in the administration. The DNS would be responsible for several key process tasks in any case:

- **Issue Identification and Assignment**: The DNS would identify major national security issues for the president. Once determined to be national security issues by the president, the DNS would assign each issue for direction, guidance, and monitoring to an ODNS office director. DNS would establish a formal review process under which current national security issues would be reviewed periodically and would maintain the potential for capturing new national security issues. It is envisioned that major operations and those that are more focused on a single department, agency, or organization would still be conducted using a lead federal agency leadership construct. However, those issues that are inherently interagency matters would be given to ODNS to manage through their control of interagency groups.

- **End-to-End Process Management**: For each issue, the DNS and his managing office director would define the national security interest. The office director would...
then be responsible for managing the issue from policy and strategy formulation through execution of supporting plans. The ODNS can apply standard processes for issue management or leave office directors greater latitude for deciding how issues are managed. In either case, the process allows for and facilitates complex, multidisciplinary decisions and the accompanying resource allocations to support interagency missions. The DNS and supporting office directors would be responsible for maintaining consistent representation on interagency committees at all levels, and for leading them in annual gaming or exercise experiences in order to strengthen integrated team decision-making. Support for all interagency committees would be provided by the executive secretary.

- **Environmental Assessments**: In order to strengthen vertical integration from policy formulation through execution, the process for performing environmental assessments of national security strategy, policy, and planning would be institutionalized. The formal process would help senior leaders identify the linkages between policy articulation, implementation, and execution. The recurring assessments would help policymakers consider the ends-ways-means linkages within national security strategies, policies, and planning.

- **Operational Control**: While operational control can vary based on the type and duration of each national security mission and the composition of the solution for an interagency issue, the ability to monitor and assess implementation of national security issues would reside within the ODNS regardless of the mission or issue. Decision-making on when and where to exert positive control would be facilitated by the executive secretariat’s Decision Support Office, which would assist with providing a national common operational picture for the operation in question, enhanced through state-of-the-art command and control facilities using appropriate situational awareness, decision support, and management tools.

**d. Resources: White House Command**

The White House must have greater ability to shift resources, so it can quickly make effective, politically acceptable tradeoffs to address emerging national security missions. In this option, two important modifications to the integrated national security budgeting process are provided for in the core reforms:

- **ODNS Budget Lines for Priority Missions**\(^{1109}\): A separate budget would be developed for selected national security missions. Authorized by Congress, the flow of resources would go from the ODNS to the departments, agencies, and organizations to fulfill specific missions. This methodology would be used for smaller missions or perhaps for new national security mission areas as they are emerging. The allocation

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\(^{1109}\) *Transforming Defense* recommends modifying current legislation to streamline the transfer of funds within and among agencies in the national security community, allowing decision-makers to provide resources to the agency or agencies best suited for the task.
of resources in this manner would permit missions based on national rather than departmental priorities.

- **Selective Reprogramming Options**\(^{1110}\): Using the visibility over national security budgets, requirements, and missions provided by the core reforms, the DNS would work with OMB to provide specific reprogramming options to better align the president’s budget with national priorities. Once approved, these would be implemented with appropriate procedures for congressional notification/approval.

### e. Human Capital: White House Command

The human capital system must reflect the structure that it supports. Thus, these additional human capital recommendations assure that individuals have the competencies to perform successfully under this unity of command alternative. Consistent with the general tenor of this alternative, the White House is now at the center of core human capital reforms. In addition, the ODNS would need to ensure that the curriculum taught within the national security education and training consortium is consistent with this highly centralized and empowered national security system. The curriculum would have to include training on ODNS functions and staff procedures, for example.

### f. Decision Support: White House Command

The recommendations contained in the core reforms are strengthened here with additional recommendations for improved decision support within the ODNS. In the current system, information is treated as owned by the component agencies; procedures for accessing information are delayed through navigation and negotiation of agency hierarchies. In this option, the ODNS hierarchy would prevail a priori, and expectations would be set that information belonged to the national security system. Departments and agencies would be data stewards rather than owners of national security information. Additionally, the logical and electronic linkages for developing efficient information-sharing and communication capabilities would need to be validated and, in some cases, established.

In this option, the ODNS would develop the capability to access information across the system. The ODNS would be empowered to reach beyond finished intelligence or analysis and quickly obtain raw data or identify the individual responsible for analysis in order to inform and augment decision processes. In this option, which relies on hierarchical authority relationships, the establishment of a “trust network” to facilitate

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\(^{1110}\) U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, *The Phase III Report* 49, suggests that the president prepare and present to the Congress an overall national security budget to serve the critical goals that emerge from the NSC strategic planning process. Separately, the president should continue to submit budgets for the individual national security departments and agencies for congressional review and appropriation. The OMB, with the support of the NSC staff, should undertake the task of formulating this national security budget. Initially, it should focus on a few of the nation’s most critical strategic goals, involving only some programs in the departmental budgets. Over time, however, it could evolve into a more comprehensive document. Homeland security, counter-terrorism, nonproliferation, nuclear threat reduction, and science and technology should be included in the initial national security budget. This process should also serve as a basis for defining the funds to be allocated for preventive strategies.
information flow is unnecessary. Instead, common leadership, common infrastructures, overarching organizational culture (which allows for the inevitably differentiated organizational sub-cultures united under common values/goals), and common incentives provide the “accountability” and “reciprocity” required for effective information flow.

- **Information Management Centers in an Expanded Decision Support Office**: The Executive Secretariat’s Decision Support Office would be expanded beyond the capabilities provided in the core reforms. The Information Services Center (provided for in the core reforms) that just coordinate and operate information services across the federal government would be augmented with Information Management Centers. The Information Management Centers would manage all information in the national security system for the ODNS, including security, access controls, prioritization, and infrastructure. Resources including facilities, personnel, and technology would be provided for these functions.

- **Improved Mission Area Analysis**: The increased authorities of the ODNS would mandate a complementary increase in capabilities designed to facilitate oversight and analysis. Decision support for mission area and budgetary analysis would need to be developed. These systems would need to be cross-departmental and allow for conducting a complete ends, ways, and means assessment throughout mission areas. This analytic contribution would help link strategy and planning with resource allocation by clarifying mission requirements.

- **Mapping and Tapping Knowledge Sources**: The Office of Decision Support would need to keep abreast of all information in the national security system and ensure it flows as required to the ODNS. Resources including facilities, personnel, and technology would need to be provided. Additionally, the logical and electronic linkages for developing efficient information-sharing and communication capabilities would need to be validated and, in some cases, established.

### 3. Conclusions for White House Command

The current structure of the national security system was designed for strong control by the president to integrate different national security disciplines. In this regard, the trend toward increasing centralization since 1947 is not surprising. However, the current

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1111 *Transforming Defense* Section “A Transformation Strategy” recommends developing a unified, multimedia communication system (both secure and unclassified) to facilitate the real-time exchange of information necessary for decision-making and coordination in the complex security environment of the future.

1112 *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Phase 2 Report* 37, recommends conducting regular NSC-chaired interagency “summits” in each region and enhancing opportunities and networks for information sharing and collaboration across agency lines and with coalition partners.

1113 *National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report* (New York: Norton, 2004) 417–418, recommends that information procedures provide incentives for sharing, in order to restore a better balance between security and shared knowledge. The president should lead the governmentwide effort to bring the major national security institutions into the information revolution. He should coordinate the resolution of the legal, policy, and technical issues across agencies to create a “trusted information network.”
system constrains the White House’s management of national security issues with a small staff size and only vague derivative presidential authority that is clearly insufficient to integrate department and agency behaviors. Thus, the president’s staff currently finds itself facing the uncomfortable dilemma of trying to reach policy consensus at low levels through too many time-consuming compromises or admitting failure and elevating even issues of lesser importance to high levels. The White House Command option would end this dilemma by empowering the DNS—a national security vicar of sorts—with positive authority to control the national security system.

a. Advantages of the White House Command Model

There are several advantages to the White House Command approach. First, the system is familiar, and thus the reforms would be more easily accepted and implemented with less friction. Second, overlapping issues could be more easily coordinated if they were centrally managed from Washington, where all the PCCs would meet in close proximity to the White House and other key players. Third, this alternative gives the president and his immediate national security team a much greater ability to engage in the subtle maneuvers involved in global realpolitik. It would be optimal for an environment in which the national security of the United States is most affected by the friendships and rivalries between great powers that are personified by their heads of state. These types of issues are more easily known or predicted, and prioritized. They benefit from tightly coordinated and timed policy, with all instruments of national power moving in lockstep.

In the past, the national security system has demonstrated the informal capacity for this type of White House Command at multiple levels, albeit haphazardly and with much less control over policy implementation than provided for here. For example, at the Cabinet level, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s style of managing national security embodied the spirit of this alternative. As one former staffer reflected, “Centralizing authority in the White House facilitated major changes of strategy in the Vietnam War and in our relationships with both Russia and China. It would be hard to have accomplished those major changes so swiftly had they relied on the usual bureaucratic process.” Other national security advisors on occasion have abandoned their honest broker roles and attempted to exert positive control over the unwieldy interagency process, as have lower-level presidential envoys and other “policy entrepreneurs.” The White House Command option would significantly reduce the disadvantages of these empowered leaders by clarifying their authorities and giving them much more control over policy implementation than when they work around the system informally, as is currently the case.

b. Disadvantages of the White House Command Model

There are disadvantages to this approach to slightly decentralized and cooperative but less collaborative issue management. First, it relies heavily on superior talent in the form of the DNS and his or her immediate subordinates. As one former Nixon staffer

1115 See the discussion of policy entrepreneurs in Parts III and IV.
remarked about the highly centralized Nixon national security system, which "worked by bypassing the whole government," it was "not a model to be followed by ordinary mortals."\textsuperscript{1116} Second, it would work best for an activist national security president, preferably one with deep foreign policy experience and bureaucratic skill.

Another shortcoming is that the slight decentralization still leaves the system vulnerable to limited decision capacity in the form of White House bottlenecks and presidential and staff-based fatigue. Kissinger has remarked, “The greater number of issues that a country takes on, the more it taxes the psychological resilience of its leadership group. It is not possible to act wisely at every moment of time in every part of the world.”\textsuperscript{1117} There are simply not enough people in the president’s security staff to manage the whole range of major issues the system must tackle.

\textit{E. Option Two: Integrated Regional Centers}

1. Overview

This alternative shifts the national security system’s emphasis from the White House’s control of interagency committees to issue management and integration at the regional level. Regional directors—national security proconsuls of sorts—would head Integrated Regional Centers (IRCs), which act as an interagency headquarters for national security policy. This option reflects the fact that there are few global powers giving priority to global interests. The vast majority of security concerns that most actors care about are intensively regional,\textsuperscript{1118} which explains the explosion of regional organizations since the end of the Cold War. Rather than being directly involved in the management of issues, the role of the White House would be to provide broad guidance based on the administration’s priorities for IRCs, which then implement our national security strategy at the regional level. The White House would retain the flexibility to manage the system either with a laissez-faire or heavily formal style. Regional directors would conduct the bulk of national security activity: establishing contacts and relationships with regional actors, promoting regional objectives, and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Integrated Regional Centers: Key Features at a Glance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President’s Security Council replaces the NSC and HSC, convening Cabinet members and Integrated Regional Directors based on issues, not statutory membership.</td>
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<tr>
<td>National security advisor and small staff focus on national strategy and system management because Integrated Regional Centers manage issues.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Decentralized issue management through empowered Integrated Regional Centers (IRCs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Departments and agencies are capability providers, supporting IRCs.</td>
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\textsuperscript{1118} Here regional issues are not defined as issue that concerns all countries in a region, which would be a relatively small number. Rather regional issues are defined to mean issues that transcend one country’s borders, but which are not global or transregional; that is, of concern to most countries. There are many such issues.
solving small problems before they become major threats to the United States. IRCs would organize themselves based on the unique characteristics of their regions, which would be defined by a common set of geographic boundaries that all departments and agencies would respect. This alternative creates durable institutions that would span the globe and ensure enduring integration of all instruments of national power.

This option is a major step toward greater decentralization and interagency collaboration. Distanced from Washington, departments and agencies with national security missions would answer directly to directors of Integrated Regional Centers, positioned forward at home and abroad where advisable.1119 These civilian-led organizations would be comprised of, or have strong liaison ties to, all government entities with interest or activities in each U.S. or foreign region. Regional directors would not be in the chain of command for the operational control of U.S. military forces employed in combat. U.S. military combatant commands would nevertheless take direction from IRCs on all peacetime engagement activities and in conflict would coordinate their activities with IRCs and could be collocated to facilitate coordination.

This alternative borrows heavily from the idea of empowering regional combatant commanders from the Goldwater-Nichols reforms of the Department of Defense. These regional commands exercise independent influence abroad and was given a hefty amount of political authority by both the White House and the Pentagon. They have large staffs that spend their time preparing and executing peacekeeping deployments, humanitarian interventions, emergency relief for natural disasters and coordinating hundreds of large and small training exchanges with newly independent nations and old allies.1120 They control resources and have clear mandate to independently engage with countries that may seem far outside the U.S. sphere of influence or concern.1121 Commanders are able to influence policy decisions in Washington, primarily attributable to their proximity to regional problems and personalities.

Similarly, IRCs would be led by a senior leader recognized for regional experience and expertise, and staffed with individuals who have geographic, cultural, foreign language skill or previous experience in the region. They would be resourced to move towards achieving goals outlined by the president, for example, the Africa division may be given a special mandate on developing and strengthening democracies in the area. If a problem is region specific, for example the conflict in Darfur, a regional task force would be created and resourced to deal with the issue. In this model, departments and agencies are capabilities providers. They develop capabilities that would be available for IRCs to use in implementing their approved regional national security strategies, much as the military departments are force providers to the combatant commanders.

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1119 Some argue that Integrated Regional Centers (IRCs) should be based in Washington as countries might not favor a large U.S. government presence in their area. Options include forward deployment of all IRCs, forward deployment of some IRCs, eclectic deployment of some people to regions and some people to Washington, and presence of all IRCs in Washington.
1120 Priest, Dana. The Mission. (p. 71-72)
1121 Priest, Dana. The Mission. (p. 74)
Organizing around IRCs would resolve the current imbalance between hard and soft power in the conduct of foreign relations. During the Clinton administration, Secretary of Defense William Perry directed the combatant commanders (Commanders in Chief, or CINCs, at the time) to “shape” their environments. In doing so, they often end up concerned about the same issues that demand the attention of their civilian colleagues, but under pressure and ill-equipped to take the lead for organizing regional policy and activities:

They get exceedingly frustrated... because they can see the other side of it and they know what is lacking. And they want help. They don’t want to do it alone. They don’t want to be proconsuls. They don’t want to be the senior[-ranking] American [official] to whom people in these countries turn because they don’t think that any other high-ranking Americans will listen to them, which is frequently the case. Think about the telephone calls they get. These calls shouldn’t be going to the military. But leaders in many of these countries don’t feel that there is anyone on the civilian side to whom they can talk honestly and get honest answers.\footnote{1122}

Ineffective regional PCCs mean the combatant commanders receive little useful strategic direction. While Washington committees stalemate over policy differences or issue watered down guidance, regional combatant commanders conspire to obtain some of Washington’s limited attention span:

The three Americans [Ambassador Presel, CIA station chief, and General Zinni] contemplated how they could make their offices back home pay attention. “We in the West aren’t thinking very hard about this,” Presel lamented. The other two nodded…. To muddy things even further, U.S. policy toward the region was completely fragmented. A gaggle of entities—the Pentagon, Central Command, the U.S. embassy, economic aid agencies, Justice Department units, the Customs Bureau, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and CIA—squabbled over money, turf, and authority. “The system is badly broken,” Zinni complained. “We use chewing gum and bailing wire to keep it together.” Zinni wanted something Washington was resisting—more contact with Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and the other “stans” of Central Asia.\footnote{1123}

While they launch initiatives to confront the challenges of the region that pose a danger to U.S. interests, they often are discouraged from communicating with members of regional interagency groups in Washington, and in particular with Department of State

regional assistant secretaries.\textsuperscript{1124} They reach out nonetheless, and often are met with skepticism.

General Petraeus, the current commander of Central Command, for example, has begun a policy review of the Middle East, tapping experts from outside the Department of Defense to examine political, economic, and information dimensions of policy. However, “some experts questioned whether Petraeus will have the authority to carry out such a sweeping strategy.”\textsuperscript{1125} Admiral Stavridis, the current commander of Southern Command, has been extraordinarily active in conducting regional military exercises, intercepting narcotics traffickers, assisting Columbia with foreign internal defense, and engaging populations using hospital ships to assist in medical care. Despite this,

Opinion in Latin America has already turned against the Pentagon’s reinvigorated activities in the region -- and against the United States in general…. The United States has a major perception problem in the two world regions where the Pentagon has decided to focus greater effort. Latin America and Africa represent new frontiers for a military that in recent decades has mostly concerned itself with Western Europe, the Middle East and the Pacific.\textsuperscript{1126}

Despite good intentions, a regional perspective and a decided penchant for taking the initiative, combatant commanders invariably put a military face on American activity that often is inappropriate. Africa Command, for example, “has become a lightening [sic] rod for a bigger concern, which is that U.S. foreign policy is being dictated almost entirely by the Department of Defense.”\textsuperscript{1127}

The Integrated Regional Center alternative would redistribute authority in the national security system by dividing labor between those responsible for building capabilities (federal departments and agencies) and those planning and conducting integrated missions (Integrated Regional Centers). The model applies both at home and abroad. This is reflective of the divisional model of organizational structure in which subunits are organized by product, geography, or market, and have their own functional capabilities. These subunits are given a great amount of autonomy to manage activity within their mandates.

Many multinational corporations operate through regional divisions. They allow each division to develop their own products, build their own supply chains, and tailor the

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company’s brands. Each division shapes its culture in response to the demands of the region for which it is responsible. For example, PepsiCo International (a part of PepsiCo) is divided into Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Africa, and the United Kingdom. Each region has a president, and each region has its own food and beverage brands, along with the company’s main brands, tailored to the flavor preferences for every country in which the company is involved. These and other companies have found that many important decisions are made at the regional level; just as markets vary naturally by region, the tactics one must use to penetrate that market must vary as well. Successful multinational corporations like Nokia and Philips Electronics allocate considerable resources to allow for this regional responsiveness.

The Marine Corps also has moved in the direction of regional adaptation, not structurally but in its personnel system, by establishing the Career Marines Regional Studies Program. “The Marines will break down the globe into 17 micro-regions,” which officers and non-commissioned officers will study for the rest of their careers. These Marines will be sent to areas deemed to have the potential for future conflict to train with foreign forces.

The principal justification for organizing around regional structures, issues and cultures is that it relieves the president from the complex and unmanageable challenge of integrating highly interdependent subunits based on disciplines that usually have trouble coordinating themselves. The current regional PCC system would be eliminated and regional policy would be delegated to the IRCs. System and crisis management would be elevated to the deputies and principals level in support of the President’s Security Council. The president and his White House staff would still be involved in crises, as certain decisions can only be made by the president, but the national security system would be able to devote more sustained attention to more issues.

Empowering the IRCs leaves the White House free to devote more attention to global policy, which the president can implement through the IRCs. As IRCs report to the president, their freedom of action will be dependent on the preferences of the president in office. Given flexibility, the IRCs will be able to solve many regional problems that are difficult for the apex of the national security system to detect, thus ameliorating the current tendency of the national security system to ignore such problems until they develop into crises or strategic surprises. The center of gravity of the national security system would be more distributed, and more stable. The president and his White House staff would still be involved in crises, as certain decisions can only be made by the president, but the national security system would be able to devote more sustained attention to more issues.

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1130 Alan Rugman and Alain Verbeke, *Regional transnationals and Triad strategy*. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (p. 1, 2, 3, 14, 15)

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attention to more issues. The perspective of the White House would widen, from managing day-to-day activity without sufficient time for reflection, to viewing national security policy in broader terms.

In full, through this organizational alternative, regional teams would have the right resources, dedicated and experienced staff, and policy leadership to accomplish objectives quickly. As with the previous option, the Integrated Regional Centers option would be in addition to the core reforms and would depend upon them for success. An integrated national security budget process, a joint personnel system and national security culture, proper knowledge management, and an improved partnership with Congress are all assumed to be in place. However, in this option the core strategy and planning reforms are redefined in terms of the regional centers.

2. Organizational Components

a. Strategic Direction for Integrated Regional Centers

Responsibility for overseeing national security system processes would be divided between a globally focused President’s Security Council and regionally focused Integrated Regional Centers. The PSC would set and review broad policy and oversee system management issues. This would include the following six processes: 1) establishing security goals; 2) setting strategic direction; 3) providing definitive national security strategy and policy, including preparation of transregional decisions for PSC discussion and presidential decision when necessary; 4) developing budget guidance, including work with OMB on the allocation of regional resource packages; 5) identifying cross-regional presidential priority issues; and 6) deconflicting Integrated Regional Division requests for support from departments and agencies. The PSC, departments and agencies, or elements of the Executive Office of the President could raise issues potentially requiring crisis management to the president, but crisis management would generally handled through regional directors.

This model maintains the core reforms’ emphasis on unifying strategic direction emanating from the Executive Office of the President. The broader-based President’s Security Council replaces the NSC and HSC as the primary senior national security governing body. Their staffing element, OMB, and the National Assessment and Visioning Center provide significant support to the president in developing grand strategy. In a clear departure from the current system, however, translation of national strategy into needed plans, programs, and resources is the primary responsibility of Integrated Regional Centers, informed by the expertise resident in individual departments and agencies and the ambassadors and their country teams.

b. Structure and Process: Integrated Regional Centers

- President’s Security Council\textsuperscript{1132}: In this option, the PSC would also include the directors of Integrated Regional Centers. The PSC would assist the president in

\textsuperscript{1132} Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Phase 2 reports also makes this point, suggesting the merging of the Homeland Security Council into the National Security Council and integrating the two staffs into a
determining regionwide common boundaries and department-specific responsibilities. In order to minimize the impact of regional seams, the PSC would serve as a discussion and decision forum for cross-regional missions. The president would convene the PSC and invite regional directors and Cabinet and other officials as needs dictate. The council would report directly to the president, and replace the National Security and Homeland Security Councils. The Office of Management and Budget would work with the PSC, particularly with the regional directors and the president’s security advisor, to assemble a national security budget that reflects the president’s priorities as elaborated in the National Security Review, National Security Planning Guidance, and Long-term Resource Guidance given to all U.S. government organizations.

- **President’s Security Advisor and Staff**: The president’s security advisor would be a Senate-confirmed political appointee who reports directly to the president. Whereas the director for national security in the White House Command option runs regional policies through the PCCs, the PSA would focus on global and transnational issues in this option. The PSA would oversee a small staff that assists the president in managing the national security system (external and domestic) and, when required, would make national security decisions. The PSA’s staff would include homeland security and national security personnel. The PSA and staff would help the president manage the national security system and take a vigorous interest in the activities of the integrated regional directors and the Cabinet departments and agencies, helping resolve conflicts in their efforts and, when necessary, raising conflicts to the level of the president for resolution. The PSA would have a small staff of approximately forty to fifty political appointees, excluding the executive secretary staff.

- **Security Executive Secretary**: The executive secretary would be housed in the Office of the President’s Security Advisor and would be responsible for managing the activities and agenda of the PSC. The executive secretary would facilitate the supporting personnel, strategic management, and administration needs of the Integrated Regional Centers. (See Empowered Executive Secretariat in Core Reforms section for more detail, see p. 461)

- **Integrated Regional Directors**: All regional directors would be presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed. The regional director would be senior in rank to ambassadors and chiefs of mission by virtue of position and could come from any

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1134 A New Structure for National Security Policy Planning by the Center for Strategic and International Studies makes a position of the director of the national security directorate (DDNSD), a Cabinet-rank position that would oversee day-to-day activities and would serve as coordinator of the principle members of the main national security entity; Cambone 55–57.
n national security agency or from outside of government. The regional director would have the leadership, managerial, entrepreneurial, political, and diplomatic skills befitting of the highest levels of the new national security personnel system. Regional directors would have authority over all national security institutions and personnel in the region, with the exception of operationally employed military forces. Integrated Regional Center staffs would report directly to the regional director. The director of each U.S. regional office would be a predesignated Department of Homeland Security official, such as a field-level principal federal official or some future iteration as a lead federal coordinator for each region.\textsuperscript{1135}

Integrated regional directors would have primary responsibility for integrating all federal operations and implementation within their areas of responsibility, with the exception of military forces engaged in active operations. Directors would issue Integrated Regional Strategies and review and approve all department and agency plans that drive activity and resource allocations. This includes country team plans (Strategic Mission Plans), DoD operational and security cooperation plans, and foreign assistance plans. In addition, regional directors would:

- Advise/participate in the President’s Security Council when requested
- Implement global U.S. national security policy in a regional context rather than in the “one size fits all” mode
- Do much of the interagency coordination and integration for issue management that is currently assigned to the PCCs, only closer to the issues and personalities in the region
- Identify cross-regional national security issues that require national-level decisions for system management and policy guidance to the President’s Security Council
- Elevate issues requiring national-level system management decisions and guidance to the President’s Security Council

- \textit{Integrated Regional Centers—Externally Oriented}\textsuperscript{1136}: The Integrated Regional Centers for external security issues would not all look the same and would be tailored for each geographic region based on the maturity of U.S. government involvement in the region through long-standing entities such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). They could have sub-regional departments (e.g., Latin

\textsuperscript{1135} See the recommendation for homeland security regional security hubs in Christine E. Wormuth, \textit{Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe: Ready (or Not)?} (Washington: CSIS, 2008) 69. \textsuperscript{1136} See the recommendation for homeland security regional security hubs in Wormuth 69. In \textit{Beyond Goldwater Nichols, Phase 2}, there is a suggestion to establish a common governmentwide framework for defining the regions of the world, 37. The Hart-Rudman Commission also suggests that the president should propose to the Congress a plan to reorganize the State Department, creating five under secretaries, with responsibility for overseeing the regions of Africa, Asia, Europe, Inter-America, and Near East/South Asia, and redefining the responsibilities of the under secretary for global affairs; U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century 54.
America and Africa) to reflect the political/economic realities on the ground. They would be paired with the regional combatant commanders, and the regional map of the world would be the same for all agencies. The Regional Centers would be housed in regional offices, preferably but not necessarily collocated with the combatant commands. Subregional and country desks reside within the Integrated Regional Centers and integrate all levels of policy and implementation support for ambassadors and their empowered country teams and interact directly with U.S. government missions to multilateral organizations in the region. Issue-based task forces are created on an as-needed basis to manage discrete interregional issues. Integrated Regional Centers would replace regional interagency committees. The size of IRCs would vary by region and preexisting U.S. government involvement therein. On average, each overseas IRC would require approximately 500–1,000 people; each domestic region would have a staff of approximately fifty people.

Figure 19. Option 2a: Integrated Regional Centers

- **Integrated Regional Centers—Internally Oriented**\(^\text{1137}\). Within the United States, IRCs would be organized similarly but would serve as regional hubs connecting

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\(^{1137}\) See the recommendation for homeland security regional security hubs in wormuth 69. In *Beyond Goldwater Nichols, Phase 2*, there is a suggestion to establish a common governmentwide framework for defining the regions of the world, 37. The Hart-Rudman Commission also suggests that the president should propose to the Congress a plan to reorganize the State Department, creating five under
Washington and the state and local levels for national preparedness. The number of domestic IRCs could vary, but given the massive collaboration effort required with state and local authorities they probably should at least parallel the existing ten federal regions. The current federal regions trace their origins to the Office of Civilian Defense (OCD), which was established within the EOP in 1941 via Executive Order 8757. The nation’s first official Civil Defense entity, it established federal regional offices in 1942 which were “geographically coterminous with the War Department Corps Areas to coordinate civilian defense activities and to provide liaison with state and local agencies, other federal agencies, and the military.”

Such organizations have gain and loss prominence as civil defense concerns (e.g. the fear of nuclear war) fluctuate. However, the current regions were reinforced by President Nixon via executive order 11647 in 1972. (See figure 21 for a depiction of domestic IRCs under the authority of the Department of Homeland Security).

- **Integrated Regional Centers and Departments and Agencies**: Cabinet secretaries would maintain the right to influence and challenge policies via the PSC, but once an issue is assigned to an IRC for management rather than to a lead agency, the Integrated Regional Centers would lead and enforce adherence to presidential policies and decisions. Department and agency heads would still be responsible for recruiting and training personnel, acquiring and maintaining capabilities, submitting budgets to achieve functional capabilities, and formulating policies and programs in support of presidential and PSC guidance. Regional directors, however, would have both authority and responsibility for the successful execution of national security missions. Where resource demands from multiple regional center directors exceed expected department capacity, Cabinet officials would seek requirement or resource resolution from the president’s security advisory staff, or in major cases, from the President’s Security Council.

- **Integrated Regional Centers and Combatant Commands**: The regional directors and their Integrated Regional Centers would not exercise authority (or command) over combatant commanders or their assigned forces in combat operations or other Title 10 missions assigned by the National Command Authority. Thus, combatant commands would prepare and review war plans through the existing military chain of command and would seek assistance from the IRCs in developing Phase IV of their war plans. However, combatant commands would take direction from IRCs for peacetime engagement and, depending on the security situation, reconstruction and stability

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1138 With the end of WWII, the OCD was abolished in 1945, and the regional offices were abolished, effective July 1, 1944, by OCD Administrative Order No. 38, June 7, 1944. “Subsequent regional functions of OCD were directed from Washington, DC, through small field offices composed of technical personnel.” [http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/171.html](http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/171.html).

1139 In 1969, Nixon established 10 standard federal regions for domestic agencies. In 1972, these regions were formalized with EO 11647, which established regional councils within these regions to more easily coordinate activities of the federal government, and not only for civil defense. This was a very controversial EO at the time as it was seen by some as an attack on federalism. [http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/RM/A/A/E/Y_/rmaaey.pdf](http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/RM/A/A/E/Y_/rmaaey.pdf)
operations. Thus, the IRCs would approve the theater security cooperation plans of the combatant commanders. Having the close relationship between the relevant combatant commander and regional director would ensure a strong relationship between peacetime engagement and deterrence and preservation of a stable steady-state situation in the regions.

- **Integrated Regional Centers and Embassies**: The Integrated Regional Centers would be superior to the embassies in their region. Ambassadors and embassies would report to Washington through the Integrated Regional Centers with the right of direct appeal to Washington. IRCs would translate the national guidance into regional terms for the individual embassies and their Strategic Mission Plans, providing regional and subregional strategies, to include priorities of effort. They also would establish directive relationships with the U.S. missions to multilateral organizations in the region.

**Figure 20. Option 2b: Integrated Regional Centers with State as Lead Agency**

- **Running Regional Centers from Department of State**: IRCs could also be organized in the form of empowered Department of State regional under secretaries.

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1140 This alternative could be strengthened by the creation of a unified Department of International Relations, which is discussed in the next option.
ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS FOR REFORM

(elevated from the current assistant secretary rank), reporting to the president through the secretary of state. These under secretaries would be charged with leading Regional PCCs, but would report to the secretary of state. Thus Principals Committees and Deputies Committees would continue to oversee PCCs.

This approach would more closely reflect the current system, using an empowered lead agency approach. It would have the same advantages and disadvantages as the current country team approach in embassies. Under secretaries would have de jure authority for integrating the efforts of other agencies, but likely would be perceived as partial to Department of State equities, much as the current ambassador and country team relationship today is perceived by other departments and agencies. Similarly, domestic IRCs for homeland security could be organized in the chain of directive authority for the Department of Homeland Security, as depicted in the following graphic:

Figure 21. Option 2b(i): Domestic Integrated Regional Centers with DHS as Lead Agency

![Figure 21. Option 2b(i): Domestic Integrated Regional Centers with DHS as Lead Agency](image)

c. Resources: Integrated Regional Centers

In addition to the core reforms concerning resource management, Congress would have to create discrete headquarters operations budgets for the IRCs. In addition, the IRCs
would have responsibility for aligning all regional and bilateral programs with regional strategies. Therefore they would:

- Integrate the individual embassy Mission Support Plans and associated resource requirements for the region into a coherent whole for submission in the national security budget process
- Champion the integrated embassy requirements to support their Mission Support Plans in the budget process
- Transmit national and regional interagency budget and policy decisions and priorities to individual embassies and monitor execution

- Integrated Requirements Analysis: The staff of each Integrated Regional Center would include at least twenty individuals dedicated to needs identification, resource allocation, and performance assessment. These staffs would provide significant cross-agency expertise upon which the President’s Security Council Staff and OMB can draw in developing cross-regional strategic guidance and a holistic national security budget.

- Operations and Maintenance Budgets: Regional directors would be responsible for facilities and exercise budgets, provided in statute and subject to OMB and presidential review. As such, Integrated Regional Centers would not rely on executive agents for their headquarters needs, although all personnel and capabilities supplied to the Integrated Regional Centers should be resourced through department and agency budgets.

d. Decision Support: Integrated Regional Centers

Organizing information and decision support efforts within regional contexts ensures country teams and combatant commands have full awareness of regional issues beyond immediate country contingencies and challenges. Current regional centers maintained by the Department of Defense could be expanded to become interagency organizations. Decision support efforts focus on supporting the needs of the Integrated Regional Centers as well as the Executive Office of the President, which orchestrates cross-center knowledge management:

- Regional Differences Resolved by PSA: The PSA and executive secretary would “own” the inter-regional information flows and incentives/infrastructures for cross-organizational cooperation. The PSA would resolve Integrated Regional Centers’ disputes regarding intelligence and information sharing (for intelligence, this may be

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1141 Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Phase 2 believes that each region should conduct regular NSC-chaired interagency “summits” to enhance opportunities and networks for information sharing and collaboration across agency lines and with coalition partners, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Phase 2 Report 37. The 9/11 Commission Report supports unifying strategic intelligence and operational planning against Islamist terrorists across the foreign-domestic divide with a National Counterterrorism Center, unifying the intelligence community with a new National Intelligence Director, The 9/11 Commission Report 399–400.
delegated to the ODNI) and would enforce accountability and reciprocity across Integrated Regional Centers’ interests.

e. Human Capital: Integrated Regional Centers

The human capital system would reinforce the essential nature of significant regional knowledge, buttressed by the language capability to deal effectively with governments, cultures, nations, and peoples in a particular region. The executive secretary of the President’s Security Council would ensure workforce goals are met for IRCs through education, training, and assignments and ensure proper staffing of the Integrated Regional Centers. Most center personnel would be career civilian or military personnel detailed on a multiyear assignment to a center, most of whom would be members of the National Security Professional Corps. Each Regional Center would maintain an education and training center as part of the national security education system and outreach to countries in the region.

3. Conclusions for Integrated Regional Centers

The United States is a global power, but, with few exceptions, other countries and even nongovernmental organizations understandably give priority to security problems in their own immediate regions. Thus, a division of labor between Washington institutions that focus on global and transregional policy and IRCs that translate those policies and priorities into regional engagement makes sense. Strategic direction and policy would still be provided by the White House. Truly global policies would be made in Washington and promoted through multilateral organizations with a global focus.

However, by far, most national security policy must be implemented on a regional, sub-regional, and bilateral basis through the IRCs working with ambassadors and their country teams. IRCs would build on the centralized strategies and policies, tailoring them to their particular regions and subregions. In this way, the system would generate decentralized issue management, that is, strategies, policies, planning, and execution that fit within an overarching national framework. A national security approach that better balances the top-down development and integration of global priorities with strongly empowered regional hubs that manage the end-to-end process of policy implementation would greatly improve integrated issue management but also the strength of U.S. relationships abroad.

a. Advantages of the Integrated Regional Center Model

There are several major advantages to the Integrated Regional Center option. First, the system builds on the success of the regional military commands. The Department of Defense’s regional commands have large staffs that spend their time preparing and executing peacekeeping deployments, humanitarian interventions, emergency relief for natural disasters, and coordinating hundreds of large and small training exchanges with newly independent nations and old allies.\(^\text{1142}\) Control over significant resources and a

general mandate allow the regional combatant commanders to independently exercise considerable influence far from Washington’s immediate supervision. In fact, allies have come to expect combatant commanders to help them solve a wide range of security related problems, blurring the military and political lines of implementing and shaping policy. Commanders also influence policy decisions in Washington, primarily because of their proximity to the regions and knowledge of regional personalities and issues.

While the degree of decentralized issue management inherent in the regional model represented by combatant commands has been undeniably successful, it has created a civil-military imbalance. The military has been asked to take a more forward role in diplomacy, but has neither the diplomatic tools nor the coordination to achieve it. Creating IRCs would correct this imbalance and provide the same kind of coherent, end-to-end policy implementation process management for the full range of U.S. foreign relations.

Second, delegating day-to-day issue management to IRCs would leave the Washington-based national security system free to focus on global and long-range security policy and strategy. Third, removed from Washington and working under the clear leadership of a regional director, the degree of interagency collaboration on the IRC staff could be expected to improve. Finally, embassies would now have a clear authority with which to coordinate their country plans to greater effect within the region. The IRCs would align resources and programs to support regional strategies instead of having every ambassador and, for that matter, department and agency, promoting their own bilateral programs regardless of regional and subregional strategies for expanding U.S. influence.

Many organizations in the private sector use regional structures divided into “culturally appropriate” subsections. Some of the world’s largest transnational corporations have found global corporate success through achieving balanced regional distribution of sales. These companies recognize that many important decisions are best made at the regional level. Markets vary naturally by region and this variance between regions requires the distribution of substantial parts of corporate decision to the regional level. Successful multinational corporations allocate considerable resources to allow for this regional responsiveness; for example, Nokia and Philips Electronics have all found success with this empowered model, where companies allow for decision-making and resource allocation at the regional level.

b. Disadvantages of the Integrated Regional Center Model

The major disadvantage to this approach is not the reality of global issues. Global issues could be identified and managed from Washington through a variety of global or trans-regional organizations. The major disadvantage would be the reality that many issues would transcend regional boundaries. IRCs would thus have to work across their “seams” on a regular basis. Cross-regional task forces and other mechanisms could be

1143 Ibid. 74.
1144 Ibid. 90.
1145 Alan Rugman and Alain Verbeke, Regional Transnationals and Triad Strategy, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 1, 2, 3, 14, 15.
employed to coordinate such issues, and Washington institutions would key a sharp eye on them as well. In particular, the PSC would have to search out transregional and “seam” issues and either assign them to Washington-based staff or task forces to resolve, or ensure that the IRCs were doing so. Nonetheless, the tendency of IRCs to become independent fiefdoms inclined to focus on what they can best control—issues within their own geographic designations—could be strong and a liability.

F. Option Three: A Hierarchy of Decentralized Teams

1. Overview

This option provides by far the most decentralized and collaborative solution for issue management. The White House would trust leaders closest to the issues to manage them on a day to day basis. The primary activity of the White House and the president’s security advisor and staff becomes long-range strategic direction, setting priorities and aligning resources, and deconfliction of issue team efforts. To understand this option, it is imperative to make the distinction between empowered teams and interagency committees.

Teams differ from committees in that they act as collaborative bodies rather than as coordinating bodies. The department- and agency-centric culture that currently

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hierarchy of Teams: Key Features at a Glance</th>
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<tr>
<td>The president and his security advisor provide strategic guidance, managing the national security system through “presidential security reviews” and issue teams.</td>
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<tr>
<td>A hierarchy—national, regional, country—of empowered cross-functional teams manages issues at all levels for the president, conducting issue management on a day-to-day basis.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The signal central characteristic of this option is a national security culture that supports collaboration and decentralized problem solving.</td>
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1146 Empowered teams are structural entities that serve the purpose of accomplishing tasks requiring multidisciplinary participation. They are cross-functional teams that are quite different than the existing interdepartmental coordination committees. Empowered teams are given purpose and authority to make decisions, often through a charter. They are staffed by people who are rewarded for their ability to contribute to the team. The whole team is rewarded for its performance. Empowered teams have formal leaders with the authority to bring efficiency to decision-making. Cross-functional teams have become the norm in many contemporary organizations. Sources that discuss cross-functional teams include: Galbraith, Jay, Designing Organizations, (San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons, 2002); Ostroff, Frank, The Horizontal Organization: What the Organization of the Future Looks Like and How It Delivers Value to Customers, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Parker, Glenn M., Cross-Functional Teams: Working with Allies, Enemies, and Other Strangers, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2003).

1147 Cooperation is the sharing of information; it is the “association of persons for a common benefit.” Collaboration, on the other hand, is to “work jointly with others,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2006). The difference between the two words is substantial and essential to understanding the empowered teams concept. Where committees and working groups cooperate (e.g., share information), teams collaborate; where current structures associate, teams have acting authority. A group that cooperates will never be more than a sum of its parts, while a team that collaborates can fuse knowledge and expertise to create and manage solutions that become larger than the sum of its members’ capabilities.
defines and frames the traditional interagency structures (e.g., committees and working groups) support cooperation, not collaboration. The distinguishing features of an empowered team that collaborates, as opposed to a committee that coordinates, are the following:

- **Clear Mandates:** Teams are given clear objectives in the form of an authorizing mandate. The team determines the best means to measure progress against the mandate’s objectives and have those metrics approved by the authority issuing the mandate. The team’s scope of authority cannot exceed its mandate.

- ** Authorities:** Issue Teams report to one leader who has managerial, evaluation, and budget control. The leader and the team receive their authority directly from a geographic office or the president. They have presumptive authority over all their mandated resources and departments and agencies supplying them. The presumptive authority may be challenged by departments and agencies if their senior leaders believe the team’s directions challenge the long-term ability of the department to fulfill its national security roles and responsibilities. Teams also have authority over their own resources.¹¹⁴⁸

- **Resources:** The team leader specifies the expertise he/she needs on the team and then is provided with the requisite personnel. Initial resource levels are specified in the mandate but later the team can clarify resource requirements given team objectives, strategies, and planning.

- **Size, Location, Tenure:** Teams are small (typically fewer than ten persons), collocated, and work full-time. Teams work problems in both steady-state and crisis mode. As President Eisenhower observed, “To my mind the secret of a sound, satisfactory decision made on an emergency basis has always been that the responsible official has been ‘living with the problem’ before it becomes acute.”¹¹⁴⁹ Members rotate periodically to ensure team creativity, guard against groupthink, and permit members to reestablish expertise in parent organizations. The team leader identifies required expertise for the team and receives personnel candidates who apply to the team or who are asked by the team leader to join.

- **Culture:** The team culture encourages a focus on mission success and teamwork, collaboration but not capitulation. Team members are expected to present their views and expertise forcefully but not at the expense of developing integrated options. Team culture would be reinforced by training and incentives:

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¹¹⁴⁸ “Empowered Teams” are also distinguishable from the classic “czar” model in that, within the narrow confines of their mandate, they have the authority to direct other agencies, up to and including cabinet secretaries. Such authority can only be conferred on a team leader who is presidentially appointed and senate confirmed or who reports directly to such a person. If neither is the case (for instance, if the team leader is not confirmed, even if he or she reports to the President), the leader cannot have any actual directive authority and would instead have to rely on the implied authority that comes from proximity to the President.

- **Team Training**: Team members, including the leader, are trained in team dynamics, including conflict resolution. The team has common standard operating procedures and skills, but diverse expertise. It has the competencies necessary to set up and maintain a shared and shareable information space within the systemwide decision support infrastructure.

- **Rewards**: Team members are rewarded based on individual and group performance. Evaluations are based on team leader recommendations for individual and group performance.

Empowered, “cross-functional” teams would be led by multidisciplinary leaders—policy entrepreneurs—and populated with subject matter experts. Rather than fixating on the bureaucratic politics of Washington, these teams would view the world as their workplace and would be expected to directly observe the impact of their activity. They would be located in proximity to the problems they resolved, and thus might or might not be located in Washington. If the team is addressing a transnational issue, they would be expected to do much travelling.

Using teams for decision-making would both require and generate a different national security culture. Rather than being consumed by policy papers and committee meetings which are constantly undermined by bureaucratic politics, teams would focus intently on seamless policy formulation and implementation. Rather than a clutter of multiple large departments and agencies working on many similar issues, a clearly authoritative and small group would integrate U.S. elements of national power for a single issue. Policy debates would not feature competing military, diplomatic, and intelligence perspectives, so much as a variety of integrated alternatives, including geographic, individual, bureaucratic and issue-based perspectives.

Those who design the policy and succeed in having it approved are responsible for implementing and adjusting it based on objective assessments. It is in the team’s interests to obtain objective feedback since they are accountable for results, having been empowered to achieve them. What works, gets rewarded. Thus teams would be willing to use unconventional and comprehensive methods to solve security challenges so long as they are effective. Using empowered teams gives the national security system the most flexibility, allowing it to adjust quickly to changes in the security environment.

In contrast to the IRCs, which have a clear, formal precedent in the form of the combatant commanders, the current national security system has few if any extant models of empowered interagency teams like the ones envisioned here. Assessed by these criteria, PCCs are not empowered teams; neither are combatant commands or the current embassy country teams. No permanent structure in the national security system currently has all these attributes, although a few structures have some or even most of the attributes\(^\text{1150}\) and work better than typical interagency committees as a result.

\(^{1150}\) See Appendix 5: Structure Comparison Charts.
Also, on occasion, spurred by necessity, the national security system reinvents teams at all levels. President Eisenhower used cross-functional teams at the national level with Project Solarium, creating three teams with diplomats, military officers, scholars, and specialists from other national security agencies to argue three different grand strategies for the United States for the Cold War. The teams were led by “three seasoned strategic advisors, Vice Admiral Richard Conolly, Air Force Major General James McCormack and George Kennan,” and helped President Eisenhower establish the grand strategy that guided American strategy during the rest of the Cold War.1151

During the Vietnam War, President Johnson intervened personally to create a team at the country level. President Johnson was frustrated by the inability for departments and agencies to collaborate, so he maneuvered to have National Security Council official Robert Komer lead the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program in Vietnam. CORDS merged different department and agency personnel into teams.

Military personnel were to be put in charge of civilians, but civilians were also to be placed in charge of military personnel to create a truly mixed, interagency team based on skills and abilities and not on previous agency loyalty.1152

All levels of the program, from district level to the country team, were comprised of interagency teams under a single chain of command,1153 and the effectiveness of USG pacification efforts improved greatly.

More recently, President Clinton used cross-functional teams at the regional level. When resolving conflict in the Balkans became a national priority, Ambassador Holbrooke put together a group that had many aspects of a team:

Our negotiating team had already developed an internal dynamic that combined bantering, fierce but friendly argument, and tight internal discipline. Complete trust and openness among the seven of us were essential if we were to avoid energy-consuming factional intrigues and back channels to Washington. This presented difficulties for representatives of those agencies—the NSC, the JCS, the Office of the Secretary of Defense—that often distrusted or competed with one another and whose representatives normally sent private reports back to their home offices each day. . . . We succeeded in avoiding this problem, in part because our team was so small, and in part because we shared all our

information internally and developed close, even intense personal relationships. 1154

A similar team backed up Ambassador Holbrooke in Washington:

We were concerned that if the unprecedented degree of flexibility and autonomy we had been given by Washington were reduced, and we were subjected to the normal Washington decision-making process, the negotiations would become bogged down…. As we envisioned it, the group would be, in effect, an extension of the negotiating team, but located in Washington. We drew on people outside the European Bureau, but insisted they work solely for Kornblum on this particular project. This meant that its participants, with the prior agreement of their superiors, would have to agree not to process drafts through the regular interagency “clearing process,” which, while essential to the normal functioning of government, was too cumbersome and time-consuming for a fast-moving negotiation. 1155

Later, a member of Holbrooke’s team, Jim Pardew, was selected to run the Bosnian Train and Equip Program, another cross-functional interagency team, only one that also controlled resources. Given an explicit mandate by senior leaders in the William J. Clinton administration, Pardew’s team drew upon diverse diplomatic, military, security assistance, intelligence, public affairs, and legal expertise to successfully raise and administer hundreds of millions of dollars in military assistance to good effect without mishap or waste.

Other examples of partially empowered teams include the small interagency counterterrorism group developed by trial and error during the Reagan administration 1156 and a highly effective East Asia informal group that operated well until economic agencies became heavily involved and generated tensions that shattered team

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1155 Holbrooke notes the advantages of the team approach as opposed to classic bureaucratic end runs: “At the same time, our small team was tired and understaffed. With only five days left until the New York meetings, we needed help, but I did not want to increase the size of the core team or relinquish our autonomy. Faced with similar challenges in earlier crises, some administrations had created secret bypass mechanisms that kept information and authority within a smaller group—but also deceived or cut out everyone else. Most famously, when Kissinger was National Security Advisor, he had frequently ignored the entire State Department—once making a secret trip to Moscow without the knowledge of the American Ambassador, and regularly withholding almost all information about his secret discussions with China from the Secretary of State. We did not want to arouse the kind of distrust and intrigue that, as a result, had marred the Nixon-Kissinger period—an atmosphere Kissinger told me that in retrospect he regretted. To avoid this classic bureaucratic dilemma, John Kornblum set up a small, informal team to support our efforts.” Ibid. 171.

1156 David Tucker, Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire: The United States and International Terrorism (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997) 125. The author notes that “the counterterrorism group is not a model for improving the performance of the bureaucracy because it was implicitly designed to skirt the bureaucracy by its exclusivity and its direct connection to the highest levels of decisionmaking.”
Another enduring example is Joint Interagency Task Force-South, a collection of law enforcement, intelligence, and military assets that focus on detecting the movements of narco-terrorist organizations. Representatives from the Department of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice Department, U.S. intelligence community, and other international partners work as one team with a fully integrated command structure and information collection system that gives it the flexibility to act in a united and expedited manner.\textsuperscript{1158}

During the war on terror interagency groups with some empowered team characteristics have proven most successful, mostly at the country or sub-country levels. In the war in Afghanistan, “in less than two months, approximately 110 Agency officers and 350 Special Forces soldiers on the ground with seventy million dollars and the support of U.S. airpower and the help of our Afghan allies,” the Taliban fell.\textsuperscript{1159} These teams were empowered to make decisions and controlled resources to facilitate their efforts. Gen. David Petraeus also used cross-functional teams to help turnaround the situation in Iraq. In writing the U.S. Army’s new counterinsurgency manual, Petraeus convened expertise from major national security departments and agencies, human rights professors from universities, and journalists.\textsuperscript{1160} After becoming the commanding general in Iraq, Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker created a Joint Strategic Assessment Team, which included military officers, Iraq specialists from the State Department, and outside academics. One advisor was an Australian specialist on guerrilla warfare, David Kilcullen.\textsuperscript{1161} Military analyst, Stephen Biddle, who in his published work about Iraq had disagreed with Petraeus, joined the team and found it highly innovative:

The invitation to join the advisory group, Biddle concluded, spoke to “a different way of thinking and working.” Once in Iraq, he found that if Petraeus believed the tenets of the counter-insurgency field manual were impractical on a particular point, he simply disregarded them. “This clearly was not a guy who feels obliged to follow some cookbook, even one he co-wrote,” Biddle said.\textsuperscript{1162}

The United States has also used cross-functional counterterrorist teams in Iraq, which reportedly was one major factor in the reduction of violence in Iraq.\textsuperscript{1163}

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Operations Commander Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal called the strategy “collaborative warfare.”

For the Joint Task Force, the CIA provides intelligence analysts and spycraft with sensors and cameras that can track targets, vehicles or equipment for up to 14 hours. FBI forensic experts dissect data, from cellphone information to the "pocket litter" found on extremists. Treasury officials track funds flowing among extremists and from governments. National Security Agency staffers intercept conversations or computer data, and members of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency use high-tech equipment to pinpoint where suspected extremists are using phones or computers.1164

The Joint Terrorism Task Force, composed of officers from nearly every law enforcement entity in the United States within a similarly flexible infrastructure, also is considered a success in homeland security because of its mission-first attitude.1165 Finally, cross-functional teams are being used to great effect by combatant commanders to integrate options on a variety of regional problems they face.1166

None of these examples of teams had all the attributes of fully empowered team suggested here and which work well in other organizational settings. Yet, they had enough empowered team attributes to be dramatically more effective than normal interagency committees or working groups. Given their record of success, it is surprising that the cross-functional team is not a common feature in the national security system. This is especially true considering the dismal experience of groups with representation from different departments that have few or no empowered team attributes. A perfect example is the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan, which offer a template for how not to build or empower a team. The PRT mission was never clearly defined, deep divisions between agencies and departments hindered communication and leadership efforts, and a lack of funding complicated their productivity.1167

At the national level Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs) epitomize the ineffectiveness of what many consider to be cross-functional teams, but which in fact do not have the proper mandates, authorities, incentives, resources, or cultures to be effective teams. This is true in even the best managed interagency systems. President George H.W. Bush administration was determined that his administration would overcome interagency frictions:

1167 “Agency Stovepipes.”
I had witnessed the inevitable personality conflicts and turf disputes that would spring up between our cabinet members, advisors, and departments. I was determined to make our decision-making structure and procedures in the new Administration so well defined that we would minimize the chances of such problems.1168

President Bush and his National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, built what is widely believed to have been the most effect interagency process. Even so, insiders have said that the PCCs were ineffective. They repeatedly found that the assistant secretaries populating the PCCs were too much dominated by their departmental views.

The PCCs sort of didn't work, in part because they were formal, and I think in part because they were headed in large measure by assistant secretaries, which meant they were headed by a department.1169 Their meetings would be very large, very unwieldy and were given up fairly early on in favor of the aptly named ungroup, which did not exist officially.1170

As a result, the Bush administration centralized national security activity to a core group close to the President, which led to considerable fatigue and restricted decision capacity, as described in Part III of this report.1171

Even partially empowered teams prove so much more effective than interagency committees that they should be institutionalized and fully empowered. Ambassador Dennis Ross once noted that “statecraft done well demands having a keen eye for organization and knowing how to gain control over all the relevant means we have in order to employ them synergistically.”1172 Right now what Ambassador Ross recommends happens only, at best, in a hit-or-miss fashion, when a crisis is evident or worse after failure demands a solution. Sometimes they are too late to make a difference, even when they succeed at their immediate mission. They always require major presidential support and attention to maintain their effectiveness, which is extremely inefficient and exhausting for the White House.

The current national security system does not have the foundation to fully empower and proliferate teams. This option would provide that foundation. Given their historically high performance, giving the president the means to create empowered teams at all levels of the national security system just constitutes taking the next logical step. A hierarchy of Holbrooke-style teams led by experienced people like George Kennan, Robert Komer, Richard Holbrooke, James Pardew, and David Petraeus, and empowered to achieve

results would greatly expand decision capacity and speed decision-making. It would free
the president and his top advisors to focus on grand strategy and how best to weave all
the activity of the national security system into major themes that can capture the
imagination of the national security system and present a clear sense of direction to the
country and friends overseas. The teams would enable all instruments of statecraft to be
integrated for both small and large problems.

2. Organizational Components

a. Strategic Direction for the Hierarchy of Decentralized Teams

With this structure, the president and his security advisors are especially free to develop
and reassess strategy rather than issue management that requires integrating the efforts of
departments and agencies. The president defines what issues are most important for the
United States; decides positions on issues; and oversees, creates, and coordinates
presidential priority teams. The president is fully relieved of the burden of cajoling and
mediating contending departments and agencies. With centralized strategic direction but
decentralized and integrated issue management, the president and his staff remain the
central hub of the organization but are no longer a bottleneck.

The president’s strategic direction in this option comes not from rigid, linear strategic
planning or highly formalized policymaking processes, but from a community and culture
led by the president, who manages the national security system by communicating vision
and a grand strategy for the republic. Strategic direction communicates goals and
delegates issue management throughout the system, intervening where deemed necessary
by the White House. In this regard, strategy evolves in response to the environment, but
it is always consistent with overarching objectives.

b. Structure: Hierarchy of Decentralized Teams

This option uses horizontal organizational models, which are organized around end-to-
end processes, and cross-functional teams, which are empowered structural units with
diverse expertise. This alternative allows the national security system to apply integrated
expertise to end-to-end issue management. Organizational structure concepts such as
semi-structures, networks and hubs, and self-organization are used to generate flexibility,
improvisation, innovation, and quickness in the national security system. This alternative
breaks down the cultural grip of the functional departments and agencies so that
individuals and resources can easily move from one place in the organization to another
to quickly respond to novel threats and opportunities in an unpredictable environment.

• Presidential Security Reviews1173: The president can call security reviews by topic as
necessary. The meetings would be informal and managed by the president’s security

1173 See Beyond Goldwater Nichols: Phase 2 Report 45: “The NSC needs to move beyond its
traditional and well-accepted role of preparing decisions for the President and take a more active oversight
role to ensure that Presidential intent (as reflected in those decisions) is realized through USG actions.”
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advisor. Attendance would depend upon the issue but would include issue team leaders, geographic managers, security advisor staff directors and relevant department and agency heads. The purpose of Presidential Security Reviews would be to inform the president or receive presidential direction on critical issues that could not be resolved at lower levels. This structure would replace Principals Committees, Deputies Committees, and Policy Coordination Committees.

- President’s Security Advisor and Staff: The new Senate-confirmable security advisor and politically appointed staff would primarily assist the president in setting strategic direction, identifying issue priorities, and security goals, that is, managing the system rather than the issues directly. The staffs would help the president energize the national security system by communicating the broad vision and scope of national security as seen from the chief executive and commander in chief’s viewpoint. This would allow the president to conduct substantive system management. The staff would take a vigorous interest in the activity of the issue teams, geographic offices, and Cabinet departments and agencies.

  - Size and Functions: The PSA and staff of approximately forty to fifty people would have no directive authority; they would only advise the president. The new security advisor and staff would oversee and coordinate all the cross-functional issue teams and departments and agencies for the president. The major functions of this new body would include: recommending to the president how the assignment of issues should be handled (either by lead agency or issue team) and at what level; writing mandates that serve as guidance and authority for the management of presidential issues; and working with OMB to coordinate the initial resource allocation level for the issue teams, deconflicting the issues team efforts, and when necessary, bringing these conflicts to the president for resolution.

17, which calls for, “qualified restoration of the President’s authority to reorganize departments and agencies as the most efficient way to ensure that the operations of the federal government keep pace with the demands placed upon it. We suggest as a model the executive reorganization authority that began with the Reorganization Act of 1932 (5 USC 901 et seq.) and continued with its successor statutes through the middle decades of the 20th century.”

1174 See U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, The Phase III Report 23, which calls for, “The President [to] propose to Congress the establishment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, reporting directly to the Secretary.” Also, Cambone 55–57, “Reorganization of the current NSC system at the cabinet secretary level, borrowing from the armed services model of unified and specified CINCs--President as DNSD (Director, National Security Directorate) would be supported by five directorates, each led by a dual-hatted cabinet secretary--DDNSD of cabinet rank would oversee day-to-day activities (could be the VP) and would serve as coordinator of the principle members of the NSC (PNSDs)--cabinet reorganized along the lines of the JCS, serving under a COS acting as secretary of the cabinet, “as a policy coordination body for the government.” Also, Beyond Goldwater Nichols: Phase 2 Report 45, “The NSC needs to move beyond its traditional and well-accepted role of preparing decisions for the President and take a more active oversight role to ensure that Presidential intent (as reflected in those decisions) is realized through USG actions. Establish a new NSC Senior Director and office dedicated to integrating interagency planning for complex contingency operations. Establish planning capacity for complex contingency operations in civilian agencies. Establish a standard, NSC-led approach to interagency planning at the strategic level for complex contingency operations.”
Empowered Executive Secretariat: The empowered executive secretariat would exercise the authorities and responsibilities indicated in the core reforms. In addition, the executive secretariat would create strong mechanisms for developing social bonds, informal networks, and informal problem solving exercises among national security professionals. The executive secretary would essentially be responsible for developing a common and cohesive strategic culture in the national security community in which the energy and teamwork of talented individuals is emphasized over bureaucratic control by departments and agencies. The empowered executive secretariat would also fulfill the basics for system management. The functions of the Executive Secretariat’s National Security Education Consortium, Decision Support Office, and National Security Assessment and Vision Center would not change from the core reforms.

Issue Teams: Issue teams are interagency teams that use supporting department and agency assets and the infrastructure built in geographic offices to move policy forward on an issue. They are the central hubs for end-to-end issue management, integrating diplomatic, military, economic, aid, intelligence, law enforcement, and other national security system capabilities. They allow issue management to be conducted below the level of the president, greatly expanding the number of challenges the national security system can manage. They exist at every policy level and the authority for creating them resides at each level: global, regional, and country or local level. Thus, they could emerge from interest generated by a geographic office, another issue team from another geographic level, national security executives (see Human Capital below), or the president. Issue teams replace all interagency committees.

- Presidential Priority Teams would be created by the president to manage the administration’s top priorities, typically only ten or so in number. Presidential Priority Teams can coordinate activity at any geographic level. One of their responsibilities as presidential priority teams is to ensure an activity is running smoothly at all levels within the scope of their issue-specific mandates.

- Global Issue Teams work global or transregional issues. Along with presidential priority teams they provide input to mandates worked by regional and country teams.

- Regional Issue Teams work regional, cross-regional and sub-regional issues, and they provide input to mandates worked by country teams.

- Empowered Country Teams (so designated to distinguish them from current country teams) implement policies and strategies developed by national, global, and regional teams on a bilateral basis.

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Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Phase 2 Report 45, which calls for “Creat[ing] rapidly deployable Interagency Crisis Planning Teams for interagency campaign planning.”
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- **Geographic Offices**: The national security system maintains country or local offices, embassies, regional offices, and a global office. Presidential priority teams would be housed directly by the empowered Executive Secretariat. The main purpose of geographic offices would be to provide a local infrastructure for issue teams and manage a geographic strategy by creating, coordinating, and moderating issue teams. One desired effect of geographic offices is the resulting close proximity of department and agency assets to the problems with which they work, encouraging team cohesion. Geographic offices support the focus of the national security system on mission success and interaction with the strategic environment.

  - Global Office: The Global Office would be headed by a national security executive and houses issue teams for issues that touch multiple regions. Issue teams based in the Global Office would provide guidance on national policy for global issues and can drive activity and issue-team creation in other geographic offices. The Global Office would be located in Washington.

  - Regional Offices: Regional offices would be headed by a national security executive and house issue teams to manage regional issues. Regional offices would coordinate and create issue teams for regional and subregional issues. There would be six to eight regional offices that are forward deployed, and some similar number for domestic regions. They would replace regional Policy Coordination Committees and integrate all structures with geographic authorities and responsibilities.

  - Country Teams: Country teams would be headed by ambassadors or desk officers when the U.S. does not have diplomatic relations with the country. Country teams would house issue teams to manage issues specific to the country, and create and oversee state/local/provincial offices as needed.

  - State/Local/Provincial Offices: State/local/provincial offices would be headed by national security service personnel who are prospective national security executives and ambassadors. They would manage issues specific to

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\textsuperscript{1176} U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, The Phase III Report 54, argues that, “The President should propose to the Congress a plan to reorganize the State Department, creating five Under Secretaries, with responsibility for overseeing the regions of Africa, Asia, Europe, Inter-America, and Near East/South Asia, and redefining the responsibilities of the Under Secretary for Global Affairs. These new Under Secretaries would operate in conjunction with the existing Under Secretary for Management.” Also, Beyond Goldwater Nichols, Phase 2 Report 37, calls for if not the establishment of geographic offices per se, at least for, “[The] establish[ment] a common USG-wide framework for defining the regions of the world.”

\textsuperscript{1177} Craig J. Alia, Assessing Proposals for Interagency Reorganization, School of Advanced Military Studies Monographs (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2005) 7 October 2008 <http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u/?p4013coll3,311> 36, recommends, “The Agency for Stability Operations [recommended by CSIS in “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols” structure should be constructed to interact with state and local government officials in order to ensure unfettered access to expertise in rebuilding a city or province. The network should also be able to reach non-governmental organizations, academic institutions, and private organizations that may have expertise in Stability Operations. A purely hierarchical structure reminiscent of the 20th century organizational design might not sufficiently incorporate this diffuse knowledge base.”
their geographic areas, and would be coordinated by issue teams representing the country team (or in the case of homeland security, whatever sub-organizations the regional offices designate).

**Figure 22. Option 3: Distributed and Networked Teams**

- **Issue Team Liaisons:** All presidential priority teams would have a liaison to Congress and would, with the president’s approval, accept embedded congressional observers (e.g., from the GAO) if a Select Committee so requested. Congressional staff liaisons can help in stimulating faster legislative action when required, and can also contribute to building greater consensus and alleviating uncertainty among Americans on national security policy. Depending on the issue, the team might find it advisable to also use its members to liaison with the private sector, multilateral partners, academia, research community, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). To ensure rapid use of these non-standard partners, resources would be available for compensation and expenses, security clearances would be expedited, etc.

The hierarchy of teams is insufficient in the case of homeland security, where state and local governments have authority independent of the federal government. A collaborative networking approach is required in addition to the federal government’s teams. Consistent with the emphasis on collaboration in this option, Congress should legislate a formal steering committee to provide a venue for collaboration between state and local government authorities, the private sector, and NGOs with the federal government on homeland security matters. Such committees have been used effectively
before. For example, at the local level, the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) utilizes a steering committee structure of public, private, and NGO stakeholders to act on national preparedness target capabilities for medical incident management. This is a systematic up-front effort for local planning for ESF-8 (Emergency Support Function-8/Public Health and Medical Services), recognized and supported by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). It forms the basis for regional collaboration and thus could be seen as a model for state- and federal-level steering committees. Another example is the Green Building Council that is really a private sector initiative. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recognizes the council’s standards in its green building initiatives.

- *Homeland Security Steering Committee:* The steering committee could convene in cases where sufficient advance warning permitted. The committee’s primary responsibility, however, would be to provide input into all major homeland security policies, strategies, and plans. It would review proposals from DHS but also place issues on the agenda for federal consideration arising from the state and local environment. The committee would be a forum to develop national, as opposed to purely federal, agendas and policy solutions. In this process, the committee would seek to strike a consensus across federal, state, and local government representatives on issues ranging from interoperability to infrastructure protection to mitigation—all of those functions that are vital to the federal homeland security mission but which escape the control and responsibility of federal agencies. The committee would develop these proposals for consideration and adoption by federal, state, and local policymaking bodies. It is conceivable that national proposals and standards arising from this process would be incorporated by DHS in lieu of federal standards, similar to American National Standards Institute standards for regulatory issues. In this way, the nation would shift from a centralized approach to homeland security policy formation to a broader collaborative approach. In essence, such a committee would resemble the cross-functional teams in that all the key players with stakes, assets, and capabilities would be represented in the governance process. Such an inclusive process is likely to generate more effective and sustainable homeland security policies grounded in intergovernmental realities.

- *Committee membership:* The committee would total fourteen members: six appointed by the president, four by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security (two by the chairman, two by the ranking minority member), and four by the House Homeland Security Committee (two by the chairman, two by the ranking minority member.) The membership would rotate with staggered two-year tenures, and would include:

  - Four governors or their designated representatives from different Federal Emergency Management Agency-designated federal regions (appointed by the Senate)
  
  - Four private-sector members, from the “critical infrastructure” sectors identified in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan and from the
major actors in the NGO community; e.g., Red Cross (appointed by the president)

- Four sitting mayors, or county executives, or their designated representatives (appointed by the House)
- Two sitting SES federal-level executives from the Department of Homeland Security (appointed by the president)

  Supporting Action: Creating the Steering Committee would require an additional action. The provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) of 1972 should be applied to the Steering Committee. The FACA requires public access to advisory bodies for the federal government. The Steering Committee would not be an advisory but a deliberative body producing input for policies and plans, and would require confidentiality.

- Business Emergency Management Assistance Compact: To facilitate collaboration with the private sector, Congress should support NGOs and private sector assistance in emergency management by creating Business Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (BEMACs) that would parallel the state-to-state Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) that supplements federal resources in extreme emergencies. Congress ratified the EMAC concept in 1996 as a national disaster compact, and the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) administers the concept. The BEMAC would cover the same issues for the private sector that EMAC covered for state-to-state cooperation on deployed personnel such as licensing, credentialing, liability, and workers compensation and reimbursement.

C. Process: Hierarchy of Decentralized Teams

The issue management process supports good decision-making by providing decision-makers a robust sense of purpose, by moving decision-makers to the front lines, and by expanding the decision-makers’ perspective with information from other sources of organizational activity. In terms of process, the idea would be to balance strategic direction from the White House with continuous refinement of lessons learned from the experiences of frontline managers. The deliberate, top-down examination of the environment by the White House would inform strategic direction for longer term planning, while remaining open to signals and emergent strategy pioneered by issue teams within the scope of their limited mandates. In short, the processes in this option emphasize communication flow up the hierarchy of teams from the country and regional teams as much as down the hierarchy from the White House and the national teams.

- National Security Strategy: The new national security strategy process should be a dynamic process in which presidential priority teams, global and regional offices, the executive secretary, and departments and agencies have regularly scheduled meetings chaired by the president’s security advisor, with optional presidential attendance, to discuss activity, progress, and challenges. Meetings should include written Status Reports about the represented issue team, geographic office, or department or agency.
Status Reports should include information about team mandates, past activity (successes and failures), projected future activity, strategy, risk, resources, capabilities, personnel, the security environment, and other subjects of concern. Presidential priority teams should write short monthly Issue Status Reports, and geographic offices, periodic Geographic Status Reports, with state/local/provincial, country, regional, and global offices releasing them at different times. Departments and agencies should write semiannual department or agency Status Reports. These Status Reports and deliberations should assist the president’s security staff in writing an annual National Security Strategy to describe large trends in past activity, projected future activity, risks, resources, capabilities, strategy, and the security environment. *This process runs parallel to the new national security budget process.*

- **Issue Management:** The issue management process is the way in which the national security system treats an issue from identification to resolution. The process begins with issue working groups created by a geographic office, a national security executive, or the president, to study a prospective issue. They are populated by personnel who would become the presumed issue team if and when a draft mandate and analysis is submitted and approved by the higher authority of a geographic office or the president. If the results of the issue working group’s investigation justify the formation of an issue team, it would instruct and coordinate assets in geographic offices devoted to the issue team by its mandate. When an issue no longer appears to require activity from the U.S. government, the home geographic office, the president, or the issue team leader can dissolve the team. Issue teams can be consolidated in the same way issue teams are created, by an ad hoc working group that investigates the pros and cons.

- **Team Management:** While issue teams and geographic offices would be positioned and empowered to interact directly with the security environment, the president, his security advisory staff, and geographic offices must ensure that a common perspective exists to maintain unity of effort. Teams would be discouraged if the national security system works at cross-purposes. With issue management now in the hands of issue teams, the new process would require that the president and his security staff facilitate a common perspective through the promulgation of evolving national security strategy as outlined in the core reforms. During the process, the president and security staff would actively work to find ways to weave activity from different parts of the national security system together, to strengthen community cohesion. The continuous activity required to carry out this process would generate informal social bonds that would strengthen the concept of a networked national security system. Here, the role of decision support reforms is critical in building the social and cultural infrastructure that will make it easier to connect teams working on related issues.

- **Resources:** **Hierarchy of Decentralized Teams**

National security budgets should be driven by the needs of issue teams, rather than by departmental equities. Departments and agencies must justify their programs based in part on how well they preserve core capabilities, but also on how well they support issue
teams and geographic offices. Ultimately, they must be able to show that their programs enable issue teams and geographic offices to fulfill their mandates. The president and geographic offices would establish which issues take priority; assets that meet the needs of relevant issue teams should receive more resources. This should accelerate the transformation of the national security system into a system capable of quickly producing new competencies and capabilities.

- **Issue Team/Geographic Office Input into Budgeting and Longer-term Planning Processes**: The resource allocation process should be adapted to incorporate the needs identified by issue teams and geographic offices. Those needs should be communicated to the NSC, OMB, departments, and agencies during the longer-term planning process, so they can be included in the six-year budget program, the NSC and OMB reviews, and the budget submission that results. Because departments and agencies have new roles as capability providers for issue teams and geographic offices, they must adapt their longer-term program plans and annual budget submissions to meet the requirements generated by issue teams and geographic offices. The NSC and OMB will be responsible for seeing that department and agency plans and budgets reflect those needs identified by the issue teams and geographic offices.

e. **Decision Support: Distributed and Networked Teams**

This option assumes full implementation of the decision support reforms identified in the core reforms. In addition, this option requires heavy reliance on systemwide access and collaboration tools such as wikis, RSS (Really Simple Syndication)\(^\text{1179}\) tagging, ambient awareness,\(^\text{1180}\) message boards, virtual social networking, document storage, and virtual meetings. Heavy emphasis is placed on organizational network analysis, to include the creation of value network maps regarding assets and regional actors. It also requires skill in team and network management and facilitation.

f. **Human Capital: Hierarchy of Decentralized Teams**

Teams are personnel- and management-intensive. Unity of command is sacrificed to provide unity of purpose and effort. Team members respond to two masters: the team leader and their parent organization. Making such a system work requires much more

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\(^{1178}\) Alia 35–36, argues explicitly that, “As the government begins “standing-up” the new Agency for Stability Operations [recommended by CSIS in *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols*] organizational theory should be used to shape its development… the Agency for Stability Operations will likely need a hierarchical system with postmodern connectivity in order to meet Congress’ requirements and coordinate with the other agencies. The postmodernism aspect is critical because of its principle of knowledge diffusion.” [Emphasis added].

\(^{1179}\) RSS refers to Really Simple Syndication, a core technology that allows you to subscribe to information feeds, or "alerts." This revolutionized information access. Instead of checking various pages to see if content had changed, you can now set up your own page with various RSS feeds and watch content update in real time (from many sources that you select in advance).

\(^{1180}\) Ambient awareness refers to the "presence" applications that proliferate on the web. “Twitter” is one example of ambient awareness; another would be Instant Messaging, where people you may want to contact directly (chat) are listed and their status is visible to you while they are logged in.
attention to personnel management and team management than a purely hierarchical and directive management system. As a result, the education and training requirements for this option are more intense. The human capital system must generate not only team member with appropriate knowledge but also leaders, supervisors, managers and executives who are equally well trained in managing such teams. Inculcating the culture of collaboration is a sine qua non for this option.

This option makes three modifications to the human capital recommendations identified in the core reforms. It adjusts incentives—material, status, and sense of achievement—for personnel to become active participates in accomplishing national security missions either as a part of an issue team or in support of issue teams. Second, it provides the flexibility for individuals to customize their own careers based on their unique strengths and weaknesses, but still within the parameters of the requirements of the work to be accomplished. Since teams are empowered to make decisions and held accountable for results, employee satisfaction would be higher. Personnel would be less likely to leave the national security system and more likely to work diligently. Third, it adds another cadre of national security professionals to manage issue teams:

- **National Security Executives**: National security executives (NSEs) would be presidentially appointed senior executives with standing and formal authority to lead issue teams or regional or global geographic offices. They would be highly respected members of the national security community who are known for their leadership skills and expertise in statecraft. NSEs would be politically appointed and can come from within the National Security Corps or from outside of it; in either case they would be Senate confirmable for presidential priority teams but not for lower-level teams. NSEs would either 1) consult high-level departmental and agency management to identify and nominate talented staff to remain on a list of potential service members for future use or 2) pull employees immediately and directly from the department and agency, based on need. These personnel, upon commencement of work with the NSC, would receive a single lump-sum bonus and, upon return to the originating department or agency, be promoted to a higher-level management position as a result of their increased experience and knowledge in the field.

3. **Conclusions on the Hierarchy of Decentralized Teams**

This option parallels the lateral or “horizontal” organizational innovations seen in private-sector management over the past several decades.\(^\text{1181}\) The value of a hierarchy of teams is based entirely on the observation that the current and projected security environment is too complex and dynamic for more traditional, hierarchical forms of organization:

> We live in a world where no one is “in charge”…many organizations or institutions are involved, affected or have a partial responsibility to act…. As a result, we live in a “shared power” world, a world in which

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organizations and institutions must share objectives, activities, resources, power or authority in order to achieve collective gains or minimize losses.\textsuperscript{1182}

If, as a major study by The Economist put it, “The future belongs to those who collaborate,”\textsuperscript{1183} the national security system must have the option for true collaboration, with all the resource control and team dynamics that collaboration as opposed to mere coordination implies. In contradistinction to the White House Command and Integrated Regional Centers, this option provides for real, empowered collaboration among diverse bodies of expertise. The national security system has experimented with elements of the empowered team repeatedly, but never systematically and seldom with fully empowered alternatives because departments and agencies insist on retaining veto power over the results. Deciding to institutionalize empowered teams as an option for doing business would constitute a major reassessment of how the world works.

a. Advantages of the Hierarchy of Decentralized Teams Model

There are several advantages to team decision-making. First and most importantly, empowered teams break down the bureaucratic parochialism of departments and agencies to fully utilize talented individuals while still ensuring that departmental expertise is brought to bear on problems. Properly empowered and conceived teams provide for truly integrated courses of action rather than regurgitated and standard department and agency issue positions. Second, empowered teams fix accountability. If a team leader has a clear mandate, can recruit the expertise the problem demands, has presumptive authority and control of resources, then he or she can be held accountable for results. Third, teams would solve problems with an ongoing, intimate knowledge of the issue. They would not meet periodically to reassess developments, but rather would work the issue consistently until U.S. objectives are met. Teams have the advantage of being scaled up or down in the hierarchy as the level of the problem dictates. For example, empowered teams for global problems like terrorism or weapons of mass destruction proliferation can be created, in addition to geographically specific localized teams for disaster relief. The current system is top-heavy and often fumbles in quickly responding to such differences in scale.

Fourth, since the president and his subordinates could create as many teams as they thought were needed, this option eliminates bottlenecks in decision-making capacity. In this regard, it is the option that is the most flexible and responsive to a diverse set of security challenges. Empowered teams are also much more sensitive instruments for gauging the nature of looming problems, or for indicating the sudden appearance of new ones. Many localized security problems which, absent immediate attention, could fester and grow into larger concerns, could be inoculated against well before they would otherwise require the attention of the higher levels of the nation’s security system. This allows those upper echelons in and around the executive branch and Congress to focus on

\textsuperscript{1183} Collaboration: Transforming the Way Business Works, Economist Intelligence Unit, April 2007, 3.
select issues and on system management, but it does not preclude periodic “dipping down” by higher authority to align team activities with higher priorities. Empowered teams are well suited for an unstable or unfamiliar strategic environment.

b. Disadvantages of the Hierarchy of Decentralized Teams Model

The disadvantage of this alternative compared to others is that it is unwieldy and the easiest to unravel. With so much activity, it is hard for the system to coordinate all its parts. Teams are management-intensive, slower to make decisions, and their focus on mission accomplishment means they will sacrifice other national objectives to meet their mandates. In addition, teams would work best under the authority of strong structural hubs. Team efforts would have to be carefully delineated (through the construction of team mandates), closely monitored and deconflicted by the president’s security staff, but also by each level of the geographic office.

G. Supporting Options: Structural Consolidation

1. Overview

The core reforms focus on changes in process, resources, knowledge management, human capital, and congressional oversight. The three preceding options primarily involve adjustments to organizational structure, with supporting modifications to other organizational functions. The three additional reforms offered here are primarily but not exclusively structural consolidations. All three would be politically challenging, but could substantially improve the efficacy of any or all of the preceding options.

The first reform provides an integrated civil-military chain of command in the field when large numbers of U.S. military forces are present. Historically, the United States has performed complex contingency operations without the benefit of a unified chain of command for the interagency effort. This reform would rectify that shortcoming.

The second, and perhaps the most difficult reform, would be the creation of a new Department of International Relations. The culture of the new department would be consciously interagency, and it would permit a Cabinet official to better integrate the efforts of the almost thirty federal government organizations that conduct foreign relations for the United States overseas.
The third reform empowers the Department of Homeland Security to increase unity of effort across the federal government and in collaboration with state and local authorities. Instead of waiting for decades and untoward events to convince us that directive authority is needed for preparing for and responding to catastrophic domestic events, this option would empower DHS to direct the federal government’s efforts.

2. Structural Consolidation: Integrated Chain of Command for Crisis Task Forces

a. Current Practice

A dual chain of command at the country level is already codified in U.S. law. Title 22 of U.S. Code gives the chief of mission:

> responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees in that country (except for . . . employees under the command of a United States area military commander) . . . The Chief of Mission is required to “keep fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations of the Government within that country, and insure that all Government executive branch employees in that country (except for . . . employees under the command of a United States area military commander) comply fully with all applicable directives of the chief of mission.”

According to a PNSR Legal Working Group review of this code:

> Based on these statutory provisions, the Chief of Mission oversees every executive Branch employee in his or her country, with the key exception of military personnel under the command of an area military commander. Although the term area military commander is not defined in the U.S. Code, it most likely encompasses the combatant commander. Therefore, the Chief of Mission probably cannot exert any direction, coordination, and supervision over military personnel under the authority of a combatant commander.

Dual civilian and military chains of command in the field complicate unity of purpose and effort in complex contingencies that require close civil-military cooperation. There is almost always confusion over the question of who is in charge. A former Marine

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1184 *U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, Phase III* 23, calls for, “The President to propose to Congress the establishment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, reporting directly to the Secretary.”
1187 It seems self-evident that the “area military commander” him or herself must also be excepted from the chief of mission’s control, though the statute is not explicit to that effect.
1188 This section of Title 22 was enacted in 1980, six years before Goldwater-Nichols, and therefore Congress would not have defined the chief of mission’s powers in reference to the combatant commander. *See* Foreign Service Act of 1980, P.L. 96-465, 1980.
colnonel dispatched by the Pentagon to help set up the Iraqi civil defense corps recalls the difficulty of forging cooperative effort between competing military and civilian chains of command:

It was Alice in Wonderland…I mean, I was so depressed the second time we went there, to see the lack of progress and the continuing confusion. The lack of coherence. You’d get two separate briefs, two separate cuts on the same subject, from the military and from the civilians.\textsuperscript{1189}

Similarly, an Institute for Defense Analyses literature review conducted for PNSR notes several studies which conclude civilian and military command and control relationships “need clarification within the USG and agreement with our multinational and multilateral partners so that joint, combined, and interagency operations can be planned and conducted effectively and efficiently, and within the legal authorities that the terms establish.”\textsuperscript{1190}

Recently, Congress also has lamented the convoluted chain of command for provincial reconstruction teams depicted in a Department of Defense briefing (see graphic) and noted:

Rather than having unity of command, PRTs in both Iraq and Afghanistan operate under complicated, disjointed and, at times, unclear chain(s) of command and receive direction from multiple sources.\textsuperscript{1191}

In addition to legal impediments, there are political and cultural challenges to an integrated chain of command. The American public tends to view war and peace as separate, discontinuous states. So do diplomats and military officers, who are recruited and prepared for different activities and different approaches to problem solving:

There is the problem of differences in approach between the soldier and the diplomat. By training and experience the soldier seeks certainty and emphasizes victory through force. The diplomat is accustomed to ambiguity and emphasizes solving conflicts through persuasion. The soldier’s principal expertise is in operations, and the diplomat’s is in persuasion.\textsuperscript{1192}

The thought that diplomats should be in charge of activities during peace and generals and admirals in charge of military operations is commonly accepted; who is in charge


\textsuperscript{1191} “Agency Stovepipes.”

when operations require a delicate balance of civil and military activities is unclear and much disputed.

The same independent chains of command and differences in approach that characterize State Department officials and military officers hold true for other national security departments and agencies. CIA Chiefs of Station report primarily to their own headquarters, and often see their mission as independently important; legal attaches report back to their Washington office, and often pursue their investigations independently of overall policy in the region. Differences in the field among these representatives have to be referred back to Washington for resolution, and this seldom occurs in a timely or satisfactory fashion.

Figure 23. Convoluted Command in Afghanistan

b. Past Experience with Formal and Informal Unity of Command

Despite the legal and political impediments, the United States does have sporadic experience with unity of command\textsuperscript{1193} for complex contingency operations. Both formal and informal models of unity of command have been used. For example, following World War II, General Douglas MacArthur was given formal authority over all U.S. activities in Japan, both military and civilian. Informally, key personalities involved in managing complex civil-military operations sometimes forge unity at the command

\textsuperscript{1193} Unity of command is one of the basic principles of war and gives a single person directive authority to accomplish a task.
through their own personal agreements on processes. A brief overview of several vignettes from past U.S. operations illustrates two important points about civil-military unity of command in contingencies where U.S. forces surge in response to crisis:

1. Proximity, informal coordination mechanisms, and senior leader attitudes can increase the chances for successful civil-military integration, but do not offer a reliable systemic solution to the problem.

2. The United States has not had a uniform structured solution for civil-military integration in conflict and post-conflict situations at the country level since Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) Program was applied in Vietnam, and is therefore dependent upon ad hoc solutions.

**Vietnam—Strategic Hamlets Program**

Despite President John F. Kennedy’s intervention in support of ambassadorial authority through the presidential letter, agencies at the country team level continued to operate along their own lines of effort. The 1962 Strategic Hamlets program in Vietnam underscored this fact. The program required U.S. Agency for International Development, military advisors, Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. Information Agency, and other U.S. government personnel to deploy into the provinces and work together. However, the U.S. ambassador to Vietnam, Frederick Nolting, believed in allowing each agency full authority over its own programs. The result was that each agency in the field pursued its own objectives without regard to the larger mission. It quickly became apparent that the civilian and military approaches to the war in Vietnam during this period were fundamentally at odds with one another:

The civilian side was committed to a concept of counterinsurgency which focused on the population as the heart of the matter. The military, despite concessions—no doubt sincere—to the importance of winning the population, was quite unshakably wedded to the idea that priority must go to destroying the enemy’s armed force, and doing it by the familiar means of concentrating manpower and firepower at the right time and place.

These two diverging approaches were not reconciled. As the military increased its use of bombs and artillery, civilian casualties mounted, thus undermining the objectives of the Strategic Hamlets program. Roger Hilsman, an advisor to President Kennedy, wrote of the situation, “The real trouble...is that the rather large U.S. effort...is managed by a multitude of U.S. agencies and people with little or no overall direction. No one man is in charge...What is needed ideally is to give authority to a single strong executive.”

The Strategic Hamlets program, which muddled along until the U.S. government developed a new, more successful structure, is illustrative in two respects:

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1195 Ibid.
1196 Ibid. 119–120.
First, even with high stakes, presidential attention, and ostensibly clear lines of authority, agencies worked at cross purposes.

Second, Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting’s laissez-faire approach was ineffective, but not atypical, and in fact is understandable. If ambassadors cannot compel compliance, why should they generate high-profile interagency fights that create additional friction, injure their reputation, and perhaps lead to their recall?

**Vietnam—CORDS**

In 1966, President Lyndon B. Johnson intervened to correct the persistent inability of the agencies of the U.S. government to act in concert. He appointed the deputy chief of mission in Saigon, Ambassador William Porter, to lead the pacification effort in Vietnam. Likewise, President Johnson appointed an NSC staff member, Robert Komer, to ensure that all agencies in Washington coordinated to provide full support to Ambassador Porter.\(^{1197}\)

Yet the United States still did not achieve unity of effort. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. and military commander General William C. Westmoreland simply did not work closely together, nor did their staffs. The U.S. government reorganized on multiple occasions to assert civilian control over the pacification mission, but to no avail. Finally, Robert Komer proposed a new structure—the CORDS program, which was enacted on May 1, 1967.

CORDS successfully unified the pacification effort of the U.S. government by placing the program in the Headquarters of Military Assistance Command—Vietnam (MACV). Robert Komer, given the rank of ambassador, served as a deputy commander of MACV for CORDS. Ambassador Komer “had status equivalent to a three-star general and ranked third in the MACV hierarchy behind Westmoreland and his military deputy, General Creighton Abrams.”\(^{1198}\) Yet he was also under the authority and had the full support of the U.S. ambassador in Saigon, Ellsworth Bunker. A combined staff of military and civilian personnel supported Ambassador Komer at HQ MACV, and this structure was replicated down to the district level in all 250 districts in South Vietnam.\(^{1199}\)

CORDS successfully integrated all pacification programs in Vietnam. Both military and civilian officials served under Komer and civilian officials had the authority to write performance reviews for their military counterparts, and vice versa. (Komer also directly reported to President Johnson.) In the words of Komer, CORDS succeeded by creating a “unique, hybrid civil-military structure which imposed unified single management on all

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\(^{1198}\) Ibid. 118–119.

\(^{1199}\) Ibid. 118–119.
the diffuse U.S. pacification support programs and provided a single channel of advice at each level to GVN counterparts.”\textsuperscript{1200}

Ironically, “subordinating civilian capabilities to the military chain of command actually realized the principle of the primacy of civil power. This unique placement gave civilian entities greater influence than they ever had before because it provided resources they did not previously have.”\textsuperscript{1201} It also helped to ensure that the political objectives took precedence over those of the military. One of the key means by which civilians were able to control military pacification activities was their newfound responsibility to write performance reports for their military colleagues.

Ambassador Komer developed the concept for CORDS, but Ambassador William Colby institutionalized it in MACV, and synergized its activities with Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. In doing so, Ambassador William E. Colby prevented major conflicts among civilian and military leaders that might have trickled down and complicated collaboration in the field. CORDS’ successes began to mount, but not before U.S. public opinion turned decidedly against the war. Also, it should be noted that CORDS was for pacification only and did not include regular military and CIA operations or normal embassy functions (e.g., economic affairs). Nevertheless, the case of CORDS demonstrated that:

- Formal integration mechanisms at multiple levels are necessary even with good individual leadership.
- Changing individual behaviors requires more than policy pronouncements from higher authority; it requires control of personal incentives.
- The ingrained desire for unity of purpose in military culture can be used to support interagency collaboration in the right decision-making structure.

Unfortunately, the lessons from CORDS were lost after the withdrawal from Vietnam, and not highlighted again until a series of limited interventions in the 1980s and 1990s.

\textit{Panama}

Following the success of Operation Just Cause in December 1989, the U.S. began Operation Promote Liberty which was intended to assist the establishment of a legitimate Panamanian government. On December 20, 1989, the commander of USSOUTHCOM established a Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF) intended to assist the State Department in advising the Panamanian government. The CMOTF, under the command of Brig.Gen. Benard W. Gann, was initially placed under the operational control of the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires John Bushnell. However, because the U.S. embassy was largely


\textsuperscript{1201} Ibid. 30.
underresourced (with a total personnel strength of only fifteen), Gann found himself
taking the lead in organizing the new government. Over the next several weeks, CMOTF
worked around the clock to help restore basic services to Panama. The State Department
did send several high-ranking political advisors to assist, but the embassy remained in an
advisory role to Brig.Gen. Gann.

On January 1, with the arrival of the new American ambassador to Panama, the U.S.
embassy began to play a larger role. Part of this was due to the fact that the U.S.
Ambassador Deane Hinton was well respected by the military community and had
significant experience in the region. There was never a formal integration mechanism
between civilian and military officials in Operation Promote Liberty, but unity of effort
was achieved through the development of personal relationships and daily meetings
between the military command, the U.S. ambassador, and Panamanian officials.1202 The
Panama case study illustrates the following lessons:

- While preferring to defer to civilian authority, the U.S. military should often take
  the lead in nation-building activities because of its superior ability to surge
  resources and personnel.

- The State Department’s inability to surge financial and personnel resources into
  an embassy hinders its ability to play a role in post-conflict environments.

Somalia—Operation Restore Hope

Ambassador Robert Oakley, as the presidential special representative for Somalia, and
Combined Joint Task Force Commander Lt. Gen. Robert Johnston had a close,
collaborative relationship, as did their staffs. At the time, their relationship was widely
identified as a major contribution to the success of the first phase of the Somalia
operations.1203 Since the U.S. liaison office (USLO) was too small for a formal country
team structure, Oakley and Johnston agreed on alternative informal coordination
mechanisms. One of Johnston’s senior officers attended all USLO meetings; Oakley’s
deputy chief of mission was Johnston’s political advisor and attended all UNITAF
meetings; and Oakley and Johnston met at least once a day. By dint of shared past
experience (e.g., Vietnam and Lebanon) and a common commitment to collaboration, the
critical civil-military relationships and complex issues requiring coordination were
managed very successfully. The question of who was senior never arose as Oakley and
Johnston were able to identify and resolve differences quickly. It also helped that the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff informally told both men that mission success
depended on their working well together. This same attitude was reflected in formal
communications with the Departments of State and Defense.

Later, under more trying circumstances and different leadership, civil-military
 collaboration deteriorated in a manner that ultimately contributed to a precipitous drop in

1202 John T. Fishel, “The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama,”
1203 David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces (New York:
public and congressional support, withdrawal of U.S. forces, and mission failure. The United States and United Nations tried to pursue a two-track policy of fighting and negotiating with a Somali warlord without sufficient unity of effort either in Washington or in Mogadishu. Somalia and the checkered record of interagency collaboration illustrate several points:

- Informal coordination mechanisms can work if backed up by good leaders and their personal commitment.
- Senior military leader guidance stressing close civil-military collaboration is helpful; the same applies to senior civilian leaders.
- Without a standing system designed to reward interagency collaboration, successful interagency coordination may prove as fleeting as individual leader assignments.

**Afghanistan and Iraq**

In September 2003, facing a difficult transition from a counterterrorism focus to a more robust nation-building/counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan, President Bush appointed Zalmay Khalilzad as U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan. Khalilzad said he deployed to Afghanistan to “ensure the concerted use of all instruments of U.S. power to accelerate the defeat of the Taliban insurgency and the reconstruction of Afghanistan.”1204 Khalilzad, and the U.S. military commander, Lt.Gen. David Barno who shared this view, were successful in integrating not only U.S. government agencies but also international partners and nongovernmental organizations. One way, Ambassador Khalilzad and Gen. Barno drove the spirit of unity of effort throughout the country team was by locating their offices adjacent to one another in the embassy. As related in the superb study “The Country Team in American Strategy”:

Specifically, the immediate proximity of the two men’s offices allowed them to begin and end most days with meetings and permitted Barno’s regular attendance at country team meetings. According to Barno’s chief of staff, the strength of this relationship was characterized as much by what it prevented as what it accomplished—“the two never had such a disagreement on possible military action that Barno undertook operations against the ambassador’s objections, despite being legally entitled to.”1205

Barno and Khalilzad were also able to improve unity of effort by creating an Embassy Interagency Planning Group. Gen. Barno seconded a small group of field officers to the U.S. embassy to assist in this office. The planning group was envisaged to provide the ambassador with a detailed planning capability—one that is not usually resident in U.S. embassies—but it had effects beyond the initial concept:


1205 Killebrew et al., 25.
The seconding of military officers to the Ambassador helped further integrate political and military efforts through closer and more continuous coordination. This dedicated group provided the Ambassador military expertise for which he might otherwise have turned to the [Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan] staff, distracting it from its other missions. For example, the group was able to collect and collate information about nearly all U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, be they military, USAID, or nongovernmental, to give the Ambassador an overall vision and indicate gaps or overlap. That, in turn, allowed him to adjust efforts and seek more support for others. Choosing to form, staff, and maintain this group built goodwill with the Embassy staff and especially with the Ambassador—an advantage when cooperation, rather than command, is the normal mode of operation.

When Ambassador John Negroponte arrived in Iraq, he and General George Casey also agreed to locate their offices next to one another to ensure a coordinated, unified approach to U.S. policy. This was a stark change from the practice of Ambassador Paul Bremer and Lt.Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, whose offices were in different buildings and who failed to coordinate with one another, thereby setting a poor example for the country team. Under the current embassy structure in Baghdad:

The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq (Ambassador Ryan Crocker) has full authority for the American presence in Iraq with two exceptions: 1—military and security matters which are under the authority of General David Petraeus, the U.S. Commander of the Multinational Force—Iraq, and 2—staff working for international organizations. In areas where diplomacy, military, and/or security activities overlap, the Ambassador and the U.S. commander continue cooperating to provide co-equal authority regarding what’s best for America and its interests in Iraq [emphasis added].

**Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan**

U.S. provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) exist in three forms—the Afghanistan PRT, the Iraq PRT, and the Iraq ePRT. They differ in composition and number of personnel but their structure is relatively similar. Each PRT has a clear organizational chart with a specified commander. In Iraq, State Dept Foreign Service Officers lead PRTs with military officers as deputies. In Afghanistan, military officers tend to lead. However, these leaders do not exert command authority over the activities of other agencies’ staff members. According to a recent report on PRTs:

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1208 The U.S. model of PRTs has been altered by S/CRS. In their framework, PRTs would be replaced by Field Advanced Civilian Teams (FACTs). However, we can still learn lessons from the experience with PRTs.
Joint goal setting, followed by subsequent goal-oriented interagency project development, does not appear to be a consistent feature of PRT decision-making. Instead, staff members often focus on projects most consistent with their own agency mandates. Cross-consultation does take place at regular meetings, but most often for the purposes of securing the logistic support and acquiescence of other team members.\textsuperscript{1209}

The lack of an empowered commander coupled with the lack of clear guidance from higher headquarters also means conflicts often arise between military officers and civilian personnel. It takes time in most cases to achieve a common understanding of individual roles, missions, and job descriptions.\textsuperscript{1210} By contrast, the British use a shared authority model in operating their PRTs in Afghanistan. All planning and operations are coordinated by a “triumvirate” of lead staff from the defense, diplomacy, and development ministries. This triumvirate shares decision-making responsibility and draws upon staff from across their respective ministries. This has resulted in a greater degree of British PRT coherence in operations and planning.\textsuperscript{1211} These diverse experiences with PRTs demonstrates that a command structure with a clearly defined but underempowered leader is not necessarily at better at producing unified effort than a structure with shared authority.

In sum, U.S. historical experience demonstrates that while informal unity of command can sometimes work, it is an unreliable remedy. The success of informal relationships at producing unified effort depends on the personality of senior leaders, their willingness to cooperate with each other, and the cultures of their parent organizations. In an earlier era, the lessons of informal civil-military collaboration were codified by those with the most experience in their application—the United States Marine Corps:

Small war situations are usually a phase of, or an operation taking place concurrently with, diplomatic effort. The political authorities do not relinquish active participation in the negotiations and they ordinarily continue to exert considerable influence on the military campaign. The military leader in such operations thus finds himself limited to certain lines of action as to the strategy and even as to the tactics of the campaign. This feature has been so marked in past operations that marines have been referred to as State Department Troops in small wars.\textsuperscript{1212}

Today, the organizational cultures of many large national security organizations militate against the level of collaboration advocated in the Marines’ \textit{Small Wars Manual}. Moreover, the ad hoc nature of informal cooperation makes long-term planning and consistent support of a particular strategy, policy, or mission difficult in the best of circumstances. As a report by the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee notes:

\begin{flushleft}\footnotesize\textsuperscript{1209} “Agency Stovepipes” 46–47.\textsuperscript{1210} Nima Abbaszadeh et al., “Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations,” Woodrow Wilson School Graduate Workshop on Provincial Reconstruction Teams, January 2008.\textsuperscript{1211} Ibid.\textsuperscript{1212} Small Wars Manual (1940) (Washington: U.S. GPO) 11.\end{flushleft}
Unity of command is an age-old principle of leadership and management that marries accountability and responsibility and provides personnel in the field clear guidance and direction. In 2003, Lieutenant General Barno and Ambassador Khalilzad in Afghanistan worked very well together. Similarly, today in Iraq, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker have collaborated closely. However, while personalities matter, the nation’s security should not have to rely on having compatible personalities to successfully carry out the mission. While senior leaders should get along in the interest of the mission, history is replete with examples where they have not. Rather than depending exclusively on personalities for success, the right interagency structures and processes need to be in place and working. As the 9/11 Commission recognized, “Good people can overcome bad structures. They should not have to.”\textsuperscript{1213}

The alternative to relying on the right set of personalities is formal unity of command. However, the United States has not had a formal, structured solution for civil-military integration in conflict and post-conflict situations (or complex contingencies) since CORDS was belatedly applied in Vietnam.

c. Structural Options for a Formal Integrated Chain of Command\textsuperscript{1214}

In normal circumstances, the ostensible authority of the ambassador is well agreed upon. However, success in a surge environment where large concentrations of U.S. forces and personnel are present can be achieved only through structural integration creating actual unity of command. Informal cooperation depends on the personality of senior leaders and their willingness to cooperate with each other. The ad hoc nature of this informal cooperation, however, makes long-term planning and consistent support of a particular strategy, policy, or mission difficult. Thus, in order to achieve long-term strategic goals on the country level, a formal structural integration of command is essential.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure24}
\caption{Directive Authority in Surge Operations}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{1213} “Agency Stovepipes” 32.
\textsuperscript{1214} Cambone 55–57, calls for two new positions to be created: secretary of the Cabinet and DDNSD (deputy director, National Security Directorate), the intent of the approach being to “free the NSD from the day-to-day management of affairs.”
PNSR investigated multiple options for a formal integration of chains of command. Two options stand out, both of which achieve unity of command through an integrated chain of command that includes all serving U.S. personnel in country (all U.S. civilian and military agencies in country as well as private contractors):

1. The first is the most simple: empower one person with operational control of all U.S. civilian and military functions (political, security, and development activities) in a given country.

2. A second option is to have country operations run by a national executive committee composed of the heads of the military (both host and U.S.), the country team, and host country representatives.

One Leader in Charge

In the first option, one person is in charge of all civilian and military functions and creates an integrated chain of command containing military personnel and civilians from the country to the local level. The lead civilian or military official would be in charge of all U.S. agencies personnel in country including private contractors in order to guarantee a successful implementation of U.S. policy objectives and unity of effort. The leader would be a civilian or military official—someone chosen by the president, capable of exercising leadership over both military and civilian personnel, with an understanding of the host nation’s history and culture.
Supporting the leader would be a sizeable and integrated civil-military staff. At provincial and local levels, the security environment would dictate whether a civilian official with a military deputy or a military officer with a civilian deputy is placed in charge. This official would exercise “operational direction” over all U.S. operations in that region to include political, security, and development activities. The lead representatives of the intelligence community, both analytical and operational, law enforcement agencies, and all other government departments and agencies, would report to this leader.

Unity of command at the country level would be achieved through integrated planning, operations, and resource cells drawing on personnel from all in-country agencies and the military with either the military or country team members in charge. These cells would represent an expanded country team, using surge resources from all relevant agencies, especially DoD and Department of State Advanced Civilian Teams (ACTs). At the provincial and local levels, the selected official (COM or COCOM) could deploy Field Advanced Civilian Teams (FACTs) to serve with military units and assist—or lead, depending on the security environment—in funding projects, developing local governance, and training local security forces.

This model of integrated command would be most useful for missions that are heavily interagency dependent and require significant operational performance by U.S. military forces, such as some cases of disaster relief and counterinsurgency operations. The novelty of the integrated chain of command means it would not be constrained by an institutional culture with preconceived ideas of how missions should be accomplished. As John A. Nagl emphasizes in his discussion on CORDS: “The organization [CORDS], a revolutionary development in its own right, encouraged innovation from its personnel as a primary facet of its developing organizational culture…. CORDS in effect wrote the field manual as it went along.”

One Leader with a National Executive Committee

The national executive committee is an alternative option for an integrated chain of command. The national executive committee would coordinate and execute policy in addition to allocating funds for projects and operations that streamline the decision-making process and improve interagency cooperation. At the provincial and district level, depending on the size of the country and the type of environment (surge or steady state), the model of the executive committee may be duplicated with provincial and district committees headed by senior local officials.

The best historic example for such an executive committee system is the British counterinsurgency effort in Malaya in the 1950s. The British ultimately prevailed against a

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communist insurgency lasting for twelve years through a unified effort, decisive leadership, and synchronized political and military objectives.

Today, when U.S. and multinational forces provide counterinsurgency support to a host government in a semi-permissive environment, the Army’s counterinsurgency manual suggests the creation of a civil-military operations center that “coordinates the interaction of U.S. and multinational military forces with a wide variety of civilian agencies.”

There is a crucial difference between the civil-military operations center and the British executive committee system in Malaya. The British state and district war executive committees were executive bodies designed to act as well as to coordinate:

- The counter-insurgency experience in Malaya indicates that joint or even combined committees that only coordinate action may prove inadequate for the task since seizing and maintaining the operational initiative from insurgents requires executive bodies that can take action and force their opponents to go on the defense.

The civil-military operations center, on the other hand, “is not designed as, nor should it be used as, a [command and control] element.”

Consequently, in the executive committee system, it is imperative that the committees are both coordinating and executing policy with a single “national committee” under the chairmanship of a military commander or civilian who takes charge of countrywide operations. The chairman has the right to set the agenda for meetings, veto decisions (except those taken unanimously), and has the last say in budget matters. By his recommendation and with the collaboration of the other committee members policy is formulated.

The executive committee model has some inherent limitations given the sensitivity of intelligence (sources and methods) and military plans and operations while conducting a counterinsurgency or counternarcotics campaign. One method of dealing with this problem was used by the British in Malaya. Each executive committee had an operations room attached to it. It was the mechanic for the operational display of intelligence. Only a selective number of executive committee members (those directly involved in the operational conduct of counterinsurgency operations) were granted access to the room and hence to intelligence. Thus, the danger of intelligence leaks was kept to a minimum.

The differences between the two options of integrated command are minimal. The single individual is more centralized, whereas the executive committee operates in a more decentralized fashion with various committees on the state and regional level, each authorized to formulate its own policy as long as it corresponds with overall U.S. policy objectives. Also, in the executive committee option, the host government is a formal member of the committee and therefore directly involved in the decision-making process.

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1218 Ibid. 61.
1219 Ibid. 66.
whereas otherwise only informal coordination mechanisms between the command authority and the host government exist.

**Supporting Measures for Unity of Purpose and Effort**

Integrated command would function more smoothly if it builds on the concept of an empowered country team that is assumed in the preceding option three. Empowered country teams consolidate the authority of the ambassador and his/her issue teams to formulate and execute policy in an integrated manner. While it is possible to have an integrated chain of command without an empowered country team, it provides a better foundation for any attempt to integrate civilian and military chains of command on the country level due to its clear delineation of authority and the team culture and processes that would already be the norm.

On the regional level, the integrated chain of command would benefit from the Integrated Regional Centers empowered with appropriate authorities and “regional chief of mission” status. It would provide a seamless bridge from integrated national and regional policy and support to decentralized policy implementation in country. The leader at the country level at the top of the integrated chain of command would report through the forward deployed regional organization rather than through the departmental stovepipes that characterize the current national security system, thereby avoiding interdepartmental turf fights at all levels.

**d. Process: Integrated Chain of Command**

To make the integrated chain of command work an important process change would be required. The lead for operations would flip between civilian and military leadership depending on the security environment. Should the security situation in a country deteriorate to the point where progress on political and other objectives is no longer possible, the lead would pass to the military and civilians would support the effort under the direction of military leadership.

The precise timing of when a switch from civilian to military control should occur would be a difficult decision. Metrics for assessing the security environment should be laid out in the objectives-based Mission Strategic Plan that every embassy creates. The metrics would be applied by the country team. Should there be any difference in opinion between military and civilian authorities over the exact timing of the transition from civilian to military command, ultimate responsibility would lie in the hands of the president.

**e. Resources: Integrated Chain of Command**

If the core reforms are adopted, resourcing operations with national priority should not be a problem. Absent those reforms, the respective ambassador as well as the military’s combatant commander or the joint task force commander should sign a strategic document similar to the NICCP (National Interdiction Command and Control Plan) used by the current Joint Interagency Task Force-South. The agreement would empower the
integrated command to be the authoritative source for coordination, planning, prioritizing, and integrating resources provided from all departments and agencies.

**f. Decision Support: Integrated Chain of Command**

In order to guarantee smooth cooperation between military and civilian elements within an integrated chain of command there have to be mechanisms to enable continuous learning and establish a common lexicon and shared principles. Inhibiting the ability of the United States to plan for surge operations is the lack of agreement on basic principles and a common lexicon, as well as a lack of clear metrics for measuring success.\(^\text{1220}\)

A civil-military handbook for handling operations within the framework of the integrated command model should therefore be compiled laying out basic guidelines for working within the integrated chain of command. This handbook should also contain clear-set metrics for measuring success in Reconstruction and Stability Operations and other types of operations requiring the integration of multiple agencies and large military forces.\(^\text{1221}\)

Projects such as the United States Institute of Peace and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) effort to “develop a handbook of common principles and processes to guide planning and execution of goals for reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) operations”\(^\text{1222}\) are a step in the right direction.\(^\text{1223}\)

**g. Human Capital: Integrated Chain of Command**

The core reforms should be further specified to support an integrated chain of command in the field. The official in charge (ambassador or military commander—depending on the security environment) should have a large, formal input into performance reports for agency heads (and these agency heads should also have a role in evaluating the ambassador and military commander). Consideration should be given to a standardized, but not simplistic, evaluation form for all personnel (civilian and military) in country.

It is also essential that civilian personnel preparing to deploy to a country, where an integrated chain of command is in place, train together with their military (and multilateral) counterparts prior to deployment. Having a common understanding of how the integrated chain of command operates is essential for the success of teams composed of both military and civilian elements. There should be a program that brings employees

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\(^\text{1221}\) The handbook in combination with the objectives-based Mission Strategic Plan, drafted by the Ambassador and the embassy staff should be the first basic guidelines for measuring success in a surge environment.


\(^\text{1223}\) This guide will be “based on the collective experience of multiple actors embodied in disparate toolkits, handbooks, guidelines, strategy documents and briefing books used by state agencies, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)” and is “intended to serve as a resource for other U.S. government agencies, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, as well as indigenous political and civil society leaders;” “Handbook of Civilian ‘Doctrine’” 10.
from the embassy, agencies, the military, the private sector, and allied governments together—program management courses to build a sense of common interest and analytical skills and bond the services together.

h. Congress: Integrated Chain of Command

Since the dual chain of command at the country level is codified in U.S. law, Congress would have to modify current statutes. The process for the delicate transition from civilian to military control in a surge environment may also require statutory clarification by Congress, but otherwise should be codified in an executive order.\footnote{For a detailed account of legal questions concerning the integrated chain of command see “Memorandum—Integrated Chain of Command,” Project on National Security Reform, Legal Working Group, April 2008.}

i. Conclusions on an Integrated Chain of Command

Some examples will help demonstrate both why an integrated chain of command is necessary and why it would be controversial: Over the past few years bombing sorties by the U.S. (and NATO) against Afghanistan insurgents have produced politically damaging civilian casualties. The casualties cause serious political problems for the Afghan government, and also have the effect of driving the civilian population in the arms of the Taliban. This undercuts the long-term success of the combined military-civilian counterinsurgency strategy. At the same time, the sorties minimize risk to coalition forces and succeed in eliminating insurgent and terrorist leaders. Judging which of the competing objectives to give priority is difficult, but making a clear decision would be better than working at cross purposes. With an integrated chain of command, the ambassador would have the authority to overrule the military commander if the environment were secure enough to give political objectives priority. If the security environment were poor enough that progress against political objectives could not be realized, then lead would be given to the military and the commander’s judgment would take precedence. In those circumstances, the military lead would direct civilian departments and agencies. For example, the commander could require that ACT/PRT staffing requirements be met. But this decision would most likely be taken at the national level with presidential involvement.

The integrated chain of command would be challenging to implement. The subordination of military to civilian control with the right to intervene in operational matters would be controversial among members of the armed services as well as Congress. However, in situations where the center of gravity for success is political rather than military, unity of command must be practiced and not just paid lip service. Findings from the recent excellent congressional report on PRTs found that progress in counterinsurgency in the war on terror is suffering from lack of unity of effort:

Neither the stabilization and reconstruction activities, nor the civilian and military personnel serving on provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan and Iraq, enjoy unity of command. This shortcoming inhibits unity of effort, which can result in uncoordinated, and even
counterproductive, outcomes. Rather than having unity of command, PRTs in both Iraq and Afghanistan operate under complicated, disjointed and, at times, unclear chain(s) of command and receive direction from multiple sources.  

The report recommended that “the Departments of Defense and State should unify leadership and command of provincial reconstruction teams to match accountability with authority and to ensure unity of effort.” For this to happen, however, Congress would need to take action to remove legal impediments.

Similarly, institutional and political impediments would have to be removed by the president and his Cabinet officials. General Anthony Zinni, the respected commander of many politico-military operations during the 1990s, including Operation Provide Hope in Northern Iraq in 1991, recently argued that:

No other time in history begs more for interagency integration and cooperation within the U.S. government. The various stove-piped agencies, especially the departments of Defense and State, have traditionally and famously been dysfunctional as a cooperative entity. We can no longer afford the dysfunction and lack of coordination, especially in this situation.”

Yet, as Robert Killebrew points out:

Despite generations of officers reciting Clausewitz’s mantra that war is simply politics by another means, military leaders in general and the U.S. Defense Department in particular generally have sought to operate independently of political statesmen whenever possible.

Removing legal and political impediments to an integrated chain of command might be difficult. An integrated chain of command also would require lesser efforts by the executive branch: amendments to the Mission Strategic Plan of the country team structural consolidation by integrating civilian and military planning, operations and resource cells a new civil-military handbook specifically addressing operations under an integrated chain of command and new interagency training methods.

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1225 “Agency Stovepipes” 35.
1226 Ibid.
3. Structural Consolidation: Department of International Relations

a. Overview

The war on terror has accentuated the difficulties the United States has in integrating non-military elements of power. Ambassador Henry Crumpton argues:

Wars of the 20th century taught us the need for joint operations rather than separate army, navy or air operations, as manifested in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. 9/11 taught us that we cannot afford to act as independent agencies. Our success against the enemy largely derives from our mastery of joint, highly integrated operations that unify all the elements of national power into a coherent whole.

Yet, contrary to the requirement identified by Ambassador Crumpton, we continue to act as independent agencies, and nowhere is this more true that in our attempts to manage the multiplicity of civilian agency programs overseas. Specifically, programs promoting soft-power development assistance, trade policy, humanitarian relief, diplomatic presence, public broadcasting, and educational exchanges are fractured and spread across many agencies and bureaus. Currently, twenty-seven agencies have formal representation overseas yet there is no way to ensure that the U.S. government message is both unified and consistent with overall foreign policy priorities and objectives. “In some large embassies, the proportion of State Department representation relative to other federal agencies can be less than one third of full-time U.S. personnel.” As a result, we see an increased U.S. presence abroad but we are still struggling to implement a unified foreign policy that is relevant to the security concerns of today.

The changing international environment and the lack of integrated purpose and effort in international relations has encouraged reforms in the Department of State, as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice notes:

More and more, solutions to the challenges we face lie not in the narrow expertise of one agency acting in one country, but in partnerships among multiple agencies working creatively together to solve common problems across entire regions. So we are looking to adopt a new version of

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1229 Brookings Institution and Paul A. Volcker, Urgent Business for America Revitalizing the Federal Government for the 21st Century, (Washington: National Commission on the Public Service, 2003) 7 October 2008 <http://www.brookings.edu/gs/cps/volcker/reportfinal.pdf> 17, “We recommend a qualified restoration of the President’s authority to reorganize departments and agencies as the most efficient way to ensure that the operations of the federal government keep pace with the demands placed upon it. We suggest as a model the executive reorganization authority that began with the Reorganization Act of 1932 (5 USC 901 et seq.) and continued with its successor statutes through the middle decades of the 20th century,” in other words, “The federal government should be reorganized into a limited number of mission-related executive departments.”

1230 Ambassador Henry Crumpton, HASC Hearing on Interagency Coordination in Combating Terrorism, 4 April 2006.

1231 Argyros et al.

1232 Argyros et al.
regional operations, one where interagency integration would be the norm. These would be joint centers networked with our embassies in the region at which you would serve alongside assistance workers or our men and women in uniform and professionals from other agencies. These regional centers will help us to continue breaking down the barriers that still hinder the interagency cooperation that we need overseas.\footnote{Condoleezza Rice, Remarks on Transformational Diplomacy, February 8, 2007.}

Despite the reforms advanced by Secretary Rice, the current Department of State cannot effectively manage the nation’s increasingly diverse international relations in an increasingly globalized world. Only in the White House and in the individual country teams of American embassies are these programs considered as a total package. Even then, limitations on presidential span of control and attention make any oversight sporadic and incomplete, and the de facto authority of the chief of mission within U.S. embassies is too limited to ensure even tactical integration.

Successful integration of important international relations components on the scale necessary requires a new and more expansive “Department of International Relations,” structured as a comprehensive, mission oriented department, with the specific mission of integrating the Republic’s international programs within the broader context of national security. The objective would be an “omnibus” type of department; one with a greater range of substantive programs than, for instance, the Department of Defense but less than the Department of Homeland Security.

Creating a Department of International Relations would help correct the current imbalance between soft (civilian) and hard (military) power which leads to the “militarization of foreign policy” described in the previous section on Integrated Regional Centers.\footnote{See pp. 527-544.} This imbalance is as much due to a disparity in authorities as in resources. To correct the imbalance, the Department of International Relations (DIR) should consolidate a critical mass of soft-power tools of statecraft under one organization.\footnote{See Appendix 2: Glossary of Terms for descriptions of core agencies} Also key to success would be the creation of a new foreign affairs culture that emphasizes multiple substantive skills, integration of programs, and program management. The new department would be organized around four components:

1. An integrated chain of command from secretary, through regional under-secretaries, to chiefs of mission to provide coherent management of all programs, global, regional and country specific – each level operating under authority analogous to current “chief of mission” authority.

2. A family of core offices or bureaus, each organized around a substantive theme (e.g. macro economic relations, economic development, public diplomacy, immigration and migration, nontraditional security threats, arms proliferation and WMD, political-military engagement), and headed by a presidential appointee at the deputy secretary level.
3. A robust networking system with other departments that have an interest in foreign relations in addition to or as part of their core mission.

4. An expanded “foreign affairs” career service and culture to cover all personnel who pursue international careers regardless of substantive discipline; combined with administrative arrangements to promote extensive and regular inter-departmental assignments (short and long term, in Washington and abroad).

Constructing this department - what to include, what to leave out - will be difficult, requiring thoughtful analysis and lengthy negotiation. The following general guidelines are proposed:

- **Consolidated**: Agencies whose current core mission is in the conduct of foreign affairs, for example: USAID, USTR, OPIC, and the various components of the current Department of State.

- **Transferred**: Programs not constituting autonomous agencies but are reasonably self-contained foreign affairs programs such as the Agriculture and Commercial Foreign Services (Departments of Agriculture and Commerce), ICITAP (Justice).

- **Partnership**: Activities conducted overseas but so specialized and intimately tied to the expertise in the home agency that it cannot profitably be separated, such as CDC research. They will interact as partners through personnel exchange programs, networking, and empowered multiagency teams.

The organizational concept of the new department is analogous to that of the country team but raised to the Cabinet department level. The substantive bureaus or divisions would be organized around a major international relations theme (see figure 25 below). In essence, the whole Department becomes a “National Team” where interagency policy and resource integration would take place within the substantive “bureaus” and operational management would be coordinated at three formal levels: at the secretarial or Cabinet level, at the regional undersecretary level, and at the country team level (and also in special teams or task forces for crises).

The new Department would better integrate related international activities where possible at the departmental level, thereby greatly facilitating the long unsatisfactory attempt to do so at the country team level. Although a number of distinctly foreign operations would be transferred to the new department, their original departments (e.g., Treasury) should continue to retain significant policy responsibilities in the foreign affairs arena through interagency mechanisms. With this approach, other departments and agencies will no longer be visitors or invitees to “interagency meetings,” but more like partners in a common endeavor. Their personnel working with, in or through the Department of International Relations would have to be treated accordingly.
Thus the new department would also expand the Foreign Service “rank in person” system of the United States to cover personnel from other department and agencies deployed overseas to work in U.S. embassies. Departments and agencies with overseas policy responsibilities would continue to pursue these duties by interaction with the DIR while contributing personnel to the expanded Foreign Service, either on a permanent or temporary basis. All personnel who make careers under the new Foreign Service would be eligible for ambassadorial appointments and for senior departmental positions, with agency diversity a departmentwide requirement.

Breaking up and reconstituting bureaucratic organizations is extraordinarily difficult. Achieving the required structural reforms cannot be done by merely folding other agencies or programs into the existing Department of State. The failed integration of USIA exemplifies the problems with that approach. USIA was reconstituted under a department with its own unique culture, structure, management style, and mission, one that was often at odds with USIA’s previously existing culture, structure, and management. The resistance within USAID to full integration under the State Department, despite their close relationship and common budgetary authority, is also directly related to differences in culture, structure, management, and mission.

The complete integration of important foreign policy components requires a new department with a new institutional culture. The organizational structure of the current Department of State, which revolves around traditional diplomacy, exacerbates rather than alleviates the integration problem. Instead of managing international affairs under the auspices of the current Department of State, all soft-power components of international relations should be combined in the new, more expansive, and more ambitious Department of International Relations. The process should not be viewed as the traditional shuffling of units and tasks but rather a restructuring designed to produce a comprehensive, mission-oriented department, with the broader mission being the integrated conduct of the republic’s foreign relations.

The programs and activities considered actually do constitute a community of related activities—the world of soft power—but one now lacking effective oversight and management. A secretary with the responsibility for coordinating the entire international relations mechanism abroad would be in a position to better implement presidential policy by ensuring that the various programs marched to a single drum. Such a secretary would dispose of a broad enough mandate, a rich enough portfolio, an enhanced international status, and a greater resource base with which to extend U.S. influence abroad and hold his/her own in the upper levels of U.S. governmental competition. Joining DoD, DHS, and the intelligence community, these four disciplines (foreign affairs, defense, intelligence, and homeland security) would provide the president with a core national security establishment that is coherent and manageable.

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1236 Rank in person means the rank is attached to the person, and not the position they are occupying.
b. Strategic Direction

The DIR would oversee, direct, and integrate all components of foreign affairs either directly or indirectly to effectively implement U.S. foreign policy. The new department would consolidate both the traditional tools of foreign relations (private diplomacy, public diplomacy, development aid, etc.) with the international components of various agencies that deploy representatives overseas to carry out relations with other countries. The organizational strategy is to provide a strong hub of foreign relations oversight and management so that appropriate and necessary networking can take place between the key executive branch players at all levels, to include the country team and Washington.

There is much precedence for this approach. The Department of Defense is the obvious model, although the more recently established Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence also apply. The idea is to bundle together related authorities and resources in order to provide for effective executive authority below the White House level and to obtain greater unity of effort and unity of purpose among related programs. Like the concept of jointness that revolutionized American defense capabilities after the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the new DIR would draw upon a combination of directive authority and procedural, human capital and cultural changes.

c. Structure: Department of International Relations

The new Department of International Relations would consist of three organizational structures:

1. A central management or operational core, headed by the secretary; the secretary of foreign relations would need to be supported by a deputy secretary and a well-staffed Office of the Secretary to manage span of control and to provide overall policy supervision and coordination. In addition, there would be a need to house some systemwide functions such as policy planning, a general counsel, comptroller and central budget office, a bureau of intelligence and research, and a central personnel department with a departmentwide training and educational system.

2. A collection of major sub-Cabinet departments would constitute the substantive core of the department. These subject-focused organizations would group the bureaucratic entities relevant to specific foreign affairs subjects that are now spread around distinct departments/agencies-developmental aid, public diplomacy, transnational threats, trade and investment-and would be headed by presidentially appointed officials. In essence, the proposal deconstructs State and joins the various component parts with similar bureaucratic units across the government whose primary missions are also in the foreign relations field, consolidating them into a new department. In this regard, the department would not take the policy formulation and expertise out of parent organizations, but rather facilitate the administration of other agency programs at home and abroad.
The following incomplete list of programs and administrations that would be included in the Department of International Relations indicates the range of consolidation envisioned:

- **Office of Trade and Investment**: U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Trade and Development Agency, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, International Trade Administration, Foreign Agriculture Service-Directorate of Agriculture

- **Foreign Commercial Service**: Department of Commerce

- **Office of Public Diplomacy**: Former components of USIA

- **Office of Transnational Threats**: The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, Office of the Coordinator for Combating Terrorism, the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the Legal Attaché office of the FBI, the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program from Justice, and the anti-narcotic Joint Interagency Task Forces, Bilateral Investigations

- **Office of International Aid and Development**: USAID, African Development Foundation, Inter-American Foundation, Millennium Challenge Corporation

- **Office of Political and Military Affairs**: The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs might be combined with the Security Assistance authorities of the Department of Defense

- **Office of Consular Affairs, Human Rights and Migration**: Bureau of Consular Affairs, Immigration and Customs Enforcement

- **CRS**: S/CRS, Iraq Investment and Reconstruction Task Force (IIRTF) - Department of Commerce, Afghanistan Investment and Reconstruction Task Force (AIRTF) - Department of Commerce

3. An operational chain of command would be created running from the secretary through regional under secretaries (Integrated Regional Centers) to chiefs of mission. This clear chain of command—president, secretary, regional under-secretary—would strengthen the authority and role of the chiefs of mission and the country team, as well as providing unified, coherent policy direction and implementation management at all levels.
The substantive offices would be policy developers and capability providers to the operational chain of command. In essence, the whole department is organized as a multi-agency “national team” where policy and resource integration would take place at three formal levels at the secretarial or Cabinet level, at the regional undersecretary level, and at the country team level. Informal coordination would occur at all levels and for emergencies ad hoc special teams or missions could be used. Other departments and agencies would participate in all of these levels just as they do now in country teams. By joining these teams and contributing to policy, personnel, and resource decisions, other agencies would help transform the culture of the new department. Other departments and agencies would no longer be visitors or invitees to interagency meetings but more like shareholders in a common organization.

From this central, joint integration and command structure in DIR, policy and resources flow down to the country team, rather than going directly through discrete bureaucratic and authority stovepipes, thereby alleviating if not eliminating the current organizational competition and effectiveness at the country level. By combining these programs into a single department, a number of existing stovepipes would be eliminated. This would not resolve the overall integration problem for the national security system but it would simplify it by providing effective delegated presidential authority over a significant
number of government activities. This consolidation would improve communication both at the executive, departmental, and country team level.

- **The DIR “Lite” Option:** An alternative would be to combine all foreign assistance programs, along with public diplomacy, in a single department. Under this option, an expanded and empowered Department of International Relations (perhaps retaining the historic name, Department of State) would gain full direction and control over traditional foreign policy instruments—diplomacy, public diplomacy, and foreign assistance. Public diplomacy would receive increased personnel and budgets for its soft-power activities. The Agency for International Development (AID) and Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) would be brought under department control, with integrated personnel systems. The department would also gain full direction and control of the 22 percent of U.S. foreign assistance programs now provided by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, including Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants or loans, International Military Education and Training (IMET), Section 1206 Global Train and Equip program, and Coalition Support Funds. The Department should also gain dual-key authority over the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) and the Train and Equip Funds for Afghan and Iraqi forces. This option would provide greater integration of U.S. foreign assistance programs and would not foreclose empowered country team provisions that could strengthen in-country control and program integration.1237

### d. Resources: Department of International Relations

Creating a Department of International Relations would not necessarily result in an increase in the overall budget for foreign relations activities. It would, however, be necessary to consolidate the resources of the agencies and programs that are included within the department. Giving a secretary of international relations authority over a comprehensive budget should allow more effective coordination of spending to address broader foreign policy objectives. In addition, the influence and effectiveness should be enhanced through better coordination of complementary effects.

In addition to budgetary authority over its own core components, the DIR would have a voice in the international activities of other agencies through the formulation and use of a strategic foreign affairs policy. It would screen and comment on the activities and budget submissions of other departments conducting foreign relations. Consistent with the core principles of budgetary leadership, such a review would give DIR the responsibility for certifying compliance by those agencies with the president’s security strategy.

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1237 An important enabling condition for either DIR option must be a comprehensive revision and simplification of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which currently imposes a checklist of 65 statutory provisions that must be considered when determining country eligibility and budget amounts as well as funding allocations and saddles U.S. aid programs with a bewildering array of 33 goals, 75 priority areas, and 247 directives.
e. Human Capital: Department of International Relations

A consolidated Department of International Relations is also needed to create a cultural shift for the foreign affairs community at large much the same way Goldwater-Nichols enhanced respect for “jointness.” The cultural shift is needed not just among other department and agency representatives, but also within the Department of State, which is too narrowly focused on traditional diplomacy and does not have and thus cannot exercise sufficient authority or resources to manage the full range of foreign relations effectively. Thus, the new department’s culture would be consciously interagency. It would have a very large component of detailed officials from other departments. The new department ought to be viewed as an interagency organization with personnel formally and consistently drawn from the full range of government departments and agencies. Positions at the highest levels of the department would be open to personnel from other agencies, including ambassadorial and secretariat.

Figure 26. Department of International Relations Foreign Service

Currently, the professional government personnel involved in foreign affairs activities abroad do belong to a self-identified community. There is a “foreign service” community whose members, despite organizational differentiations, view foreign service as a fundamental aspect of their professional identity. The existence of this foreign service community is acknowledged by the American Foreign Service Association and by the
eligibility criteria for membership in the DACOR (Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Retired). However this community is divided by organizational boundaries: State, USAID, U.S. Trade Representative, Commerce, etc.

The expanded Foreign Service of the United States should expressly include not only public diplomats and USAID workers but also agricultural attachés and commercial attachés. In fact, personnel from all other departments and agencies exercising foreign relations would be seconded to the Department of International Relations to fill positions requiring their expertise. Those deploying overseas would receive standard training in the relevant region and language, and in embassy and country team operations.

- **The Interagency Foreign Service Option:** Instead of borrowing personnel from other agencies who would be expected to contribute the expertise of those agencies, we could create a consolidated foreign relations career personnel system and culture to match. First, the present Foreign Service of the United States would be expanded to include all career officials committed to a professional foreign relations career. Apart from USAID and former USIA officers, this includes agricultural attaches of the Department of Agriculture; the commercial attaches of the Department of Commerce; quite possibly FBI agents on a legal attaché career track; similar Drug Enforcement Agency agents; and probably a significant number of employees of USTR. People would enter into this Foreign Service either by direct entry or by transfer from the career services of other departments and agencies. Secondly, personnel from other departments and agencies would be eligible for short-term appointments into the Foreign Service for employment in the Department of International Relations, either in Washington or in overseas posts and missions. Career employees in other departments could serve periodically in Foreign Service assignments, just as Foreign Service personnel would be eligible for regular and periodic “excursion” tours in other departments. Finally, it should be normal practice, especially for senior positions, to recruit candidates from the National Security Professional Corps. The new Foreign Service would be the core of the department personnel system and culture, but would not have automatic or exclusive claim on positions, either in Washington or abroad. The objective would be to create a foreign relations career culture which includes career officials from many departments and which expands to fill the substantive boundaries of the foreign relations world.

- **The Expanded Foreign Service Community and the National Security Professional Corps:** In creating an expanded Foreign Service, the DIR will draw personnel from across the whole-of-government to become better prepared and more effective at representing and implementing the United States’ soft power abroad. The creation of the National Security Professional Corps will similarly draw qualified personnel from across various governmental agencies to become part of an interagency community of specially trained and deployed civilians who concentrate on issues of national security. Although a Foreign Service officer may elect to be part of the NSPC, it is not part of what constitutes the Foreign Service or his or her training, which would entail separate training and some
different ethos, including the willingness to deploy to conflict zones or endure hardship tours without accompanying family. Both Foreign Service officers who are part of the core cones of DIR and those that are trained and deployed through DIR but represent their parent departments, could elect to be part of the NSPC, however.

An expansion of the Foreign Service to better include the representatives of other departments and agencies is a natural next step to achieve better integration of soft power and also characteristic of the tradition of the Foreign Service, which has evolved and expanded consistently with the changing requirements of the international environment:

- The Rogers Act of 1924 merged the Diplomatic and Consular services into one Foreign Service. An extremely difficult Foreign Service examination was also implemented to recruit the most outstanding Americans, along with a merit-based system of promotions. Since the Rogers Act, about two thirds of U.S. ambassadors have been appointed from within the ranks of the Foreign Service, and the remaining third have been appointed directly by the president of the United States.

- In 1939, President Franklin D. Roosevelt integrated the U.S. Foreign Commercial Service into the State Department, where it remained for the next four decades.

- The Foreign Service Act of 1946 overhauled the management and administration of the Foreign Service and created the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) to provide language, area, and professional training for foreign affairs personnel.

- In 1957, an overhaul of the personnel system proposed by Henry M. Wriston led to the integration of many Civil Service employees into the Foreign Service, doubling its size.

- The 1970s witnessed major changes in personnel policies regarding female officers, spouses, and families in the foreign affairs agencies. Efforts were made to increase recruitment of women and minorities and to assure fairness in the promotion process.

- The Foreign Service Act of 1980 enacted danger pay for those diplomats who serve in dangerous and hostile surroundings along with other administrative changes.

f. Congress: Department of International Relations

The consolidation of a very large majority of the foreign relations programs into one department would require some adjustments in current oversight mechanisms since the foreign policy committees do not currently have jurisdiction over trade, foreign economic policy, imports and exports, or overseas legal, financial, and agricultural attachés. Congress might choose to permit overlapping jurisdiction, as has been done with DHS, or it might choose to consolidate those matters under an expanded foreign policy committee.
The core reforms establish a process for the select committee on interagency matters to resolve these questions as part of its work on a National Security Act of 2009.

**g. Conclusions on a Department of International Relations**

It is a challenge getting the subordinate organizations in the defense, intelligence, and homeland security communities to act in concert with one another, but the consolidation of the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence now make it much easier to obtain unity of purpose in these disciplines. One principal reason the U.S. government does not maximize the influence of its soft-power assets is that foreign policy programs are spread around approximately thirty departments and agencies with almost no central direction and management except at the presidential level. Only in the conduct of foreign relations do we continue to tolerate numerous government agencies acting semi-autonomously to represent U.S. interests. Given the Department of State’s inability to coordinate the full range of soft-power assets it is not surprising that it is not taken as seriously by world leaders as the Department of Defense:

DoD’s regional combatant commanders have come to be perceived by states and other actors as the most influential U.S. government regional representative. It is argued that the resources that combatant commanders control, their presence and frequent travel throughout the region, and even the symbolic impact of their aircraft and accompanying service members, all combine to place them in perceived position of preeminence.¹²³⁸

While the Department of State occupies the center of the civilian foreign affairs community, it is not empowered to coordinate the diverse overseas programs of the United States. Thus, the impact of individual programs is less and they are not consistently applied in support of broader strategies to promote American interests, from strategic and regional to local levels. To maximize U.S. influence abroad, we must build a civilian organizational capability that is as well organized and capable of integrating civilian programs in support of foreign relations as the Department of Defense is capable of integrating our diverse defense capabilities.

Creating a multiagency Department of International Relations would rebalance the combination of soft and hard power and ultimately increase U.S. influence abroad. It also would support the solution sets offered in preceding options. Allowing the Department of International Relations to orchestrate the diverse overseas programs of numerous federal departments and agencies would facilitate the integration mechanisms in all three of the preceding options, whether the White House Command model, the Integrated Regional Centers, or the Decentralized and Networked hierarchy of interagency teams. The DIR also supports nicely the recommendation in the core reforms that ambassadors be vetted by a Presidential Advisory Panel, and that once nominated, noncareer ambassadors receive training.
4. Structural Consolidation: Empowered DHS

a. Overview

It took several decades—each with its own military failure—to empower the secretary of defense and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to integrate the service departments into an effective and efficient Department of Defense. Homeland security, however, does not have the luxury of decades or even a single homeland security failure. The Preventive Defense Project’s *The Day After: Action in the 24 Hours Following a Nuclear Blast in an American City*, makes the point when it speaks of the specter of “loose nukes” and the doomsday consequence management challenges posed by nuclear detonations in American sites. “The federal government needs a realistic response plan specific to the Day-After scenario that marshals the resources of all agencies.” While the secretary of homeland security is the principal federal official (PFO) for management of domestic incidents, his interagency lines of authority and collaborative intergovernmental relationships are not clear. Moreover, like the secretary of defense vis-à-vis the services in the first few years of the Department of Defense, the secretary of homeland security is currently not empowered to integrate DHS agencies into an effective and efficient department.

The DHS lacks the authority necessary to fulfill its national security mission. The department requires more authority in two distinct but related areas: the federal interagency process of domestic incident management, which DHS coordinates, and the prevention and protection aspects of the homeland security mission that DHS coordinates. Connected to both areas—and critical to the department’s power to address the entire scope of its homeland security activities—are the department’s acquisition and procurement authorities. Further empowering the DHS in all three of these areas would enable the department to fulfill its role in the national security system.

b. The Interagency Process for Domestic Incident Management

In its lead-federal-agency role, the secretary of homeland security is the PFO. Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5), *Management of Domestic Incidents*, which designates the secretary of DHS as the PFO for domestic incident management, bestows no additional authority on the secretary to execute that mission. Thus the DHS lacks the authority to effectively manage the entire federal interagency process of domestic incident management as laid out in the National Response Framework (NRF). Absent an empowered DHS Secretary, FEMA, an agency-level entity, is unable to manage effectively the Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) and the interagency (i.e., department level) pre-scripted mission assignments.

In addition, the current chain of command from the president to senior federal officials in the field is stovepiped and has the potential to compromise the secretary of homeland security’s role as domestic incident manager in a catastrophic disaster. The commander,

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Joint Task Force (CJTF), reports to the secretary of defense; the senior federal law enforcement official (SFLEO) reports to the attorney general, and the federal coordinating officer (FCO) reports to the FEMA administrator, while the “PFO in the field” is a designated representative who reports directly to the secretary of homeland security.

- **Empowering the Secretary of Homeland Security:** By statute and executive order, the secretary of homeland security should be empowered to direct the federal interagency effort for all domestic incidents. This could be done through statutory empowerment of the Secretary of Homeland Security as PFO, by appointing his subordinates to head domestic Integrated Regional Centers, or by appointing his subordinates to head cross-functional teams at the national and regional levels (i.e., consistent with either reform options one, two, or three, respectively). The secretary and staff could then ably direct the entire federal interagency process, serving as the president’s singly empowered domestic incident manager for homeland security.

- **DHS Staff Augmentation**\(^{1240}\): Strengthening the secretary of homeland security’s role as PFO for domestic incidents as described above would require augmentation of the staff and capacity—for example, to 1) support the DHS National Operations Center (NOC) and 2) serve as empowered liaison to other Federal departments and agencies—thereby eliminating any confused reporting relationships and stovepipes as presently allowed for in the NRF.

### c. Prevention and Protection

The prevention and protection aspects of the homeland security mission need the same operational attention that the National Response Framework (NRF) has accorded the response and recovery aspect. The NRF constitutes an operational capability primarily targeting Stafford Act events and, to a lesser extent, national-security emergencies or broader coordination of domestic prevention-and-protection operations. Operational national experience is limited with respect to the prevention and protection missions. FEMA’s development of the NRF did not adequately address shared policy, doctrine, and plans for prevention and protection. FEMA is an emergency management agency, not a public safety agency. The response and recovery actions of federal agencies for domestic incidents should be codified in a new operational framework that combines prevention, protection, response and recovery:

- **National Operational Framework:** Congress should direct the secretary of homeland security to develop by a certain date a comprehensive National Operational Framework (NOF). The NOF would describe how operational integration should occur across all levels of government and the private sector for

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\(^{1240}\) *Beyond Goldwater Nichols: Phase 2 Report* 71—76, “Leverage DoD’s considerable planning expertise to provide significant assistance to the NSC and DHS in their efforts to develop a concept of operations and associated requirements for homeland security.”
the full range of homeland security activities: prevention and protection as well as response and recovery.

d. Homeland Security Resourcing

The interagency structure for homeland security resourcing cannot translate capability requirements into budgeting and programming. The Department of Homeland Security needs the ability to integrate departmental-level acquisition, procurement, coordination and resourcing authority and oversight activities across its operational components—a structure that would, in turn, save on costs and improve efficiency. The secretary of homeland security and the undersecretary for management currently have sufficient authority to direct this change. However, DHS components and congressional supporters have stalled implementation of this change. GAO and the director, joint staff inspector general have both recommended this change. Statutory language would make this happen quickly:

- **Centralize Acquisition and Procurement Authority**: By statute, Congress should empower the DHS under secretary for management via the chief procurement officer to centralize acquisition and procurement authority to leverage the buying power of the department and to mandate consistent, departmentwide policies to guide acquisition and procurement.

With this change, the nine component procurement offices would report directly to the DHS chief procurement officer, enabling the department to unify its acquisition program, increase opportunities for program success, and eliminate waste. It also would enable the department to obligate nearly fifteen billion dollars of its budget through the acquisition process in a more unified manner thereby assuring greater program and mission success. For example, currently there are nine separate procurement policy shops, nine separate procurement automation shops, nine separate procurement training organizations—all within a fifteen-minute drive of one another.

To further empower DHS to rationalize procurement for homeland security, it needs more authority to direct the grant process to state and local authorities:

- **Changes in Grant Process**: Congress should also transfer from FEMA to the DHS secretary the executive-agent authority for all homeland-security grants—that is, the authority to publish grant guidance, and manage the grant application, and the review and approval process, as well as fulfill the fiduciary responsibilities associated with grant management.

Finally, as a counterpart reform to the creation of the Homeland Security Steering Committee in option three, the Department of Homeland Security should reestablish a single office, acting on behalf of the secretary of homeland security, to coordinate the policies, programs, and activities of the department relating to state, tribal, and local governments to ensure that the relationship between DHS and its partners is well managed and strong. Presumably the Office of State and Local Government Coordination currently has most of the authority it needs to implement this solution.
through the Homeland Security Act of 2002, but reconfirming language will be needed in light of the Post Katrina Reform Act.

- **Empowered Office of State and Local Government Coordination**: The head of the office would be a deputy assistant or assistant secretary, supported by approximately twenty-five to thirty personnel. The Office of Intergovernmental Programs (the successor office to the Office of State and Local Government Coordination) would be dissolved or removed from the National Protection and Programs Directorate and made a part of the Office of the Secretary of DHS.

5. Conclusions on Structural Consolidations

There is no question that the three alternatives reviewed here present politically difficult undertakings. In fact, the same could be said for all the baskets of reforms reviewed in this report. Yet, as one statesman recently argued, the size of the task should not be an excuse for inaction if we are to prevail on our terms in the war on terror:

> We as a country, we as a government, we as a Congress, can continue focusing on small details, and at the same time miss some very big-picture items. Goldwater-Nichols for the military, we did that. That wasn’t a small detail; that was a big deal, forcing better integration among our different services. We need a Goldwater-Nichols for the United States government if we’re going to do these kinds of engagements in the future.\(^\text{1241}\)

Since there is no sign that terrorists will cease and desist or that the security environment of the twenty-first century will lurch toward the benign and predictable, it is certain that we will “do these kinds of engagement in the future.” Therefore, the question is not the difficulty of the undertaking but whether the solutions proffered would have their intended effects and remedy the core problems that have been identified.

H. Conclusion

The core reforms solve four of the five major system problems identified by PNSR. They provide the means for effective strategic direction and system management and offer the basis for a new legislative-executive branch partnership on national security. The process and resource reforms give the president, with support from Congress, the wherewithal to provide strategic direction for the national security system, to conduct both short- and long-term planning in support of strategy, and to allocate resources consistent with those strategy and planning priorities.

However, the core reforms cannot improve system management of the national security system without decentralization and interagency integration of issue management. The requirement for the White House to intervene to accomplish integrated issue management distracts the leadership from system management of emerging trends, new threats, and

opportunities. One of the three options for decentralization, integration and better collaboration of department and agency efforts must be adopted to solve this problem. Adopting some or all of the structural consolidations would further improve system management, issue management, and interagency integration of our national security system.

The alternatives outlined in this study need not be adopted in toto, and a hybrid set of solutions that draw upon some elements or all of these options is possible. In fact, we believe doing so makes sense and recommend this course of action in the concluding section of the report.

Considered separately or as a whole, the reforms recommended here are robust, even radical. And they would be difficult to implement. However, taken together, they fit the problems identified and reasonably could be expected to resolve them. In this regard the PNSR quest for better integrated and resourced national security missions is reminiscent of Sherlock Holmes’s famous observation, “Once you eliminate the impossible, whatever remains, no matter how improbable, must be the truth.”

It is impossible for one person—the president—to generate unity of purpose and effort from a rigidly vertical collection of semiautonomous departments and agencies without consistently effective mechanisms for the delegation of his authority. Eliminate that impossibility and the only solutions that remain, no matter how improbable, must be accepted. The truth is that the United States will have to adopt some combination of the reforms offered in this paper if it wants a national security system that consistently produces unified purpose and effort.

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PART VI: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In short, based on my experience serving seven presidents, as a former Director of CIA and now as Secretary of Defense, I am here to make the case for strengthening our capacity to use “soft” power and for better integrating it with “hard” power. The way to institutionalize these capabilities is probably not to recreate or repopulate institutions of the past such as AID or USIA. On the other hand, just adding more people to existing government departments such as Agriculture, Treasury, Commerce, Justice and so on is not a sufficient answer either – even if they were to be more deployable overseas. New institutions are needed for the 21st century, new organizations with a 21st century mind-set.

-- Robert M. Gates
Secretary of Defense

A. Introduction

It is generally understood that the national security system cannot integrate and resource the expertise and capabilities required to secure the vital interests of the nation. It is widely recognized that the national security system performs multiagency missions poorly because of bureaucratic obstacles and that it is unable to produce capabilities for nontraditional missions in the quantity and quality needed. Experts cited throughout this report, including presidents, national security advisors and numerous Cabinet officials have understood the system’s limitations for many years, including current secretary of defense Robert Gates, who speaks candidly about how hard it is to get the organization he leads to devote resources to non-traditional missions. Recently, Secretary Gates made an appeal for institutional change within the Pentagon that also applies to the broader national security system:

Let’s be honest with ourselves. The most likely catastrophic threats to our homeland—for example, an American city poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terrorist attack—are more likely to emanate from failing states than from aggressor states. The kinds of capabilities needed to deal with these scenarios cannot be considered exotic distractions or temporary diversions. We do not have the luxury of opting out because they do not conform to preferred notions of the American way of war…. The key is to make sure that the strategy and risk assessment drives the procurement, rather than the other way around.1243

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It may seem odd that a sitting Cabinet official acknowledges that resource allocation often drives strategy rather than the reverse, or that he appeals for subordinates to embrace nontraditional missions, but it underscores the difficulty of reform in the current system. It is also peculiar that the secretary of defense is the most eloquent official spokesman for increasing the nation’s non-military capabilities, yet his voice is not a lone one. He is joined by innumerable other expert voices in lamenting the militarization of diplomacy and the inadequacy of the nation’s soft-power capabilities.

How the system arrived at its current state of inadequacy is less well understood, but explained in this report. Considered as a whole, the national security system is grossly imbalanced, supporting strong departments at the expense of integrating mechanisms devoted to the success of national missions. Resources allocated to departments and agencies are devoted to capabilities required by their core mandates rather than the full range of capabilities required by interagency missions. The president or his staff must intervene to compensate for the system’s inability to integrate and resource efforts to resolve national security problems. They must do so with such regularity that the broader management of the national security system is left unattended. Strategic direction for the system is weak and resisted by the system in any case. The legislative branch provides resources and conducts oversight in ways that just reinforce the system’s limitations.

For all these reasons and more, the national security system is not agile, collaborative, or consistently successful, and it is particularly vulnerable during presidential transitions. The system is structured for highly centralized decision-making, but in practice chaotic. The president does not have the time to run the system and the national security advisor’s integrating authority cannot compete with the semi-autonomous status of the Cabinet level officials who run the major national security organizations. Strategy has become a short-term, neglected activity; required capabilities are not being built; and the conduct of foreign relations is skewed by the imbalance in the nation’s ability to wield military and civilian elements of power. The system:

- Is failing to produce desired outcomes with increasing frequency
- Is inefficient and increasingly so
- Encourages internal behaviors that undermine both efficiency and effectiveness

Because system problems are complex, interrelated and deeply embedded throughout the system, it cannot adapt without outside intervention. Surprisingly to some, the president cannot simply command the system to change any more than the secretary of defense can suddenly change the Pentagon. The autonomy of departments and agencies, the lack of effective integrating mechanisms, and the conflicting roles of his top advisors force the president to work around the very system he is charged with directing. Since the security environment is changing faster than the system can adapt, and in ways that exacerbate the system’s limitations, system performance will continue to decline despite the fact that it...
is served by extremely hard working and capable people and enabled by enormous resources.

In short, the system needs a complete overhaul. What it gets with some regularity, however, are emergency repairs. The system generated by the National Security Act of 1947 has been amended frequently over a period of sixty years, sometimes with dubious value and sometimes with good effects, but never in a manner that resolved the system’s basic shortfalls. Our enduring familiarity with the current system’s limitations and repeated but unsuccessful efforts to correct them should induce a sense of caution in the national security reformer. The administrative turbulence involved in major reform is high, and so is the political capital required. A major effort that produces scant results can dampen enthusiasm for reform and postpone real progress for years or until a major catastrophe reveals that the problems remain uncorrected.

Thus national security reform and its associated costs should not be undertaken without assurance that the reforms will produce their advertised benefits. That assurance can be provided with attention to several requirements, including 1) the methodological prerequisites for successful reform; 2) a vision of a better system, one built upon well-recognized concepts from proven organization and management approaches better suited for the current and projected security environment; 3) a rigorous implementation plan that demonstrates respect for our constitutional framework; and 4) a bipartisan, executive-legislative branch partnership for a rapidly orchestrated and sustained effort. This final section of the PNSR report is built around these requirements.

B. Prerequisites for Successful National Security Reform

There are three major methodological requirements for a successful national security reform study: rigorous problem analysis, a multidisciplinary approach, and an insistence on solutions that tightly and logically match the problems identified. All three of these requirements were built into the methodology that guided this study. Their necessity bears some explanation.

1. Rigorous Problem Analysis

It seems obvious that it is difficult to solve problems if they are not well understood, but it is surprising how often reform recommendations are divorced from careful problem analysis. Taking the time to investigate problems with as much objectivity and attention to detail pays handsome dividends, as a recent account of the origins of General David Petraeus’s success in Iraq underscores:

The key to the success in Iraq was, first of all, to correctly diagnose and address the fundamental problem. It sounds obvious, but it hadn’t been done by the previous commander or the White House policymakers. “The job of the leader is to get the big ideas right,” Petraeus told me during a Sept. 2 interview in his office in Baghdad’s Green Zone. When he arrived in Iraq in January 2007, he put together a top-notch multidisciplinary
study group of military, academic and diplomatic experts to analyze the war’s current state in depth and map out a sophisticated approach.\(^\text{1244}\)

Like General Petraeus searching for the solution in Iraq, national security reform demands a multidisciplinary and rigorous approach to problem analysis. Insufficient attention to problem analysis can lead to recommendations based on conventional wisdom rather than careful examination of the evidence. For example, many popular accounts of the national security system observe how flexible it is and conclude major organizational reform is not necessary. They note that the president often changes structures and processes to match his decision-making style and should do so. This is true, but the changes presidents typically make are superficial and have little impact on the actual performance of the system. As many presidents later lament, the system is fundamentally rigid—hierarchical and dominated by a set of powerful, functional bureaucracies that can stymie or veto collaboration that runs counter to their organizational interests.\(^\text{1245}\)

Another piece of conventional wisdom that proves unfounded is the assumption that the National Security Council staff will work better if it is smaller. Administrations that have temporarily reduced the staff have not seen a corresponding increase in effectiveness. The assumption that a two to three hundred person National Security Council staff can oversee an approximately four million person national security establishment is unrealistic. Compared to other organizations with headquarters that are supposed to provide integration across functional divisions and supply backbone services (e.g., State, Defense, or Central Intelligence Agency, and others), the NSC staff is small and clearly insufficient. While it may be more important to increase the authority of the staff rather than its size, both reforms are necessary.

Yet another mistaken piece of conventional wisdom is that leadership matters and organization does not. This observation is made in two contradictory ways. Some assert that the national security system works best when it is managed by a few powerful leaders, perhaps just the president working with a powerful national security advisor (think Nixon-Kissing or Carter-Brzezinski). Alternatively, it is asserted that the system works well when the top leadership embraces shared decision-making and consists of people who know, like, and respect one another. Actually, neither style of leadership has been able to ensure interagency collaboration. In the president-centric national security system created by the Constitution and reinforced by our current organization, it is always good to have a president who is knowledgeable about national security and heavily involved in it (think Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and the first Bush administration). However, most presidents do not have such experience. Moreover, while strong


individual leaders like Kissinger are able to formulate major policy positions by working around the established national security organizations, their span of control is limited and the implementation of their policies is resisted by the organizations that were sidestepped during the policy development process. Other less personality-centric national security leadership teams manage to keep their organizational differences less public, but the interagency frictions persist and militate against collaboration.

Default to conventional wisdom is not the only reason that rigorous policy analysis does not occur. There are two primary reasons why deep problem analysis is not as common as it should be. First, such analysis is impolitic. Dissecting inadequate performance when people are working extremely hard to produce favorable outcomes seems unnecessarily confrontational. Even though we ought to be able to differentiate between the performance of the system and the performance of current leaders, in practice it proves hard to separate the two. Therefore, some reports and studies avoid overly detailed problem analysis that might be considered unconstructive and simply jump to a discussion of ways to make things better. Second, problem analysis is difficult. As competing case studies illustrate, it is often hard to agree on the explanation for even a single national security issue or event. It is much more challenging to explain system performance over time. Because so many variables actually affect outcomes, and because their explanatory weight shifts so much over time, framing a summary explanation for system performance is a daunting task. Many experienced national security practitioners doubt that national security system performance can be explained with any precision, hence their tendency to identify a range of influential variables but to make no attempt to weigh and assess them for their relative import. Yet in the abstract it is obvious that the value of reform recommendations cannot exceed our understanding of the problems they are intended to remedy.

2. **Broad, Multidisciplinary Scope**

In-depth problem analysis is more manageable if the scope of the problem is limited for example to a specific mission like post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization or a function like intelligence or national security education. Accordingly, many national security reform studies and reports examine some portion of the overall national security system. These studies can be quite valuable, but in order to improve the performance of the system as a whole, it must be examined as a whole. In the case of national security, a comprehensive treatment of the system means considering both the legislative and executive branches of government.\(^{1246}\) Congress has a major role to play in national security, including codifying executive branch department and agency mandates (i.e., roles and responsibilities), providing resources for the national security system, confirming national security leadership, and conducting oversight of national policy and its implementation. Yet many national security reform studies ignore Congress—either because congressional reform is too daunting or because the expertise the studies draw upon is more familiar with the executive branch.

\(^{1246}\) An argument can be made for judicial reform on national security as well, an issue not taken up here.
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A comprehensive treatment of the national security system requires an examination of its diverse organizational components: leadership, structures, processes, human capital, resources, and knowledge management. Many national security reform efforts focus narrowly on one dimension of organization, particularly structure. One common complaint about the reforms that led to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security is that they overly emphasized the consolidation of twenty-two different agency structures and did too little to address other organizational factors, such as culture, processes, and personnel incentives.

Many other national security reform studies are not informed by organizational analysis at all. Since most national security reform efforts draw heavily if not exclusively upon the experience of expert practitioners, they tend to focus on policy analysis. In other words, instead of just examining how the system functions and why, they examine current policies and offer advice on specific policy issues, such as what the nation’s grand strategy ought to be; the sufficiency of resources devoted to nonmilitary elements of power; and the importance of particular issue areas like space, information operation, science and technology, or strategic communications. Policy analyses and prescriptions are valuable for leaders trying to get the best results using the current system, but they just detract from efforts to pinpoint major impediments to overall system performance. Put differently, driving toward a more secure future requires a team of automotive experts rather than more backseat drivers.

3. Tight Linkage between Problems and Solutions

Yet another pitfall to be avoided is compromise that vitiates the impact of the proffered solutions. Some national security reform studies conduct good, broad analysis of our system and its performance but limit their recommendations to ones supported by all members of the study team, or to those considered “politically practical.” In doing so, the authors often weaken their recommendations to half measures that cannot actually solve the problems they worked so hard to identify. Creating new functional organizations or “czars,” for example, often fail because they are given great responsibilities but few authorities to compel collaboration across diverse agencies and departments. Similarly, new procedures and education programs also have been created, but are not enforced or resourced. As the security environment continues to change in ways that make the limitations of the current national security system ever more glaring, the pace of reform efforts quickens. Limited reforms to improve unity of effort increased during the 1990s and especially after 9/11. Strangely, however, we keep instituting the types of inadequate reforms that have in the past led to such little effect.

The cumulative effect of the many inadequate national security reform initiatives in recent decades is mixed. The manifest need for greater collaboration among departments and agencies and the dismal track record of efforts to provide it underscore the urgent need for system reform, a need that has never been greater or more widely recognized. Particularly over the past two decades, an increasing number of national leaders have recognized and publicly supported the need for such reform. In this regard, the time is ripe for system reform. On the other hand, what one observer calls reorganization fatigue
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is also settling in. The costs of another failed reform effort would be high, dampening enthusiasm for organizational change for decades, and saddling the current system with a multitude of inefficiencies and counterproductive alterations. Even modest organizational reform efforts typically pass through an initial phase of low productivity before generating positive results; failure in executing a major overhaul of the system would be that much more costly than the limited reforms to date. For this reason, the nation should not embrace major national security reform unless it convincingly demonstrates a deep understanding of impediments to system performance, describes a comprehensive plan for reform, and is based on recommendations that solve the problems identified. Meeting these prerequisites is essential for building a new system capable of protecting the nation in the twenty-first-century security environment.

C. Twenty-first Century Vision

The national security system must perform on a strategic topography that is constantly generating diverse and complex challenges. Secretary of Defense Gates compares the twenty-first century strategic environment with that of the past:

I recall Henry Kissinger in 1970. There had been the Syrian invasion of Jordan. I think something was going on in Lebanon. And we had discovered the Soviets were building a submarine base in Cuba. I always thought Kissinger managing two or three crises at the same time was an act of legerdemain. I tell you: that was amateur night compared to the world today.

The challenges confronting today’s national security system are multifaceted, interrelated, and numerous. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq cannot be won without addressing broader and even more complex regional and global policy issues. Even within those two theaters, countering al-Qaeda requires a combination of diplomacy, intelligence, law enforcement, development, and military tools. To achieve energy security, the United States must integrate economic, science and technology, military, and intelligence policies and activities. The current financial crisis also has security dimensions, raising both immediate and longer-term challenges. With such a large variety of fluctuating and interrelated variables, the environment is consistently volatile and difficult to predict.

The national security system faces twenty-first century challenges but it is far from being a twenty-first century organization. The increasingly complex and dynamic security environment puts a premium on what our current system does least well: rapid, effective integration of diverse competencies to address multiple problem sets. Problems must be solved concurrently rather than sequentially, and with proper appreciation for their manifold interrelationships. We need a system that makes and implements decisions quickly across multiple functional domains and can quickly adapt to a changing environment, but we do not have one.

For those who know the system best, having worked within it for decades, it can be difficult to imagine a different way of doing business. Yet just such vision is indispensible for reform. Dean Acheson described General George C. Marshall and the group he conceived that was responsible for creating the Marshall Plan as able to “look ahead…beyond the vision of the operating officers caught in the smoke and crises of current battle; far enough ahead to see the emerging form of things to come and outline what should be done to meet or anticipate them.”\textsuperscript{1251} “The same type of vision is required now to transform the national security system into a twenty-first century organization.

The remainder of this section of the report explains the PNSR Guiding Coalition’s vision for transforming the national security system. It assumes knowledge of the discussion of reform options in Part V of the report, and concentrates on explaining new or modified recommendations and the relationships and cumulative value. In general, the terminology adopted in Part V is also used here; if not, a brief explanation is offered to clarify meaning.

1. A New Foundation for the National Security System

The first step in building a better national security system is to demonstrate that we understand the requirements imposed by the strategic environment. We can do so by adopting the following four foundational recommendations:

- Broaden the scope of national security beyond defense against aggression to include security against massive societal disruption resulting from natural forces and security against the failure of major national infrastructure systems and to recognize that national security depends on the sustained conscientious stewardship of the foundations of national power. As a corollary reform, the national security roles of each department and agency would be prescribed in statute, especially those that heretofore have not been viewed as part of the national security system. For each department not previously considered part of the national security system but which would now have prescribed roles in the system, an assistant for national security should assist the department secretary with fulfilling the organization’s new obligations.

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- **Create a new, more flexible President’s Security Council** that replaces the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council. Given the need for flexibility to address unpredictable issues, council membership and operations should move away from the restrictions imposed by the National Security Act of 1947. Accordingly, the membership of the President’s Security Council would not be specified in statute, but rather would allow the president the flexibility to determine attendance depending on the issue. The traditional core of participants would be maintained but each individual’s attendance would not be mandatory; that is, they would not be required to attend meetings that did not demand their expertise. Instead, the president should invite participants to a council meeting based on the diverse departmental and agency expertise and perspectives required to address the issue under consideration. For example, the President’s Security Council should address economic issues with security implications and would require additional attendance from department and agency heads involved in economic policy. For meetings addressing long-term strategic planning and resource allocation, the president should seek the broadest participation. The point would be to encourage the president to address international security, homeland security, and economic security issues in an integrated manner where they overlap, and without large numbers of unnecessary attendees that would undermine effective decision-making.

- **Appoint Cabinet secretaries and agency heads who are collaborative and understand the need to integrate the expertise and capabilities of departments and agencies.** As will become clear from later recommendations, a new national security system will require different leadership expectations. The new president will no doubt have to make these expectations perfectly clear on multiple occasions, but it would be best to do so upfront. His senior leaders must fully appreciate the need to 1) effectively integrate the expertise and capabilities of departments and agencies in order to carry out national security missions and 2) support interagency teams. The president should state these expectations in the executive order on the national security system or presidential directive that prescribes the President’s Security Council system. During confirmation hearings, Senate committees should assure that nominees for positions within the national security system are fully committed to working as part of a highly collaborative team focused on national missions and outcomes.

- **Establish a coherent, continuing framework and process for the national security system through an executive order and derivative presidential directives.** At a minimum, the new president’s executive order (and derivative presidential directives) would: 1) define the national security system; 2) state the overall policy of the executive branch for the national security system; 3) set forth the expectations of the president for performance of the senior officials of the national security system; 4) establish fundamental norms for all phases and functions of the national security system, including strategy, planning, policy development, policy decision-making, policy
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implementation, oversight, system management, budgeting and resourcing, human capital, and knowledge management; and 5) provide continuity across administrations for fundamental aspects of the national security system.

Because the executive order would be designed to endure, details of these fundamental norms that would be prone to change from administration to administration should be included in presidential directives derived from the order. As one example, while the president may choose to establish the basic function and membership of the President’s Security Council in the executive order, he may choose to set forth details of the Council, including substructures, staff responsibilities, and regular attendees in a separate directive, analogous to National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-1.

These foundational reforms align the upper echelon of the national security system with the strategic environment. They will not remedy major system shortcomings alone, but they pave the way for doing so. For example, broadening the scope of national security and the configuration of the President’s Security Council will not guarantee a more comprehensive approach to security, but they set the stage for it. To ensure an appropriately broad approach to security, the president should direct one or more interagency teams to focus on the foundational sources of American strength (sound economic policy, energy security, robust physical and human infrastructure, including health and education systems, especially in the sciences and engineering). Similarly, encouraging the appointment of collaborative leaders alone will not overcome the conflicting Cabinet officer roles and incentives that lead to interagency frictions. Additional reforms are necessary to accomplish that purpose. However, without collaborative leaders who understand their roles and the president’s expectations, reforms that directly address these problems will not work.

Thus, adopting these four mutually supporting recommendations is a necessary foundation for a new national security system that better reflects the reality of the twenty-first century security environment. They signal and set in place the requirements for a new system that emphasizes unity of purpose and integrated effort, agility, and a focus on national missions and outcomes rather than priority for individual department and agency equities. As the executive order should make clear, and as will be explained in detail below, the President’s Security Council and staff would focus on overarching policy, grand strategy, and strategic management while maintaining a capacity for well-informed operational and crisis decision-making. Collectively, these reforms improve the president’s ability to generate unified purpose across the required range of security activities.

For easy reference, these major recommendations and associated measures are summarized and juxtaposed with related PNSR conclusions in the following table:
Table 9. The Security Environment and the Foundation of a New National Security System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conclusions</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The security environment is changing faster than the system can adapt.</strong></td>
<td>Broaden the scope of national security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The current system assumes the environment produces only periodic challenges that require the temporary, undivided attention of the president and a small set of senior advisors.</td>
<td>- Prescribe in statute the national security roles of each department and agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In reality, the security environment is producing numerous, subtle, constantly evolving security challenges and opportunities that require careful integration of multiple department and agency efforts and that defy periodic central management.</td>
<td>- Create assistants for national security in departments and agencies not previously included in the national security system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The security environment is marked by an increase in the number and type of actors with greater means to exercise influence; e.g., small groups can conduct strategic attacks.</td>
<td>- Direct that one or more interagency teams focus on the foundational sources of American strength.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The national security system was not designed to deal with problems that require the rapid integration of diverse capabilities across multiple departments and agencies.</td>
<td><strong>Create a President’s Security Council that replaces the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Complex contingencies and other nonstate security challenges require the integration of multiple disciplines and capabilities not resident in a single agency or department.</td>
<td>- Provide that the President’s Security Council also would address economic and energy issues with security implications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Given fiscal limitations, the system must operate as efficiently as possible. Yet, by its very nature, the system is prone to capability gaps, duplication of effort, and working at cross purposes.</td>
<td>- Do not specify in statute the membership of the President’s Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- When the system fails to produce a desired outcome, it tends to increase its commitment of resources without a commensurate increase in effectiveness.</td>
<td><strong>Appoint Cabinet secretaries and agency heads skilled in collaboration.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish a coherent, continuing framework and process for the national security system through an executive order and derivative presidential directives that would:</td>
<td>- The president should state expectations for Cabinet secretaries in an executive order on the national security system or in the presidential directive that prescribes the President’s Security Council system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Define the national security system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- State the overall policy of the executive branch for the national security system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Set forth the expectations of the president for performance of the senior officials of the national security system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Establish fundamental norms for all phases and functions of the national security system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Provide continuity across administrations for fundamental aspects of the national security system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Twenty-first Century Imperatives

Organization theory and practice demonstrate that alternative ways of organizing can make the national security system thrive, despite the need for speed and undoubted complexity of the new environment. Concepts from learning organizations, organizational decision-making, complex adaptive systems, organizational culture, and organizational social psychology all have informed the practices and strategies of the most innovative and successful contemporary organizations—General Electric, IBM, Google, Whole Foods, 3M, W.L. Gore, and DuPont. Although these are business enterprises, the practices they have adopted came from sources as diverse as firefighting, basketball, jazz improvisation, and flocks of birds. They improve their performance with a readiness to embrace lessons from a remarkable spectrum of relevant experiences, and a willingness to experiment, learn, and adapt that has allowed them to reap enormous rewards. The national security system must do the same.

- A twenty-first century organization. Organizational theory has evolved considerably since its beginnings in the late nineteenth century, when Weberian bureaucracy shaped governments and companies adopted industrial-era mass production methods. Earlier conceptions of how people organized assumed that executives could break organizations down into mechanical parts. Today, this approach is considered too constraining and too confining to support individual initiative. Modern organizations are typically more malleable, with less hierarchy, less structure, and less formality. Whereas earlier organizational theorists focused on how to best divide tasks among labor, organizations now place more emphasis on how to coordinate labor across numerous dimensions—geographic, cultural, legal, institutional, political, religious, ethnic, gender, technological, and economic (markets, industries, logistical, financial). Lessons from Iraq underscore the full spectrum of activity required to succeed, including combat operations, training and employing security forces, maintaining essential services, promoting governance, and growing economic pluralism. While organizational strategists once assumed that deliberate mapping of the organization and environment and the scheduling

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of tasks to reach goals produced the best results, more recent theory and experience\textsuperscript{1257} emphasizes the need for leaders to configure their organizations to cultivate decentralized problem solving. These and other insights are relevant for reforming our national security system, which must learn to learn, handle complexity, move quickly and cohesively, and innovate. These imperatives overlap and will become mutually reinforcing.

- \textit{A learning national security system.} To better learn and assimilate knowledge, the national security system requires a new culture. Participants in the system must be devoted to constant improvement, and encouraged to acknowledge and to learn from small errors, while also staying alert to evidence that challenges their assumptions.\textsuperscript{1258} In dynamic environments, the greatest error is ignoring small mistakes and failing to notice “weak signals” that presage systemic disturbances that experienced people closest to the problems will instinctively notice. An “unmindful” and overly centralized decision-making authority contributed to the national security system’s inability to quickly deal with the insurgency in Iraq.\textsuperscript{1259} Sharing information, questioning assumptions, and emphasizing learning will permit organizational and strategic change and yield significant benefits.\textsuperscript{1260}

- \textit{Self-organizing to better manage complexity with a culture of accountability.} To handle complexity, the national security system must be able to self-organize.\textsuperscript{1261} Complex and rapidly changing environments do not allow organizations to be singularly dependent on a single decision-maker who must decide every major move the organization makes.\textsuperscript{1262} The strategic apex of an organization can scan the horizon and prepare for future threats and opportunities, and should set broad direction accordingly. But below the president, the national security system must be broken down into structures that can easily attach, detach, and reattach with others to solve problems efficiently while remaining accountable to higher authorities who have the responsibility to monitor their performance. Flexible structures that control resources can and must continuously generate new capabilities.\textsuperscript{1263} Since complex environments adapt to and challenge the strategies of organizations, the national security system must be able to produce innovative

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behaviors and accustom itself to an increasing the tempo of change. Establishing a rhythm for transitioning from one state of organizing to another is crucial for maintaining agility and accountability.

- **A national security system that makes fast, informed, and effectual decisions.** To be agile, the national security system must configure its processes to make fast, informed, and potent decisions. Those who make decisions must be properly trained, trusted, and have access to diverse expertise. They should be close to the problem they are trying to solve, as such closeness brings intimate understanding of the problem and the ability to find the proper leverage points that lead to solutions. This requires decision-making to be decentralized, and a culture open to information-sharing. The national security system must remove bureaucratic processes that impede problem-solving, clog direct communication, and lead to superfluous effort.

- **A cohesive national security community.** While complexity and decentralization are features of a reformed national security system, it also must maintain cohesion. To be cohesive, the national security system requires a common culture that connects its participants to the larger group and enterprise. Institutionalized rituals that introduce new members to the national security community must include demonstrations of openness, respect, trust, and high expectations. Members of the national security community must expect situations that challenge preconceived notions of how to accomplish tasks. Unexpected problems can destroy unified effort unless the system is made resilient through group activities that lead to greater team cohesion. The national security system must challenge individuals by conferring upon them multiple social roles so that in uncertain situations they remain adaptable. Leadership is vital for helping participants make sense of complexity, especially during periods of stress and uncertainty.

- **An innovative national security system.** To be innovative, the national security system must encourage creativity. Complex and rapidly changing environments do not allow organizations to fix their behavioral expectations. Individuals should be encouraged to find new ways of conducting their tasks. The larger system must encourage efforts to learn from failure through simulated exercises and

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1269 Ibid.
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small-scale projects that reward experience. People must be rewarded for success and encouraged with additional responsibility. Unconventional thinking must be promoted but also tested with evidence-based analysis. The national security system must emphasize not only collaboration and teamwork, but also individual strengths and interests.\textsuperscript{1270} This cannot happen unless the national security system breaks the hold of separate departments and agencies on how individuals relate to the larger community.

a. Refining the Vision

The twenty-first century organizational imperatives just enumerated provide a conceptual basis for how the new national security system should be organized, but they must be translated into a set of specific prescriptions for system reforms. To provide greater unity of purpose, better and more consistent strategic direction, and unity of effort, the president needs additional help and tools. In essence, we need a new national security system that is responsive to the direction of the president but not dependent on him to run the system and make decisions on a day-to-day basis. We are at the end of the president’s practical span of control and now need better cross functional mechanisms and tools for strategic decision-making and collaboration at all levels of the national security system. To create such a system, the following three steps are necessary:

1. **Strengthen strategic direction and build a collaborative backbone for the system.**

   Process, resource, knowledge management, human capital, and security culture for the national security system would be supported by new cross-cutting capabilities directed from the White House. A director for national security and a small staff would conduct national security mission analysis and mission budgeting in cooperation with other White House offices. The director and his staff would be supported by an empowered executive secretary and larger staff that would oversee supporting human capital and knowledge management reforms. In addition, the president would be provided with additional system management tools that would be used by the President’s Security Council, the director for national security, and supported by the executive secretary.

2. **Distribute national issue and mission management.**

   Currently national issue and mission management get pulled into the White House to ensure success. Instead, in the new national security system, the director for national security would help the president push issue management out of the White House. He or she would assign missions or issues to be managed by the appropriate authority. Agency-centric issues would be assigned to lead departments to manage, and inherently, interagency issues would be managed by teams empowered for end-to-end issue management of any security issue (or mission if the objectives were already clear) at appropriate levels of the national security system. In the case of homeland security, the collaborative teams employed by the federal government must be adjusted to reflect the

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independence of state and local government and to accommodate the critical role played by the private sector.

3. **Consolidate some elements of national power and crisis management authorities.**

Since 1947, greater unity of effort within functional disciplines (e.g., diplomatic, military, intelligence, and homeland security matters) has been provided by consolidating authority in powerful departments. The degree of consolidation rightly differs by functional area, but in two cases there has been insufficient consolidation of authority under a single entity. First, during steady-state, non-crisis periods the consolidated authority for managing foreign relations is weak, and our influence abroad suffers as a result. Second, during crises when decisions must be made quickly and authoritatively across a range of disciplines, there is the need for a single, integrated source of directive authority to manage the interagency response.

Recommendations on how to take these three critical steps and associated measures are explained in the following sections along with supporting tables that summarize the conclusions that led to the recommendations.

b. **Stronger Strategic Direction and a Collaborative Backbone**

The system needs an overarching authority dedicated to full-time system management on behalf of the president. The current national security advisor lacks the authority to fulfill this purpose. When national security advisors abandon their honest broker role for more aggressive policy development and system direction, the powerful Cabinet officials and departments raise legal impediments to the exercise of such authority and also resist policy implementation. If national security advisors do not abandon their honest broker role, they can only organize and clarify department positions for the president, leaving him to perform whatever integration and system management his schedule and impossible span of control permit. To assist the president with national security system management, a new position is required, which PNSR has given the title “director for national security.” The director for national security would facilitate the preparation and coordination of departments that are to be assigned new national security missions and associated roles and functions, but also would have the duties specified in the following chart, of which apply to other recommendations discussed below:
### Table 10. Director for National Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conclusions</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The system is grossly imbalanced, supporting strong departmental capabilities at the expense of integrating mechanisms.</td>
<td>Create in statute the position of director for national security, within the Executive Office of the President, with the following duties:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Poor system integration (from basic information to capabilities to authority relationships) leads to poor efficiency. The system:</td>
<td>- Serving as the principal assistant to the president on all matters relating to national security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Is reactive, not anticipatory; prone to crisis management</td>
<td>- Promoting effective performance of the national security system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Doesn’t manage issues “end to end” from assessment to policy implementation and evaluation</td>
<td>- Developing the National Security Strategy, National Security Planning Guidance, and National Security Resource Document, to include resource allocation for interagency teams and task forces (in conjunction with the director of the Office of Management and Budget [OMB])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Is expensive to run and wastes resources</td>
<td>- In close collaboration with the intelligence community, identifying and/or validating national security opportunities and threats that require an interagency response, either at the national or regional level, and recommending their assignments to appropriate interagency teams, interagency crisis task forces, or lead departments and agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Requires informal “work around” behaviors and processes that seem expedient, but ultimately reduce system efficiency and effectiveness</td>
<td>- Securing presidential approval for each interagency team, its charter (specifying mission, objectives, authorities, and resources), and the strategy developed by the team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The authority relationship between Cabinet secretaries and national security advisors is conflicted and confusing.</td>
<td>- Monitoring the performance of interagency teams approved by the president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cabinet members must balance statutory obligations to build, manage, and safeguard departmental capabilities with their roles as presidential advisors on national missions.</td>
<td>- Assisting the president in overseeing and reconciling differences among teams, task forces, and other multiagency organizations, and conflicts between interagency organizations and departments and agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Security advisors must serve as honest brokers who fairly represent department positions on any issue but also advise the president and serve as his primary source of integrated perspective.</td>
<td>- Assessing continually the efficiency and effectiveness of the system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Supporting the president’s supervision and coordination of the policies, plans, and actions that are the primary responsibility of a single department or agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Creating appropriate organizational linkages and arrangements across regional and issue-specific teams to ensure unity of purpose with the president’s security strategy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the director for national security’s duties would be overseeing a set of processes designed to improve system management. He or she would be responsible for developing the National Security Strategy, National Security Planning Guidance, and the National Security Resource Document, all of which would enable the White House to allocate resources consistent with strategic direction. The National Security Review would be performed at the beginning of each presidential term in order to prioritize objectives.
establish risk management criteria, specify roles and responsibilities for priority missions, assess required capabilities, and identify capability gaps. Based upon the results of the National Security Review, National Security Planning Guidance would be prepared and issued annually to all national security departments and agencies. The planning guidance would provide specific objectives, directives, and measures of performance to national security organizations and also require some small number of integrated interagency plans to build required capabilities. These processes would include resource allocation for the interagency teams and task forces discussed below (in conjunction with the director of OMB).

There are good arguments for and against requiring the advice and consent of the Senate on a nomination of a person to serve as the director for national security. Some of these arguments cut both ways, including the plusses and minuses of making this official accountable to Congress. Senate confirmation would, as a practical matter, establish a primary official to provide authoritative testimony on system-wide national security matters, reports, and interagency missions and activities. The legal standing it would give the director would be indispensable in carrying out the duties of the position. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how a person exercising the authorities of what is currently one of the most powerful positions in government, and which will become even more powerful if PNSR’s recommendations are accepted, would not be accountable to the legislative branch in some degree.

Yet, a confirmable director for national security also would have major disadvantages, beginning with accountability to Congress, which would disrupt the director’s singular responsibility to serve the president. Confirmation could undermine the director’s confidential relationship with the president to the degree that the president may feel compelled to rely on other unconfirmed advisers, a development that would weaken the director’s ability to run the national security system. In addition, responding to Congress would levy another burden on an official who would have vast duties.

Given the strong arguments for and against making the director for national security confirmable, PNSR’s Guiding Coalition decided not to rule on the issue at this time. If the president and Congress act on PNSR’s recommendations, the confirmation of the director for national security position would be a key issue for those authorities to address. PNSR’s Guiding Coalition will continue to study this issue and may advance its own recommendation in the future. Meanwhile, the key point is that, regardless of confirmation, the director for national security position would still have to have authorities and responsibilities not now assigned to the assistant to the president for national security affairs. The director for national security would have authority to run the national security system and to decide which issues to assign to lead departments and agencies and which to assign to interagency teams. He or she would also direct the activities of the Executive Secretariat, which in turn would run the human capital, knowledge management, and long-range assessment and planning activities for the national security system. In addition, the director for national security would assist the president by developing the
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS


To assist the director for national security with these responsibilities, two additional positions should be created. First, there would be a deputy director responsible for interagency operations analysis that would assist the director in evaluating progress on a select number of critical interagency policies and missions. This deputy and his or her staff could not function as a red team, second guessing and challenging the efficacy of current approaches, but instead would support the director and staff with analysis designed to objectively answer specific concerns associated with ongoing missions and issues. However, the president and director should on occasion draw upon other outside expertise to perform red team functions. Given the sensitivity associated with such analysis of ongoing policies, it would be important to have the deputy for operations analysis subject to the director’s immediate supervision.

Second, the executive secretary that currently serves the National Security Council should be given a broader set of “good government” functions, specified in statute that would support better system management. The executive secretary would assist the director for national security in supporting the President’s Security Council, which would focus on high-level policy and strategy, and associated planning (e.g., the National Security Review, National Security Strategy, National Security Planning Guidance, National Security Resource Document, National Security Strategic Human Capital Plan), oversight and coordination of interagency teams, and system management.

These recommendations, with additional details on the duties of the new positions, are captured in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 11. System Management Tools and an Empowered Executive Secretary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conclusions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A burdened White House cannot manage the national security system well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently, the national security system is not subject to strategic direction and is not manageable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The president must work around the system that is supposed to support him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The system cannot conduct long-range planning or resource management.</td>
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</table>

¹²⁷¹ The director of national security would be responsible for these strategic guidance documents, but might want to form interagency teams to perform one or more or some portion of these policy formulation and strategic planning tasks.
### Conclusions and Recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conclusions</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>● The system encourages crises by delaying action until problems are so severe the president must intervene.</td>
<td>○ Establish and routinely update principles for the functioning of the national security system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● The powerful statutory authorities of Cabinet level officials are not counterbalanced with tools that would assist the president in integrating those capabilities to accomplish national missions.</td>
<td>○ Direct preparation of a select number of integrated interagency plans to build required capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>○ Since departments control resources, the president must work through them to implement policies.</td>
<td>● Create in statute an executive secretary position for the President’s Security Council, reporting to the director for national security, with the following duties to support system management:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● The system has trouble assigning responsibilities in new or non-traditional mission areas. Departments and agencies both fight over and neglect key missions.</td>
<td>○ Assessing the alignment of organizational strategy and processes with strategic objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Management support, including decision support, for priority interagency efforts is poor.</td>
<td>○ Supporting the development of strategy, strategic guidance, and long-range and near-term strategic planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>○ NSC staff cannot marshal sufficient analytic resources and information to advise the president well on interagency issues.</td>
<td>○ Ensuring that macro-resource allocation is consistent with strategic objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Poor system management is greatly exacerbated during presidential transitions.</td>
<td>○ Communicating policy, strategy, missions, and initiatives to the national security workforce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Managing the interagency human capital system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Providing the capacity to rapidly create, house, and support interagency teams established to address presidential priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Ensuring that knowledge, information, best practices, and key ideas are shared throughout the system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Supporting interagency scenario-based planning and assessments of the system and its environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Create a position reporting to the director for national security responsible for interagency operations analysis:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Providing real-time assessments of system performance, down to the regional team or interagency crisis task force level, during ongoing operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Forwarding lessons learned from assessments of system performance to the executive secretary for compilation and dissemination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Linking strategic direction to resource allocation is one of the most important ends served by the improved system management tools and new positions created in these recommendations. All the strategic planning processes and documents identified above must be developed with full recognition of resource constraints and the advantages and disadvantages of alternative resource choices. Thus, the president’s security staff and the OMB must cooperate better to review and clarify resource allocation choices. Jointly, these two presidential staffs should assess the extended resource plans for each national security department and agency to determine their consistency with the National Security Planning Guidance, issue guidance for each department’s and agency’s program, and produce an integrated national security budget for congressional consideration. The President’s Budget submission to Congress should include integrated justification material that reflects how each department’s and each agency’s budget and the overall
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Budget align with the objectives of the National Security Review and National Security Planning Guidance. Currently, these activities would exceed the capacity of the president’s security staff and OMB, so these staffs would have to be strengthened.

Table 12. National Security Mission Analysis and Mission Budgeting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conclusions</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Departments and agencies use resources for capabilities required by their core mandates rather than those required for national missions.</td>
<td>Link resources to goals through national security mission analysis and mission budgeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The resource allocation process is a rigid and tightly contested race to win and maintain funds, not conducive to tradeoffs or the ability to meet emergencies with a surge of effort.</td>
<td>• Direct each national security department and agency to prepare a six-year budget projection derived from the National Security Planning Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o The process reflects and exacerbates friction between departments and agencies.</td>
<td>• Direct the President’s Security Council (PSC) staff to lead a joint PSC-OMB review of those plans to assess consistency with National Security Planning Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Budgets are developed along departmental lines and disbursed through departmental mechanisms.</td>
<td>o Direct OMB to issue guidance for each department’s and agency’s six-year program in the National Security Resource Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o In the process, departments and agencies shortchange interagency missions.</td>
<td>• Require each department and agency to submit its annual budget to OMB consistent with the guidance in the National Security Resource Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The system provides capabilities for core activities but not for the full range of capabilities required by priority national missions.</td>
<td>• Produce an integrated national security budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o As part of the President’s Budget submission to Congress, provide a single integrated national security budget display</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The president will also need a system that cooperates rather than resists these higher level exercises in strategic direction. Thus, the current disincentives for individuals to collaborate across departmental boundaries must be eliminated. The national security system must consolidate personnel and information-sharing systems to change the system’s culture and enable such collaboration. This must be done without degrading the quality of specialists and without sacrificing information security. In addition to ameliorating problems identified in the current national security system, the new personnel and information-sharing system would include features that instill organizational learning, encourage innovation, and strengthen cohesion.</td>
<td>• Build a core competency within the President’s Security Council staff and OMB to execute the above tasks, including national security mission analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The recommended actions for centralizing control of some personnel and information-sharing systems are straightforward and detailed in the following charts. Some of the human capital recommendations require elaboration, however. For example:

• The Human Capital Advisory Board designed to advise the executive secretary of the President’s Security Council should identify all stakeholders, including employee professional associations, unions, and employees, and develop a
structured consultation process built around meetings, town hall events, web-based collaboration sites, and similar methods.

- **The National Security Professional Corps** personnel should be specifically trained and prepared for interagency assignments with incentives to recruit and retain the most talented and qualified personnel. The executive secretary should establish education, training, and experience prerequisites for entry into the Corps, and designate interagency positions that may only be filled by Corps members.

- **The Cadre of National Security Executives** (NSEs) would be presidentially appointed with standing and formal authority to lead interagency teams. Personnel accepted as NSEs would be highly respected members of the national security community who are known for their leadership, expertise in statecraft, and skills in their departmental specialty. They could come from within the National Security Professional Corps as well as from outside of it.

- **The National Security Fellowship Program** designed to recruit and train highly qualified individuals for national security service would emphasize skill areas—scientific, technological, cultural, language, etc.—identified in the National Security Strategic Human Capital Plan. The program would include rotational assignments in different national security departments and agencies.

- **The Promotional Requirements** to create incentives for service in interagency assignments would require:
  
  o Each department and agency rigorously screen personnel to serve in interagency or rotational assignments in other departments to ensure that they are highly qualified, and to ensure personnel that have successfully served in interagency or rotational assignments in other departments receive significant credit in promotion evaluations for such performance
  
  o One rotational assignment outside of an individual’s department or agency as a prerequisite for promotion to senior rank (e.g., Senior Executive Service, Senior Intelligence Service).

- **The Comprehensive, Professional Education and Training Program** should be based upon and use the existing National Security Education Consortium (established by Executive Order 13434) and focus on common skills and culture, spanning the life cycle of national security employees

- **Civilian Personnel Augmentation** should take place in annual increments to be phased in over five years and based upon a manpower analysis. The increase in civilian personnel and supporting authorizations and appropriations would create a “float” to enable interagency training, education, and experiential opportunities.

**Table 13. Human Capital Reforms**

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## Conclusions and Recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conclusions</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>● The system complements weak integrating structures and processes with even weaker cross-cutting national security culture, personnel system, and knowledge-sharing mechanisms.</td>
<td>Align personnel incentives, leader development, personnel preparation, and organizational culture with strategic objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Departments and agencies control and hoard their people, making interagency staffing difficult.</td>
<td>● Develop a National Security Strategic Human Capital Plan to align human capital programs with strategic goals, objectives, and outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o There are no incentives for individuals to leave their agencies or for departments or agencies to share them.</td>
<td>o Require the periodic (but not less than every four years) review of the National Security Strategic Human Capital Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Strong and enduring department and agency cultures exert primary influence over behaviors and are not conducive to collaboration.</td>
<td>● Approve a Human Capital Advisory Board of public and private experts to advise the executive secretary of the President’s Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Personnel must now regularly perform a broader set of tasks than their predecessors.</td>
<td>● Establish new interagency personnel designations and programs to better recruit, prepare, and reward national security professionals for interagency assignments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Building organizational capacity is not a high priority for senior leaders because incentives encourage attention to policy advising and external political struggles.</td>
<td>o Create a National Security Professional Corps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● The short tenure of political appointees militates against leaders building the strength of their organizations through better management.</td>
<td>o Create a separate cadre of National Security Executives to lead interagency teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Establish a National Security Fellowship Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Use promotional requirements to create incentives for service in interagency assignments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Strengthen education and training programs for interagency personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Create a comprehensive, professional education and training program with an interdisciplinary curriculum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Increase civilian manpower to create a “float” that will enable interagency training, education, and experiential opportunities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Require a mandatory orientation program for each individual assigned to a national security position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Give high priority to preparing civilian personnel for leadership positions in the national security system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Require an individual nominated to serve in a Senate-confirmed national security position to complete a three-week course on the national security system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Strengthen the process for appointment and service in senior positions in the national security system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Require that each nomination for one of the ten most senior positions in a national security department or agency would be placed on the executive calendar of the Senate with or without a committee recommendation after 30 days of legislative session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Within an administration, establish the expectation that each presidential appointee, unless disabled, experiencing a hardship, requested to resign by the president, or appointed to another government position, would serve until the president has appointed his or her successor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Improve cross-administration continuity by staffing the Executive Secretariat of the President’s Security Council with career civil servants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conclusions</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- The system cannot make sense of all available information or routinely make effective and informed decisions.</td>
<td>- Create a common set of financial and other forms required of nominees for use by the White House and Senate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- There is little maintenance of an organizational memory at the national security system level.</td>
<td>- Establish an independent commission to identify minimum qualifications of ambassadorial positions and review the qualifications of career and political nominees for these positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Agencies and departments control capabilities for issue assessment, decision-making support, and evaluation, complicating the rapid integration and adjustment of policy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Current organization generates powerful disincentives to share information freely.</td>
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</table>

The intent of the knowledge management reforms also requires some commentary. The chief knowledge officer in the PSC Executive Secretariat would enhance decision support to the president and his or her advisors and ensure that the national security system as a whole can develop, store, retrieve, and share knowledge, including such basic information as current and past executive orders, policy decisions, issue papers, lessons learned, recommendations from outgoing presidential appointees, etc.

Table 14. Knowledge Management Reforms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conclusions</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The system has only a weak capacity for self-reflection, self-renewal, or self-reform.</td>
<td>Greatly improve flow of knowledge and information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The system cannot make sense of all available information or routinely make effective and informed decisions.</td>
<td>- Create the position of chief knowledge officer in the PSC Executive Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- There is little maintenance of an organizational memory at the national security system level.</td>
<td>- Create capacity to track executive orders, policy decisions, issue papers, lessons learned, and recommendations across administrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Agencies and departments control capabilities for issue assessment, decision-making support, and evaluation, complicating the rapid integration and adjustment of policy.</td>
<td>- Establish a single security classification and access regime for the entire national security system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Current organization generates powerful disincentives to share information freely.</td>
<td>- Consolidate security clearance procedures and approval so individual clearances are respected across the national security system.1272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Create the position of chief knowledge officer in each national security department and agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Create a Federal Chief Knowledge Officer Council to enhance cross-system knowledge flows and information management policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1272 A statutory provision is needed to strengthen section 2.1(c) of Executive Order 13467 signed by President Bush on June 30, 2008.

c. Decentralized National Mission and Issue Management

While the security advisor must be empowered to provide system management, he or she cannot be responsible for managing the numerous issues that the system must be capable of handling. Instead, new, more decentralized mechanisms that can integrate cross-functional expertise and capabilities are required. The existing national security system’s
structure, which is a source of strength but also many problems, subdivides into disciplines—diplomacy, military, intelligence, economics, etc. The departments and agencies that provide core expertise should not be replaced but augmented with horizontal organizational structures that can provide better integration across functional disciplines and do so for a range of critical issues. Horizontal organizations create the kinds of empowered teams identified as an option in Part V of this report. They work with diverse expertise formed around types of processes and problems.\textsuperscript{1273} In the case of the national security system, teams could be created to confront challenges such as nuclear proliferation in the Middle East or Northeast Asia, extremist Islamic terrorism, Colombian drug trafficking, energy security, global warming, etc. Departments and agencies would not be able to impose boundaries on individuals to collaborate in a multidisciplinary fashion.

With this new hybrid organizational structure, the national security system would no longer resemble a small group of barons overseeing their fiefdoms under the less than watchful eye of a distant and distracted king. Rather, it would operate much like professional and leading high-tech organizations, in which actors take on issues by assembling teams comprised of their peers. The teams remain under the direction of higher authority but are provided wide latitude for how they solve problems. Team leaders and members are judged by their performance against desired outcomes and not for their devotion to one leader’s perspective or an organization’s interests. Over time, this type of self organization wherein many different levels of the system can create teams and the teams themselves have broad authority and latitude to solve problems within the scope of their mandates and subject to selective intervention by higher authority will better handle complexity, making fast and informed decisions.

The national security system could not suddenly absorb a large number of empowered teams. Instead, the transition to such teams would need to evolve slowly and would best begin under the direct supervision of the president and his director for national security to ensure they were successful. Thus, the first teams would be small in number and focused on the president’s top national security priorities. They would be prototypes for later teams and it would be important to get their attributes and functions right. Team attributes are specified in the chart below.

**Table 15. Empowered Teams**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conclusions</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presidential intervention to integrate or resource missions well centralizes issue management and burdens the White House.</td>
<td>Initiate the process of shifting the management of national security issues from the President’s Security Council staff (and supporting interagency committees) to interagency teams, starting with a small set of presidential-priority-issue teams.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Interagency committees cannot integrate different agency perspectives into alternative courses of action, each of which would</td>
<td>• They would be led by a national security executive with national stature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The team leader selects team members based on expertise needed to successfully accomplish mission.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conclusions</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>represent a combined effort from multiple agencies, and make and implement the decision with unity of effort.</td>
<td>• Teams without representation from a relevant department or agency would have senior points of contact to ensure good communication between the team and the departments and agencies that will carry out the interagency mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Even with a declared policy, unified effort frequently breaks down during implementation leading to poor performance.</td>
<td>• The team would endure until its mission is accomplished, but leadership and membership could change as circumstances warrant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• All presidents, regardless of initial inclinations, end up asserting greater centralization control over priority issues:</td>
<td>• Team leaders and members would be required to complete a training program administered by the Executive Secretariat of the President’s Security Council that would include team leader and member responsibilities, operating procedures, dynamics, and conflict resolution. It would also distinguish collaboration from cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The problem with centralizing policy development and implementation is that the relatively small White House staff cannot cover the range of necessary issues.</td>
<td>• The team would perform its mission under a presidentially-approved charter. The charter would include the specified mission, clear objectives, team authorities, and initial resource levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o The White House only succeeds in establishing clear policy and strategy for a small number of issues, and often in an untimely fashion.</td>
<td>• The team would develop a strategy for achieving the charter’s objectives. The strategy would include an assessment of alternative approaches, integrated for the whole government, along with advantages and disadvantages and ways to minimize the latter; the responsibilities of existing or newly created organizations within the strategy; milestones and measures by which to judge progress toward meeting the objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is important to be clear about the limited authority of the teams and their relationship with the director for national security. The teams are provided wide latitude for how they solve problems, but they remain under the supervision of the director for national security, who serves the president. Since the president, advised by his Security Council, and the director for national security focus on high-level policy and strategy, they will not want to intervene in team activities often. At the same time, they must retain the capacity for well-informed operational and crisis decision-making. This includes the ability to</td>
<td>• Once approved by the president, the team would have the responsibility for assessing the strategy and associated plans and making necessary adjustments that are within its mandate or recommending adjustments that require approval.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o The team would monitor department and agency progress toward achieving mission objectives.</td>
<td>o The team would exercise authority under its charter to adjust responsibilities and resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o The team would exercise authority under its charter to adjust responsibilities and resources.</td>
<td>o In case of major adjustments that constitute a change in strategy, the team would recommend changes to the president that would be staffed through the President's Security Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o In case of major adjustments that constitute a change in strategy, the team would recommend changes to the president that would be staffed through the President's Security Council.</td>
<td>• In addition to commenting on initial team strategy and major adjustments, department and agency heads would be able to challenge team recommendations and decisions by appealing them to the president on the basis of unacceptable damage to national interests.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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delve down into an issue when that seems necessary, and after careful review, issue corrective directions.

This point bears some elaboration. The Tower Commission’s investigations and recommendations on Iran-Contra popularized the notion that White House staff should not delve into or control operational details. But it is important to remember that Iran-Contra became a scandal because White House staff worked around congressional restrictions in a manner that was generally agreed to be illegal, poorly coordinated, and ultimately based on poor decisions and bad direction. Interagency teams would relieve the system’s tendency to find ways to work around the ineffective formal structures and processes. In addition, however, in the new, more transparent system, structured for collaborative decision-making, it would be entirely appropriate for higher authority on occasion, after due deliberation, to guide subordinate decision-making. It will also be common for interagency teams, sometimes challenging one another, and sometimes challenged by Cabinet departments, to appeal conflicts for resolution by higher authority. The division of labor in these recommendations, between those responsible for strategic direction and those charged with decentralized issue management, does not preclude supervision by higher authorities. Leaders with broader vision and charged with reconciling competing objectives must have the responsibility and capacity to intervene to obtain information and occasionally direct the details of subordinate operations. This holds true both for presidential priority teams and the crisis task forces recommended below.

It is also important to be clear about the expected growth in team decision-making. While the new national security system should absorb interagency teams slowly at first, and at the national level under close supervision, they have potential for making rapid progress in addressing global and regional issues from an integrated whole-of-government perspective. If the president is given the means to use interagency teams, which we believe requires statutory changes, then based upon their performance, he may well choose to proliferate them as circumstances demand. As empowered teams prove, they are better able to integrate diverse expertise and capabilities to achieve national priority objectives quickly and efficiently, and as department and agency leaders recognize and accept their division of labor with the interagency teams, the system will continue to evolve.

In particular, the more teams proliferate, the greater will be the need for intervening levels of decision authority to manage team efforts. Teams will focus on and give priority to their missions and issues. As the use of teams proliferates, it will become more necessary and challenging to coordinate and reconcile their efforts. In the future, it will not be necessary or helpful to have all team efforts directly supervised by the director for national security and his or her staff. Eventually, the national security system will have to agree on lower level authorities who could serve as hubs around which the teams would operate, drawing guidance and logistical support from them. The hierarchy of offices and teams in the graphic on page 519 are just illustrative. As noted in Part V of the report, there are several viable options for how best to provide such guidance.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Empowered teams could greatly improve the ability of the federal government to assist state and local governments responding to a catastrophic event because they ultimately operate under the authority of the president. However, because state and local governmental authority exists independent of the federal government, a much more collaborative networking approach is required for homeland security issues. The Homeland Security Collaboration Committee proposed in the chart below would be a rotating membership with staggered two-year terms patterned upon the models of collaborative steering committees identified in Part V of this report, including the Green Building Council that the Environmental Protection Agency recognizes as an authority in setting standards for its green building initiatives. The committees’ membership would have to be small enough to work effectively but diverse to reflect and secure the support of the tens of thousands of state and local jurisdictions and innumerable private sector interests. PNSR proposes a rotating membership of fourteen members with staggered two-year terms, to include:

- Four governors or their designated representatives
- Four private-sector members
- Four sitting mayors or county executives or their designated representatives
- Two senior officials from the Department of Homeland Security

To further facilitate collaboration with nongovernmental organizations and the private sector in the event of a catastrophic incident, Congress should pass a law creating a Business Emergency Management Assistance Compact that would parallel the state-to-state Emergency Management Assistance Compact. It would facilitate collaborative support during emergencies by eliminating impediments that arise from complications such as licensing, credentialing, liability, and workers compensation and reimbursement.

Table 16. Homeland Security Collaboration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conclusions</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homeland security is hampered by weak integrating mechanisms in the federal</td>
<td>Establish arrangements for increasing the collaboration on homeland security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government, and between the federal government and state and local</td>
<td>among the federal government, state and local governments, and private-sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>authorities.</td>
<td>and nongovernmental organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Weak integration among federal departments and agencies diminishes the</td>
<td>• Create in statute a Homeland Security Collaboration Committee under the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ability of the federal government to assist state and local governments</td>
<td>purview of the President’s Security Council to provide a venue for collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>responding to a catastrophic event.</td>
<td>of state and local governments and private-sector and nongovernmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Constitution division of power between federal and state and local</td>
<td>organizations with the federal government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>authorities means that unified purpose and effort requires more collaborative</td>
<td>○ Specify fourteen members of the committee: six appointed by the president,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arrangements than empowered teams.</td>
<td>four by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>four by the House Committee on Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Create in statute a Business Emergency Management Assistance Compact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>concerning private sector and nongovernmental</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>assistance in emergency management.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Direct the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a National Operational Framework that would describe how operational integration would occur across all government and private sector levels.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**d. Consolidation of Soft-Power and Crisis Management Authorities**

The empowered team approach will work better with two additional types of consolidated authorities. First, the exercise of soft-power overseas requires further consolidation so that the almost thirty organizations representing the U.S. government in this domain work better together. Second, in a crisis when there is little time for collaborative development of courses of action and the referral of especially difficult issues to higher deliberative bodies, more directive authority and significant staff augmentation are required. In particular, the practice of maintaining dual chains of command in the field—one for managing military forces and another for managing civilian agencies—must stop. Both of these recommendations require elaboration since at first glance they might seem inconsistent with the requirement for horizontal organizations that are also recommended.

**e. Department of State**

Most major national security problems will require the integration of multiple instruments of power. Since 1947, Congress and the president have repeatedly intervened to consolidate the authority of a single department or agency to provide the U.S. government with an essential discipline—mostly in defense, less so in intelligence, recently in homeland security, and seldom with respect to foreign relations. As a result, the current structure of the Department of State has been unable to effectively manage the nation’s increasingly diverse foreign relations responsibilities for some time. The exercise of foreign relations is a mob scene of independent agencies, especially in our attempts to manage the numerous so-called “soft powers” resident in diverse organizations within the federal government.

When the Department of State has been given additional responsibilities, it has not proven able or willing to manage them well. While the Department of State occupies the center of the civilian foreign affairs community, it is too narrowly focused on traditional diplomacy and does not exercise sufficient authority, resources, or management skill to effectively supervise the full range of foreign relations. Even at the country team level, where unified management exists in the form of the chief of mission authority, de facto unity of effort is limited by the relative autonomy of the several departments and agencies participating on the country team.

Successful integration of diverse foreign policy components on the necessary scale requires a new department with a new institutional culture. The objective would be to consolidate a sufficient mass of soft-power components of international relations in a new and more expansive Department of State, structured as a comprehensive, mission-oriented department, with the specific mission of integrating the nation’s international programs within the broader context of national security. In doing so, a corollary
objective would to rebalance the relationship between soft (civilian) and hard (military) power. The current imbalance, often referred to as the “militarization of foreign policy,” is due as much to a question of authorities as resources. In fact, until the Department of State is empowered to direct a wider range of soft-power capabilities and reformed to manage and integrate them well, throwing additional resources into this arena would not be productive.

The recommendations for restructuring the Department of State are detailed in the following chart:

### Table 17. Department of State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conclusions</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The absence of an effective integration mechanism for soft (civilian) power stimulates unhealthy reliance on hard (military) power, including inadequate resourcing for soft-power capabilities.</td>
<td>Transform the Department of State by:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Insufficient resources for civilian foreign affairs agencies undermine effective conduct of the war against terror, jeopardizing success and sending the wrong signals about American priorities and methods.</td>
<td>• Transferring to the Department of State any organization assigned to another department or agency that is performing a responsibility that is clearly within the core competencies of the Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• More resources for soft power are not likely absent fundamental reform of the culture and management capabilities of the Department of State.</td>
<td>• Expanding the Foreign Service to include cadres of personnel from other departments who represent their departments and U.S. foreign policy interests overseas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. Crisis Task Forces

In normal circumstances, the system will solve security problems in a more time-consuming and collaborative fashion. For example, teams will normally develop integrated courses of action and if the advantages of multiple courses of action seem evenly balanced, they will elevate the decision to the next higher level for resolution, which may take some time. In a crisis, however, more directive authority is required. Empowered teams should be augmented to create crisis task forces (see figure below).
The task force leader may draw upon the strengths of an existing team, taking the time allotted to collaborate to the extent possible. However, ultimately, the task force leader must be empowered to use directive authority to keep pace with the developing situation. Ensuring an integrated chain of command from the president to the task force leader will require legislative changes but also cultural changes as diverse organizations learn to work in a collaborative fashion under the direction of a leader with directive authority.

Figure 27. Crisis Task Force Reporting & Chain of Command

The interagency crisis task force recommendations are illustrated in the preceding graphic and specified in the table below.

Table 18. Interagency Crisis Task Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conclusions</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dual chains of command seriously undermine unity of purpose and effort in</td>
<td>Create an Interagency Crisis Task Force to handle a crisis in a country or region that exceeds the capacity of the country team or regional-level team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the field.</td>
<td>• The Task Force would have a single director, a clear mission, clear responsibilities, authority commensurate with responsibilities, and resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The director would be supported by an augmented interagency staff and additional resources from national security departments and agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The director would report to the president through the director for national security if the mission is large and important enough or alternatively to the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- head of the task force director’s respective department.
- For crises involving complex contingencies when a large number of U.S. military forces are present, unless directed otherwise by the president, the director would be placed in a single integrated chain of command for all U.S. civilian and military functions during interagency operations.
- This integrated chain of command may be headed by a civilian official or military officer, depending on the security situation.
- Empower the leader to be the authoritative source for coordination, planning, prioritizing, and integrating resources provided by departments and agencies.
  o Require the preparation by an integrated team of a civil-military handbook for integrated command operations presenting basic principles, common lexicon, and performance metrics.
  o Require personnel deploying to an integrated command to receive training in crisis management.
- Direct a common alignment of world regions for departments and agencies to adopt in their internal organizations.
- Direct the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a National Operational Framework that would describe how operational integration would occur across all government and private sector levels for the full range of homeland security activities, including prevention and protection as well as response and recovery.

Centralizing strategic direction and system management, decentralizing national mission and issue management, and some additional consolidation of soft-power and crisis management authorities will provide a fundamentally new national security system for the United States. The new system would eliminate current impediments to good performance and permit the continued evolution of the system in response to environmental demands:

- Instead of a grossly imbalanced system dominated by strong departmental capabilities at the expense of integrating mechanisms, we would have a hybrid organization that permits integrated problem solving.

- Instead of a burdened White House incapable of managing the national security system as a whole, the president would be given the tools to ensure strategic direction of the national security system so that it is agile and collaborative and performs well even during presidential transitions.

- Instead of requiring White House intervention to force integration and resourcing of national priorities, the system would decentralize problem solving while allowing the White House to explore any priority issue that arises.

- Instead of departments and agencies using the resources they are allocated only for building and employing the capabilities required by their core mandates, the system would provide resources for priority national missions.
3. Congressional Reforms

To complete the transformation of the system, the legislative branch behaviors that currently reinforce the system limitations must be removed. Congress must adjust its own organization to permit healthy executive branch flexibility and better oversight of ongoing national security missions. The recommendations for effecting congressional reforms are fully consistent with the recommendations in Part V of this report and captured in the following chart for ease of reference. Only the recommendations for amending Section 302 (a) of the Congressional Budget Act require some elaboration. The amendments should include the following provisions:

- Reenact the firewalls that prevented floor amendments transferring funds from international or defense programs to domestic programs that would exceed caps on discretionary spending.

- Require a supermajority vote in the House to waive the current rule requiring passage of authorizing legislation prior to consideration of appropriations bills for defense and foreign policy.

- Impose limitations on debate in the Senate on national security authorization measures similar to those currently in place for the budget resolution—approximately fifty hours of debate and a strict germaneness rule on all amendments.

- Provide that the majority and minority leaders would designate a particular measure as a privileged national security authorization bill.

Table 19. A Legislative Branch–Executive Branch Partnership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conclusions</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congress provides resources and oversight in ways that reinforce system limitations and preclude performance improvements.</td>
<td>Build a legislative branch–executive branch partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress focuses almost exclusively on department and agency capabilities and little on multiagency missions.</td>
<td>- Establish Select Committees on National Security in the Senate and House of Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ultimately, no committee is devoted to overseeing interagency mechanisms or multiagency operations.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1274 Except for the internal matters of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and its components.</td>
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### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conclusions</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Congressional rules and statutory provisions provide widely varying limits on reprogramming and transfer authorities for contingencies.</td>
<td>- legislative consultations on national security matters</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>- Strengthen the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee by empowering them to formulate and enact annual authorization bills through the following actions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Adopt new rules for consideration of the budget and authorizing legislation of each department and agency that is a major component of the national security system</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Amend section 302 (a) of the Congressional Budget Act to provide that the Senate and House Budget Committees recommend allocations for all national security budget function components</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Provide greater flexibility on reprogramming (intradepartmental) and transfer (interdepartmental) of funds for multiagency activities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Create a mechanism for a contingency fund—over which congressional leadership would control the release of monies—that would meet unanticipated requirements during a crisis</td>
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<td>- Establish standard procedures in the revised Foreign Assistance Act for notifications and committee responses</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Establish procedures for expedited reviews in special cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Allow expedited fund transfer reviews in special circumstances</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Establish a goal of a comprehensive revision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by the end of the 111th Congress (December 2010)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>- Consolidate oversight of the Department of Homeland Security to one authorizing committee and one appropriations subcommittee per chamber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slow confirmation of presidential appointees exacerbates poor system management during presidential transitions.</td>
<td>- End the practice of honoring a hold by one or more senators on a nominee for a position in a national security department or agency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4. Rethinking Strategic Direction and Strategy Formulation

The broad changes to the national security system recommended above and depicted in the following chart demand a change in strategic thinking. Members of the national security system will need to adjust their expectations and understanding of how the system works, and how they view the security environment and the scope of national security. New strategic direction will be required from the president. At the moment, the president’s national security strategy is a document outlining diverse national security agenda items. Many argue that the national security strategy should be more specific and binding, more prescriptive and authoritative. Many argue that the national security system needs elaborate strategic planning documents that provide schedules and program activities based on goals and supporting objectives to control resource allocations. That is not the intent of the recommendations provided here. The intent behind the strategy, planning, and resource documents recommended above is to enable the president and his advisors to make strategic adjustments in a fluid fashion and communicate grand
strategy. Static or quadrennial strategic plans often misread the environment and are wrong about the future.

**Figure 28. New System**

The purpose of the entire set of recommendations offered here is to allow the president strategic direction of the national security system while maintaining an ongoing debate about the details of strategy, missions, and problem-solving efforts and encouraging initiative in problem-solving at all levels. Achieving these objectives will require significant cultural change that can only occur over time and with structural and procedural changes to the national security system:

- **The strategic presidency.** Presidents and their advisors must be enabled to set an example to the national security community in strategic thinking and innovation. They become crucial in leading the national security system through uncertain times by developing grand strategy that highlights the large challenges and ways to overcome them. In a new twenty-first century national security system, presidents would be empowered for system leadership and would occupy the center stage for national security strategy. They would guide the system through their most important decisions but also through their influence over culture and behavior expectations. The strategic reviews led by the president and his Security Council would set the tone for strategic direction, collaboration, and information sharing.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- **A dynamic and collaborative strategic agenda.** A small set of senior leaders cannot manage well all the important issues that will arise in the new security environment. Hence, lower-level leaders must be empowered to act while keeping superiors well informed. Senior leadership will have to expand the action agenda to realize the advantages of the new system, permitting subordinates to self-organize and innovate in a collaborative manner and intervening on a by-exception basis. The system would maintain a strategic agenda that does not bind the organization to rigid schedules of activity and courses of action set in detail, or formal and forced procedures, but rather sets a broad direction for more creative processes that permit subordinate actors in the national security system to take more strategic initiative.

- **A national security community of strategic actors.** The national security community as a whole must consider strategy in the organizational context. Internal incentives, experience, and education initiatives that cultivate “strategic level” thinking among members of the national security system must be encouraged. In the twenty-first century national security system, those at the top are often too far away from realities on the ground and cannot interact with their subordinates frequently enough to provide continuous control. As both military and diplomatic leaders have noted, what used to be considered strategic issues now blend with “tactical” levels of activity and are addressed by lower-ranking members of the national security community. Even minor actors, issues, and events can now produce strategic consequences. The national security system must ensure leaders at all levels are prepared to think and act strategically.

5. New System Assumptions and Additional Benefits

The new system recommended by PNSR makes some implicit assumptions that should be highlighted and carefully evaluated. For examples, the new system assumes:

- **The recommendations made by PNSR are adopted and implemented as a complete set.** If not, the system will not function as intended. The recommendations can be implemented incrementally and even slowly. However, system limitations will not be eliminated until the recommendations to centralize strategic direction and system management and decentralize national mission management, in particular, are adopted as a set.

- **There is enough talent within the national security system to make the recommendations work.** The few sitting Cabinet officers are not the only people

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competent to make decisions of national importance. Other people within the system, but currently constrained by rigid hierarchy, and talent that can be brought into the system from outside sources, can also make decisions well if supported with appropriate analysis and information-sharing reforms.

- **Accountability is impossible without empowerment.** The only way to hold leaders accountable for performance is to give them the means to accomplish their missions. Checks and balances are a constitutional principle applied among different branches of government; they are not a recipe for success within the executive branch.

- **A division of labor between mission integrators and Cabinet officials is possible.** Initially, some will wonder if top talent can be recruited for Cabinet positions if the responsibility for integrated mission management is given to others. The answer is yes. Running a functional discipline like intelligence, defense, diplomacy, or any major domain is job enough for a Cabinet official. Not only must they build and manage world-class capabilities, they must also properly execute the missions that fall singularly within their domains. Over time, as the system culture changes, Cabinet officials and security advisors will both appreciate the clear division of labor and associated authorities.

- **Teams that are management- and personnel-intensive can make decisions quickly.** It is true that collaboration, as opposed to mere coordination, is time-consuming. For this reason, the system is given the option of creating crisis task forces with more directive authority, procedures, and culture. However, since teams work issues full-time, they can respond with more alacrity than committees. Because they are not hamstrung by narrow organizational equities, they can make decisions faster than working groups.

- **Teams can manage an issue end-to-end.** Initially, many will wonder how a small team of ten to fifteen individuals can manage a major national security issue. Upon reflection, it will become evident that we expect the same of the National Security Council, only without the benefit of full-time dedication to the mission at hand. Teams will manage issues end-to-end the same way any good leader does: by making the big decisions and digging down far enough at any stage of the process to discover and remedy problems as necessary. They will perform better than interagency committees because they will work full time and are structured, trained, and rewarded for cohesive team performance.

- **Departments and agencies will reward personnel who choose to invest in interagency expertise.** This is a weak assumption because the reforms redistribute authority to ensure that departments will not penalize personnel who chose to participate in interagency teams. However, it is understood that informally much could be done to make such decisions less than career enhancing. The assumption is that, over time, departments and agency leaders will understand that they need generalists as well as specialists, especially in the new security environment and new security system.
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- **Teams can direct the activities of departments and agencies.** Within the duly authorized scope of their written mandate, teams will be able to direct the activities of departments and agencies. Initially, there will be resistance as departments and agencies assume the team could not possibly know how to direct their specialized capabilities. When it becomes evident the team is well informed, and as the president backs the teams up, and as departments learn not to raise anything other than truly substantive and serious objections, they will cooperate willingly with the teams, much the way military services now are eager to contribute to combatant commanders conducting priority missions.

- **The director for national security can direct the activities of teams.** This assumption is initially safe but requires qualification. The singular focus empowered teams bring to their mission is a strength, but also a management challenge. In a collaborative system, teams will work to accommodate larger interests. However, they will also naturally concentrate on their own effort, asking for more resources and policy latitude to reduce and ensure the success of their mission, sometimes to the detriment of other national security efforts. Someone must manage the teams closely to ensure their efforts are affordable and compatible. Initially the director for national security will oversee a small number of presidential priority teams, but as use of teams proves productive and spreads to other levels of the national security system the burden will grow unmanageable. Since it will be important to keep the director for national security’s staff a small elite group focused on the president’s priorities and strategic direction, the responsibility for managing teams at lower levels will eventually have to be delegated to lower authorities.

These are only a few of the critical assumptions that are implicit in the new national security system. They raise important questions but also suggest many residual benefits from a new national security system that deserve the same consideration as the new system’s implicit assumptions. For example, the new system would encourage better leadership and increase accountability. Many senior participants in the current system believe it actually encourages lack of accountability:

“There are those who think that the heart of a bureaucracy is a struggle for power,” noted Rusk. “This is not the case at all. The heart of the bureaucratic problem is the inclination to avoid responsibility.”

The result was a proliferation of committees, which protected individuals by spreading responsibility among many. “If you want to see anybody in Defense or State, or any other department I know of,” said veteran diplomat David Bruce, “they seem to be perpetually off in committee meetings.” “The system of diffused authority spreads outwards into a thousand branches and twigs of the governmental tree,” wrote George Kennan. At every level, decision-making was made by consensus among bureaus and agencies, any of which could veto or delay action.

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operative principle frequently voiced by officials becomes, “Anything you fellows can agree on is all right with me.”

By contrast, if an empowered team leader is given all the means required for success, from choosing the required expertise and controlling decisions and resources, and is still unable to make progress, accountability can be enforced. In the current system, it is not possible for any individual leader below the president to control the prerequisites for success in missions requiring unity of purpose and effort, so it is hard to hold anyone accountable for performance.

Other benefits could be enumerated, particularly in mission areas where the United States currently performs poorly. For example, many of the major shortcomings identified in policy studies and assumed to be leadership problems—such as inadequate strategic communications and poor integration of science and technology into national security mission management—would be better resolved in the new national security system recommended here. In particular, non-traditional mission areas such as cyber security and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction that are inherently interagency missions would benefit disproportionately from the reforms. Post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction was a particular concern to some members of Congress supporting the legislation that called for this study. PNSR asked an independent source of expertise on post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction missions to assess the PNSR recommendations and its findings strongly support the contention that the new system would transform the U.S. government’s ability to perform well in this mission area.

D. Reform Implementation

The sweeping recommendations made here will require careful and progressive implementation, yet all too often reform proposals are offered and adopted without due attention to the innumerable difficulties that arise during implementation. For example, a Congressional Research Services review of past reorganizations leading up to the formation of the Department of Homeland Security found that in most cases, “serious concern with implementation [was] typically too little and too late.” An advisor to PNSR with over thirty years of experience in organizational reforms advised that all of her experience taught that the success or failure of organizational reforms boils down to sustained and attentive implementation. Not yet knowing whether or how Congress and the president might adopt the recommendations offered here, we can only identify general principles for effective implementation, beginning with careful attention to our nation’s constitutional framework.

1. National Security Reform and Our Constitution

Because the recommendations will fundamentally change the way the current national security system operates, some will question whether they respect the constitutional

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1278 See Appendix 8: An Evaluation of Proposed Reforms on Potential Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations.
1279 I.M. Destler q. in Relyea, CRS-36.
framework bequeathed by our Founding Fathers and to which national security professionals pledge their allegiance. They must, and they do. The U.S. Constitution disperses responsibility for aspects of national security across three branches of the federal government, as well as fifty sovereign states, making the national security reform initiatives recommended here a complex but feasible undertaking.

Under the Constitution, national security is the federal government’s most “compelling” interest. The Preamble of the Constitution declares: “We the People of the United States, in Order to…provide for the common defence…do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.” Federal responsibility for national security is shared across the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Under Article I of the Constitution, the legislative branch is vested with, among other things, the power to declare war; the power to establish, maintain, and regulate the military; and—perhaps most notably—the power to fund (or defund) national security activities. Beyond these enumerated powers, the legislative branch maintains other specific powers involving foreign relations, as well as the more general power to make laws “necessary and proper” for carrying out all powers vested by the Constitution in the federal government. Based on these powers, Congress is said to have “a substantial and essential role in both foreign affairs and national security.”

The executive branch, led by the president, is the operational arm of the federal government. The president is empowered to protect our national security pursuant to laws passed by Congress, as well as his own constitutional authority in the areas of national security and foreign affairs. Under Article II of the Constitution, for

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1280 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (“It is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.” (quoting Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964)); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 23 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The principal purposes to be answered by Union are these—The common defence of the members—the preservation of the public peace as well against internal convulsions as external attacks—the regulation of commerce with other nations and between the States—the superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries.”).

1281 U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).

1282 The legislative branch is empowered, for example, to regulate commerce with foreign nations and to define and punish violations of the “Law of Nations”. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. In addition, the Senate advises the president on proposed treaties and consents to their ratification by the president. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.


1285 The dual functions of the legislative and executive branches in the areas of national security and foreign affairs was captured in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918): “The conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative—‘the political’—departments of the government.…”

example, the president is vested with “[t]he executive power”; he is the commander-in-
chief of the military; he makes treaties, and appoints and receives ambassadors; and he
maintains the “lead role” in foreign policy.\footnote{\textit{See U.S. Const.} art II, § 1, 2, 3.}

The judicial branch, led by the Supreme Court of the United States, also plays a
significant role in the national security process. Analogous to an umpire, the judicial
branch adjudicates what constitutes the lawful pursuit of national security by the other
two branches. This may involve, for example, resolving inter-branch disagreements,
adjudicating whether the executive branch exceeded statutory authority granted by
Congress, or protecting civil liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.

Powers not delegated to the federal government, including general police powers, are
reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution, subject to some
exceptions.\footnote{\textit{See e.g. U.S. Const.} art I, § 10; \textit{U.S. Const.} amend. XIV.} State and local governments are on the frontline of threat detection; they
are our first responders in the event of attacks; and, in a well-functioning system, they
share important information with each other and the federal government.

Successful national security reform must operate within this constitutional framework,
and the recommendations made by PNSR do so. Some recommendations will require
changes to executive branch legal authorities that may naturally affect relations with the
legislative branch, and perhaps state and local governments. Such changes must be
approached soberly and crafted carefully to avoid compromising fundamental
constitutional principles such as the separation of powers, federalism, and the protection
of civil liberties.

If history is a reliable guide, such prudence and careful crafting is required for successful
reform. In the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986,
for example, Congress restructured the chain of military command but—given the
president’s constitutional role as commander in chief—gave the president ultimate
authority to modify it. This is simply one example of how national security reform can
be accomplished if approached prudently and skillfully in a way that respects
constitutional principles.

PNSR’s goal of creating a coordinated and efficient national security system is fully
achievable within our system of government. There is no constitutional barrier to greater
integration within the executive branch, as the checks and balances of our Constitution
are inter-branch, not intra-branch. While Congress cannot delegate to the executive
branch a core constitutional responsibility, for instance, the power to raise revenue or to
appropriate funds, Congress can provide the executive branch with greater flexibility in
shifting funds and internally restructuring itself to meet crises or grasp opportunities in
the global security environment, without undermining Congress’s constitutional

\footnote{\textit{See U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation}, 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)
(stating that the president is “the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations—a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress”).}
prerogatives. In some instances, Congress has already granted such flexibility: the executive branch can reprogram funds up to certain thresholds and with consultation of Congress; the Homeland Security Act authorizes the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) secretary to conduct internal reorganization of DHS within certain limits; and the Economy Act allows resources to be marshaled across agency lines.

To avoid violating fundamental constitutional principles, PNSR’s Legal Affairs Working Group conducted in-depth legal analyses and offered advice to ensure recommendations are legally and constitutionally viable. Upon the approval of the project’s recommendations, PNSR is ready to work with implementing authorities on the most appropriate means for implementation.

a. Legal Instrumentalities

Various tools could be used to effect national security reform, including constitutional amendments, statutes, regulations, presidential directives, executive branch reorganization plans, and House and Senate rules. But in a practical sense, not all of the tools that could be used can or should be used. For instance, one of the most enduring tools for change—the constitutional amendment—is by far the most difficult to enact. Conversely, one of the most efficient tools—executive branch reorganization plans—is today largely unavailable, as the general authority for reorganization plans lapsed in 1984. Thus, the primary legal instruments to effect PNSR’s proposed recommendations are threefold: statutes, presidential directives, and congressional rule changes.

Statutes are passed by both houses of Congress and, in the normal course, are signed by the president within ten days of passage. They are formulated through an oftentimes long and cumbersome deliberative process involving 535 members of Congress, multiple committees, and complex parliamentary rules and procedures. Statutes may take months, if not years, to be enacted. Once in force, they are characterized by a high degree of permanence; unless they include a provision causing them to expire (a “sunset” provision), their reach is altered only through amendment or repeal. Statutes are “the supreme Law of the Land,”\(^{1289}\) and are typically binding on the entire public-private citizens, government, and private enterprise.

Directives, on the other hand, may be formulated by one person—the president—without the deliberation or the strictures associated with parliamentary rules and procedures. The president’s signature is all that is required for their issuance.\(^{1290}\) In the words of one former presidential advisor, “Stroke of the pen. Law of the Land. Kinda cool.”\(^{1291}\) And though the president is not a lawmaker,\(^{1292}\) courts have determined that the president

\(^{1289}\) U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.

\(^{1290}\) Presidential directives can also be issued orally, as was often the case in the Johnson administration. But written directives are the normal means to express presidential decisions upon the bureaucracy.

\(^{1291}\) See James Bennet, True to Form, Clinton Shifts Energies Back To U.S. Focus, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1998, at 10 (quoting Paul Begala, former counselor to President William J. Clinton).

\(^{1292}\) See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587 (“In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and
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possesses the inherent constitutional authority to issue directives that have the force of law over the executive branch. Presidential directives can be withdrawn, changed, or superseded at any time by any president, again by the stroke of a pen. In the national security area, it is typical for an incoming president (even of the same political party as his predecessor) to repeal the existing directive that governs the National Security Council system and sign new ones.

House and Senate rules govern the manner in which business is conducted in each chamber. In the House of Representatives, the rules are adopted by majority vote at the start of each two-year Congress. Rules in the House do not endure—once each Congress ends, the rules of that Congress end with it. In practice, however, the rules of each succeeding Congress are substantially similar to those of the previous Congress. So while the opportunity for major change arises every two years, such change rarely occurs.

Conversely, the Senate’s Standing Rules do not automatically terminate at the end of each Congress. While a new Senate of a new Congress is entitled to adopt its own rules, Senate Rule V states that “[t]he rules of the Senate shall continue from one Congress to the next Congress unless they are changed as provided in these rules.” Though a change in Senate Rules requires just a majority vote for adoption, in practice any rule change requires the acquiescence of two-thirds of the Senators present: S. Rule XXII requires an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Senators present and voting in order to end debate and allow a vote on adoption of the change.

Many of the reforms proposed can be accomplished either by statute or by presidential directive. In these cases, the decision regarding how to implement a desired reform will turn on factors such as the intent of the reform itself or the practical and political realities of how best to achieve a desired end. The characteristics of the different tools will be a major driver in determining how best to implement a reform. Where permanence is desired over flexibility, a statute is best. Where expedience is crucial, a presidential directive may be the best route. In other cases, a hybrid approach may be best—establishing the core attributes and structural framework of a reform through statute, leaving room for successive presidents to refine the related goals, processes, and other details through a directive.

Yet while the superficial attributes of the respective tools are the most obvious factors to be considered, they are just part of a broader calculation. Successful reform will require a partnership between the executive and legislative branches; as such, political considerations will be as important as structural ones. Just because a particular reform can be done by executive order does not mean that this is the best way of achieving a

the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute.”)
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successful, stable end-state if doing so would unnecessarily antagonize Congress. Similarly, Congress can impose its will on the executive through legislation (within constitutional limits), but a reform imposed upon a resistant administration is unlikely to provide the desired results.

Thus, a successful implementation plan will require sensitivity to the fact that one branch may view a particular issue or action as falling squarely within its domain. It will require consideration of what is best assigned to executive discretion; what is best done by the Congress; and, most important of all, how to develop a process that will engender the maximum amount of cooperation and engagement by both branches.

2. Efficient Implementation

One possible objection to comprehensive national security reform is cost. A common and not unreasonable response is that given the stakes, the United States can ill afford not to reform. In the case of PNSR’s recommendations, some additional points should be made. First, while the recommendations will be politically difficult and require a change in thinking, they are not unduly costly to implement. Most of the recommendations involve policy changes or realignment of authorities. In addition, over time, the implementation of these recommendations will secure substantial savings. The current system proliferates numerous interagency working groups and organizations, most of

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1293 For example, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence maintains a number of interagency centers: the Center for Security Evaluation, National Intelligence Emergency Management Activity, Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, National Counterterrorism Center, DNI Special Security Center. The Department of Defense maintains the National Interagency Biodefense Campus; Joint Task Force Homeland Defense, Combined Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa, Joint Interagency Task Forces (East, West, North, South), Minerva initiative. The assistant deputy undersecretary of defense for environment, safety and occupational health represents the Department of Defense (DoD) on the Interagency Cooperative Conservation Task Force Senior Policy Team. DoD is represented on the Interagency Cooperative Conservation Task Force Executive Team with two staff-level members; one from Army Civil Works and one from the Department’s Range Sustainment Initiative. Additionally, these two DoD offices also have representatives at the functional level Interagency Cooperative Conservation Team. Human resources staff from DoD’s Personnel Office provide human capital management expertise on the interagency working group on Cooperative Conservation competencies. Defense coordinating officers sent as part of a five-member Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) to each of the ten DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regional offices. DCO/DCE will have capability to deploy in support of an interagency Joint Field Office, which integrates federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector incident management entities. In coordination with DHS, FEMA, and the Department of Transportation, DoD has developed eighteen prescribed Requests for Assistance to expedite the provision of DoD support to civil authorities during disaster response. The Department of State has Provincial Reconstruction Teams; the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Regional Strategic Initiatives, the U.S. Embassy Border Management Task Force, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, the Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework, the Criminal Justice Task Force (Afghanistan), WMD Terrorism Experts Network, Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. The Department of Homeland Security has the National Homeland Security Consortium, the Homeland Security Operations Center, Interagency Security Committee, Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council, Interagency Coordinating Council on Emergency Preparedness and Individuals with Disabilities, Homeland Security Information Network, and the Federal Interagency Coordinating Committee. The Department of Justice has the National Joint Terrorism Task Force. There also is the U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative. In addition to these interagency task forces, councils, and groups that the
which operate with decidedly limited degrees of effectiveness. Few are empowered to make decisions; most are limited to information-sharing activities. In the multimillion-person national security establishment, personnel and organizational support would be a minor cost of implementing the reforms recommended here. If the recommendations deliver the promised improvements in unity of purpose and effort, the savings over time in terms of increased effectiveness and efficiency will be major advantages for the United States, much the same way the Goldwater-Nichols reforms produced a major leap forward in effectiveness for the United States military.

E. Conclusions: Thriving in the Twenty-first Century

As noted, the full set of recommendations offered here must be adopted to ensure the transformation of the current national security system and the elimination of the system limitation defined throughout this report. It should be clear from the breadth and difficulty associated with these recommendations that nothing less than a bipartisan, executive-legislative branch partnership to act quickly and in a sustained effort will allow national security reform to succeed. Many observers will judge the prospects for such collaboration to be poor if not impossible. It is true that national security reform on the scale proposed here may not be possible. It may take another external stimulus like 9/11 to propel reform. What is clear is that we have before us two choices; both of which entail risks. Either we risk living with the current system’s limitations or we risk bold reform to eliminate them. We must decide whether the consequences of inaction outweigh the risks of action.

1. Living with System Shortfalls

The increasingly limited ability of the system to produce desired outcomes is not an indictment of the interagency participants involved in the process over the past sixty years. On the contrary, it is a function of the changing security environment:

The world has changed, and the threats we face have changed, and that means it is time for a fundamental reorganization of our national-security apparatus…. Iraq is a symptom of this disease, not the cause. Similar tensions occurred over Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, each with different people in the key positions. This is not a problem of personality dysfunction…. It is a problem of structure, of organization, and, more fundamentally, of the conception of what kinds of war we are likely to have to fight and how we will fight them.  

new system would replace over time, there are other permanent organizations within the system that have a heavy interagency focus or purpose. These include the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, the Executive Office’s Office of Global Communications, and the Department of Defense’s Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs. All of these would see their workload lighten in the new system.


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Merely changing leadership will not solve problems that are inherently systemic. Today, leaders at all levels must work in a system built on two faulty and intertwined assumptions: 1) that strong core national security capabilities are more important than the full range of required capabilities and the means to integrate them and 2) that sufficient integration can be provided by the president alone or through his subordinates.

The experience of the past sixty years suggests these assumptions are wrong. In fact, the president needs better tools to manage the national security system and integrate its various elements—where necessary, in collaboration with state and local authorities. Without these tools, the system tends to be rigid, slow, and unable to adapt to problems that do not neatly fit with the domains of existing national security organizations. This is not a new conclusion:

Whatever the wisdom of U.S. intervention…why has a cumulatively enormous U.S. contribution…had such limited impact for so long?...From the outset the preponderant weight of the U.S. military…tended to dictate an overly militarized response…. On the civilian side the same tendency existed for the chief U.S. agencies involved to focus primarily on that with which they were most familiar…. Especially significant has been institutional inertia, the built-in reluctance of organizations to change preferred ways of functioning except slowly and incrementally. Another such factor has been the shocking lack of institutional memory, largely because of short tours for U.S. personnel. Skewed incentive patterns also increased the pressures for conformity and tended to penalize adaptive response. And there was a notable dearth of systematic analysis of performance, again mainly because of the inherent reluctance of organizations to indulge in self-examination…. Nor was there any integrated conflict management to pull together all the disparate aspects of the…U.S. effort….it was everybody’s business and nobody’s…. Also at issue was the natural preference of any institution to operate as an autonomous, homogeneous unit…. If these rather generalized lessons seem like restating the obvious, one need only recall how little we actually practiced them in Vietnam.1295

Since Vietnam, the need to integrate national security missions, develop adaptive courses of action, and generate nontraditional capabilities has grown. The domestic and international security environments are more demanding. Leadership and decision-making are strained by the breakdown of the bipartisan consensus on national security collaboration following Vietnam, the diminution of a unifying national security culture following the demise of the Soviet Union, and the gradual shift to an information age where twenty-four-hour news cycles and instantaneous global communications are the norm.

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The same lack of adaptation and unity of effort that plagued the United States in Vietnam and cost us greatly were also identified as problems by the 9/11 Commission, which traced them back to the semi-autonomy of national security departments and agencies reinforced by numerous statutory authorities:

The problem is nearly intractable because of the way the government is currently structured. Lines of operational authority run to the expanding executive departments, and they are guarded for understandable reasons: the DCI commands the CIA’s personnel overseas; the secretary of defense will not yield to others in conveying commands to military forces; the Justice Department will not give up the responsibility of deciding whether to seek arrest warrants. But the result is that each agency or department needs its own intelligence apparatus to support the performance of its duties. It is hard to “break down stovepipes” when there are so many stoves that are legally and politically entitled to have cast-iron pipes of their own.1296

The problem identified by the 9/11 Commission in this passage explains not only why the U.S. government has multiple competing intelligence-gathering efforts, it also explains why so many operational efforts that should be coordinated end up working at cross purposes. Each agency pursues its own mandate and is loath to make the necessary tradeoffs when their different objectives must be reconciled to the larger governmentwide strategy as circumstances and best judgment warrant.

Even more recently, an excellent investigation by the House of Representatives into operations in Iraq and Afghanistan discovered that the same system limitations still undermine unity of purpose and effort:

Coordination is necessary, but not sufficient. While we know that many people in many places are trying to make improvements to interagency planning and operations throughout the government, without direct Presidential involvement, these efforts are not enough. Action is needed. At the end of the day, someone has to be in charge. The subcommittee found a lack of unity of direction and “unity of command.” This results in a lack of unity of purpose. Among the efforts at staffing, training, applying lessons learned, and planning, there is no one person or organization in the lead for the “whole of government.” When “no further action” is taken, but the mission is not complete, someone must step up to lead. That leader must be empowered to direct the “whole of government” PRT, and larger, stabilization and reconstruction efforts.1297

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The United States must remedy such enduring shortcomings, and we must not confuse ourselves as to whether these limitations will be removed with half-measures and the hope of better leadership in the future. The 9/11 Commission’s superb report serves as a cautionary example in this regard. Both well researched and well written, the report clearly identifies major problems in the system. The report notes that effective management of transnational counterterrorist operations was “missing” and explains the absence by the inability to get departments and agencies to collaborate:

The agencies are like a set of specialists in a hospital, each ordering tests, looking for symptoms, and prescribing medications. What is missing is the attending physician who makes sure they work as a team.\textsuperscript{1298}

As the report further explains, the problem cannot be resolved without adjusting the authorities of Cabinet officials:

Recalling the Goldwater-Nichols legislation of 1986, Secretary Rumsfeld reminded us that to achieve better joint capability, each of the armed services had to “give up some of their turf and authorities and prerogatives.” Today, he said, the executive branch is “stove-piped much like the four services were nearly 20 years ago.” He wondered if it might be appropriate to ask agencies to “give up some of their existing turf and authority in exchange for a stronger, faster, more efficient government wide joint effort.” Privately, other key officials have made the same point to us.\textsuperscript{1299}

Surprisingly, however, the 9/11 Commission did not go on to recommend circumscribing the authorities of Cabinet officials to ensure management on transnational counterterrorism operations could be conducted on an interagency basis. Instead, the commission recommended a National Counterterrorism Center charged only with planning. The commission’s report explicitly notes the new center would not be responsible for making policy or directing operations. The best recommendation permitted by the consensus\textsuperscript{1300} process adopted by the commission was an interagency organization for planning support.

Using the commission’s analogy of the different departments and agencies acting like a set of specialists in a hospital without an attending physician, we can say the commission settled for a specialist who could offer a second opinion without providing the attending physician who directs the operations. Not surprisingly, to date the departments and agencies have treated the National Counterterrorism Center as a source for second opinions. The reality is that all priority national security missions—not just counterterrorism—require an “attending physician.”

\textsuperscript{1298} The 9/11 Commission Report \textless \url{http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf} \textgreater\ 353.
\textsuperscript{1299} Ibid. 403.
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In the past, presidents have attempted to compensate for the imbalance between the national security system’s strong individual capabilities and weak integrating mechanisms through their personal leadership and interventions. In doing so, the president and his staff are not able to attend to the broader, longer-range national security system management tasks that are necessary to manage the system holistically and make it perform better for more consistent unity of purpose and effort. The president cannot routinely be the attending physician since he must run the entire hospital well. The changing security environment now makes dependence on an overburdened president who is poorly supported with a weak White House national security staff unacceptably dangerous. As former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich concludes:

The interagency process which was essentially developed in the 1950s is now broken. It is hopelessly too slow and too lacking in accountability. An integrated system has to be developed which sets metrics and accountability and which reports to the Commander in Chief with the clarity that a global battlefield requires.\textsuperscript{1301}

Without reform, the national security system cannot hope to keep pace with the changing security environment. The one universally shared expert prediction about the future is that it will present more diverse and frequent challenges that require routine integration of the resources, expertise, and capabilities resident across the national security system. Currently, the national security system cannot meet these challenges consistently or well enough to safeguard the nation’s security, a conclusion that is increasingly apparent to those who study its performance as well as to those who lead and work within the system.

Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld recently responded to criticism of the government’s performance in recent trials by noting, “The charge of incompetence against the U.S. government should be easy to rebut if the American people understand the extent to which the current system of government makes competence next to impossible.” He asserted that U.S. government structure is “still in the industrial age and it is not serving us well” and that “only a broad, fundamental reorganization is likely to enable federal departments and agencies to function with the speed and agility the times demand.”\textsuperscript{1302}

Many experts in academia, the executive branch, and Congress share Secretary Rumsfeld’s conviction that the nation has crossed an historical threshold where incremental and ad hoc adjustments to the system are no longer sufficient—and they are correct. Instead, the current national security system, a sprawling multimillion-person establishment divided into numerous organizations, must be fundamentally reformed with the performance of the entire system in mind. Reform on such a scale must involve both the legislative and executive branches, and it can be accomplished within our constitutional form of government. It won’t be easy.

**Table 20. Momentum for Reform**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conclusions</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Support for broad, multidisciplinary, and fundamental reform of the national security system has never been higher.</td>
<td>• Fundamentally reform the national security system to enable integrated effort without compromising constitutional requirements for executive-legislative branch collaboration, a president-centric executive branch, or the national security system’s current set of highly capable functional disciplines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• System performance will continue to decline as the security environment continues to change unless major system reform is undertaken.</td>
<td>• Implement system reform through new presidential directives or executive orders, a new national security act, and amendments to Senate and House rules</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Reform must respect the system attributes imposed by the founding fathers and the Constitution.</td>
<td>• Undertake the reform in the first year of the new administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The time to act is now, before another major failure again reveals the system’s fundamental shortcomings.</td>
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2. **Innovating to Secure the Future**

The nation’s security demands good leadership and good policy, but it also requires good systemic and organizational performance. In fact, it can be argued that our national security has suffered more over the past few decades from the system’s poor implementation of policy than from outright policy mistakes. The most difficult policy issues generally have good arguments for and against alternative courses of action. Once a policy decision is made, its success frequently hangs on how well the policy is implemented, assessed, and changed in response to unexpected changes in the security environment.

To ensure all relevant factors are considered before decisions are made, and that decisions are properly implemented thereafter, requires fundamental reforms. A reformed national security system is also required to support presidents with differing degrees of national security experience. The national security system is a president-centric system by virtue of the Constitution; it is a president-dependent system by force of current system limitations. It is always good to have a president who is knowledgeable about national security and heavily involved in it, for example, a Roosevelt or Eisenhower. But it is not realistic to expect all presidents to have extensive national security experience. Even those who do deserve a system that effectively supports their strategic direction.

Despite the growing awareness that the national security system cannot sufficiently integrate and resource the elements of national power, several factors have prevented major reform:

• The superficial flexibility of structures and processes that respond to presidential direction masks the underlying rigidity and deficiencies of the system.
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- Presuming the system to be flexible, many incorrectly conclude that if there is a problem it must be with the leadership, and that changing leaders will improve system performance.

- Even those who understand the system is flawed in ways that thwart good leadership are daunted by the difficult task of comprehensive reform that must include changes in both the legislative and executive branches of our government.

Moreover, while the immediate costs of any reform process are known, the benefits of any large system change are long-term and uncertain. Accepting short-term pain in exchange for the less than certain prospect of long-term benefit is a major challenge.

As difficult as major reform is, it is not beyond the reach of the American body politic. In 1947, American leaders in the private sector, Congress, and the White House understood that World War II had ushered in a new era fraught with peril. They took the necessary corrective action, and their efforts safeguarded the nation through the Cold War. The security environment is once again undergoing major change. Today the diffusion of knowledge and global communications permit small groups to deliver strategic attacks. The failure to stop a small group from using a weapon of mass destruction to attack an American city would have untold consequences for the future of the Republic. We have no choice but change. Once again, Americans must reinvent their institutions, prepare to defend their way of life, and lead the way for others seeking a better future. The purpose of the Project on National Security Reform is to enable and support leaders who want to lead those changes and create a national security system able to thrive in a twenty-first century security environment.
APPENDIX 1: PROJECT PARTICIPANTS

This appendix lists more than 200 individuals who participated in the Project on National Security Reform within the Research and Analysis Directorate. PNSR would like to thank the individuals listed below for the invaluable information and counsel they have provided to project. We have made every effort to include all contributing individuals, and apologize if anyone has been inadvertently omitted.

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APPENDIX 2: GLOSSARY OF TERMS

**Administrative Control (ADCON):** Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. (Source: DoD)

**Alternative Solutions:** Corrective actions as proposed by PNSR for the resolution of identified problems. (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Assessment:** The active sensing, searching and discovery of emerging issues. It includes noticing small early warning signals and understanding interrelationships among issues and events. (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Asymmetric Threat:** A broad and unpredictable spectrum of military, paramilitary, and information operations, conducted by nations, organizations, or individuals or by indigenous or surrogate forces under their control, specifically targeting weaknesses and vulnerabilities within an enemy government or armed force. (Source: Michael L. Kolodzie, USA)

**Authority:** 1. Any duly recognized (e.g., lawful) agent of federal, state or local power with control over the activities of other organizations or persons (give commands, enforce compliance, etc.); 2. (USAID) The legally binding instrument that authorizes and/or constrains the policy and procedures issued as direction. These instruments include laws, regulations, Executive Orders, court decisions, and rulings by Federal authorities. "Authority" refers to the legal ability or power to give commands, enforce compliance, or make decisions. (Source: Modified from USAID glossary)

**Capability:** 1. The quality or state of being capable: ability. 2. A feature or faculty capable of development: potentiality. 3. The facility or potential for an indicated use or deployment. (Source: Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary)

**Capacity:** 1. Legal competency or fitness. 2. a. The potential or suitability for holding, storing, or accommodating. b. The maximum amount or number that can be contained or accommodated. 3. a. An individual’s mental or physical ability: aptitude or skill. b. The faculty or potential for treating, experiencing, or appreciating. 4. Duty, position, or role. 5. The facility or power to produce, perform, or deploy: capability. (Source: Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary)

**Causes:** The primary independent variables leading to a problem. (Also see Problem.) (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Chain of Command:** A series of command, control, executive, or management positions in hierarchical order of authority. (Source: NRP)
**Chief of Mission (CoM):** The principal officer in charge of U.S. Diplomatic Missions and U.S. offices abroad, which the Secretary of State has designated as diplomatic in nature. The CoM reports to the President through the Secretary of State. The U.S. Ambassador to a foreign country, for example, is the Chief of the U.S. Mission (CoM) in that country. Other CoMs include the Chiefs of permanent U.S. Missions to international organizations (e.g., the U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna), the Principal Officers of Consulates General (e.g., in Hong Kong), and the U.S. Interest Section in the Swiss Embassy in Havana. The CoM has full responsibility and authority for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all U.S. Government executive branch employees in country and at international organizations, regardless of their employment categories or location, except those under command of a U.S. area military commander or on the staff of an international organization. Sources: Chief of Mission Authority and Overseas Staffing and President George W. Bush’s Letter of Instructions to Chiefs of Mission

**Coordination:** The regulation of diverse elements into an integrated and harmonious operation. (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Collaboration:** 1. (general management) Cooperative arrangement in which two or more parties (which may or may not have any previous relationship) work jointly towards a common goal. 2. (knowledge management) Two or more humans cooperating in such a way that the result is a mutual creation reflecting notable insight, skill, or intellect. 3. (conflict resolution) Strategy that uses both assertiveness and cooperation to seek solutions advantageous to all parties. It succeeds usually where the participants' goals are compatible, and the interaction among them is important in attaining those goals. (Source: Business Dictionary.com)

**Collaborative Government Approach:** A whole-government approach that can draw on capabilities in any part of the government when necessary. (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Combatant Command (Command Authority) (COCOM):** Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command. (Source: Joint Pub 1-02)
APPENDIX 2. GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS

Command and Control: The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Command and control functions are performed through the arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures, which are employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. (Source: Joint Pub 1-02)

Committee jurisdiction: The formal lists for each committee, of matters on which it can act, established by Senate and House rules. (Source: stipulated by Study)

Competencies: The knowledge, skills, experiences and behaviors required to successfully perform an objective or mission. (Source: stipulated by Study)

Comprehensive Reform: Comprehensive reform entails profound and fundamental change, not just in management and organization, but across many other dimensions—in attitudes and mindsets, leadership and culture, operations and execution, tools and procedures, human resources and financial support. (Source: stipulated by Study)

Consequences: The results of the national security system’s outputs. Consequences can be either successful or unsuccessful, and can be categorized either as the outcomes of implementation attempts, the behaviors of actors in the system, or the efficiency cost of a given action. (Source: stipulated by Study)

Consequence Management: 1. The attempt to affect the type of consequence desired. 2. (DoD) Actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or terrorist incidents. 3. (DHS) Predominantly an emergency management function that includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. The requirements of consequence management and crisis management are combined in the National Response Framework. (Source: NRF)

Cooperation: The action of cooperating—that is, working together towards the same end, purpose, or effect; joint operation. (Oxford English Dictionary)

Coordination: 1. (common use) The regulation of diverse elements into an integrated and harmonious operation. (Source: stipulated by Study) 2. (UN) the harmonious and effective working together of people and organizations towards a common goal. (Source: UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies) 3. (PCRU) the process through which understanding is achieved in the interests of working together on common interests, including liaison, co-operation etc. (Source: PCRU Glossary) 4. (DHS) to advance systematically an analysis and exchange of information among principals who have or may have a need to know certain information to carry out specific incident management responsibilities. (Source: DHS NIMS Glossary).
Core Function: The primary purpose of an institution within the national security system; an institution’s key mission as understood from within that institution. (Source: stipulated by Study)

Core Problems: The five core problems of the national security system that explain the system’s increasingly inadequate performance: 1) The system is grossly imbalanced, supporting strong departmental capabilities at the expense of integrating mechanisms; 2) Resources allocated to departments and agencies give priority to capabilities required by their core mandates rather than national missions; 3) Presidential intervention to compensate for the systemic inability to integrate or resource missions well centralizes issue management and burdens the White House; 4) A burdened White House cannot manage the national security system as a whole, so it is not agile, collaborative, or able to perform well during presidential transitions; and 5) The legislative branch provides resources and conducts oversight in ways that reinforce all of these problems and make improving performance difficult. (Source: stipulated by Study)

Counter-proliferation: Those actions (detection and monitoring, preparation, offensive operations, and active and passive defense) taken to defeat the threat and/or use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, its military forces, friends, and allies. Also called “CP.” (Also see Proliferation) (Source: DoD Dictionary of Military Terms)

Deputies Committee (of the National Security Council (NSC/DC)): Serves as the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security and meets at the call of its chair, in consultation with the other regular members. Any regular member of the NSC/DC may also request a meeting of the Committee for prompt crisis management. The NSC/DC can prescribe and review the work of the interagency groups, and help ensure that issues brought before either the NCS Principals Committee (NSC/PC) or the NSC have been properly analyzed and prepared for decision. (Source: NSPD#1)

Direct: 1. To conduct or regulate the affairs of; manage. 2. To take charge of with authority; control. 3. To order or command. 4. To move or guide someone towards a goal. (Source: The American Heritage Dictionary, Second Edition)

Directive: A form of executive order that the President issues and that usually pertains to national security issues. (Source: stipulated by Study)

Elements of National Power: All available means by which a nation-state attempts to exert control over its interests. Elements may include diplomatic, military, economic, cultural, or other sources of power. (Source: stipulated by Study)

Executive Order: An order issued by the President, under the President’s constitutional or statutory authority, which is binding upon the Executive Branch. (Source: stipulated by Study)

Fiscal Realities: The tension between the domestic budgetary requirements of the United States, specifically the future spending mandated for programs such as a Social
Security and Medicaid, and the future spending on national security. (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Foresight:** The act of looking forward to likely future contingencies. This is different from prediction, which is the act of foretelling. (Source: Random House Unabridged Dictionary, 2006)

**Geopolitical Shifts:** Geopolitics traditionally indicates the links and causal relationships between political power and geographic space; often seen as a body of thought assaying specific strategic prescriptions based on the relative importance of land power and sea power in world history. A geopolitical shift occurs when the links and causal relationships that have been stable for some period of time change, forcing existing worldviews to adapt to the new links and relationships. (Source: Adapted from Oyvind Osterud, *Journal of Peace Research*)

**Hegemony:** Preponderant influence or authority over other states; the social, cultural, ideological, or economic influence exerted by a dominant state in the international arena. (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Implementation:** The conduct of operations (military, diplomatic, economic, etc.) or missions in accordance with a strategy. (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Integration:** The combining and coordinating of separate parts or elements into a unified whole. (American Heritage Dictionary)

**Interagency Community:** The executive branch of the federal U.S. Government, as established in the Constitution and presided over by the President, which includes the Executive Office of the President, the executive departments and independent agencies, corporations, and quasi-official entities created by the Congress. (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Interagency Space:** The space below the President and above the Cabinet level departments. (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Inter-Governmental Organization:** Organizations established and funded by sovereign nations, and directed by their designated representatives, to accomplish specific global or regional mandates. Examples include the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Interagency Working Group (NSC/IWG):** Working groups subordinate to the National Security Council (NSC) Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs) that assist the PCCs in performing their duties. The Chairman of each Policy Coordination Committee may, with the agreement of the Executive Secretary, establish such groups. (Source: NSPD#1)

**Instruments of Power:** The specific means by which a nation-state exerts power (see Elements of National Power). (Source: stipulated by Study)
**Instruments of Soft Power:** The specific means by which a nation-state exerts power, but excluding means which employ direct coercion. “Soft power” attempts to get other actors in the international system to want what the employing nation-state wants, and thus to act in accordance with the employing state out of its own will. (Source: Adapted from Joseph Nye)

**Issue Management:** Issue management is a core national security system process in which national security professionals work closely with politicians and/or political appointees to identify, manage, and resolve episodic national security issues. Issue management is different from system management in that the former occurs at the level of a singular event (e.g., what to do about Iran taking hostages), while the latter implies a higher level of attention to more than just a singular event (see System Management). (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Knowledge Management:** Knowledge Management refers to the management of the components and enabling of relationships from which knowledge emerges: used to enhance decision-making, spark innovation, and comprehend weak signals in the information environment. Knowledge management does not focus on managing knowledge itself; rather, it seeks the positive interaction of the component elements that can be managed to lay the foundation for better decision-making, innovation, and adaptation. (Source: Joint Pub 1-02)

**Lead Agency:** An agency designated among U.S. Government agencies to coordinate the interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation. The lead agency chairs the interagency working group established to coordinate policy related to a particular operation. The lead agency determines the agenda, ensures cohesion among the agencies, and is responsible for implementing decisions. (Source: Joint Pub 1-02)

**Management:** The act or manner of managing; handling, direction, or control. (Source: Random House Unabridged Dictionary, 2006)

**Managing Risk:** The act of understanding and attempting to control the degree to which an institution is exposed to “risk” as it is defined by the institution. Also known as “Risk Management.” (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Mandate:** Provides regional input and national security policy guidance and establishes a comprehensive policy for all U.S. government activities (to include military) in the region, taking into account the United States’ goals and objectives, available resources, and other international and regional partner activities. Policy execution is then decentralized to the regional and country team levels. (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Mission Integration:** A duty or task assigned to an individual or unit (especially lower military units), that involves melding different individuals or units from separate institutions toward the completion of that task. (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Multilateral:** Involving two or more coalition partners. (Source: stipulated by Study)
**APPENDIX 2. GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS**

**Multinational:** Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations. (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Nation:** A people who share common customs, origins, history, and frequently language. (Also see State.) (Source: American Heritage Dictionary, 2nd Edition)

**National Power:** Legal authority, physical force, strength, and influence which may be in the form of a central government and/or coalition government formed by a major party having an affect on the citizenry, subjects, or other nations. (Source: MNF SOP Primer)

**National Response Framework:** The National Response Framework (NRF) establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response in the United States. It presents guiding principles that enable all response partners (local law enforcement, FEMA, city officials, etc.) to prepare for and provide a unified national response to disasters and emergencies ranging from the serious but purely local to catastrophic natural disasters or large-scale terrorist attacks. (Source: National Response Framework)

**National Security Strategy:** An overarching U.S. Government policy document that covers the national security principles underlying U.S. foreign policy. Prepared by the National Security Council and published in 2002, the strategy’s main themes include promoting “human dignity” through political and economic freedoms; providing security against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction; working with others to defuse regional conflicts; and strengthening America’s national security institutions. The objectives of development assistance are central to the document. (Source: USAID Glossary of ADS Terms)

**National Security System:** A group of interacting, interrelated, and interdependent U.S. national security institutions with structural and functional relationships that form a complex whole. (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Nonstate Actor:** According to international relations theory, these are actors in the international environment that are not otherwise defined as states. (See State.) Nonstate actors can include non-governmental organizations (NGOs), loosely-networked tribal communities, religious groups, terrorist networks, and multi-national corporations. (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Norm-building:** The establishment of ways and traditions of behavior within a society that constitute a code of appropriate and inappropriate behavior within that society. (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Operational Control (OPCON):** 1. *(NATO)* The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned to the mission or tasks, which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned; and to retain or assign tactical control of these units. OPCON does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of units concerned, nor does it include administrative or logistical control. 2. *(DOD)* Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant
command (command authority) and may be delegated. OPCON is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces; assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the subordinate organizations. Normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and service or functional or component commanders. (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Orchestrate:** To arrange or combine so as to achieve a maximum effect. (Source: Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary)

**Oversight:** The review, monitoring, and supervision of federal agencies, programs, activities, and policy implementation. (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Policy:** The nation’s position on an issue or event and the long-term prioritization of issues and events as expressed in terms of national interest. (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Policy Coordination Committee (NSC/PCC):** The NSC/PCCs are the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy, providing policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSC system and ensuring timely responses to decisions made by the President. Each NSC/PCC includes representatives for the executive departments, offices, and agencies represented in the NSC/DC. (Source: NSPD-1)

**Preparedness:** The state of being ready for some occasion, duty, or test. (Source: Merriam Webster)

**Prevention:** Acting ahead of time in order to stop an event from occurring. (Source: Merriam Webster)

**Principals Committee (NSC/PC):** The senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The council meets at the call of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Regular attendees include the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of Staff to the President, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (who serves as chair). Other heads of departments and agencies, along with additional senior officials, are invited when appropriate. (Source: NSPD#1)

**Problems:** Impediments to performance. Problems are driven by causes (See Causes.) (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Proliferation:** The process by which one nation after another comes into possession of, or into the right to determine the use of, nuclear or other weapons; wherein each nation becomes potentially able to launch an attack on another nation. (Source: DoD Dictionary of Military Terms)

**Radicalism:** The political orientation of those who favor revolutionary change in government and society. (Source: Princeton Online Dictionary)
Reconstruction and Stabilization: The military and diplomatic efforts intended to rebuild the degraded or destroyed political, socio-economic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create a foundation for long-term development (Source: US Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation, 1 December 2005). Also referred to as Phase IV operations in the DoD concept of the “continuum of war.” Reconstruction and stabilization is the point at which civilian efforts supplant military force, and underlying tensions that may lead to a resurgence of violence and/or a breakdown of law and order are managed and reduced while preconditions for successful long term development are implemented (Source: US Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation, 1 December 2005). National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44 articulates general roles and responsibilities for conducting stabilization and reconstruction operations overseas, vesting the State Department with coordinating U.S. Government reconstruction activities with the Defense Department. (Source: stipulated by Study)

Scenario-Based Planning: A system for developing flexible long-term plans. Herman Kahn first used the term in his work on contingency planning for thermonuclear war (1967). Scenario planning generally involves six steps: 1) decide on the drivers or trends of change; 2) develop a realistic enough framework that can allow the drivers to tell a plausible narrative; 3) write several initial mini-scenarios; 4) reduce these to two or three scenarios; 5) write the scenarios as in-depth narratives; and 6) examine the issues that arise from the process. (Source: H. Kahn, 1967)

Span of Control: A measure of the number of subordinates in an organization who are supervised by managers. (Source: stipulated by Study)

State: 1. A politically unified people occupying a definite territory. 2. The territory, or one of the territories, of a government. 3. A human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. (Sources: Random House Unabridged Dictionary, 2006 [for #s 1 and 2]; Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation” [for #3])

Strategy: The coordination of operations and missions for the achievement of national policy. (Source: stipulated by Study)

Symptoms: Observable impediments to performance as driven by problems. Symptoms indicate problems. (Source: stipulated by Study)

System Imperatives: Those system characteristics necessary for the effective performance of the national security system in the 21st century. (Source: stipulated by Study)

System Management: System management concerns the macro-level management of the nation’s entire national security system. It is focused on building effective, efficient, and sustainable national security management processes that will provide future
presidents a wide array of capabilities necessary to resolve future national security issues, missions, and projects.  (Source: stipulated by Study)

**System Performance Criteria:** The three criteria used to assess the current performance of the national security system: 1) the system’s ability to generate desired outcomes; 2) how efficiently the system produces; desired outcomes; and 3) whether the system is producing the types of behaviors that are logically required to obtain desired objectives.

**Synchronize:** To represent or arrange (events) to happen at the same time.  (Source: Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary)

**Unity of Command:** 1. A clear understanding and agreement on the structure of authority. (Related to Unity of Effort.) 2. (business) No subordinate reports to more than one boss.  (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Unity of Effort:** 1. To bring into a common action the efforts of all partners by establishing organizational and procedural standards and templates, to be used for sizing and training staffs, equipping them, and filling the positions with educated and well-trained personnel through a governmentwide career-enhancing selection process. 2. When all means are directed to a common purpose. 3. (PACOM MPAT) Unity of effort requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. Involves a common understanding among all national forces of the overall aim of the multinational force and the concept for its attainment. Requires coordinated policy, particularly on such matters as alliance or coalition commanders’ authority over national logistics (including infrastructure) and intelligence. Also requires coordinated planning for rules of engagement, fratricide prevention, communications, and source and employment of reserves; timing of operations is essential.  (Source: MNF SOP Primer)

**Unity of Effort Plan:** A governmentwide plan that details the national security/foreign relations tasks of all departments and agencies across the regions of the world, to include who is in charge of what and where.  (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Unity of Purpose:** A common understanding of what is being attempted and the underlying factors that are important to achieve success.  (Source: Institute for Defense Analyses)

**Unity of Vision:** The commonly understood vision of U.S. Government foreign assistance and security cooperation goals and objectives that accommodates country-specific perspectives.  (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Value Added:** The additional benefits derived from well-designed, orchestrated foreign assistance programs that account for both national and transnational activities.  (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Vision:** A description of a future state that typically involves finding what is “hoped for” or what attributes that are “ideal”—what an organization, system, etc., aspires to become. A vision describes at least one scenario for the future and can describe several alternative
futures and the successful role of the entity (country, organization, etc.) in the future. Visions can remain the same over long periods of time (e.g., the United States’ Declaration of Independence). (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Visioning:** A collaborative process involving dialogue, debate, and a systemic methodology or process for attaining the desired vision or future state. There are three types of visioning processes: 1) a statement used to give organizational or enterprise direction to key stakeholders; 2) a process to build consensus among key stakeholders (e.g., Congress coming together to agree on something; and 3) a process that creates a description of a future state. (Source: stipulated by Study)

**Whole-of-Government:** An approach that fosters governmentwide collaboration on purpose, actions, and results in a coherent, combined application of available resources to achieve the desired objective or end state. (Source: stipulated by Study)
APPENDIX 3: CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY

The Case Studies Working Group commissioned a diverse range of “major” and “mini” case studies to examine significant national security events and developments. The group assessed issues and incidents that involved multiple U.S. government agencies and departments to discern the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. national security process and inform efforts to reform the current system.

The case study collection is neither entirely random nor entirely planned. The working group solicited several specific studies that addressed issues and historical events considered essential to the examination of the U.S. national security system (e.g., the U.S. intervention in Somalia, planning for the Iraq War, the Iran-Contra Affair, and others), and also sought cases on national security matters involving lesser known events, episodes not entailing the use of force, and those for which the author brought unique insights based on past scholarship or government service. Although the majority of cases focus on the post-Cold War security environment, the working group strove to include studies involving each presidential administration since 1947. The outcome of a proposed case was not considered in the selection process because successful, failed, or mixed results are equally valuable in analyzing the national security process.

Each case study addressed four questions:

1. Did the U.S. government generally act in an ad hoc manner or did it develop effective strategies to integrate its national security resources?
2. How well did the agencies and departments work together to implement these strategies?
3. What variables explain the strengths and weaknesses of the response?
4. What diplomatic, financial, and other achievements and costs resulted from these successes and failures?

A. The Major Cases

A majority of the Project for National Security Reform’s (PNSR’s) “major” case studies (approximately 15,000 words in length) offer original scholarship in national security policymaking. These products typically use both secondary and primary sources, including government records, interviews, and periodicals to investigate a range of national security issues, including responses to immediate, medium-, and long-term challenges as well as organizational restructuring and program management. Case studies examining recent issues, such as the proposed U.S.-Indian civil nuclear cooperation accord, rely heavily on periodicals, while those reaching further back incorporate archival research. Using their government experience, some case study authors applied first-hand knowledge to their investigations, though the authors and the working group also reviewed secondary literature to extend the analysis.
B. The Mini Cases

In contrast to the major cases, the mini case studies (less than 10,000 words in length) draw on the vast secondary literature that has arisen over the decades on important national security events. The working group authors focused on issues related to the performance of the agencies involved rather than the personalities engaged or other dimensions unrelated to the structures and processes of the U.S. government.

Authors employed three to five books, monographs, government reports, or seminal articles regarding their event—basing their choices on scholarly and popular reviews. Many used ten to fifteen additional sources to enhance the narrative of the case, provide more detail regarding the organizational and process issues of central concern to PNSR, and determine whether there was a general consensus among experts regarding the U.S. government’s response to a particular event or issue.

C. Comparative Analysis

To generate insights as to what led to or prevented good outcomes in the cases—defined as achieving the goals of the policy that led to the action and not costing so much in terms of finances or eroding government authority as to outweigh any benefits from the outcome—the case study authors used the following four questions to frame their descriptions and analyses:

1. **Strategy**: Did the U.S. government generally act in an ad hoc manner or did it develop effective strategies to integrate its national security resources?

2. **Implementation**: How well did the agencies/departments work together to implement the strategies?

3. **Strengths and Weaknesses**: What variables explain the strengths and weaknesses of the response?

4. **Costs and Benefits**: What diplomatic, financial, and other achievements and costs resulted from these successes and failures?

The working group drew factors relating to these four general questions from the cases, and then “scored” along spectrums running from a highly negative (a key factor in high costs and poor outcome of the case) to a highly positive influence (a key factor in a good case outcome). The working group parsed the four broad questions into specific issues as follows:

1. **Strategy**
   - How much was senior authority involved in the case? (positive to negative range: high involvement and awareness–disengaged or ignorant)
APPENDIX 3. CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY

- How much was there an early agreed, coherent strategy? (positive to negative range: early agreement on a strategy which linked goals and assessments of resource requirements–little agreement or coherency)

- To what extent was the initial strategy maintained? (positive to negative range: consistent strategy throughout–hardly any at all or often altered)

- How was the strategy devised? (positive to negative range: systematic evaluation through strategy formulation–little or no systematic consideration of goals, risks, resources, linkages)

2. Implementation

- How did interagency procedures affect strategy implementation? (positive to negative range: facilitated cooperation, coordination, and implementation–produced stalemate and uneven implementation)

- To what extent were agency authorities and responsibilities clear and adhered to? (positive to negative range: well-understood by all participants and adhered to–little agreement or common understanding, competing claims to lead agency status)

- How was information managed? (positive to negative range: collaborative, open–competitive, compartmentalized)

- What characterized the interagency culture? (positive to negative range: collaborative, focused on problem solving–competitive, focused on advancing agency’s position, interaction viewed as zero-sum game)

3. Strengths and weaknesses

- To what extent was success or failure a function of personalities? (positive to negative range: personalities dominated successful outcome, overcame procedural and bureaucratic delays and hindrances–personalities were a major explanation for lack of success)

- To what extent was success or failure a function of existing procedures? (positive to negative range: procedures were key to success–procedures significantly contributed to failure)

- To what extent did political partisanship contribute to success or failure? (positive to negative range: contributed to success, maintained discipline of majority party–contributed to failure, undermined governmental unity of effort)
To what extent was there agreement on what constituted success or failure? (positive to negative range: pervasive and consistent agreement–very little agreement)

Were lessons learned from the case institutionalized? (positive to negative range: formal to institutionalized lessons learned–no formal effort)

4. Costs and Benefits

- How did the outcome affect the authority of the government?1303 (positive to negative range: increased and enhanced the government’s authority–eroded the government’s authority)

- How did financial costs affect the perception of success or failure? (positive to negative range: financial costs estimated accurately–exceeded estimates)

- Short-term cost-benefit conclusions. (positive to negative range: more beneficial than costly–more costly than beneficial)

- Longer term cost-benefit conclusions. (positive to negative range: outcome viewed as more beneficial than costly–outcome viewed as more costly than beneficial)

Each of the analysts involved in the cross comparison of the cases scored each case separately. Where their scores differed, they discussed the different rationales for the scores until arriving at a single, consensus score.

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1303 Authority, as used here, refers to the belief on the part of citizens that the government acts legitimately, effectively, and to the benefit of the citizens, and, as such, is worthy of loyalty, trust, and support.
APPENDIX 4: THE COSTS OF AN INEFFICIENT NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM: SELECTED VIGNETTES FROM PNSR CASE STUDIES

A. The Interagency, Eisenhower, and the House of Saud

The 1950s witnessed the first decade of sustained, yet imperfect, American involvement in the Middle East. By 1956, U.S. officials had become disillusioned with the political leadership of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and generally frustrated by the failure of U.S. strategies in the region. To resuscitate the government’s agenda, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles proposed reorienting U.S. regional policies away from Egypt towards more friendly regional countries while President Dwight D. Eisenhower looked to Saudi Arabia in particular, and spearheaded an effort to make King Saud a preeminent leader and ally in the Middle East in the hope that the king would lead the region away from the anti-American currents of Nasser’s Arab nationalism and safely into the Western camp. In subsequent months, the nationalization of the Suez Canal, Israel’s invasion of Egypt, and other crises confirmed the president’s commitment to promoting the Saudi leader’s status. The Saud strategy thus began, and would continue, as a casual presidential strategy underpinned by individual errors in judgment and interagency weaknesses, including entrenched world views and an unbalanced Cabinet.

In building up King Saud, the clear authorities of the administration and the president’s individual initiative allowed for relatively effective integration of the elements of national power. Over the course of 1956–1957, Eisenhower dispatched two ambassadors to Saudi Arabia, engaged in extensive personal diplomacy with the king, and solicited a National Security Council report on how Islam could be used to further American Cold War aims. Dulles enlisted the support of regional embassies and information agencies in boosting Saud. The Department of State also hosted a Saudi state visit. Furthermore, under Eisenhower’s authority, the Department of Defense renewed its lease of Dharan airfield in Saudi Arabia, the International Cooperation Agency granted the Saudi kingdom economic assistance, and officials in diverse agencies coordinated a substantial sale of armaments to the Saudi monarchy.

Yet the strategy proved a dismal failure because it ignored predominant political realities in Saudi Arabia and the greater Middle East. Though the Middle East remained free of Soviet domination and the administration made progress in moving Saud into alignment with the West, King Saud never emerged as an effective leader or counterweight to Nasser. Instead, Saud led Arab opposition to Israel in the Gulf of Aqaba; rejected the Eisenhower Doctrine; and supported an anti-American, nationalist government in Syria. In the longer run, the foundered Saud endeavor quickened the demise of American influence in the Middle East and led to further policy misadventures in the region. The failure of its regional policies also cost the administration an invaluable opportunity.
B. Reaction to Sputnik under the Eisenhower Administration

When assessing the results of the Sputnik crisis, it is important to note first that the United States was beat into space. There was confusion, chaos, and unnecessary duplication in all areas of Intercontinental Ballistics Missile (ICBM) and space research. Eisenhower himself lamented that the intense interservice rivalry prior to Sputnik was “highly harmful to the Nation.” But the president himself was also reluctant to engage in a prestige-based space “race.” Eisenhower’s resistance and the inter-service competition cost the U.S. a psychological and propaganda victory and resulted in a perceived loss of prestige and deficiency in science and technology. Additionally, one of the principal costs as a result of the failure of U.S. strategy in the pre-Sputnik era was the failure to make U.S. citizens feel safe. President Eisenhower’s “low key response to Sputnik failed to defuse the growing sense of public alarm.” Despite eventual success in the creation of National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the severe interservice rivalry that had hindered the U.S. space program prior to the launch of Sputnik also slowed the implementation of the Space Act after the Soviet Success. As Kinnard notes, President Eisenhower thought that many people had come to believe “that the services were more interested in the struggle with each other, than against an outside foe.” The U.S. Army, for example, held stubbornly to its prestigious ballistic missile and space programs.

C. Bay of Pigs Debacle: Failed Interaction of the Intelligence Community and the Executive

Although it is difficult to comprehensively assess all the effects of the abortive Bay of Pigs operation, which if successful could have prevented Cuba from becoming a Communist state, some primary consequences are evident. Abroad, the failed invasion proved an American diplomatic embarrassment, and undermined U.S. prestige. The debacle seemingly legitimized Soviet interference in South America and inadvertently contributed to the Cuban Missile Crisis. As White House-CIA relations deteriorated following the Bay of Pigs debacle, the CIA’s credibility suffered a lasting decline. Worse still, in a frantic attempt to regain a glimmer of its former prestige, the CIA become more active elsewhere in Central and South America, interfering in Ecuador only seven months later and eventually becoming embroiled in British Guiana—ventures that have been harshly criticized. Domestically, the Bay of Pigs created an era of government exposé, as journalists became more critical of the government. Accordingly, the media began actively investigating and reporting on U.S. covert operations, ignoring the risks of exposing CIA operatives abroad.

D. After Disaster: Recovering from the 1964 Alaskan Earthquake

In 1964, an earthquake struck Alaska that measured 9.2 on the Richter scale, the most severe ever recorded in North America. Transportation networks and critical infrastructure were almost entirely decimated, crippling Alaska’s feeble pre-oil economy. The very viability of Alaska as a state was in jeopardy.
In response, President Lyndon B. Johnson created the Federal Reconstruction and Development Planning Commission for Alaska, a Cabinet level agency that developed a rehabilitation strategy and managed its implementation through an effective division of labor among the agencies most engaged in the recovery efforts. Backed by presidential authority, the commission expedited both policy and operational decision-making, encouraging cooperation among scores of government agencies. Eventually, virtually every government agency became involved and many specialized task forces supplemented the activity of the first responders in the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP), rather than attempting to supplant it. This non-hierarchical approach was essential to convincing the OEP to collaborate with the new commission.

The fact that no single agency had clear authority over peer agencies facilitated the conceptualization of a unified strategy, while maintaining incentives for individual agencies to employ their resources most effectively. The simplicity of the organization and management approaches used by the Federal Reconstruction and Developing Planning Commission for Alaska not only allowed a high degree of flexibility in the implementation of broad federal objectives, but in combination with the unprecedented emphasis on rapid action, it also minimized the level of financial investment necessary for the recovery effort. Reliance on experienced career personnel to lead the execution of commission policies also turned out to be crucial. Rather than retarding progress, involving affected Alaskans, as well as state and local agencies in the federal decision-making inspired trust in the actions of the federal government, and saved both time and money. The initial cost of the earthquake’s damage was $311 million, a number that could have been amplified extensively if the government had not acted in a cooperative, unified manner.

The earthquake imposed major costs on many Alaskans, but reconstruction efforts showcased effective and swift collaboration between federal, state, and local agencies tasked with responding to a catastrophic natural disaster. Integrated action obviated the need to activate the last-resort strategy of relocating much of the Alaskan population to other parts of the United States and allowed the state’s economy to survive the ordeal. These successes additionally demonstrated how the federal, state, and local governments can profitably collaborate with businesses and nonprofit groups as an integrated team even in the face of a catastrophic disaster. Although each community faced unique challenges, the unprecedented management strategies adopted by the commission provided a framework under which diverse and timely solutions could be implemented very rapidly. One of the more long-term benefits of interagency cooperation during Alaska’s reconstruction was the example set for policy analysts to take an active role in disaster preparedness. As population concentrations in urban areas and investments in construction and development increase, so do the consequences of natural disasters. Integrated reconstruction efforts could substantially decrease the long-term costs and ripple effects for the economy of the areas affected by future natural disasters.


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E. CORDS and the Vietnam Experience: An Interagency Organization for Counterinsurgency and Pacification

Prior to 1967, the U.S. pacification assistance mission in South Vietnam was run by the United States Mission offices in Saigon. The State Department, CIA, U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the U.S. Information Service all were responsible for various aspects of this mission. The military advisory effort was run by Military Assistance Command Vietnam; however, military assets were outside the direct purview of the embassy. The splintered organization of pacification endeavors achieved dismal results. President Johnson decided to intervene directly to improve the management of U.S. support to pacification in South Vietnam. The presidentially motivated shift resulted in an organization known as CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Support) which created an interagency headquarters that streamlined U.S. efforts in support of the South Vietnamese government and the fight against Viet Cong insurgents.

CORDS was unique in that it placed nearly all civilian and military interagency assets involved in the pacification struggle under one civilian manager—and then subordinated that individual to the military hierarchy as a Deputy Commander of Military Assistance Command Vietnam. The CORDS structure also placed military commanders in charge of civilians and civilians in charge of military commanders, demonstrating to CORDS staff that agencies would reward personnel based on their skills, abilities, and mission performance and not on previous agency loyalty. This innovative organization also provided the pacification effort nearly unfettered access to enormous military and civilian resources, allowing the elements of CORDS to accomplish objectives quickly and completely. Finally, CORDS emphasized creating a working relationship with the South Vietnamese to generate more comprehensive pacification plans that would ensure U.S. and Vietnamese military and civilian resources worked together. By centralizing planning and management in one headquarters, and subsequently replicating the identical management structure at every level of the South Vietnamese government (military region, province, and district), CORDS established an effective interagency body.

CORDS was, on the whole, effective in establishing viable military and civilian aid initiatives in conjunction with the South Vietnamese, efficiently managing those programs and measurably improving the effectiveness of the South Vietnamese security forces in the countryside. While the basic legitimacy of the South Vietnamese government and its popular support was still problematic, the realignment of military-civilian resources under CORDS helped cripple the Viet Cong insurgency. CORDS accomplished this feat with only a fraction of the resources expended on the greater war. Between 1966 and 1969, the CORDS budget peaked at $1.5 billion.\textsuperscript{1306} This was a drop in the bucket compared to the total cost of the ten-year U.S. entanglement in Vietnam, which was $111 billion.\textsuperscript{1307} The relatively small investment in CORDS made a major


contribution to pacification of the Vietnamese countryside. The fact that CORDS had to partner with the deeply flawed South Vietnamese government, which limited the net effect of the effort, does not negate the value and efficiency of the integrated approach to pacification.

**F. The 1970s Energy Crisis and National Energy Policy Creation**

The absence of a coherent energy strategy through the 1970s and failure to craft even marginally effective ad hoc response to the oil shocks worsened general economic conditions and contributed to energy price inflation, strengthening OPEC’s power, and increasing America’s vulnerability to the vicissitudes of the energy market. Commenting on the 1970s oil shocks, James Carafano writes that “At almost every turn, Washington policymakers exacerbated the already challenging energy situation with their own policy blunders.” As a result of heavy government regulations and the lack of a national energy strategy, markets were distorted, the oil industry became less efficient, and U.S. dependence on imported oil increased. The government learned little from the first oil crisis and responded similarly to the second. According to the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, significant energy price increases resulted from policy miscalculations. The committee reported that “OPEC price increases did have an effect on oil prices but domestic issues were largely to blame for the energy inflation of 1979.”

**G. The Carter Administration and the Iranian Hostage Crisis Rescue Mission**

American prestige, already weakened by Washington’s inability to engage effectively with revolutionary Iran, declined further from the failure of the Iran hostage rescue mission. After Operation Eagle Claw was called off due to the disaster at Desert One, the American press was mournful. The mission had failed to rescue the hostages and resulted in the loss of eight U.S. servicemen, seven helicopters, an Air Force EC-130, numerous classified documents and equipment, and American prestige. Editorials excoriated Carter’s seeming ineptitude as a leader in a time of crisis. The Iranians reacted jubilantly and Ayatollah Khomeini proclaimed to the world: “We shall export our revolution to the whole world. Until the cry ‘There is no God but God’ resounds over the whole world, there will be struggle.” The diplomatic cost was also high, resulting in a hardening of the Iranian position and a further nine-month delay in the release of the hostages. The botched hostage rescue attempt also encouraged radical Islamic terrorists. The hostage crisis initiated a period of hostage taking throughout the Middle East, concentrated primarily in Lebanon and in 1983, a suicide bomber had killed 241 American servicemen in Beirut. Arguably, American policymakers’ failure to counter radical Islam effectively began with the hostage crisis and continues to this day.

**H. Losing Iran: The Accidental Abandonment of an Ally through Interagency Failure**

In losing Iran after the 1979 revolution, the U.S. lost a valuable regional ally—a “pillar of stability” in President Jimmy Carter’s words—which had conducted military operations
on behalf of American interests and had served as a deterrent against Soviet expansion to the Indian Ocean. Indeed, Brzezinski believes that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was only possible because of the Iranian revolution. Thus, the true strategic cost of poor policy responses may not have been just losing Iran, but also Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan also gave rise to the American-backed mujahideen resistance, which in turn contributed to the eventual emergence of the Taliban, the protector of al-Qaeda. The loss of Iran also forced the U.S. into an uncomfortable alliance of convenience with Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. Support of the Iraqi regime increased both Iraqi power and ambitions in the region, again with longer term strategic implications that contributed to the U.S.-led wars of 1991 and 2003. There were also high direct military-related economic and technical losses. The U.S. had invested large sums of money in military bases in Iran including the very advanced BishShahr and Kapkan stations. These posts were critical to monitoring Soviet missile activity originating in Central Asia. In addition to losing access to these and other bases, billions of dollars in advanced weapons were simply abandoned after their gradual seizure throughout 1979, as no plan for their emergency withdrawal, or destruction, was in place. The final destination of this military hardware can only be speculated at, but none of the possibilities would have positive implications for American interests. Economic fallout from the revolution also had short-term direct and longer term economic costs which are less calculable. Approximately twelve billion dollars in arms sales were cancelled in May 1979, harming U.S. military industries and raising the per-unit cost of high technology systems for the U.S. military. Exact losses to firms which already had operations within Iran are difficult to determine, but over ten billion dollars in claims were filed by roughly 2,800 corporations and individuals. A serious long-term impact on the U.S. economy was the loss of access to a key oil supplier. Short-term supply disruptions contributed to the U.S. oil shortages of 1979, which in turn aggravated, whether directly or indirectly, the economic phenomenon of stagflation during the late-Carter and early-Reagan administrations.

I. U.S. Policy on the Iran-Iraq War

The United States ended their professed neutrality early on in the Iran-Iraq war by leaning towards Baghdad, but the goal remained largely to keep with country from winning the war. While this technically succeeded, both Iran and Iraq were put on collision course with the United States due to Washington’s policies. Weak enforcement of trade regulations with Iraq enabled Saddam Hussein to horde weapons and ammunition in preparation for the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and his “friendly” relations with Washington gave him a false confidence that his power grab would not be opposed militarily. The de-facto abandonment of neutrality in favor of Iraq contributed to Iran’s pursuit of an aggressive international relations policy, evident today in Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. In addition, the military clashes between Iran and the United States, which contributed to the accidental shot down of Iran Air Flight 655, further tarnished America’s image in Iran, setting off a wave of anti-American protests and calls for revenge. Lastly, illegal sales of weapons to Iran prompted extensive congressional hearings and tarnished President Reagan’s political image. They also delivered a severe blow to America’s reputation among its European and Middle Eastern allies, as they began questioning Washington’s stance against terrorism and its commitment to the security of Arab Gulf states.
J. The Iran-Contra Affair

The Iran-Contra affair resulted from two separate operations: 1) the sale of arms to Iran in hopes that American hostages in Lebanon would be released and 2) the supply of covert military aid to the Nicaraguan Contras waging an insurgency against the anti-American Nicaraguan government. While the diversion of profits from the arms deals to the Contras garnered the most attention at the time, the operations themselves represented a larger failure of the national security system as the consultative processes and transparency of the National Security Council (NSC) and the executive departments were abandoned in favor of ad hoc decision-making by a small group of individuals.

Frustrated by an increasingly hostile Congress and constant Cabinet infighting, in the early- to mid-1980s the Reagan administration transferred operational control of policy from the principals of the NSC, whose departments were susceptible to congressional oversight, to the NSC staff, which operated outside legislative review. In this arrangement, the office of the National Security Advisor (NSA), select civilian officials, and even private contractors were tasked with implementing the president’s agenda—namely, assisting the Nicaraguan Contras in their armed opposition to the Sandinistas and supplying Iran with arms in the hope that Tehran would pressure Hezbollah to free recently taken American hostages. Those agencies with the proper knowledge and skills to manage the operations—the CIA, the Department of State, and the Pentagon—were purposely cut out and consequently the Department of State’s opposition to the arms deals and the Department of Defense’s refusal to run the Contra operation thus failed to influence actual events.

Unsurprisingly, fiasco ensued. Few hostages were released and few security or other gains were garnered from the funding the arms sales created for the Contras, either. Much of this financing was wasted; the disarray of the operation led to the misplacement of millions of dollars while reliance on private contractors resulted in a large amount of the Iranian profits going directly to the personal accounts of contractors. In addition, in the midst of the Iran-Iraq war, in which the U.S. government ostensibly supported Iraq, the arms deals of Iran-Contra provided Iran with intelligence on Iraq and more than 2,000 TOW antitank missiles and other parts for missile construction. The arms exchanges did not facilitate the hoped-for improved relationship with Tehran nor did they positively influence Iran’s policies. Instead, according to the Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, “the exorbitant amounts charged for the weapons inflamed the Iranians,” while simultaneously diminishing the U.S. government’s “credibility with friends and allies, including moderate Arab states.” There is no question U.S. prestige and the reputation of the Reagan administration both suffered serious blows. Reagan biographer Lou Cannon put it more bluntly: “The United States became the laughingstock of the Middle East and eventually of the world.” Finally, the Iran-Contra affair had significant, negative ramifications for the national security system. Interagency enmity, personified by conflict among the NSC principals, filtered down into the administration’s bureaucracies, further corroding the policymaking process during the Reagan administration and beyond.
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K. Somalia: Did Leaders or the System Fail?

In late 1992, the United States intervened in Somalia to prevent fractious warlords from hindering the distribution of international food aid in the midst of widespread drought and economic collapse. U.S. forces performed admirably (as part of the Unified Task Force [UNITAF]) and ensured food distribution. Before and during UNITAF’s humanitarian operations, the NSC operated without a strategy and on an ad hoc basis. The intervention was driven more by the president’s personal feelings than by sober calculations of national interest. Even so, the NSC was able to generate alternative courses of action, and to align its objectives with the means necessary to achieve them. In the field, Ambassador Robert Oakley and Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston judiciously combined diplomacy and military power, never failing to keep open lines of communication and limiting the application of force to that which was necessary to ensure the delivery of aid. They integrated force with civic action and information campaigns to reassure the public that the UNITAF presence was ultimately benign.

By contrast, though President William Clinton’s administration, which took over the Somalia problem in 1993, developed a formal, coordinated and explicit policy for the United Nations forces (UNOSOM II) that relieved UNITAF, it was not able to closely integrate the elements of national power well in crafting policy for the follow-on UNOSOM II mission. Interagency decision bodies were not able to develop common and iterative assessments of the resources required to execute U.S. policy. Neither could they develop common assessments of risks nor effective risk mitigation plans to hedge against undesirable outcomes. The NSC, as well as other U.S. government assessment and decision-making bodies, repeatedly papered over a fundamental mismatch between objectives and resources. In pursuing an ambitious reconstruction agenda, UNOSOM II ran into stiff armed resistance and following several months of low-level conflict, the United States sent U.S. special operations forces to Somalia to neutralize the most troublesome warlord. Throughout, hope was a persistent but poor substitute for clear analysis as the U.S. government stumbled into a high-risk, military-centric strategy, ignoring one warning after another that UNOSOM forces and special operations forces could not accomplish their assigned objectives.

The decision-making system did not respond nimbly to these warnings or effectively coordinate its own policy decisions, particularly with regard to managing the inherently complex and difficult two-track policy of pursuing military and political initiatives simultaneously. The national security apparatus could only digest and act on this reality slowly and incompletely—and, as it turned out, too late to avoid being overtaken by events that should have been assessed as increasingly likely and prepared for accordingly much earlier. The mission ended disastrously on October 3, 1993, when U.S. special operations forces were pinned down in a protracted engagement. After inflicting close to a thousand casualties on the enemy and losing eighteen soldiers, a United Nations (UN) relief force extracted the special operations forces. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. military withdrew from Somalia.

Washington’s failure produced a debacle that cost the United States a great deal besides lost lives. It created deep policy divisions in Washington and increased tensions between
senior civilian and military leaders. Somalia effectively ended the Clinton administration’s policy of assertive multilateralism and Les Aspin’s short career as secretary of defense. The failure disinclined the United States from intervening elsewhere, including in Rwanda. In addition, the defeat undermined the credibility that the United States had acquired from the successful Gulf War the previous year. Arguably, Somalia also encouraged America’s enemies to challenge U.S. interests. Just as the most powerful Somali warlord bluntly told Ambassador Oakley that American failures in Vietnam and Beirut proved the United States did not have staying power, Osama bin Laden and others similarly concluded from Somalia and other events that the United States lacked the will to protect its interests.


The U.S. government lacked an agreed position on Anti-Personnel Land-mines (APLs) throughout the Ottawa Process which led to a convention to ban APLs in the 1990s. Policy development on this issue was undermined by an extended debate and notable antagonism within the Department of Defense over the military necessity of APLs. The Pentagon was divided between pro-ban members of the Office of the secretary of defense (OSD) and service representatives in the Joint Staff (JS) who were virtually impervious to contrary views put forth by OSD because the JS did not require OSD approval for an issue to rise to the chairman’s level and then cross over to the secretary of defense, whereas OSD officials could not move an issue up to the secretary if they did not have agreement from the Joint Staff. The JS-OSD dispute, exacerbated by a lack of clear signals from the White House, made it difficult for the Department of State to formulate an effective diplomatic strategy. Compounding the discordant state of policymaking, policy work was bifurcated between mid- and high-level officials; middle managers at State, OSD, and even the JS attempted to steer their own course since the results of the principals and deputies meetings seldom filtered down and there were rarely opportunities for mid-level staff to move ideas up to the higher levels.

As the process became increasingly muddled, high-ranking members of the Clinton administration strove to create a new policy. Eschewing in-place mechanisms, partly because of constant press leaks and partly out of a sense of urgency, they devised a policy in support of a limited ban. This decision was promulgated by Presidential Decision Directive 48, which was designed to establish interagency roles and missions relating to APLs. Despite the tone of the directive, finality of decision and unity of purpose had not been achieved within the U.S. government. Most telling, the document asked the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), NSC, and assistant secretary of state for politico-military affairs each to provide separate implementation options for review by the principals.

The administration eventually decided to pursue the APL limits through the regular arms control venue of the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD). This approach was known to be arcane, slow, and very deliberate, but it was a process with which many officials felt comfortable and which others thought appropriate. Unfortunately, Defense and State’s inability to integrate policy kept negotiators in a constant state of frustration and
often forced them into stony silence. ACDA’s efforts to dominate decision-making within the State Department also created tensions and apprehensions among members of the U.S. team. Moreover, the CD implementation strategy did not effectively engage the public on the land-mine issue and it proved unable to keep abreast of the accelerated pace of modern diplomacy—in particular the hide-bound arms control protocols of the CD slowed down the U.S. responses to the nimble efforts of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).

Interagency conflicts thus impeded the development of a strategy regarding how to address the substantive and public relations issues fueling the international shift against the U.S. land-mine position. The mixed messages of the Department of Defense and the White House made policy formation difficult and implementing an effective diplomatic strategy impossible. As a result, the United States was left outside of an important global process and suffered a loss of soft power. Most of those involved in the APL policy effort believe that the U.S. lost significant prestige, credibility, and leadership capital yet, perhaps the greatest damage was wrought within the interagency process itself. The tactics of leaking stories to the press, working the Congress behind the scenes, and covert collaboration with the ICBL took their toll. Agencies’ positions hardened, suspicions mounted, and feelings of betrayal remained to poison future policymaking. The failure to reconcile agency differences on the best way to manage APLs cost the United States much international goodwill, which is difficult to quantify, but substantial nonetheless.1308

M. Interagency Paralysis: Stagnation in Bosnia and Kosovo

For the first three years of the war in Bosnia, the U.S. government failed to develop a coherent strategy. Instead, an ad hoc, reactive stance, and ever-changing policy, most often characterized as “muddling through” allowed the belligerents to control the tempo of events. Proceeding from a shallow analysis, based on the assumption that the war resulted from atavistic ethnic hatred, the State and Defense departments independently developed policy options centered on protecting departmental equities. Consequently, the president received options that were both too few and too contradictory. Eventually, the NSC bypassed the interagency process to create a strategy. Force and diplomacy were eventually, albeit haltingly, coordinated in Bosnia with Operation Deliberate Force in 1995, after much delay as the departments proved incapable of cooperating well due to their disparate perspectives and desired goals. Events also illustrated that no individual beneath the president could navigate the full political-military spectrum with authority and competency; routinely, the military interfered in political decisions and diplomats meddled in military matters.

The interagency struggle which stagnated Bosnia policy eroded Washington’s ability to take decisive action, reduced the credibility of American power, and made it difficult for Washington to lead the global response to the crisis. This impotence prolonged the

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Balkan crises and very likely increased the human and financial costs of the violence. In addition, collective security as a concept and NATO as an organization suffered serious blows. Even after U.S. officials decided on action with Operation Deliberate Force, the gap between diplomats and war fighters produced a policy that could not link political and military means and ends. Though Washington was able to end the war, its failure to effectively link political and military means and ends prevented the intervention from establishing a stable end-state, leaving problems (especially unresolved ethnic and international tensions) for U.S. national security policy that persist to this day. Although it is impossible to quantify how much more the desultory, poorly integrated and incremental engagement in the Balkans cost the United States, the amounts in play were substantial. For example, the cost of the Kosovo campaign, as determined by Department of Defense was $3 billion. Presumably, a better integrated political-military effort in the Balkans would have enabled faster results at substantially less cost.

N. Brinkmanship in the Straits: The 1995–1996 China-Taiwan Missile Crisis

The United States government neglected to understand Beijing’s sensitivity regarding the Taiwan issue. The Clinton administration’s attempt to link human rights and trade relations had already strained relations with Beijing, and demonstrated a generally incoherent U.S. policy towards China. The administration’s failure to credibly communicate its commitment to Taiwan in 1995 allowed China to believe that it could continue military exercises in the near future. The ensuing crisis, culminating in Chinese military exercises near Taiwan, was an American policy failure which resulted in the U.S. government appearing weak in the eyes of Chinese leaders and the American public. Poor strategy by the Clinton administration in 1995 cost the United States not only a suspension of diplomatic and official ties with China, but fostered within China a strongly negative view of U.S. policy intentions. There is agreement among most authors that the Clinton administration’s response to the 1996 missile crisis during Taiwan’s election was more effective, particularly in its demonstration of military power. However, overall the national security process still failed to create a coherent China policy that demonstrated a commitment to Taiwan while simultaneously sustaining good relations with Beijing.

O. The 1998 Bombings of the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania: The Failure to Prevent and Effectively Respond to an Act of Terrorism

The failure of the intelligence and policy communities to recognize the threat posed by al-Qaeda to U.S. interests in East Africa prior to August 1998 contributed to the vulnerability of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. When these embassies were bombed, 224 people were killed, including twelve Americans and thirty-two Foreign Service National employees. Thousands more were injured. The considerable damage to

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U.S. physical assets represents another significant cost. The magnitude of the damage from the explosion in Kenya, the inefficient response of the Nairobi FEST, and the numerous planning and logistical failures resulted in chaos and confusion at least in the first days of the emergency response, although the costs here could have been higher. The U.S. retaliation for the bombings, Operation Infinite Reach, has been characterized as a “very expensive failure.” It was never determined whether the al-Shifa plant was involved in chemical warfare manufacturing, and its ties to bin Laden were not confirmed. Rather, the evidence seems to indicate that the factory was involved solely in the production of pharmaceuticals. This miscalculation hurt the U.S. international image and no high-level al-Qaeda leaders were killed. The failed operation thus cost about sixty million dollars.

P. U.S. Decision-Making Regarding East Timor, 1999

In 1999, after the voters in the Indonesian territory of East Timor overwhelmingly voted to separate from Jakarta in an August 30 referendum, anti-independence militias linked to the Indonesian government launched a campaign of terror. The response of the U.S. government to this violence, though ultimately effective, was initially lethargic and splintered. Absent attention from high-level U.S. policymakers, American officials first looked unsuccessfully to Indonesia to halt the violence. Subsequently, both the Australian and American governments endorsed deploying an international peacekeeping force to restore order in the territory but U.S.-Australian relations were strained by discordant messages emanating from the United States regarding Washington’s willingness to commit U.S. manpower and material to any such force. It was not until the Australians made clear their dissatisfaction with the lack of clear U.S. support regarding an issue that they perceived as of vital interest for their country, that President Clinton and his key advisors established a clear strategy—combining pressure on Indonesia with support for Australia—and effectively mobilized the bureaucracy behind it. Pressure from the U.S. government, international financial institutions, and the international community successfully compelled a reluctant Indonesian government to permit the effective deployment of International Force for East Timor on its territory while U.S. provision of sufficient, though limited, assistance to the Australian-led military intervention helped smooth relations between Washington and Canberra.

Though American policies helped end the civil strife in East Timor, facilitated the territory’s transition to independence, and ultimately strengthened U.S.-Australian ties, the inability of U.S. government agencies to develop a coherent preventative strategy still caused needless confusion in Australia. In addition, Washington’s original reluctance to commit heavily to a military intervention in East Timor resulted in a short-term deterioration in U.S.-Australian relations and perhaps led to a greater level of post-referendum violence than might otherwise have occurred.

Q. The National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) and the National Counterintelligence Mission: What Has Worked, What Has Not, and Why

Foreign intelligence services have stolen U.S. national security secrets for decades and the damage Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen, and others have inflicted on U.S. national
security has been incalculable. To address this problem by providing strategic direction to U.S. counterintelligence (CI) and better coordinating the diverse CI activities of the U.S. government, the Office of the NCIX was established in 2001. The NCIX seemed poised to succeed when created. It had widespread congressional support, a consolidated national strategy, the endorsement of a highly respected commission, and the president’s personal backing. Yet, the statutory intent to integrate U.S. CI efforts has been repeatedly frustrated. Due to weakness of NCIX authorities in budget allocation, strategic direction, and other areas, individual agency priorities continue to eclipse governmentwide CI integration. As a consequence, American secrets remain excessively vulnerable to foreign intelligence services.

A series of government and independent analyses have documented the high costs of the seams in U.S. counterintelligence strategy. Failing to establish effective national CI leadership threatens to replicate past costs. Seven years after the NCIX was created, no single entity is capable of providing a comprehensive threat assessment of possible foreign intelligence successes, supporting operations, or formulating policy options for the president and his national security team. While CI-related cooperation among the FBI, CIA, and the military services has increased, this collaboration has failed to provide the comprehensive, well-integrated CI strategy and policies required to uphold U.S. national security.

R. Balancing Democracy Promotion and the Global War on Terror in Pakistan

The cost of insufficient strategy development and coordination has been an entrenched, emboldened, and strengthened terrorist adversary; an escalating rise in the level of violence within Pakistan (that as of mid-2008 shows no sign of abating); the diminished power and ousting of President Musharraf—the cornerstone of U.S. policy; and a Pakistani public even more suspicious of U.S. intentions. It is true that Department of Defense and the United States’ Intelligence Community efforts helped yield a variety of landmark captures and significant counterterrorism successes. Since late 2001, “Pakistan authorities have apprehended more than 700 suspected members of al-Qaeda, including nearly all of the senior leaders that have been captured globally to date, most of whom were promptly turned over to the United States for interrogation.” However, many believe that America’s global war on terror strategy, heavily reliant on force and orchestrated through Washington’s relationship with President Musharraf and the Pakistani military, has made matters worse. According to the Director of National Intelligence J. Michael McConnell, al-Qaeda and its affiliates now pose a significant threat to the stability of Pakistan itself. For the year 2007, the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies found “that a total of 1,442 terrorist attacks left 3,448 persons dead and 5,353 injured in the FATA and throughout the country; this included 60 suicide attacks.” America’s staunch support for President Musharraf and quiet acquiescence to Pakistan’s democratic deterioration seemed to push people who favor democracy towards extremism. For example, during Pakistan’s 2007 state of emergency that pushed back

S. The U.S. in Central Asia: Lessons from U.S.-Uzbek Engagement

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) operations in Afghanistan and Russia’s growing influence to the west of the Caspian Sea, have recently amplified the strategic importance of Central Asia. As the area’s most populous country and greatest military power, Uzbekistan is critical to U.S. strategic interests and will likely remain key to U.S. cooperative security arrangements in the region. In its conduct of U.S.-Uzbek relations from 2002 to 2005, however, the U.S. government did not demonstrate a coherent, overarching strategy.

In 2002, the White House established a Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework Agreement with Uzbek President Islam Karimov which, though touching on development, human rights, and other issues, predominantly focused on mutual security concerns. Yet shortly thereafter Washington’s approach shifted with Congress and the executive branch increasingly targeting Uzbekistan’s human rights record, to the exclusion of other critical issues. As a result, U.S. assistance to Uzbekistan was repeatedly curtailed as U.S. policy first confused and then disappointed Uzbek officials. This confusion was exacerbated by mixed signals from the Pentagon, which focused on security issues in its dealings with Uzbekistan, and the State Department which repeatedly criticized Karimov for allegedly suppressing political freedoms. Poor U.S. public diplomacy in response to regional political upheavals, and poor management of democracy promotion funding which largely circumvented the Uzbek government and elites and was instead often distributed through non-government organizations to the political opposition further degraded U.S.-Uzbek relations.

The inability of the U.S. to craft a single coordinated policy toward Uzbekistan culminated in the eviction of U.S. forces from Uzbekistan’s Karshi-Khanabab air base in 2005 and a freeze in bilateral relations. Security cooperation halted and a critical regional strategic partnership disintegrated. Shortly after American forces vacated Karshi-Khanabad, Moscow and Uzbekistan signed a treaty of alliance and the Russian media presciently hailed the reversal as a great victory for Russian diplomacy and a setback for U.S. influence in the region. By allowing cooperation with Uzbekistan to disintegrate, Washington lost a valuable regional ally in the fight against terrorism as well as the chance to promote more liberal governance through effective, long-term engagement. As recent events in Georgia demonstrate, the U.S. government can little afford to advance Russian influence or alienate potential allies in the former Soviet States.
Appendix 4. The Costs of an Inefficient National Security System

T. North Korea’s Nuclear Programs and American Policy Formation

The U.S. policy failure on the North Korean nuclear issue has potential implications at the bilateral, regional, and global levels. Bilaterally, the North Korean nuclear test has radically altered the jumping-off points for negotiation by invalidating both the Defense Department’s “no bomb” policy and the State Department’s efforts to preserve the integrity of the non-proliferation regime. Regionally, the policy failure appears to have had little immediate effect, although there was some concern that Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan would respond by constructing nuclear deterrents. The North Korean issue, when considered in concert with military quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan, is altering global perceptions of American power. Descriptors such as “decline” and “impotent” are gaining currency in the academic world. Furthermore, if the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)-Syrian nuclear collusion is verified, it will demonstrate the DPRK’s willingness to breach a new set of international non-proliferation norms. Over the long term, this could multiply the nuclear threats and containment challenges faced by the United States. One scholar identifies a genuine fear in the U.S. government that North Korea’s proliferation will become “a ‘how-to-guide’ for other countries such as Iran.”
### APPENDIX 5: STRUCTURE COMPARISON CHARTS

Figure A1. Interagency Integration Models: Horizontal vs. Typical Interagency Structures (National Level)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existing National Security Organizations</th>
<th>1. ODNI Model</th>
<th>2. NCTC Model</th>
<th>Typical Interagency Structures (PCCs, IWGs, etc.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Archetypes</strong></td>
<td>Stakeholders assign themselves to team and control resources.</td>
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<td>Stakeholders assign themselves to team and control resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Horizontal Team Model</strong></td>
<td>Team lead identifies and controls personnel, budget, and evolving.</td>
<td>Team has common SOPs and skills, but diverse expertise.</td>
<td>Team lead identifies and controls personnel, budget, and evolving.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Core Attributes of Horizontal Teams</strong></td>
<td>1. Proper resources (Personnel and Resources)</td>
<td>2. Clear objectives</td>
<td>3. Empowered with proper authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Training, including conflict resolution</td>
<td>5. One leader, not several</td>
<td>6. Rewards and Incentives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Culture</td>
<td>8. Communication</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Green** = Horizontal Team Model similarity
- **Orange** = IA Committee similarity
- **Yellow** = Status in between the two.
## Figure A2. Interagency Integration Models: Horizontal vs. Typical Interagency Structures (Regional Level)

### Existing National Security Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Archetypes</th>
<th>Horizontal Team Model</th>
<th>Typical Interagency Structures (PCCs, IWGs, etc.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Reorganized SOUTHCOM</strong></td>
<td>Limited personnel/budget control. Untested program / activity management concept could impose delay.</td>
<td>Stakeholders assign themselves to team and control resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. JIATF - S Model</strong></td>
<td>Team lead influences personnel, some budget execution ability.</td>
<td>Often poorly defined and ambiguous.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. JIATF - S Model</strong></td>
<td>Team lead identifies and controls personnel, budget, and resources.</td>
<td>Direct from senior authorities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Core Attributes of Horizontal Teams

1. Proper resources (Personnel and Resources)
2. Clear objectives
3. Empowered with proper authority
4. Training, including conflict resolution
5. One leader, not several
6. Rewards and Incentives
7. Culture
8. Communication

### Archetypes

**Horizontal Team Model**
- Team lead identifies and controls personnel, budget, and resources.
- Specific, measurable, action-oriented, time-bound and evolving:
- Direct from senior authorities.
- Team has common SOPs and skills, but diverse expertise.
- One leader with managerial, evaluation and budget control.
- Individual and team performance measured and rewarded.
- Focus on mission success and teamwork.
- Communication:
- Encourages and rewards information sharing.

**Typical Interagency Structures (PCCs, IWGs, etc.)**
- Stakeholders assign themselves to team and control resources.
- Often poorly defined and ambiguous.
- Direct from senior authorities independent of functional bodies.
- One leader with managerial, evaluation and budget control.
- Individual and team performance measured and rewarded.
- Focus on mission success and teamwork.
- Communication:
- Encourages and rewards information sharing.

### Core Attributes of Horizontal Teams

1. Proper resources (Personnel and Resources)
2. Clear objectives
3. Empowered with proper authority
4. One leader, not several
5. Rewards and Incentives
6. Culture
7. Communication

### Green
- Horizontal Team Model similarity

### Orange
- IA Committee similarity

### Yellow
- Status in between the two
## Figure A3. Interagency Integration Models: Horizontal vs. Typical Interagency Structures (Country Level – Heavy Footprint)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Archetypes</th>
<th>Horizontal Team Model</th>
<th>Core Attributes of Horizontal Teams</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. US Mission HQs (&quot;surge&quot; operations)</td>
<td>Stakeholders assign themselves to team and control resources.</td>
<td>1. Proper resources (Personnel and Resources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. PRTs</td>
<td>Team leader identifies and controls personnel, budget, and other resources.</td>
<td>2. Clear objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. CORDs</td>
<td>Direct from senior authorities independent of independent functional bodies.</td>
<td>3. Empowered with proper authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. SCRS</td>
<td>Team has common SOPs and skills, but different expertise.</td>
<td>4. Training, including conflict resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. One leader, not several</td>
<td>One leader with managerial, evaluative, and budgetary control.</td>
<td>5. One leader, not several</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Rewards and Incentives</td>
<td>Individual performance is measured and rewarded.</td>
<td>6. Rewards and Incentives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Culture</td>
<td>Focus on mission success and teamwork.</td>
<td>7. Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Communication</td>
<td>Encourages information sharing and regular communications.</td>
<td>8. Communication</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<th>Interagency Structures (PCCs, IWGs, etc.)</th>
<th>Existing National Security Organizations</th>
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</table>

### Archetypes
- **Green** = Horizontal Team Model similarity
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- **Yellow** = Status in between the two.
APPENDIX 6: CURRENT NATIONAL SECURITY PROCESSES

After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, a host of changes shifted the organizational processes—old patterns of interaction—among departments and agencies. These changes created new agencies with new processes that had to then be integrated into the existing system. The two primary organizational processes that have undergone these changes are policy and strategy.

A. Policy Coordination

The foundational policy coordination processes in place today are found in National Security Presidential Directive-1 (NSPD-1) and Homeland Security Presidential Directive-1 (HSPD-1). Two additional, recent macro processes in the U.S. federal government are the National Response Framework and the Foreign Assistance Planning process. Each of these key processes is described below. In 1987, then Vice President George H.W. Bush best summarized the rationale for many of the changes in these processes that have continued to this day:

Presidents exercised a broad range of foreign policy powers for which they neither sought nor received Congressional sanction through statute. This history speaks volumes about the Constitutional allocation of powers between the branches. It leaves little doubt that the President was expected to have the primary role of conducting the foreign policy of the United States. Congressional actions to limit the President in this area therefore should be reviewed with a considerable degree of skepticism. If they interfere with core presidential foreign policy functions, they should be struck down. Moreover, the lesson of our constitutional history is that doubtful cases should be decided in favor of the President. 1311

With the exception of the National Security Council (NSC) and the Homeland Security Council (HSC), there are no congressionally mandated structures within the White House. Otherwise, each president is free to change the executive structures and processes as he sees fit.


NSPD-1 and HSPD-1 articulate the policy coordination processes that govern the resolution and, if necessary, the elevation of issues to the president via the NSC


Below these councils are the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council Principals Committees, which are comprised of Cabinet secretaries and chaired by the national security advisor and homeland security advisor, respectively.\footnote{In addition to the National Security Advisor, regular attendees of the NSC/PC are designated as the secretary of state, the secretary of the treasury, the secretary of defense, and the chief of staff to the president. Other attendees invited to participate as their expertise is needed include the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the director of central intelligence, the attorney general, the director of the Office of Management and Budget, the secretary of commerce, the U.S. trade representative, the assistant to the president for economic policy, and the secretary of agriculture. The assistant to the president for homeland security chairs the HSC/PC, which also includes the secretary of the treasury, the secretary of defense, the attorney general, the secretary of health and human services, the secretary of transportation, the director of the Office of Management and Budget, the assistant to the president and chief of staff; the director of central intelligence, the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the assistant to the president and chief of staff to the vice president. The assistant to the president for national security affairs is invited to attend all meetings of the HSC/PC. As with the NSC/PC, other attendees are invited as issues dictate.} Below each Principals Committee sits a Deputies Committee, which is comprised of deputy secretaries from the same departments as their parent Principals Committee and chaired by their respective advisors. Finally, below the Deputies Committees sit issue-specific Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs) for both the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council. NSPD-1 summarizes the function of the PCCs:

Management of the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the United States Government shall usually be accomplished by the NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs). The NSC/PCCs shall be the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy. They shall provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSC system and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President.\footnote{NSPD-1, 4.}

HSPD-1 contains parallel language, additionally emphasizing the HSC/PCCs’ role in coordinating with state and local governments as well as across the federal sector.\footnote{HSPD-1, 2.}

NSPD-1 and HSPD-1 manage most of the coordination of economic issues related to national security; though the National Economic Council has its own principals, deputies,
APPENDIX 6. CURRENT NATIONAL SECURITY PROCESSES

and PCCs, it presently appears to be inactive. Coordination of other domestic policy areas relating to national or homeland security, such as domestic counternarcotics, health, education, and transportation infrastructure, is typically conducted under the purview of the Domestic Policy Council and is taken up only by exception in the NSPD-1 or HSPD-1 processes.

a. Crisis Management

The NSPD-1 and HSPD-1 processes are intended for use in non-crisis situations for the most part, but can be used to support crisis decision-making as well. There are also some standing processes specifically designed for crisis management. The National Response Framework (NRF) is used in response to domestic emergencies, and a Foreign Assistance framework facilitates foreign crisis management. NSPD-44 articulates roles and responsibilities for conducting stabilization and reconstruction operations overseas, and vests the State Department with coordinating U.S. government reconstruction activities with the Defense Department.

The George W. Bush administration, like many of its predecessors, often manages crises outside of the formal NSPD-1 or HSPD-1 systems, as President Bush’s designation of the Department of Defense (DoD) as the lead agency for post-war Iraq affairs illustrates. In the DoD lead agency situation, both General Jay Garner and Ambassador Paul Bremer reported directly to the secretary of defense, and the well-documented tensions between State and Defense occurred in Washington and on the ground in both Iraq and Afghanistan—with the NSC staff attempting, at best, to bridge them. In both operations, the successful teaming of key leaders from the Embassy and the U.S. military achieved periods of relative interagency coherence. The 2007, creation of a “war czar” in the NSC staff to coordinate non-military support for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is a notable exception to the more general preference for lead agency crisis management.

Post-war Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate how crises can be managed through ad hoc processes—arrangements that are largely the result of presidential leadership style, the quality and character of relationships between senior administration officials, and relationships between Washington and the “field,” be that overseas or at home.

2. National Response Framework

The National Response Plan (NRP) was issued in the wake of 9/11. The NRP was a 426-page highly complex document that entailed fundamental command and control changes to the long-standing Federal Response Plan, which it replaced. Many deemed the

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NRP confusing and poorly implemented. Neither the process changes, nor the training of many key officials at the federal, state, and local levels were exercised well. The result, according to one Senate report, was that:

...without a systematic training and implementation effort, the NRP was unlikely to be widely or readily understood, and unlikely to offer effective guidance, just four months after its implementation, for the massive federal, state, and local response necessary for Katrina.\textsuperscript{1319}

The National Response Framework (NRF) is a post-Hurricane Katrina construct that replaced the NRP. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, President Bush called for “a comprehensive review” of the federal responses to the hurricane so that the necessary changes could be made for the nation to be “better prepared for any challenge of nature or act of evil men” that might pose a national threat.\textsuperscript{1320} A subsequent extensive study led by Francis Townsend, the White House head of homeland security and counterterrorism policy, culminated in the creation of the NRF.

According to the Department of Homeland Security:

> The \textit{National Response Framework} presents the guiding principles that enable all response partners to prepare for and provide a unified national response to disasters and emergencies—from the smallest incident to the largest catastrophe. The \textit{Framework} defines the key principles, roles, and structures that organize the way we respond as a Nation.\textsuperscript{1321}

Intended for use at the federal, state, local, and tribal levels, and by private as well as non-governmental organizations, the NRF establishes national domestic response structures, doctrine, and planning processes. The NRF took effect in March 2008 but, at the time of this writing, is yet to be tested in the field.

3. \textbf{Foreign Assistance Framework}

Ambassadors are the primary means for coordinating interagency policy and implementation abroad. The United States currently has ambassadors in over 189 countries and missions around the world serving as the president’s representatives. President John F. Kennedy was the first to clarify the singular role of the ambassador, keeping the chief of mission out of the chain of command for decisions relating to the use of U.S. forces—except when, in the ambassador’s opinion, the activities of those forces might affect relations with the country. Then, President Kennedy advised, the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1320} Bradley H. Patterson, \textit{To Serve the President: Continuity and Innovation in the White House Staff} (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2008) 127.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
ambassador “should promptly discuss the matter with the military commander and, if necessary, request a decision by higher authority.”

The designation of the ambassador as the chief of mission has remained in effect since it was first issued in 1961. Nevertheless, some diplomats believe that the ambassador has come to be seen as the secretary of state’s representative in a country, without the presidential authority over other government elements working in the country that Kennedy intended to establish.

Country Team Processes, by which ambassadors coordinate mission activities, span from policy development and coordination, to strategy and planning, to implementation and assessment. These processes appear to be highly informal and thus largely dependent on personalities and relationships. Until recently, country teams typically developed Mission Program Plans that bore little relation to policy and strategy set in Washington. Moreover, neither the State Department nor the broader interagency systematically used the Mission Program Planning process to evaluate the linkage of ends, ways, and means. As one team of scholars recently lamented, “the Ambassador and Country Team [have] no real opportunity to evaluate ends, ways, and means in the context of a strategy… Ambassadors simply allow each organization to pursue broad, generic objectives.”

Significant reform of foreign assistance began in 2006 with the State Department looking at the U.S. government’s approach to foreign assistance policy. Under a new director of U.S. foreign assistance (who was also the administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID]), the State Department sought to correct perceived failings in the allocation of foreign assistance. Randall Tobias, the first director, recounted some of these failures, prior unsuccessful efforts to address them, and the consequences for U.S. foreign and national security policy:

The purposes for which foreign assistance funds have been allocated have differed from one U.S. Government agency to the next, from one office to the next, from one bureau to the next, from one overseas mission to the next. United States foreign assistance has had a thousand agendas, and therefore no coherent story to tell Congress, the American public, or the citizens and host governments of the countries we seek to assist about what it was the United States was seeking to achieve with its foreign assistance dollars.

The State Department began its review of the foreign assistance process by examining the range of programs and activities under its own auspices as well as those at USAID.

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1325 The first Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance also held the title of deputy secretary of state.
Because other U.S. government departments and agencies administer and rely on foreign assistance, the reform process quickly took on an interagency character.

Beginning with the development of the Fiscal Year 2007 foreign assistance budget, the director of foreign assistance set up a framework to categorize potential aid recipients and associated programs according to 1) how they use foreign assistance and 2) how dollars spent would support achievement of key objectives. Today, State Department-led interagency working groups provide input on priority recipients and programs. The framework includes a performance measurement phase to determine results, identify potential improvements, and/or make necessary adjustments.

After its inception, complaints arose that the foreign assistance framework was not transparent to its key stakeholders. Based on these complaints, the director of foreign assistance commissioned an After Action Review in 2007, which included at least one USAID mission and one embassy representative from every region of the world. Other government departments and agencies also provided suggestions for improving the process. Today, the foreign assistance framework continues to evolve, with ongoing efforts to increase its efficiency, transparency, and effectiveness.

**B. Strategy and Scenario-Based Planning**

The foreign assistance framework is perhaps the only interagency effort aimed at creating an end-to-end strategic management process—from policy objectives to resource allocation and their systematic assessment. Strategy, however, is an organizational process unto itself, one that uses a planning process known as scenario-based planning. Scenario-based planning takes into account myriad contingencies to help an organization effectively plan for the future and anticipate its most effective next steps. Most departments and agencies in the U.S. government employ scenario-based planning to construct long-term plans based on known data and variables.

The numerous applications of scenario-based planning within, without, and across government underscores the utility and breadth of these endeavors. The weakness of scenario-based planning, however, is that it cannot deal well with unknown variables—and often it is these unknowns that prove to be the most important.

**1. Origins and Evolution of Scenario-Based Planning**

The scenario-based planning processes used today evolved from a long-standing tradition in military war gaming; the development of War Plan Orange, for example,
and the annual GLOBAL series at the U.S. Naval War College. Civilian organizations in America first utilized this tool through the RAND Corporation during and after World War Two. RAND’s Herman Kahn coined the term “scenario” in the 1950s while constructing a policy and planning tool as part of a strategic and military work for the U.S. government. Then, in 1965, Frederick Emery and Eric Trist published their seminal article, “The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments,” questioning the effectiveness of single-point forecasts that assume a relatively stable world. Emery and Trist identified four “ideal” environments that result from interactions of competitive organizations and developments within an existing environment (e.g., innovation): 1) placid, randomized environment; 2) placid, clustered environment; 3) distributed reactive environment; 4) turbulent fields. The environments were graduated, increasing in complexity and uncertainty to the fourth, described as if the “ground is in motion.” In response, firms such as General Electric, SRI International, and Royal Dutch Shell sought alternative long-term planning approaches—including Kahn’s scenario approach—to cope with increasing turbulence and uncertainty.

Believing a purely deductive approach to be limited due to the “unknowability” of the future, Kahn saw scenarios as unique in their ability to incorporate knowledge from multiple disciplines and to improve the communication between experts, and consequently focused on building quality scenarios that would lead policymakers and others “to think the unthinkable.” In 1967, Kahn and Anthony Wiener’s book, The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years, defined “scenario” as a narrative that described “hypothetical sequences of events constructed for the purpose of focusing attention on causal processes and decision points.”

By 1977, 15 percent of U.S. Fortune 1000 companies were using scenarios—a number that doubled by 1981. Thus, by the early 1980s, scenarios were “the primary format for depicting corporate environmental assessments for planning purposes.”

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1329 Kees Van der Heijden, Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation, 2nd ed. (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2005).
2. Scenario-Based Planning Within the National Security System\textsuperscript{1337}

Scenario-based planning is conducted by a number of the major institutions within the national security system, from the State Department to the primary organizations of the intelligence community. The largest, most recent example of the adoption of scenario-based planning within the system is the Department of State’s recently completed Project Horizon.

\textbf{a. Department of State: Project Horizon}

Recognizing that the federal government lacked integrated strategic planning mechanisms to reach common goals, the Department of State’s Office of Strategic and Performance Planning created Project Horizon in 2005, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and other interagency organizations.\textsuperscript{1338} Project Horizon is now jointly funded and administered by the U.S. Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Labor, State, and Treasury; the Environmental Protection Agency; the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; the Millennium Challenge Corporation; the National Defense University; and the USAID.\textsuperscript{1339}

Project Horizon aims to produce a structured set of interagency strategies, associated considerations, and action plans. This set will be applied to interagency capabilities and tools; organizational models and processes; management and operational models; knowledge, skill, and training requirements; and strategic planning approaches and goal frameworks. The project consists of four phases: 1) Scenario Development, 2) Interagency Planning Workshops, 3) Knowledge Transfer, and 4) agency-specific Planning and Interagency Linkage Analysis. According to the project’s summer 2006 progress report:

\begin{quote}
Project Horizon has brought together senior officials from the National Security Council and Global Affairs agencies to explore ways to improve [U.S. government] interagency coordination in global affairs using scenario-based planning. The purpose of the ongoing project is threefold. First, it is to develop strategic interagency capabilities in which the [U.S. government] should consider investing in order to prepare for the threats and opportunities that will face the nation over the next 20 years. Second, it is to provide participating agencies with a scenario planning toolset that can be used to support both internal agency planning and planning across agencies. Finally, it is to provide a starting point for an institutionalized interagency planning process.\textsuperscript{1340}
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{1337} This section is adapted from IDA Draft Working Paper: \textit{The Military’s Role in Conflict Prevention}.  \\
\textsuperscript{1339} Ibid. \textsuperscript{1}.  \\
\textsuperscript{1340} Ibid. 1.
\end{flushright}
Project Horizon’s strategies are designed to address a range of interagency planning issues including global security, development, trade, health, resource management, and humanitarian relief. As Project Horizon was not intended to produce a comprehensive “vision” for the U.S. government, the scenario-based planning methodology is grounded in the assumption that it is impossible to predict long-term futures.

The Project Horizon Core Team systematically created a set of five plausible alternative future operating environments or scenarios based on research and interviews with approximately 200 senior executives from the participating agencies as well as global affairs experts from academia, think tanks, and the private sector... The five Project Horizon scenarios represent a diverse range of operating environments that the U.S. Government could face in 2025. They are not intended to be forecasts of the future, and are “valid” only as a set. They are a single planning instrument comprised of five pieces. Each of the scenarios... contains distinct challenges and opportunities for the U.S. Government that became the context for the interagency strategic conversations that took place during the Project Horizon planning workshops.

Demonstrated and subsequently used as a “proof of concept,” Project Horizon has not been institutionalized. The Project Horizon process relies on a cooperative agreement among peers and voluntary participation by the various agencies and organizations of the U.S. government. The project also has not been consistently used with other “visioning” or scenario-based tools to provide strategic guidance across the U.S. government, for use in the national security community or other inter-agency communities. While most have agreed that Project Horizon is the best approach to date for integrating forecasting into interagency planning, it has shortcomings. Without directive senior leadership and strong buy-in at a level above individual departments and agencies, participation and outcomes in such efforts have not translated into authoritative mandates for policy or program changes and/or budget allocations.

b. Department of Defense: Defense Planning and Other Scenarios

The U.S. military primarily uses scenario-based planning in three applications to assist with 1) sizing the force, 2) training elements of the force, and 3) addressing potential or ongoing contingencies across all six phases of the operational continuum.

*Force Sizing Scenarios* are used to determine the scale of forces needed in the future. The DoD employs these scenarios in program budget analyses; major joint studies; concept development activities; and joint, interagency, and combined war games. Central

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1341 Ibid.
1342 Patrick Gorman and Deborah Barger, Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence and Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Interviews.
1343 Gorman and Barger, Interviews; Written input provided by Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence Patrick Gorman, 20 April 2008.
to Force Sizing Scenarios are Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS), which the Office of the Secretary of Defense develops and distributes to the military departments and the Joint Staff through the Defense Planning Guidance.\textsuperscript{1345} The DPS depict security threats and U.S. military missions guided by a strategic-level concept of operation; ensure DoD consistency for studies, war games, and experimentation; and inform force sizing decisions in the five to twenty-five year time frame.

*Training Scenarios* are used to train elements of U.S. military forces, either jointly or by a particular service or unit. The majority of training scenarios are conducted on an individual basis—outside of an established process for the development of joint training scenarios—and are specifically designed to either support the objectives of the training (e.g., pre-deployment training) or ensure the objectives of an exercise are met.

*Contingency Planning Scenarios* are used to address potential or ongoing contingencies across all six phases of the operational continuum.\textsuperscript{1346} The Joint Planning and Execution Community uses contingency planning when requirements in the Contingency Planning Guidance, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, or a planning order are identified.\textsuperscript{1347} Based on guidance from the Contingency Planning Guidance, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan mandates the production and maintenance of a certain number of contingency plans. A commander may also initiate contingency planning by preparing plans not specifically assigned but considered necessary to fulfill command responsibilities.


Partnering with the Department of Homeland Security, the federal interagency, and state and local homeland security agencies, the Homeland Security Council has developed all-hazards planning scenarios for use in national, federal, state, and local homeland security preparedness activities. Contained in the National Preparedness Guidelines, the fifteen National Planning Scenarios collectively depict the broad range of natural and man-made threats facing the United States, and guide overall homeland security planning efforts at all levels of government and within the private sector.

Designed to be the foundational structure for the development of national preparedness standards from which homeland security capabilities can be measured, the National Planning Scenarios form the basis for national planning, training, investments, and exercises needed to prepare for all types of emergencies.\textsuperscript{1348} While these scenarios reflect a rigorous analytical effort by federal, state, and local homeland security experts, it has been recognized that refinement and revision may be necessary over time—to ensure that

\begin{itemize}
  \item “Contingency” is defined as “an anticipated situation that likely would involve military forces in response to natural and man-made disasters, terrorists, subversives, military operations by foreign powers, or other situations as directed by the President or [Secretary of Defense].” *Joint Pub 5-0: Joint Operation Planning*, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006, xi.
  \item Ibid.
\end{itemize}
the scenarios accurately represent the evolving all-hazards threat picture and to embody the capabilities necessary to respond to domestic incidents.\textsuperscript{1349}

d. The Intelligence Community: Producer and Consumer of “Forecasting”\textsuperscript{1350}

Composed of federal agencies, military services, bureaus, and other organizations within the executive branch that play a role in national intelligence, the U.S. intelligence community (IC) is charged with the mission to “collect, analyze, and disseminate accurate, timely, and objective intelligence, independent of political considerations, to the president and all who make and implement U.S. National Security policy, fight our wars, protect our nation, and enforce our laws.”\textsuperscript{1351} The IC utilizes the most sophisticated process in the U.S. government for “forecasting” futures.\textsuperscript{1352} Forecasting, essential to effective visioning and scenario-based processes, is a form of estimative intelligence and one principal type of intelligence analysis that the IC produces to accomplish its mission.

The Director of National Intelligence is one of a number of intelligence agency and other directors who use such IC products as the National Intelligence Estimate, to develop strategy and long-range plans that support, coordinate, and manage the capabilities and resources of the broader IC enterprise. Thus, the IC has a twofold role in forecasting—producer and consumer.

\textit{The Intelligence Community as Producer of Forecasting}

The importance and difficulty of forecasting within the Intelligence Community is growing. As the former Director of National Intelligence Ambassador John Negroponte highlighted,

\begin{quote}
Strategic analysis is all the more needed now because of the unfolding new age in which we live. The former bipolar world—with its structure of nuclear deterrence and balance of great powers—is no more, and the shape and contours of the new age we are entering are not yet clear. There are more variables and factors in play, both regional and functional, than ever before. Simply distinguishing between the tactical and the strategic is increasingly difficult.\textsuperscript{1353}
\end{quote}

Further emphasizing the need for longer term forecasting, the President’s Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass


\textsuperscript{1350} Based on the work of Bob Wysoki’s paper, 2008.

\textsuperscript{1351} “Vision and Mission,” Office of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence public website, 6 November 2008 \url{http://www.odni.gov/aboutODNI/mission.htm}.

\textsuperscript{1352} Much of this information was validated using publicly available sources. Select information was obtained from internal government websites not available for routine public viewing, and some information was gathered through interviews with senior officials in the intelligence elements of the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. A current web address is provided wherever possible for the reader’s review.


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Destruction called for a greater emphasis on strategic analysis. In response, the IC created a Long Range Analysis Unit in the National Intelligence Council.

The Long Range Analysis Unit coordinates its activities with the strategic analysis elements of the Community and the Open Source Center. The goal is to use innovative technologies to address issues with strategic implications, such as global democratization and energy/environment. In spite of its creation, the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Subcommittee on Oversight has expressed continued concern about insufficient long-term analysis. While it is difficult to gather public information to ascertain the success of the unit, its existence speaks to the widely perceived need for better forecasting capability in the IC.

The National Intelligence Estimate is the principal product through which the IC develops and communicates its judgments about future events and identifies implications for U.S. policy. According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Intelligence Estimate embodies the

...most authoritative written judgments on national security issues designed to help U.S. civilian and military leaders develop policies to protect U.S. national security interests. [National Intelligence Estimates] usually provide information on the current state of affairs in the domestic and/or foreign arena but as a basis or backdrop for primarily “estimative” analysis—that is, judgments about the likely course of future events and the implications of U.S. policy.

The National Intelligence Council and the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies held a series of conferences at the university in 1996 to identify key global trends and their impact on major regions and countries of the globe. The exercise was designed to help describe and assess major drivers and features of the international political landscape as they were judged to likely appear in 2010. Conference participants were drawn from the U.S. government, academic institutions, journalism, business, and other professions. This effort produced Global Trends 2010, which became the first in a series of recurring products that the conference initiates and the council publishes approximately every four to five years.

The major contribution of the National Intelligence Council, assisted by experts from the IC, to the second in this series of futures documents, Global Trends 2015 was to harness U.S. government and nongovernmental specialists to identify and prioritize drivers, highlight key uncertainties, and produce an integrated trends analysis within a national security context. Developed to provide a longer term strategic perspective and flexible

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1355 Office of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence internal website, 6 November 2008 <www.odni.ic.gov>.
framework for discussing and debating the future, Global Trends 2015 was published in December 2000 and identified issues for more rigorous analysis and quantification.\(^{1357}\)

In the third global trends document, the National Intelligence Council continued to refine its assessment of the evolution of international developments and of the threats and opportunities that might warrant policy action. Published in late 2004, Mapping the Global Future identified four major scenarios and carried the strategic global perspective to 2020.\(^{1358}\) At the time of this writing, the National Intelligence Council is working on the fourth iteration of its global trends product line, NIC 2025.

The Global Futures Forum (GFF), sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency, is a multinational, multidisciplinary intelligence community that works at the unclassified level to identify and elucidate emerging transnational threats.\(^{1359}\) With selected experts from academia, non-governmental organizations, and industry joining core members in intelligence and security organizations, the GFF engages diverse officials and subject matter experts to stimulate cross-cultural and interdisciplinary thinking. The forum also challenges prevailing assumptions by creating an environment where comments are not attributed—to provoke consideration of the challenges without consideration for who made the challenge. Polling members annually establish and maintain topic areas or communities of interest, as illustrated below.

<table>
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<th>Table A1. Global Futures Forum Communities of Interest (^{1360})</th>
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<td>Emerging and Disruptive Technologies</td>
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<td>Genocide Prevention</td>
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<td>Global Disease</td>
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<td>Illicit Trafficking</td>
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The GFF reports a membership of more than 900 from nearly forty countries (Argentina, Greece, Poland, and Turkey, to name a few), with plans to expand into Asia during 2008.

**The Intelligence Community and its Customers**

The principal customers of the Intelligence Community frequently task individual intelligence agencies to produce forecasts. The Defense Intelligence Agency, for example, provides intelligence forecasts to defense acquisition planners, defense policymakers, and warfighters.\(^{1361}\) As weapons systems and platforms often have life spans measured in decades (e.g., U.S. Navy aircraft carriers), analysts develop long-

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\(^{1357}\) Ibid.
\(^{1358}\) Ibid.
\(^{1359}\) Global Futures Forum provides a password-protected yet publicly available website [https://www.globalfuturesforum.org/Home.php](https://www.globalfuturesforum.org/Home.php).
\(^{1360}\) Ibid.
range, threat-specific forecasts for acquisition planners—designers and engineers working to defeat assessed threats and challenges. Further, the IC is often called upon to provide technology-specific forecasts to ensure that future U.S. collection systems can monitor adversary capabilities and challenges.

Cabinet departments also leverage IC forecasts and future-based threat scenarios (along with similar products of their own organic intelligence elements) into their strategy, planning, and programming processes. IC products serve the DoD Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), for example. The QDR informs both the National Military Strategy, which broadly derives from the National Security Strategy, and the Defense Planning Guidance, which directs specific planning and programming activities in defense organizations.

The DHS Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, modeled after the DoD review, is expected to have a similar role in informing DHS strategy, planning, and programming efforts. The first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review will recommend long-term strategies and priorities for homeland security and comprehensively examine programs, assets, budgets, policies, and authorities required to provide the U.S. with sound, effective future homeland security capabilities.\footnote{1362 Lora Becker, Senior Advisor to the Deputy Under Secretary of Intelligence, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, US Department of Homeland Security, Interview, 23 April 2008.}

**The Intelligence Community as Consumer of Forecasting**

The IC conducts a quadrennial review process, known as the *Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review (QICR)*, much the same way the DoD conducts its process. Since its 2001 inauguration, the QICR has matured in its use of forecasts and future scenario-based analytic products. At the start, QICR participants informally used *Global Trends* products. As management of the IC was reshaped in response to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the second QICR, conducted in 2005, resulted in “crosstalk among the agencies, but not integration.”\footnote{1363 Deborah Barger, Assistant Deputy Under Secretary and Director of Policy, Strategy, and Doctrine Office, Deputy Under Secretary of Warfighter Support, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, US Department of Defense, Interview, 21 April 2008.}

A key objective of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence is to synchronize the National Intelligence Council forecasting process and the strategy and planning process for prioritizing, programming, and building intelligence capabilities in the out years. In late 2008, the IC is due to undertake a significant strategic planning regimen—led by the Office of Strategy, Plans, and Policy and relying on the National Intelligence Council’s draft product *Global Trends 2025*. This process, illustrated below, is due to be completed before the 2009 transition to a new administration.

**Figure A4. The Strategic Enterprise Management Process**\footnote{1364 Patrick Gorman, Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Strategy, Plans, and Policy, Office of Policy, Plans, and Requirements, Office of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, Briefing.}

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\footnote{1362 Lora Becker, Senior Advisor to the Deputy Under Secretary of Intelligence, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, US Department of Homeland Security, Interview, 23 April 2008.}

\footnote{1363 Deborah Barger, Assistant Deputy Under Secretary and Director of Policy, Strategy, and Doctrine Office, Deputy Under Secretary of Warfighter Support, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, US Department of Defense, Interview, 21 April 2008.}

\footnote{1364 Patrick Gorman, Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Strategy, Plans, and Policy, Office of Policy, Plans, and Requirements, Office of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, Briefing.}

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The Strategic Enterprise Management (SEM) process will use Global Trends 2025 as a catalyst for the next QICR. The QICR will then lead to a strategic planning process that will begin with the development and publication of the second National Intelligence Strategy. The sequence of events, from forecasting through strategic planning, is designed to lead to better informed portfolio investment decisions and to establish outcome-based goals for the National Intelligence Program.\footnote{1365}

While much of what needs to be done in IC forecasting is being done, it is being accomplished in a less than optimal environment—one that emphasizes analysis of such “threat du jour” or short-term preoccupations as Islamic terror or global warming. For example, one senior intelligence official noted:

[T]here are significant “islands” of futurists and scenario-based planning in the IC, but I would not call it a predominant element of the overall intellectual culture or habit of the community…there is still the need to reconcile individual component futures with a community future.\footnote{1366}

Another challenge for the IC is the generally “distant relationship” between most IC analysts and their policymaker customers. As senior analysts attempt to “dialogue” with their customers to better understand their needs and assist them in “contextually articulating” their concerns, some analysts can lose their objectivity—or be perceived as having lost that objectivity (i.e., “politicized” their analysis). The competing forces of engaging the customer in the forecasting process while concurrently maintaining an unbiased, objective perspective—making judgments that are “independent of political considerations”—creates this “tension.”\footnote{1367} Such tension can have a “chilling effect on intelligence managers’ support for direct analyst-customer interface. The distance

between analysts and customers often is detrimental to the overall process and outcome.”

Indeed, the intelligence community’s recent report, *Vision 2015*, discusses the issue as it will affect a new generation of intelligence consumers. “The customer’s requirement for both accuracy and prediction—often a conflicting requirement when dealing with futures analysis, makes the analyst-customer interface even more significant” when developing a forecast or estimate to ensure the often nuanced intelligence terminology, types and range of uncertainty, source reliability, and overall confidence level in the key judgments is well-understood. The IC mission to “collect, analyze, and disseminate accurate, timely, and objective intelligence” requires a mature and effective blend of both art and science.

3. Recent Developments in Scenario-Based Planning

Since the Harry S. Truman administration, the national security establishment has periodically sought means to integrate planning across multiple agencies. The Dwight D. Eisenhower and William J. Clinton administrations mounted particularly robust efforts to do so. More recently, spurred by the war on terror, a wide range of new planning efforts are underway, some which explicitly aim (at least in part) at improving interagency integration.

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1370 Ibid.

a. Adaptive Planning System (Department of Defense)

Early in his tenure as secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld became frustrated with the slow pace of deliberate planning in the Pentagon. As he told author Thomas Barnett:

I looked at the…plans and was stunned at how stale they were and how unfocused on agreed-upon assumptions or where assumptions existed or where assumptions were no longer valid.1372

Rumsfeld called the deliberate planning process he inherited “inefficient” and “medieval.”1373 The adaptive planning process, initiated in 2003, was born of the secretary’s frustration and sought to produce contingency plans more quickly than the 24-month cycle of past years.

Specifically, adaptive planning sought to correct problems, including the difficulty of adapting on-the-shelf plans to actual contingencies, the failure to periodically update plans, and the “insufficient process mechanisms” for facilitating consultation between plan developers (military) and DoD leadership (civilian).1374 However, improved interagency coordination was not among the adaptive planning process’s initial goals. DoD operational plans, commonly referred to as “war plans,” contained an annex specifically designated for interagency coordination. “Annex V,” produced after the secretary of defense had approved the base plan, seldom involved significant coordination with the very interagency partners named as critical in the annex.1375

Adaptive planning evolved during a time of great interest in interagency coordination and eventually came to emphasize up-front coordination. Plan development begins with a strategic guidance statement, which is coordinated with the Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, and other key interagency partners. In addition, a provision has been made for sharing Annex V with interagency partners. A State Department representative recently noted that the DoD adaptive planning process has improved its degree of State Department involvement.1376

b. Integrated Planning System (Department of Homeland Security)

Lines of authority for homeland security are complex and highly interconnected: prevention falls largely under the auspices of the Director of National Intelligence; the DHS handles protection activities; and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a DHS component, is charged with handling responses to man-made and natural disasters. Given these linkages, emphasis on the importance of developing and

1373 Ibid.  
1376 Donna Hopkins, Director of Strategic Planning, Department of State/Political-Military Affairs, panel presentation at the U.S. Army War College Strategy Conference, 10 April 2008.
implementing planning processes has increased since the inception of the DHS. Illustrative of this trend, the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security mentioned the term *planning* thirty-nine times, while its 2002 predecessor used the word only twelve times. Less evident, however, is how this attention has translated into actual planning and tangible results.

HSPD-8, released in December 2003, tasked the secretary of homeland security to develop a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal “in coordination with the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies and in consultation with State and local governments.” The 2007 *National Strategy for Homeland Security* created a new homeland security management system to implement the strategy by undertaking “a continuous, mutually reinforcing cycle of activity across four phases: Guidance, Planning, Implementation, and Assessment and Evaluation.” The White House subsequently released HSPD-8 Annex I, *National Planning*, guided by the philosophy that the nation required a “standardized approach to national planning... to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from all hazards.”

The HSPD-8 National Planning Annex directs the secretary of homeland security to build an Integrated Planning System (IPS) in coordination with other Federal departments and agencies. Notably, this includes a National Homeland Security Plan to implement the guidance detailed in the 2007 *National Strategy for Homeland Security*. The forthcoming plan is expected to provide specific details on homeland security guidance, planning, implementation, and assessment and evaluation.

Parallel to the establishment of these operational planning requirements, and as a result of the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, the White House established an interagency planning cell within the DHS. The Incident Management Planning Team (IMPT) was created in 2006 to “provide contingency and crisis-action incident management planning in support of the Department of Homeland Security’s national level domestic incident management responsibilities articulated in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and HSPD-5.” The IMPT is staffed by fifteen full-time planning representatives from key DHS elements and additional interagency members. Thirty-eight additional planners

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1377 This is an unscientific metric, but seems to be indicative of a prevailing trend nonetheless. As a means of comparison, it’s also worth nothing that the 2007 version, which uses the word “planning” over three times more often than its 2002 predecessor, is also only 2/3 of its total page length.
1380 HSPD-8, Annex I, Paragraph 31.
1381 The following outline is derived from a Pre-Decisional DHS Planning Document.
from DHS and elsewhere in the executive branch serve as “on-call” staff.\textsuperscript{1384} The IMPT is tasked with reaching out to State, local, and tribal entities and assessing potential DHS and interagency planning seams and gaps.

c. Interagency Management System

Following a Principals’ Committee meeting on the need for better coordinated civilian reconstruction efforts, the State Department created the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in 2004.\textsuperscript{1385} The Department of Defense had lobbied hard for the new organization’s creation; initial State Department receptivity to its creation was less assured. In December 2005, President George W. Bush signed NSPD-44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, which gave the State Department, through the S/CRS, the responsibility to “improve the coordination, planning and implementation of U.S. Government reconstruction and stabilization missions in states and regions at risk of, in or in transition from conflict or civil strife.”\textsuperscript{1386}

As stipulated by NSPD-44, the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization works with sixteen interagency partners to establish a framework to guide “the development of U.S. planning for reconstruction and stabilization operations by facilitating coordination across federal agencies and aligning interagency efforts at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.”\textsuperscript{1387} The S/CRS does so through a three-part framework, as follows.

First, there is an **Interagency Management System (IMS)** for managing high-priority and highly complex crises and operations. The system is “specifically designed to integrate military and civilian planning at the Washington, combatant command, and embassy/Joint Task Force levels.”\textsuperscript{1388} The NSC, along with Cabinet Secretaries and deputy secretaries, is charged with determining when the IMS is needed for a specific operation.\textsuperscript{1389} The IMS “is not intended to respond to the political and humanitarian crises that are regularly and effectively handled through current organizations and

\textsuperscript{1384} DiFalco 5.
systems.‖ It is designed to improve U.S. whole-of-government capacity to plan for and execute integrated conflict and crisis prevention, mitigation or response operations.

Second, a guide for planning specific reconstruction and stabilization operations is intended to facilitate coordination across federal agencies at the “strategic, operational, and tactical levels.” The guide designates the secretary of state as the coordinator and primary initiator of policy formulation and strategy development for each operation. Implementation planning responsibility resides with the individual agencies. First published in 2005 by the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization and U.S. Joint Forces Command, the State Department is currently rewriting the framework.

Third, procedures for initiating governmentwide planning, including the IMS and the planning guide, were approved by the National Security Council in 2007. Although the procedures had not been fully applied as of October 2007, they may serve to inform crisis management and contingency planning in other mission areas.

The stabilization and reconstruction planning process has suffered from a perceived lack of senior leader investment—either in the process or in the S/CRS itself. Administration efforts to bolster the S/CRS and its coordinating processes have been at their peak in 2008, largely centered on promoting the office’s initiative for a civilian reserve corps. The views of the next presidential administration will likely be critical to the continued existence of the S/CRS.

d. Mission Strategic Planning (Department of State)

The Department of State has a country team-based process for planning. The Mission Performance Plan, created under the auspices of the U.S. ambassador, was intended to delineate “the intended goals, priority initiatives, and performance indicators for the country team” and was often developed including all relevant interagency members of the mission. The staff of the State Department’s Assistant Secretary for Resource Management would annually review in detail approximately one-quarter of these plans.

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1395 For a description of these criteria, see U.S. Government Accountability Office, Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps, (Washington: GAO, November 2007).
1396 Ibid.
“to evaluate past progress and program implementation changes needed in the coming year.” Based on these reviews, the assistant secretary might provide feedback to an ambassador on areas for improvement in a mission’s operations.\footnote{1397}

In recent years, the State Department has renamed these documents Mission Strategic Plans, which have become critical in the justification for resources within the new Foreign Assistance Process. Accordingly, country teams have significantly increased the time and attention they pay to developing Mission Strategic Plans as a means for justifying greater foreign assistance funds. Although the resulting plans may be skewed toward foreign assistance over consular affairs, the energy devoted to the planning process may promote a greater planning culture than previously existed at the country team level or within the State Department.

e. Strategic Operational Planning (National Counterterrorism Center)

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 established the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) with two main functions: to serve as a focal point for all intelligence matters relating to counterterrorism and to conduct “Strategic Operational Planning for the Global War on Terror for the entire U.S. Government.”\footnote{1398} The enacting legislation for the National Counterterrorism Center did not define this strategic operational planning, but its meaning has been understood as linking the policy direction of the National and Homeland Security Councils and the conduct of operations by departments and agencies.\footnote{1399}

The National Counterterrorism Center uses an iterative three-phase strategic operational planning process:

1) A \textit{planning} process that translates national-level guidance from the National Security Strategy, National Strategy for Homeland Security, National Counterterrorism Strategy, and other sources into ends, ways, and means. This phase includes the prioritization of goals and the assignment of roles and responsibilities across the interagency system.

2) The \textit{coordination} of operational activities to ensure that activities are supporting objectives and doing so without needless duplication or harmful gaps.

3) An \textit{assessment} of the implementation and of the effectiveness of both the planning process and the plan.

Although the National Counterterrorism Center has made some progress on phase one, issuing a classified National Implementation Plan for Counterterrorism released in June 2006, reports indicate that the plan catalogues activities better than it prioritizes and


\footnote{1398} John Scott Redd, Director, National Counterterrorism Center, Written Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, 4 April 2006, 2.

\footnote{1399} Ibid.
integrates across them. This is perhaps understandable given the infancy of cross-governmental counterterrorism planning. The National Counterterrorism Center itself identified several key challenges to its effectiveness early in the planning process, highlighting the confusion about agencies’ roles and responsibilities, the need to reconcile its statutory mandate to integrate across the counterterrorism mission set with existing departmental authorities in this area, and the uncertainty of its own human capital and funding stream.

Other notable interagency planning processes have sprung up in recent years, many of which were created to address particular issues that had no extant parent process to sponsor them. One example is the process that created the National Implementation Plan for Pandemic Influenza, signed by President Bush and published by the HSC in May 2006. Without an overarching homeland security planning process, the HSC developed the plan using an HSPD-1 process of tiered interagency coordination. Another interagency planning process under the auspices of the Homeland Security Council is the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, which also leveraged the HSPD-1 framework. Both of these plans rely on individual agencies to execute their responsibilities outlined in the plans—and both rely on the Homeland Security Council to oversee implementation and assess plan suitability.

4. Scenario-Based Planning Methods Developed by and with Other Entities

The expanding complexity of national and international threats to the national security system strains the analytical capabilities of the U.S. government and the intelligence community, highlighting the need for additional methods and tools. In addition to the resources found within its departments and agencies, the U.S. government has looked to academia, private industry, and allied countries for resources with which to address the growing need for scenario-based planning. Computer-based predictive technologies are one such resource. Computational modeling based on reliable simulations of human behavior can be applied to extant information—information on which to base unbiased predictions of potential threats. This combination of technologies can then form the basis for courses of action in response to a systematic assessment of potential threats.

The computational modeling and related software described below are arranged in alphabetical order.

The Coalition Stability Operations Project, sponsored by the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Concept Development & Experimentation Directorate (J9), was initiated in early 2006 by the U.S. Center for Research and Education on Strategy and

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1401 This section adapted from IDA Draft Working Paper: The Military’s Role in Conflict Prevention.
Technology (U.S.-CREST). The project focuses on multinational stability operations, with the overarching goal “to contribute to the definition of more coherent civil-military conceptual approaches and capabilities between European actors and the United States, in an operational domain of increasing importance.”

The second phase, launched in July 2006, is designed to “bring together several multinational working groups in order to discuss the concepts, capabilities and coordination mechanisms that are necessary to improve multinational action in stability operations.” The first meeting focused on the role of the military in conflict prevention, and participants included government officials from France, Italy, the United States, and the United Kingdom; representatives from the European Union, United Nations, NATO, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; various non-governmental organizations; and subject matter experts from academia and business. A fictional scenario based in West Africa provided the context to a discussion on the military’s contribution to multinational conflict prevention.

The Conflict Modeling, Planning & Outcomes Experimentation Program (COMPOEX), jointly developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the U.S. Joint Forces Command, is a set of models and simulations that acts as a predictive tool to identify risk areas and allow users to experiment with risk management strategies using changeable variables. The package consists of a conflict space tool (maps sources of instability and relationship and centers of power), a campaign planning tool, an options exploration tool, and a family of models.

The GMU Conflict Prevention Scenarios were a series of force planning scenarios that the George Mason University (GMU) Peace Operations Policy Program for NATO developed in 2002 to support the Defense Requirements Review for Crisis Response Operations. The Defense Requirements Review process occurs every two years for the purpose of force structuring. A set of scenarios are developed which then serve as the basis for a task analysis to determine force requirements.

The Politics of Fertility and Economic Development Model (POFED), developed by the Sentia Group, a consulting services company that utilizes social science modeling to enable customers to understand, forecast, and shape individual and group behavior, uses pooled data to identify and estimate the impact of structural variables that contribute to humanitarian crises. POFED maps regional factors that may contribute to instability

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1404 Ibid.
1405 For a description of the scenario-based methodology used for this meeting, see Coalition Stability Operations (CSO) Project: First Working Group Meeting on Conflict Prevention, December 4-5, 2006, École Militaire, Paris, Meeting Report, U.S. CREST <www.uscrest.org/070130_cso_ph2-1.pdf> 5–6; for key findings from this meeting, see p. 23.
1407 Based on IDA interview with program director, July 2006.
and helps to identify actions likely to increase stability and mitigate humanitarian concerns. The majority of POFED indicators are derived from open sources; once a country or situation has been added to the POFED database, automatic annual or quarterly updates are provided upon request. Model output can be simplified to anticipate trouble areas, possible consequences of policy changes, and recovery from natural or man-made disasters. Recent applications of POFED include regional stability in the Horn of Africa and cross-temporal prospects for stability, assessment of provincial stability, and evaluation of implications of potential partition in Sudan.¹⁴⁰⁹

**Senturion**, also developed by the Sentia Group, maps the positions of key stakeholders in a conflict and identifies opportunities to reach an agreement.¹⁴¹⁰ Tested by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University since 2002, the model uses input data from subject matter experts to frame issues and to identify stakeholders’ positions, influence, and importance. The model applies game theory, decision theory, and spatial bargaining models to simulate evolving stakeholder relationships, potential coalitions, and the impact of changes in environment. Senturion can visually represent complex situations, integrate the views of the interagency community, provide insights into complex decision-making, and identify second- and third-order effects of decisions.¹⁴¹¹

The **Strategic Economic Needs and Security Exercise (SENSE)**, maintained and employed by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), is a computer-based simulation focusing on negotiations and decision-making in a post-conflict environment.¹⁴¹² The USIP develops scenario-based simulations as educational tools for students to role-play the perspective of key stakeholders in a given scenario.¹⁴¹³ The simulations are designed to increase participants’ understanding of peacemaking dynamics and to help participants both practice conflict prevention management and test policy options—to determine the preferred response to a given set of circumstances.

Originally developed by the Institute for Defense Analyses as the Synthetic Environment for National Security Estimates, SENSE simulates resource allocation challenges confronting national and international decision-makers.¹⁴¹⁴ The simulation gives participants rapid feedback on time-sensitive decision-making to build political stability, social justice, and a foundation for economic progress. SENSE has been used in the United States, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Iraq, and Poland.

The USIP also developed another simulation for use in the Greater Horn of Africa. Based on the assumption that the African Union (formerly the Organization of African

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¹⁴⁰⁹ Ibid.
¹⁴¹¹ Based on IDA interview with Senturion developers, July 2006.
Unity [OAU]) had established a peace plan to which Ethiopia and Eritrea agreed, this simulation focused on conflict prevention along the Ethiopia-Eritrea border. Participants were asked, in their roles as representatives of OAU member states, to devise a plan to prevent the spread of the conflict into neighboring countries and throughout the region.

The Strategic Management System (STRATMAS) software was developed to model war and peacekeeping operations by injecting operational plans into a synthetic “country” based on real actors and events. A joint U.S.-Swedish project hosted at the Swedish National Defense College in Stockholm, STRATMAS assessed post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan in January 2003 and, in April 2004, supported Exercise Iraq Future 05. An enhanced version of STRATMAS supported Multinational Experiment 4, which the U.S. Joint Forces Command conducted with NATO and numerous international partners. According to Dr. Alexander Woodcock, project director and public policy professor at George Mason University, this system was preferred due to its ability to identify quick-impact results of data input.

Synthetic Environments for Analysis and Simulations (SEAS), developed by Purdue University and marketed by Simulex, Inc. for military war-gaming exercises, has been expanded to incorporate management, economics, and psychology. SEAS is used by senior officials to solve problems ranging from business strategies to disaster management. As an agent-based modeling construct, it recreates in detail many of the dynamics of a decision-making environment. Although SEAS allows for the incorporation of models from multiple domains (social, political, economic, etc.), it focuses primarily on human interaction. Multinational Experiment 4 used SEAS as a tool to predict in real time the effects of influences on populations, modeling variables as diverse as national reactions to U.S. policy and turbulence within refugee camps.

C. Implementation and Assessment

1. Implementation

The efforts to integrate the implementation of national security policy have been based largely on structure rather than on processes. Nevertheless, preferred structural solutions have had significant process implications. The following are the structures used most often—or that have most recently been attempted—for integrated implementation.

The creation of interagency “czars” is codified most fully in the Director of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). Given its congressional mandate to create a budget for domestic and overseas missions relating to its issue area, the ONDCP is unique. But, like non-statutory czars, the ONDCP relies on the president’s authority to direct any changes

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to agency budgets deemed vital to executing the National Drug Control Strategy. The Bush administration has established one new national security czar, commonly referred to as the “war czar.” The assistant to the president for Iraq and Afghanistan reports directly to the president and coordinates civilian agency efforts in support of U.S. operations in those countries.

The creation of Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and, later, Iraq, is another structural attempt to improve integrated implementation—this time in semi-permissive operational environments overseas. PRTs were an innovation created in the field; no standardized processes existed (nor do they now) for PRT decision-making, doctrine, and training. The effectiveness of the PRTs is yet to be well documented.\textsuperscript{1418} Staffing them with adequate, appropriate civilian experts remains a significant challenge for the U.S. government.

The U.S. military’s combatant commands have likewise created or housed a variety of regional and global combatant command structures, to improve their interagency integration. These include Joint Interagency Task Forces, directorates for interagency coordination, and Joint Interagency Coordinating Groups. Much like the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, however, these structures have not been accompanied by standardized processes or staffing to ensure their best use and their record in helping integrate interagency implementation has been limited. The most successful and longest standing structure is the Joint Interagency Task Force-South, which conducts U.S. counternarcotics and related intelligence fusion efforts focused on Central and South America. Because of this, two geographic commands, U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Africa Command, are attempting to integrate interagency personnel at the penultimate level of command and in lower levels throughout their directorates.

The executive branch has established interagency operational centers and task forces—centers for intelligence fusion and homeland security operations, and ad hoc task forces (such as the Joint Terrorism Task Force) to provide a co-located environment for integrated coordination. However, coordination processes vary across these structures, with no standard best practice in use.

The most prominent example of a best-practice process for integrated implementation is the National Incident Management System (NIMS). FEMA released the NIMS in 2004 to serve as a common framework for integrating emergency response elements from the first responder to the federal level. In HSPD-5, President Bush required the creation of the NIMS, an adaptation of the previous National Inter-agency Incident Management System. The 9/11 Commission likewise underscored the need for a national incident command system. All federal agencies involved in emergency response are required to operate under the NIMS structure, and all DHS-provided assistance to state, local, and tribal governments is predicated on their adoption of the system.

\textsuperscript{1418} For a more detailed discussion of PRTs, see J. Stephen Morrison and Kathleen Hicks, Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance (Washington: CSIS Press, January 2008).
APPENDIX 6. CURRENT NATIONAL SECURITY PROCESSES

As with its policy companion, the National Response Plan, the U.S. government received criticism in the wake of Hurricane Katrina for not having sufficiently exercised the NIMS prior to that catastrophe. Unlike the National Response Plan, however, fundamental criticisms of the National Incident Management System are few.

2. Assessment

Assessment is the least integrated strategic management process within the national security system. The current tools on which one might model cross-agency assessment include the following.

a. Performance Measurement: From GPRA to the PMA

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), together with individual federal departments and agencies, is responsible for conducting resource performance assessment in the executive branch. The processes by which OMB oversees performance assessment have evolved over time. In 1993, Congress passed the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) to “provide for the establishment of strategic planning and performance measurement in the Federal Government.”

The GPRA requires each agency to submit a strategic plan and to prepare related annual performance plans and reports. Performance plans may be embedded in a performance budget. The annual reporting requirement is fulfilled either by the annual Performance and Accountability Report (PAR) or by an agency’s congressional budget justification materials. The intelligence community is excluded from the Government Performance and Results Act requirements.

The GPRA approach has long been met with criticism for its failure to markedly improve the efficiency and effectiveness of federal programs. In 2004, the Office of Management and Budget itself called attention to these inadequacies:

Unfortunately, the implementation of this law has fallen far short of its authors’ hopes. Agency plans are plagued by performance measures that are meaningless, vague, too numerous, and often compiled by people who have no direct connection with budget decisions. Today, agencies produce over 13,000 pages of performance plans every year that are largely ignored in the budget process.

Driven by its belief that performance management in the U.S. government was broken, the Bush administration launched the President’s Management Agenda. “Government likes to begin things—to declare grand new programs and causes,” President Bush stated.

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1421 Others excluded are the General Accountability Office, the Panama Canal Commission, the United States Postal Service, and the Postal Rate Commission.
“But good beginnings are not the measure of success. What matters in the end is completion. Performance. Results.” The OMB’s primary tool for assessing performance in the President’s Management Agenda is the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), which consists of either an evaluation of major programs within each federal organization, an action plan for improvement, or recommendations for program termination. In all, the OMB annually assesses more than 1,000 programs across the executive branch using the PART.

However, assessment at the interagency level remains outside the parameters of both the Government Performance and Results Act and the President’s Management Agenda. The OMB rarely undertakes interagency national security assessments. For instance, executive branch officials report that the OMB conducted a net assessment of the National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror, including its resource implications. In addition, the OMB provides an “analytic perspective” of homeland security mission funding by agency as part of the President Budget Submission.

Although this latter effort appears to involve little performance assessment, the process of compiling the analytic perspective data may drive OMB to assess homeland security priorities across mission areas and contributing agencies. The HSPD-1 and NSPD-1 processes also sometimes include interagency assessments by either the Policy Coordination Committees, the Deputies Committees, the Principal Committees, or through a lead agency.

b. Inspectors General

Inspectors general are an obvious source of performance assessment, but their jurisdictions are typically limited to that of a particular agency. An exception to this rule is the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction (SIGIR), who reports to both the secretary of defense and the secretary of state. The special inspector general’s mandate is to provide oversight of “the use, and potential misuse, of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) and all obligations, expenditures, and revenues associated with reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in Iraq.” The position is thus inherently interagency, as such reconstruction funds flow through a variety of federal agencies, including the Department of State, the USAID, and the Department of

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1423 George W. Bush, President’s Message in The President’s Management Agenda: Fiscal Year 2002, Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, 2002, 1. For more information on the PMA, see <http://www.results.gov>.

1424 For more information on the PART, visit <http://www.expectmore.gov>.

1425 Information provided at a meeting of the PNSR Processes Working Group Meeting, 21 April 2008.


Defense. The SIGIR has conducted more than 150 investigations and audits, but its reputation has suffered due to the alleged misconduct of its senior leadership.\(^\text{1428}\)

The special inspector general’s unique interagency mandate has garnered little notice as a precedent for executive branch assessment structures. From a process perspective, however, the special inspector general’s role actually has born some imitation. In 2006, the inspectors general from the Departments of State and Defense, in consultation with the Department of Justice’s inspector general, created an “interagency assessment” team to review the U.S. government’s role in and programs for counternarcotics in Afghanistan. “Since implementation of the counter narcotics program in Afghanistan relies on collaborative interagency participation,” the inspector general establishing memorandum states, “cooperation from all agencies involved in counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan is solicited in all phases of this project.”\(^\text{1429}\) Moreover, the inspectors general based their assessment on the interagency-approved Five Pillars Strategy for the Afghan Counter Narcotics Program, mirroring the Government Performance and Results Act’s strategic assessment approach.\(^\text{1430}\)

c. “Czars” and Oversight

So-called “czars” are sometimes granted the authority to review agency budgets and programs for their compliance with strategic direction and to determine their value. The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) authority is instructive:

> By law, the Director of ONDCP…evaluates, coordinates, and oversees both the international and domestic anti-drug efforts of executive branch agencies and ensures that such efforts sustain and complement State and local anti-drug activities. The Director advises the President regarding changes in the organization, management, budgeting, and personnel of Federal Agencies that could affect the Nation's anti-drug efforts; and regarding Federal agency compliance with their obligations under the Strategy.\(^\text{1431}\) (emphasis added)

As the above language indicates, departments and agencies may alter their budgets and behavior based on assessment feedback provided by these interagency issue leads, but their willingness to do so has depended on whether they believe the president will back these judgments if they conflict with those of Cabinet officials. Institutional rivalry at times impedes the oversight effectiveness of mission czars.


\(^{1429}\) Howard J. Krongard, State Department IG, and Thomas F. Gimble, Defense Department IG, Interagency Assessment of the Counter Narcotics Program in Afghanistan, Memorandum to Embassies and Commands, 14 August 2006, 1.


d. Intelligence Oversight

The president has two important assessment mechanisms for the intelligence sphere: the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board (and its subcomponent, the Intelligence Oversight Board) and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. Although both are primarily concerned with criminal wrongdoing, they provide interesting models for broader interagency assessment structures and processes.

Established during the Eisenhower administration as the President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board, so renamed by President Kennedy, has served all but one president (President Carter) since the 1960s. Today, the Board “provides advice to the President concerning the quality and adequacy of intelligence collection, of analysis and estimates, of counterintelligence, and of other intelligence activities.”

The Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) is the key component of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board. Created by President Gerald Ford in 1976, the IOB’s most notable responsibility is to review reports produced by inspectors general and general counsels of the intelligence community—as well as the policies and procedures they use to gather information—and to report their findings to the attorney general and the president. The influence of these boards has fluctuated over time. The Bush administration has recently come under criticism for weakening the IOB’s investigative power.

In 2004, Congress created the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board in response to a recommendation by the 9/11 Commission. The board’s mandate is to advise the president on how issues of civil liberties and privacy are affected by proposed guidelines, regulations, and policies aimed to prevent the next terrorist attack, as well as the implementation of existing laws and policies. The board is an element of the Executive Office of the President, with the chairman and vice chairman both requiring Senate confirmation.

Although not given the power of subpoena, the board was “authorized to request the assistance of the Attorney General in obtaining desired information from persons other than federal departments and agencies.” In response to questions about the board’s

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1432 President’s Intelligence Advisory Board, 7 November 2008 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/piab/>.
1433 Ibid.
1434 Executive Order 11905: United States Foreign Intelligence Activities, 18 February 1976.
1437 Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, 7 November 2008 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/privacyboard>.
independence, oversight authority, and subpoena power, Congress subsequently removed White House control of the board and strengthened the board’s subpoena power and congressional oversight of its personnel and activities. The changes took effect early in 2008.

### e. Congressional Assessment

Assessment of national security policy, strategy, and plans also takes place in the Congress. Congressional processes for performance assessment are well known, routinely practiced, and occasionally provoke controversy between the executive and legislative branches. Hearings on subjects of interest constitute the most common assessment mechanism. Issues and witnesses sometimes span the national security system, but the department-based jurisdiction of many committees and subcommittees typically limits their scope of inquiry. Suffering from the same stovepipes, committee reports and prints rarely attempt to examine national security from a whole-of-government perspective.

Congress can also legislate the creation of outside commissions, panels, and advisory boards to investigate national security issues. In some cases, such as the Hart-Rudman Commission, the 9/11 Commission, and the Project on National Security Reform, these independent groups can step beyond parochial agency boundaries to examine national security broadly and advise Congress accordingly. Finally, Congress has several in-house assessment entities that operate through a combination of congressional requests and personal and institutional initiatives to investigate specific national security issues. The General Accountability Office, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Congressional Research Service are structured to best align with existing executive branch departments and agencies, but are free to offer assessments across those seams.

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1440 President Bush Announces His Intention To Nominate Eight Individuals, Appoint One Individual To Serve In Administration, Press Release, 26 February 2008.

A. Alternatives from Other Countries

Other countries must deal with the same security environment that is proving so challenging to the U.S. national security system, even if their interests and capabilities differ from ours. Some are considering or have already instituted reforms. Five countries and one regional institution—Australia, Germany, France, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the European Union (EU)—have made major defense or national security organizational reforms in recent years. We can draw some instructive observations from their experience.

1. Australia

Australia has adopted a “whole-of-government” approach to security strategy that seeks to address issues that cross organizational boundaries. The whole-of-government approach was developed in response to recommendations from the Australian Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade to develop a comprehensive National Security Strategy that considers all of Australia’s key interests. In a 2004 report, the Australian Management Advisory Committee (MAC) affirmed that thoughtfully structured interdepartmental collaboration would be useful and could increase efficiency in important areas. However, due to the consensus-based nature of interdepartmental committee decision-making, the report warned that such an approach could be less practicable for complex policy issues where there is “deep contention between portfolios, or in the community, and tight time limits.” Task forces under strong leadership, the report maintained, are more likely to produce high-quality outcomes in such circumstances. Thus, Australia complements the whole-of-government approach by using a lead agency concept that employs the contributions of supporting agencies.

Australian analysts identified criteria that could strongly affect the success of this approach or other forms of interagency cooperation, notably:

- **Newly created agencies can take on a centralizing role:** Agencies should be uniquely (and deliberately) emplaced as overarching and coordinating bodies that

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1442 This section draws upon a research paper produced for PNSR by Arnaud Kurze, “Comparative Analysis of National Security Reforms: Australia, France, Germany, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the European Union in Perspective.”
1443 While the EU is not a classical nation-state, it has developed political decision-making structures for foreign policy and national security.
can overcome parochialism and make the hard prioritization decisions that are required for reform.\footnote{1445}{M. S. Forrest, “Towards A National Security Strategy For Australia,” \textit{Australian Army Journal} V.1 (2008): 65–78.}

- **A shared organizational culture needs to be established**: Visionary leadership and effective policies that lay out organizational structure and functioning can override the traditional departmentalization discourses that block effective change.

- **A strong legal framework for the new agencies is required**: The 1999 Public Service Act enabled the government of Australia to create new agencies that work directly for ministers and utilize resources across departments. The clarity and effectiveness of interagency policy allowed for the success of these “frontier agencies.”

2. **France**


- **The creation of a Defense and National Security Council (NSC)**. The president and the prime minister will co-lead a NSC, which would include the Ministers of five of the top Ministries, convening others as appropriate. An advisory council of independent experts, appointed by the president, would support the NSC.

- **The creation of a National Intelligence Council** to address foreign operations and nuclear deterrence.

- **The introduction of a crisis management system** modeled after the UK’s Cobra committee.

- **Substantial upgrading of preparations against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear contingencies**, including detection and early warning systems for ballistic missile launches.

- **The creation of other security bodies**, such as the Central Interior Intelligence Directorate, Joint Forces Space Command, and others.
• New training programs for security professionals, including an intelligence academy with a common training course for all services and agencies, and a Joint National Training Center for both military and civilian personnel countering chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats.

Other changes are also recommended, such as placing a greater emphasis on networking and asset-sharing between ministries and improved information gathering and sharing.

3. Germany

Due to its history, defense reform in Germany has been more incremental and controversial than in other states studied. Legal restrictions preventing the use of armed forces in military interventions abroad were only relaxed in the late 1990s, prior to which time the German military could only be deployed in disaster response. More recently, however, the Bundeswehr expanded its role to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in almost all of its operations, and has itself undergone significant command structure reform. In addition, steps have been taken to increase the amount of interagency cooperation in Germany and to adopt a more comprehensive security plan. In 2004, an action plan was promulgated to enhance civilian crisis management, which included the creation of an inter-ministerial steering group to coordinate crisis response.

The idea for a comprehensive security policy was first laid out in Germany in a 2006 white paper and was further developed in a strategy paper introduced by the Christian Democratic Party in May of 2008. The report stresses:

• The German security apparatus must work to contain emerging threats and to intervene promptly and effectively where necessary.

• European Union and NATO structures are important to implement these objectives.

• The resources and expertise of the private and non-profit sectors must be integrated into the security strategy.

• Adequate coordination between the federal government, the states, and the municipalities is necessary.

The paper met with criticism from the opposition Social Democratic Party because it took a realist viewpoint, sparking a national debate over the proper path of German defense policy that continues to broaden and deepen the discussion over reform in Germany.

4. Singapore

Singapore takes a network approach to national security, recognizing the importance of enhanced coordination and integration of government agencies. In 1999, Singapore
created the National Security Secretariat (NSS) to build and sustain inter-agency links in order to direct efforts against non-conventional security threats and global terrorism.\textsuperscript{1448} In 2004, the NSS was renamed the National Security Coordination Center (NSCC) and reformed to give a stronger focus to inter-agency coordination and integration.\textsuperscript{1449}

The NSCC is in charge of security planning, policy coordination, and anticipating strategic threats. It works to ensure that government agencies complement each other, rather than perform duplicating and competing tasks. It is supported by four centers:

- **The Homeland Security Engineering Center**, which looks into technological aspects of counterterrorism
- **The Center of Excellence for National Security**, which develops the intellectual capital necessary for creating defense policy
- **Horizon Scanning Center**, which serves as the government’s “nerve center,” connecting various government agencies and managing information databases and exchange
- **Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning Experimentation Center**, which works on technology, research and development, and experimentation

Despite the Singaporean government’s intent to better cope with transnational issues and the number of reports highlighting its structural and institutional improvements, Singapore’s poor response to the SARS crisis and the bird flu epidemic indicate that there are areas for improvement in their national security system remain. The Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning process is intended to improve Singapore’s ability to anticipate such “weak signals” from the security environment as those that preceded the SARS epidemic. It supports a “whole-of-government approach to strategic planning” that “hinges on a collaborative approach,” linking ministries and agencies across government to develop “an instinct to share and encourage a collective analysis of possible futures.”\textsuperscript{1450}

5. United Kingdom

Since 2001, the United Kingdom has taken several steps to increase interagency cooperation and coordination and to improve its ability to respond to unconventional threats:

- **Resource allocation for counter-terrorism activities and intelligence** has increased from £1 billion in 2001 to £2.5 billion in 2008, with more increases planned.

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\textsuperscript{1448} Ibid. 12, 27–30.
\textsuperscript{1449} Ibid. 12.
2001—**Conflict Prevention Pools** were created to improve joint working between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defense, and the Department for International Development.

2003—**The Joint Terrorism Analysis Center** was established, combining expertise from the police, intelligence community, and sixteen other agencies.

2004—**The Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit** was created to coordinate the post-conflict responses of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defense, and the Department for International Development. It was renamed in 2007 and is now called the Stabilization Unit.

2007—**The Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism** was established to improve cross-government counter-terrorism efforts, along with a Cabinet Committee on National Security to bring together different ministries from the government.\(^{1451}\)

However, not all efforts have proved successful. In particular, the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit (now called the Stabilization Unit) proved ineffective at carrying out its mission, due to a reluctance of the agencies to cede power. To avoid similar failures in the future, analysts have recommended the following measures:

1. Introduce interagency competition
2. Create incentives for interagency cooperation
3. Increase funds for development agencies
4. Establish flexible funding mechanisms
5. Maintain great leadership and legislative oversight\(^{1452}\)

Additionally, in March 2008, the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office published a report framing a broad security strategy to address interconnected security threats in a globalized world. It calls for a national security forum for policymakers and academics and a joint parliamentary committee to help implement and monitor strategy.

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\(^{1452}\) Nora Bensahel, “International Perspectives on Interagency Reform, Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on January 29, 2008,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008)
6. The European Union (EU)

In December 2003, the European Council approved the European Security Strategy, the first document of its kind to address multidimensional and multilateral security issues on the EU’s political agenda. It emphasized:

- Anticipation of crisis and conflict with early, rapid, and powerful intervention capacity
- Improvement of multilateral cooperation (with international organization such as the United Nations)
- Capacity increases, using the European Defense Agency
- Strengthening resource management (e.g., diplomatic tools)
- Intelligence sharing for better risk assessment
- Alliance and coalition building

The signing of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2007, which was designed to streamline the workings of the European Union, affected previous security reforms. For example, the treaty merges the post of high representative for the common foreign and security policy with the European commissioner for external relations and European neighborhood policy to create a high representative of the union for foreign affairs and security policy. The purpose is to better coordinate the European Union’s foreign policy. In addition, the treaty creates a new presidential system for the European Council and an External Action Agency. These institutional changes aim for greater coherence in the decision-making process. New voting rules that allow members to abstain from a vote without blocking an otherwise unanimous decision increase the likelihood that policy can be acted upon. Since the treaty enters into force on January 1, 2009, it is too early to judge whether these changes will be effective in creating an integrated and responsive European “national” security system.

B. Observations

In the countries studied and in the European Union, changes have been enacted to better address future security challenges. In general, the trend is toward a more holistic, long-term approach to security strategy. Greater cooperation between competing agencies is a common goal, as is the expansion and strengthening of ties between public and private actors. A broader concept of security is also a prominent feature of these reform efforts, with concerns ranging from climate change to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Other common elements derived from these different experiences include:

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• **Leadership:** The need for strong, competent, and visionary leadership to carry out reform is evident. In the EU, such leadership has been elusive. However, the EU realizes that more engagement and commitment is necessary before it can fulfill its role as a global player and is embarking on a quest for a holistic security strategy in ways similar to that of the United States. EU reforms lack implementation capacity and have been mostly declaratory in character. Several leaders have called for more concrete and actionable provisions in new treaty negotiations, and Germany may be the most able candidate to lead the charge. Its demonstrated ability to make progress in centralizing, coordinating, and enhancing efficiency may be hampered by a reluctance to take on a leadership role in military matters, however. In any case, lasting national security reform requires broad nonpartisan political support and a roadmap in which the government embraces long-term planning and commitment that outlives the immediate leadership’s tenure in office.

• **Multilateralism:** The transnational nature of current security threats cannot be effectively countered by unilateral domestic and international responses. Better cooperation among states is therefore a common element in new strategies to meet these threats. The EU has made progress in increasing multilateralism in security over the last several years, but agreement on common strategy remains elusive. The failure of the EU’s 2003 European Security Strategy agreement has been blamed on an overabundance of idealism, which failed to take into consideration the impact of disagreements between France, Germany, and the UK on important issues.\footnote{Felix Sebastian Berenskoetter, “Mapping the Mind Gap: A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies,” *Security Dialogue* 36.1 (2005): 71–92.} Despite this experience, there is strong sentiment within the EU on the need for U.S. leadership to promote stronger international institutions that could create, maintain and regulate international regimes ranging from environmental issues to trade disputes.\footnote{J. S. Nye, Jr., “US Power and Strategy after Iraq,” *Foreign Affairs* 82.4 (2003): 60–73; Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman, *Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement*, Center on International Cooperation Studies in Multilateralism (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002); J. Cirincione, “The Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain,” *Foreign Policy* 118 (2000): 120–137.} Doing so would enable the United States to sustain the transnational cooperation necessary to cope with contemporary security challenges.

• **Knowledge Sharing:** The sharing of intelligence information across different organizations and agencies is vital for efficient and effective national security reform, but current political systems in Western governments are not structured to cooperate in this way. New offices intended to provide better integration across organizations must make use of the assets and knowledge of multiple agencies, which requires strong leadership and organizational authority.\footnote{Bensahel 7–9.} Interagency coordination and knowledge sharing is difficult when the newly created structure is a joint office, as was the case with the UK’s Unit for Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction. Deprived of a hierarchical structure empowered to delineate competencies, the new organization was rendered ineffective by personal conflicts...
and power struggles between competing agencies. To improve knowledge sharing, many international partners are developing alternative third-party information-gathering capacities, similar to the strong knowledge and open source intelligence capacity that is represented by U.S. think tanks.

- **Culture and Accountability**: The perceived legitimacy and accountability of new structures must not be neglected. Training and continuous education of personnel is invaluable for ensuring that performance is adequately evaluated and monitored. The French defense white paper, for instance, recommends creating an intelligence academy in order to create a national security culture in the civil service corps as well as a joint training center that combines the public and private sector workforce. Common education and training can provide the national security workforce with a shared perspective that prevents destructive competition and provides a set of common assessment tools that foster transparency and accountability.

- Some of the reforms surveyed exceed anything comparable in the United States—for example, the Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning process used by Singapore. Others simply move those countries closer to the current model employed by the United States. For example, the French creation of a national security council, the Australian experimentation with lead agency concepts, various intelligence community reforms, and the more general interest in use of public policy and private sector knowledge centers are all examples of other countries following in the footsteps of the U.S. experience.

### C. Alternative Models from Other Organizations

The Project on National Security Reform is different from most other major national security reform studies in that it made a concerted effort to reach beyond national security expertise to other disciplines for insights, and in particular to organization and management theory and practice. Organization and management theory is an interdisciplinary body of research that covers management of both public and private organizations. Serious organizational reform requires some theoretical foundations, whether simple, popular versions of organizational archetypes, or more sophisticated, explicit, rigorous, “evidence-based theories.” Yet many practitioners within the national security system believe the national security sector is so different from any other organizational experience that useful comparisons between the two cannot be made.

To be sure, there are important differences to be noted. A typical private sector organization (such as General Electric) is a completely different organization than a typical public sector organization (such as the Central Intelligence Agency). Moreover, most organizations are unique in some respects. General Electric Corporation does not have the same organizational characteristics as Wal-Mart, the Walt Disney Corporation, or Microsoft.1457 These four American corporations do not have the same organizational characteristics as Wal-Mart, the Walt Disney Corporation, or Microsoft.1457

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characters as their Japanese and European counterparts for that matter. The same is true within the public sector. There are differences among the national governmental structures of Russia, the United States, France, and Japan. Even within the U.S. federal government, there are substantial differences between the Department of Energy and the Department of the Interior, the Department of Justice and the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security.

Focusing on the differences between organizations can obscure their common characteristics or experiences from which general insights might be extracted, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as the “uniqueness paradox.” It is not uncommon to imagine that an activity or organization is so unique, so unfathomable to outsiders that nobody can understand how to lead, manage, organize, strategize, or enact change within that context except for the most experienced and successful of practitioners. Xenophon raised the uniqueness paradox in discussions with Socrates in about 600 B.C. Xenophon maintained that military leaders were the only people who understood military organizations. Socrates, unconvinced and noting common elements of leadership, pointed out the possibility that a leader of a Greek chorus might have better leadership skills than a leader of a Greek army.

All organizations share at least some common characteristics that identify them as organizations, or types of organizations. From these common characteristics, general insights may be drawn. In the case of national security reform, there is no reason why the public sector cannot learn from the experience of private sector organizations as long as due attention is paid to the appropriate level of specificity. For example, organization and management theorists investigate leadership, management, and strategy in a wide variety of organizations at the most general level. At subsidiary and more specific levels, they explore leadership, management, and strategy within narrow contexts such as golf course administration, library administration, social work administration, healthcare administration, business administration, and public administration.

There is no sharp theoretical distinction between private sector and public sector, and most of the practical differences between the public and private sector turn out upon close examination to be relative rather than absolute. For example:

- The private sector responds to a well-defined client base while the public sector is accountable to the larger and more diverse body politic. Yet, both have responsibilities to a constituency and must meet diverse needs that are often conflicting.

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1461 There has never been a field of research labeled “national security administration,” although arguably there should and might be one in the future.
Public sector employees operate under accountability constraints not experienced by private sector employees. However, both sectors rely on qualitative and quantitative measures to evaluate success and investment choices.

The private sector faces a relentless competitive pressure to innovate whereas this pressure is sporadic and crisis-driven within the public sector; but, both must respond to changes in the external environment or performance will suffer.

Both the private and public sectors deal with external oversight in different forms. In the private sector, it is passive and stable, while the public sector it is more active yet inconsistent.

Both sectors face challenges in disseminating information that is critical to mission success, whether that mission is profit or goal-driven.

Private sector organizational goals are generally more simple and stable than public sector goals that change with administrations. Yet, both sectors must reevaluate goals in light of environmental changes.

The cost of failure for the private sector is primarily monetary and may lead to extinction, causing a bias favoring action; whereas, for the public sector, while the price of failure is severe, the organization will survive, spurring a bias for caution. However, the difference in cost is relative, as neither sector wants to fail, regardless of the price paid.

Arguably, the differences that do exist between the private and public sectors are diminishing. Recent debate on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is marked by the term “Government Sponsored Enterprise,” a label that is symptomatic of a deep relationship between the public and private sectors. Private sector consulting companies such as MITRE Corporation, SAIC, and Booz Allen Hamilton are all—in different ways—tied closely to U.S. government activities. The 190,000 contractors in Iraq are tightly integrated into the U.S. government’s operations abroad. A rigid distinction between public sector and private sector highlights the political and accountability difference between the two, but at the expense of obscuring their common characteristics and many linkages.

In fact, historically, both the private and public sectors have learned from one another. Lessons from the public sector have been effectively adopted in the private sector. Alfred D. Chandler was a professor at the naval war college teaching naval strategies before crossing over to the Harvard Business School with his landmark work, Strategy and Structure, in 1962. Herbert Simon’s dissertation in 1947 was a study of decision-making within the context of public administration. Graham Allison picked up on Simon’s ideas and used them to analyze the Cuban Missile Crisis; a situation used by organizational theorists to understand decision-making within all types of organizations.

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APPENDIX 7. SOURCES OF INSIGHTS ON ALTERNATIVES

The private sector, in turn, contributes consistently to government. The White House Office of Management and Budget has launched the Federal Enterprise Architecture initiative to promote internal cultural change, modernization, and better investment practices in government agencies. It has proved successful for the Food and Drug Administration, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The private sector also contributes to the national security sector more specifically.

Business management techniques contributed to the creation of operations research in World War II, which in turn contributed to more efficient logistics and eventually to major gains in the battle against U-boats for control of the Atlantic shipping lanes. Building on this tradition, RAND later made major contributions to U.S. Air Force decisions on nuclear deterrence strategy and posture and stimulated demand for other cross-disciplinary think tanks supporting the national security system. More recently, the Department of Homeland Security created a Private Sector Office in response to major business associations that convinced Congress that increased public-private sector cooperation could enhance homeland security efforts. This office facilitates cooperation in a variety of areas, including attempts to coordinate industry efforts to identify private sector resources that would aid government efforts to prevent or respond to terrorist attacks and natural disasters.

While collaboration across the public and private sectors, and more generally across research disciplines, is common—even in national security—such collaboration must overcome a natural tendency for communities to look within their own boundaries for inspiration. Research shows that individuals, groups, organizations, and networks all tend to overvalue their own ideas and undervalue ideas of others. Industries and organizations that overcome the natural tendency to invoke “not-invented-here” defenses are seen as learning organizations and have discovered that there is high value in inter-industry benchmarking. For example, a hotel organization can benchmark the best practices of the U.S. Army and Burger King to derive organizational insights, and American cereal manufacturers are doing the same when they tour Japanese automobile plants trying to understand just-in-time engineering. There is nothing wrong with the national security system benchmarking organizations in the private sector that also are confronting an increasingly dynamic, competitive, knowledge-intensive environment. In an age of complex social and security phenomena, government agencies, private think tanks, universities, and corporations alike are trying to facilitate, maintain, and utilize cross sector networks for better learning.

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1466 David Ulrich, Personal Communication.
APPENDIX 7. SOURCES OF INSIGHTS ON ALTERNATIVES

The Academy of Management and the National Academy of Public Administration are two professional organizations involved in the development and study of organizations and their management and administration. Both have programs that bridge disciplines and that can benefit the national security sector. Universities also are a source of broad organizational insights covering both the public and private sectors. The Consortium of Centers for Organization Research (CCOR) supports institutional cooperation and research exchanges across different universities. The University of Michigan created the Interdisciplinary Committee on Organizational Studies to study organizational solutions and create problem-solving expertise for any organization. The University of California, Irvine’s Center for Organizational Research, facilitates research in diverging bureaucratic structures; examining network structures; collective threats to security, non-governmental organizations; and alliances across private, public, and non-profit fields. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill took their efforts in another direction and created the self-sustaining Institute for Defense and Business, a research and education organization that develops and delivers education programs and coordinates interdisciplinary projects across the business, academic, and governmental fields.

In the national security system, there is increasing evidence of interest in cross-disciplinary research. The national strategy for the Department of Homeland Security notes that the integration of the capabilities of government, private, and non-profit sectors is critical to a multi-layered approach to security. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, noting the existing similarities between business and defense, established the Defense Business Board in 2001. With a membership consisting of top consultants from the management, accounting, information technology, communications, governmental and legal professions, the Defense Business Board provides independent advice and recommendations on effective strategies for the implementation of best business practices of interest to the Department of Defense. This advice is specifically formulated in order to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of organizational support to the department. Similarly, corporations have reached out to contribute to the public sector. The IBM Center for the Business of Government publishes white papers and reports that are meant to connect public management research with practice, stimulate dialogue, and advance knowledge on how to improve public sector effectiveness.

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1467 Consortium of Centers for Organizations Research (CCOR), 7 October 2008 <http://www2.tepper.cmu.edu/afs/andrew/gsia/ccor/home.html>.
1468 The Interdisciplinary Committee on Organizational Studies (ICOS), 7 October 2008 <http://www.si.umich.edu/ICOS/>.  

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APPENDIX 7. SOURCES OF INSIGHTS ON ALTERNATIVES

In short, while the stakes are higher and many of the accountability and evaluation tools and techniques are different, there are many lessons that the national security system can appropriate from the private sector and organizational theory and practice more generally. Accordingly, the options for reform considered by the Project on National Security Reform drew upon organization theory and practice, including the trend in the private sector toward greater reliance on horizontal organizations like cross-functional teams and team decision-making in general.1474

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APPENDIX 8: AN EVALUATION OF PROPOSED REFORMS ON POTENTIAL RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS

A. Introduction

The Project on National Security Reform requested an independent evaluation by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), a federally funded research and development center, of how the project’s recommended solutions might impact one critical aspect of national security: reconstruction and stabilization operations (RSO). IDA has conducted extensive research of past and ongoing RSO and continues to provide analytical support for U.S. government and international partner experimentation with organizational concepts and processes to improve the effectiveness of RSO capabilities. The conclusions summarized in this appendix were developed by the analysts based on their extensive experience with the subject and provide their independent qualitative assessments of how the various solutions developed by the project’s staff could affect the ability of the U.S. Government to conduct RSO missions and build RSO capabilities.

This appendix provides IDA’s independent evaluation of the proposed Project on National Security Reform solutions—the core reforms, the three options, and the supporting structural consolidations—for a single mission area: reconstruction and stabilization operations. For purposes of this evaluation, the definitions for “reconstruction” and “stabilization” are drawn from the US Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation:

- **Reconstruction** – The process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socio-economic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for longer term development. (Source: U.S. Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation, 1 December 2005)

- **Stabilization** – The process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful longer-term development. (Source: U.S. Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation, 1 December 2005)

While reconstruction and stabilization activities are usually considered foreign post-conflict operations because of U.S. government (USG) experience with Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, these definitions equally apply to the full

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1475 The Department of State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and the Joint Warfighting Center of the U.S. Joint Forces Command jointly published the document on 1 December 2005.
continuum from steady state operations through post-conflict contingency response. Prior to crisis response, reconstruction of failing foreign political or socio-economic institutions may be required, and underlying tensions that could lead to violence or a breakdown in law and order may require mitigation before a conflict occurs. Similarly, a post-Katrina or post-Ike domestic contingency is likely to require some form of reconstruction response to rebuild critical physical infrastructure to help restore normalcy and stability actions to ensure that law and order are maintained.

B. Evaluation Methodology

In related research on RSO, the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) identified six major areas that were critical to achieving success in these types of operations.

- **Unity of Purpose** – What is being attempted and which underlying factors are important to achieve success?

- **Roles and Responsibilities** – Who has what role (authority and responsibility) and where are the lanes of responsibility among the various actors?

- **Resources and Capabilities** – How are resources (personnel and funding) planned, programmed, budgeted, and prepared (education and training of human capital and clarification of processes to mobilize and deploy) for employment in RSO?

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1476 “Steady State Operations and Activities” – shaping activities (including Phase 0 elements of contingency plans) designed to promote acceptable international behavior by potential adversaries and sustain peace and stability under conditions that promote U.S. national interests, or set the conditions for military success if a contingency cannot be prevented (Source: draft “Guidance for the Employment of the Force [GEF] [U],” SECRET, March 2008).

1477 The analysis draws on the following IDA products developed in support of PNSR:

- A synthesis of past studies evaluating the successes and failures of previous interagency efforts at training for, planning, and executing reconstruction and stabilization operations, including Iraq. This study identifies major trends, schools of thought, and areas of agreement and disagreement.

- A summary analysis of the current division of U.S. government authorities, duties, responsibilities, functions, and resources among executive branch agencies for reconstruction and stabilization. The analysis draws on IDA’s previous study on “Emerging U.S. Government Civilian Capabilities to Support Foreign Reconstruction and Stabilization Contingencies” and concentrates on determining how the current state of affairs complicates the U.S. government’s ability to integrate and adequately resource the elements of national power required for effective reconstruction and stabilization.

- An overview of the legal, strategic, operational, and tactical challenges to U.S. government integration in reconstruction and stabilization operations. This focused research draws on insights from case studies in Panama, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan to more specifically identify integration challenges in RSO.

1478 “Unity of Purpose” – a common understanding of what is being attempted and the underlying factors that are important to achieve success (Source: Stipulated).
INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION

- **Interagency Collaboration**[^1479] – How are capabilities, resources, and end states[^1480] integrated with unity of purpose so that unity of effort[^1481] can be achieved?

- **Executive Organization** – How is the Executive Branch (the planner and executor of the tasks) organized and prepared to ensure unity of effort is achieved in an effective and efficient way?

- **Legislative Oversight** – How is the Legislative Branch (oversight and resource provider) organized and prepared to ensure unity of effort is achieved in an effective and efficient way?

The methodology used for the qualitative evaluation examines each of the proposed reforms against the six criteria and uses five possible outcomes:

- 2 Very strong contribution to RSO
- 1 Positive contribution to RSO
- 0 Neutral or not applicable to RSO
- -1 Negative impact on RSO
- -2 Very strong negative impact on RSO

A brief discussion for each proposed reform summarizes the qualitative justification for the assigned scores. Reforms that received the maximum outcome of “2” are highlighted in yellow. A key assumption in this analysis is that foreign RSO are conducted from steady state through post-conflict environments, but domestic RSO only occur in post-disaster situations. Consequently, the proposal for an [integrated chain of command](#) was assumed to apply to foreign post-conflict RSO because in those environments, civilian and military personnel must work together closely in unstable conditions that require clear lines of authority and responsibility. While the analysts did consider the application of this proposal in other RSO contexts, the traditional model for a dual civil-military chain of command was assumed in steady state foreign or post-disaster domestic situations.

[^1479]: “Collaboration” – to cooperate with an agency or instrumentality with which one is not immediately connected (Source: Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary); “cooperation” – 1) to act or work with another or others: act together; 2) to associate with another or others for mutual benefit (Source: Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary).

[^1480]: “End State” – the condition to be attained at the end of an operation which indicates that the objective has been achieved (Source: Stipulated).

[^1481]: “Unity of Effort” – to bring into a common action the efforts of all coalition partners (Source: Stipulated).
C. Evaluation of Proposed Reforms

The evaluation of the proposed reforms is divided into three sections. The first section addresses the core reforms. That section is followed by the evaluation of the three options. The final section summarizes the evaluation of the supporting options for structural consolidation.

1. Core Reforms

The proposed core reforms are designed to:

- Improve strategic planning and management
- Help integrate policy development and resourcing
- Promote a unified national security human capital system that supports a common culture
- Enhance knowledge management across all components of the national security system
- Create a more integral relationship between the Legislative and the Executive branches

This section evaluates each of the solution sets described in the core reforms against the five criteria using the five point scale described above. The numbered headings are linked to the reforms listed in Table A2.
### 1.0 Better Strategic Direction and Management

#### 1.1 National Security Review

The National Security Review (NSR) process should contribute to establishing common vision; clear objectives; unambiguous roles and responsibilities; and an evaluation of the ends, ways, and means amongst the executive branch actors leading and supporting RSO. The NSR’s findings could be used to determine the enduring capabilities (personnel and funding) needed to support RSO. The process is also likely to assist the Executive Office of the President (EOP) and Congress in making necessary adjustments to organizations supporting a national RSO capability.

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Table A2. RSO Evaluation of Core Reforms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reform Measure</th>
<th>Unit of Purpose</th>
<th>Roles and Responsibilities</th>
<th>Resources and Capabilities</th>
<th>Interagency Collaboration</th>
<th>Executive Branch Leadership</th>
<th>Legislative Oversight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 National Security Review</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 National Security Planning Guidance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 National Security Resource Document</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Expanded and Empowered Executive Secretary and Secretariat</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 National Assessment and Visioning Center</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 Security Staff Augmentation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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#### 2.0 Better Integration of Policy Development and Resourcing

- **2.1 Longer Range Budget Planning**
  - 1
- **2.2 Executive Budget Review Process**
  - 1
- **2.3 Budget Transparency**
  - 2
- **2.4 Congressional Budget Review Process**
  - 2
- **2.5 Budget Execution Oversight**
  - 2

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#### 3.0 A Unified National Security Human Capital System

- **3.1 National Security Strategic Human Capital Plan**
  - 1
- **3.2 Core Values**
  - 1
- **3.3 Human Capital Advisory Board (HCAB)**
  - 0
- **3.4 National Security Professional Corps**
  - 0
- **3.5 Mandatory Orientation Program**
  - 2
- **3.6 National Security Fellowship Program**
  - 1
- **3.7 Comprehensive Education and Training Program**
  - 2
- **3.8 National Security University System Alternative**
  - 0
- **3.9 Continuing and Training Political Appointees**
  - 0

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#### 4.0 Enhanced Information Services and Knowledge Management

- **4.1 Knowledge Management Office**
  - 1
- **4.2 System-Wide Information**
  - 1
- **4.3 Common Security Clearance Approach**
  - 1
- **4.4 Common Security Classification Approach**
  - 1
- **4.5 Information Security Processes Should Enable a Risk Management**
  - 0
- **4.6 Common Information Services**
  - 1
- **4.7 Federal Chief Knowledge Officers and Council**
  - 1

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#### 5.0 Legislative-Executive Branch Partnership

- **5.1 Interagency Select Committees**
  - 1
- **5.2 Executive Secretary Senate Confirmable**
  - 0
- **5.3 Stronger Foreign Policy Committees**
  - 0
- **5.4 Consolidated Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security**
  - 1
- **5.5 Consolidated Oversight of the Intelligence Community**
  - 1
- **5.6 Stronger Oversight Mechanisms**
  - 0
APPENDIX 8. AN EVALUATION OF PROPOSED REFORMS ON POTENTIAL RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS

1.2 National Security Planning Guidance

The National Security Planning Guidance (NSPG) could be used to codify roles and responsibilities across the whole-of-government for RSO. Developed jointly by the National Security Council (NSC)/Homeland Security Council (HSC) staffs and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), this guidance should improve the alignment of resources (ways) with priority reconstruction and stabilization missions (ends and means). A transparent presentation of the president’s priorities for departments and agencies is also likely to increase interagency awareness of roles and responsibilities and therefore improve collaboration towards common goals in RSO. The NSPG should also help the executive branch make its organizational arrangements more effective. Although not explicitly stated in the Solutions paper description, it is imperative from an RSO perspective that such planning guidance includes prevention as well as response.

1.3 National Security Resources Document

This guidance should enable all designated departments and agencies to identify and prioritize RSO requirements and then plan, program, and budget the essential resources within the thresholds established. This process should lead to greater unity of purpose and improved legislative oversight by more effectively linking priority objectives with budget decisions over a six-year period. Strategy-linked resource allocations should help to clarify department and agency roles and responsibilities in implementing RSO activities in the context of the national security strategy. The collaborative and consistent approach across the executive branch actors should strengthen its capabilities and increase interagency collaboration.

1.4 Expanded and Empowered Executive Secretary and Secretariat

An expanded and empowered executive secretariat responsible for national security system management should increase unity of purpose through the promotion of a more common and cohesive strategic culture among actors involved with RSO. Fulfilling this management function could also contribute to the clarification of roles and responsibilities among the various actors and increase the level of interagency collaboration at the strategic level during RSO. This proposal does not specifically address how resources are planned, programmed, budgeted, and prepared for employment in RSO, but the reform should improve effectiveness of the executive branch. The increased size and professionalization of the executive secretariat is a critical contribution to RSO that could clarify many of the interagency management responsibilities currently lacking in this mission area. From this perspective, it is essential that the expanded staff will contain a sufficient number of individuals with RSO expertise.

1.5 National Security Assessment Center (NSAC)

This reform should make a very positive contribution to achieving unity of purpose across the various actors involved with RSO by providing common assessments of both internal capabilities and the external environment. Roles and responsibilities
should be further codified to the extent that the center facilitates a systematic review of missions, activities, and budgets for this mission area (e.g., NSR) and interagency collaboration is likely to improve through the integration of capabilities, resources, and end states in planning and visioning. The center is likely to advance training and education for RSO to the extent that it offers education, practical learning opportunities, or participation in national exercises as part of the consortium of national professional development institutions. Finally, the center should contribute to executive organization, and with a Senate-confirmed director and career staff, should also improve congressional oversight of planning for RSO.

1.6 Security Staff Augmentation

To the extent that the augmented security staff will provide coordinated direction or fulfill required management responsibilities for RSO, this proposal could contribute to the promotion of common objectives, priorities, and the ways and means to achieve them. The recommendation does not specifically address how this staff would be organized, what mechanisms they would employ to manage or coordinate RSO, nor does it outline specifics resources and capabilities; but, if arrayed appropriately, this reform could help the executive branch make its organizational arrangements more effective.

2.0 Better Integration of Policy Development and Resourcing

2.1 Longer Range Budget Planning

With the extended budget period, designated national security agencies should be able to plan, program, and budget for the resources each will need when called upon to conduct RSO and in this sense improve the way that resources are planned, programmed, and budgeted for employment in RSO. The longer term budget should provide greater visibility for both executive and legislative branches and should be helpful in obtaining increased congressional support for multi-year funding to ensure continuing support for priority reconstruction and stabilization programs and operations.

2.2 Executive Budget Review Process

Budget reviews by OMB, in close collaboration with the NSC staff to ensure submissions are consistent with strategic guidance, should contribute to unity of purpose by ensuring that resources and priorities are aligned at all stages of the budget process. A transparent identification of interagency tradeoffs necessary to achieve objectives within the overall budget constraints is also likely to increase interagency awareness of roles and responsibilities and therefore improve collaboration towards common goals in RSO. The review process should help to identify resources for RSO and improve the way in which those resources are budgeted for such operations.

2.3 Budget Transparency

Increased budget transparency in the president’s annual budget submission to Congress that justifies resource allocation in support of strategic objectives should improve unity of purpose in national security mission areas such as RSO and is a critical component for
A better integration of policy development and resourcing. The emphasis on national missions instead of individual departments is intended to allow Congress and the executive branch to identify overlaps and deficiencies as well as alternatives and comparisons for pursuing strategic objectives and should therefore improve clarity regarding roles and responsibilities for RSO and lead to greater interagency collaboration. It will be essential that RSO be defined as a priority mission within this process and receive an appropriate budget line. The collaborative and transparent approach across the executive branch actors should strengthen its capabilities.

2.4 Congressional Budget Review Process

A thorough congressional review of the administration’s multi-year strategic plan for the entire national security budget should improve understanding of what is being attempted in mission areas such as RSO. An objectives-focused, cross-jurisdictional review is likely to further clarify roles, with increased transparency contributing to collaboration among implementing agencies. This process should improve alignment of the executive and legislative branch and promote unity of effort in the planning and conduct of RSO.

2.5 Budget Execution Oversight

An NSC/OMB consolidated view of execution status linked to presidential guidance across agencies following appropriation of funds should reinforce unity of purpose and further codify roles and responsibilities for national missions such as RSO. This proposal is not likely to significantly impact interagency collaboration, but should improve how resources are planned, programmed, budgeted, and prepared for employment in RSO and contribute to more effective alignment of the executive and legislative branches.

3.0 A Unified National Security Human Capital System

3.1 National Security Strategic Human Capital Plan

This plan should contribute to unity of effort by providing the necessary focus on human capital and the actions that are necessary to improve it across the designated departments and agencies. The plan will only define roles and responsibilities for enhancing human capital, where its contribution to RSO could be substantial. Aligning human capital needs with national goals and objectives is essential for identifying competencies and resources needed to carry out RSO successfully. Interagency incentive plans would reward cross-agency collaboration and teaming, an essential element of successful RSO. The plan should strengthen the organizational capabilities of the Executive Branch. It could also be used to help develop common language and definitions for RSO. One key component recommendation from an RSO perspective is to increase civilian resources to create a “personnel float” that would allow personnel from civilian agencies engaged with RSO to have opportunities for training and participation in exercises comparable to their military counterparts and, when deployed, allow providing departments and agencies to function normally.

3.2 Core Values
Designating the executive secretariat with the responsibility to lead the effort to achieve consensus on “core values” for the national security system is a positive contribution towards unity of purpose. This recommendation could be extrapolated such that the empowered executive secretariat is assigned further responsibility for establishing and maintaining common USG principles and lexicon, for example, in various mission areas such as RSO. A foundational understanding of the vision, values, goals, principles, and terminology that unite the otherwise disparate actors in RSO environments should help to clarify roles and responsibilities; improve interagency collaboration; and provide cohesiveness in resource planning, programming, budgeting, and preparation. This process should also promote a common perspective across both the executive and legislative branches.

3.3 **Human Capital Advisory Board**

An advisory board that incorporates both public and private experts on human capital policies, training, and education should increase unity of purpose across the interagency as well as between public and private sector actors in RSO. This proposal is unlikely to impact roles and responsibilities or interagency collaboration for RSO, but will improve training and education by incorporating the perspectives of a more diverse range of actors involved with RSO. The proposed board could also help to identify if and where the USG has the capacity to support RSO as well as to offer guidance on the composition of the proposed Civilian Reserve Corps.

3.4 **National Security Professional Corps**

The National Security Professional Corps (NSPC) should promote unity of purpose through the development of a more unified personnel system that can be utilized for RSO in place of separate and often disparate personnel systems now operating in implementing departments and agencies. The system is likely to increase civilian personnel capacities and systems to more adequate levels for participation in future RSO and could raise standards and professional requirements for this mission area. One challenge might be in balancing such standards with the need for a system that is flexible and not restricted through insertion of additional requirements. Joint assignments, promotion requirements, and a common training and education curriculum should increase levels of interagency collaboration for mission areas such as RSO and contribute to more effective executive organization. A system such as the proposed NSPC is imperative for this mission area and will serve as the needed “surge capacity” to respond to emerging RSO situations. The current concept does not articulate how it would promulgate or codify roles and responsibilities for RSO, but such a system would benefit from that codification, which should be built into the more unified personnel system.

3.5 **Mandatory Orientation Program**

This proposal should have a significant impact on promoting unity of purpose across the various actors involved with RSO. To the extent that the program will reinforce for new employees roles and responsibilities in specific mission areas such as RSO, the process should raise interagency awareness and encourage collaboration. The program should
make the most significant impact on the preparation of personnel resources through the
education of the various actors involved with RSO.

3.6 National Security Fellowship Program

Through the promotion of joint assignments, this proposal should increase unity of
purpose and strengthen a common culture across agencies involved with RSO. The
program does not impact roles and responsibilities for this mission area, but is likely to
make a significant contribution to interagency collaboration and training and should help
the executive branch make its organizational arrangements more effective. If appropriate
emphasis is given to this mission area, the program should be a positive means to recruit
personnel with particular aptitude for RSO.

3.7 Comprehensive Education and Training Program

This proposal should make a strong contribution towards unity of purpose by instituting a
common curriculum for all actors involved with RSO, including private sector and
contractors. This initiative has the potential to make significant contributions to
promoting a more effective whole-of-government approach to national security
challenges as well as the potential to improve interagency collaboration for RSO through
the common skills and culture elements of the program. To improve RSO, these
programs will need to be organized in a way that will ensure a high level of participation
of personnel who can take the lead in executing this mission area, with particular
emphasis on the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the
State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). Lessons
learned are a critical process for RSO.

3.8 National Security University System Alternative

This alternative is inadequately detailed and thus one cannot draw conclusions as to
whether it will have any impact beyond the current status quo from the perspective of a
single mission area such as RSO. Should this alternative have the same system attributes
as the National Security Education Consortium, it might have a better chance of
impacting RSO.

3.9 Confirming and Training Political Appointees

More comprehensive training for political appointees who will be involved with RSO
activity (to the extent that they might be) is essential. At the same time, the number of
political appointees who are engaged to handle RSO should be kept to an absolute
minimum and should be expected to have a comparable level of professional credentials
as career civil service, Foreign Service, and military personnel. Individuals who are
rewarded with ambassadorships and other senior appointments in recognition of political
campaign services should not be given responsibility for managing RSO.

4.0 Enhanced Information Services and Knowledge Management

4.1 Knowledge Management Office
Improved system-wide knowledge management should contribute to unity of purpose for RSO, clarify the roles and responsibilities of the actors, and enhance the collaboration among members of the national security interagency community. Such a repository could also support education and training programs of the designated departments and agencies by sharing lessons identified and best practices to be incorporated in their training programs to a strengthened RSO capability within the executive branch. This could also be valuable in evaluating emerging crises that might require an RSO response.

4.2 National Security Historian/Librarian to Manage Authoritative System-Wide Information

This reform should contribute to unity of purpose by cataloguing authorities, policy guidance, lessons learned, and other relevant information for national security practitioners across administrations. To the extent that this proposal increases levels of awareness and accessibility of this critical information, it is likely to improve interagency coordination and contribute to more effective executive branch alignment. Capabilities should improve if lessons are learned and applied to RSO. From this perspective, it will be imperative that lessons “identified” are not only captured and made accessible, but also translated into a contemporary context that can be quickly “applied” to current situations.

4.3 Common Security Clearance Approach

To the extent that consolidated security clearance procedures across the interagency results in more efficient security clearance processes, this proposal is likely to increase the ability to coordinate in Washington between headquarters agencies (easing movement in and out of the State Department and the Pentagon) as well as increase the speed in which personnel can be deployed to the field in RSO environments. The approach should also increase interagency collaboration by facilitating joint assignments and the transfer of personnel between departments and agencies. This increased capacity for interagency collaboration facilitated by the ability for USG personnel to work and deploy together for RSO should improve executive branch organization and serve to bolster unity of purpose in such missions.

4.4 Common Security Classification Approach

A common security classification approach could contribute to unity of purpose for RSO through facilitating the sharing of information and guidance across implementing agencies. This ease in information sharing is likely to contribute significantly to further interagency collaboration and should improve the way in which the executive branch is organized for RSO.

4.5 Information Security Processes Should Enable a Risk Management Rather than a Risk Reduction Regime

This proposal to shift emphasis from “avoidance” to “management” of risk is critical in the context of RSO. Often during such operations, security concerns trump mission objectives and prevent policy guidance from being carried out in the field. Operationally
focused organizations, such as USAID, have been severely constrained in their ability to carry out their mandates due to limitations associated with a “risk reduction regime.” This paradigm has led to increased fortification of embassy compounds and further separation from the realities on the ground; a challenge illustrated by recent experience in Iraq where disconnects between realities inside and out of the Green Zone were apparent. The proposed reform should have a significant impact on the capabilities of operations organizations to carry out their missions and should allow for a more efficient and effective use of resources to achieve policy goals. Over time, this paradigm shift should significantly improve executive branch organization to address RSO challenges.

4.6 Common Information Services

This proposal will have particular potential for promoting unity of purpose and should significantly enhance interagency collaboration for all USG agencies with responsibility for RSO. Similarly to common approaches to security classification, this consolidation should facilitate information sharing and communication across various actors involved with RSO. The solution proposed does not articulate how this would contribute to clarifying/codifying roles and responsibilities for RSO nor does it cover any aspects of resources and capabilities.

4.7 Federal Chief Knowledge Officers and Council

Establishing a chief knowledge management officer to implement agency knowledge management and coordinate cross-system knowledge flows should contribute to unity of purpose by ensuring that appropriate guidance and information is distributed. These officers should also improve accounting for agency resources and capabilities and sharing the information among participants thereby increasing interagency collaboration and strengthening the executive organization.

5.0 Legislative-Executive Branch Partnership

5.1 Interagency Select Committees

This reform significantly impacts the legislative branch oversight. During RSO, the select committee structure should enhance Congress’ oversight of the U.S. government activities by providing the committee(s) with improved visibility over the whole-of-government approach to address the challenges associated with the RSO. Furthermore, such a committee could help to raise the profile for RSO and obtain appropriate resources, particularly for civilian departments and agencies that have key roles in RSO. This proposal should help to clarify congressional roles and responsibilities regarding resourcing and oversight of RSO as a national mission, and less from the disparate perspectives of multiple committee structures.

5.2 Executive Secretary Senate Confirmable

The creation of this position to be occupied by a career national security specialist whose service would bridge administrations should make an important contribution for RSO, by helping to ensure the continued active participation of all government agencies with the
capability to provide support for RSO and promoting the effective coordination of these contributions. As this officer is accountable to Congress on national security management and interagency coordination, this option should increase the linkage between the executive and legislative oversight as well as have the potential to increase interagency collaboration.

5.3 Stronger Foreign Policy Committees

This proposal could have some direct impact on RSO as a national security mission area if the committees focus on RSO. One potential benefit could be simplified or increased flexibility in the authorization processes that allows for more coherent and consistent funding for these operations. Furthermore, strengthening foreign policy committees could lead to an increase in funding for key civilian departments and agencies, thereby codifying their roles and responsibilities in RSO.

5.4 Consolidated Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security

Consolidation of congressional oversight of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) homeland security functions into one authorization committee and one appropriations sub-committee per chamber should have a positive impact on legislative branch organization and oversight of domestic disaster response activities to the extent that these operations are considered RSO.

5.5 Consolidated Oversight of the Intelligence Community

Consolidation of congressional oversight of the intelligence community should have a positive impact on legislative branch organization and oversight of intelligence activities, such as the identification and classification of emerging crises that may lead to RSO. This consolidated oversight has the potential to foster improved interagency collaboration which could also lead to better access to more holistic intelligence assessments in support of RSO. This could in turn reinforce unity of purpose and better inform the resources and capabilities required to address the RSO challenges as well as the most appropriate roles and responsibilities for USG actors.

5.6 Stronger Oversight Mechanisms

This proposal is likely to have a negligible direct impact on RSO, but stronger oversight mechanisms should improve legislative oversight of these activities.

3. Three Reform Options

The solutions proposed in the core reforms are assumed to be in place and have been taken into account in the evaluation of all three reform options reviewed in this section.

6.0 Option One: White House Command

The focus of the White House Command option is a strong executive presence in both policy and resource allocation. New structures and processes give the president and his
key staff the ability to control the national security system using hierarchical chains of
command and complementary authorities for allocating resources. The option largely
retains the current national security system. The major changes are increased authorities
and mandates for the EOP, resulting in guidance and direction to the government for
foreign and domestic security and defense activities.

### Table A3. RSO Evaluation of Option One

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reform Measure</th>
<th>Units of Purpose</th>
<th>Roles and Responsibilities</th>
<th>Resources and Capabilities</th>
<th>Interagency Collaboration</th>
<th>Executive Organization</th>
<th>Legislative Oversight</th>
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</table>

#### 6.1 President’s Security Council

Creating a single council that replaces the NSC and HSC would have a favorable impact
from an RSO perspective. This would be particularly true with respect to emergency
preparedness and disaster response where it would facilitate the application of
experiences and use of federal, state, and local personnel responsible for dealing with
either foreign or domestic challenges. Many of the same resources provided by the
designated national security agencies could be employed either domestically or to foreign
RSO. When competing requirements occur, the council could establish priorities and set
resource constraints based on common operational pictures and common inventory
information. If focused on specific mission areas such as RSO, and not solely on
providing broad policy guidance, then these considerations could improve unity of
purpose, clarify lines of authority and responsibility, and increase interagency
collaboration resulting in a more effective executive branch response.

#### 6.2 Director for National Security Affairs (DNSA)
APPENDIX 8. AN EVALUATION OF PROPOSED REFORMS ON POTENTIAL RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS

This reform establishes a position with directive authority rather than merely advisory responsibilities. From the RSO perspective, this authority should clarify unity of purpose and the roles and responsibilities of the actors. The DNSA could help produce greater consistency between identifying the need for a prospective RSO and allocating the necessary resources to accomplish it. The result should be a more collaborative environment for planning and implementing RSO and improved Executive Branch organization.

6.3 Office of the Director for National Security Affairs (ODNSA)

This office in support of the DNSA assumes many of the interagency process management responsibilities that are lacking for RSO in the current system. Oversight and direction should contribute to clarification of roles and lanes of authority among agencies with RSO responsibilities. Perhaps most significantly, these management duties and directive authority contribute to improved interagency collaboration. From an RSO perspective, it will be critical that staff members have expertise in this mission area.

6.4 Executive Secretary of ODNSA

As described in the core reform evaluation, the executive secretary could assume responsibility for ensuring unity of purpose through the development and maintenance of common principles and lexicon for mission areas such as RSO. This proposal does not specifically address resources and capabilities, but should help the executive branch make its organizational arrangements more effective. Similar to the composition of the ODNSA, it is essential that the staff contain a sufficient number of individuals with RSO expertise.

6.5 Vice President as National Security Manager

This proposal is likely to have negligible direct impact on RSO. Its impact would be dependent on the individual in office and the extent to which he/she is able to fulfill this key managerial role. One challenge associated with this proposal is that if the vice president is unable or unwilling to take on this responsibility, there is no avenue of recourse outside of impeachment, which may not be appropriate or useful given that national security manager is only one of several duties performed by this office. If adopted, this reform would cause the larger issue of vice presidential accountability to be called into question.

6.6 Issue Identification and Assignment

Identification and assignment of national security issues will help to align efforts with priority mission areas and therefore contribute to unity of purpose. A formal review process in which new national security issues are captured should help to identify potential RSO situations as priority issues before they emerge as crises and help these situations to receive appropriate attention from the national security community to ensure that whole-of-government solutions are developed and implemented. It will be critical throughout this process to be able to reach agreement regarding priorities among potential RSO challenges, gain consensus on how constrained resources are to the employed, and
assign appropriate responsibility for action. As new challenges arise, each situation will need to be compared and evaluated in the context of other RSO demands and not as an isolated situation.

6.7 **End-to-End Process Management**

This approach described in this proposal should be useful in ensuring that unity of purpose is defined and translated into unity of effort across implementing agencies. DNSA responsibility for maintaining consistent representation on interagency committees at all levels should help to clarify roles and responsibilities and encourage interagency collaboration. The process by which resources are planned, programmed, budgeted, and prepared for employment in RSO is likely to improve with a comprehensive, “end-to-end” approach to managing major RSO challenges that aligns resources and priorities.

6.8 **Environmental Assessments**

Similarly to the previous proposal for end-to-end issue management, a formal assessment process to help policy-makers consider the ends-ways-means linkages within reconstruction and stabilization strategies, policies, and plans should help to ensure unity of purpose in policy formulation is translated into unity of effort in policy implementation. This process is also likely to further clarify roles and responsibilities and encourage interagency collaboration by providing a common assessment among agencies working in the reconstruction and stabilization mission area. Finally, environmental assessments should improve the way in which resources are planned, programmed, budgeted, and prepared for employment in RSO.

6.9 **Operational Control**

To the extent that RSO are considered “major operations,” this recommendation proposes that they be conducted using the lead agency approach while monitored and assessed by the ODNSA. The lead agency approach has not always proven to work in RSO environments. Granting a single agency the authority to lead a national reconstruction and stabilization mission may have a negative impact on ensuring clear lanes of authority, and promoting interagency collaboration among supporting agencies. A more viable option might be the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) concept that has demonstrated success in directing focused tasks involving USG and multinational civilian and military resources. On the other hand, “Plan Colombia”—based on the U.S. country team and the affected nation’s government working together—with unity of purpose has led to perhaps one of the more successful RSO. Granting the White House the authority to exert operational control during an RSO could help to ensure unity of purpose is maintained; however, this could also be accomplished through organizations such as a JIATF, or the chief of mission in the affected nation, and each situation will need to be evaluated before the appropriate control procedure is selected. The proposal for the

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executive secretariat’s knowledge management office to provide a national common operating picture should contribute to achieving unity of purpose in this mission area.

6.10 **ODNSA Budget Lines for Priority Missions**

Administering a separate budget for selected national security missions such as RSO should promote unity of purpose, clarify roles and responsibilities, and encourage interagency collaboration through increased emphasis on national missions rather than on the core mandates of individual departments and agencies. Education and training may or may not be functions provided for in national budgets. The mission-focused budgets should also help to further align the executive and legislative branches around common national security missions such as RSO. This approach could be particularly important to ensure that priority reconstruction and stabilization missions are funded appropriately and that funds are reprogrammed to these missions if necessary.

6.11 **Selective Reprogramming Options**

Providing specific reprogramming options to better align the president’s budget with national priorities should help to ensure unity of purpose in aligning the president’s budget with national priorities. This process is unlikely to have a significant impact on interagency collaboration, but should further clarify roles and responsibilities and improve executive branch organization to plan, program, budget, and prepare resources for employment in RSO.

6.12 **Information Management Centers**

Granting expanded responsibilities to the executive secretariat’s Knowledge Management Office to manage all information in the national security system would further improve unity of purpose through the assurance of common security, access controls, prioritization, and infrastructure. This proposal should increase compatibility among federal agencies, thereby increasing collaboration during RSO and improving executive branch organization to deal with these challenges.

6.13 **Improved Mission Area Analysis**

Putting in place common systems to improve mission area analysis should contribute to achieving unity of purpose across agencies involved with RSO. To the extent that these systems allow for the conduct of comprehensive ends-ways-means assessments in the reconstruction and stabilization mission area, they should help to clarify roles and responsibilities, improve interagency collaboration, and contribute to more effective executive branch organization.

6.14 **Mapping and Tapping Knowledge Sources**

Mapping and tapping knowledge sources across the national security system should contribute to unity of purpose for RSO, clarify the roles and responsibilities of the actors, increase awareness and accessibility of key capabilities, and enhance the collaboration among members of the national security interagency community by providing for
common information sharing and communication capabilities across actors involved in this mission area.

7.0 Option Two: Integrated Regional Divisions

This option increases strategic management and accountability in the system by requiring departments and agencies with national security missions to answer to directors of Integrated Regional Divisions, positioned forward at home and abroad where advisable. These civilian-led organizations are comprised of, or have strong liaison ties to, all government entities with interest or activities in each U.S. or foreign region. Regional directors are not in the chain of command for the operational control of U.S. military forces employed in combat. U.S. military combatant commands would nevertheless coordinate their activities with the Integrated Regional Centers and could be co-located to facilitate collaboration and provide support.

Table A4. RSO Evaluation of Option Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reform Measure</th>
<th>Roles and Responsibilities</th>
<th>Interagency Collaboration</th>
<th>Executive Organization</th>
<th>Legislative Oversight</th>
<th>Unit of Purpose</th>
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<tr>
<td>7.0 Option Two: Integrated Regional Divisions</td>
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<td>7.1 President’s Security Council</td>
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</table>

7.1 President’s Security Council (PSC)

As a combined council, this body could address both foreign and domestic RSO requirements. This action could lead to development of standard processes that link the strategic, operational, and tactical echelons of the national response. Moreover, many of the same resources provided by the designated national security agencies could be employed either domestically or to foreign RSO. When competing requirements occur, the council could establish priorities and set resource constraints based on common operational pictures and common inventory information. If focused on specific mission areas such as RSO, and not solely on providing broad policy guidance, than these considerations could improve unity of purpose, clarify lines of authority and responsibility, and increase interagency collaboration resulting in a more effective executive branch response.
APPENDIX 8. AN EVALUATION OF PROPOSED REFORMS ON POTENTIAL RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS

7.2 President’s Security Advisor (PSA) and Staff

This proposal for a small staff to assist the president in managing the national security system and resolving conflicts among the integrated regional divisions should contribute to the achievement of unity of purpose through the establishment of security goals, strategic direction, and policy and budget guidance. Empowering this staff to resolve conflicts among the integrated regional divisions should contribute to interagency collaboration in the execution of RSO and should more effectively organize the executive branch to deal with these challenges. Assisting the president in providing guidance on priorities linked to budget allocations should improve the way in which resources are planned, programmed, budgeted, and prepared for employment in RSO.

7.3 Security Executive Secretariat

As described in the core reform evaluation, an expanded and empowered security executive secretariat responsible for national security system management should increase unity of purpose through the promotion of a more common and cohesive strategic culture among actors involved with RSO. Fulfilling this management function could also contribute to the clarification of roles and responsibilities among the various actors and increase the level of interagency collaboration at the strategic level during RSO. The increased size and professionalization of the executive secretariat is a critical contribution to RSO which should fulfill many of the interagency management responsibilities currently lacking in this mission area. From this perspective, it is essential that the expanded staff will contain a sufficient number of individuals with RSO expertise.

7.4 Integrated Regional Directors and Centers

This proposal to empower regional directors should increase unity of purpose in the field if national priorities are adequately articulated by the PSC and addressed by issue-based task forces that are focused solely on priority missions such as reconstruction and stabilization engagements. A regional perspective is critical for this mission area as many RSO situations have spillover effects in neighboring states. Current disparate alignment across agencies has been a source of tension in coordinating for RSO in the past, and the proposed model could address this challenge to the extent that it forces regional alignment across the USG. This option also has the potential advantage that the regional directorship, or subordinate task forces, could be “closer to the problem” (both physically and otherwise) and therefore able to address the situation more effectively by quickly bringing whole of USG capabilities to bear, especially when transnational issues must be resolved. The reform should also impact legislative oversight by providing Congress with a single point of interaction in the form of a Senate-confirmed director accountable for RSO issues on a regional basis.

7.5 Option for Running Regional Divisions from Department of State

Empowering the regional assistant secretaries at the Department of State to fulfill the function of running the Regional Divisions would “lower” the Regional Divisions below
the interagency space and therefore lessen the authority of the directors to direct and
manage the interagency resources to address the RSO challenges. This arrangement is
similar to the status quo associated with the lead agency approach and is likely to have a
negative impact on this mission area.

7.6 Integrated Requirements Analysis

Granting the Integrated Regional Divisions authority over resource allocation and
performance assessment should contribute to unity of purpose at the regional level
through empowerment of an entity in the interagency space responsible for these
functions in a single region. This proposal should improve the way in which resources
are planned, programmed, budgeted, and prepared for employment in RSO. Similarly to
other reforms, from the perspective of a single mission area such as RSO, it is critical that
the staff maintain the relevant functional perspectives while performing the integrated
requirements analysis.

7.7 Operations and Maintenance Budgets

This proposal is likely to contribute to unity of purpose and interagency collaboration at
the regional level. A common regional budget for operations and maintenance should
improve the way in which resources are planned, programmed, budgeted, and executed
for RSO in respective regions, improving flexibility and accountability.

7.8 Regional Differences Resolved by President’s Security Advisor

This proposal is critical to ensure that unity of purpose and unity of effort are achieved at
the national level and across Integrated Regional Divisions. It is possible for RSO
situations to have an impact across regional boundaries and therefore dispute resolution,
information flows, and incentives/infrastructures for cross-organizational cooperation are
imperative in this mission area.

8.0 Option Three: Distributed and Networked Teams

This set of solutions uses strong informal social contacts to focus attention and activity in
the national security system on problems and opportunities quickly. Cross-functional
teams enable all instruments of statecraft to be integrated for both small and large
problems. The recommendations support these teams and informal social networks with
a robust collaborative infrastructure. The system is held together by providing the
president with mechanisms to drive the administration’s priorities.
Table A5. RSO Evaluation of Option Three

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<tr>
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<th>Roles and Responsibilities</th>
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8.1 Presidential Security Reviews

From the RSO perspective, such reviews would be very similar to the current system and would have negligible impact. The process described in this proposal reflects the National Security Council committee mechanisms in place today and its adoption is unlikely to impact the RSO mission area.

8.2 President’s Security Advisor and Staff

The president’s security advisor and staff resemble the current system in that the PSA and staff have no directive authority, they only advise the president. Roles and responsibilities are only impacted by the PSA in an advisory capacity. In overseeing and coordinating interagency teams, the PSA and staff should help promote unity of purpose by providing the broader vision. Empowering this staff to resolve conflicts among the integrated regional divisions should contribute to interagency collaboration in the execution of RSO and should more effectively organize the executive branch to deal with these challenges.

8.3 Empowered Executive Secretariat

As described in the core reforms, the executive secretary could assume responsibility for ensuring unity of purpose through the development and maintenance of common
principles and lexicon for mission areas such as RSO. Similar to the composition of the
president’s security advisor and staff, it is essential that the staff contain a sufficient
number of individuals with RSO expertise. The empowered executive should enforce
agency roles and responsibilities and available resources and capabilities. This proposal
should help the executive branch make its organizational arrangements more effective.

8.4 Issue Teams

This proposal to empower interagency issue teams to address priority national security
issues should increase unity of purpose in the field by increasing focus on national
missions instead of department and agency core mandates. Unity of purpose is likely to
be increased at the level of the individual issue team, but perhaps not so at the national
level. Emphasis on collaborative cross-functional teams, in place of coordinating bodies
such as Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs), should contribute to increased
interagency collaboration in RSO. Similarly to the proposal for regional directorships,
this reform offers the potential advantage that the issue teams could be “closer to the
problem” (both physically and otherwise) and therefore able to address the situation more
effectively by quickly bringing whole of USG capabilities to bear. This proposal also
raises several key concerns for this mission area such as the need for a mechanism to
ensure appropriate interaction occurs across the various issue teams so that unity of effort
is achieved overall. Also, the small size of the proposed teams is a potential challenge in
addressing a complex issue such as RSO, especially if more than one contingency occurs
simultaneously.

8.5 Geographic Offices

The Global Office will promote unity of purpose at the national level through the
provision of policy guidance to the hierarchy of issue teams. By creating, coordinating,
and moderating issue teams, the Geographic Offices should help to clarify roles and
responsibilities and improve interagency collaboration within and across issue teams.
This proposal should impact resources and capabilities and improve executive branch
organization by providing local infrastructure for issue teams and ensuring close
proximity of department and agency assets to address reconstruction and stabilization
problems.

8.6 Issue Team Liaisons

This proposal should allow for increased unity of purpose between the executive branch
and Congress, the private sector, multilateral partners, and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) through the creation of liaisons with these entities. Liaisons can
help to stimulate faster and more adequate legislative action for RSO when required,
provide clarity and transparency to the American people, and improve collaboration with
other international partners leading up to and during such operations.

8.7 Homeland Security Steering Committee

A formal “steering committee” to provide a venue for collaboration between state and
local government authorities, the private sector, and NGOs with the federal government
on homeland security matters, should have a positive impact on post-disaster domestic RSO. Since critical reconstruction and stabilization capabilities exist within state and local governments, as well as within the private sector and NGO communities, this proposal should promote further collaboration and unity of purpose between these entities and the federal government in responding to RSO demands in the U.S. Through providing input to all major homeland security policies, strategies, and plans, the committee could further clarify the roles and responsibilities of these various actors involved in domestic reconstruction and stabilization environments. The steering committee concept could also serve as a venue to facilitate the application of experiences and provide consolidated input to the Civilian Reserve Corps process that seeks to draw on state, local, and private sector capabilities to contribute to foreign RSO.

8.8 Business Emergency Management Assistance Compact

This is a creative idea focused on domestic disaster and emergency response applications that could, if applied in a foreign contingency setting, bolster support from the private business sector for RSO abroad. If this option were developed further, to address foreign RSO operations, it could be broken out from the other proposals set forth in option three as a useful option to meet the broader set of requirements for RSO. It could lead to unity of purpose with the private sector as well as increased interagency collaboration.

8.9 National Security Strategy

The proposed National Security Strategy is an improvement from the current process in that it should provide more strategic direction to an issue area such as RSO, thereby increasing unity of purpose across the system. Reports on activities, strategies, risks, resources, capabilities, personnel, the security environment, and other subjects of concern to issue teams contribute to the more detailed strategy. This approach, linked to the National Security Budget, should improve the way that resources are planned, programmed, and budgeted for employment in RSO.

8.10 Issue Management

This issues-focused process should increase unity of purpose and interagency collaboration at the level of individual issues such as RSO; however, it is not likely to impact unity of purpose above the level of individual issues. Similarly, issue management will help address how resources are planned, programmed, budgeted, and prepared at the level of specific issues.

8.11 Team Management

Team management is critical to promote unity of purpose at the national level to ensure a common perspective across the various issue teams. Additionally, this approach should increase interagency coordination across teams. This function will be critical in the RSO mission area to ensure that this issue is tied to related capabilities and missions, such as disaster response, humanitarian assistance, and relevant steady state activities.
8.12 **Issue Team/Geographic Office Input into Budgeting and Longer Term Planning Processes**

This proposal should increase unity of purpose for individual issues by instituting an issues-based resource allocation process. The process should improve the way in which resources are planned, programmed, budgeted, and prepared (including budgeting for training and education) and should better align the executive and legislative branches to promote unity of effort in planning and conducting RSO. Furthermore, this process should codify department and agency roles as capability providers for issue teams and ensure that resources and capabilities are aligned with issue team requirements. Longer range budget perspectives should increase visibility and help to obtain increased congressional support for multi-year funding to ensure continuing support for priority reconstruction and stabilization programs and operations.

8.13 **National Security Executives (NSE)**

This proposal is likely to increase civilian personnel capacities to more adequate levels for leadership in future RSO and could raise standards and professional requirements for this mission area. Strong leadership of the issue teams will be critical to ensure that appropriate levels of authority are maintained to manage and direct the teams. From this perspective, it is essential that the NSE will bring to bear an appropriate level of RSO expertise. This reform is likely to help the Executive Branch make its organizational arrangements more effective.

3. **Supporting Options for Structural Consolidation**

The core reforms focused on changes in process, resources, knowledge management, human capital, and congressional oversight. The three preceding options primarily involved adjustments to organizational structure, with supporting modifications to other organizational functions. This section of the Solutions report identifies three supporting options for structural consolidation. The first of the remaining proposals seeks to realign authorities to establish an integrated chain of command, while the two additional reforms offered in this section are primarily, but not exclusively, structural consolidations. The solutions proposed in the core reforms are assumed to be in place and have been taken into account in the evaluation of the Supporting Options.
9.0 Supporting Options

9.1 Integrated Chain of Command

While not identified in the solutions paper as a core reform, this supporting option is a core structural consolidation requirement for RSO because during these operations, the civilian and military resources are expected to work together effectively at the operational and tactical levels. The case studies cited in the main report reinforce the need to have clear and unambiguous lines of authority and responsibility if RSO are to be accomplished effectively. Lack of an integrated chain of command has been noted as a major shortfall in most historical and contemporary contingency situations. Furthermore, an integrated chain of command could be beneficial in foreign steady state situations as well as in surge environments because there is a requirement to integrate civilian and military resources to prevent a crisis from emerging.

9.2 Empowered Department of Homeland Security

An empowered Department of Homeland Security with the authority to direct the federal interagency for all domestic incidents, including reconstruction and stabilization activities in disaster response situations, should increase unity of purpose and interagency collaboration for RSO domestically. A National Operational Framework could increase operational integration across all levels of government and the private sector and further codify roles and responsibilities in domestic reconstruction and stabilization environments. This proposal does not address resources specifically, but should improve the management of capabilities for employment in RSO.

9.3 Department of Foreign Relations

This proposal could increase unity of purpose and interagency collaboration among participating agencies; however, this is only likely to occur over the long-term as a new culture emerges in a new department. Regarding the way in which resources are planned, programmed, budgeted, and prepared for employment in RSO, this proposal should consolidate the resources of the implementing agencies, giving a Secretary of Foreign

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Table A6. RSO Evaluation of Supporting Options for Structural Consolidation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reform Measure</th>
<th>Unity of Purpose</th>
<th>Roles and Responsibilities</th>
<th>Resources and Capabilities</th>
<th>Interagency Collaboration</th>
<th>Executive Organization</th>
<th>Legislative Oversight</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.1 Integrated Chain of Command</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.2 Empowered Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<td>9.3 Department of Foreign Relations</td>
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APPENDIX 8. AN EVALUATION OF PROPOSED REFORMS ON POTENTIAL RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS

Relations authority over a comprehensive budget aligned with broader foreign policy objectives.

4. Summary Findings and Recommendations

A large number of the specific proposals embedded in the core reforms should greatly enhance the overall USG capability to design and implement policies and programs for RSO using a whole-of-government approach. Through this evaluation and supporting research, several reforms have emerged as critical to the success of RSO. Specific recommendations which appear to have particular importance include:

- The creation of integrated interagency plans through the proposed National Security Review and the initiation of National Security Planning Guidance are essential and must include planning for both prevention and response to emerging contingencies.

- An Expanded and Empowered [NSC] Executive Secretary and Secretariat comprised of career national security career professionals and led by a congressionally confirmed executive secretary who will overlap between administrations is necessary to direct and manage the interagency community involved with RSO activities. It is imperative that this enlarged NSC must contain staff members, including senior officials, who have RSO expertise.

- The National Assessment and Visioning Center would be an important asset in developing interagency consensus on countries and regions threatened by instability, the relative implications of these potential threats for U.S. security, and possible responses.

- Increasing the executive’s ability to obtain congressional support for funding on a multi-year basis is of high importance for RSO which in most instances will require extended commitments. The proposals for Better Integration of Policy Development and Resourcing should help to accomplish this, particularly the recommendations for Longer Range Budget Planning, the Executive Budget Review Process, and Budget Transparency. However, it is most important that as part of this process RSO be defined as a priority mission and receive a meaningful budget line.

- The proposals for establishing a Unified National Security Human Capital System will have significant implications for RSO. Recommendations with the greatest potential appear to be the National Security Strategic Human Capital Plan, which, among other things, could be used to help develop common language and definitions for RSO; the Human Capital Advisory Board, which could help identify if and where the USG has the capacity to support RSO; and the Comprehensive Education and Training Program. In implementing the proposals on human capital development, it is essential that emphasis be placed on those personnel from USAID, S/CRS, and other departments that will be expected to take a leading role in the implementation

of RSO. The recommendation for Confirming and Training Political Appointees is critical and the use in RSO of those political appointees being rewarded for campaign contributions should be strictly avoided. Civilian resources must be increased, specifically to create a “personnel float” that would allow personnel from civilian agencies engaged with RSO to have opportunities for training and participation in exercises comparable to their military counterparts, and allow providing departments and agencies to continue to function during RSO deployments.

- An Integrated Chain of Command, although not listed as a core reform, is a key reform for RSO that would greatly increase unity of effort in field environments and could be a key component of any reform option. Included in this concept, the proposal for a civil-military handbook to establish basic guidelines for working within the integrated chain of command is critical. These guidelines must include: 1) a common set of initial metrics to enable determination of when success has been achieved in RSO noting that all metrics will need refining during the actual mission, and 2) common whole-of-government terminology and principles for RSO to ensure a foundational understanding of what is being attempted along with the underlying factors that are important to achieve success.1483

- Merging the NSC and HSC into a single President’s Security Council would have a favorable impact from an RSO perspective. This would be particularly true with respect to emergency preparedness and disaster response where it would facilitate the application of experiences and use of an expanded civilian reserve pool by adding skilled personnel from state and local echelons to the federal resources currently under development by S/CRS to respond to these challenges.

The research team has identified several additional reforms that are not explicitly described in the proposals, but are seen as imperative to success in the RSO mission area. They include:

- Establishment of missions, organizational templates, supporting modules, and concepts of operations for field-level organizations such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

- The provision of congressional funds with mandates that ensure domestic agencies have the legal authorities to spend these funds on creating and maintaining internal departmental capacities to support RSO activities abroad. These capacities, at a minimum, should include: 1) the process of internal whole-of-department planning, 2) the process of maintaining and sending

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1483 See Glossary: Terminology Related to Operations Involving Civilian and Military Resources (Institute for Defense Analyses, 2006) for an illustration of the lack of common terminology across the USG. This glossary focuses on national security terminology more broadly, but includes many examples of the lexicon challenges associated with the mission area of RSO.
APPENDIX 8. AN EVALUATION OF PROPOSED REFORMS ON POTENTIAL RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS

trained personnel forward to RSO activities abroad, and 3) the process of supporting those forward personnel with the reach back support across the entire department through a single coordinating office. All of these basic capacities should be mandated and somewhat standardized across the USG national security community.

In considering the three options for reform, Option One, “White House Command,” appears to be viable from an RSO perspective in providing the leadership and direction necessary to motivate, guide, and coordinate the contributions of a broad range of USG agencies and help ensure that potential capabilities are utilized and sustained. It is one option that would make effective use of other constructive recommendations for more effective support for RSO, such as an empowered and congressionally confirmed NSC Executive Secretary, an expanded and professionalized NSC Secretariat, the creation of a National Security Assessment and Visioning Center, and a National Security Review. Option One appears to offer a promising means for dealing with potential multiple crises, setting priorities, and providing guidance for the best use of what will inevitably be limited resources.

Option Two, “Integrated Regional Divisions,” presents another viable option for an improved approach for RSO. The success of both Option One and Option Two in RSO (particularly when simultaneous, large-scale contingencies occur) would establish the management mechanisms to ensure appropriate organizational leadership for coordinating and adding capabilities to address these challenges from a regional perspective. A regional perspective is necessary to address “spillover” issues and transnational challenges in the region. The Regional Directorship, or subordinate task forces, should be “closer to the problem” (both physically and otherwise) and, therefore, able to address the situation more effectively by quickly bringing whole-of-government capabilities to bear. Furthermore, this model provides Congress with a single point of interaction in the form of a Senate-confirmed director accountable for RSO issues on a regional basis.

Option Three, “Distributed Network Teams,” has positive aspects from an RSO perspective, but also raises important concerns from that perspective. At the level of individual RSO, an emphasis on collaborative cross-functional teams, in place of coordinating bodies such as PCCs, should contribute to increased interagency collaboration and unity of purpose for those particular operations. While this model provides innovative approaches for focusing attention on emerging crises and potential problem areas, it is questionable how effective it would be in coordinating a whole-of-government approach for dealing with multiple challenges or establishing priorities among these challenges at the national level. From the RSO perspective, the particular weaknesses posed by this option are its strong reliance on informal networks and exercises, and the relatively small size of the key issue teams. For example, it is unlikely that such teams, with a membership of only ten persons, will be able to develop either the in-depth insights into complex problems or assert their authority across the interagency community. Furthermore, it is unclear whether one team would handle all RSO or whether each RSO would have its own team and then compete with all other teams for resources and attention. Finally, it is not clear that the geographic offices provide
APPENDIX 8. AN EVALUATION OF PROPOSED REFORMS ON POTENTIAL RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS

adequate mechanisms to ensure effective interaction between the various issue teams. These deficiencies could have important negative consequences for RSO.

The supporting option intended to contribute to additional structural consolidation that has the most salience for RSO is the Integrated Chain of Command. The empowered DHS option is useful, only as it applies to those domestic contingencies one might define as RSO. This option, however, is solely domestically focused and so delinks itself from the important capacities it would need to draw upon for a more holistic approach to improved RSO. The Department of Foreign Relations option is the least applicable to improving RSO, and is likely to encounter many political, cultural, and institutional impediments in order to come to fruition.

The proposed “hybrid” solution incorporates many of the reforms described above as imperative to success in the RSO mission area. Foundational reforms in the areas of 1) strategic planning and system management, 2) linkages between policy and resource allocation, 3) human capital incentives, 4) enhanced knowledge management, and 5) legislative branch-executive branch partnerships are key enablers that lay the groundwork for further structural and process reforms to take root. In addition to the core reforms and the proposal for an Integrated Chain of Command included in the hybrid proposal and endorsed at the beginning of this summary section, several additional structural and process reforms stand out as critical from the perspective of this mission area. A key recommendation is the proposal to prescribe in statute the national security roles of each department and agency and to create the position of assistant for national security in those departments and agencies without traditional national security responsibilities to ensure that all actors are equipped with the mandate and necessary capacity to support national reconstruction and stabilization missions. Borrowing from Options Two and Three, the hybrid proposal incorporates the concepts for Integrated Regional and Global Centers providing regional and global perspectives to RSO through the conduct of strategy formulation, planning, implementation, and assessment for these operations. Other key reforms proposed in the hybrid include the amendment of Title 22, U.S. Code, to clarify and strengthen the authority of an ambassador leading a country team and the creation of Interagency Task Forces to handle a crisis in a country or region that exceeds the capacity of the country team of Integrated Regional Center. Overall and based on the criteria established by the research team, adoption of the hybrid reform proposal should have a strong positive impact on the USG’s ability to plan for and conduct successful reconstruction and stabilization operations.
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