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Interagency Structures in "Surge" Environments Statement of Problems

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General

The intent of this paper is to examine the structures associated with interagency cooperation in "surge" operations.[1] As the military becomes more involved in stability operations, and as the existence of failed and failing states has become a key national security concern, the ability of U.S. civilian and military elements to work together in the field as a single team becomes imperative. Many of the problems that exist in steady-state environments also exist (and are sometimes exacerbated) in surge environments. However, there are also problems unique to surge operations. Among them are effective coordination with coalition military forces as well as civilian operations by other governments, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. Another central problem is coordination with military and civilian authorities of the country in which the surge operations are taking place.

Many of the problems of civil-military coordination in post-conflict operations have been taken up by NSPD-44, the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS), and the new Interagency Management System (IMS). Our analysis attempts to be inclusive of these new structures, but there is limited evidence with which to evaluate them at this point.

This annex covers in detail only the U.S. interagency aspects of surge operations. However, it tries to take into account the need for broader cooperation and coordination. Our analysis is based in part on several products produced for the Country Team Working Group: 1) a PNSR Legal Working Group memorandum on delineation of authority between U.S. civilian and military elements in the field; 2) an Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) literature review of reconstruction and stabilization operations (RSO); and 3) an IDA study on U.S. government authorities in RSO. The two IDA products,

[1] We define "surge" operations as operations where military forces under the command of an area military commander are engaged in direct action (vice advisory missions) and deployed alongside civilian members of the USG in a semi-permissive or non-permissive environment. Surge operations are of an extended duration and require a different command structure than the embassy and military structures already in place. We define "structure" as how an organization divides and coordinates labor, including the alignment of authority and component parts of an organization.

while they focus on RSO, are also applicable to general "surge" operations so we have included them here.

Core Problem

The U.S. Government has no formal command and control arrangements for foreign contingencies where civilian and military resources are employed that can be practiced before and implemented during interventions. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that civilian and military leaders of similar personality, vision, and intent can at times achieve unity of effort[2] for the U.S. Yet, as the following problem statement identifies, a structural solution is needed if this is to be durable. Our research has identified the following core problem of U.S. interagency cooperation in surge environments:

- In environments where a large U.S. military presence is deployed alongside U.S. civilian personnel, two chains of command operate at the top. One encompasses all non-DOD USG personnel in country. The other chain of command encompasses all forces under the area military commander. By law, these two chains of command cannot be combined. This means that the first point of formal integration between the two chains of command is the President; no effective delegation of presidential authority exists. This disunity of command[3] makes unity of effort dependent on personalities, visions, and physical working locations. As a result, unity of effort often breaks down.

Below the top level, there are separate U.S. military and civilian chains of command for geographic entities such as regions or provinces. There are also often separate entities conducting

[2] Unity of effort is achieved when all means are directed toward a common purpose.
[3] Unity of command is achieved when subordinates all have a single superior.

overlapping U.S. civil-military operations.[4] This is further complicated by the activities of non-U.S. entities.

Issues of Authority

As noted in the statement of our core problem, unity of effort is hindered in surge operations because of the existence of two chains of command. In steady-state operations, where the ambassador has de jure authority over most, if not all, personnel in the embassy (since the U.S. military footprint is normally small), an empowered ambassador can exercise unity of command. However, in surge operations the military is deployed in large numbers and the environment is semi-permissive or non-permissive which means the U.S. chief of mission and the military area commander must share authority. In this situation, conflicts can arise between the military commander and chief of mission, which, if not solved, can cause military and civilian elements in country to pursue divergent aims. There are multiple reasons why this dual chain of command can inhibit unity of effort and multiple reasons why a lack of unity of effort is detrimental to the mission. This paper will explore these areas.

The reason for this dual chain of command can be found in both policy documents and in U.S. law. NSPD-44 (Appendix A) outlines management of interagency efforts in reconstruction and stabilization. NSPD-44 acknowledges the need for coordinated U.S. efforts and tasks the Secretary of State with the responsibility to "coordinate and lead integrated United States government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations." With assistance from the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, the Secretary of State is responsible for coordinating reconstruction and stabilization

[4] In Iraq there is a military command structure – MNF-I – which does not have a civilian parallel. Civil-military activities are carried out by PRTs, embedded PRTs, and other US military unit commanders and USAID and State Dept. authorities. There are also those activities funded and carried out by the Iraqi government. Resources come from many sources (Iraq, US, other governments, international organizations)

activities not only with U.S. government entities such as the Department of Defense, but also with foreign countries, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and private sector entities. NSPD-44, however, does not establish a specific in-country structure for leading reconstruction and stabilization efforts, nor does it give the Secretary of State any power other than the power to "coordinate" with the Department of Defense. It does task the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State with developing a "general framework for fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations at all levels where appropriate."

The Interagency Management System (IMS) (Appendix B) followed the publication of NSPD-44 and is designed to assist policymakers, Chiefs of Mission, and military commanders plan and manage reconstruction and stabilization operations by ensuring coordination among all USG stakeholders at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.[5] The IMS consists of a Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (a Washington-based policy coordinating committee), an Integration Planning Cell (a civilian planning cell integrated with the relevant Geographic Combatant Command or multinational headquarters), and an Advance Civilian Team (one or more interagency field management and coordination teams to support Chiefs of Mission in the field). Like NSPD-44, the IMS does not address the issue of dual authority between civilian and military components in the field, but it does provide additional coordinating structures. These additional structures will likely improve, but not solve the dual authority problem.

A dual chain of command at the country level is also codified in U.S. law. According to Title 22 of U.S. Code, the Chief of Mission has "responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of *all* Government executive branch employees in that country (*except for ... employees under the command of a United States area military commander*) ...[6] The Chief of Mission is required to "keep

[5] Institute for Defense Analyses, "U.S. Government Authorities for Reconstruction and Stabilization," March 2008, ES-6.
[6] 22 U.S.C. § 3927(a)(1) (emphasis added).

fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations of the Government within that country, and shall insure that *all* Government executive branch employees in that country (*except for ... employees under the command of a United States area military commander*) comply fully with all applicable directives of the chief of mission."[7] According to a PNSR Legal Working Group review of this code:

> Based on these statutory provisions, the Chief of Mission oversees every Executive Branch employee in his or her country, with the key exception of military personnel under the command of an 'area military commander.'[8] Although the term 'area military commander' is not defined in the U.S. Code,[9] it most likely encompasses the combatant commander. Therefore, the Chief of Mission probably cannot exert any 'direction, coordination, and supervision' over military personnel under the authority of a combatant commander.

Because of this distinction, discussions on authorities in surge operations almost always lead to the question of who is in charge. The IDA literature review notes several studies which judged that civilian and military command and control relationships "need clarification within the USG and agreement with our multinational and multilateral partners so that joint, combined, and interagency operations can be planned and conducted effectively and efficiently, and within the legal authorities that the terms establish."[10]

Along with a lack of clearly defined authority, the roles and responsibilities for these operations are just beginning to be codified. S/CRS has developed several reconstruction and stabilization mission-

[7] 22 U.S.C. § 3927(a)(2) (emphasis added).
[8] It seems self-evident that the "area military commander" him or herself must also be excepted from the Chief of Mission's control, though the statute is not explicit to that effect.
[9] This section of Title 22 was enacted in 1980, six years before Goldwater-Nichols, and therefore Congress would not have defined the Chief of Mission's powers in reference to the combatant commander. *See* Foreign Service Act of 1980, PUB. L. NO. 96-465 (1980).
[10] Institute for Defense Analyses, "U.S. Government Authorities for Reconstruction and Stabilization," March 2008, ES-20.

essential tasks lists which outline the immediate, mid-term, and long-term tasks associated with security, governance and participation, humanitarian assistance and social well being, economic stabilization and infrastructure, and justice and reconciliation.[11] It remains to be seen how these essential tasks lists will be used in practice and whether or not they will help clarify roles and responsibilities.

Similar problems exist at the provincial and local levels of U.S. operations where there may be several U.S. entities as well as other international entities alongside those of the host nation. A 2005 report from USIP identifies several lessons from the *U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan*. The report finds that PRTs lack "a clear set of guidelines for civil-military interaction" which led to the need for extensive improvisation" and that "military officers and civilian agency personnel came from different 'corporate cultures' and had different, sometimes competing, mandates." This situation was exacerbated by the absence of any "interagency pre-agreement on individual roles, missions, and job descriptions."[12] Further complicating cooperation is the fact that each PRT must report through multiple chains of command: the military, the Office of Provincial Affairs, the embassies, and Washington-based country representatives of the departments and agencies. In Afghanistan, PRTs are commanded by different NATO member governments with different procedures and capabilities. There is no single ISAF/NATO entity which can effectively coordinate them.

S/CRS has created a structure to replace PRTs known as Field Advanced Civilian Teams (FACT). FACTs are organized similar to PRTs and serve the purpose of implementing reconstruction and stabilization activities at the provincial or local level. According to initial U.S. government planning, FACTs will report to the U.S. Chief of Mission.[13]

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[11] S/CRS, "Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks," April 2005, available at http://www.state.gov/s/crs/
[12] The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified. (USIP, 2005) 11.
[13] OSD Policy, "Report on Improving Interagency Support for United States 21st Century…", June 2007, 26, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/downloads/Signed_1035_Report.pdf

Selection and Training

The U.S. government needs a more efficient capability to rapidly mobilize human resources for surge operations. S/CRS has recognized this problem and has created an Active Response Corps (ARC), Standby Response Corps (SRC), and Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC).[14] There are currently a small number of personnel in the Active and Standby Corps with the Civilian Reserve Corps still awaiting congressional authorization. The Active Response Corps has so far deployed to Sudan, Chad, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nepal, Haiti, and Lebanon.

S/CRS has also begun to outline a series of readiness training and pre-deployment courses that members of the ARC, SRC, and CRC will go through.[15] Readiness training would focus on issues, theories, and principals of reconstruction and stabilization as well as planning guidelines and standards for interaction among USG and non-USG partners. In addition, pre-deployment training would include mission-specific studies, area studies, and force protection training over the course of ten to seventeen days. This training is designed to include all members of the ARC, SRC, and CRC, not just Department of State employees.

S/CRS's initiatives are intended to address a variety of problems that have been identified in recruiting and training for surge operations. In an examination of the U.S. experience in Iraq since 2004, the CSIS *Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction* observed that the "State Department and other civil branches of the U.S. government continued to have serious problems in recruiting and retaining suitable personnel" and that "USAID and the contracting officers in the Department of Defense

[14] The Active Response Corps, slated to have a membership of 250 personnel, would deploy within the first 72 hours of a U.S. military landing. The Standby Reserve Corps – slated to have 2,000 personnel – would be able to deploy 200 to 500 of its personnel within 45 to 60 days of a crisis onset. The Civilian Reserve Corps would also have 2,000 personnel made up entirely of non-U.S. government employees. For more information, see S/CRS, "Meeting the Challenge of Failed States: Civilian Stabilization Initiative," http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=4ZMC, date unknown.

[15] S/CRS, "Future Interagency Training and Education for Reconstruction and Stabilization," November 27, 2007.

lacked the experience and expertise to plan and manage aid on anything like the scale required."[16] Regarding the performance of PRTs in Iraq, the study found that "interagency rivalry and recruiting problems prevented the timely staffing and deployment of provincial reconstruction teams."[17] A House Armed Services Committee report on PRTs found that "many of the skills sets required for stabilization and reconstruction operations do not currently exist in our government agencies. The government has had to hire from the private sector to establish new recruiting and training programs."[18] For the skills that do reside in the Executive Branch, neither the State Department nor the U.S. military have a way to track these skills. Neither a career track nor special experience identifier for people who have served on PRTs or in stabilization and reconstruction operations exists. Even in the U.S. military reserves, where soldiers bring valuable civilian work experience, there is only an informal method for keeping track of special skills.[19]

A related problem is that different experts from different agencies within the U.S. government do not train together prior to deployment. The first time these experts have operated as a group is usually once they are already deployed. Two distinct types of training are used for U.S. led PRTs, depending on whether they serve in Iraq or Afghanistan. A third program of training takes place in Germany for coalition-led PRTs in Afghanistan.[20] A 2008 CSIS study addressing PRTs cites "minimal pre-deployment training" as a key inhibitor to PRT success.[21] A 2001 IDA Study, in which civilian and military practitioners were surveyed, revealed a number of findings regarding the perceived challenges in civil-military training. The study concludes that "a more rigorous and structured system is required to

[16] American Strategic, Tactical, and Other Mistakes in Iraq: A Litany of Errors (CSIS, 2006) 8-9.
[17] Ibid., 9.
[18] House Armed Services Committee, "Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan," April 2008, 25.
[19] House Armed Services Committee, "Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan," April 2008, 43.
[20] House Armed Services Committee, "Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan," April 2008, 25.
[21] Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance (CSIS, 2008) ES-XII.

train military personnel realistically in the capabilities and operational styles of civilian agencies, both in military schools and during regularly scheduled exercises." Further, the study finds that "this deliberate training must be supplemented by additional familiarization training and intensified liaison activities, bringing selected military and civilian leaders together prior to actual deployments."[22]

The inability of civilian agencies in particular to participate in such training and education is due to insufficient numbers of personnel within these agencies. Agencies such as State and USAID lack a "training float" and therefore cannot move personnel into training without leaving an operational position vacant.

Unifying Plans

USG capacity to effectively plan for surge operations is undergoing significant change. The Interagency Management System, approved by the NSC in March 2007, is "specifically designed to integrate military and civilian planning at the Washington, Combatant Command, and Embassy/Joint Task Force levels" by creating a common operating picture and framework for decision making.[23] The IMS created three new structures (previously discussed on page 3), which have so far only been tested in JFCOM Multinational Experiments.

The IMS comes about as a result of previous difficulties in planning for surge operations. In many cases, differences in the planning capabilities and capacities of DOD and non-DOD organizations hinder the effectiveness of attempts to integrate planning efforts.[24] This is due to the fact that planning is a routine military activity, but one less developed among civilian authorities. All too often, U.S.

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[22] Lidy, et al. DOD Training for Smaller Scale Contingencies: Enhancing Predeployment Linkages with Civilian Agencies. (IDA, 2001) 3.
[23] OSD Policy, "Report on Improving Interagency Support for United States 21st Century…", June 2007, 18, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/downloads/Signed_1035_Report.pdf and U.S. Department of State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. *Briefing: Civilian Stabilization Initiative*: *Building a USG Civilian Response Capability to Support Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*. April 10, 2008 (Slide 3).
[24] Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Needed to Improve Government wide Planning and Capabilities for Future Operations (GAO, 2007) summary page.

government planning for surge operations fails to address the mission's objective, the intended scale of commitment, and the institutional arrangements for managing the intervention. USG planning for surge operations is often done by one agency exclusively, with little input from other authorities, either in the USG or multilaterally – partially a result of there being no clear delineation of authorities in policy execution.[25] Lessons learned are also not routinely incorporated in planning for surge operations.[26] While the military has developed programs to collect lessons learned at all levels of operations, including PRTs, planners do not consistently examine past results as they develop future plans.

Inhibiting the ability of the U.S. to plan for surge operations is the lack of agreement on basic principles and a common lexicon, as well as a lack of clear metrics for measuring success. The IDA description of U.S. government authorities for reconstruction and stabilization operations observes that "the USG currently lacks a unifying set of principles that can bring the military and civilian partners together and provide a common agreed foundation upon which to develop USG interagency doctrine for future interventions within the framework of transformational diplomacy."[27] A USIP report on *Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction* finds that "the success of efforts to stabilize and reconstruct failed states and war-torn societies is heavily dependent on proper assessment tools and reliable measures of progress." The report continues with the following observation:

> Previous interventions have been severely hampered by faulty initial analysis that has overlooked the entrenched drivers of conflict and instability. Lofty goals are rendered unattainable by unrealistic time frames, inadequate resources, and constrained authorities.

[25] Examples include planning in the run-up to intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as Iraq.
[26] House Armed Services Committee, "Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan," April 2008, 46-47.
[27] Snapshot of Emerging Civilian Capabilities to Support Foreign Reconstruction and Stabilization Contingencies (Institute for Defense Analyses, 2007) ES-18.

> Progress is judged on the basis of programs that have been implemented rather than on actual results.[28]

Additionally, before surge operations are even conducted, there are no coordinated efforts among agencies to identify failed or failing states. S/CRS was given the responsibility in NSPD-44 to "Coordinate interagency processes to identify states at risk of instability". Agreeing on the process for performing this task is another key aspect of interagency planning.

Inadequate planning and a lack of metrics has also been a key inhibitor to PRT success.[29] According to a recent House Armed Services Committee Report, "absent a comprehensive strategy from Washington or CENTCOM headquarters, the direction of PRTs has been ad hoc and personality-driven."[30] This lack of guidance has led to confusion over what a PRT is supposed to do and what its limits are.

Communications

A problem which carries over from steady-state operations is how to share information among agencies within the U.S. mission when much of the information is classified and there is a need to protect sources. In situations with a heavy military and intelligence community presence, sharing information among agencies becomes extremely sensitive, but no less imperative. According to an OSD Policy paper, "DOD is experimenting, along with other United States Government partners, with various tools to support information-sharing during operations and to improve security classification guidance

[28] Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction (USIP, 2006) 1.
[29] Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance (CSIS, 2008) ES-XII.
[30] House Armed Services Committee, "Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan," April 2008, 18.

and training to facilitate sharing of information with key partners…"[31] Much of this work centers on establishing common standards, lexicons, and interoperable systems through new information management systems such as wikis, blogs, chats, and other technologies.

Civil-Military Cooperation

Civil-military cooperation is particularly important below the national level where so many U.S., international, and host country military and civilian entities are operating. Various structures for coordination have been tried in different countries (and at various times). None of them has been as successful as to have been accepted as a model for other operations.

These problems are especially acute in reconstruction and stabilization environments where civilian NGOs bring critical resources and expertise. However, these actors often differ with USG authorities on missions, goals, methods, and acceptable timeframes, and may not want to be seen as part of the U.S. mission.

The number of contractors present in many surge operations also presents a unique complexity to command structures. Many military tasks (e.g., logistics, food service, maintenance, personnel security) and civilian tasks (e.g., police training, development work) are in part, or in whole, carried out by contractors. These contractors are often loosely overseen by U.S. authorities in country and can create problems if they act in ways inconsistent with U.S. strategy. A structure is needed to ensure that contractors can continue to provide vital services, but also act in support of the U.S. mission.

[31] OSD Policy, "Report on Improving Interagency Support for United States 21st Century…", June 2007, 29, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/downloads/Signed_1035_Report.pdf

Resources[32]

The issue of resources to support reconstruction and stabilization operations is often cited as the principal inhibitor to achieving success across the whole-of-government. The RAND Corporation's *Beginner's Guide to Nation Building* makes this case. "In planning any mission…it is essential to ensure a match between ends and means. Mismatches between inputs, as measured in personnel and money, and desired outcomes…are the most common cause for failure of nation-building efforts."[33] More specifically, an imbalance in resource allocation resulting in under-resourced civil capacities for reconstruction and stabilization is a major theme that emerges from past analyses. For example, Barbara Bodine testifies that the problem within the USG is less one of organization, but rather a giant imbalance of resources which has DOD "on steroids" and civilian agencies on "life support."[34]

There are also the critical questions of providing the requisite level of civilian resources for the duration of a multi-year operation. The U.S. government – constrained by the necessity of annual appropriations from Congress – is not and should not be the only source of funds and personnel for activities of a civilian nature. Other governments, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations are important resource providers. (In the case of Iraq, the host government is potentially a major resource provider, but this is an exception). Even within the U.S., the coordination of many separate resource streams must be brought together (different USAID and State accounts, military CERP funds, as well as funds for other civilian agencies such as HHS, Commerce, Justice, etc.).

Several examples from past operations help to shed light on this challenge of funding surge operations. A common finding relates to the need "to create funding mechanisms that will

[32] A separate PNSR working group is tasked with analyzing the use of resources in interagency operations. This section is merely a brief description of the problem as it relates to surge operations.
[33] The Beginner's Guide to Nation Building (RAND, 2007) XXI.
[34] Can the PRT Case Study Illuminate the Future of Reconstruction and Stability Operations? (HASC, 2008).

allow…respon[se] in a timely and appropriate manner."[35] In considering lessons learned from *The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Governance in Iraq*, a 2005 USIP report finds that "U.S. government agencies and other organizations involved in building governance structures should develop financial systems that allow them to get money moving quickly." This will be the case for all surge operations, not merely the unusually large one in Iraq.

Multilateral Structures

Broad consensus exists that the U.S. should not perform surge operations alone. Partner nations and the international community can provide critical support to such operations, especially as the relative power of the U.S. declines. As described by Richard Haass in the May/June 2008 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, "the principal characteristic of twenty-first century international relations is turning out to be nonpolarity: a world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power."[36] Haass notes that this international structure "will make it more difficult for Washington to lead on those occasions when it seeks to promote collective responses to regional and global challenges. . . Herding dozens is harder than herding a few."

Much of the literature supports this conclusion, by noting that the lack of multinational or multilateral coordination is often a key inhibitor to successful surge operations. A 2007 article published in *Survival* maintains that "intergovernmental coordination is no less critical than interagency coordination at the national level, yet it often faces even more difficult hurdles." The article goes on to identify that "this is especially challenging for nation building, because no single country possesses the resources or the capabilities to effectively undertake nation building efforts on its own."[37] *The Beginner's Guide to Nation Building* maintains that "nation-building always requires the integration of

[35] Towards Postconflict Reconstruction (*Survival*, 2002) 95.
[36] Richard N. Haass, "The Age of Nonpolarity," *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2008), electronic version.
[37] Organising for Nation Building (*Survival*, 2007) 67.

national and international efforts [and that] larger missions require several layers of consultative machinery to operate effectively." The report concludes that "without such coordination, international efforts are likely to be disjointed, with the various organizations concerned competing for turf while shirking the riskier or less rewarding tasks."[38] The Council on Foreign Relations Task Force notes that "another problem is coordinating the reconstruction assistance offered by national governments, regional organizations, and international financial institutions." The report finds that "too often, there is an overlap of effort in some areas and insufficient aid in others."[39]

To address these challenges, S/CRS and several international partners have held Multinational Experiments which aim to improve civil-military cooperation in surge operations. Many of these partners and allies are, at the same time, improving their own reconstruction and stabilization capabilities. According to an IDA study, "several nations have developed or are in the process of developing RSO capabilities [and that] a number of multilateral organizations have been established to carry out RSO-related tasks."[40] An agreed-upon structure for organizing these various capabilities does not yet exist.

Vignettes

The difficulties of interagency cooperation in surge environments did, of course, not begin with Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. The need for a structure to bring together civilian and military elements of the U.S. government can be seen in several vignettes from past U.S. operations. These brief overviews illustrate several key conclusions about the state of interagency collaboration at the country level in surge environments:

[38] The Beginner's Guide to Nation Building (RAND, 2007) XXII.
[39] In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities (Report of an Independent Task Force, Council on Foreign Relations, 2005) 28.
[40] Snapshot of Emerging Civilian Capabilities to Support Foreign Reconstruction and Stabilization Contingencies (Institute for Defense Analyses, 2007) ES-24.

- Military authorities retain substantial independent freedom of action during military operations
- Proximity, informal coordination mechanisms, and senior leader attitudes can increase the chances for successful civil-military integration, but do not offer a reliable systemic solution to the problem
- The United States has not had a uniform structured solution for civil-military integration in conflict and post-conflict situations at the country level since CORDS, and is therefore dependent upon ad hoc solutions.

Vietnam – Strategic Hamlets Program

Despite President Kennedy's intervention in support of ambassadorial authority through the Presidential letter, agencies at the Country Team level continued to operate along their own lines of effort. The 1962 Strategic Hamlets program in Vietnam underscored this fact. The program required USAID, military advisers, CIA, USIA and other U.S. Government personnel to deploy into the provinces and work together. However, the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, Frederick Nolting, believed in allowing each agency full authority over its own programs.[41] The result was that each agency in the field pursued its own objectives without regard to the larger mission. It quickly became apparent that the civilian and military approaches to the war in Vietnam during this period were fundamentally at odds with one another:

> The civilian side was committed to a concept of counterinsurgency which focused on the population as the heart of the matter….The military, despite concessions – no doubt sincere – to the importance of winning the population, was quite unshakably wedded to the idea that priority must go to destroying the

[41] Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present (The Free Press: New York, NY), 1977, p. 117.

> enemy's armed force, and doing it by the familiar means of concentrating manpower and firepower at the right time and place.[42]

These two diverging approaches were not reconciled. As the military increased its use of bombs and artillery, civilian casualties mounted, thus undermining the objectives of the Strategic Hamlets program.

Roger Hilsman, an advisor to President Kennedy, wrote of the situation, "The real trouble…is that the rather large U.S. effort…is managed by a multitude of U.S. agencies and people with little or no overall direction. No one man is in charge…What is needed ideally is to give authority to a single strong executive."[43] The Strategic Hamlets program, which muddled along until the U.S. Government developed a new, more successful structure, is illustrative in several respects:

- First, even with high stakes, Presidential attention, and ostensibly clear lines of authority, agencies worked at cross purposes
- Second, it has been particularly difficult to reconcile military and other agency objectives, although NSPD-44 and DOD Directive 3000.5 should help
- Third, Ambassador Nolting's laissez-faire approach was ineffective, but not atypical, and in fact is understandable. If Ambassadors cannot compel compliance, why should they risk high profile interagency fights that would injure their reputation and perhaps lead to their recall

Vietnam – CORDS

In 1966, President Lyndon B. Johnson intervened to correct the persistent inability of the agencies of the U.S. Government to act in concert. He appointed the Deputy Chief of Mission in Saigon, Ambassador William Porter, to lead the pacification effort in Vietnam. Likewise, President

[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid, p. 119-120.

Johnson appointed an NSC staff member, Robert Komer, to ensure that all agencies in Washington coordinated to provide full support to Ambassador Porter.[44] Yet the United States still did not achieve unity of effort. Ambassador Lodge and military commander General Westmoreland simply did not work closely together, nor did their staffs. The U.S. Government reorganized on multiple occasions to assert civilian control over the pacification mission, but to no avail. Finally, Robert Komer proposed a new structure – the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program, which was enacted on May 1, 1967.

CORDS successfully unified the effort of the U.S. Government by placing the program in the Headquarters of Military Assistance Command – Vietnam (MACV). Robert Komer, now an Ambassador, served as a Deputy Commander of MACV for CORDS. Ambassador Komer "had status equivalent to a three-star general and ranked third in the MACV hierarchy behind Westmoreland and his military deputy, General Creighton Abrams."[45] Yet he was also under the authority and had the full support of U.S. Ambassador to Saigon Ellsworth Bunker. A combined staff of military and civilian personnel supported Ambassador Komer at HQ MACV, and this structure was replicated down to the district level in all 250 districts in South Vietnam.[46]

Ironically, as Major Ross Coffey points out in his study of CORDS, "Subordinating civilian capabilities to the military chain of command actually realized the principle of the primacy of civil power. This unique placement gave civilian entities greater influence than they ever had before because it provided resources they did not previously have."[47] It also helped to ensure that the political objectives took precedence over those of the military. One of the key means by which civilians were

[44] Richard W. Stewart, Dr., "CORDS and the Vietnam Experience: An Interagency Organization for Counterinsurgency and Pacification." Research paper for the National War College Class of 2006. Research Fellowship, Fort McNair, Washington, DC, 1 May 2006, p. 16.
[45] Ibid, p. 118-119.
[46] Ibid, p. 118-119.
[47] Ibid., Stewart, p.30.

able to control military activities was their newfound responsibility to write performance reports for their military colleagues. In addition, CORDS had the advantage of not being constrained by an institutional culture with preconceived ideas of how missions should be accomplished. As John A. Nagel states: "The organization [CORDS], a revolutionary development in it own right, encouraged innovation from its personal as a primary facet of its developing organizational culture…CORDS in effect wrote the field manual as it went along."[48]

Ambassador Komer developed the concept for CORDS, but Ambassador William Colby institutionalized it in MACV, and synergized its activities with Ambassador Bunker. In doing so, Ambassador Colby prevented major conflicts among civilian and military leaders that might have trickled down and complicated collaboration in the field. CORDS' successes began to mount, but not before U.S. public opinion turned decidedly against the war. Nevertheless, the case of CORDS demonstrated that:

- Formal integration mechanisms at multiple levels are necessary even with good individual leadership
- Changing individual behaviors requires more than policy pronouncements from higher authority; it requires control of personal incentives
- The ingrained desire for unity of purpose in military culture can be used to support interagency collaboration in the right decision-making structure

Unfortunately, the lessons from CORDS were lost after the withdrawal from Vietnam, and not highlighted again until a series of limited interventions in the 1980's and 1990's.

[48] John A. Nagel, "Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam- Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife", (Westport, Preager, 2002) 165.

Panama

Following the success of Operation JUST CAUSE in December 1989, the U.S. began Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY which was intended to assist the establishment of a legitimate Panamanian government.

On December 20, 1989, the commander of USSOUTHCOM established a Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF) intended to assist the State Department in advising the Panamanian government. The CMOTF, under the command of BG Benard W. Gann, was initially placed under the operational control of the U.S. Charge d'Affaires John Bushnell. However, because the U.S. Embassy was largely under-resourced (with a total personnel strength of only 15), BG Gann found himself taking the lead in organizing the new government. Over the next several weeks CMOTF worked around the clock to help restore basic services to Panama. The State Department did send several high-ranking POLADS to assist, but the Embassy remained in an advisory role to BG Gann.

On January 1, with the arrival of the new American ambassador to Panama, the U.S. Embassy began to play a larger role. Part of this was due to the fact that the U.S. ambassador, Deane Hinton, was well respected by the military community and had significant experience in the region. There was never a formal integration mechanism between civilian and military officials in Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, but unity of effort was achieved through the development of personal relationships and daily meetings between the military command, the U.S. ambassador, and Panamanian officials.[49] The Panama case study illustrates the following lessons:

- While preferring to defer to civilian authority, the U.S. military will often take the lead in nation-building activities because of its superior ability to surge resources and personnel

[49] John T. Fishel, "The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama", Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 1992.

- The State Department's inability to surge financial and personnel resources into an embassy hinders its ability to play a role in post-conflict environments

Somalia – Operation Restore Hope

Ambassador Robert Oakley, as the Presidential Special Representative for Somalia, and Combined Joint Task Force Commander Lt. Gen. Robert Johnston had a close, collaborative relationship, as did their staffs. At the time, their relationship was widely identified as a major contribution to the success of the UNITAF phase of the Somalia operations.[50] Since the U.S. Liaison Office (USLO) was too small for a formal Country Team structure, Oakley and Johnston agreed on alternative informal coordination mechanisms. One of Johnston's senior officers attended all USLO meetings, Oakley's Deputy Chief of Mission was Johnston's Political Advisor and attended all UNITAF meetings, and Oakley and Johnston met at least once a day. By dint of shared past experience (e.g. Vietnam and Lebanon) and a common commitment to collaboration, the critical civil-military relationships and complex issues requiring coordination were managed very successfully. The question of who was senior never arose as Oakley and Johnston were able to identify and resolve any differences quickly. It also helped that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff informally told both that mission success depended on their working well together. This same attitude was reflected in formal communications with the Departments of State and Defense.

Later, under more trying circumstances and different leadership, civil-military collaboration deteriorated in a manner that ultimately contributed to a precipitous drop in public and congressional support, withdrawal of U.S. forces, and mission failure. The United States and United Nations tried to pursue a two-track policy of fighting and negotiating with a Somali warlord without sufficient unity of

[50] Christopher Lamb and David Tucker, U.S. Special Operations Forces, forthcoming, August 2007. Columbia University Press.

effort either in Washington or in Mogadishu. Somalia and the checkered record of interagency collaboration illustrate several points:

- Informal coordination mechanisms can work well if backed up by good leaders and their personal commitment
- Senior military leader guidance stressing close civil-military collaboration is helpful; the same applies to senior civilian leaders
- Without a standing system designed to reward interagency collaboration, successful interagency coordination may prove as fleeting as individual leader assignments

Afghanistan and Iraq

In September 2003, facing a difficult transition from a counterterrorism focus to a more robust nation-building/counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan, President Bush appointed Zalmay Khalilzad as U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan. Khalilzad said he deployed to Afghanistan to "ensure the concerted use of all instruments of US power to accelerate the defeat of the Taliban insurgency and the reconstruction of Afghanistan."[51] Khalilzad, and the U.S. military commander, Lieutenant General David Barno who shared this view, were successful in integrating not only U.S. Government agencies but also international partners and nongovernmental organizations. One way Amb. Khalilzad and LTG Barno drove the spirit of unity of effort throughout the Country Team was by locating their offices adjacent to one another in the Embassy. As related in the superb study "The Country Team in American Strategy:"

> Specifically, the immediate proximity of the two men's offices allowed them to begin and end most days with meetings and permitted Barno's regular attendance

[51] As quoted in the excellent paper by Bob Killebrew, Erin Simpson, Christopher Griffin, and Kate Bateman, "The Country Team in American Strategy," December 2006, p. 24.

> at country team meetings. According to Barno's then-chief of staff, the strength of this relationship was characterized as much by what it prevented as what it accomplished – the two never had such a disagreement on possible military action that Barno undertook operations against the ambassador's objections, despite being legally entitled to.[52]

Barno and Khalilzad were also able to improve unity of effort by creating an Embassy Interagency Planning Group. General Barno seconded a small group of field officers to the U.S. embassy to assist in this office. The planning group was envisaged to provide the Ambassador with a detailed planning capability – one that is not usually resident in U.S. embassies – but it had effects beyond the initial concept. According to a *Joint Forces Quarterly* article on interagency operations in Afghanistan:

> The seconding of military officers to the Ambassador helped further integrate political and military efforts through closer and more continuous coordination. This dedicated group provided the Ambassador military expertise for which he might otherwise have turned to the C[ombined] F[orces] C[ommand]–A[fghanistan] staff, distracting it from its other missions. For example, the group was able to collect and collate information about nearly all U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, be they military, USAID, or nongovernmental, to give the Ambassador an overall vision and indicate gaps or overlap. That, in turn, allowed him to adjust efforts and seek more support for others. Choosing to form, staff, and maintain this group built goodwill with the Embassy staff and especially with

[52] Bob Killebrew, Erin Simpson, Christopher Griffin, and Kate Bateman, "The Country Team in American Strategy," December 2006, p. 25.

> the Ambassador—an advantage when cooperation, rather than command, is the normal mode of operation.[53]

When Ambassador John Negroponte arrived in Iraq, he and General George Casey also agreed to locate their offices next to one another to ensure a coordinated, unified approach to U.S. policy. This was a stark change from the practice of Ambassador Paul Bremer and Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, whose offices were in different buildings and who failed to coordinate with one another, and thereby set a poor example for the Country Team.

Under the current Embassy structure in Baghdad:

> The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq (Ambassador Ryan Crocker) has full authority for the American presence in Iraq with two exceptions: 1 – military and security matters which are under the authority of General Petraeus, the U.S. Commander of the Multinational Force – Iraq, and 2 – staff working for international organizations. In areas where diplomacy, military, and/or security activities overlap, the Ambassador and the U.S. commander continue cooperating to provide *co-equal authority* regarding what's best for America and its interests in Iraq [emphasis added].[54]

Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan[55]

U.S. PRTs exist in three forms – the Afghanistan PRT, the Iraq PRT, and the Iraq ePRT. They differ in composition and number of personnel but their structure is relatively similar. Each PRT has a clear organizational chart with a specified commander. In Iraq, State Dept FSOs lead PRTs with

[53] Tucker B. Mansager, "Interagency Lessons Learned in Afghanistan," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, issue 40, 1st quarter 2006.
[54] Susan Epstein, "U.S. Embassy in Iraq," *CRS Report for Congress*, 3 April 2007, p. CRS-2.
[55] The U.S. model of PRTs has been altered by S/CRS. In their framework, PRTs will be replaced by Field Advanced Civilian Teams (FACTs). However, we can still learn lessons from the experience with PRTs.

military officers as deputies. In Afghanistan, military officers tend to lead. However, these leaders do not exert command authority over the activities of other agencies' staff members. According to a recent report on PRTs:

> "Joint goal setting, followed by subsequent goal-oriented interagency project development, does not appear to be a consistent feature of PRT decision making. Instead, staff members often focus on projects most consistent with their own agency mandates. Cross-consultation does take place at regular meetings, but most often for the purposes of securing the logistic support and acquiescence of other team members."[56]

The lack of an empowered commander coupled with the lack of clear guidance from higher headquarters also means conflicts often arise between military officers and civilian personnel. It takes time in most cases to achieve a common understanding of individual roles, missions, and job descriptions.[57]

The British have used a shared authority model in operating their PRTs in Afghanistan. All planning and operations are coordinated by a "triumvirate" of lead staff from the three defense, diplomacy, and development ministries. This triumvirate shares decision-making responsibility. Staff for this coordinating group are taken from across ministries which also encourages cohesion and cross-pollination. This has resulted in a greater degree of British PRT coherence in operations and planning.[58]

The case of PRTs offers the following lesson:

[56] House Armed Services Committee, "Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan," April 2008, 46-47.
[57] Abbaszadeh et al., "Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations," Woodrow Wilson School Graduate Workshop on Provincial Reconstruction Teams, January 2008.
[58] Ibid.

- A command structure with a clearly defined, but under-empowered leader is not necessarily preferable to a structure with shared authority

Appendix A:

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 7, 2005

NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/NSPD-44

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization

Introduction

The purpose of this Directive is to promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.

Policy

The United States has a significant stake in enhancing the capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially those at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and market economies. The United States should work with other countries and organizations to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law. Such work should aim to enable governments abroad to exercise sovereignty over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests.

Responsibilities of the Department of State

Need for Coordinated U.S. Efforts. To achieve maximum effect, a focal point is needed (i) to coordinate and strengthen efforts of the United States Government to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization assistance and related activities in a range of situations that require the response capabilities of multiple United States Government entities and (ii) to harmonize such efforts with U.S. military plans and operations. The relevant situations include complex emergencies and transitions, failing states, failed states, and environments across the spectrum of conflict, particularly those involving transitions from peacekeeping and other military interventions. The response to these crises will include among others, activities relating to internal security, governance and participation, social and economic well-being, and justice and reconciliation.

Coordination. The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. The Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict. Support relationships among elements of the United States Government will depend on the particular situation being addressed.

To achieve the objectives of this Directive, the Secretary of State shall be responsible for the following functions and may direct the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization ("Coordinator") to assist the Secretary to:

1. Develop and approve strategies, with respect to U.S. foreign assistance and foreign economic cooperation, for reconstruction and stabilization activities directed towards foreign states at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife;
2. Ensure program and policy coordination among Departments and Agencies of the United States Government in carrying out the policies set forth in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Arms Export Control Act, and other relevant assistance laws, as well as section 408 of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and related Agencies and Appropriations Act, 2005, with respect to such states;
3. Coordinate interagency processes to identify states at risk of instability, lead interagency planning to prevent or mitigate conflict, and develop detailed contingency plans for integrated United States Government reconstruction and stabilization efforts for those states and regions and for widely applicable scenarios, which are integrated with military contingency plans, where appropriate;

4. Provide United States Government decision makers with detailed options for an integrated United States Government response in connection with specific reconstruction and stabilization operations including to recommend when to establish a limited-time PCC-level group to focus on a country or region facing major reconstruction and stabilization challenges;
5. Coordinate United States Government responses for reconstruction and stabilization with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations, including peacekeeping missions, at the planning and implementation phases; develop guiding precepts and implementation procedures for reconstruction and stabilization which, where appropriate, may be integrated with military contingency plans and doctrine;
6. Coordinate reconstruction and stabilization activities and preventative strategies with foreign countries, international and regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector entities with capabilities that can contribute to such efforts provided that the Secretary of the Treasury shall lead coordination with the international financial institutions and multilateral financing bodies and shall facilitate the Secretary of State's stabilization and reconstruction work with respect to these institutions and bodies;
7. As appropriate, work with people and organizations, including in expatriate and foreign communities, with relevant ties, expertise, or knowledge related to countries in which the United States may conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities;
8. Develop strategies to build partnership security capacity abroad and seek to maximize nongovernmental and international resources for reconstruction and stabilization activities;
9. Lead United States Government development of a strong civilian response capability including necessary surge capabilities; analyze, formulate, and recommend additional authorities, mechanisms, and resources needed to ensure that the United States has the civilian reserve and

response capabilities necessary for stabilization and reconstruction activities to respond quickly and effectively;

10. Identify lessons learned and integrate them into operations;
11. Resolve relevant policy, program, and funding disputes among United States Government Departments and Agencies with respect to U.S. foreign assistance and foreign economic cooperation, related to reconstruction and stabilization consistent with the Office of Management and Budget's budget and policy coordination functions; and
12. When necessary, identify appropriate issues for resolution or action through the NSC interagency process in accordance with NSPD-1. Such issues would include the establishment of a PCC-level group as described in sub-paragraph (4) above.

Responsibilities of Other Executive Departments and Agencies

To enable the Secretary of State to carry out the responsibilities in this directive and to support stabilization and reconstruction activities and requirements with necessary resources, Executive Departments and Agencies whose programs and personnel may be able to assist in addressing the relevant challenges will:

1. Coordinate with S/CRS during budget formulation for relevant reconstruction and stabilization activities prior to submission to OMB and the Congress or as required to coordinate reconstruction and stabilization activities;
2. Identify, develop, and provide the Coordinator with relevant information on capabilities and assets:
3. Identify and develop internal capabilities for planning and for resource and program management that can be mobilized in response to crises;

4. Identify within each agency current and former civilian employees skilled in crisis response, including employees employed by contract, and establish under each agency's authorities mechanisms to reassign or reemploy skilled personnel (including by contract) and mobilize associated resources rapidly in response to crises;
5. Assist in identifying situations of concern, developing action and contingency plans, responding to crises that occur, assessing lessons learned, and undertaking other efforts and initiatives to ensure a coordinated U.S. response and effective international reconstruction and stabilization efforts;
6. Designate appropriate senior United States Government officials and government experts as points of contact to participate in relevant task forces, planning processes, gaming exercises, training, after action reviews, and other essential tasks; and
7. Make available personnel on a non-reimbursable basis, as appropriate and feasible, to work as part of the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization and develop plans for additional personnel exchanges, as appropriate, across departments and agencies to increase interoperability for stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Coordination between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense

The Secretaries of State and Defense will integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate. The Secretaries of State and Defense will develop a general framework for fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all levels where appropriate.

Within the scope of this NSPD, and in order to maintain clear accountability and responsibility for any given contingency response or stabilization and reconstruction mission, lead and supporting

responsibilities for agencies and departments will be designated using the mechanism outlined in NSPD-1. These lead and supporting relationships will be re-designated as transitions are required.

Policy Coordination Committee

I hereby establish a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations. The PCC will be chaired by the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and a designated member of the NSC staff. The PCC shall include representatives in accordance with NSPD-1.

Nothing in this directive shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect the authority of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budget, administrative, or legislative proposals. In addition, this Directive is not intended to, and does not: (1) affect the authority of the Secretary of Defense or the command relationships established for the Armed Forces of the United States; (2) affect the DNI's and D/CIA's authorities under title 50 of US Code; (3) affect the authority of the President's Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance under Section 493 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; and , (4) create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, by a party against the United States, its departments, agencies, entities, instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

This directive supersedes Presidential Decision Directive/NSC 56, May 20, 1997, "Managing Complex Contingency Operations."

[signed:] George W. Bush

APPENDIX B: S/CRS AND THE INTERAGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM[59]

The Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

In the spring of 2004, the National Security Council (NSC) authorized the Department of State (DoS) to establish an office to manage interagency civilian post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization operations. The position of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization[60] (S/CRS), reporting directly to the Secretary of State, was established on 1 July 2004.

In the spring of 2007 the S/CRS was aligned under the leadership and direction of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance[61], designating the Coordinator as a Deputy Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance. The operational expertise and planning mandate of S/CRS was aligned with the funding authorities and foreign assistance country planning and budget processes of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, enabling more effective and efficient leadership for reconstruction and stabilization activities while minimizing duplicative roles or processes. At the same time, in accordance with the 2005 Appropriations act, the Coordinator for S/CRS will also continue to maintain a reporting relationship to the Secretary.

The coordinator is responsible for and authorized to oversee and coordinate civilian post-conflict response activities undertaken by the DoS and other civilian departments and agencies of the USG interagency community. The office serves as the focal point for monitoring, planning, staffing, and

[59] This appendix is taken from: IDA, "U.S. Government Authorities for Reconstruction and Stabilization," March 2008, ES-4 to ES-8.
[60] Action Memorandum: Establishing a Coordination Function at State for Civilian Post-Conflict Operations, 9 June 2004.
[61] Memorandum: Aligning the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) with the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (F), 19 March 2007.

organizing USG civilian responses to post-conflict contingencies, and as the interface with the military forces in the DOD. The office looks to future crises involving failing, failed, and post-conflict states and complex emergencies rather than ongoing activities, and is to provide clearly defined and prepared options for intervention contingencies, maintain a surge capacity for deployment across a range of situations, and support the DoS regional bureaus and coordinate the USG civilian response as required. The S/CRS office has subsequently established a standing Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) within the NSC framework and assembled a number of sub-PCCs to develop the concept of operations and organizational entities to implement the concept. The organizational arrangements and various entities are shown in Figure 1.

The emerging process under development involves the formation of a Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (a country-specific PCC) prior to a declared contingency. The Standing PCC for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations (PCC-RSO) and its sub-PCCs, with representation from appropriate departments and agencies, develop the supporting mechanisms and organizational framework to conduct these operations. There are now four (formerly five) sectoral and three cross-sector sub-PCCs (cross-sector sub-PCCs are shaded in the figure).



Figure 1. USG Reconstruction and Stabilization Organizations and Concept of Operations

S/CRS uses the following definitions[62] for key terms:

- **Stabilization –** *The process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful longer-term development.*
- **Reconstruction –** *The process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socio-economic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for longer-term development.*

[62] "US Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation (Version 1.0)," 1 December 2005, and briefing: S/CRS at the Civil-Military Interface, 21 November 2005.

- **Conflict Transformation –** *The process of diminishing the motivations and means for destructive forms of conflict while developing local institutions so they can take the lead role in national governance, economic development, and enforcing the rule of law. Success in this process permits an evolution from internationally imposed stability to a peace that is sustainable by local actors, with the international community providing continued support at a greatly reduced cost.*
- **Locally Led Nascent Peace –** *The stage in a conflict transformation process at which the motivations and means for destructive forms of conflict are sufficiently diminished and local institutional capacity is sufficiently developed to allow international actors to pass the lead to local actors, usually with continued international assistance, without the country falling back into conflict.*
- **Sustainable Development –** *Continued economic and social progress that rests on four key principles: improved quality of life for both current and future generations; responsible stewardship of the natural resource base; broad-based participation in political and economic life; and effective institutions which are transparent, accountable, responsive, and capable of managing change without relying on continued external support. The ultimate measure of success of sustainable development programs is to reach a point where improvements in the quality of life and environment are such that external assistance is no longer necessary and can be replaced with new forms of diplomacy, cooperation, and commerce.*

The Interagency Management System

The Interagency Management System[63] for Reconstruction and Stabilization is designed to assist Washington policymakers, Chiefs of Mission (COMs), and military commanders plan and manage these complex operations by ensuring coordination among all USG stakeholders at the strategic, operational, and tactical/field levels. The lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo demonstrate that the U.S. must employ an approach in these types of engagements that draws upon the full range of diplomatic, development, defense, intelligence, and economic resources available to the USG.

The Interagency Management System (IMS) is designed for highly complex crises and operations, which are national or security priorities, involve widespread instability, may require military operations, and where multiple U.S. agencies will be engaged in the policy and programmatic response. The IMS is not intended to respond to the political and humanitarian crises that are regularly and effectively handled through the current Washington and Embassy systems.

The system is designed to provide policymakers in Washington, COMs, and military commanders with flexible tools to ensure unity of effort as laid out through whole-of-government strategic and implementation planning for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations. The system is intended to facilitate and support:

- Integrated planning processes for unified USG strategic and implementation plans, including funding requests
- Joint interagency field deployments

[63] "Draft Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization," 22 January 2007.

- A joint civilian operations capability including shared communications and information management.

This system is a response mechanism. It does not preclude interagency scenario-based, prevention or contingency planning, which may occur independently. The system will draw upon such plans when they exist.

When a significant crisis occurs or begins to emerge, the Secretary of State may decide to establish an Interagency Reconstruction and Stabilization Management System based on a decision by the Principals' or Deputies' Committees and implemented at the direction of the NSC.

The Interagency Management System consists of the following:

- CRSG (Country Reconstruction & Stabilization Group): A Washington-based decision-making body (Policy Coordinating Committee—PCC) with a planning and operations staff
- IPC (Integration Planning Cell): A civilian planning cell integrated with relevant Geographic Combatant Command(s) (GCC) or with equivalent multinational headquarters
- ACT[64] (Advance Civilian Team): One or more interagency field management and coordination teams to support COMs in the field. [65]

[64] The ACT headquarters (ACT–HQ) will augment an existing country team in an affected nation. If there is no existing American Embassy, the ACT will serve as the embassy and the chief of the ACT as the COM. Field ACTs (FACTs) will also be deployed. They may be attached to tactical forces if deployed to provide immediate civilian support the forces and/or assigned to the provinces and municipalities within the affected nation to work with the provincial and municipal governing authorities.

[65] On 22 February 2007, the Deputy Secretaries of State and Defense concluded a Memorandum of Agreement on the operational requirements, authorities, and responsibilities shared between the U.S. Mission-Iraq and the Multi-National Forces Iraq for Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

These structures are flexible in size and composition to meet the particular requirements of the situation and integrate personnel from all relevant agencies. Recruitment of personnel may require additional flexible hiring authorities, training, and resources not presently available. International or coalition partners may also be represented on these teams. Each team is designed to support and augment, not replace, existing structures in Washington, at the GCC, or at the tactical level in the field.

S/CRS has developed and distributed five sectoral task lists as the *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Task List* (PCRETL). The task lists identify the scope of the potential effort that might be required. The task lists will be tailored according to the country-specific contingency because all tasks might not be required, or additional tasks might be found necessary based on the particular conditions in the affected nation.