# PROCESSES LITERATURE REVIEW

## INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS

This literature review highlights the non-linear evolution of national security processes since 1946. In the first fifteen years after World War II, the nation saw a progressive strengthening of formal, centralized mechanisms for coordinating and integrating policy. This formalized approach drew significant criticism from some quarters, particularly Congress. As a result, the subsequent fifteen years, overseen by two former US senators, witnessed a reactionary movement toward informal and decentralized processes for national security decision making. Since the 1970s, the pendulum has continued to swing from centralized to decentralized process preferences and mechanisms, albeit not as widely. The literature review reveals neither end of the spectrum to be problem-free. The primary perceived downsides to centralization were the creation of additional layers of bureaucracy that impeded effective and swift implementation, a reduction in the reach of congressional oversight, which relied on agency and department heads for accountability, and the abuse of accreted power at the White House. The literature also cites flaws in decentralized approaches. These included poor coordination of policies and operations across agencies and poor or spotty implementation of presidential direction.

The literature review also reveals that most administrations paid relatively little attention to the working group's focus areas of strategy, planning, execution, and assessment. Major policy goals, such as arms control, or operations, such as Vietnam, typically consumed most interagency coordination activity. Relative periods of activity in these areas can be found in the Eisenhower, Nixon, George H.W. Bush and Clinton eras. In addition, the current administration is undertaking several reforms in interagency planning and coordination processes, but little reliable literature evaluating these nascent processes exists.[1] Among presidents, only Eisenhower, a military strategist, appears to have taken a significant personal interest in national security strategy, planning, execution, and assessment processes. Ironically, some of the most interesting calls for institutionalizing interagency planning, personnel, and strategy came from

[1] At the national level, these newly formed planning processes include the Homeland Security Planning System for homeland security, the Interagency Management System for stabilization and reconstruction, the "F" process for prioritizing foreign assistance at the State Department, and the Strategic Operational Planning process at NCTC. At the regional, local, and country-team level, there has also been a wide range of efforts to improve interagency coordination and better link ends, ways, and means. These include restructuring combatant commands for improved interagency coordination, use of military-civilian Provincial Reconstruction Teams to plan and execute reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan, creation of country-team level Mission Strategic Plans, and revision of national incident management through a new National Response Framework.

Eisenhower's critics. President Kennedy adhered to the spirit of these critics' warnings to decrease the size and scope of NSC activities, but neither he nor any subsequent president seems to have seriously contemplated suitable substitutes for NSC power, as Eisenhower's critics recommended.

In each administration, there have been clear attempts to bring order out of chaos. From the concept of a institutionalized "policy book," to an Operations Coordinating Board, to an Executive Committee, to Tuesday lunches, to Principles and Deputies Committees, to the creation of a National Economic Council and a Homeland Security Council, each president and his national security advisor have attempted to tailor a process for managing the burgeoning national security system and its demands. None were clearly satisfied with the system they inherited, although some were more comfortable with their predecessor's approach than others, and none left processes unchanged during their tenure. The literature review thus provides a rich history to inform our consideration of future process paths, but taken alone, it does not point to a clear problem or solution set.

This literature review is complemented by the work provided in the Project on National Security Reform's monograph entitled *National Security Management and Organizational Theory*. Significant additional contributions from the business management literature, specifically in the areas of strategy, governance and strategic management, strategic planning, and learning organizations, will be evaluated in the working group's alternatives for analysis.

## I. PRIMARY SOURCES ON NATIONAL SECURITY PROCESSES

Truman, Harry S. "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security." NSC 68/1, Annex 9. 21 September 1950. Digital National Security Archive. George Washington University Melvin Gelman Library, Washington, DC. Accessed 21 February 2008 http://gateway.proquest.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CPD00178.

President Truman issued no initial directive concerning national security organization and procedures. However, Truman was instrumental in devising the 1947 National Security Act and 1949 amendments. By late 1950, NSC participants had tested the new national security system and developed views on its strengths and weaknesses. NSC 68/1 is an interagency report consisting of ten sections, or Annexes, that attempt to match national security programs to the

strategy outlined in NSC 68. Annex 9, prepared by the Bureau of the Budget,[2] recommends adjustments to the "administrative machinery" of the NSC in order to more effectively coordinate policies and programs "aimed at turning back Communist aggression"—a hallmark of the new strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

NSC 68/1 Annex 9 makes several recommendations on the national security system that highlight both continuities and discontinuities of a national security system now 60 years old. It mentions and quickly dismisses the notion of a "White House 'czar'" to coordinate national security policies and programs. It alludes to the tensions around the State Department's role as both disinterested interagency coordinator and interested participant. The proposed solution is for the President to strongly support the Secretary of State. Emphasis on the State Department's role as the rightful interagency coordinator has existed rhetorically in administrations since Truman but has only held true in a few cases. The paper recommends that the National Security Resources Board (NSRB) increase its oversight of Korea-related mobilization activities: "NSRB must on behalf of the President review the progress of the entire program and, where a participating agency may not have 'geared up' its operations, bring this shortcoming to the attention of the agency head or, when necessary, the President." Oversight is also a stated function of the Special Assistant to the President. The Special Assistant should advise the President when there are unresolved policy conflicts, and sit in NSC meetings. This proto-national security adviser should organize and direct a staff to assist the President in the coordination, direction, and oversight of policy. Annex 9 implies that the NSC staff should expand, noting that the President lacks "adequately-organized, continuing staff assistance" in the "total range of problems." The paper explains that the President has relied on the Executive Secretary for some of these tasks, but that the Executive Secretary role is by nature subordinate to the Cabinet. The Special Assistant and his staff, however, can "function independently of the agencies concerned." Immediately there is a caveat:

> It would be easy for the Special Assistant to over-organize and to pull tasks out of the NSC and the departments. At the outset, this might expedite certain individual decisions. In the long run, it would prove damaging because it would weaken those agencies and produce in the Executive Office an unworkable super-agency.

On planning, NSC 68/1 Annex 9 speaks to the reluctance of agencies to contribute staff for White House planning purposes. "Too frequently there has been a tendency in the past for agencies to insist that they had to have new staff and money if they were to undertake any meaningful part of the planning job on a high priority basis." Seeking consensus among parts of the interagency is desirable where possible, but "should not carry so far as to lead to undue delay" or overly-generalized recommendations. When disagreements persist, "NSC advice to the President should contain a full delineation of major alternative courses of action and of the considerations for and against each course." The paper judges that the NSC will function best if

[2] The Bureau of the Budget was the agency responsible for organization studies during the Truman administration.

its basic membership is small, which will be achievable if most agencies are invited only on an ad-hoc basis.[3] Finally, the paper recommends the creation of a "policy book" for the NSC staff, beginning with NSC-68, to be continually expanded and revised. This documentation would enhance the NSC's ability to coordinate the strategic objectives, policies, and programs affecting national security. NSC 68/1 Annex 9 offers a comprehensive early appraisal of the national security system. Sixty years later, many of these tensions remain unresolved.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. "33 - White House Statement Concerning Steps Taken to Strengthen and Improve the Operations of the National Security Council." Public Papers. 23 March 1953. The American Presidency Project. Accessed 21 February 2008 http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9800&st=statement&st1=.

Like Truman, Eisenhower issued no initial directive concerning national security organization and procedures, but his White House Statement of March 23, 1953 serves a similar function. The statement reaffirms the President's commitment to reestablish the NSC at the center of the policy process. The President feels that "the Council can afford the greatest possible assistance to the President in deciding policy issues affecting the national security." The statement reflects Eisenhower's intention to move beyond a merely coordinating role for the NSC that he felt had produced lowest common denominator policies in the Truman administration. Eisenhower conceived of NSC members as advisers to the President in their own right, and tried to create a national security system that would facilitate this. The March 23rd statement announces NSC members. Specifically, it names Robert Cutler "Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs," announcing his role as the "principal executive officer" of the National Security Council and as chairman of the Planning Board. Eisenhower kept Truman's Executive Secretary and deputy in their supporting staff positions. On the subject of presidential advisers, the statement announces Eisenhower's intention to use civilian consultants from outside of government to bring "a fresh point of view" to Council deliberations. Finally, the document explains the use and membership of the NSC Planning Board, which would replace Truman's Senior Staff. Six months later, Eisenhower completed his major changes to the National Security Council system by establishing the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB). This was a subcabinet committee on the implementation side of the NSC "policy hill." Although the OCB did not have the authority to execute policy, it was designed to monitor the executive agencies and departments in their implementation of NSC policies. Executive Order 10483 (September 2, 1953) instituted the OCB, and Executive Order 10700 (February 25, 1957) clarified its responsibility to provide feedback on policy integration and implementation. The Eisenhower administration's attempts to supervise implementation through the NSC came under

[3] Presidents after Truman have generally ignored this principle and later regretted it. The pattern has been to initially expand the number of people with an implied right to sit on the Council, and then to abandon formal Council meetings altogether or to create more selective NSC principals committees, often with a new name.

fire by the end of the Eisenhower administration, led by critics such as Senator Henry Jackson and John F. Kennedy.

Jackson, Senator Henry M., ed. *The National Security Council: Jackson Subcommittee Papers on Policy-Making at the Presidential Level.* New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965.

"Major Issues." Interim Report. Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery. 12 January 1960.

Three points should guide efforts to improve the national security policy process. First, "paper changes" in organization do not necessarily help policymakers in their work. Second, policy machinery should be adaptable to the style and work habits of top decision makers. Third, proposals for change should build on existing machinery wherever possible. The National Security Council is an adaptable institution, as evidenced in its evolution over two administrations. Its limitations are primarily a bias towards consensus and an inability to conduct the sort of planning that occurs in the executive agencies. Efforts to improve planning should ask whether officials with more diverse backgrounds should be recruited to State and Defense policy planning processes, whether State, Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would benefit from a joint Planning Staff, and whether *ad hoc* interagency task forces should be the norm for special national security topics. In concert with seeking joint policymaking, some have suggested that the executive branch should develop a joint career service. Human talent is vital: good people can often triumph over poor organization, but poor people will defeat the best organization. As national security demands have expanded, it has become clear that the NSC process must be more closely related to the budget process, either by coordinating State and Defense in the initial stages, shortening the budget cycle, or preparing alternative budgets with sacrifices and benefits clearly delineated.

"Super-Cabinet Officers and Super-Staffs." Staff Report. Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery. 16 November 1960.

Some have suggested that a super-Cabinet official and a super-staff would help an administration rise above individual bureaucratic interests which tend to "coordinate" lowest common denominator policies. This would fail to solve the current difficulties and introduce new ones into the NSC process. The historic record shows that Presidents deputize intimate

advisers on an *ad hoc* basis to take charge of certain operations or to manage dealings with department heads. Only the President has the constitutional and political power required to mediate conflicting national security policies in a sustained fashion. An above-the-department staff would presumably offer a broader perspective on national security affairs and do a better job of long-term planning than the departments themselves. But such a super-agency would be out of touch with day-to-day operations and would create a new layer between the President and the departments. The departments will always be the main wellsprings of policy ideas and innovations. The path to reform will lie in delegating more authority to individual department heads, limiting National Security Council membership and procedures, relating NSC activities more closely to the budget process, asking more of the Secretary of State in terms of policy guidance and comprehensive initiatives, increasing the State-Defense partnership, relying more on the Joint Staff for planning, restoring the budgetary process as a target-setting policy instrument, and reducing barriers for highly qualified private citizens to serve in government.

"The National Security Council." Staff Report. Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery. 12 December 1960.

The real worth of the National Security Council is in providing the President with a forum in which his closest advisers present a full exposition of policy alternatives and in which he in turn gives them clear-cut policy guidance. Unfortunately, NSC effectiveness has been diminished by a crowded agenda, elaborate procedures, excessive reliance on derivative interagency groups, and the mistaken use of the NSC for comprehensive coordination and follow-up. The subcommittee recommendations are intended to "deinstitutionalize" and to "humanize" the NSC process. First, the Council should meet only at the President's request to avoid becoming ritualistic. Second, Council discussions should fully air remaining policy differences rather than spare the President the necessity of choice. Third, Council meeting participation should be restricted to principals, but decisions should be recorded and adequately distributed. Fourth, the Planning Board should be restricted to reviewing policy rather than watering papers down to a consensus view that will be unchallenged in the Council itself. Fifth, the President must look to the Secretary of State for the initial synthesis of national strategy. Sixth, the Operations Coordinating Board should be abolished and implementation oversight should be assigned to a particular department or officer. Seventh, the President will continue to need a small personal staff independent of the bureaucracies who can assist him in spotting gaps in policy creation and execution. The Council itself will continue to need a key official and staff to prepare the work of the Council, record its decisions, and troubleshoot. Finally, the NSC should assist the President in preparing an integrated national security budget.

"Concluding Statement." Senator Henry M. Jackson, Chairman. Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery. 15 November 1961.

> In order to outplan, outperform, and outlast totalitarianism, the President must formulate a coherent national security policy. Ten principles will assist this endeavor. First, the President and Secretary of State must be absolutely clear on the nation's vital national interests. Second, the current national policy machinery should be trimmed down rather than replaced or added to. Third, the key problem of national security is not reorganization but inexperienced, uncomprehending, indecisive, or unwise officials. Fourth, national security departments are overstaffed, not understaffed. Fifth, national security personnel should receive better training, interagency opportunities, and higher salaries. Sixth, more outstanding people will accept government posts if archaic conflict-of-interest laws are changed. Seventh, the National Security Council can best serve the President in crisis management and long-range strategic planning if it is neither over-institutionalized or excessively informal. Eighth, the Secretary of State and his department must have enhanced capacity to innovate, coordinate, and lead the interagency, especially in comprehensive forward planning. Ninth, the President's budget officials must be more able to link agency programs to presidential priorities. Tenth, the Congress should consider national security requirements in their totality, by means of joint committee deliberations and multiple-agency hearings.

Kennedy, John F. "Establishment of an Executive Committee of the National Security Council." National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 196. 22 October 1962. John F. Kennedy Library. Accessed 21 February 2008 http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/NSAMs.htm.

In keeping with the Jackson Subcommittee hearings on the NSC, President Kennedy rejected the large, complex, and formal NSC system of his predecessor. His preference for the concise and informal extended to his directions concerning NSC organization and processes. Kennedy's wishes appear in the minutes for the first NSC meeting, held February 1, 1961. Item 2401 on the "Organization and Procedures of the National Security Council" reads:

> The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs reported that in response to the President's desires a different organization and procedures would henceforth be used… involving fewer and smaller staff groups composed of more senior personnel. Policy

recommendations would be brought to the NSC without being obscured by inter-agency processing but with adequate previous consultation and the presentation of counter-proposals.

President Kennedy promptly abolished Eisenhower's Operations Coordinating Board with Executive Order 10920 of February 18, 1961. Kennedy eliminated NSC policy papers,[4] calling for policy review and development on a case-by-case basis rather than in the systematic fashion preferred by some administrations. The Bay of Pigs fiasco convinced the President that the State Department was not equipped to coordinate the interagency in a crisis,[5] and the Situation Room was born. During the Cuban Missile crisis, the President felt it would be valuable to record the NSC decisionmaking body that had evolved to meet his needs. NSAM 196 of October 22, 1962 formalized the Executive Committee of the NSC, essentially a reinvigorated National Security Council, usually chaired by the President, with revised attendance. The memo attached to NSAM 196 indicates NSC participants that served with distinction in the crisis, and gives a window into how the President actually made use of his national security machinery when the stakes were high. Kennedy's decision to record Executive Committee meetings allows researchers to gain further insight into the policymaking processes of his administration.

Johnson, Lyndon B. "The Direction, Coordination and Supervision of Interdepartmental Activities Overseas." National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 341. 2 March 1966. Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. Accessed 21 February 2008 http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/NSAMs/nsam341.asp.

Like Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy, President Johnson did not immediately issue a directive on NSC organization and procedures. When he did issue directives of this nature, they echoed the Kennedy administration's practice of addressing specific committees and topics rather than the national security system as a whole. One unique feature of Johnson's directives on NSC processes is the President's consistent effort to vest interagency coordination responsibilities in the State Department wherever possible.[6] Other postwar presidents have

[4] Jeffrey T. Richelson, "Presidential Directives and National Security Policy," essay to collection *Presidential Directives on National Security, Part II: From Harry Truman to George W. Bush,* Subsection: Kennedy-Johnson, Digital National Security Archive, The George Washington University, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/collections/content/PR/essayx.jsp [accessed October 19, 2007].

[5] The White House, *History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997*. "Kennedy Administration, 1961-1963," http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html [accessed October 19, 2007].

[6] NSAM 281 (2/11/64) gives the Secretary of State the authority to set procedures for and to promulgate certain National Policy Papers; NSAM 280 (2/14/64) establishes an interagency committee, chaired by a State Department official, to "permit an energetic, unified, and skillful prosecution" of the Vietnam war; NSAM 310 (7/8/64) assigns White House representative Michael Forrestal to assume the chairmanship when the State official is sent to Saigon; NSAM 308 (6/22/64) calls on the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs to coordinate the administration's public explanation of the war; and NSAM 313 (7/31/64) requests the Secretaries of State and Defense and the

tended to pay lip service to the State Department's primacy in the interagency, and subsequently have allowed this role to settle in White House. NSAM 341 is notable not because it was central to the decisionmaking process—Johnson preferred to consult with advisers individually and over his Tuesday lunches—but because it instituted an interagency system that was specifically rejected or revived by later administrations. NSAM 341 creates a "Senior Interdepartmental Group" (SIG) chaired by the Under Secretary of State and hosted by the Department of State. To support the SIG, it creates a series of "Interdepartmental Regional Groups" (IRGs) chaired by the Assistant Secretaries of State and corresponding to the geographical bureaus of the State Department. President Johnson made major wartime decisions from the White House, but the SIG-IRG system generated basic policy on non-crisis issues[7] and was assigned implementation oversight responsibilities. The Nixon administration explicitly rescinded NSAM 341; the Reagan administration implicitly reinstated it, lifting several paragraphs virtually verbatim from NSAM 341.

Nixon, Richard M. "Reorganization of the National Security Council System." National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 2. 20 January 1969. Nixon Presidential Library. Accessed 21 February 2008 http://nixon.archives.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/nsdm/nsdm_002.pdf.

Nixon began the tradition of using the first presidential directives of an administration to establish national security organization and procedures. National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 1 establishes a two-track/study-decision policy paper process to which the Nixon administration adhered with remarkable consistency. The Nixon administration was not the first to emphasize thorough review of national security issues before decisions were made. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations used the NSC paper series both to request extensive written reports and to communicate presidential decisions. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations requested written reports on certain topics but favored oral deliberations for policy review and recommendations. The new two-track system reflected the preferences of President Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger for systematic written development of policies linked to clear strategic objectives. Although some of Nixon's successors executed this concept more ably than others, the tradition held until the advent of the George W. Bush administration. Nixon was a vocal supporter of the Eisenhower NSC, which he had sat on and occasionally chaired as Vice President. By 1969, two Democratic administrations had tested the Jackson Subcommittee recommendations which had largely condemned the elaborate Eisenhower system. In NSDM-2 Nixon confidently reestablished the National Security Council as the "principal forum" for national security affairs, both for crisis management and

Director of the CIA to adhere to NSAM 308 and rein in their personnel after contradictory messages on Vietnam appeared in the press.

[7] John Prados, *Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush*, New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 159.

long-term planning. Breaking with Johnson, the President gave his Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs broad authority to coordinate interagency affairs and to lead the policy process. The State Department's involvement in top decisionmaking only returned when Kissinger himself became its Secretary upon the resignation of William Rogers.

Ford, Gerald R. "Functions and Organizations of National Security Council Sub-Groups." National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 326. 21 April 1976. Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. Accessed 21 February 2008 http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/nsdmnssm/nsdm326a.htm.

President Ford's first official word on the National Security Council was one of continuity. National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 265 reaffirmed the organization and procedures designed by President Nixon in January 1969. Fifteen months into his presidency, Ford decided to reshuffle the national security team to suit his own vision and needs. He recorded this change not by directive but in a November 3, 1975 press conference. Donald Rumsfeld would be his new Secretary of Defense; Brent Scowcroft was promoted to Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Scowcroft's nomination as national security adviser would allow Henry Kissinger to "devote his full time" to his position as Secretary of State; George H.W. Bush would become the Director of Central Intelligence; and Richard Cheney was promoted to Assistant to the President (equivalent to White House Chief of Staff). In response to press speculation that Kissinger's influence had been "substantially reduced," the President stated, "Secretary Kissinger will have the dominant role in the formulation and the carrying out of foreign policy." However, Ford did attempt to share NSC responsibilities more broadly among the principals. In his statement to the press, the President affirmed that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld would have the dominant military role in the administration. NSDM 326 clarifies and redistributes the leadership of twelve subcabinet or hybrid cabinet/subcabinet NSC subgroups. In the Nixon NSC, the majority of the subgroups had been controlled by Kissinger. In the Ford NSC, chairmanships were shared among the NSC, State, Defense, and the CIA. This shift can be interpreted as a move to improve morale and restore the balance on Ford's national security team.

Carter, James E. "The National Security Council System." Presidential Directive/National Security Council (PD/NSC) 2. 20 January 1977. Jimmy Carter Library. Accessed 21 February 2008 http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/pddirectives/pd02.pdf.

President Carter's reorganization of the National Security Council was signaled by Presidential Directive/National Security Council (PD/NSC) 2. The directive takes several cues from Nixon's NSDM-2. President Carter intended the reorganization to "place more responsibility in the departments and agencies," but over time this intention did not hold, the

result of an activist national security adviser with close ties to the President. The Carter administration kept several Nixon-Ford Interdepartmental Groups intact, but simplified NSC procedures at the top. Besides the NSC itself, there would be two principals-level committees, which in practice became full Council meetings when the President attended. The Policy Review Committee (PRC) had a fixed portfolio but ad hoc chairmanship and membership. It was designed to facilitate coordination "where the basic responsibilities fall primarily within a given department," and to direct the Interdepartmental Groups. The Special Coordination Committee (SCC) had a flexible portfolio and ad hoc membership but fixed chairmanship in the person of the national security adviser. It would deal with "cross-cutting issues requiring coordination in the development of options and the implementation of presidential decisions." Specific SCC responsibilities include oversight of covert operations, arms control, and perhaps most importantly for the Carter administration, crisis management. In practice, the Special Coordination Committee became the dominant NSC body. On the paper process, the Carter administration intentionally kept the number of NSC studies lower than during the Kissinger era. However, Carter and his advisers valued systematic policy review for major questions of national strategy, and the dual paper process served them well.[8]

President's Special Review Board. *The Tower Commission Report: The Full Text of the President's Special Review Board*. Part V. John Tower, Edmund Muskie, and Brent Scowcroft, members. New York: Bantam Books, Inc., and Times Books, Inc., 1987.

> The Board's recommendations are offered to those who face time constraints, high stakes, incomplete information, and the danger of premature disclosure, as the Reagan administration did. Judging from forty years of NSC history, the system seems to work best when it operates with clear presidential guidelines for NSC roles, relationships, and procedures. A successful NSC system requires presidential commitment to act *through* rather than *around* the executive agencies, and a corresponding commitment on the part of the agency heads to carry out the President's goals, designs, and policies. The national security adviser must verify that items on the Council agenda have been sufficiently vetted for depth and quality of analysis, including alternative courses of action, costs and benefits, related intelligence, legal considerations, and potential difficulties in implementation. Analysis and policy review are best accomplished in subcabinet interagency groups. In addition to reviewing agenda items, the national security adviser has the responsibility to keep NSC

[8] For example, President Carter called for a study (Policy Review Memorandum-10) of U.S. defense capabilities, alternatives, and resources requirements. In response to the interagency study, PD/NSC-18 recognized that "U.S.-Soviet relations will continue to be characterized by both competition and cooperation…" The directive outlined policies for exploiting U.S. advantages vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. PD/NSC-18 led to further decisions by the President (PD/NSC 41, 53, 57, 58, 59) to bolster U.S. survival capabilities in the event of a prolonged nuclear war.

principals informed and to maintain adequate records of NSC meetings and presidential decisions. The national security adviser is also responsible for monitoring and assessing the implementation of presidential policies. Implementation is the strength of the departments and agencies, not of the national security adviser. In addition to the role of NSC process manager, the national security adviser must walk a careful line between advising the President and using his proximity to cut out or outshine the NSC principals. Like the NSC Adviser, the NSC staff must not exclude the executive agencies, become implementers, or seek media attention. The staff should be small and experienced in public policy, drawn both from within and outside the government. Clear lines of authority and accountability must be drawn and no single department should predominate. There is no magic solution. "Process will not always produce brilliant ideas, but history suggests it can at least help prevent bad ideas from becoming presidential policy" (89).

Eight specific recommendations support the NSC model presented above. First, the National Security Act of 1947 as amended remains a fundamentally sound framework and should not be substantively altered. Second, the national security adviser should not be subject to Senate confirmation, because he serves the President as an adviser rather than a decision-maker or implementer. Third, the national security adviser should chair senior-level NSC committees, because he is the individual with the highest stake in making the NSC process successful. Fourth, senior decision-makers must set the example for leak-proof consideration of covert action within agreed parameters. Fifth, the line between intelligence and advocacy must be preserved. Sixth, the role of NSC legal adviser should be strengthened to provide the national security adviser and staff with expert counsel. Seventh, Congress should replace the existing Intelligence Committees with a joint committee with restricted staff to restore presidential confidence in the consultative process. Eighth, the use of people outside the U.S. government for diplomatic or covert activities should be the exception rather than the rule and should be closely supervised.

Reagan, Ronald. "Implementation of the Recommendations of the President's Special Review Board." National Security Decision Direction (NSDD) 266. 31 March 1987. Federation of American Scientists Intelligence Resource Program. Accessed 21 February 2008 http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/index.html.

Composed near the end of the Reagan administration, NSDD-266 is one of the richest presidential directives on national security organization and processes. It combines Reagan's original NSC directive, NSDD-2 of January 1982, with the recommendations of the President's Special Review Board (known as the Tower Board) following the Iran-Contra scandal. NSDD-

266 reaffirms the NSC as the principal forum for national security considerations. It emphasizes a concern for legality and proper record-keeping. NSDD-266 also modifies the interagency responsibilities of the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. As in the original Reagan directive, these officials are given the authority to direct, coordinate, and supervise interdepartmental activities in foreign policy, defense policy, and intelligence matters, respectively. However, their responsibility to prepare papers for NSC consideration has been removed and their policymaking role is now "subject to review within the NSC process." Reagan's top officials continued to be influential in policymaking, but his fifth and sixth Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, Frank Carlucci and Colin Powell, gradually assumed interagency coordination responsibilities. NSDD-266 gives refreshingly explicit descriptions of the national security adviser and the NSC executive secretary, revealing discontinuities between the NSC system as conceived in 1947 and what it had become by the mid-1980s. On the national security adviser, NSDD-266 declares that he will manage the NSC process, monitor policy implementation, advocate personal views, and yet honestly represent NSC principals' views to the President. On the Executive Secretary, the directive explains his role by quoting the original language of the National Security Act of 1947.[9] The juxtaposition raises questions about the statutory basis for the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, often portrayed as the natural successor to the Executive Secretary.

The Reagan NSC placed less emphasis on the policy review side of the two-track paper series than either Nixon or Carter (just fifty-three National Security Study Directives in eight years.) In certain cases, such as U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan Contras and involvement in the Lebanese conflict prior to the Marine barracks bombing, more extensive analysis would have been difficult to generate but may have led to sounder policies.

In addition to NSDD-266, NSDD-276 of June 9, 1987 is worth noting because it revises the interagency process established in NSDD-2—itself modeled on Johnson's NSAM-341. The June 1987 directive refers to twenty-two Senior Interagency Groups and some fifty-five Interagency Groups, many of which, "although formally established, have not met or ceased to meet." NSDD-276 reduces the number of NSC committees; George H.W. Bush will simplify it even further.

Bush, George H.W. "Organization of the National Security Council System." National Security Directive (NSD) 1. 30 January 1989. George Bush Presidential Library. Accessed 21 February 2008 http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/nsd/nsd1.pdf.

National Security Directive-1 both simplified and extended the NSC organization of the late Reagan era, detailed in National Security Decision Directives-266 and -276. NSD-1

[9] See U.S. Code Title 50, section 402c.

reaffirms the National Security Council itself as the principal forum for consideration of national security affairs. It eliminates the principals-level National Security Planning Group and Senior Review Group, and the deputies-level Policy Review Group of the late Reagan period. In their place, the directive establishes the Principals Committee and Deputies Committee, which will be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Deputy Assistant, respectively. The Reagan interagency committee structure has been replaced by a series of Policy Coordination Committees (PCC) at the Assistant Secretary level. The PCCs are given regional and functional mandates, to be chaired by representatives of the relevant agency. However, the PCC for arms control will be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Brent Scowcroft. The Assistant to the President will appoint an NSC staffer to serve as the Executive Secretary of each Policy Coordinating Committee, with monitoring, liaison, and recordkeeping duties—a priority carried over from the Tower Board. An October 1989 supplement to NSD-1 assigned crisis management responsibilities to the Deputies Committee, which proved its worth in the Persian Gulf crisis. One factor in their success was a phenomenon sought after since Truman, namely, deputies with credibility and access to their principals.[10]

Clinton, William J. "Organization of the National Security Council." Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 2. 20 January 1993. Federation of American Scientists Intelligence Resource Program. Accessed 21 February 2008 http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-2.htm.

President Clinton modeled his national security system largely on the Bush NSC, the first time an administration adopted the major NSC features of its immediate predecessor. Features still intact in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 2 included the Principals Committee, the Deputies Committee, and working groups to support them. Clinton's adoption of the Bush system seems to indicate that the Tower Commission findings were still relevant, since the Bush NSC itself took its lead from the Tower Commission's 1987 report. One durable post-Tower Board assumption is that the Principals Committee (minus the President) ought to be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, since he or she is most invested in the interagency process. In the Ford administration, National Security Adviser Scowcroft chaired one of several principals-level committees, and in the Carter administration, Brzezinski had chaired the dominant principals-level committee. The Reagan administration saw this as an aberration and emphasized the national security adviser's subcabinet status until NSDD-276 (June 1987) created the principals-level Senior Review Group, chaired by the adviser. Clinton's PDD-2 describes the duties of the Principals Committee in language that can be traced back to the Senior Review Group mandate, namely, that it will "review, coordinate, and monitor the development and implementation of national security policy." Unfortunately, much of the NSC archives from the Clinton era remain classified, making it difficult to gauge Clinton NSC processes from the outside.

[10] Karl Inderfurth and Loch Johnson, *Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council*, Editors' Introduction to Part IV, 99.

Clinton innovated by creating a National Economic Council parallel to the National Security Council via Executive Order 12835 of January 25, 1993. The President tried hard to forestall unnecessary competition between the National Security Council and the new National Economic Council (NEC). He wanted international economic aspects of foreign policy to be considered in an integrated fashion with traditional foreign policy priorities. Clinton felt that a full-fledged economic interagency process, rather than a single adviser, would be necessary to achieve the regular, high-level consideration of international economics that he desired. The Executive Order instituted the National Economic Council, the position of Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and a staff to serve the Council. Clinton attempted to minimize the institutional tensions between the national economic adviser (Robert Rubin) and the Secretary of the Treasury (Lloyd Bentsen) by reaffirming the Secretary of the Treasury as the President's "senior economic official" and "chief economic spokesperson." Potential NSC-NEC tensions would be solved by a shared NSC-NEC economics staff. I.M. Destler explains: "Rather than recruiting separate international economic staffs, they would share one. Aides in this sphere would wear two hats...Each reported up two chains of command: Rubin/Cutter and Lake/Berger."[11] This unique arrangement was a successful one, thanks to good interpersonal relationships and processes carefully designed to facilitate them.

The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century. *Hart-Rudman Commission.* Phases I-III. Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman, co-chairs. Federation of American Scientists. Accessed 5 March 2008 http://www.fas.org/man/docs/nwc/.[12]

"New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century." Hart-Rudman Phase I. 15 September 1999.

The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century consisted of fourteen members, seven Republicans and seven Democrats, with distinguished careers in Congress, the executive branch, the military services, the media, and public policy organizations. The first phase of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century assessed the world emerging in the first quarter of the 21st century. The Commission named a wide range of traditional and non-traditional national security challenges facing the United States, including the role of technology to empower adversaries and sharpen ideological divides, and the

[11] Quoted in Inderfurth and Johnson, *Fateful Decisions,* 101.

[12] The official site, www.nssg.gov, was not available at the time of this writing.

availability of weapons of mass destruction and mass disruption in the hands of hostile groups around the world. It discerned contradicting global trends of integration and fragmentation. It predicted both continuity (such as U.S. military dominance, the importance of fossil fuels, and the relevance of state sovereignty) and change (such as military competition in space, difficulty sustaining alliances, and simultaneously increasing wealth and decreasing security in many countries.) The Commission called for a new strategy to make Americans safer in a changing global security environment.

"Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom." Hart-Rudman Phase II. 15 April 2000.

The second phase of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century outlined a national security strategy for the next 25 years, based on the global assessment in Phase I. It judged that the United States must ground its strategy in the national interest, maintain strength over the long-term, rise to positive as well as negative challenges, encourage international systems that can share U.S. burdens, resist limitless commitments, and live up to its own principles. The Commission defined three categories of national interests for the President to prioritize: *survival* interests, such as defense against direct attack and the preservation of America's constitutional system, *critical* interests, such as the security of international energy, economic, transportation, and public health systems, and *significant* interests, such as the global institutionalization of the rule of law and human rights. Based on this ordering of national interests, the Commission determined key objectives for U.S. national security policy, and delineated strategies for achieving them. The Commission defined parameters for the use of force and called for a balancing of five kinds of military capabilities (nuclear, homeland security, conventional, expeditionary/intervention, and humanitarian/constabulary) to match the existing and projected threat environment. The Commission judged that improving the interagency process around existing structures would not suffice. It concluded that the U.S. government must reorganize to execute this national security strategy to avoid becoming a merely reactionary institution.

"Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change." Hart-Rudman Phase III. 31 January 2001.

The third phase of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century proposes changes to ensure the implementation of the national security strategy outlined in Phase II.

To do this, the Commission examined the structures and processes of the national security apparatus. Recommendation 14 states that the President should guide a top-down strategic planning process and delegate authority to the national security adviser to coordinate that process. Recommendation 15 addresses the need for an integrated national security budget to serve the goals that emerge from the strategic planning process, in addition to individual department and agency budget submissions. Recommendation 18 calls for the abolition of the National Economic Council and the distribution of its responsibilities to the Domestic Policy Council and National Security Council. Recommendation 19 proposes a State Department reorganization at the Under Secretary level, to strengthen decisionmaking processes ("Someone would actually be in charge,") to represent State views at the NSC, and to improve accountability to the President and to Congress. Recommendation 21 aims to improve strategic planning and strategy-budget links at the State Department through a new Strategic Planning, Assistance, and Budget Office. Likewise, to improve Defense Department strategic planning processes, Recommendation 24 calls for a new office of an Assistant Secretary for Strategy and Planning, replacing the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, whose mandate has been integrated into activities across the Department. Recommendation 27 states that the Quadrennial Defense Review should be moved to the second year of a presidential term. Recommendation 33 calls on the Secretary of Defense to update force sizing processes away from the concept of two major theater wars to reflect recent trends, intelligence estimates, and newly articulated national security objectives. Recommendation 35 calls for an increased emphasis on space policy coordination at the NSC, including the creation of an Interagency Working Group on Space. Recommendation 36 calls for a top-down process for prioritizing intelligence, using NSC guidance. In concert with initiatives adopted by the Congress, Recommendation 49 calls for an increased commitment from the Executive branch to consult with Congress on national security, recognizing that effective consultation can improve the quality of foreign and national security policy. Finally, recommendation 50 calls for presidential leadership in implementing the proposed reforms, by means of an independent advisory commission, a prestigious presidential adviser, a joint Executive-Legislative commission, a group of "Wise Men," a special NSC committee, or a combination of these.

Bush, George W. "Organization of the National Security Council System." National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 1. 13 February 2001. Federation of American Scientists Intelligence Resource Program. Accessed 21 February 2008 http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm.

Many key documents on George W. Bush NSC processes remain classified, but NSPD-1 gives a window into the President's initial vision for the NSC. Like most first NSC directives since Nixon's NSDM-2, it harks back to its legal roots in the original 1947 Act, as amended.

NSPD-1 keeps the Clinton-era institutions of the National Economic Council and staff, Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and a continued strong role for the Secretary of the Treasury. The directive also draws a line back to the George H.W. Bush administration: "The NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC) will continue to be the senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security, as it has since 1989." The Principals/Deputies committee structure arose out of the 1987 Tower Board recommendations, which held that the top interagency committees should be chaired by the impartial, coordination-oriented NSC adviser and deputy. NSPD-1 echoes NSDD-266 in its emphasis on legality, stating that the Attorney General will advise the President on legal matters and that the President's Counsel will be consulted regarding NSC Principals Committee meeting agendas. NSPD-1 echoes the pledges of many presidential directives to fully analyze issues that come before the NSC, stating that the Deputies Committee "shall also help ensure that issues being brought before the NSC/PC or the NSC have been properly analyzed and prepared for decision." As in the senior Bush administration, the Deputies Committee is designated both as a policy review and a crisis management body. In the administration's biggest crisis, the attacks of September 11, 2001, the initial crisis management was conducted simultaneously at the Defense Department and at the White House, and then by the President himself when he was available. Seven weeks after the attack, the President signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 1. HSPD-1 calls for a Homeland Security Council (HSC) to "ensure coordination of all homeland security-related activities among executive departments and agencies and promote the effective development and implementation of all homeland security policies." HSC organization and processes mirror those of the NSC, but the membership is much broader, reflecting the many participants involved in homeland security. There are conflicting reports about how national security policies were made in the first term of George W. Bush. As a rule, it appears that the President leaned more on individual advisers to develop policy options than on official NSC meetings and subcommittees.

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. *9/11 Commission Report*. July 2004. Accessed 14 March 2008 http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/index.htm.

"Foresight—and Hindsight"

The 9/11 attacks revealed a failure of imagination. Presidents Clinton and Bush and their top advisers were concerned about the al Qaeda threat and took steps to address it, but it appears that they did not fully understand how many Americans al Qaeda might kill, and how soon. U.S. government agencies had considered al Qaeda hijacking scenarios, but they failed to push them further, test them, look for gaps, and correct them. After Pearl Harbor, the

intelligence community developed processes for forestalling surprise attacks, but these were not applied to the possibility of a large-scale al Qaeda attack without weapons of mass destruction. The United States must find a way to institutionalize imagination. The 9/11 attacks also revealed a failure of policy. The Clinton and Bush administrations had opportunities to mount major action against al Qaeda, but they considered the most far-reaching solution—denying the group sanctuary in Afghanistan—disproportionate and inconceivable. This option was never on the agenda in formal interagency meetings. The third failure revealed by the 9/11 attacks was a failure of capabilities. The Clinton administration relied on the CIA to lead long-term planning against terrorist sanctuaries. The Bush administration began to envision a Defense Department role, but the Secretary of Defense was focused on other threats. The most serious capabilities gap lay in the domestic agencies—the FBI, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Federal Aviation Administration, and others.

Finally, the 9/11 attacks revealed a failure of management. Several agencies had pieces of information about the movements of potential terrorists, but had no orders to share the information with other agencies or to persist when tracking activities faltered. The Director of Central Intelligence lacked the authority to discipline the intelligence community in counterterrorism efforts. The Director lacked an overall counterterrorism intelligence budget. The relationship between the FBI director on the one hand, and the President and National Security Council on the other, was nearly nonexistent during the Clinton administration. This was ironic, since the FBI had sole responsibility for domestic intelligence gathering on terrorism. The U.S. government must improve management of counterterrorism operations by pooling intelligence, planning, and conducting joint interagency operations.

## “What to do? A Global Strategy”

The United States must develop a strategy to protect the nation against terrorism, and reorganize the government to serve this strategy. There are two aspects to the terrorist enemy: the al Qaeda network itself, and the ideology that gives rise to Islamist terrorism. A broad political-military counterterrorism strategy rests on a tripod of policies, namely, attacking terrorists, preventing the continued growth of Islamist terrorism, and preparing defenses against future attacks. Planning does make a difference, allowing limited resources to be allocated effectively. The goals in a war on terrorism seem unlimited. Policies need concrete objectives and agencies must be able to measure their success in achieving these objectives. The U.S. government cannot promise that a catastrophic attack like that of 9/11 will never happen again, but it must develop realistic objectives, effective organization, and standards of performance for the American people to judge.

To implement the policy of attacking terrorists and their organizations, the U.S. government must identify and prioritize terrorist sanctuaries, create realistic strategies to keep terrorists on the run, and work with partner countries. To implement the policy of preventing the continued growth of Islamist terrorism, the U.S. government must define what America stands for, offering a vision of a better future, acting in defense of Muslims, and engaging other nations in the struggle against terrorism. To implement the policy of protecting against and preparing for future attacks, the U.S. government must create a strategy to intercept and constrain terrorists, raise U.S. and global border security standards, improve information sharing among government agencies while safeguarding civil liberties, prioritize infrastructure protection, and require emergency response agencies nationwide to adopt unified command procedures in exchange for federal homeland security funding.

"How to do it? A Different Way of Organizing the Government"

The present national security institutions are constructed to win the Cold War. The generation that experienced 9/11 has the responsibility to restructure the government. Incremental, ad hoc adjustments to the system are not enough. The Commission offers recommendations to achieve unity of effort in the U.S. government. To achieve unity of effort across the foreign-domestic divide, the President should establish an interagency National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) for joint planning and joint intelligence. The existing Homeland Security Council should be merged into the National Security Council to improve coordination at the White House. Since the NCTC would have interagency planning authority, strong agencies would be asked to give up some of their authority in exchange for a more efficient government-wide effort.

To achieve unity of effort in the intelligence community, the Director of Central Intelligence should be replaced by a National Intelligence Director. The new director would oversee interagency intelligence centers, manage the national intelligence program, and oversee the agencies that contribute to it. The current Director of Central Intelligence lacks the policy and operational influence that comes with control over purse strings, ability to hire and fire, and ability to set standards for intelligence agencies. A stronger joint intelligence process would help reduce structural barriers, establish common standards, centralize management of intelligence capabilities, and strengthen the capacity to prioritize and move resources where they are most needed.

The nation requires unity of effort in executive branch information sharing and in congressional oversight. Effective intelligence analysis is essential for informed national security decisionmaking. The biggest impediment is the resistance to sharing information across agencies. Weighing the risk of inadvertent disclosure, the Commission advocates a

major shift from a need-to-know culture to a need-to-share culture. Congress must do its part to facilitate national security policymaking by reforming its committee structure. Congress should create a joint committee or a combined authorization-appropriation committee in each house to enhance oversight of intelligence and counterterrorism activities. Similarly, Congress should create a single point of oversight and review for homeland security. The creation of a new domestic intelligence agency is unnecessary. Congress must also help minimize disruptions in national security policymaking during presidential transitions by streamlining confirmations. The outgoing administration must also help to reduce vulnerabilities by compiling a classified document cataloguing threats, operations, and pending decisions on the use of force.

To achieve unity of effort in securing the homeland, the responsibilities and authorities of the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security must be clarified. The Department of Defense has the primary responsibility to defend the homeland, by means of Northern Command. The Department of Defense and its oversight committees should regularly assess and update Northern Command's strategies and planning. The Department of Homeland Security has the secondary responsibility to defend the homeland. Like the Department of Defense, it must regularly assess the threat environment, adequacy of homeland security planning, progress in building homeland security capabilities, and readiness to respond to threats.

U.S. White House. *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned.* February 2006. Accessed 7 March 2008 http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/.

When Hurricane Katrina disabled critical State and local infrastructure such as hospitals, communications, and law enforcement capabilities, it became clear that a Federal response was essential to manage the catastrophe. However, with the exception of the Department of Defense and the Coast Guard, the Federal response to the crisis was inefficient and in many cases inadequate. Responding to catastrophes such as Hurricane Katrina requires a transformation in Homeland Security processes. Specifically, Katrina showed the need for increased Federal leadership to foster preparedness and unity of effort in Federal, State, and local governments, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, communities across the nation, and individual citizens.

The Federal government must create a National Preparedness System that links strategies with resources and implementation; provides interagency coordination and joint training; creates a Unified Command structure for all levels of government in emergencies; integrates governmental and non-governmental planning and response; and emphasizes feedback and remedial procedures when deficiencies are identified. Before Hurricane Katrina, the Federal

government had plans, policies, and guidelines for disasters, such as the National Response Plan and the Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan. None enabled the Federal government to play its central role of organizing the public and private efforts to manage the crisis. The National Response Plan was complex, largely unknown, and took too long to implement when rapid relief was needed. The Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan provided strategic guidance to Federal, State, and local entities in identifying infrastructure for protection, but there was no supporting implementation plan to protect the identified infrastructure. The Department of Homeland Security's command and control processes were unclear, and often overlapping. When Hurricane Katrina struck, the nation was still operating in a culture of federalism, in which local and State governments wait to reach their limits and exhaust their resources before requesting Federal assistance. The new National Preparedness System will clarify the Federal role in offering anticipatory assistance and coordinating the national response to large-scale natural or man-made disasters.

The National Preparedness System should be modeled on the highly successful national security system. The national security system is characterized by deliberate planning, risk assessment, policy development, mission and task identification, and matching capabilities. The Combatant Command model, in which a regional commander has operational control of forces and assets owned and equipped by the armed services, is not appropriate for Homeland Security scenarios. In cases like Katrina, State and local governments and non-governmental organizations will generally operate their own resources. The Federal role will be to improve national planning and response processes. In addition, the Federal role will be to foster a culture of preparedness in all levels of government, the private sector, non-governmental organizations, communities, and individual citizens. The National Preparedness System will reinforce the Department of Homeland Security's role in managing the Federal response and will strengthen individual department and agency response capabilities. The National Preparedness System will develop joint preparedness training and worst-case crisis exercises, such as the scenarios run by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. The National Preparedness System will require homeland security partners to regularly assess their readiness and will provide processes for translating lessons learned into corrective action.

U.S. Department of State. "Triggering Mechanisms for 'Whole-of-Government' Planning for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation." Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). Paper for Policy Coordination Committee on Reconstruction and Stabilization. N. IzzoJackson and C. Skerry. 25 January 2007. Unclassified.

This document establishes a process for deciding when to set whole-of-government planning in motion to address conflicts and natural disasters overseas. The process is differentiated into "long-term" (defined as up to 2-3 years) and "crisis" scenarios. Decisions

to begin whole-of-government long-term planning should be prioritized based on the following factors: importance to U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives, potential magnitude of the conflict, potential for U.S. military involvement, likelihood, as determined by U.S. government and other assessments, and capacity of the affected country and its neighbors to respond. Suggestions to conduct long-term planning for a country may originate below the senior level, in the Reconstruction and Stabilization Policy Coordinating Committee (R&S PCC) of the NSC. The R&S PCC will determine the list of countries requiring whole-of-government planning, forward recommendations to the Deputies Committee or Principals Committee, and hold follow-up meetings to reassess the list of countries and related planning efforts. The planning process itself will be coordinated by the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and will include the policy leadership from the appropriate agencies and the core country team.

The decision to begin whole-of-government crisis planning may be triggered by a variety of indicators, such as actual or potential U.S. military involvement, impending or actual genocide or "massive and grave violations of human rights," significant threat to U.S. citizens or facilities, and economic collapse or environmental damage with the potential to undermine regional stability. Due to potential urgency in jumpstarting whole-of-government planning, the decision may be triggered by senior officials, or by the R&S PCC with the concurrence of the State Regional Assistant Secretary and the Chief of Mission. Recommendations to begin whole-of-government crisis planning may come from any member of any relevant PCC, State Department, or USAID bureau, and initial crisis analysis may be conducted within S/CRS.

This process attempts to establish clear responsibilities in the interagency for anticipating and responding to potentially destabilizing international events. As indicated by the title, this process is focused on reconstruction, stabilization and conflict transformation rather than the entire range of national security contingencies, and is essentially a near-term planning process. The broader process to implement National Security Presidential Directive 44 on improving the civilian-military partnership in reconstruction and stabilization is detailed in a R&S PCC document entitled "Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization."

Congressional Research Service. "Executive Branch Reorganization and Management Initiatives: A Brief Overview." CRS Report for Congress. Harold C. Relyea. Updated 10 July 2007. Accessed 9 April 2008 http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33441.pdf.

The President does not currently have reorganization plan authority, which is seen as a way to expedite the legislative process for reorganizations. According to the original 1932 statute, Congress had a 60-day period in which to approve or disapprove a proposed reorganization. The President had statutory authority to issue executive orders proposing

reorganization for most of the period between 1932 and 1984. Reauthorization of the authority was not requested by Presidents Reagan, Bush, or Clinton. President George W. Bush recommended the restoration of reorganization plan authority in July 2002 but Congress has shown only fleeting interest. Still, major reorganizations such as the creation of the Department of Homeland Security have been accomplished since 1984 under the constitutionally based legislative process. The President may make minor executive branch reorganizations with a presidential directive or executive order, but any attempt to achieve significant reorganization by presidential directive risks incurring Congressional displeasure and subsequent legislative and fiscal reaction.

## II. SECONDARY SOURCES ON NATIONAL SECURITY PROCESSES

Daalder, Ivo H. and I.M. Destler. "A New NSC for a New Administration." National Security Council Project. Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland and the Brookings Institution. November 2000. Accessed 19 October 2007 http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2000/11governance_daalder.aspx.

The NSC is a durable institution, uniquely situated to manage the policymaking process, ensuring that the President and his top advisers benefit from the full range of policy options. The authors recommend eight features of a successful National Security Council system based on analysis of past trends, strengths, and pitfalls. The NSC must be strong, with the authority to chair interagency groups, bring disparate agencies together, advise the President, and ensure that policies are implemented. It must be straight, earning the trust of the key NSC principals by keeping them informed. The NSC must be sharing, including all players with a substantial stake in a given issue. It must be subdued: "The adviser and staff must keep a low profile, limit press contacts, and work principally within the executive branch," rather than expending resources on Congressional and media outreach. The NSC staff should be largely senior, experienced in government and able to work with senior and upper-middle level officials. It must remain small, with a maximum of 40-45 professional staff, which will be possible when support functions such as media and congressional relations are returned to the White House proper or the other agencies. The NSC committee structure should remain slim, with no more than five regional and five functional directorates, and with the ability to relocate rapidly expanding subunits outside the NSC. Increasingly operational NSC directorates should be moved elsewhere in the Executive Office of the President or, even better, to a department or agency. The NSC adviser and staff must be self-disciplined, resisting the natural temptation to broaden their portfolios and to grow as a result.

Michele A. Flournoy and Shawn W. Brimley, "Strategic Planning for National Security: A New Project Solarium," Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 41, Spring 2006.

The United States has no truly effective strategic planning process for national security. The 2002 National Security Strategy is valuable in describing a destination, but not in providing a comprehensive roadmap for getting there. Individual agencies conduct strategic planning of varying quality. Efforts are stovepiped rather than integrated in a comprehensive interagency process. Top-level decisions are made in an environment in which the urgent crowds out the important. Harried senior officials lack incentives to participate in long-range planning. Eisenhower's Project Solarium combined presidential leadership with an inclusive strategic planning process that preserved alternative analysis and contrarian viewpoints. The trend since Eisenhower has been a declining willingness or ability at the NSC to perform strategic threat assessments and planning. As the national security adviser has evolved into a central administration player, the NSC adviser and staff have lost the ability to drive an extended long-term strategic planning process. Formal NSC meetings have been eclipsed by informal mechanisms. Although informal mechanisms are vital, they cannot replace the analytical debate, long-range thinking, and real policy alternatives that a formal process provides.

In order to integrate all the elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, economic, etc.), the authors propose a three-part strategic planning process. First, a Quadrennial National Security Review would identify and prioritize national security objectives and develop a strategy with implementation guidance to achieve them. The review would precede other agency reviews, such as the Quadrennial Defense Review, and would produce both internal planning guidance and the unclassified National Security Strategy mandated by Congress. Second, an interagency process would regularly assess threats and inform senior decision makers of challenges and opportunities. This process would include initial roundtable discussions to assess national security threats, semiannual "Over the Horizon" reviews to proactively address long-term trends and possible wild cards, and annual crisis simulations for senior officials to identify gaps in U.S. capabilities and form plans to close them. To facilitate this process, a new NSC Senior Director and Office of Strategic Planning would coordinate the quadrennial review, draft and staff the internal planning guidance and National Security Strategy, assist the Director of National Intelligence in preparing over-the-horizon reviews, and oversee the annual national security crisis exercises. Third, a new resource allocation process would match fiscal guidance with the President's national security priorities. Government-wide mission reviews should be conducted for high priority areas such as combating terrorism or homeland security in order to identify and

correct gaps, duplication, or misalignment of effort. For high-priority areas, the administration would present budgets to Congress both in the traditional form and as a crosscut. No process can guarantee a successful national security policy, but these steps will enhance the President's ability to apply all elements of national power to present and future challenges.

Murdock, Clark A. and Michèle A. Flournoy, lead investigators. *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era.* Phase 2 Report. Center for Strategic and International Studies. July 2005.

An improved strategic planning, programming, and budgeting process for the interagency will increase the federal government's ability to "connect the dots." An improved strategic planning process will include elements such as a Quadrennial National Security Review and semi-annual "Over the Horizon" interagency reviews at the deputies' level. An improved programming and budgeting process will include elements to strengthen the link between policy priorities and their implementation, such as a clear, agreed set of roles and responsibilities for interagency stakeholders in key mission areas, and combined NSC/Office of Management and Budget mission area reviews for top national security priorities. These processes should be facilitated by the creation of a national security career path to develop "jointness" across the government. "Process and organizational structures are not substitutes for good policy, but they can enable its formulation and execution."

Unity of effort across the U.S. government is imperative because it can determine whether the United States succeeds or fails in a given operation. Operational failures, such as the inability to stabilize and rebuild Somalia and more recently, post-conflict Iraq, may have stemmed in part from misguided policy but also in part from poor policy execution. Unlike the U.S. military, the U.S. government as a whole lacks established procedures for complex interagency operations. Over the last two decades, civilian and military leaders have tended to develop new approaches for each operation, ignoring lessons learned and best practices from previous operations. Joint Interagency Coordination Groups, Civilian-Military Centers, and other innovations have had varying degrees of success in improving integration. The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols team proposes a more comprehensive and integrated set of initiatives to improve interagency planning and execution of complex operations. For example, while not directing operations themselves, NSC staffers must take a more active oversight role to ensure that the President's intent is being realized on the ground; agencies other than DoD must increase their capacity to contribute to the planning process; rapidly deployable Interagency Crisis Planning Teams should develop truly integrated plans for a given operation and should coordinate with the relevant Combatant Commander; and

Interagency Task Forces should be established in the field, led by a civilian Special Representative and a Commander of the Joint Task Force, and supported by a fully integrated staff. Interagency operations are the next frontier of jointness. The U.S. government must build these capabilities, but in the short term, the U.S. military will continue to bear a disproportionate share of the planning and execution of complex interagency operations.

Aaron L. Friedberg, "Strengthening U.S. Strategic Planning," *The Washington Quarterly* 31:1, Winter 2007/2008, The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, pp. 47-60.

The U.S. government must significantly improve its capacity for serious, sustained national strategic planning. This will require both institutional and intellectual changes. The purpose of a national strategic planning process is to help top officials make strategic decisions, not to create a comprehensive strategy document or generate operational plans. The four key tasks of strategic planning are to 1) develop alternative strategies and systematically weigh their costs and benefits, 2) regularly assess the performance of the current strategy, 3) examine key contingencies and make preliminary response plans, and 4) identify emerging trends that may affect U.S. strategic planning. Barriers to improving U.S. strategic planning capacities include bureaucratic resistance to a centralized planning process, lack of trust due to a pervasive culture of leaks, and attitudes of busy officials who assume that annual strategic statements or informal strategic examination will suffice. The U.S. government could strengthen its strategic planning capabilities in at least three ways. First, an Eisenhower-style Planning Board would synchronize the collective thought and action of the entire executive branch while attempting to maximize relevance to NSC principals and avoid interagency disputes. Second, an NSC strategic planning directorate would assist the national security adviser in assessing current strategy, presenting alternative approaches, examining critical contingencies, and identifying emerging trends. This option would be top down, with no direct input from or follow-up mechanisms in the agencies. Third, a 2-3 person NSC strategic planning cell would raise the quality of the government's strategic thinking but would be limited by manpower and weak connections to the rest of the bureaucracy. Recent executive branch changes have done little if anything to improve U.S. government capacity for strategic thought and action. There is no perfect strategic planning process, but the absence of any process makes strategic errors more likely.

Karl F. Inderfurth and Loch K. Johnson, eds., *Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council*, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

This collection of primary and secondary NSC sources devotes sections to NSC origins, evolution, notable national security advisers, case studies, trends and controversies, and reform proposals. Key points concerning NSC processes are presented here by administration.

*Truman.* President Truman wanted a top-level permanent committee to integrate foreign and military policies. But although he wanted the NSC to advise him on major national security decisions, he made it clear that he alone would make policy. He intended the Secretary of State to chair the NSC when he was not presiding, and relied heavily on the State Department, led first by Marshall and then by Acheson, for policy advice and coordination. Truman's Executive Secretary, Sidney Souers, saw his role as "an anonymous servant of the Council"—hardly what comes to mind when one thinks of Kissinger, Brzezinski, Berger, or Rice. At one point, Truman rejected a proposal to task the Executive Secretary with monitoring the implementation of presidential decisions, on the grounds that this was the proper function of the departments, not the NSC. When the Korean conflict broke out, Truman designated the NSC as his crisis coordination committee.

*Eisenhower.* President Eisenhower wanted the NSC to help him "make the right plans in time." His NSC system was characterized by a complex network of committees and clear lines of authority. It featured a "policy hill" that channeled policy recommendations up through a Planning Board to the Council itself, where the President presided 90% of the time. Once the President made his decision, policy flowed back down through the Operations Coordinating Board to the executive agencies. Controversial aspects of the Operations Coordinating Board included its responsibility to translate policy into specific guidance when necessary and to monitor policy implementation. The highly structured and formal NSC system suited Eisenhower's military background and his expectations for well-staffed work. With the exception of Kennedy and Johnson, all future presidents followed Eisenhower's precedent of establishing a formal NSC system suited to their own decision-making style and priorities. Eisenhower's "institutionalized" NSC served the administration well during emergencies: agencies were able to keep functioning, knowing that they were following the presidentially approved policy guidance generated by NSC deliberations. Critics felt the Eisenhower NSC was overstaffed and excessively rigid. In their eyes, it had become a "paper mill" producing watered-down policy recommendations and stifling innovation.

*Kennedy.* President Kennedy felt that the Eisenhower NSC had stifled policy alternatives and produced lowest common denominator recommendations. Long-term policy planning on the scale of the previous administration was abandoned as the Kennedy administration

focused on day-to-day operations and crisis management. Kennedy preferred to make major decisions with few people present. He met 3-4 times per week with the core NSC members and advisers (minus the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) but avoided larger, formal NSC meetings. Kennedy embarked on the "committee killing" suggested in the Jackson subcommittee report, specifically the Operations Coordinating Board. He abolished the Planning Board and replaced it with ad hoc interagency task forces on specific problems. Kennedy convened a special group of the NSC, the Executive Committee (ExComm) to deal with the Cuban Missile crisis. Kennedy originally wanted the State Department to coordinate and lead the policy process. However, he soon became frustrated at the Department's inflexibility, unresponsiveness, and even insubordination on certain policy matters. He then required McGeorge Bundy and the NSC staff to become what he wised the State Department had been. Bundy's staff of foreign and defense policy experts became the President's "eyes and ears," a "mini-State Department." It was their responsibility to prod the bureaucracy on its analysis, provide additional policy options when the President wanted more choices, and kept a close watch on implementation. National Security Adviser Bundy worked hard to keep Dean Rusk (State) and Robert McNamara (DOD) well informed.

*Johnson.* There was considerable continuity in the National Security Council processes from the Kennedy administration into the Johnson administration. Johnson kept Kennedy's use of the NSC as a presidential staff, and echoed Kennedy's desire to restore the role of the State Department in planning and coordinating foreign policy. Differences in Johnson's approach were his heavy reliance on the Secretaries of State and Defense, his informal Tuesday lunches, and his increasing use of the national security adviser as public spokesman for administration policies. Even as the national security adviser gained prominence in the Johnson administration, the National Security Council lost its role as a forum for high-level policy decisions. The NSC staff also atrophied. Johnson established the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) to oversee the implementation of foreign policy initiatives, but the SIG was never very effective at interagency coordination. Johnson's Tuesday lunches assembled a small group of advisers "whose advice the President wanted most to hear," and who could be trusted not to leak sensitive information. Some criticized the group as a "procedural nightmare," complaining that the lack of recordkeeping made it difficult to implement presidential decisions that were made in the Tuesday meetings.

*Nixon.* On the campaign trail, Nixon pledged to "restore the National Security Council to its prominent role in national security planning," linking the foreign policy failures of his predecessors to neglect of the NSC. Nixon's criticism was shared by many NSC observers, who felt that the Kennedy-Johnson years had erred on the side of informality to the detriment of long-range planning. Eight years earlier, Senator Jackson and others had made the opposite criticism about Eisenhower's NSC, calling for a less rigid and more creative policymaking system. Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger sought to combine the flexibility of the Johnson NSC with the reliable processes of

the Eisenhower NSC. The stated intention was to present the President with a cost-benefit analysis of all realistic alternatives, and to give all interested agencies a voice. At the same time, according to Kissinger, the President's other objective was to centralize foreign policy control in the White House rather than in the State Department. To support the prominent role the President intended for Kissinger, the NSC was given fifty professional and eighty support personnel. One of the principal ways Kissinger interacted with the bureaucracy was to assign National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM) on a range of near-term and long-term issues. Initially, the NSSM process generated a steady flow of options to the President and engaged the bureaucracy in the interagency process. However, some became suspicious that the NSSMs were intended to provide the bureaucracy with busywork while Kissinger and the NSC staff did the real foreign policy work of the administration. Kissinger was foreign policy spokesman and even media star. White House-State Department relations deteriorated to the point that Secretary Rogers resigned in August 1973. At that point, Kissinger became secretary of state as well as national security adviser, and much of the foreign policy work shifted to State. Kissinger's dominance in foreign policy contributed to a resistant permanent bureaucracy and a neglected NSC "system." As Kissinger became more preoccupied with day-to-day foreign policy operations, the NSC committees and processes lost relevance.

*Ford.* Sensitive to criticisms of Kissinger's control of foreign policy, Ford took away his NSC role and gave it to Kissinger's NSC deputy, Air Force Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft. Despite Kissinger's continued dominance in the NSC system, the new national security adviser brought the adviser's position closer to the original job description of a neutral manager and coordinator of National Security Council business.

*Carter.* President Carter had four initial objectives for his National Security Council: 1) avoid excessive centralization and secretiveness and move away from "lone ranger" diplomacy, 2) emphasize the responsibility of cabinet, especially the Secretary of State, 3) create a process responsive to presidential control, and 4) restore a sense of collegiality. Carter's NSC had two cabinet-level committees, the Policy Review Committee and the Special Coordination Committee. The first committee would be chaired by the relevant department head, usually the Secretary of State, and the second committee would be chaired by the national security adviser, an unprecedented arrangement. The Carter administration used a written policy process to address major policy issues, and established informal procedures such as the President's "Friday breakfasts" and Brzezinski's Vance-Brown-Brzezinski (V-B-B) lunches. But tensions between the State Department and the NSC staff emerged over who would run policy and who would represent the President in public. The President tended to favor his national security adviser and staff. In addition to this, Vance and Brzezinski were often fundamentally opposed on policy, Vance advocating a more cooperative approach and Brzezinski a more competitive (some said confrontational) approach. These differences, and Carter's failure to arbitrate, were aggravated by a series of crises including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian seizure of U.S. hostages.

*Reagan.* In an October 1980 televised address, presidential candidate Reagan declared the Carter administration "unable to speak with one voice in foreign policy" and promised to restore U.S. leadership by organizing foreign policy "in a more coherent way." President Reagan implemented this by increasing the authority of the agency heads, in particular, State, Defense, and the CIA, and by diminishing the national security adviser and staff to a subordinate role. The NSC staff would focus on interagency coordination and long-range planning rather than policymaking. Reagan's first Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, intended to be the President's "vicar" in foreign policy formulation, execution, and explanation. His reach ultimately exceeded his grasp, and George Shultz was directed to head the State Department. Some Reagan NSC processes were created but rarely used, such as the Senior Interdepartmental Groups that became bureaucratic battlegrounds. Former National Security Adviser Brzezinski criticized the proliferation of committees and their absorption in minutiae, at the cost of strategic direction and policy discipline. Other processes were successful, such as Reagan's National Security Planning Group, which became the smaller, less formal alternative to the National Security Council. President Reagan's hands-off management style and lack of interest in policy details did nothing to resolve the ongoing State-Defense standoff. The result was policy gridlock. During the tenure of Reagan's fourth national security adviser, John Poindexter, the NSC staff became deeply involved in covert operations that would become known as the Iran-Contra scandal. When NSC staff activities were subjected to Congressional investigation, President Reagan decided to implement the Tower Board recommendations. Reagan's fifth and sixth national security advisers, Frank Carlucci and Colin Powell, helped to simplify and revitalize NSC processes, restoring NSC credibility.

*G.H.W. Bush.* Several top Bush officials were veterans of the Reagan years, and had witnessed NSC dysfunction at close range. The new national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, had authored several segments of the Tower Commission report dealing with NSC reform. One of the Tower recommendations was to place the national security adviser in charge of the Cabinet-level Principals Committee, since the Adviser had the greatest stake in the success of the NSC process. The deputy national security adviser chaired the Deputies Committee, which was responsible for policy review and crisis management. Scowcroft had apparently conceived of the Principals Committee as a forum in which the NSC principals could meet without the President to hash out their differences. However, the President reportedly made clear that he wanted to be involved in his senior advisers' discussions. The Principals Committee did not meet often. As the Deputies Committee became heavily involved in managing the Iraq war, it was criticized for paying too little attention to long-range policy development. Brent Scowcroft was viewed as an "honest broker" in the Bush NSC. Scowcroft and his staff did have opinions but were trusted not to "tilt" the NSC process or exclude the departments and agencies. President Bush felt that the collegiality among his advisers contributed to policymaking success.

*Clinton.* The President tried hard to minimize the possibility of rivalry between the National Security Council and the new National Economic Council (NEC). He wanted international economic aspects of foreign policy to be considered in an integrated fashion with traditional foreign policy priorities. Previous attempts to integrate economic considerations into national security policymaking existed in the form of a designated economic portfolio on the NSC staff. Clinton did want to create an NSC advisory position for international economics, but he felt that a full-fledged economic interagency process would be necessary to achieve the regular, high-level consideration of international economics that he desired. The President instituted the National Economic Council, the position of Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and a staff to serve the Council. To balance the creation of a new economic advisory role, Clinton reaffirmed the Secretary of the Treasury as the President's "senior economic official" and "chief economic spokesperson." Integration with NSC processes was facilitated by a shared NEC-NSC staff. Economic aides thus wore two hats and reported up two chains of command. This unique arrangement was a successful one, thanks to good interpersonal relationships and a structure carefully designed to facilitate them. Clinton's first Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Tony Lake, emphasized consensus building among the NSC principals. This left the NSC open to accusations of creating policy based on the lowest common denominator. When Sandy Berger took over the adviser role after Lake, he ran a tighter ship. The NSC staff doubled in size over the course of the administration, from about 50 in 1993 to 100 in Clinton's final year, in order to meet the needs of the President's expanded national security vision.

*G.W. Bush.* With several foreign policy heavyweights in the administration, the new Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs planned to emphasize an "honest broker" role for the national security adviser. Condoleezza Rice expected to be a low-profile presidential assistant rather than a policy initiator or implementer. She would ensure that the President was adequately briefed and staffed for foreign policy success and the advancement of his strategic agenda. Rice initially cut the NSC staff by one-third and reorganized staff clusters to reflect the President's priorities. Communications and legislative affairs were initially moved to the White House, international and environmental affairs were eliminated, international economics remained, and national missile defense returned to the agenda. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the NSC proved to be a flexible presidential tool. The President regularly convened the Council to manage the crisis and deliberate courses of action. President Bush instituted the Homeland Security Council on the model of the National Security Council to coordinate the vast range of government players responsible for defense of the homeland. Within the NSC, the President established two new offices, one responsible for counterterrorism and the other for cybersecurity.[13]

[13] In his second term, President Bush created a Special Advisor for Strategic Planning and Institutional Reform. The position carried little weight in the NSC bureaucracy and achieved no fundamental process reforms during the tenure of its occupant.

John Prados, *Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush*, New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1991.

The author tells the story of the National Security Council across nine administrations, ending with George H.W. Bush's Operation Desert Shield. He delves into the details of NSC processes and the personalities that drove them. Three consecutive presidencies are represented here.

*Ford*. Gerald Ford initially followed Nixon's advice to keep the indispensable Kissinger in his two roles as Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. President Ford convened the NSC when there was a major policy issue to discuss or a crisis to manage, such as the Mayaguez incident of May 1975, in which a U.S. vessel and crew were seized off the coast of Cambodia. Since the President's interests were primarily domestic, his national security team had more leeway than they had under President Nixon. However, the NSC was not uniformly successful. Arms control negotiations with the USSR suffered several delays and eventually died, not because of an inability of the two sides to reach an acceptable agreement, but because of bureaucratic maneuvering and infighting between Kissinger and the defense bureaucracies. Kissinger's dual position as both rival cabinet officer and presidential intermediary provoked an any-idea-but-Henry's mentality in the bureaucracy. Kissinger's diplomatic missions reduced his ability to chair NSC committees and perform other Council duties. Since the final year of the Nixon administration, Kissinger's deputy Brent Scowcroft had been doing much of the work of the national security adviser. In October 1975, Ford disrupted the bureaucratic bickering by reshuffling his top officials. Among the changes were Scowcroft's rise to the NSC Adviser position and Kissinger's narrowed focus as Secretary of State. Scowcroft was in many respects the model manager of the NSC principals and staff. He brought calm and mutual respect to the national security team. The latter half of the Ford administration featured smooth NSC management of crises in Cyprus, Turkey, and southern Africa, renewed primacy of the NSC principals, and the full Council as the primary decisionmaking body of government.

*Carter*. President Carter encouraged strong-willed advisers to express their views, and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski did not hesitate to do so. Brzezinski was a policy advocate, pursuing his own agenda on numerous occasions. At times he "extended the President's meaning, halted initiatives in which Carter had indeed been interested, or worked to hold open options in hopes the President might be induced to change his mind later" (444).

The new national security adviser was not above reviving back channels and keeping the State Department in the dark when expedient. Brzezinski favored the “presidential” rather than the “secretarial” mode of making policy, in which the national security adviser and other White House advisers efficiently carry out the President's wishes. Congress lost an opportunity to investigate and reform the NSC in 1980, when it pressured the White House over the so-called Billygate affair involving the President’s brother. A bill had been proposed in 1979 that would have required the national security adviser to be confirmed by the Senate, but it was not pursued. There was a presidential reorganization project on NSC management, led by Philip Odeen of the Kissinger and Scowcroft NSC, but Brzezinski's staff was too busy with current events to fully participate or to take it seriously. The Odeen report criticized the Carter NSC for excessive numbers of meetings, single-agency rather than interagency papers, failure to monitor policy implementation, inadequate interagency crisis planning, and especially, preoccupation with advising the President. Some of the Carter administration's foreign policy difficulties were of its own making, such as the deadlock over Iran. However, to a significant extent, Carter was paying bills for his predecessors. He was not experienced in foreign policy when he came to the presidency, but he learned quickly and was directly involved in NSC management.

*Reagan*. Early in Reagan's first term, the President instituted the National Security Planning Group (NSPG), a version of the NSC principals committee, chaired by Vice President Bush, and attended by the President himself. The NSPG or the NSC met regularly throughout the administration, including during crises. The Reagan NSC also used its myriad senior and mid-level interagency committees to discuss policy and to manage crises. The NSC staff ran the paper process, drafting presidential directives on crucial policy issues, sometimes in coordination with specific NSC principals. When there was no agreement on the substance of the directives, as in the case of the arms-for-hostages deal with Iran, the written directive was dropped and the NSC staff proceeded without it. Policy reviews were only commissioned by the President in response to crises such as the Marine barracks bombing and the hijacking of TWA flight 847, rather than periodically for prevention purposes. The Tower Board set out to discover the problems in the NSC system that may have led to the Iran-Contra affair. Instead, the Tower Report concluded that the errors were not procedural but the mistakes of individuals. The NSC machinery escaped reform.

Reagan's lack of a deliberate national security agenda and his hands-off management style encouraged bureaucratic entrepreneurs to make policy, with mixed results. The NSC staff’s involvement in Lebanon and Nicaragua show the Reagan NSC at its worst. Reagan’s third national security adviser, Bud McFarlane, became the President's special envoy to Lebanon in July 1983. Unfortunately for McFarlane’s mission, there was no plan or policy for obtaining an agreement from the warring parties, because McFarlane was sent to avoid an NSC fight between Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger, who held opposing views on U.S. support for Israel. On the advice of McFarlane and others on the

ground, the U.S. put its military behind the Lebanese Christians. In October, America lost 243 Marines to a terrorist bombing. The NSC system had not been used to examine the stakes in Lebanon and to chart steps to an attainable goal before deploying U.S. military resources in the first place. Reagan's fourth national security adviser, Admiral John Poindexter, took up McFarlane's initiative of selling arms to Iran through Israel to win the release of U.S. hostages, over the opposition of Shultz and Weinberger. Under Poindexter's watch, NSC staffer Oliver North did everything he could to support the Nicaraguan Contras, including the diversion of funds from the arms sales. A system that allows policy entrepreneurs at any level to generate options might work in administrations with an activist, engaged President, but in the Reagan administration the result was chaos. The fifth and sixth national security advisers, Frank Carlucci and Colin Powell, restored the NSC image as a responsible and responsive mechanism, implementing the Tower Board recommendations. Powell became the epitome of an "honest broker" adviser, coordinating policy that represented the views of all principals and their agencies.

David Rothkopf, *Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*, New York: Public Affairs, 2005.

In order to fulfill America's global leadership responsibilities, the President needs a high-functioning NSC system. American foreign policy processes are easy to understand and have generally served us well. But policymakers must be wary of the system's biases, namely, toward consensus, reaction, and disengagement. Management by consensus endangers the purpose of the NSC, that is, to advise the President on the relative merits of different approaches—including unpopular ones. Strategic planning is routinely shortchanged at the NSC due to the constant pressure to react to the 24-hour news cycle and to overwhelming amounts of intelligence streaming in.

*Truman.* President Truman was more disciplined than his predecessor and had a greater appreciation for process. He knew how to delegate authority, illustrated in the development of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, in which he gave Acheson and others leading roles but saw to it that the end result advanced his core beliefs. Truman knew how to translate policy ideas into political action. He had worked on defense reorganization before becoming President, and recognized the necessity of organizing not just the armed forces but all military, economic, and political aspects of national security. The mission for the new National Security Council was to provide a permanent forum for interagency contact. The

NSC would be policy-forming and advisory rather than executive. Truman refused to be constrained to take the Council's advice, but he believed strongly in its coordination function. The NSC would coordinate policy and regularly evaluate goals, commitments, and risks to match strategy with capabilities. When the Korean War broke out in 1950, Truman began to use the Council for war planning and related foreign policy management. In addition, he created a subcabinet NSC committee, the Psychological Strategy Board, to develop psychological warfare strategies for the Cold War and to oversee their implementation. Truman's NSC proved an adaptable tool, evolving according to his personal style, beliefs, and the national security challenges that he faced.

*Eisenhower.* Eisenhower was caricatured as a corporate President who preferred process to substance. This is unfair. Eisenhower used the NSC process and his Solarium project of 1953 to fully air different points of view, work through them, and produce policies with the maximum level of buy-in. Project Solarium facilitated debate on the major aspects of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union and produced an integrated "Basic National Security Policy" (NSC 162-2) that reflected the President's views on the use of force and covert action against communism. Eisenhower desired NSC participants to speak their views as individuals rather than as bureaucratic representatives. He expected hard thinking and real alternatives, not consensus. The subcabinet Planning Board debated agency views on critical issues, identified points of disagreement, and sent them up for debate in the Council and decision by the President. Once Eisenhower made policy decisions, he expected discipline: dissenting views were appropriate during the deliberation process but not after. In addition to NSC meetings, Eisenhower sought the advice of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and other advisers. Near the end of his presidency, President Eisenhower favored smaller informal meetings to manage the Berlin crisis, but still depended on the NSC staff to provide papers and options.

*Kennedy.* Kennedy had a "natural allergy" to formal staff processes, preferring smaller groups of top advisers. His informal processes were inadequate in the Bay of Pigs decisionmaking, and successful in the Cuban Missile crisis. Kennedy quickly abolished Eisenhower's Operations Coordinating Board to eliminate a layer between the President and the executive agencies. His administration discarded his predecessors' distinction between planning and operations, and suffered for it. As witnessed in the Bay of Pigs invasion, the mission's advocates and planners, principally the CIA, did not maintain objectivity. Kennedy's informal process did not produce a dispassionate, rigorous analysis. Potential consequences were not fully debated and key players were not required to question their assumptions. After the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy decided that he was not being served by the cabinet agencies, and set up the Situation Room to keep the President fully informed of developments around the world and cable traffic to and from the agencies. Kennedy moved top NSC staffers to the West Wing to facilitate their enhanced role in coordinating operations. In October 1962, when reconnaissance photos revealed Soviet missiles in Cuba, Kennedy established an NSC Executive Committee (ExComm) to provide him with reliable

interagency advice throughout the crisis. ExComm worked because options were not prematurely narrowed, information was evenly weighed, international implications were kept in mind, Kennedy made the final decisions alone, and his decisions were implemented through the formal NSC structure.

*Johnson.* In many respects, the Johnson era was an extension of the Kennedy era. But it was plagued by groupthink concerning Vietnam. Although the President heard dissenting voices, such as Under Secretary of State George Ball and presidential adviser Clark Clifford, consensus built for escalation in Vietnam. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara was the leader of the President's inner circle, and drove the groupthink. Johnson hosted Tuesday lunches with his most trusted advisers, preferring small, informal groups over formal NSC meetings. Johnson did not get along well with military leaders, and did not invite his service chiefs to the lunches, where war planning occurred. With the overthrow of President Diem in Saigon, the U.S. military conducted a series of simulations on the war with senior administration and NSC officials. The prospects for victory appeared low, but the President and his core advisers ignored this, focusing instead on how to increase public support for more aggressive efforts in Vietnam. When the North Vietnamese appeared to be going on the offensive in the Tonkin Gulf incidents, the administration was over-ready to use the shaky intelligence in support of conclusions it had already reached. The Johnson administration was characterized by a breakdown in the advisory process in which advice became advocacy.

*Nixon.* President Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, created "the smallest, most powerful, most brilliant, and sometimes…most dysfunctional" of inner circles. Together they created the modern NSC. Nixon wanted to centralize foreign policy control in the White House, with the NSC—not State—leading the policy process. The Nixon team criticized the Johnson NSC process, including the prominence of the informal Tuesday lunches and the frequent failure to clearly communicate decisions to the operational agencies. To correct this, the Nixon NSC established a dual paper series. The National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs) aired agency views and forced long-term planning, and the National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs) outlined policy decisions. Early study memoranda, such as NSSM-3 on military strategy, were seen by some as Nixon's version of Eisenhower's Solarium exercise. Nixon's national security processes were not uniformly successful. Many of the Nixon-era interagency committees did not work as intended, and did not contribute significantly to a robust interagency process. However, the Nixon NSC was unusually successful at strategic planning and detailed options development for important contingencies. Nixon and Kissinger applied a broad geopolitical vision to the three major foreign policy tests of the Nixon years: opening to China, negotiating an end to Vietnam, and responding to the 1973 war in the Middle East. As the President became engulfed in the Watergate scandal, Kissinger assumed the country's foreign policy leadership. Kissinger rose to the challenge, but he was nonetheless an unelected official wielding unprecedented power.

*Ford.* Gerald Ford kept the Nixon system largely in place, making a few gradual adjustments. At first, Kissinger dominated the system, using his position as Secretary of State position to facilitate his objectives as national security adviser, and vice versa. Then President Ford shook up the team and made it his own, with key figures such as Donald Rumsfeld, George H.W. Bush, Dick Cheney, and Brent Scowcroft. Some felt that Secretary Kissinger continued to run foreign policy. Others felt that the President relied heavily on National Security Adviser Scowcroft for advice and policy choices. President Ford insisted that he always made the final judgment as Commander in Chief. In Ford's view, he used his secretary of state and national security adviser as they should have been employed according to the 1947 National Security Act. Kissinger was the "primary promoter" of foreign policy decisions, and Scowcroft consulted directly with the President, providing background and making observations on policy options. The fact that Kissinger and Scowcroft were so different in style and approach, and yet so well suited to the job of national security adviser, says much about the way the NSC operates. It is in the end a presidential tool.

*Carter.* On the campaign trail, Carter criticized the previous two administrations for Kissinger's dominance, stating that in terms of foreign policy, Kissinger had been president. Carter determined to establish a national security policy process that would contrast with his predecessors. The President settled on a simplified NSC deliberative process with two principals committees. The second of these committees dealt with covert operations, arms control, and crisis management and was chaired by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. The committee division gave Brzezinski responsibility for nearly all important national security issues. The President was aware of the shift in policymaking power from the State Department to the NSC. He allowed and even encouraged it because, like other presidents, he wanted to direct foreign policy from the White House. Carter valued both Brzezinski and Secretary of State Vance, and he valued the debate that arose from their differences. Carter also relied on Vice President Mondale as a partner in diplomacy and defense strategy. The NSC principals generally met informally for Carter's Friday breakfasts. Brzezinski, Vance, and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown also met weekly, as did Carter and Mondale. Formal NSC meetings were "infrequent and usually done for history's sake, for major decisions." Brzezinski felt that informal processes were helpful for crystallizing decisions, and formal processes were valuable for implementing and coordinating national security policies. The Carter NSC used Policy Review Memoranda (PRMs) at the outset of his presidency to set goals and strategies for foreign and defense policy. Interagency studies informed NSC debate, which informed the President's decision. Carter's national security team worked well together on the Panama treaty, the administration's defense strategy, and Camp David, but bickered tensely over SALT negotiations, U.S.-China diplomacy, and Iran.

*Reagan.* The Reagan era was a low point for the NSC. The Reagan team assumed that downgrading the role of the NSC adviser and staff would help the cabinet advisers work together better. But the weakened NSC was eclipsed by warring bureaucrats. According to

interviewees, the Weinberger-Shultz struggle was “the nastiest and most relentless of all the nasty, relentless battles that have riven every bureaucracy of the modern era.” The Reagan NSC was underproductive in terms of policy development. It was also undersupervised. The President's absentee management of the NSC process led to severe foreign policy missteps. The administration's mistakes triggered a reexamination of NSC structure via the Tower Commission. NSC fortunes changed when Frank Carlucci and later Colin Powell became national security adviser. Under their tenures, there was an unusual blend of experience and mutual respect among the NSC principals. Despite continued structural tensions, interagency communication and coordination improved. During this time, the NSC's influence increased, and the stage was set for a period of successful NSC management.

*G.H.W. Bush.* The Bush national security apparatus was “well led, well organized, and well manned.” President Bush pulled together a highly experienced group of officials, many of them from the Ford and Reagan administrations. Bush wanted his administration to unlearn the habits (bureaucratic tensions, leaks) of the Reagan years. He expected his national security principals and their staffs to work together. There were two main NSC subgroups, the Principals Committee and the Deputies Committee, which in turn were supported by Policy Coordination Committees. Formal NSC meetings were infrequent, and the Principals Committee did not often meet as such. An informal group of NSC principals, called the Gang of Eight, became the primary forum for high-level national security deliberations. The Deputies Committee drove the interagency process. The Deputies Committee became a linchpin in the policy process because members had reliable daily access to their principals, and worked with each other on a continual basis. Below the Deputies Committee, an informal “Ungroup” on arms control policy proved more effective than the unwieldy Policy Coordination Committee. Its members set aside bureaucratic loyalties and concerns over its multi-rank membership and hammered away at problem areas with the goal of solving them. The Bush NSC’s policy review process was not as satisfying as its policy coordination process. As soon as he came into office, the President called for a series of policy reviews on crosscutting issues, including arms control and national security policy. Bush was looking for new thinking on the U.S.-Soviet relationship, but the interagency policy reviews did not provide it. Instead, individual administration officials such as NSC staffer Condoleezza Rice offered new ideas for the post-Cold War strategic framework. Scowcroft’s disappointment in the policy reviews centered around less-than-robust long-range planning capabilities in the national security bureaucracies. The goal of long-range planning is to offer a road map for administration policies while remaining independent of day-to-day crises. During the Gulf crisis of 1990-91, Scowcroft, his deputy Robert Gates, and NSC Near East director Richard Haass made up for this lack of planning by meeting on a weekly basis to step back, look at the larger picture, and anticipate future developments. The success of the Bush national security apparatus highlighted the importance of people and relationships over the NSC process or system.

*Clinton.* President Clinton's National Economic Council (NEC), modeled on the NSC, was significant as a sign of the ascendancy of economic policy issues in U.S. foreign policymaking after the Cold War. Its role was to manage international economic policy and to ensure its integration with other national security policy priorities. The NEC deputies committee was responsible for much of the heavy lifting for the administration's economic policy. Collegiality between the NSC, NEC, State, Defense, and the CIA factored into the economic council's success. When Robert Rubin moved to head the Treasury Department, NEC relevance diminished somewhat, but economic policy retained its importance in the administration.

Clinton's national security team decided early on to keep the largely successful NSC structure (Principals Committee/Deputies Committee) of the Bush administration. Choosing continuity of structure was politically courageous and helped institutionalize NSC changes established in the late Reagan years. In addition, the Clinton team retained several State and NSC staffers of the Bush administration. At the outset of the presidency, it was clear that Vice President Gore would be a key foreign policy player, and Clinton and Gore established processes that would maintain this relationship while reducing the risk of tensions among the top foreign policy players. Gore's national security adviser, Leon Fuerth, helped the Vice President track NSC deliberations so that he was informed and up to date in his foreign policy counsel to the President.

President Clinton and his national security team learned on the job. The post-reelection team was more experienced and better able to manage world events. Somalia represented a failure of planning and a worst-case scenario that actually occurred. The CIA was sidelined in NSC deliberations, heard but overshadowed by the President's public relations officials. It took two years before President Clinton and his team took Bosnia seriously. The inertia on Bosnia ended when National Security Adviser Lake resolved to become a policy advocate. The NSC became the focal point for President Clinton's evolving counterterrorism strategy. With the President's backing, Richard Clarke "bullied" the government agencies around counterterrorism initiatives. Still, the bureaucracies were reluctant, since many felt that the terrorism threat was exaggerated. In the transition to the presidency of George W. Bush, the fight against terrorism lost momentum.

*G.W. Bush.* The George W. Bush administration continued many of the traditions established by Reagan, Bush, and Clinton. NSC operations continued to center on the Principals and Deputies Committees. President Bush maintained the National Economic Council (NEC) of the Clinton era, but it became less influential as security issues dominated the Bush foreign policy. The President held more NSC meetings after the September 11 attacks than he had previously, but relied primarily on his informal "war cabinet." Like many of his predecessors, President Bush wanted the departments to take the lead in national security policymaking. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice initially trimmed down

NSC staff and functions and later expanded them. One of Rice's innovations was a deputy national security adviser for strategic planning.

The Bush national security system had good structures and potentially good processes in place, but the disproportionate influence of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice President Cheney changed the NSC dynamic. Rumsfeld was criticized for disregarding NSC processes and instructing Office of the Secretary of Defense officials to do the same, frequently dismissing senior military advice, and improvising Iraq policy. Critics pointed to the Vice President's "mini-NSC" staff with a direct policy channel to the President, and spoke of Principals Committee discussions skewed by the Vice President's presence. In addition, critics argued that in the national security adviser's effort to staff the President, she allowed NSC processes to atrophy. Divisions among the national security principals compromised the administration's ability to manage certain crises and to deliver coherent diplomatic messages. Intelligence and expertise existed within the bureaucracy that could have prevented many of the policy missteps, such as managing Iraqi reconstruction, but an imbalanced policy process allowed a small group of like-minded people to dominate. The rise of the State Department in President Bush's second term was a positive development, but the State Department cannot mobilize the interagency. For that, the President needs a strong and independent NSC process.

Steers, Howard J.T.[14] "The Interagency Planning Conundrum."

There is a critical gap in State-Defense-NSC coordination mechanisms. State Department officials responsible for policy formulation have formal NSC structures and processes for coordinating with Office of the Secretary of Defense strategic planners. However, Country Team officials responsible for State Department policy implementation overseas have only informal processes for coordinating with operational and tactical planners located respectively in the Combatant Commands (COCOMs) and Joint Task Forces. The COCOMs and their Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) have no State Department counterpart. This poses a problem on both sides. COCOM planners are forced to go *up* to the policy formulation level or *down* to the Chiefs of Mission and Country Teams. The State Department could likewise complain that none of the Defense Department personnel on the Country Teams are COCOM representatives *per se* or responsible for coordinating operational planning. The State Department lacks comparable planning expertise and resources to be able to vet/coordinate COCOM planning. The nature of State Department planning is fundamentally different, because Country Teams cannot act unilaterally as the

[14] The author is Department of State Representative to the EUCOM JIACG. The views expressed in this paper are "purely personal and do not represent the position of either EUCOM or the Department of State."

military does; they exist to interact with sovereign countries or international organizations. State Department action centers around persuading a sovereign government to act (or not to act) within its own territory. JIACGs have been touted as the solution to the interagency planning conundrum, but they will not fully resolve the problem while there is no State Department interlocutor for DoD's operational planners. State needs to strengthen its process for coordinating with COCOM planners. The COCOMs, in turn, need to consider reorganizing their own resources to interface more effectively with Country Teams abroad and policy formulation circles in Washington. State is not likely to accept any regional operational counterpart to the Geographic Combatant Commanders, but must improve its ability to marshal Country Teams into unified regional efforts. Relationships with other agencies will fall into place once this structural, procedural, and cultural gap between State and DoD is repaired.

The White House, "History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997," http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html [accessed October 19, 2007].

The proper functioning of the NSC depends on the interpersonal chemistry between the President and his principal advisers and department heads. The NSC was created to advise the President on the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. The position of a national security adviser was not provided for by the 1947 Act or by the 1949 revisions.

*Truman.* Truman's NSC was dominated by the Department of State, but guaranteed a continued military voice in peacetime. Jealous of his decision-making prerogative, Truman kept the NSC at arm's length until 1950 and the Korean War. He relied heavily on personal advisers and individual cabinet members. By not attending most NSC meetings for the first few years, Truman forced NSC members to seek him out privately. NSC papers in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations were composed primarily by State's Policy Planning Staff, and then discussed in Council meetings. Starting in 1949, international events prompted Truman to change the way he used the NSC. The Policy Planning Staff submitted an interagency report, NSC 68, which articulated a new strategy of containment and policies to support it. This new strategy in turn led to the creation of the Psychological Strategy Board (State-Defense-CIA). Together with the NSC, this committee managed America's covert counterattacks to the Soviet Union's psychological assaults.

*Eisenhower.* Under Eisenhower, the NSC became the President's principal tool for formulating and executing foreign and military policy. Eisenhower valued careful staff work,

formal procedures, and extensive debate resulting in broadly supported recommendations. He instituted the "policy hill" process, in which draft policy recommendations would originate in the agencies, undergo review by the NSC Planning Board, be considered at the NSC itself and, if endorsed by the President, descend back down policy hill to the implementing agencies via the Operations Coordinating Board. Critics argued that Eisenhower's system was inflexible, overstaffed, and unable to manage crises. However, Eisenhower intended the NSC for policy review. He reserved day-to-day foreign policy operations for the Department of State and typically managed crises over the phone with principal advisers and in small meetings.

*Kennedy*. Influenced by the Jackson Subcommittee recommendations, Kennedy immediately cut back NSC positions and procedures. He reduced the NSC staff and held meetings infrequently. Kennedy abolished the Operations Coordinating Board because he felt that the NSC was not suited to monitoring policy implementation. At first, Kennedy intended the Secretary of State to have clear authority "as the agent of coordination in all our major policies toward other nations." After the Bay of Pigs disaster, President Kennedy gave power back to the NSC for monitoring implementation. He created the Situation Room with access to State, Defense, and selected CIA communication lines. When the Cuban Missile Crisis emerged, Kennedy created a special NSC principals committee, "ExComm," to manage it. McGeorge Bundy set several precedents for the present-day national security adviser, with his close relationship to Kennedy, and his presence at all formal NSC meetings and most major committees. Bundy was known for being scrupulously fair when presenting conflicting agency opinions to the President.

*Johnson*. Johnson did not dramatically change NSC structures and procedures. He did not favor large Council meetings where the danger of leaks was great. Critics charged that NSC meetings on Vietnam were used to "rubber stamp" decisions rather than as a consultative mechanism. Gradually, NSC meetings were convened for reflective discussions preceding Tuesday lunches, where the real decisions would be made. Johnson dropped meetings of the NSC Standing Group, which Kennedy had used to review planning and operations. He discontinued official record keeping of NSC actions and issued less National Security Action Memoranda. Johnson looked to key cabinet members and advisers such as McGeorge Bundy and his successor, Walt Rostow, in the context of the Tuesday lunches. The secrecy and informality of the lunches occasionally posed problems for the implementers of presidential decisions. Johnson created a special committee along the lines of ExComm to deal with the Six Day War. His last innovation was the creation of a Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) supported by Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRGs), which gradually contributed to interagency coordination and follow-up.

*Nixon*. As he wrote in his memoirs, Nixon "planned to direct foreign policy from the White House." National Security Decision Memorandum-2 established this dominant White House role, particularly the authority of National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. Nixon

wanted the NSC to oversee the interagency process. Nixon required the State Department to clear important cables with the NSC. Kissinger expanded the NSC professional staff, which required analysis from the departments to present the President with the best range of options. At first Kissinger attempted to separate policy and operations, but gradually performed both roles. Nixon preferred extensive written, not oral, exploration of strategy and policy options, so the dual study-decision paper process suited him. The Nixon NSC was heavily involved in diplomatic operations, bypassing the State Department to avoid likely bureaucratic disputes and inertia. When Kissinger needed to send secret communications overseas, he used CIA and White House channels to avoid alerting the State Department.

*Ford*. Ford responded to public disapprobation of Kissinger's foreign policy dominance by shaking up the cabinet and installing Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft as national security adviser. Scowcroft sought to present the President with clear analyses and options. Scowcroft managed a toned-down version of the Kissinger NSC system and did not threaten Kissinger's role as top foreign policy adviser.

*Carter*. Carter intended to emphasize the policy coordination and research role of the NSC and restore the Cabinet's role in decision-making. He simplified the standing committee structure, from eight to two. The Policy Review Committee would be chaired by the relevant department head on a given issue, whereas the Special Coordinating Committee would be chaired by the NSC Adviser—an arrangement intended to limit the adviser's dominance. The Carter NSC paper process was essentially the same as the Nixon process. Review memos identified topics, defined problems, and set deadlines for studies to be completed. Carter held very few formal Council meetings, relying instead on informal Friday breakfasts with no official recordkeeping procedures. Carter was open to a diversity of strong views, which contributed to indecision at critical moments.

*Reagan*. Reagan hoped to correct the bureaucratic rivalry of the Nixon and Carter administrations by downgrading position of the national security adviser. The President believed that the Secretary of State was his "primary adviser on foreign affairs, and in that capacity, he is the chief formulator and spokesman for foreign policy for this administration." National Security Adviser Richard Allen interpreted his role as ensuring the integration of policies and views proposed by the agencies. After Allen's resignation, William Clark became national security adviser. On his watch, the three principal department heads, State, Defense, and CIA, agreed to chair Senior Interdepartmental Groups (SIGs) in their respective areas. Early in his presidency, Reagan authorized the creation of the National Security Planning Group (NSPG), a less formal version of the NSC. The NSPG met weekly with the statutory NSC members and advisers and was instrumental in shaping policy. Clark increased the NSC staff's coordination role in intelligence and classified information, became a major administration spokesman with Congress, and took back NSC responsibility for long-range policy review. Arms control responsibilities likewise moved back to the NSC from the State Department. Clark's deputy McFarlane became the chief U.S. negotiator in the Lebanon

crisis. When McFarlane became national security adviser, the position became less visible but the adviser became more involved in foreign policy management and operations. This new activism backfired in the Iran-Contra dealings. After the administration adopted several Tower Board recommendations, the NSC largely withdrew from operations but continued to coordinate policy on Nicaragua. Reagan's last national security adviser, Colin Powell, sought to provide balanced coordination of policy options for the President. The new NSC process was efficient but low key.

*Bush.* The George H.W. Bush team brought considerable foreign policy and national security experience to the White House. Besides the NSC itself, the President authorized a Principals Committee, chaired by the national security adviser, and a Deputies Committee, chaired by his deputy. Eight Policy Coordinating Committees replaced the Reagan-era Interagency Groups. National Security Adviser Scowcroft was particularly experienced in NSC management: he held the job once before, under President Ford, and chaired the Tower Board investigating the Iran-Contra affair. Scowcroft had a strong relationship with the President and maintained good relationships with Secretary of State Baker and other agency heads. The NSC contributed to a series of foreign policy successes for the George H.W. Bush administration.

*Clinton.* The Clinton administration focused the NSC on non-traditional security areas such as counternarcotics, peacekeeping, and the environment. President Clinton created the National Economic Council to coordinate foreign and domestic economic issues and to better integrate them in national security policy. Clinton's first national security adviser, Anthony Lake, had served in the Nixon and Carter administrations, and sought to develop an atmosphere of cooperation and collegiality. At first, he maintained a low profile, but gradually responded to the President's need for a strong public spokesman on foreign policy. The Clinton NSC used a Principals and Deputies Committee system supported by Interagency Working Groups which would review and coordinate the implementation of presidential decisions. When Sandy Berger became national security adviser, he initiated a broad strategic review to guide foreign policy for the rest of the Clinton presidency.

## POTENTIAL LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS

The literature review revealed legal impediments to the use of the National Security Council staff in the implementation of national security policy and operations.