

**PROJECT ON NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM  
STRUCTURES WORKING GROUP  
Country-Level Issue Team**



**Structures in Steady-State and Surge Environments  
Proposed Solutions**

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The following recommended solutions correspond to both the Steady-State and Surge Statement of Problems.<sup>1</sup>

In the Steady-State Problem Statement, the core challenge is to have a fully trained and prepared ambassador, with clear de jure and de facto authority, able to bring together the elements of the Country Team and to exercise authority in a clearly understood and transparent manner. In the Surge Problem Statement, the core challenge is a greater unity of effort to aid a military commander and civilian chief of mission to share authority appropriately and avoid working at cross purposes. These challenges exist not just at the country level, but also at provincial and local levels and in many cases, at the regional or sub-regional levels when more than one nation is involved.

While the impact of individuals – for better or worse – is acknowledged as a major factor in addressing this core problem, structural solutions that better align authority and the component parts of interagency organizations can also improve unity of effort by removing obstacles and increasing the capacity of individuals to achieve effective interagency cooperation. When combined with improved personnel policies, planning practices, and resourcing strategies, these structural solutions will increase the likelihood that the Country Team will operate effectively in the increasingly complex global environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

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<sup>1</sup> The difference between steady-state and surge operations is that surge operations include a large military footprint (under the command of an area military commander) engaged in direct action in the field that either includes combat or humanitarian operations (e.g. disaster relief operations). Steady-state operations can include military forces, but acting only in an advisory capacity (e.g., Military Groups).

## Country Level Authority Models

We recommend several authority structures depending on the external environment a Country Team might face in a country. As a baseline we recommend an “Empowered Country Team” to strengthen the ambassador’s authority and achieve unity of effort in country. Depending on the external environment, i.e. whether in steady state, surge, permissive, semi-permissive, low or high intensity warfare environment, several authority models are recommended. In a surge environment, we believe that unity of command has to be institutionalized by formally integrating the civilian and military command structure in country. This can be achieved by uniting operations under either civilian or military authorities. The key to this, as Figure 1 shows, is the transition from civilian to military control in a semi-permissive surge environment when the security situation is deteriorating (a move from low intensity to high intensity warfare as indicated in Figure 1) and when civilian authorities hand over country wide operations to the military.

One of the major problems of such a transition, obviously, is the precise timing of when a switch from civilian to military control should occur. Should there be any difference in opinion between military and civilian authorities over the exact timing of the transition from civilian to military command ultimate responsibility would lie in the hands of the president. The bottom line of our proposal is that in a Surge environment we recommend the fusion of command authority under one single individual, whereas in Steady State operations the empowered Ambassador will be equipped to exercise strong unified leadership over the country team thereby guaranteeing unity of effort in country.

An alternative to the Fully Integrated Model is the Shared Authority Mission Based Model. This model, however, does not address the core problem identified in our Surge Problem statement, a dual chain of command, but is nevertheless a viable option if combined with the Empowered Country Team concept.

Figure 1

**Country Level**

	<b>Steady State Environment</b>	<b>Surge Environment</b>	
<b>Permissive Environment</b>	Civilian Control <i>(Empowered Country Team)</i>	Civilian Control <i>(Empowered Country Team)</i> <i>(FI Model, FI-EC Model)</i> <i>(SAMB Model)</i>	<b>No Warfare</b>
<b>Semi-Permissive Environment</b>	Civilian Control <i>(Empowered Country Team)</i>	Civilian Control <i>(Empowered Country Team)</i> <i>(SAMB Model)</i> <i>(FI-EC Model, FI Model)</i>	<b>Low Intensity Warfare</b>
	Civilian Control <i>(Empowered Country Team)</i>	Military Control <i>(Empowered Country Team)</i> <i>( FI Model, FI-EC Model)*</i>	<b>High Intensity Warfare</b>
<b>Non- Permissive Environment</b>	Civilian Control <i>(Empowered Country Team)</i> <i>Embassy Evacuation<sup>2</sup></i>	Military Control	<b>Open Warfare</b>

\* SAMB Model: Shared Authority Mission Based Model, FI Model: Fully Integrated Model, EC Model: Executive-Committee Model

**Empowering the Country Team**

The White House and the Executive Office of the President must give greater support to the ambassador, in order to strengthen the ambassador’s de facto authority. “It is imperative that the U.S. ambassador provide strong leadership, steady oversight, and a firm hand on the component parts of...activities in U.S. embassies overseas. This includes the authority to challenge...directives from

<sup>2</sup> In case security situation deteriorates to a certain level or an official declaration of war.

other government agencies in Washington to their resident or temporary staffs in the embassy.”<sup>3</sup> This applies to all U.S. activities in steady-state operations whether in a permissive, semi-permissive or non-permissive environment.

Ambassadors need to assert existing authorities and the latter need to be clarified and strengthened both in the Presidential letter to ambassadors (reinforced by an Executive Order), and in guidance from agencies to agency heads in the field and regional COCOMs, which must reinforce and track with the Presidential letter (the latest Unified Command Plan, signed by the President, does not mention the Presidential Letter, but instructs the ambassador and regional COCOM to “keep each other currently and fully informed”).<sup>4</sup> The 2001 Council on Foreign Relations Task Force on State Department Reform suggested:

...strengthen[ing] the coordinating authority that ambassadors exercise over officials representing the numerous U.S. government agencies operating out of our embassies. Every president, beginning with John F. Kennedy, has issued to each ambassador a letter that defines the latter’s responsibilities and authorities. NSDD 38, which technically grants ambassadors influence over the size, composition, and coordination of embassy staffs, should be restructured so that it (1) more assertively codifies the “Kennedy Letter”; (2) grants ambassadors greater input into the resource decisions concerning the activities of all agencies in their host countries; (3) grants ambassadors greater authority to return personnel to their home offices; and (4) instructs all agencies and departments to treat performance evaluations by ambassadors concerning personnel deployed to their embassies as a principal evaluation. This last specific recommendation is the most effective way to strengthen the ambassador’s capacity to coordinate the activities of his or her mission staff without violating the lines of authority between non-State Department personnel and their home agencies.<sup>5</sup>

The Chief of Mission should also have sufficient authority in coordination with responsive agency assignment systems to select individuals for the country team capable of coordinating all

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<sup>3</sup> Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, “Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign,” 15 December 2006, pg. 2.

<sup>4</sup> The need for enhanced Ambassadorial authority is recommended in many studies on improving the efficacy of the Embassy/Country Team. See, for example, “America’s Overseas Presence in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century,”

<sup>5</sup> Frank Carlucci and Ian Brzezinski, “State Department Reform,” Report of an Independent Task Force Cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001, pgs. 15-16. ((Recommend this report for usage by National level, Washington level groups – among others))

agencies dealing with specific issues of a similar nature. Ambassadors should also make more effective use of existing authority under NSDD-38 in the selection of subordinate personnel, including other agencies, and in ensuring their continued satisfactory performance. This should include the recall or reassignment of personnel for continued unsatisfactory performance after an issue has surfaced and been discussed by the ambassador with the responsible officials. It applies to TDY personnel as well, and the ambassador needs to keep careful track of the presence of TDY personnel who often arrive and depart unnoticed and thus circumvent the intent of NSDD-38. An ambassador's performance evaluation of all agency heads should be seen by their agencies as a major factor in judging their performance. The ambassador, in turn, should be judged by the overall performance of his/her mission, not merely the State Department elements.

In steady-state operations, the ambassador should also exercise authority over all personnel assigned to country (especially TDY) and over institutional contacts and personnel. In posts with large programs, there should be a separate staff to assist the ambassador and DCM in their oversight and other management and coordination responsibilities. The ambassador and DCM should both have previous experience and training in leadership and management. This should be made a precept by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and perhaps a key line of questioning during confirmation hearings.

The formal responsibilities of agency heads at the Country Team level will need to evolve -- and none more so than that of the Chief of Station whether or not he or she is resident in country and whatever administrative arrangements are used to ensure he/she effectively functions as a member of the Country Team answerable to the ambassador. Obviously, the need will remain to protect and compartmentalize internal Agency communications, especially in intelligence, but COSs will need to think of their roles in far more cooperative, mission-objective-based terms than many do now.

The COS should be formally designated by the DNI as his representative responsible for oversight of all intelligence activities and personnel at the Country Team level. Given that many

intelligence-related responsibilities and objectives in a given country often are, and will continue to be removed in many cases from the immediate, parochial concerns of the ambassador and the rest of the Country Team, ambassadors will need to be cognizant of this and be willing to embrace those elements of the intelligence programs in their respective countries as their own. This applies to all agencies, particularly the Department of Defense, including the Defense Attaché. All intelligence personnel – including military – must be placed under the authority of the Chief of Station. The Department of Defense directive creating the position of Senior Defense Official underlines that point by stating that, “DoD personnel in a foreign country who are not under the command of a U.S. military commander shall be under the authority of the Chief of Mission (COM) in that country.”<sup>6</sup> The ambassador can use his authority, if need be, to support the authority of the COS.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) report of December 15, 2006 recommends that the ambassador have the authority “to approve all military-related programs implemented in country.”<sup>7</sup> In steady-state operations, we believe that such ambassadorial authority should go beyond military programs to include all agencies. This should be codified in Memoranda of Understanding between the relevant cabinet Secretaries or the regional COCOM and Chiefs of Mission. However, we also believe that this authority should contain a provision for appeal to Washington in the event there is a difference of view that can not be resolved at the embassy level. Whereas the ambassador and Country Team will have a better feel for country relations, the Washington level has better perspectives on regional and global issues as well as a longer-term viewpoint.

We agree with the Department of Defense Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) which recommends that Chiefs of Mission exert “operational direction” over military groups

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<sup>6</sup> DOD Directive 5105.75, December 21 2007

<sup>7</sup> Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, “Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign,” 15 December 2006, pg. 3.

(MILGRPs)<sup>8</sup> deployed in country in steady-state operations in a semi-permissive environment. The JOC defines operational direction as:

“The authority over US military forces that the President delegates to a chief of mission for a specific complex contingency operation for which the chief of mission has responsibility. Operational direction normally includes the authority to assign tasks, designate objectives, synchronize and integrate actions, and give authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.”

The ability of the ambassador to exercise operational direction in steady-state operations ensures that unity of command remains consistent within the Country Team and that US military groups pursue goals compatible with the overall Country Team strategy. This model of authority has been used in the past.

According to DOD’s September 2007 Military Support to Indirect Security and Stability Surge Operations Joint Integrating Concept:

...between 1947 and 1974, the United States organized and manned more than 60 MILGRP-type entities, then called Military Assistance and Advisory Groups [MAAG]. These organizations played a key role in America’s persistent global campaign to contain communism. President John F. Kennedy gave U.S. COMs explicit authority over the MAAGs in their country, which were then integrated directly into the ambassador’s country team. As such, the MAAGs became the DOD contribution to an indirect, bottom-up interagency approach to presence, security cooperation, and partnership building operations, focused on the particular needs of each individual country.<sup>9</sup>

The use of military groups was curtailed significantly after the Vietnam War, but the Department of Defense, according to planning documents, is looking to reestablish this concept.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Defined in the DOD Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept as: “Any DOD element located in a foreign country under the ‘operational direction’ of a US chief of mission and with assigned responsibilities for performing title 10 combat advisory, training and other operational missions as well as title 22 security assistance management functions. In practice these elements may be called military missions and groups, military assistance advisory groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, or liaison groups.” (IW JOC, 25)

<sup>9</sup> Colonel Robert B. Killebrew, U.S. Army (retired), “The Army and the Changing American Strategy,” *Army*, August 2007, p. 30, as quoted in Department of Defense, “Military Support to Indirect Security and Stability Operations Joint Integrating Concept,” September 2007, 49.

<sup>10</sup> See Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (September 2007) and Military Support to Indirect Security and Stability Operations Joint Integrating Concept (September 2007).



In the case of Special Operations Forces, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report recommends that there should be a Memorandum of Understanding with the relevant regional COCOM making clear the ambassador's authority.<sup>11</sup> We agree. This would reinforce the present provision that the Ambassador's approval is always necessary for the deployment of SOF, as well as any actions that they take in the country to which the ambassador is accredited.

It is important that there be a senior military representative designated by the COCOM on the Country Team responsible for oversight of all military activities and personnel. DOD Directive 5105.75 makes significant progress in this regard by establishing a Senior Defense Official (SDO) as the principal DOD official in U.S. embassies, and the point of contact for the COCOM.

In general, there needs to be more authority and operational autonomy for embassies and less micro-management by Washington agencies, while at the same time the State Department and the NSC need to ensure that all agencies support agreed policy and Country Team objectives, and the mission is provided with timely guidance for the formation and execution of policy. In most situations and for most embassies, State-led interagency working groups can provide interagency oversight. For crisis situations or where there are major programs by a non-State agency (e.g. treasury, defense, justice, intelligence, particularly CT programs) there should be an NSC-led interagency group. The new Interagency Management System is limited by NSC/DC to support Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations (RSO). A single system that can accommodate any contingency would be helpful in resolving this problem.<sup>12</sup>

### **Shared Authority Mission Based Model**

In surge operations, when military forces under the authority of the COCOM are deployed in country and engaged in direct action, there are several alternative authority structures that could be used.

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<sup>11</sup> Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, "Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign," 15 December 2006, pg. 3.

<sup>12</sup> For information on the IMS, see the Country-Level Issue Team's Surge Problem Statement.

In the Shared Authority Mission Based Model the Chief of Mission and military commander each share responsibility for certain mission sets (e.g., state-to-state diplomacy, counterterrorism, economic reconstruction, governance, etc.) The responsibilities of the military and the civilian authorities could vary depending on the security environment in the country or in specific provinces. A civilian led coordinating body should be put in place supervising and coordinating all in country activities in order to guarantee that the specific mission sets fit into the overall country wide strategy.

For example, during a surge operation in a semi-permissive environment with low intensity warfare, the Chief of Mission could be responsible for the majority of mission sets, with the possible exception of counterterrorism operations and host-nation security force training. While the ambassador and military commander would coordinate all in-country activities, final decision making authority (and day-to-day oversight) would fall to the person chosen to lead each mission set and should be in accordance with overall country strategy. Authority over each mission set would need to be responsive to the security environment.

Unity of effort at the country level would be achieved through integrated planning, operations, and resource cells drawing on personnel from all in-country agencies. These cells would represent an expanded Country Team, using surge resources from all relevant agencies, especially DOD and S/CRS's Advanced Civilian Teams (ACTs). At the provincial and local levels, the COM could deploy Field Advanced Civilian Teams (FACTs) to serve alongside military units and assist – or lead depending on the security environment – in funding projects, developing local governance, and training local security forces.

The Shared Authority Mission Based Model is only suitable for a low-intensity warfare environment. If the security situation deteriorates to a certain level full command authority will shift from civilian to military control as outlined in the Fully Integrated Model below. Furthermore, it is

possible that the division of mission sets at the provincial and local levels might differ from that at the country level, as the division of mission sets all depends on the level of security in the area.

The advantage of the *Shared Mission Based Authority Model* is that it works well when the ambassador and military commander are inclined to cooperate and collaboration is supported by senior leaders. With two compatible personalities and visions, support from higher headquarters, integrated coordination cells, and physical proximity between senior leaders, the military commander and Chief of Mission can often achieve unity of effort. The disadvantage to this model is that incompatible personalities can often scuttle cooperation, even when there are formal coordination mechanisms and supervision. Although, giving the Chief of Mission authority to supervise, all military programs may solve this. It nevertheless is not suitable in a high-intensity warfare environment.

Another weakness is that the *Shared Mission Based Authority Model* still leaves the military and civilian authorities in country reporting to different masters in Washington. As a result, the *Shared Authority Model* may not fully solve the core problem in surge operations – the presence of two chains of command each working for separate agencies in Washington. Similar integrated structures at the national level would be critical for implementing this model.

### **Fully Integrated Models**

The second possible model for authority structures in surge operations is the *Fully Integrated Model* and is the model most recommended in a surge environment. Efforts to organize the executive branch to manage effectively civil-military relations on the country level in a surge environment have been difficult. The problem is that overall responsibility for operations with a large military footprint does not belong to any one agency, there is no continuous center of authority, and it is very difficult to sustain an integrated effort. Civil-military relations are particularly critical in that respect.

As history has shown success in country operations in a surge environment can only be achieved through unity of command.<sup>13</sup> As discussed in the section on the Shared Authority Mission Based Model, this can be achieved formally or informally. Informal unity at the country level depends on the personality of senior leaders and their willingness to cooperate with each other. The ad-hoc nature of this informal cooperation makes long term planning and consistent support of a particular strategy, policy or mission difficult. A report by the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee in that respect states:

“‘Unity of command’ is an age-old principle of leadership and management that marries accountability and responsibility and provides personnel in the field clear guidance and direction. In 2003, Lieutenant General Barno and Ambassador Khalilzad in Afghanistan worked very well together. Similarly, today in Iraq, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker have collaborated closely. However, while ‘personalities matter,’ the nation’s security should not have to rely on having compatible personalities to successfully carry out the mission. While senior leaders should get along in the interest of the mission, history is replete with examples where they have not. Rather than depending exclusively on personalities for success, the right interagency structures and processes need to be in place and working. As the 9/11 Commission recognized, ‘Good people can overcome bad structures. They should not have to.’”<sup>14</sup>

Consequently, we investigated multiple options for a formal integration of chains of command. Two stand out; the Fully Integrated and Fully Integrated Executive Committee Model. Both integrate military and civilian chain of commands under one authority in order to achieve unity of command at the country level.

The Fully Integrated Model should be seen as building on the concept of an Empowered Country Team (ECT)<sup>15</sup>, which attempts to structurally consolidate the authority of the ambassador and streamline decision making processes on the country level in any given external environment. While it is possible to have an integrated chain of command without it, the ECT provides a better foundation for any attempt

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<sup>13</sup> Unity of command is one of the basic principles of war and gives a single person directive authority to accomplish a task.

<sup>14</sup> “Agency Stovepipes versus Strategic Agility: Lessons We need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan” - *US House of Representatives Report*, Committee on Armed Services- Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, April 2008, pg. 32.

<sup>15</sup> See above.

to integrate civilian and military chains of command on the country level due to its clearer delineation of authority due to its cross functional team nature.<sup>16</sup>

Should the security situation in a country deteriorate to a certain level (metrics for assessing the security environment should be laid out in the objectives-based Mission Strategic Plan), unity of command will be guaranteed by unifying civilian and military forces under a common command structure. This model places one person in charge of all civilian and military functions and creates an integrated chain of command containing military personnel and civilians from the country to the local level. At the top would be a lead civilian or military official – someone chosen by the President, capable of exercising leadership over both military and civilian personnel, and with an understanding of the host nation’s history and culture. (Obviously individuals with the requisite skills and experience and who command the respect of the most senior US and foreign officials who are hard but not impossible to find. He/she would need the full support of the President). Supporting this authority would be a sizeable and integrated civil-military staff. At provincial and local levels, the security environment would dictate whether a civilian official with a military deputy or a military officer with a civilian deputy is placed in charge. This official would exercise “operational direction”<sup>17</sup> over all US operations in that region to include political, security, and development activities. Should the security situation improve to the point where there is no longer a need for large scale military operations in the country, authority can be handed back to a civilian (i.e., the Ambassador) who, like his military predecessor, will oversee and direct country wide operations. The *Fully Integrated Model* will be most useful in those missions that are most heavily interagency dependent.

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<sup>16</sup> See PNSR Structure Recommendation 5.21 “Cross -Functional Teams”

<sup>17</sup> Operational Direction: “The authority to assign tasks, designate objectives, synchronize and integrate actions, and give authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.” (DOD Irregular Warfare JOC, p. B-5).

The CORDS program provides an example of where this type of model was implemented.<sup>18</sup> Under CORDS, all pacification programs in Vietnam were united under a civilian head (Ambassador Robert Komer) who then served as one of the three deputies to MAC-V commander General William Westmoreland. Both military and civilian officials served under Komer and civilian officials had the authority to write performance reviews for their military counterparts, and vice versa. (Komer also directly reported to President Johnson) In the words of Komer, CORDS succeeded by creating a “unique, hybrid civil-military structure which imposed unified single management on all the diffuse U.S. pacification support programs and provided a single channel of advice at each level to GVN counterparts”<sup>19</sup>

Another variant on the *Fully Integrated Model* is the current Joint Interagency Task Force – South (JIATF-S) which integrates participating US military and civilian agencies into a unified task force focused on counter-narcotics in South America. This model, however, should only be seen as an exception. It may not be applicable to the much broader spectrum of COIN operations. JIATF-S is directly linked to the Executive Office of the President through the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Within JIATF-S, lead officials from participating agencies have the authority to commit resources to operations, as long as those resources have been dedicated or pledged to JIATF-S according to department and agency Statements of Intent and internal decisions.<sup>20</sup> Interagency resources are generated for JIATF-S through processes specified in the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan. JIATF-S is organized as a military headquarters but has embedded civilian and multi-national staff that provides expertise and capabilities for planning and operations. A Joint Operations Center operates around the clock and can put together mission packages on 24-hours notice. While the JIATF-

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<sup>18</sup> See vignettes in the Surge Problem Statement for more information on CORDS.

<sup>19</sup> Robert Komer, *Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 118, as quoted in Henry Nuzum, “Shades of CORDS in the Kush: The False Hope of Unity of Effort in Counterinsurgency”, unpublished graduate thesis, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, October 23, 2007, 51.

<sup>20</sup> IDA, *Trip Report on Coordination Authorities, Processes, Organization, and Resources at Joint Interagency Task Force-South, Conducted 5-8 February 2008*, pg. 26

S model is significantly less ambitious than the CORDS model, it does ameliorate the core problem of dual chains of command by tying authorities directly to the Executive Office of the President, linking resources to a national plan (the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan) that is communicated to all USG entities and international partners, preserving the independence of the organization from the normal military staff, and providing for unified commitment and control of resources.<sup>21</sup>

The NICCP notes that JIATFs are *national task forces* and not subordinate to any particular department or agency, although they report to and depend on certain agencies for guidance, resources, and authorities. However, a study undertaken by the Institute for Defense Analysis points out that coordination mechanisms in JIATF-S work because it is a national task force responsible to a single agency and with authorization and authorities commensurate with its mission and assigned by both the President and Congress.<sup>22</sup> Therefore we concur with the IDA study's recommendation and propose that under the *Fully Integrated Model*, both the respective Ambassador as well as the military Commander should sign a document similar to the NICCP empowering them to be the authoritative coordination, planning, prioritizing and integrating node, with resources provided from all departments and agencies. Depending on the external environment (permissive, semi-permissive, surge or steady-state)<sup>23</sup> the lead responsibility laid out in this document will either rest with the civilian or military authority.

### **Executive-Committee Model**

Another variant of the Fully Integrated Model and military-civilian integration is the executive-committee system. In that model, country operations are run by a national executive committee composed of the heads of the military (both host and U.S.), the country team and civilian representatives of the host government.

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<sup>21</sup> This information is further explained in the PNSR Regional Structures paper.

<sup>22</sup> IDA, *Trip Report on Coordination Authorities, Processes, Organization, and Resources at Joint Interagency Task Force-South, Conducted 5-8 February 2008*, pg. 27

<sup>23</sup> See Figure 1

The national executive-committee coordinates and executes policy in addition to allocating funds for projects and operations streamlining the decision-making process and improving interagency cooperation. At the state and district level, depending on the size of the country and the type of environment (surge or steady state), the model of the executive-committee may be duplicated with state and district committees headed by senior local officials.

The best historic example for such an executive-committee system is the British counter-insurgency effort in Malaya in the 1950s. The British ultimately prevailed against a communist insurgency lasting for twelve years through a unified effort, decisive leadership and synchronized political and military objectives.

Today, when U.S. and multinational forces provide counter-insurgency support to a host government in a semi-permissive environment, the current army counter-insurgency manual FM 3-24 suggests the creation of civil-military operations centers (CMOCs). The manual states, “The CMOC coordinates the interaction of U.S. and multinational military forces with a wide variety of civilian agencies.”<sup>24</sup> There is, however, one crucial difference between the CMOC and the British executive committee system in Malaya: The British state and district war executive committees (SWECS and DWECS) were executive bodies designed to act as well as to coordinate. The CMOC, on the other hand, ‘is not designed as, nor should it be used as, a [command and control] element.’<sup>25</sup> Walter C. Ladwig in his study on the Malayan emergency notes,

“The counter-insurgency experience in Malaya indicates that joint or even combined committees that only coordinate action may prove inadequate for the task since seizing and maintaining the operational initiative from insurgents requires executive bodies that can take action and force their opponents to go on the defense.”<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Quoted in Walter C. Ladwig III, *Managing Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Malaya*, Military Review May- June 2007, pg. 65.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid. pg. 66.

<sup>26</sup> Walter C. Ladwig III, *Managing Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Malaya*, Military Review May- June 2007, 61.



Consequently, in the Executive Committee system under the Fully Integrated Model, it is imperative that the committees are both coordinating and executing policy with a single “national committee” under the chairmanship of a civilian (i.e., the Ambassador) or a military commander taking charge of countrywide operations. The chairman has the right to set the agenda for meetings, veto decisions, except those taken unanimously, and has the last say in budget matters. By his recommendation and with the consensus of the other committee members policy is formulated.

The executive committee model has several inherent limitations which make it unsuitable for high intensity or open warfare situations given the sensitivity of intelligence (sources and methods) and military plans and operations.. One mean of dealing with this problem – was used by the British in Malaya. Each executive-committee had an “operations room” attached to it. It was the mechanic for the operational display of intelligence. Only a selective number of executive committee members (those directly involved in the operational conduct of counterinsurgency operations) were granted access to the room and hence to intelligence. Thus the danger of intelligence leaks was kept to a minimum.

A closer look at the Malayan emergency will help to illustrate the executive-committee system at work. Malaya was officially not a British colony; rather, it was a group of nine British protected Malay states and two settlements each with its own ruler organized as a federation. The leading British authority was the High Commissioner who had the power to make decisions about the conduct of defense and foreign relations in the federation. For domestic issues he needed the approval of the federation’s legislative council representing different domestic interest groups and the nine governments of the Malayan Federation. As Walter C. Ladwig states: “[The High Commissioner] was limited in the scope of domestic legislation he could impose on the rulers of individual Malay states, similar to the way a U.S. president is limited in directing governors of states to take action.”<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid. pg. 62.

The British Army in Malaya was under the command of General Headquarters, Far Eastern Land Forces. The federation itself was run by the Malay Civil Service consisting of mostly British expatriates on higher level posts as well as Malaysians in junior positions.

When the insurgency broke out, the British, keeping with their old colonial tradition, selected a civilian as “Director of Anti-Bandit Operations” or simply director of operations (DO). Within the federation, the DO held a rank equal to that of the chief secretary, the second highest rank in the Malayan colonial administration. The DO, however, had to go through the chief secretary to get to the high commissioner.

To coordinate efforts at the federation level, a Federation War Council was created. It was chaired by the DO and the High Commissioner. Its member included representatives from both the military and civilian ministries. At the state and district level, the model of the War Council was duplicated with the creation of state and district war executive committees (SWECs and DWECs respectively) of which there were more than sixty across Malaya.

Despite this system, the counter-insurgency effort lacked cohesion. As quoted in a study done in the 1950s:

“No important decisions could be carried out until it had been ratified by eleven state and settlement governments of Great Britain- thirteen in all. The military director of operations had limited authority and was hampered by the civilian officials. They had a ‘business as usual’ tendency to carry on their normal work as if the revolt did not exist, and only assist the director of operations so far as they feel disposed to.”<sup>28</sup>

The main problem, however, was that the director of operations, number two in the government, still had to submit decisions for the high commissioner through the civilian chief secretary. When it became obvious that the lack of unity of effort was endangering the war effort, some radical steps were taken. A newly elected British government decided to merge the position of Director of Operations and High Commissioner into one person thereby unifying control of civil and military forces. In addition, the

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<sup>28</sup> Lennox A. Mills, “Malaya: A Political and Economic Appraisal” (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp 60- 61.

posts of deputy director of operations (military) and deputy high commissioner (civilian) were created. Furthermore, the newly appointed High Commissioner/ Director of Operations merged the high commissioner's cabinet, the Federal Executive Council, with the Federal War Council. The High Commissioner/ Director of Operations was empowered to coordinate all aspects of the counter-insurgency campaign.

Within two years the insurgents had lost the initiative and were gradually forced back. This model was later successfully replicated in British counter-insurgency efforts in Kenya and Cyprus.

The differences between the Fully Integrated and the Fully Integrated Executive-Committee Model are minimal. The Fully Integrated Model is more centralized, whereas the Executive Committee Model operates more decentralized with various committees on the state and regional level each authorized to formulate their own policy as long as it corresponds with overall U.S. policy objectives. Also, in the Executive-Committee Model the host government is a formal member of the committee and therefore directly involved in the decision-making process, whereas in the Fully Integrated Model only informal coordination mechanisms between the command authority and the host government exist.

The advantage of the *Fully Integrated Model* is that it goes furthest in ensuring all units in country pursue the same objectives and receive unified guidance. The disadvantage is that this integrated model has never before been applied to several mission sets at the same time. CORDS and the Executive Committee system were focused entirely on pacification, and JIATF-S is focused entirely on counter-narcotics. This focus on a single mission may be a limiting factor in adapting this model to broader missions. This however does not outweigh, the main advantage of the *Fully Integrated Model*: It goes furthest in ensuring all units at the country level pursue the same objectives and receive unified guidance thereby guaranteeing unity of command.

The Fully Integrated Model would require statutory clarification by Congress, specific amendments to the Mission Strategic Plan of the Country Team, structural consolidation by integrating

civilian and military planning, operations and resource cells, a new civil-military handbook specifically addressing operations under an integrated chain of command and new interagency training methods.

### **Selection and Training**

The President must insist that individuals selected for the position of ambassador – career or non-career – have proven track records of successful involvement in foreign affairs, experience abroad, strong leadership and management abilities and a teamwork outlook on his/her position. The same applies to all agency heads at the Country Team level. Neither political considerations, nor personal connections, nor time in service can be the principal criteria for selection of individuals. “The President must send to the Senate as nominees for ambassadorships only those candidates who are qualified for the sensitive and important post-9/11 role of U.S. ambassador.”<sup>29</sup>

In order to maximize the selection of truly qualified candidates for Ambassadorial appointments should be reviewed by a Presidential Advisory Panel. The Panel would vet all future candidates and forward to the President only those deemed to be well qualified. The President would of course retain the prerogative of ignoring the Panel’s recommendations. However, if the President chose to act counter to the recommendations he would be subject to press scrutiny and questions when the nomination came before the Senate.. (For details on the Presidential Advisory Panel, see Appendix #2)

In general, candidates should have experience in a range of areas to include<sup>30</sup>:

- Interagency process awareness and coordination experience;
- Engaging and working effectively with a range of non-state actors;

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<sup>29</sup> Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, “Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign,” 15 December 2006, pg. 2.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, 30.

- Public affairs and media communications;
- Foreign assistance policy and program management;
- Multilateral diplomacy;
- Military affairs;
- Large team leadership and management skills.

Training for non-career ambassadors should begin once they are nominated, and can continue while Congress deliberates. With Congressional consent, the period between selection and confirmation should be used for this purpose. Training for career diplomats should parallel that of military officers, with periodic schooling throughout an FSO's career. Training should focus on the areas identified above, with the goal of building diplomats who are capable of developing unified engagement plans for their country of accreditation. This system was originally envisioned by Colin Powell when he was Secretary of State, but its implementation has been limited because of the lack of a sufficient "training float". As a result, assigning an FSO to training will leave a position vacant in an embassy abroad.

More emphasis must be placed upon cultural and country-specific training for key personnel of all agencies. The Departments of Defense and State have significantly stepped up such training. An interagency training program of a week or so for new ambassadors and agency heads (in Washington or elsewhere) so they may train together is highly desirable and agencies should make their representatives available for these purposes.<sup>31</sup> Annual off-sites for all agency heads could further improve the unity of effort. In evaluating Country Team members, the ambassador and DCM should have a large, formal input into performance reports for agency heads (and these agency heads could also have a role in evaluating the ambassador and DCM). Consideration should be given to a standardized, but not simplistic, evaluation form for all personnel in foreign affairs agencies assigned to Country Teams.

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<sup>31</sup> The criticality of expanded and improved training regimes is echoed in the 1999 Report of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel, "America's Overseas Presence in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century." See pages 54 – 55.

Senior managers should take periodic courses in ethics training to ensure that the functioning of the embassy and their own actions are held to the highest standards. The proposed National Security University consortium could oversee the development of such training programs.<sup>32</sup>

The State Department should also create compelling incentives for staff to develop professional networks across agency boundaries in order to enable them to access and leverage the expertise, knowledge assets, and operational capabilities of interagency partners. There should also be a requirement for interagency assignments by State Department personnel and expanded reciprocal arrangements with agency partners. The expansion of the critical POLAD program is an excellent example of these interagency assignments. To address the growing role of non-state actors, the State Department should create a wider range of opportunities and incentives for staff to work with or in multilateral and international organizations as well as private business.<sup>33</sup> Group incentives and rewards should also be created.

Training and promotion of military Foreign Area Officers (FAO) must also be strengthened. There needs to be more FAOs in-country, at regional COCOMs, and at the State and Defense Departments in Washington. Additionally, FAOs should be promoted past O-6, where, for most of them, their careers currently end. It is especially important to have these FAO-trained flag officers in countries with large military assistance missions or that have militaries that play a powerful role in the country's affairs.

There must be a mechanism for recording "lessons learned" and establishing a common lexicon and shared principles, especially as the US gets more involved in complex operations such as humanitarian interventions and counterinsurgencies. The effort by the Consortium for Complex Operations to bring together defense, development, and diplomatic experts in an online forum to record lessons learned is a good first step in this regard. The Foreign Service Institute should also take part in

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<sup>32</sup> See Appendix 1 on Training.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, 34.

this and develop its own lessons learned capability. These efforts should build on ongoing projects such as the United States Institute of Peace and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) effort to “develop a handbook of common principles and processes to guide planning and execution of goals for reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) operations.”<sup>34</sup> This guide will be “based on the collective experience of multiple actors embodied in disparate toolkits, handbooks, guidelines, strategy documents and briefing books used by state agencies, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)” and is “intended to serve as a resource for other U.S. government agencies, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, as well as indigenous political and civil society leaders.”<sup>35</sup>

The efforts of S/CRS in developing a civilian surge capacity must be supported by the Executive Branch and fully funded by Congress. The Active Response Corps, Standby Response Corps, and Civilian Reserve Corps, and associated training programs, can provide a critical asset in surge (and steady-state) operations. It is essential that civilian personnel preparing to deploy to conflict-prone areas train together and with their military (and multilateral) counterparts prior to deployment. Having a common understanding of how these groups will operate once in the field is essential for the success of these teams.

In addition to these efforts, the State and Defense Departments should create skill identifiers for personnel experienced in stability operations, counterinsurgency, reconstruction and stabilization, and other complex contingencies. These employees should receive a pay differential for maintaining and employing these skills (as do State Department and military personnel with respect to language skills). Additional training courses in these areas should also be pursued, provided that trainees commit to serving tours in areas where they can practice the skills they have learned.

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<sup>34</sup> Draft Concept Paper: Handbook of Civilian ‘Doctrine’ for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations (United States Institute of Peace, 2007) 1.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., Draft Concept Paper: Handbook of Civilian ‘Doctrine’ for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations.

## Planning

As called for in the new Joint State-USAID Strategic Framework and the new Joint Planning Process, the Mission Strategic Plan (MSP) should be reformulated to emphasize the primacy of an integrated policy planning process in which all agencies provide input and endorse the final plan, including recommendations in the Country Assistance Operational Plans for the amount and allocation of funds (the Washington level should give priority to Country Team recommendations in deciding upon resources for the field).<sup>36</sup> In steady-state operations, the MSP provides for an agreed annual interagency policy document, which clearly spells out objectives and programs. The Country Team should initiate this document with the personal approval of the ambassador, who should be responsible for settling differences of opinion. It should not be a consensus document, but the ambassador must strongly support all agencies, not just State. Such a comprehensive approach will ensure a unified interagency country plan and facilitate a clear delineation of roles and authorities.

The ambassador and country team should use the MSP to tee-up the areas of policy conflict so that Washington is forced to make policy decisions. The Country Team should review the MSP annually, starting with input from the ambassador.<sup>37</sup> Washington should use this as an input in developing an agreed interagency policy document, which in turn could serve as the basis for

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<sup>36</sup> The lack of comprehensive U.S. Government (USG) strategies for foreign assistance programs is often cited as a shortcoming of the current system. To address this deficiency, the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance established a State-USAID Task Force in August 2007 to develop a new approach to producing country-specific foreign assistance strategies. The Task Force recommended the introduction of a five-year U.S. Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) that would encompass all State and USAID programs. This has been approved by the Director of Foreign Assistance and he agreed that the concept be tested initially on a pilot basis.

<sup>37</sup> An off site training opportunity could precede the annual plan, in which all country team members could focus upon: the USG priorities for the country; each agency's programs; developing a diplomatic strategy for success; resource requirements; and developing the core elements of the "policy program plan."



interagency resourcing. The country plan would also need to be integrated with a regional plan developed under the leadership of the regional COCOM and the regional Assistant Secretaries of State.

The MSP will need to have compartmented annexes, most likely, to accommodate intelligence-related functions. Although it needs to be comprehensive, it should be kept as short as possible, focusing on objectives. All members of the Country Team should understand that they will be judged based on their performance in meeting the objectives of the plan. Agency heads should be rewarded for meeting overall objectives when it requires investing some of their resources and energy in other agencies' programs.

Building on the annual Mission Strategic Planning process, embassies must also be able to plan for the long term. The State Department in 2025 Working Group makes the following recommendation:

...ambassadors should lead the development of longer-term, government-wide country engagement plans at three-year intervals for large posts and five-year intervals for smaller posts. Management of this process should rest with the DCM, supported by a designated planning officer at missions of more than 100 direct-hire staff. These integrated plans would identify priority goals, agency-specific strategies/tactics, performance measures, and unified resource requests. They would be aligned with...overarching strategic and regional plans...and incorporate insights gained from interested private sector and NGO stakeholders as appropriate.<sup>38</sup>

Beyond country-specific plans, strategic planning for global programs such as counter-terrorism should be formulated in a clear, brief manner designed to set overall priorities and tie them to a comprehensive, but generally not too detailed, strategy which could be applied on a country basis. They should focus on bringing together all relevant aspects of national power, and on setting broad divisions of labor. They should be focused, again, on the goals, objectives, and priorities of policy. The details should be left largely to the implementers on the ground.

For surge operations planning, the Interagency Management System (IMS) must facilitate an integrated plan that is then passed on to leaders at the country level. This plan must contain clear

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<sup>38</sup> Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, "Final Report of the State Department in 2025 Working Group," Feb. 2008, 22.

objectives (with a set of metrics for evaluating those objectives), the intended scale of US commitment, and the institutional structures for managing the intervention, as well as be cognizant of lessons learned in previous operations. These plans must continue down to the provincial and local levels so that interagency teams (e.g., FACTs, PRTs) are given clear guidance on their objectives and performance measures, milestones for achieving objectives, and resources available.

Efforts by the Consortium for Complex Operations, USIP, and the Army's PKSOI will greatly aid planning by creating a common set of principles for complex contingencies, especially in surge operations. These common principles should help lead to common qualitative and quantitative metrics that can be used to assess ongoing operations, and indicate to decision makers when a change in plans is necessary.

### **Communications**

The reporting and tasking system used by agencies in Washington needs to be updated and improved to make it more transparent and offer more input from the Chief of Mission, particularly on policy and resource issues. To promote information sharing and the natural synergy that comes with an open architecture, a unified communications/IT architecture should be created.<sup>39</sup> This will be difficult due to compartmentalization of some issues, but it is essential if the COM is truly to oversee the entire security and foreign policy community at post and ensure proper coordination. Alternatively, there should be greatly increased sharing of communications, coordinated by the ambassador and the DCM, so that all elements of the Country Team are informed about the others. The use of agency proprietary systems and back-channel communications should be limited. Finally, the State Department must increase funding for communications rather than relying so heavily upon other agencies.

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<sup>39</sup> The November 1999 report, "America's Overseas Presence in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century" stresses the need to improve Embassy communication/IT capabilities. See pages 56-58.

Integrated communications are also essential when civilian and military leaders operate side by side in surge operations. Often the amount of information in surge operations is overwhelming, which is why it is essential that integrated civil-military teams process this information and decide what to send higher and what information requests to send to the field. The use of common standards, lexicon, and interoperable systems among USG agencies through wikis, blogs, chats, and other technologies will facilitate this task.

### **Civil-Military Cooperation**

In both steady-state and surge operations, the increasing involvement of government contractors and other state and non-state actors (such as NGOs and international organizations) makes civil-military cooperation critical. In the case of US government contractors, both embassies and military task forces should have trained, resourced offices capable of conducting oversight. Contracting agencies should be held responsible for the conduct of their employees and contracts should be terminated if employees act in ways inconsistent with US policy. For NGOs and international organizations, Country Teams and military forces must be capable of incorporating these organizations into decision making and, especially, resourcing. While some of these groups may be hesitant about working with the US, their expertise and resources can be valuable.

Coordination with the host government and other partner governments is also crucial. In reconstruction and stabilization operations, building capacity in the host government is one of the most important aims of US policy. The Country Team must have consultative bodies that include host government officials, NGOs and IGOs, and partner governments. In some instances, host government officials should be incorporated into US government structures at the country, provincial, and local levels as outlined in the Fully Integrated Model. Examples of this might include placing senior host government civilian officials into FACTs, conducting weekly meetings with provincial governors and

local officials, or host and USG government representatives in the Executive Committees within the framework of the Fully Integrated Executive-Committee Model.

In other instances consultative bodies for the host government might operate independently of US government structure allowing to keep the US fully informed.

### **Resources**

In embassies and in Washington, there needs to be routine coordination of all resources – military and civilian. Allocation of fiscal resources should be linked to the objectives-based Mission Strategic Plan, but should be expected to cover resources of all agencies, not just State and USAID, and link all resources to the national objectives. These plans should apply to the 19 separate sources of State and USAID foreign assistance programs. At present most resourcing planning is top-down, rather than initiated with the Country Team.

The ambassador should have the authority to review the appropriation and obligation of funding for all agencies, and recommend to Washington any modifications he/she deems necessary. A single officer responsible to the ambassador (normally the DCM or USAID Mission Director) should be responsible for coordinating the expenditure of all operational civilian funds, including development, disaster relief, refugees, post-conflict reconstruction, counternarcotics (INL, AID, DEA), law enforcement (Justice, State, AID), as well as military funds with an essentially civilian objective (e.g. CERP). This officer will require extensive interagency training to understand their operations and procedures, including military programs and funds (IMET, FFMF, CERP, etc.). If there are differences of view which the ambassador can not resolve, the agency head would appeal to Washington. At larger embassies, this individual would be part of a larger executive staff.

More flexibility needs to be built in at the country and Washington levels for the movement of funds from one function to another and for the management of contingency funds and personnel. In emergency situations (e.g., political upheaval, humanitarian emergency), the COM should have the authority to allocate funds from all sources and the ability to appeal directly to the President and the Office of Management and Budget for waivers on spending restrictions and for resolution of disputes. This would give Ambassadors some leeway (in the perspective of Washington agencies) to make mischief by trying to direct funds and other resources from one Mission element to another, but that is what the Washington-based interagency process should be for – to mediate and ultimately to adjudicate such disputes. The ambassador should also have the authority to terminate funds if the project is clearly failing to deliver expected results and there are objective criteria to show it (this is consistent with Recommendation 68 of the Iraq Study Group). Additionally, ambassadors should be much more aggressive in advocating for resources for non-State agencies included in their Country Teams.

There must be a rationalization of existing contingency funds and capacity to act on supplementals. There should be a resource push with Congress for the appropriation of all-purpose reserve funds (an S/CRS proposal). Current Congressional restrictions upon a unified approach to the utilization of operational funds by different agencies (Title 31 USC) need to be removed so that the Country Team can achieve unity of effort and respond rapidly to changing local conditions. The use of Section 1206 and 1207 funds does not provide the needed flexibility or integration. The recent implementation of Quick Reaction Funds for PRTs in Iraq does appear to provide this flexibility and responsiveness. The new Strategic Partnership Initiative is an interesting response to this issue, but applies very narrowly to security assistance.

Given the increasing importance of AID programs and the need for better trained, experienced personnel under direct USAID control, a major increase in USAID direct hire personnel is recommended, rather than continuing to rely so heavily upon contractors. The Department of State is

seriously understaffed (some 1100 positions are unfilled) and is particularly short of personnel with language area and other specialized training. There must be a significant increase, going well beyond the current staffing crisis. This would enable Country Teams to meet the new and expanding challenges associated with the problem of failed and failing states and terrorism (such as increasing its personnel for police training rather than relying so heavily upon contractors in the field as well as in the INL Bureau). It would also provide the additional personnel needed for adequate, professional interagency training.

All agencies must beef up their personnel numbers to reverse the current reliance upon contractors and to provide for a surge or reserve personnel capacity for civilian agencies beginning with State but also including other key agencies (Treasury, Justice, etc.). DOD and USAID already have a surge capacity for crises. Both the proposed Civilian Reserve Corps and the Active and Standby Response Corps could help cover the gap between needs and availability for skilled civilian personnel in crisis situations. Along with these reforms, there needs to be a central interagency focal point (e.g., S/CRS) to match personal needs and availability. The right people must be developed, deployed, and recognized for longer-term assignments; otherwise, all structural fixes will be irrelevant.

Personnel systems must adapt to provide incentives for people to serve in high-risk countries and greater attention should be given to longer tours of duty in hardship situations so that training and locally-acquired knowledge and contacts can be put to best use. Compensation issues need to be resolved in order to encourage top-level personnel to participate, including financial compensation and more support for families in unaccompanied tours, comparable to that provided by the military. There should be more authority for agencies to induce personnel to accept assignments, even at risk of being separated from the service in certain circumstances. If this is too difficult, consideration need be given to expanding the current civil affairs capabilities of the U.S. military.

There must be greater flexibility for the ambassador in determining whether the local security situation allows for officers to leave the embassy to cultivate contacts with the local population, and civilian personnel must assume greater risk, equal to their military colleagues. To do so, civilian personnel must be trained to operate in semi-permissive environments and the Washington agencies should allow them to do so when and where the COM approves.

In surge operations, civilian agencies must be staffed and resourced to serve alongside their military counterparts. In many previous US operations (e.g., Panama, Iraq, Afghanistan), US civilian agencies did not have the personnel or the funding to make significant contributions in the early stages of the crisis.<sup>40</sup>

There must also be integrated resource cells in surge scenarios at the country and provincial levels capable of coordinating both military and civilian funds (and that of NGOs, IGOs, and the host government if possible). Like in steady-state situations, where our recommendation is to have one individual (as part of a larger executive staff) responsible for expenditure of all funds, in surge operations this individual would work hand-in-hand with his military counterpart and share a large, integrated civil-military staff. This cell would settle all resource disputes and ensure that funding decisions do not work at cross-purposes and support the overall country plan. This cell – as well as teams out in the field – must also be capable of coordinating with host-government officials to ensure that projects are sustainable and serve local needs.

### **Antiquated Structure of the Embassy**

There should be two DCMs in larger embassies – one for substantive issues, and one for program management. The DCM for management would be in charge of all administrative resource allocation in support of the country team and their policy agenda. The DCM for management need not necessarily be

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<sup>40</sup> See vignettes in Country-Level Issue Team Surge Problem Statement.

a State Foreign Service Officer. The DCM for Policy would perform the Executive Secretariat and Chief of Staff functions for the ambassador, supervising the various functional components, as well as serving as the ambassador's alter ego. In surge situations, where there is a high degree of military participation, consideration could be given to an active duty military officer serving as DCM, assuming he/she has the required broad interagency experience and management skills. There should be a small embassy Staff with deep knowledge of all procedures and operations headed by the DCM to support the ambassador in coordinating the Country Team. This staff should monitor all communications except for those of particular sensitivity, which should be discussed between appropriate agency heads with the DCM and/or the ambassador.

Concomitant to the need for two DCMs is the critical requirement to restructure larger embassies into integrated functional components rather than agency offices. Examples of such components could include: Law Enforcement (including consular function), Trade Promotion/Development, Economic Analysis, Political/Intel Analysis and Coordination, Crisis Planning and Response, Public Information/Public Affairs/Cultural Activities, and Social Activities (e.g. humanitarian and human rights, disease, environment). Consular personnel should be included in almost all of the structural components given their (underutilized) capacity to identify key issues and trends. Each integrated functional component would have a designated chairperson, in some cases the DCM, in others an agency head reporting to the DCM and ambassador. This would facilitate interagency communication and coordination.

All DOD offices and personnel should be consolidated under a single office with a designated officer in charge. DOD Directive 5105.75 goes a long way in establishing this practice. Similarly, all intelligence personnel (including military) should be coordinated under the authority of the Chief of Station. Employees of all agencies – as appropriate – would populate each functional cluster to ensure



an integrated approach.<sup>41</sup> Agency participation in these components should be broad rather than restrictive.

There should be a clear delineation of responsibilities for communicating with representatives of local and other governments (embassies) and international organizations as well as NGOs and private businesses. The substance of these communications should conform to existing policy and be made available to all agencies with a need to know.

The ambassador should structure the embassy to meet local circumstances and U.S. priorities. For example, in Bogotá, the high priority of counter-narcotics and counterinsurgency programs is reflected in the organizational structure. In other countries, the structure would reflect the importance of counterterrorism or military-to-military relations, or of environmental, health, and economic issues.

### **Regional**

Regional structures have been taken up by the Regional-Level Issue Team, but we offer some initial ideas here.

There is an informal relationship between regional COCOMs and Assistant Secretaries of State, which often works well, despite the anomalies of geographic regions (which need to be corrected). However, a more formal, structural relationship would enhance the regional view of the COCOM and provide for regional coordination of all agencies with the COCOM, rather than relying upon a sense of country-by-country inputs. For example, the Deputy Assistant Secretary could be assigned as the State Department representative to each COCOM for this purpose, acting as the principle liaison for both State authority and dealing with the military commander, while continuing to work closely with the Assistant Secretary. The latter would remain the official channel for the COM to the Secretary of State.

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<sup>41</sup> See “America’s Overseas Presence in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century,” pg. 66 for more on cross-agency teams.

Another solution as outlined in the Regional Structure Working Group paper is the creation of Integrated Regional Directors and Divisions.<sup>42</sup> In that proposal overseas, sub regional and country desks reside within the Integrated Regional Divisions and integrate all levels of policy and implementation support for Ambassadors and their empowered Country Teams and interact directly with U.S. government missions to multilateral organizations. For all peacetime engagement activities, Combatant Commands report to and could be co-located with the Integrated Regional Division to facilitate coordination of all civilian and military activities. For war fighting and war preparation, the Combatant Commands would report to the Department of Defense. Integrated Regional Divisions replace regional interagency committees.

The new Africa Command offers a possible second model for future military regional structures. Planned to be more integrated on an interagency basis than any previous COCOM, AFRICOM is seen by Secretary of State Rice as a way “to continue breaking down the barriers that still hinder the interagency cooperation that we need overseas.”<sup>43</sup> The COCOM’s integration is enhanced by the addition of a State Department Senior Representative, serving alongside the Regional COCOM as an advisor and coordinator for all civilian activities (the AFRICOM civilian Deputy for Civ-Mil Activities’ position). AFRICOM is still a “work in progress” but could become a useful example for other COCOMs.

At the Country Team level, it will be essential to have a single military representative under the ambassador’s authority with reporting duties to the Regional COCOM; DOD memo 5105.75 aims to accomplish this. The closer ODC-DAO relationship should enhance the cooperation of the latter. The military representative would be responsible for coordinating all major military activities, including those of special operations forces (together with the Chief of Station). Agencies other than DOD often have regional personnel assigned to the embassies. There needs to be a clear interagency agreement on

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<sup>42</sup> See Regional Regional-Level Issue Team paper

<sup>43</sup> See Condoleezza Rice’s remarks “On Transformational Diplomacy,” 8 February 2007.

their programs, policies and to whom they report. The ambassador(s) in the country where they operate should have oversight authority agreed to by the ambassador in the country where they are stationed.

There needs to be a mechanism to create integrated regional strategies and policies, and to elevate decisions on competing courses of action. To do so, there should be a dedicated civil-military operations planning staff at all regional COCOMS (SOUTHCOM has started this). This is especially crucial in planning for surge operations. Alongside the COCOM, in complex exigencies, one ambassador could serve temporarily as the region's coordinating ambassador or Presidential Special Representative. One could see this model of coordination during the Tsunami relief operations in 2005. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has proposed that "the Secretary of State should regularize and expand the Department's Regional Strategic Initiative comprised of regional meetings of ambassadors, regional assistant secretaries, and senior interagency personnel, including the combatant commands."<sup>44</sup> The RSI should cover all activities, not just counterterrorism. At present, many regional and sub-regional meetings are organized (and funded) by the regional COCOM.

Concomitant to these changes, realignment of the geographic regions by the different US Government agencies so that all include the same countries could make policymaking and operations easier for individual Country Teams, as well as those in a particular region. As it stands, the military combatant commands, DOD, State and AID all have different alignments. This hampers rationalization of policymaking and implementation.<sup>45</sup>

## **Washington**

National structures have been taken up by the National-Level Issue Team, but we offer some initial ideas here.

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid, pg. 4.

<sup>45</sup> Again, for a more detailed discussion of regional structure issues, see the Regional-Level Issue Team paper.

It is essential that the Washington agencies create a common crisis planning and response cell – either at the NSC or at State. The new Interagency Management System (IMS) with its Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group could help in resolving this problem for national security crises. NSPD-44, which established the IMS, also clearly gave the State Department the responsibility to coordinate the civilian component of reconstruction and stabilization operations. State must exercise these authorities. Congress must assist in this process by funding the State Department, specifically S/CRS, to fulfill this function.

At the end of the day, the Washington-based process should be charged solely with determining the goals, objectives, and priorities of policy. Policy decisions may well overrule the ambassador's recommendations in many instances, but at least the priorities and the marching orders should be clear and the reasons for overturning the Country Team should be clearly communicated.

The manner and details of policy implementation in the field should be left almost entirely to the ambassador and Country Team. Once policies are set and resourced – and acknowledging that policy must evolve to suit sometimes rapidly-changing circumstances on the ground – the responsibility of the interagency process should be (and should be formally understood to be) to support the ambassador and the Country Team by adjudicating interagency disputes and otherwise making decisions which will enable and facilitate actions on the ground which fall under the ambassador's authority. Additionally, the ambassador must be given the flexibility to decide whether the safety restrictions placed upon embassy personnel are too stringent, thereby preventing the Country Team from accomplishing its objectives.

Country Teams must receive a formal articulation of the responsibilities of the Washington policy process – various interagency working groups, Deputies' Committee, and Principals' Committee. The policymaking system must make policies that are realistic in light of the need to implement the policy on the ground. The entire process should begin with the ambassador and the country team – as

they are ideally positioned to assess and prioritize policy objectives and resource needs – and end at the national level, where a global, strategic perspective can inform final policy decisions.

The White House and a functioning National Security Council must enforce the authorities delegated to the ambassador. The President and the NSC should give career ambassadors the same strong support often accorded to political appointees close to the President. The ambassador needs to ensure that his/her interagency concerns are communicated clearly to the White House, either via the Secretary of State, or if need be, the NSC. The functional clusters would assist in ensuring that their concerns are understood by all agencies. The National Security Council should continuously backstop the ambassador. The Washington level and the regional level should ensure that cooperation rather than pursuit of agency-specific activities takes priority. This should be a factor in personal performance ratings for agency representatives.

While much of the NSC and interagency structure will continue to be functionally based in order to drive broad US policy goals on a global basis, it should fall to the geographically-organized NSC Senior Directors and Directors to lead the integration process, addressing key points of contention as identified by ambassadors. In the case of many, indeed most countries, the process of integration will not be difficult, and can be accomplished with little contention at the Working-Group level. In the context of the United States' most difficult and significant foreign policy challenges, however, decisions will need to be driven at the Deputies' and Principals' level, and it will be the responsibility of the NSC to ensure that decisions are reached and then enforced, as necessary, through Presidential interaction with relevant Cabinet secretaries. All too often, the President is never engaged and discipline never enforced, until a full-blown crisis is underway. Further, the decision-making process is too reliant upon full interagency consensus, which is almost never reached. This problem can only be overcome by a president who demands compliance in implementing his/her decisions and takes actions to enforce them.

Lastly, Congress must receive a holistic country foreign policy plan and request for country (and regional) resources that all agencies support in the form of Country Operational Plans. There should be also a regional provision, which would provide a broader context. This should probably not be a formal request for appropriations. This should be common to all Committees with oversight over national security affairs.

### **Conclusion**

Adopting the structural solutions outlined above, in combination with an improved selection and training process that puts the right people into critical positions, will address the core problem of Country Teams – the lack of an empowered leader, espousing a shared vision, capable of bringing unity of effort.

In regard to operations in a surge environment, the United States has not had a uniform structured solution for civil-military integration in conflict and post-conflict situations at the country level since CORDS, and is therefore dependent upon ad hoc solutions. Unity of command is paid lip service to but not practiced in reality. This is nothing new as Robert Killebrew points out:

“Despite generations of officers reciting Clausewitz’s mantra that war is simply politics by another means, military leaders in general and the U.S. Defense Department in particular generally have sought to operate independently of political statesmen whenever possible.”<sup>46</sup>

General Anthony Zinni, military coordinator for Operation Provide Hope in Northern Iraq in 1991 emphasizes that,

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<sup>46</sup> Killebrew Robert, *The Left-Hand Side of the Spectrum –Ambassadors and Advisors in Future U.S. Strategy*, “The Future of U.S. Military Series”, Center for a New American Security, June 2007, 9.

“No other time in history begs more for interagency integration and cooperation within the U.S. government. The various stove-piped agencies, especially the departments of Defense and State, have traditionally and famously been dysfunctional as a cooperative entity. We can no longer afford the dysfunction and lack of coordination, especially in this situation.”<sup>47</sup>

Both the Empowered Country Team (ECT) and the Fully Integrated Model would address this issue. An Empowered Country Team, which consolidates the authority of the Ambassador to formulate and evaluate policy in an independent manner, will lead to better unity of effort at the country level.

The Fully Integrated Model operates an integrated chain of command combining military and civilian elements under one authority on the country level in a surge environment thereby curtailing the military’s freedom of action and avoid that military issues take precedent over political matters. Second, informal coordination mechanisms will be formalized by clear delineations of authority and integrated civil-military planning, operations and resource cells. Third, the Fully Integrated Model will provide for a uniform structured solution for civil-military integration in a surge environment and avoid dysfunctional ad-hoc arrangements. Fourth, the Fully Integrated Model would provide for flexible responses to changing external environments at the country level by guaranteeing smooth transition from civilian to military control due to the integrated chain of command structure.

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<sup>47</sup> Zinni Anthony, The Future for Iraq-Realities and Requirements, POLICY BRIEF World Security Institute, June 2006, 7.

Appendix 1:  
Training – National Security University  
(By Retired Ambassador Donald Hays)

Foreign Affairs work has become a great deal more programmatic and technical over the past several decades. The era of the generalist is passing, what the foreign affairs agencies need is integrators, analysts, program managers and negotiators. We have over thirty government agencies and departments represented overseas in our diplomatic missions. They are advising on everything from tax policy, aviation safety, privatization, human rights, military and police training, energy management, etc. The US government has program experts in all of these fields but what we have not developed is a way to harness this expertise into a comprehensive and workable foreign policy program.

For the Foreign Service – it is time that we create a comprehensive and thoroughly professional training program that spans the life cycle of our employees. It should integrate the skills of diplomacy into those of program management, human resource development and management as well as critical leadership skills necessary to work with other agencies and assist them in creating a foreign policy program that promotes our interests while addressing those needs of other countries which we wish to fulfill.

This program should have opportunities to bring employees from other agencies together in common: program management courses, build a sense of common interest and analytical skills that will bond our services together. These courses should be mandated for all officers every two or three tours (6 years). This would ensure that while the employee is rising in rank he or she is also developing skills and associations that will ensure that he/she can contribute effectively in more senior positions.

In order to do this we will have to send officers to advanced training in Universities around the country to build the necessary skills in order to instruct those taking these professional courses. We can learn a great deal from the military services in this regard. Furthermore we will have to greatly expand the diversity and course offerings at our Foreign Service Academy, bring in professional educators, train



our own personnel teaching there up to that same level and focus the overall curriculum on the courses needed for our core professional development requirements.

There should be adequate space to invite on a fee for attendance basis for representatives of agencies working overseas and in support of those serving abroad. This will build over time a sense of camaraderie and teamwork. \* (As a result of the recent executive order promoting a new interagency training program to develop national security specialists from throughout the government, a number of US government agencies have begun discussions regarding the possibility of developing a range of courses to be taken within a consortia of USG educational facilities (FSI, NDU, Agriculture etc.) This program proposal is still under interagency discussion.) Frankly, while it is a step in the right direction, it is not likely to provide the opportunity for team building that a more centralized training program would.

My preference would be to continue the work of Secretary George Schultz in building a first-rate foreign policy academy for those who carry the responsibility to conduct the diplomacy of the United States. The coordinating body for national security training institutions is a first step in this direction. To do this I would suggest convening representatives from key universities in the D.C. area, and other well known universities such as Harvard, Princeton, the Fletcher School, Stanford and Syracuse, to name a few, to discuss how best to build the proper curricula and offer them a chance to participate in the development of such an academy.

This program would be not only a training ground but a program to build unity of purpose and collaboration. It could also serve as a laboratory for pre and post conflict planning.

Recommendation – training given every six years throughout the career of the Foreign Service officer. This training is to incorporate professional expertise, analytical skills, management development, leadership, and supervisor requirements.

Professional development training should be the sole purpose of the Foreign Service School. We need to focus on building professionals, who are properly integrated into the multi agency Missions we now have abroad.

Language training goals should be for fluency not basic understanding. Therefore the courses need to be extended and repetitive over at least two tours of duty. Each officer must be tested while at post and take remedial training to improve their capacity to understand, read, write and speak the language.

To do all of this we need to build a truly national academy in order to provide those serving at our missions abroad with the tools to perform the national interest.

We should bring together representatives of our premier universities, the military, FBI and others to craft a curriculum, a training approach and to design a system that will provide such a facility and a program.

## Appendix 2:

### Presidential Advisory Panel Ambassadorial Appointments (By Retired Ambassador Donald Hays)

In the interest of ensuring that the U.S. Ambassador corps is seen as the President's representative and preeminent representative of the U.S. government in the country of his/her assignment. The President of the United States has determined that the selection of candidates for the office of U.S. Ambassador must be transparent and subject to rigorous scrutiny. Furthermore the national interest mandates that Ambassadors be chosen for the proven skill from throughout the US government, academia and the private sector. In order to ensure this goal is achieved the President will establish a Advisory Panel to vet future candidates for these posts.

The President shall appoint individuals to a 15 member panel for a duration not to exceed three years. The panel shall meet at least four times a year to consider nomination for Ambassadorial postings and more often if necessary. This panel will be review and endorse qualified individuals for the position of Ambassador for ultimate use by the President of the United States.

The panel will be composed of individuals of the highest caliber drawn from the career civil service, the US Foreign Service, the U.S. military, academia and private industry. The composition of the panel will be determined by the President but shall have no less than eight members from the career service of the U.S. government. The non government members will be selected from business, academia and at least two from organizations such as CFR, AEI, American Academy of Diplomacy and CSI on a rotating basis. AFSA as the Dept of State's Foreign Service professional association will have a permanent chair. The chair of this panel will be selected by the panel members.

The panel will review the qualifications of the nominees for the position of US Ambassador and after considering the posts available and their unique requirements will identify those deemed qualified

for the position and rank order those in order of proven accomplishment and expertise. They may choose not to recommend candidate deemed to be unqualified, for whatever reason for the positions under consideration.

The President will have the prerogative to select anyone the panel deems to be qualified, regardless of the panel's ranking. However, no candidate should be considered, who has been deemed as lacking the necessary qualifications for the positions being considered. Selection for one post does not automatically qualify the candidate for future postings given the different demands imposed by each posting.

The panel will draft a report outlining its views pertaining to the candidates on the list and that report will accompany the list of those deemed qualified to the President. An excerpt will be provided to Congress when the nominees for posts are submitted with the panel's judgment on their qualifications.