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Project on National Security Reform Literature Review

(Working Group on Structure)

Prepared by

Lisa Andivahis
Michael Casey, Jr.
Ben Mallory
Matthew A. Shabat
Rei Tang
Adam Vaccaro

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Introduction and Synthesis

There are several overarching themes that emanate from the vast literature on national security and organizational structure.

- First, although it is argued that the current security environment is vastly different from that of the Cold War, the structures and mechanisms under which the United States develops and implements its national security policies remain largely unchanged.¹ Numerous minor adjustments have been made to national security structures, and a few major consolidations of multiple agencies in new departmental structures. However, in contrast to the business world, which increasingly has opted for “horizontal” structures over the past several decades, the U.S. national security apparatus remains comparatively rigid and hierarchical.
- Second, the literature identifies two general problems associated with insufficient authorities. Commentators note that only the president has the authority to require a department or agency to act.² However, as a practical matter, delegated presidential authority does not work. Any other interagency coordinator, whether it is a designated “lead agency,” a cabinet secretary or a member of the NSC staff, cannot manage and harmonize the necessary interagency participants in order to implement policy. Unity of command does not produce unity of effort. In addition, the literature identifies legislative and other barriers that limit the authority of departments or agencies to shift funds between each other even when doing so is critical for success.³
- Third, most sources, and especially organizational literature, insist that formal structural problems cannot be isolated from other organizational considerations. Even necessary structural adjustments must be made with due attention to informal structures, and other organizational components such as process, culture, human resources, and knowledge management.

Structure, as defined by the Project on National Security Reform (“PNSR”), pertains to the alignment of authority and component parts of organization. The focus of this literature review is on the problem identification; the shortcomings identified by authors examining the structure of our national security system at the national, regional, and country levels, and with respect to multilateral cooperation. The national level encompasses structures, authorities and relationships that primarily are centered in Washington, DC. It tends to involve interactions among Executive branch departments and agencies relating to the planning, implementation, coordination and oversight of

¹ Murdock, Clark A., et al., “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies Report*, July, 2005, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/bgn_ph2_report.pdf, Accessed August 29, 2007.

² See, e.g., Arnas, Barry and Oakley (2005).

³ See, e.g., Thannhauser (2007).

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policy. Attention is devoted to the areas of interaction between the president and these departments or agencies, and between these organizations without White House involvement. It must be recognized, however, that a certain degree of overlap can occur between the national and other levels of engagement. For example, a regional Policy Coordinating Committee (“PCC”) of the National Security Council (“NSC”) is likely to interact with a regional Assistant Secretary of State, a regional Combatant Commander and one or more members of an Embassy country team.

The regional level concerns activities and operations conducted by the U.S. Government across a “regional” area. Regional boundaries are subjective and their definitions are determined by the state actors involved and outside actors attempting to grasp events taking place within them. Furthermore, regional definitions vary from country to country and even between agencies within the U.S. Government. Regional definitions also change depending on the issue being examined: resources, geography, culture, conflict, crises, partnerships, etc. Addressing the often-amorphous boundaries of regions, the literature often indicates that U.S. interagency collaboration at the regional level would be easier were the government to adopt common definitions of the regions.

The country level of engagement focuses on the activities of the Country Team, which encompasses U.S. Embassy staffs (comprised of representatives from different agencies and the armed forces - all led by the Ambassador). These staffs are positioned as first lines of engagement on challenges to U.S. national interests. The Country Team concept, first mentioned in the Clay Paper,⁴ is a construct not codified in law. It is an Executive branch measure designed to grant the Ambassador the means to coordinate all U.S. Government activities in the country to which he or she is assigned in order to maximize the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy.

Multilateral relations are those between the U.S. Government, or any agency thereof, and international organizations (“IOs”), agencies, groups, and non-state actors. They are collaborative relations between the U.S. Government and multiple international actors who ‘come to the table’ together to deal with some defined problem or objective. They are not defined or constrained geographically, and they do not consist of multiple bi-lateral relations. The multilateral environment consists of three sectors or arenas: formal, international organizations in which the United States holds membership, for example the United Nations (“UN”), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”), and The World Trade Organization (“WTO”); formal IOs with whom the United States deals but is not a member, such as the African Union (“AU”) and the European Union (“EU”); and lastly, *ad hoc*, informal coalitions such as those involving humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, and the “coalition of the willing” in Iraq.

As a general matter, the literature recognizes several major, cross-cutting problems in all four areas of engagement:

⁴ An excerpt from the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Departments of State and Defense and the Economic Cooperation Administration, commonly referred to as the “Clay Paper,” can be found in *The Ambassador and the Problem of Coordination*, U.S. Senate Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress, September 13, 1963

- First, the lack of clearly identified leadership, with lead agencies or individuals either not specified or if so, routinely circumvented.
- A closely related problem is that putative lead agencies and officials do not possess sufficient authority to execute their responsibilities.
- Reliance on *ad hoc* structures at the national, regional and multilateral levels prevents efficient and proactive engagement.
- Both horizontal and vertical integration difficulties are discussed with respect to the national and regional levels.
- At the national, country and multilateral levels resource management is a persistent problem, plagued by inadequate attention to priorities and inadequate authority to move resources between accounts.
- Finally, the literature suggests these structural problems contribute to the difficulty of planning, implementing and overseeing national security missions.

In general, this review focuses on structural problem sketches. Authors' prescriptive materials are discussed only when they also identify structural problems, or if a proposed solution seems to strongly imply a particular problem. However, the analysis sections relating to each level of engagement do offer short descriptions of some sample solution sets put forth in the literature. The bibliography included herein contains summaries of the literature. The best sources offering the most attention to structural problem sketches are highlighted in yellow. As this is a work in progress, additional sources will be added along with accompanying annotations in the future, and the overarching observations in this section and the analyses set forth in the final section will be updated accordingly. In addition to identifying problems in the four areas of engagement, and in order to provide a theoretical basis for the analysis of structures, this review begins with a sketch of the literature regarding organizational theory as it relates to structural design.

Organizational Theory

Organizational designers use structure to divide labor. While the formal aspects of an organization are often the focus of structural considerations, the literature warns against the neglect of an organization's informal aspects in structural design.⁵ Contemporary organizational theorists stress that an organization's structural form must correspond to the organization's environment, whether complex and unstable, or simple and certain.⁶ Some forms emphasize efficiency while others emphasize flexibility.

⁵ See, e.g., Hammer and Champy (1993), Ostroff (1999) and Woolridge and Micklethwait (1996).

⁶ See, e.g., Daft (2004) and Galbraith (1995).

Sources on theory generally identify three primary dimensions of structure—unity of command, span of control and specialization.⁷ In addition, five primary structural models are often recognized—functional, divisional, matrix, horizontal and modular. However, these models exist on a spectrum ranging from the extremely formal and mechanistic to the highly informal and organic. As such, a variety of hybrid models are possible.

Contemporary literature on organizational structure emphasizes that an organization's structure must be based on the organization's strategy for dealing with its business environment. In the past three decades, customer preferences, innovation and speed have replaced low-cost mass production as the factors that offer competitiveness in the environment. Simple, stable environments value efficiency and centralized, hierarchical structures. Complex, uncertain environments value flexibility, and decentralized, more horizontal structures. In the post-war period, business organizations began to change from a stable but rigid functional structure into a divisional structure, which divides an organization into product groups, with their own administrative and technical staff. This organization was less centralized, and focuses on products. Coordination for this structure is hard, though strong leadership and cohesive culture can compensate. The matrix structure became popular in the 1980s. It arranges the organization into groups that create cross-functional cooperation. This is more flexible yet but can lead to conflict between groups if authority is not properly balanced. In the 1990s, organizational designers found they could significantly increase the effectiveness of organizations through flexible and decentralized horizontal structures. A horizontal organization consists of cross-functional teams organized around core processes. The most flexible and decentralized of organizations is the modular organization, in which various organizations pursue common interests, with each organization taking part through its core competencies. Outsourcing, just-in-time inventory and supply chain management are examples of how companies use modular structure. Modular organizations possess risk of incompatible standards with each other's products and lack of unity of command. Most organizations are a combination of structures, which organizational designers call hybrids.

National Level

Much of the literature addressing the structure of the national security system at the national level is prescriptive in nature. It offers a variety of structural reform solutions to problems without first identifying and describing those problems.

Of the sources that do provide problem sketches, each usually addresses only two or three problems. However, if the sources are viewed in their entirety, a varied set of problems is explained. Four of these problems received the greatest amount of attention within the literature:

- insufficient authorities;
- unclear lead responsibilities;

⁷ See, e.g., Galbraith (1995) and Gulick (1937).

- use of *ad hoc* structures; and
- horizontal/vertical integration difficulties.

A trend towards centralizing power and activity in the NSC and its staff over the past few decades is a likely contributor to some of these problems. As noted by the Hart-Rudman Commission in 2001, “[o]ver the past decade, Presidents have increasingly centralized power with the NSC staff for the making and execution of national security policy. In many ways, the NSC staff has become more like a government agency than a Presidential staff.”⁸

Regional Level

Most literature regarding the regional level concentrates on solutions to a perceived fragmentation of the national security system, but some authors attempt to identify underlying problems. Two broad problems with the interagency system at the regional level often cited are: (1) creating and maintaining interagency collaboration; and/or (2) establishing an apparatus with the ability to carry out civilian and military missions equally efficiently and effectively. Presently, the United States lacks a permanent bureaucratic entity to unify all interested actors, identify specific regional issues and formulate strategies aimed at resolving regional conflicts. Some authors advocate the formation of *ad hoc* groups to address U.S. regional interests. However, the consensus in the literature seems to be that over reliance on *ad hoc* creations actually can inhibit the formulation of comprehensive and forward-thinking policy responses.

The literature generally indicates that regional security issues became a greater concern for the United States following the end of the Cold War. This event shattered the bi-polar geopolitical environment and created some regional vacuums of power, offering new opportunities for countries to exert regional dominance and resulting in continued regional conflict and instability. The rise of the non-state actor over the last two or three decades creates another challenge to developing sustainable regional security policy. Due to their amorphous design, organizations such as al Qaeda tend to diffuse geographically, and the effect of their presence can destabilizes entire regions, not just single countries. As a result, security issues have become more interconnected and fluid while the U.S. interagency system at the regional level, according to the literature, remains fragmented and incapable of collaborating in an optimal manner.

Country Level

Relatively few sources discuss the Country Team—the primary U.S. Government structure at the country level—although several informative sources are available. They present a fairly unified view of the main challenges facing the Country Team, identifying

⁸ The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century (the Hart-Rudman Commission), *Road Map; for National Security: Imperative for Change*, (Phase III Report). (Washington, DC: February 15, 2001). p. 50

three main problems. First, the authority of the Ambassador has eroded over time. Second, centralized Washington-based decision-making processes unduly limit the Ambassador and Country Team input into policy decisions, while the growing number of agencies operating out of embassies makes it increasingly difficult to unify U.S. Government activities. Third, literature underscores the negative impact of inadequate Department of State (“State”) resources compared to other agencies.

Although these three main problems are most commonplace in the literature, other impediments to effectively integrating all sources of national power at the country level are presented, as are some notable attempts to overcome them. Several pieces highlight the successes of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (“CORDS”) program, for example. CORDS illustrated the effective placement of civilian capabilities within the military chain of command without succumbing to military domination over civilian personnel and organizations. Strong Executive and Congressional leadership support for the Ambassador, and the creation of policies designed to achieve unity of effort are other prescriptions found in the literature. Instances of past interagency success often are attributed to the Ambassador and military commanders being able to forge strong personal working relationships. Source argue that power-sharing arrangements between an Ambassador and a Regional Combatant Commander must be determined during transition periods leading up to, or emerging from, conflict.

Multilateral Level

Two distinct reasons why multilateral collaboration is/can be beneficial to U.S. national security are found in the literature. The first is that multilateral cooperation facilitates the United States’ achieving its objectives regarding particular issues and problems. The second is that the United States, in pursuit of the historical objective of a rule-based international society, also views the fostering of multilateral organizations as a desirable goal in and of itself. Therefore, in any multilateral situation, the U.S. Government can pursue the multiple goals of (a) obtaining a specific current objective while (b) fostering the growth of effective multilateralism, i.e. international rules. According to some, the latter goal can also be an important determinant of how best to structure the U.S. national security bureaucracy for effective multilateral engagement.

Currently, there is very little structure built into the U.S. Government that relates to multilateral functions or engagements. The State Department is the only agency or department that has designated bureaucratic units charged with coordinating U.S. Government multilateral policy and programs. Its Bureau of International Organization Affairs is charged with coordinating and implementing U.S. Government policy in the major multilateral areas of IOs, while the newer Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability is charged with coordinating and implementing U.S. Government policy in the international complex emergency area. All other departments in the U.S. Government interagency come to the multilateral table with alternative perspectives.

The body of literature sampled in this review is weighted towards sources that refer, via case studies, to *ad hoc* coalitions. Insufficient attention is paid to the many sources depicting shortfalls and/or successes of U.S. multilateral relations within formal organizations of which it is a member (UN, NATO, WTO, etc.), and those for which it is not (EU, AU, etc.). Multilateral relations with formal IOs constitute a large part of the U.S. Government's multilateral engagements and will be addressed more fully in a subsequent update of this review. For now, we want to mention that part of the overall problem is not fully captured in this review.

Most sources contained herein take into account and refer to case studies and, as such, tend to present recommendations in terms of “lessons learned.” They effectively provide a set of “dos” and “don’ts,” which taken together can be translated into a set of requirements dictating what processes, procedures, networks and structures should be in place to ensure multilateral relations can occur in order to best facilitate U.S. national security needs. With few exceptions⁹, most authors do not explicitly mention structure as it relates to multilateral engagements. Implicit reference to structure, on the other hand, is frequently referenced by way of mentioning problems concerning chain of command and authority in situations where the U.S. is engaging in *ad hoc* coalition.

Some of the major lessons learned with regards to U.S. multilateral relations involving *ad hoc* coalitions are as follows:

- Establish who the partners and players are and build trust if it does not already exist:
 - Must have clear statement of roles, missions, of all parties involved (*Know who you are and broadcast it to others*)
 - Must have some form of knowledge and/or education, usually acquired through training, of norms and culture of other major organizations. (*Learn who others are*)
 - Must have common end goals in order for successful cooperation between various organizations. (*Choose collaborators well suited to your own end goals*)
 - Achieving the first 3 bullets goes a long way towards establishing trust between multilateral partners. (*Trust is a must, and is often lacking to the degree that it is required.*)

- Get the right structural mechanisms, resources and information infrastructures in place:
 - Ensure financial resources are adequate
 - Unity of command / clarity of command when working with/in coalitions
 - Lines of communication (LOC) established, open
 - Transparency maintained

⁹ See Slaughter, Anne-Marie, “A New World Order” for discussion of government networks as a structure for enabling global governance.

As literature is reviewed that addresses multilateral relations with institutions the U.S. belongs to or enjoys a formal relationship with, we will see whether a different set of lessons learned emerges.

Annotated Bibliography

Organizational Theory

Books

Daft, R. L. (2004). *Organization theory and design*. Mason, Ohio, Thomson/South Western.

Part 1: Introduction to Organization

Chapter 1: Organizations and Organization Theory

Organizations are open systems. Functions of organizations are supposed to perform the subsystem functions of production, adaptation, maintenance, management, and boundary spanning. Five parts of the organizational core are the technical core, top management, middle management, technical support, and administrative support. The focus of analysis is not individuals, but the organization itself. The dimensions of formalization, specialization, hierarchy, centralization, professionalism, personnel ratios, size, organizational technology, environment, goals and strategy, and culture are elements of measurement and analysis. These dimensions vary from organization to organization. Turbulence and complexity have replaced stability and predictability in today's environments for organizations. Challenges include globalization, ethics and social responsibility, rapid response to environmental changes, customer expectations, shifting to a technology-base workplace, and supporting diversity. Trend is changing from mechanistic to organic models. Many organizations are being redesigned into learning organizations, characterized by horizontal structure, empowered employees, shared information, collaborative strategy, and adaptive culture.

Part 2: Organizational Purpose and Structural Design

Chapter 2: Strategy, Organizational Design, and Effectiveness

Organizational goals and strategies are generally designed by top management. Goals specify mission and purpose, and organization's desired future state; strategies define the means. Operative goals relate to subsystems, which include profitability, resources, market, employee development, innovation and change, and productivity.

Porter's Competitive Strategies:

Differentiation: producing a unique product

Low-cost leadership: emphasis on efficiency

Focus: concentration on a specific regional market or buyer group using differentiation or low-cost leadership within the market

Miles and Snow's Strategy Typology

Prospector: emphasis on creativity and innovation

Defender: emphasis on efficiency and stability on reliable products

Analyzer: emphasis on stability while innovating on the periphery

Reactor: not really a strategy – ad hoc responses to changes in the environment; doesn't work too well

Strategies affect organizational design

Contingency effectiveness approaches:

Goal Approach: assess how well the organization has met goals. This approach is the easiest to measure.

Resource-based Approach: examine how inputs are transformed. Indicators include bargaining position (securing resources), ability to perceive the external environment, ability to use tangible (supplies, people) and intangible (knowledge, corporate culture) resources in day-to-day activities to achieve superior performance, and the adaptability. This approach is harder to measure.

Internal Processes Approach: examines organizational health and efficiency, with emphasis on culture and social environment, and efficient use of resources. It is hard to evaluate output and the organization's relationship with the external environment.

These approaches result in competing values. The integrated effectiveness model combines these values into a single framework.

The indicators are:

Focus: external vs. internal

Structure: stability vs. flexibility

Open Systems: external and flexible

Primary goals: resource acquisition and growth

Subgoals: flexibility, readiness, positive external evaluation

Dominant value: establishing good relationship with environment

Similar to resource-based approach

Internal Goal Emphasis: external and stability

Primary goals: productivity, efficiency, and profit

Subgoals: internal planning and goal setting

Similar to goal approach

Human Relations Emphasis: internal and flexible

Primary goal: development of human resources – autonomy and development for employees

Subgoals: cohesion, morale, training opportunities

More concerned with employees than environment

Chapter 3: Fundamentals of Organization Structure

Structure must provide a framework of responsibilities, reporting relationships, groupings, mechanisms for linking and coordinating organizational elements into a coherent whole. Structure determines information-processing. Vertical organizations are designed for efficiency. Horizontal organizations provide horizontal linkages include cross-functional information systems, direct contact between managers across department lines, temporary task forces, full-time integrators, and teams.

Symptoms of structural deficiency include: delayed or poor quality decision-making, weak innovation and response to environmental changes, and too much conflict.

Options for structure: Functional, Divisional, Multifocused, Horizontal, Modular

Part 3: Open System Design Elements

Chapter 4: The External Environment

Organizations are open systems, which mean they interact with and are influenced by an external environment. Organizational environments differ in terms of uncertainty and resource dependence. Uncertainty is the result of stable-unstable and simple-complex dimensions of the environment. Resource dependence is the result of scarcity of the material and financial resources needed by the organization. Organizational structure is designed to correspond to the type of environment in which the organization operates. The organization can be conceptualized as a technical core and departments that buffer environmental uncertainty. Boundary-spanning (tasks that go beyond fixed jurisdiction) roles provide information about the environment. Organizations try to control the environment to reduce uncertainty. This can be done by allocating resources to departments that plan and deal with environmental uncertainty, and by establishing linkages through acquisition of ownership, strategic alliances, interlocking directorates (cooptation), executive recruitment, or advertising and public relations, political activity, trade associations, or illegitimate activities.

Contingency Framework for Environmental Uncertainty and Organizational Responses

Dimensions: Environmental Change (stable, unstable); Environmental Complexity (simple, complex)

Low Uncertainty: 1. Mechanistic Structure, formal, centralized. 2. Few departments. 3. No integrating roles. 4. Current operations orientation, low-speed response.

Low-Moderate Uncertainty: 1. Mechanistic structure, formal centralized. 2. Many departments, some boundary spanning. 3. Few integrating tools. 4. Some planning, moderate-speed response

High-Moderate Uncertainty: Organic structure, teamwork, participative, decentralized. 2. Few Departments, much boundary spanning. 3. Few integrating roles. 4. Planning orientation, fast response.

High Uncertainty: 1. Organizational structure, teamwork, participative, decentralized. 2. Many departments differentiated. 3. Many integrating roles. 4. Extensive planning, forecasting; high-speed response.

Chapter 5: Inter-organizational Relationships

Organizations now see themselves in an ecosystem, and establish relationships with many companies in many different industries. Companies now compete and collaborate at the same time. Four perspectives explain relations among organizations: resource dependence, collaborative network, population ecology (specialists and generalists), institution (creating legitimacy for stakeholders). Institutionalism can lead to homogeneity, which is developed by three core mechanisms: mimetic forces (pressure to copy from other organizations as responses to uncertainty), coercive forces (pressure to change from power differences and political influences), and normative forces (common training and professionalism).

Chapter 6: Designing Organizations for the International Environment

Three primary motivations for expanding to the global scale are: economies of scale, economies of scope (larger testing of standards), achieve scarce or low-cost factors of productions such as labor, raw materials, or land. One way to expand globally is to develop internal partnerships. The phases of expansion to a global scale are: domestic orientation, international orientation, multinational orientation, and global orientation. Structures include having and international division, an international product structure, geographic structures, a matrix structure, or a hybrid structure. It is harder to integrate global organizations. Many organizations are shifting to a transnational model.

Part 4: Internal Design Elements

Chapter 7: Manufacturing and Service Technologies

Technology, organizational structure, and management systems interrelate to increase performance of organizations. Service technologies, characterized by intangible outcomes and direct client involvement in the production process, differ systemically from manufacturing technologies. Understanding the variety and analyzability of a technology tells one about the management style, structure, and process that should characterize that department. Routine technologies are characterized by mechanistic structure and non-routine technologies by organic structure. Technology facilitates interdependence between departments. Departments depend on each other for materials, information, and other resources that require coordination. Flexible manufacturing systems are allowing manufacturing

organizations to become more adaptive and organically structured. These technologies replace routine jobs, giving employees more autonomy, more challenging jobs, and encouraging teamwork. Socio-technical systems theory attempts to design human and technical aspects of an organization to fit one another.

Service Technologies

Perrow’s framework of four major categories of technology: Routine (clerical, sales, drafting, auditing), craft (performing arts, trades, fine good manufacturing), engineering (legal, engineering, accounting), and non-routine (strategic planning, social science, applied research).

Relationship of Department Technology to Structural and Management Characteristics

Routine (Mechanistic Structure): 1. High formalization, 2. High centralization, 3. Little training or experience, 4. Wide span, 5. Vertical, written communications. High analyzability, low variety.

Craft (Mostly Organic Structure): 1. Moderate formalization, 2. Moderate centralization, 3. Work experience, 4. Moderate to wide span, 5. Horizontal, verbal communications. Low analyzability, low variety.

Engineering (Mostly Mechanistic Structure): 1. Moderate formalization, 2. Moderate Centralization, 3. Formal training, 4. Moderate span, 5. Written and verbal communications. High analyzability, High variety.

Non-routine (Organic Structure): 1. Low formalization, 2. Low centralization. 3. Training plus experience, 4. Moderate to narrow span, 5. Horizontal communications, meetings. Low analyzability, high variety.

Thompson’s types of interdependence that influence organizational structure

Form of Interdependence	Demands on Horizontal Communication, Decision Making	Type of Coordination Required	Priority for Locating Units Close Together
Pooled (Bank) Baseball	Low Communication	Standardization, rules, procedures Divisional Structure	Low
Sequential (Assembly Line) Football	Medium Communication	Plans, schedules, feedback Task Forces	Medium

Reciprocal (Hospital) Basketball	High Communication	Mutual adjustment, cross- departmental meetings, teamwork Horizontal Structure	High
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Chapter 8: Information Technology and Control

How organizations collect, store, distribute and use information influences performance. Transactional processing systems, data warehousing, and data mining help lower organizational levels. Management information systems, reporting systems, decision support systems, and executive information systems help support top and middle level management. Management control systems include budgets and financial reports, periodic non-financial statistical reports, reward systems, and quality control systems. Balanced scorecards provide managers with a balanced view of the organization by integrating traditional financial measurements and statistical reports with a concern for markets, customers, and employees. IT systems include intranets, enterprise resource planning (ERP), and knowledge management, which improve coordination and flexibility. Systems that support and strengthen external relationships include EDI networks, the integrated enterprise (coordination between partners, suppliers, and customers), and e-business. IT is allowing more modular structures to develop. Implications include smaller organizations, decentralized structures, and improved internal and external coordination.

Chapter 9: Organization Size, Life Cycle, and Decline

Organizations evolve through distinct life cycle phases as they grow and mature. Managers must guide the organization through entrepreneurial, collectivity, formalization and elaboration stages of development. Organizations grow to become bureaucracies, which is a logical form of organization that lets firms use resources efficiently. Many organizations may reduce bureaucracy by decentralizing authority, flattening organizational structure, reduce rules and written records, and create small company mind-sets. These organizations trade economies of scale for responsive, adaptive organization organizations. Sometimes an organization may subdivide. Incident command systems allow an organization to transition from bureaucracy, which is effective in stable environments, to flexibility during crisis. Larger organizations require more support from clerical and professional staff specialists. There are three ways to control an organization: market (outputs are priced, competition exists), bureaucracy (standard rules and rational-legal authority of managers), clan (self-control, rely on commitment, tradition, and shared values – more organic and flexible). When organizations stop growing, they decline. Managers must try to detect decline. Causes include: atrophy, vulnerability, and environmental

decline or competition. Stages of decline include the blinded stage (when leaders miss signals), inaction stage (when leaders are in denial), faulty action stage (when leaders make a mistake – leaders are often pressured to downsize and retrench, in which they should clarify values and provide information), crisis stage (social fabric of the organization is eroding and requires dramatic changes in leadership, structure, strategy, or culture), and dissolution stage (where organization suffers an irreparable loss of reputation, markets, loss of personnel, and capital). In downsizing, organizations should: 1. communicate more, not less, 2. provide assistance to displaced workers, 3. help the survivors thrive.

Part 5: Managing Dynamic Processes

Chapter 10: Organizational Culture and Values

Relationship of Environment and Strategy to Culture

Adaptability Culture: need flexibility, external strategic focus

Mission Culture: need stability, external strategic focus

Clan Culture: need flexibility, internal strategic focus

Bureaucratic Culture: need stability, internal strategic focus

Culture and ethical values help determine social capital. Culture is a set of key values, beliefs, and norms shared by members of an organization. Cultures serve two important functions: integrate members to know how they relate to one another, and to help the organization adapt to a changing external environment. Cultures express themselves through rites and ceremonies, stories and heroes, symbols, and language. Culture should reinforce strategy and structure. When widespread consensus exists on specific values, the organizational culture is strong and cohesive. Subcultures can emerge, especially in large organizations. Learning organizations encourage openness, boundariless, equality, continuous change, and risk taking. Adaptive cultures have different values and behavior patterns than non-adaptive cultures. Strong, but unhealthy cultures can be detrimental. Managerial ethics are important in shaping an organization's culture. Formal systems that influence culture include ethics committees, ethics departments, disclosure mechanisms for whistle-blowing, and a code of ethics. Global companies tend to emphasize multicultural values, merit, excitement for new cultural environments, openness to ideas from other cultures, and sensitivity to cultural differences. Social audits help organizations maintain high ethical standards.

Chapter 11: Innovation and Change

There are two tempos of organizational change: incremental and radical. There are four types of change: technology, products and services (encouragement of employee autonomy, department charged with creating new technical ideas, venture teams and idea incubators, encourage idea champions – often requires inter-departmental cooperation), strategy and structure (top-down approach typically best, restructuring, downsizing, policy change, goal revision, control systems), and culture

(generally responsibility of top management – done through reengineering, shift to horizontal form, greater diversity, shifting to a learning organization, and organizational development (OD)). Strong leadership is needed in times of change. Barriers to change include excessive focus on cost, failure to perceive benefits, lack of coordination, and individual uncertainty avoidance and fear of loss. Managers must plan changes. Techniques to help change include establishing a sense of urgency, creating a powerful coalition to guide change, formulating a vision and strategy, aligning with the needs and goals of users, or even forcing innovation. Change teams and idea champions are also effective.

Chapter 12: Decision-Making Processes

Most organizational decisions are not made in a logical, rational manner. Most decisions do not include careful analysis of the problem, systemic analysis of alternatives, and finally implementation of a solution. Decision processes are characterized by conflict, coalition building, trial and error, speed, and mistakes. Managers have bounded rationality, and must sometimes operate by hunch and intuition. Organizational decisions are made by a social process, not by a single individual. The greatest amount of conflict occurs when people disagree on the problems. Priorities must be established. Managers can lose support for addressing a problem people don't agree with. Managers should build coalitions during problem identification. If technical knowledge is low, the solution often comes through incremental trials that gradually lead to an overall solution.

The Garbage Can Model: Decisions, problems, ideas and people flow through organizations and mix together in various combinations. The organization gradually learns.

Organizations must make decisions quickly. Mistakes will be made. Encouraging trial-and-error facilitates organizational learning. Unwillingness to change from a failing course of action can be detrimental.

Chapter 13: Conflict, Power, and Politics

Differences in goals, backgrounds, and tasks are necessary, but also can create conflict. Managers use power and politics to manage and resolve conflicts. The rational model of organization assumes organizations have specific goals and that problems are solved logically. The political model assumes goals are not specified or agreed upon. Departments have different values and interests. Decisions are based on power and politics. Outcomes are decided through bargaining, negotiation, persuasion, and coalition building. Vertical sources of power include formal position, resources, control of decision premises, and network centrality. With increasingly uncertain environments, top executives are increasing the power of middle managers and lower-level employees. Dependency, resources and non-substitutability determine the influence of departments. People generally distrust political behavior. Politics is often needed to achieve department and organizational goals. Politics play

a role in structural change, management succession, and resource allocation. Although politics can be beneficial, managers should try to enhance collaboration so that conflict does not become too strong. Managers can enhance collaboration through integration devices, confrontation and negotiation, inter-group consultation, member rotation, shared mission and superordinate goals.

Articles/Papers

Appleby, Paul, (1945), “Government Is Different,” in Shafritz, J. M., & Hyde, A. C., (Eds.), (1992), *Classics of public administration* (pp. 101-107). Brooks/Cole series in public administration. Pacific Grove, Calif, Brooks/Cole Pub. Co.

Government is very different from other forms of social activity. The difference between being a lawyer or a judge provides a way to analyze the unique elements of government. Few understand that good lawyer may not make a good judge – that the functions of both occupations are different. To have a society in which everyone thinks like lawyers and their clients is impractical. Societies must also have those who think and act like judges, just as societies must have government officials, and not only private business. There is an element of self-selection that places those suited for government in government and those suited for private business in private business. Those who are not attracted by the public sector will work in the private sector, but the developed interests and habits of thought in the private sector are unfit for government, although this is less applicable to lower-level jobs such as messengers, clerks, or typists. The government can only be understood by its employees – through their conceptions of position, and their attitudes of what the public wants. Government as an organized action is similar to private business in that it involves decision-making, the organization of resources, personnel, materiel, and information to accomplish objectives. However, the public interest is the key concern for the public official. Government officials are expected to serve the public interests, and should act fairly, uniformly, and in a publicly acceptable manner. There is no institution with so much breadth, held with so much public accountability, or political in character as government. Government is not separate from politics. Everything in government must be considered with public judgment in mind whether from the press or Congress. Government is costly in this regard. Its objective to serve the public interest makes it efficient only at being publicly agreeable.

Argyris, Chris (1957), “Organizational Behavior,” in Shafritz, J. M., & Hyde, A. C., (Eds.), (1992), *Classics of public administration* (pp. 182-187). Brooks/Cole series in public administration. Pacific Grove, Calif, Brooks/Cole Pub. Co.

Organizational behavior has two components: the individual and the formal organization. The needs of individuals are often incongruent with the needs of formal organizations. Individuals engage in informal behaviors to: decrease subordination from management, decrease probability of unilateral action by superiors, release

frustrations, and to create informal worlds for psychological shelter or to influence the formal organization. These behaviors serve to minimize conflict, failure and frustration. There is always a tension between individual needs and formal organization optimization. If an imbalance exists against individual needs, the results could be harmful to the organization. Managers who dislike informal behavior exacerbate these informal vs. formal tensions. Informal behavior actually holds back disorganization, and positive informal behavior is largely generated through good leadership. Organizational behavior has given way to several primary findings:

Proposition I: There is a lack of congruency between the needs of healthy individuals and the demands of formal organizations.

Proposition II: Disturbances from proposition I include frustration, failure, short-term perspective, and conflict. Frustration is caused by blocked self-actualization; failure by the inability to define one's own goals in relation to the organization's central goal; short-term perspective from murkiness and instability in the future; conflict by efforts to avoid the former.

Proposition III: Under certain conditions, negative informal behaviors tend to increase. These conditions include individual maturation, increase in dependence, subordination and passivity, increase in job specialization, and exactness from the formal organization

Proposition IV: The nature of formal principles of organizations cause competition, rivalry, inter-subordinate hostility, and focus toward parts, rather than the whole.

Proposition V: Adaptive behavior maintains individuality and impedes integration with the formal organization. Adaptive behavior may lead to: leaving the organization, climbing the hierarchy, manifest defensive reactions, apathy, the creation of informal groups to sanction defensive reactions, formalization of informal groups, group norms perpetuating the former group behaviors, decrease in wants and teaching others the former behaviors.

Proposition VI: Adaptive behavior accumulates, and feedback reinforces the behavior

Proposition VII: Management reactions can increase antagonistic behavior. These include more directive leadership, more controls, and more bad human resources programs.

Proposition VIII: Other managers can worsen antagonisms.

Proposition IX: More empowerment for employees and good leadership can cause a decline in adaptive behavior.

Proposition X: Difficulties in proposition IX can be solved by reality-oriented leadership that acknowledges the need for individuality among employees.

Bernard, Chester, (1938), “Informal Organizations and Their Relations to Formal Organizations,” in Shafritz, J. M., & Hyde, A. C., (Eds.), (1992), *Classics of public administration* (pp. 48-52). Brooks/Cole series in public administration. Pacific Grove, Calif, Brooks/Cole Pub. Co.

Informal organizations are aggregates of personal contacts, interactions and associated groups in a society. Informal organizations are without structures, without subdivision, and are the unconscious processes of society. Informal organizations have two classes of effects: 1) they establish certain attitudes, understandings, customs and habits, and 2) they create conditions for formal organizations to rise. The first class of effects creates divergences and connective actions between formal and informal organizations. The second class of effects demonstrates that informal organizations are a precondition for formal organizations, out of which formal organizations arise. Informal relationships may be brief. A consensus of needs in an informal organization compels the creation of formal organizations, or if there is divergence, conflict and disorganization. Formal organizations come into being because people want to do things with people, and want to fulfill certain needs – people have a tendency to cooperate, therefore formal organizations are vitalized and conditioned by informal organizations. On the other hand, disintegrated organizations are polemic.

When formal organizations come into operation, they create require informal organizations. Many people in formal organizations are unaware of the informal organizations within. One cannot determine how an organization works by looking at its formal rules, as one cannot learn how the United States work by looking solely at the constitution. Informal organizations within formal organizations are rarely studied, except in the production level of industrial organizations. The functions of informal organizations in formal organizations include mechanisms for communication, the maintenance of cohesion by regulating willingness to serve and providing stability of authority, and the maintenance of feelings of personal integrity, self-respect and the preservation of independent choice. Informal organizations are not dominated by impersonal or objective authority. However, informal organizations can be destructive to formal organizations, as they are created to maintain personality and individualism. Informal relationships with joint purpose and repetitive character become systemic and organized through effects on habits and thoughts. Also, endless-chain relationships develop similarities between people leading to mores, customs and institutions. Formal organizations then make these informal characteristics explicit.

Dahl, Robert A., (1947), “The Science of Public Administration: Three

Problems,” in Shafritz, J. M., & Hyde, A. C., (Eds.), (1992), *Classics of public administration* (pp. 122-135). Brooks/Cole series in public administration. Pacific Grove, Calif, Brooks/Cole Pub. Co.

Efforts to make public administration scientific has taken away from several important considerations. The first is that public administration is considered with normative values, which science cannot demonstrate. This brings into question the character of efficiency in a democratic society. As such, public administration requires wider analysis and consideration than private administration. It is also inescapable that public administration is concerned with human behavior, which limits the ability to have a science of the subject. If public administration presupposes rationality too much, it may lose sight of the aspect of people. If one simply fits people into positions, the people become dejected. Furthermore, some research has shown that informal and social factors influence the behavior of people in organizations. Public administration cannot make an “administrative man.”

As social settings influence public administration, it would follow that comparative administration should illuminate the social side of the subject. In the United Kingdom, the country’s civil service class is educated in social mores and classics, while in the United States it is more educated in technical skills. The United States’ civil service values merit over patronage, and has not given way to a civil service elite, governing the nation.

Follet, Mary, (1926), “The Giving of Orders,” in Shafritz, J. M., & Hyde, A. C., (Eds.), (1992), *Classics of public administration* (pp. 29-37). Brooks/Cole series in public administration. Pacific Grove, Calif, Brooks/Cole Pub. Co.

Orders are harder to give than many may believe. Subordinates do not always follow orders, nor do they always follow orders satisfactorily. Rather than issuing orders, organizations should first build habit-patterns and attitudes. The steps in the process are: 1) build up certain attitudes; 2) provide for the release of these attitudes; 3) augment the released response as it is being carried out. In other words, orders will not take the place of training; orders will not make a worker do what he/she is incapable of doing. The objective of training is to produce habit. Proximity can help in increasing the effectiveness of an order. The ultimate objective of the manager is to resolve internal conflict within the worker – to create integrated rather than dissociated individuals. Often when a manager issues an order, the order attacks the worker’s self-respect. It elicits contempt for being commanded. An order can also be too weak when the manager wants to avoid conflict. The solution is to depersonalize orders – i.e. orders should come from the situation, rather than from another person. This creates an agreement that the task should be implemented. Follet says, “find the law of the situation.” In some ways Follet is in agreement with Taylor in how scientific management does this.

The worker-manager relationship is a personal relationship or social situation. They must do a joint study of a problem or situation. This allows the worker to heighten his/her self-respect, which improves efficiency. It creates pride in one's work and gives them a sense of taking responsibility. In order to reconcile the taking of orders and the taking of responsibility, orders must come from the law of the situation. This is helpful in that situations change, orders cannot keep up. Orders should also involve circular (agreement) rather than linear (directive) behavior. Several unresolved issues remain. How can we eliminate resentment of supervision? How can we point out misconduct? Follet suggests that supervisors should speak not to blame, but to accomplish something, and to have managers deliver good news. Follet ends by speculating on the reason why artillerymen suffered the most mentally after war, mentioning the fact that they had fired from a distance and focused their fire by telephone.

Frederick, Taylor, (1912), "Scientific Management," in Shafritz, J. M., & Hyde, A. C., (Eds.), (1992), *Classics of public administration* (pp. 17-20). Brooks/Cole series in public administration. Pacific Grove, Calif, Brooks/Cole Pub. Co.

Scientific management ensures constant rather than irregular initiative from workers, but it requires four new duties for managers. 1) Managers amass knowledge of workers' tasks. This relates to "science" as it involves the classification of knowledge. 2) Study the practices of workers. 3) Use amassed knowledge and knowledge from the study of workers to train workers. 4) Place management of the workers' tasks in the manager's repertoire. This creates a much more relationship similar to how coaches manage baseball players.

Gulick, Luther, (1937), "Notes on the Theory of Organization," in Shafritz, J. M., & Hyde, A. C., (Eds.), (1992), *Classics of public administration* (pp. 38-47). Brooks/Cole series in public administration. Pacific Grove, Calif, Brooks/Cole Pub. Co.

Large scale enterprises achieve the best results when there is a division of labor. Organization theory must deal with structure of coordination imposed upon the work-division units. Organization is how work is divided. Gulick explains why we divide work: "Because men differ in nature, capacity and skill, and gain greatly in dexterity by specialization; Because the same man cannot be at two places at the same time; Because the range of knowledge and skill is so great that a man cannot within his life-span know more than a single fraction of it. In other words, it is a question of human nature, time, and space." Division of labor allows for specialization and eliminates lost time from changing from one task to another. Certain circumstances make for increased specialization such as the operation of machinery, law, teaching, accounting.

Division of labor is most of all a pragmatic arrangement, but it has limits. Specialization that does not require full-time devotion is usually worthless, although there are part-time exceptions. Technology and custom can interfere with division of labor, such as how a priest will worship and sweep the church floors, or if the operation of technology requires tasks so integrated that specialization in the use of the tool requires understanding of multiple characteristics. Division of labor also cannot pass from physical to organic division, such as how one cannot milk a cow in the barn and feed it in the pastures at once. Gulick asks, “does the division work out? Is something vitally destroyed and lost? Does it bleed? (40)”.

In an organization, the whole is equal to the sum of its parts. Organizations should not be subdivided wherein the central design or purpose of the organization is lost. The construction of a house, for instance, requires an architect, besides those who do the construction. The work of an organization must be coordinated. There are two ways to coordinate work in an organization. 1) Create superiors and subordinates. 2) Allow an idea to dominate, which creates enthusiasm of the tasks among workers. Size and time can interfere with coordination. If too large, the parts of an organization can lose sight of the whole. New rules and the instilling of new habits can take time to establish. If organization is the division of labor, it must have hierarchy. To build an organization, framers must 1) define tasks, 2) appoints supervisors, 3) determine divisions, 4) establish structures of authority. The central concern of organizational theory is the establishment of structures of authority. The most important functions of an organization are too 1) enable direction, 2) coordinate an energize subdivisions, 3) achieve major objectives, 4) operate efficiently.

Supervisors are limited by the amount of control they have by time and their energy. Exact and routine work is easier to control than diversified, qualitative, and scattered work, which is mostly found at the top of organizations. As such, it is better to reduce the number of individuals in a group as one moves up the structure. Also important is unity of command, which is the source of where commands are issued. Multiple commands often create confusion. It is tempting and sometimes necessary to set up more than one master.

Efficiency is related to homogeneity. Non-homogeneous tasks in a team create friction. In a team of experts, laymen should not manage them. In a democracy, where politics can determine so much of how government runs, inefficiency is common. Experts especially those who are very specialized, desire independence, and may dismiss the needs of the people. The commoner is usually the better judge of his/her needs than the experts. A. E. says, “on tap, not on top.”

Some people differ in thinking about organization from top-down, where one examines subdivisions under chief executive, or bottom-up, where one examines individuals units and how they build into an aggregate. Both consider the entire organization, which is acceptable, but they have their weaknesses as well. Top-down thinkers must not sacrifice individual effectiveness, while bottom-up thinkers must not thwart coordination. Solutions must be bottom-up and top-down. Also, top-down

thinkers must consider span of control, while bottom-up thinkers must consider homogeneity. In addition, top management should keep out of technical matters, and should focus on coordination.

The task of management is to carry out the functions of POSDCORB. Sometimes, POSDCORB may be subdivided.

- P**lanning tasks, methods and purposes
- O**rganizing subdivisions
- S**taffing who to bring, training, and controlling work conditions
- D**irecting/ making decisions
- C**oordinating: interrelating various parts of work
- R**eporting: informing superiors, subordinates through records, research, inspections
- B**udgeting: fiscal planning, accounting, control

Hammer, M., & Champy, J. (1993). *Reengineering the corporation: a manifesto for business revolution*. New York, NY: HarperBusiness.

Chapter 2: Reengineering Formally Defined

Four key words describe reengineering. Reengineering reexamines the *fundamentals* of organizational design, down the reason why certain labor is divided, and whether or not it should be. Reengineering is *radical* reinvention. Reengineering is *dramatic*, and a company should only reengineer if in serious need. Three types of companies need to reengineer: those in deep trouble, those not yet in deep trouble, but in coming trouble, and those in peak condition. Lastly, reengineering focuses on *process*, a set of activities that transform inputs into outputs. Several common themes in reengineering is that it is process oriented, ambitious, rule breaking (in that it no longer focuses on specialization, sequentiality or timing), and uses information technology creatively that allows the company to conduct its business very differently. Michael Hammer and James Champy believe reengineering is starting over from Adam Smith's division of labor.

Chapter 3: Rethinking Business Process

A reengineered process is one in the company combines several jobs into one, and where workers make the decisions. In a reengineered process, the company performs process steps in natural order, and there are multiple versions of a process – i.e., there is no “right way” to perform a process. People work where it makes the most sense, the company reduces checks and controls, distorted and omitted data is minimized, and a case manager provides a single point of contact.

Chapter 4: The New World of Work

Many changes occur in a reengineered company. Work units change from functional departments to process teams. Jobs become multi-dimensional rather than simple and specialized. Workers become empowered, rather than controlled. Workers prepare for jobs through “education” rather than training. Performance measures and compensation focus on results, rather than activity. The company culture begins to value productivity over protection. Managers behave more like coaches than supervisors, i.e. they take on more of an advisory role. The organizational structure flattens and hierarchy diminishes. The role of executives is to ensure that the environment cultivates effectiveness.

Chapter 5: Enabling Role of Information Technology (IT)

The recent advances in IT permit organizations to reengineer, but companies must make sure that they do not misuse IT. Companies must learn to think inductively – they must recognize solutions and then find problems to solve, and must make people respond, rather than respond to people. The following is a list of old rules changed by disruptive technology:

1. Old Rule: Only experts can perform complex work.
Disruptive Technology: Expert systems
New Rule: Generalists can do expert work.
2. Old Rule: Organizations must choose between centralization and decentralization.
Disruptive Technology: Telecommunications networks
New Rule: Organizations can now do both.
3. Old Rule: Managers make all the decisions.
Disruptive Technology: Decision support tools (database access, modeling software)
New Rule: Everyone makes decisions.
4. Old Rule: Field personnel need offices to receive, store and transit information.
Disruptive Technology: Email, telecommunications networks
New Rule: Field personnel can work from the field
5. Old Rule: The best contact with a potential buyer is personal contact.
Disruptive Technology: Interactive videodisk
New Rule: The best contact is the most effective contact, whether personal, or prepared through technology.
6. Old Rule: You have to find things.
Disruptive Technology: Automatic identification and tracking
New Rule: Things tell you where they are.
7. Old Rule: Plans are revised periodically.
Disruptive Technology: High-performance computing
New Rule: Plans are revised immediately.

Chapter 6: Who Will Reengineer?

Several options are available when choosing who to use to reengineer, and companies can choose a combination of them. The first criterion for a company to reengineer is for a senior executive to authorize and motivate the effort. He or she will appoint the process owners. He or she must have authority over dealing with the stakeholders, and must communicate the need to reengineer. The process owner is a manager who is responsible for a specific process and the reengineering effort for that process. The process owner must carry with him or her experience, prestige and influence. The process owner sees that reengineering happens. The company can appoint a reengineering team to diagnose a process and oversee design and implementation. The team should not be a committee. The company should encourage the team to use outside experts, which can benefit the company with fresh thinking. The company can appoint a steering committee, which would be a policy-making body of senior managers developing overall reengineering strategy and who monitor progress. Lastly, the company can appoint a reengineering czar who acts as a chief of staff to advise and moderate discussion. The company must avoid allowing the czar to become too controlling.

Chapter 7: The Hunt for Reengineering Opportunities

In the search for processes to reengineer, broken processes usually have symptoms that a company can identify. Examples of symptoms and diseased processes are listed below:

- Symptom: extensive information sharing, data redundancy and rekeying
Disease: arbitrary fragmentation of a natural process
- Symptom: inventory, buffers and other assets
Disease: system slack to cope with uncertainty
- Symptom: high ratio of checking and control to value adding
Disease: fragmentation
- Symptom: rework and iteration
Disease: inadequate feedback along chains
- Symptom: complexity, exceptions and special cases
Disease: accretion onto a simple base

Sometimes data may indicate something is broken, but may not point to which process. In the prioritization of processes to reengineer, companies must take into account the importance of the process, and the feasibility of reengineering it. Companies must understand its processes by knowing what they do, how well they perform and things that govern their performance, yet a company does not need to expose all the details. The most important aspect of a process to understand is its relation with the customer.

Chapter 8: The Experience of Process Redesign

During process redesign, the experience begins with process redesign sessions. As a principle, as few people as possible should be involved in the performance of a

process. Three techniques to use in these sessions are to boldly apply one or more principles of reengineering, search out and destroy assumptions and look for opportunities to apply technology. In session role playing, several discoveries have been made that should guide redesign sessions:

1. No one needs to be an expert
2. Being an outsider helps.
3. Discard preconceived notions.
4. See things through the customer's eyes.
5. Teams are best for redesigning.
6. The process does not need to be known too much.
7. Great ideas are easy.
8. Sessions can be fun.

Chapter 9: Embarking on Reengineering

In order to persuade a company to reengineer, one must explain why the company cannot remain as it is, and provide a vision of where the company must go.

Chapter 10: Succeeding at Reengineering

In designing reengineered processes, companies should try to fix processes rather than change them. They should ignore everything except process redesign, such as job designs, organizational structure and management systems. The following lists actions that a company should not do if it wants reengineering to succeed.

- Neglect other people's values and beliefs.
- Be too impatient.
- Constrain the problem definition and scope of the reengineering effort.
- Allow existing cultures and attitudes to prevent reengineering
- Try to make it happen from the bottom up
- Assign someone who does not understand reengineering to take the lead.
- Withhold on resources for reengineering.
- Bury reengineering in the middle of the organization's agenda.
- Dissipate energy across many reengineering projects.
- Attempt to reengineer when the CEO is two years away from retirement.
- Fail to distinguish reengineering from other business improvement programs.
- Concentrate exclusively on design.
- Try not to make anyone happy.
- Pull back in the face of resistance.
- Drag out the effort.

Katz, Daniel and Robert L. Kahn, (1966), "Organizations and the System Concept,"
in Shafritz, J. M., & Hyde, A. C., (Eds.), (1992), *Classics of public*

administration (pp. 238-249). Brooks/Cole series in public administration. Pacific Grove, Calif, Brooks/Cole Pub. Co.

Organizations make up a group of individuals, and are not so simple as to be guided by an objective. In using systems analysis, organizations can be seen as input and output systems. There are two criteria for identifying social systems and determining their functions. First, trace the pattern of energy exchange or activity of people as it results in some output. Second, ascertain how the output is translated into energy which reactivates the pattern. Systems analysis view organizational functions as outputs rather than conscious leaders of groups. It is concerned with relationships, structure and interdependence, and is dependent on the external environment. The following are common characteristics of open systems:

1. Importation of energy: Energy from external environments affects and vitalizes systems. Social organizations must draw energy from other institutions, people and the material environment.
2. The Through-Put: Open systems transform energy available to them, creating new products, processing materials, training people, and providing services.
3. The Output: Organizations export some product in to the environment.
4. Systems as Cycles of Events: Output reinforces system processes through profit or satisfaction. Events, rather than things are structured. Functions in organization structure and subsystems give further reinforcement.
5. Negative Energy: To acquire more energy from its environment than it expends to survive.
6. Information Input, Negative Feedback, and the Coding Process: Information is considered an input that allows organizations to adapt to their environments. The simplest type of input is negative feedback, which corrects deviations from a system's course. The quality and type of information received is determined by the system's attenuation.
7. The Steady State and Dynamic Homeostasis: The character of a system remains the same to transform energy as required. In countering energy, systems move toward growth and expansion. Damage is automatically fixed, but changed as a result. The basic principle in systems analysis is that systems seek to preserve themselves. Systems store reserve energy for safety. Systems try to ingest or establish control over the environments, which make them grow further. There are two types of growth. The first is one in which subsystems develop. The second is when growth creates a qualitative difference of the system's function.
8. Differentiation: Global patterns are replaced by more specialized functions, because systems become too complex and specialization increases. This happens because systems seek to be steady.
9. Equifinality: A system can reach the same final state in a different ways. As open systems move toward regulatory mechanics to control their operations, equifinality is reduced.

Some consequences of viewing organizations as open systems include the realization that organizations must change and adapt to their environment. Too much focus on

coordination, control and stability hinders flexibility. External factors should be recognized, rather than adopting the “public be damned” approach. Equifinality means there is not necessarily one best way. Organizational theory still follows the closed system concept.

Lilienthal, David E., (1944), “Planning and Planners,” in Shafritz, J. M., & Hyde, A. C., (Eds.), (1992), *Classics of public administration* (pp. 95-101). Brooks/Cole series in public administration. Pacific Grove, Calif, Brooks/Cole Pub. Co.

The Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”) is unique because its planning is very open and flexible. In U.S. history, much of the planners have been elected officials and businessmen. The settlement of the West and the industrial planning of the Northeast have shown the old ways of planning to be quite successful, but now the old ways of planning has led to deterioration of the economy. TVA has been largely successful by assisting farms with resource management expertise and technology through a kind of “democratic planning.” In TVA, planners must understand and believe in people, and know that planning is not an end in itself. The old ways planning, even if done earnestly, can make the mistake of becoming too unrealistic. TVA planning emphasizes direction over goals, and multiple means, rather than one. TVA planning is grounded in the present situation, where people and institutions can take part. TVA has never attempted to eliminate institutions or force reform and has been given the necessary power to carry out its functions. TVA’s purpose was not to make a plan, but to help the valley develop. As a result, the successes of TVA have come chiefly from the people’s participation. As TVA was not a planning agency, but an agency of action, its experts interacted up close with the people, and its work had to have the support and voluntary compliance by the people. TVA has shown that plans must be worked out democratically. TVA has some powers to take property of land owners and sell, but the force of law was used only to meet the crisis of soil depletion. TVA has insisted on voluntary compliance, and tries to rely on incentives, contracts, persuasion, encouragement, and other methods based on gaining the confidence of the people.

Long, Norton E., (1949), “Power and Administration,” in Shafritz, J. M., & Hyde, A. C., (Eds.), (1992), *Classics of public administration* (pp. 143-152). Brooks/Cole series in public administration. Pacific Grove, Calif, Brooks/Cole Pub. Co.

The life blood of an administrative agency is power. Without power, the agency would not amount to much significance. This article tries to analyze the source of power in public administration. Legislation and executive orders confer only legal authority, but not substantive power. The real mandate of local authorities is set by the power groups embodied in it. Also, power is not centralized in the leadership as structure suggests; structure only determines the scope of possible action. Power

flows from the bottom up, so bureaucrats can not simply use chain-of-command to execute decisions. Even without mandate, departments and agencies in the United States are deeply involved in policy. Their avenues of influencing policy include Congress, presidential advisors, and courts. Agencies will lead themselves in conflicting directions, and will have values that are not uniform. Loose and implicit alliances form. The President will have to feel out policy options from the groups. During budgeting, resources allocation becomes politicized. Only during crises are the departments most effectively integrated. Unity of command is also unclear in agencies, when they must serve the organization, the country, the people, the Congress, or the President. Organizational interests can conflict with the overall objectives of the government. Informal processes and social roots make reorganizations difficult. Furthermore, there is no common product around which agencies can organize their efforts. In the United States, efficiency for its own sake is denied in government. As such, realistic public administration must recognize the existing political system. The Office of the President resembles an imperial court, and the incentives pull the President to strive for executive power, power in party, and power in Congress.

Maslow, A. H., (1943), "A Theory of Human Motivation," in Shafritz, J. M., & Hyde, A. C., (Eds.), (1992), *Classics of public administration* (pp. 80-95). Brooks/Cole series in public administration. Pacific Grove, Calif, Brooks/Cole Pub. Co.

In building a theory of human motivation, the drives that are classified must be human and more than just biological, and should come from the subconscious. The basic needs of humans are physiological needs, safety needs, love needs, esteem needs, and self-actualization. Physiological needs are largely defined by the conditions of homeostasis of the blood stream – water, salt, sugar, protein, fat, calcium, oxygen, acid-base balance, and constant temperature. These things determine the appetite of human beings, and produce the hunger and thirst, driving humans to eat and drink. Physiological needs do not include sensory pleasure. They are also relatively independent of each other. Sometimes, what may seem like behavior that fulfills a physiological need may actually fulfill other needs. Physiological needs are the preponderant factor for motivation when one is in extreme deprivation. Once physiological needs are satisfied, other needs emerge. Safety needs emerge once physiological needs are satisfied. Safety comes from undisrupted routine or rhythm. Disruption of such factors can amount to illness. Early experience in one's life of quarreling, assault, separation, or death can cause one to live in fear. Products of safety motivation include science and philosophy – things that humans can use to organize the world. Love needs arise when safety needs are satisfied. The thwarting of love leads to maladjustment. Love is not synonymous with sex. Esteem needs drive achievement, respect from others, confidence, self-respect, independence, and freedom. Thwarting of esteem needs leads to feelings of inferiority, weakness, and helplessness. The highest of needs is self-actualization, in

which a human actualizes his/her potential. This need is very individualized, and requires more research to discover more of its properties.

McGregor, Douglas Murray, (1957), “The Human Side of Enterprise,” in Shafritz, J. M., & Hyde, A. C., (Eds.), (1992), *Classics of public administration* (pp. 187-194). Brooks/Cole series in public administration. Pacific Grove, Calif, Brooks/Cole Pub. Co.

Social sciences can be used to make human organizations more effective. Changes have already taken place in the study of human organizations that consist of ideas from the social sciences. However, differences remain. The conventional manager’s view, which McGregor labels “theory x,” consists of the following propositions: 1) management is responsible for organizing the elements of productive enterprise – money, materiel, equipment, people, 2) people must be motivated, directed and controlled, 3) people must be persuaded, rewarded, and punished to carry out the needs of the organization. Theory X has several additional beliefs that are less explicit. These include: the average man works as little as possible, lacks ambition, dislikes responsibility, prefers to follow, is inherently self-centered, indifferent to organizational needs, resistant to change, gullible and not very bright. Although this is the conventional view, management styles still vary from strong, coercive, and controlling to soft, harmonious and permissive. Both ranges of styles have weaknesses. If the manager is too strong, conflict will result; if too weak, people will take advantage of the manager. The popular style is to be “firm but fair.”

The conventional view is incorrect. The conventional view assumes that human behavior is a consequence of organization rather than human nature – theory X confuses cause and effect. Maslow’s theory of human motivation – “theory y” – examines human behavior in an organization with a different perspective. Theory X assumes that the fulfillments of physiological needs is the objective of workers, however, theory Y postulates that when a need is satisfied, it is no longer a motivator of human behavior. As such, needs in the higher levels of the motivation hierarchy must be examined. With regard to security needs, employees need security in order to take risks. Dependence and subjection to unilateral action by a superior thwarts satisfaction of this need. Employee social needs include acceptance, a sense of belonging, acceptance and friendship. Managers are often weary of the pursuit of these needs, assuming they threaten the organization. However, close and cohesive groups of workers have been shown to be more effective. When managers attempt to dismantle informal groups created by these needs, they tend to create more conflict in the workplace. Workers also have ego needs, which includes self-esteem, self-respect, respect from others, confidence, independence, freedom, competence, knowledge, reputation, status, recognition and appreciation. Organizations offer few opportunities for workers to fulfill these needs. The last level of needs is self-actualization, in which one realizes one’s own potential. Modern life gives limited opportunity to fulfill all these needs.

Managers should try to create a work environment that can fulfill the needs of the organization's workers. Management by control impedes the creation of this environment. Theory assumes the following propositions:

1. Management is still responsible for organizing elements of productive enterprise.
2. People are not naturally passive and resistant to organizational needs.
3. Management does not instill motivation, but provides conditions for motivation.
4. Managers should seek to have workers achieve their individual goals that are congruent with the organization's through their own effort.

The transition to theory Y, but organizations have recently made some correct steps. Decentralization and deregulation, job enlargement by giving workers more responsibilities, participative and consultative management, and worker created performance appraisals are all methods of applying theory Y to organizations. None of these will work, however, if they are implemented with cynicism or as gimmicks.

Merton, Robert, (1957), "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," in Shafritz, J. M., & Hyde, A. C., (Eds.), (1992), *Classics of public administration* (pp. 53-62). Brooks/Cole series in public administration. Pacific Grove, Calif, Brooks/Cole Pub. Co.

Bureaucracy is a rationally organized social structure that involves clearly defined patterns of activity in which every action relates to purposes of the organizations. Within bureaucracies one finds offices in which one's authorities derive hierarchies, rules and areas of responsibility. Action occurs within the framework of the rules. Formality is symbolized by social rituals consistent with the rules, which minimizes organizational friction. There is a social distance between the occupants of offices, and stability results from mutual expectations, calculable actions, and protection from arbitrary action. Procedure fosters objectivity and restrains impulse.

Weber's description of bureaucracy includes discussion on clear division of integrated duties; controls, sanctions, and regulations; assignment of roles; meritocracy; and impersonal processes. Experts act within a set of rules. Cases and problems are categorized. The purest bureaucrats are those who are appointed, while elected officials function to affect the purpose of the organizations, without interfering in technical procedure. Emphasis is placed on attaining life-tenure and vocational security. Individuals are separated from their means of production. Bureaucracies tend to avoid public discussion of their techniques in order to keep a competitive advantage against their competitors or foreign governments.

People often emphasize the imperfect and dysfunctional aspects of bureaucracy. Specialization can lead to inflexibility, which Dewey calls "occupational psychosis", in which focus on one thing can lead to neglect of another thing. Limitations come

from attaining precision, reliability, and efficiency, in which pressure to be methodical, prudent, and discipline leads to instilling sentiment for devotion to rules. Too much adherence to rules detracts from accomplishing goals, which results in focus on processes over mission.

There are four structural sources of over-conformity in a bureaucracy. 1) An effective bureaucrat demands reliability of response and strict devotion to regulations. 2) Such devotion to the rules leads to their transformation into absolutes; they are no longer conceived as relative to a set of purposes. 3) This interferes with ready adaptation under special conditions not clearly envisaged by those who drew up general rules. 4) The very elements which conduce toward efficiency in general produce inefficiency in specific instances. The idea of the career bureaucrat creates incentives for discipline action and conformity to regulation. The lack of competition, common destiny, esprit de corps in an organization leads to a sharing of interests that makes the organization defend its interests rather than serve clientele and elected higher officials. In such cases, organizations will withhold information or overload higher officials with information. A tendency exists for bureaucratic norms that are introduced for technical reasons to become rigid and sanctified. Also, bureaucrats are subject to the tension of primary (personal) vs. secondary (impersonal) relations in which they are pressured to treat others impersonally when others desire them to treat them personally.

Several problems that can serve as subjects for research include how personality types are accepted into organizations and how personality types respond to bureaucracy. Also, does promotion lessen competitive anxiety and increase efficiency?

Parkinson, C. Northcote, (1957), "Parkinson's Law or the Rising Pyramid," in Shafritz, J. M., & Hyde, A. C., (Eds.), (1992), *Classics of public administration* (pp. 194-198). Brooks/Cole series in public administration. Pacific Grove, Calif, Brooks/Cole Pub. Co.

Work expands to fill time available for its completion. The tasks to be done swell in importance and complexity in a direct ratio with time to be spent. This leads to officials who will try multiply their subordinates, not rivals, and officials making work for each other (buck passing). This leads to the expansion of bureaucratic organizations. Parkinson expresses the number of staff acquired yearly as $x = (2k^m + 1)/n$.

x= number staff acquired yearly

k=number of staff seeking promotion by appointing subordinates

l=difference between the ages of appointment and retirement

m=number of man hours devoted to answering minutes within the department

n=number of effective units being administered

Roethlisberger, F. J., (1969), “The Hawthorne Experiments,” in Shafritz, J. M., & Hyde, A. C., (Eds.), (1992), *Classics of public administration* (pp. 67-77). Brooks/Cole series in public administration. Pacific Grove, Calif, Brooks/Cole Pub. Co.

The Hawthorne experiments were a series of experiments conducted by researchers at the Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric Company. The results were made to public by Stuart Chase in Readers’ Digest under the title of “What makes a worker like to work?” The research demonstrates that human problems require human solutions which need human data and human tools.

The first experiment was to find a relationship of quantity and quality of illumination to efficiency of industrial workers. A test group of telephone relay assemblers would work with varying intensities of light by increasing magnitude from 24, to 46, to 70 foot candles. A control group would work with light of the same intensity. In all cases, the output remained the same. They also decreased magnitude from 10 to 3 foot candles, in which output increased for both groups. They told the workers that they would increase illumination without doing so, in which output remained the same, but the workers believed illumination increased. They told the workers that they would decrease illumination, in which output also remained the same, and the workers believed illumination decreased. People found the research to be very peculiar, in that there were so many uncontrollable variables in the testing. Some wondered that human motivation would require change of human factors. This was an example of a human experiment done in non-human terms.

The next set of experiments involved five girls assembling telephone relays. They were studied for five years. The researchers changed a host of physical inputs, and recorded the girls’ routines thoroughly. They hypothesized that fatigue was responsible for differences in output. They changed sleep patterns, rest pauses, working day and week lengths, and provided lunches. The investigators and operations were the same. They were happy, they earned more money, produced more, and were objects of attention from the management. But after going back to the normal routine, output remained the same as it was in the experiment. When humans are experimented upon such as in this case, they know. The experiment had altered the social situation in the room. This led to the development among researchers of a new and more fruitful point of view. The researchers realized the importance of worker attitudes and sentiments. One’s work habit reflect how he/she feels about his/her job, fellow workers, and superiors – the meaning for the worker about what his happening around him/her.

The researchers began a new experiment in which they would interview workers. It was difficult at first – to not interrupt, give advice, make moral judgments, argue, be too clever, dominate a conversation, or ask leading questions. It was also difficult to get information on what was important for the worker, and not the interviewer. They found the most significant thing to a person was not something in his/her

immediate work situation. Sooner or later the workers would disclose the most important things they felt. The researchers protected the confidences of the workers. They came up with a new way of viewing employee satisfaction and dissatisfaction. They first assumed that logical relations existed between likes and dislikes and certain items and events in the immediate work situation, wherein they could correct the complaint and the problems would be solved. This assumption was simplistic. Sometimes workers would report gratitude for a change that did not happen. Researchers found that some complaints dated years back. Workers seemed to just want someone to whom they could talk. The research defied the assumption of the logical “economic man.”

The new concept had three key lessons: 1) the behavior of workers cannot be understood apart from feelings and sentiments, such as in phenomenon expressed as “loyalty,” “solidarity,” and “integrity.” 2) Sentiments are easily disguised. Integrity can be expressed in a handshake or expressed as violated in a sit down strike. People project their sentiments on the world, where they may say, “The world is bad,” rather than, “I feel bad.” 3) Sentiment can only be understood in terms of the total situation of the person. The meaning of a change depends on: 1) social conditioning or sentiments (values, hopes, fears, and expectations) brought to work from home and group associations. One must find the relation of change to these sentiments. Change also depends on: 2) satisfaction developed from social participation with coworkers, supervisors and immediate work groups. Work is primarily a social environment. Workers are members of a group. They have sentiments and feelings for each other which lead to a collaborative effort. They attach meaning to every item and object in the industrial environment such as material goods, output, wages, hours of work – they must be interpreted as carriers of social value. Output is a form of social behavior.

In their new experiment the researchers interviewed workers in the bank wiring observation room. Three occupational groups were put in the room: wiremen, soldermen, and inspectors, and the more output they produced, the more they earned. People did not put pressure on each other for output as expected. Those who worked too hard were called “ratebuster.” Those who worked too little were called “chiseler.” Those who reported negatively were called “squealer.” Inspectors were pressured to not be too officious, or act like inspectors. To be respected, they had to abide by social standards. The best performers were not the most accepted, but the one who performed at the rate everyone agreed was best. Also, output did not correspond to tests of intelligence or dexterity. The most intelligent worker actually had the lowest output. Each worker’s level of output reflected his position in the organization.

The researchers became interested in the informal employee groups – their beliefs, creeds, and social norms. These groups are not represented in company charts, and are results of employees working together without choice in whether or not they would cooperate. The researchers studied important social functions – their histories, how they spontaneously, how they perpetuate themselves, multiply, disappear, or when they are in jeopardy from technical change and how they resist

innovation. They also examined how codes and norms are at variance with technical and economic objectives of the company as a whole, in which it is more likely for groups to oppose and separate from the objectives of the whole organization. The researchers thought they had arrived at the heart of the problem of effective collaboration. It shows how many perplexing problems became intelligible. They found salary is not the prime incentive for performance. The researchers found people wanted the satisfaction of being accepted as people of worth by friends and work associates. Money is always a small part of a social organization. The way people are greeted by their superiors, being asked to help a newcomer, keep an eye on a difficult operation demonstrated social recognition. These facets of their work environment tell how they stand in a group. People want evidence of social importance, a socially useful skill, and security from being accepted as a member in a group. Problems are created when people who feel personal integrity is injured, which is neglected by over-logicized machinery. These were the matters of primary importance in Hawthorne, and not negotiated in contracts. If industry is filled with people in a social void and without social functions, these problems exacerbate. If workers are an integral part of social situations at work, things often work out.

The researchers found that solutions must include understanding of human situations, the dealing of problems with human methods, which is a precondition for effective collaboration, and that the performance of workers is based on sentiment rather than logic. The key point is that the worker is a social animal. Even while technological advancement has been tremendous, the handling of people is archaic. The Hawthorne experiments call for further research in understanding human motivation.

Sayre, Wallace S. (1958), "Premises of Public Administration: Past and Emerging," in Shafritz, J. M., & Hyde, A. C., (Eds.), (1992), *Classics of public administration* (pp. 198-203). Brooks/Cole series in public administration. Pacific Grove, Calif, Brooks/Cole Pub. Co.

[To be reviewed]

Selznick, Phillip, (1943), "The Cooptative Mechanism," in Shafritz, J. M., & Hyde, A. C., (Eds.), (1992), *Classics of public administration* (pp. 135-142). Brooks/Cole series in public administration. Pacific Grove, Calif, Brooks/Cole Pub. Co.

Cooptation is the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy determining structure of organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence. Cooptation can be formal or informal. Two conditions result in formal cooptation: when the legitimacy of an organization is called into question, or when the organization requires self-governance, i.e. when there is no power transfer, or when decision-making stays in the hands of the same people. Informal cooptation

happens in response to specific power centers of a community. Cooptation reflects tension between formal authority and social power. The changes that take place are consequential for the character of the organization. They also restrict choices for decision-makers. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), for instance, absorbed local elements into its decision-making, yet TVA had preserved its unity of command.

Simon, Herbert, (1946), "The Proverbs of Administration," in Shafritz, J. M., & Hyde, A. C., (Eds.), (1992), *Classics of public administration* (pp. 107-122). Brooks/Cole series in public administration. Pacific Grove, Calif, Brooks/Cole Pub. Co.

It is hard to make proverbs for administration because it is a field with so much room for debate. However, there are some accepted administrative principles: 1. specialization will increase efficiency, 2. creating a determinate hierarchy of authority will increase efficiency (unity of command), 3. limiting span of control to a small number will increase efficiency, 4. grouping workers for purposes of control to (a) purpose, (b) process, (c) clientele, or (d) place will increase efficiency. These administrative principles are quite clear and should be able to solve all administrative problems, yet that does not happen.

These principles are mutually incompatible, and have their own nuances. Specialization can lead to efficiency, but also too much rigidity during a certain phase in an organization's pursuit of its objectives. An organization must specialize efficiently. The purpose of unity of command is to have experts make decisions, but sometimes the expert is unable to issue commands on particular issues outside of the command, such as when an issue falls across stovepipes, or when a subordinate must seek approval by his/her supervisor. In this situation a process of adjudication must be created, but when this happens, specialization is lost. Span of control calls for minimization of breadth, yet this contradicts the desire to minimize levels of hierarchy. Too large a breadth will interfere with specialization, as the decision-maker oversees more things in which he/she is not an expert. Purposes, processes, clientele, or places also compete as the point around which an organization should organize. The terms are also ambiguous. Purpose and process can mean the same thing, such as how when typing is the purpose and process of a typist. Clientele can be the same as an area. There is no method to clarify these problems. To demonstrate these problems, suppose the government is going to teach farmers the latest agricultural best practices. It could use either the Department of Education or the Department of Agriculture. With the Department of Education, the government will use the best teaching techniques, but may not teach the best agriculture techniques. With the Department of Agriculture, the government may teach the best agriculture techniques, but without the best teaching techniques. All the principles of administrative theory are now demonstrably less valuable.

However, the diminution of these principles has not made administration unsalvageable. The principles serve the purpose of measurement, so that in building a structure, one can use these principles to construct it with the right proportions and balance, as one would with the rooms of a house. Although this settles the question of the principles of administration, upon further examination, other considerations arise. Administrative theory must look at describing administrative situations, such as where decisions are made, and lines of communication. The aim of administration is efficiency, and the simplest method to examine efficiency is by examining input and output and the limits to performance. Individuals can be limited by skills, habits, and reflexes, or values, conception of purpose, loyalty, or motivation. In the case of individuals, training is imperative in improving performance – to make behavior rational for completing the aims of the organization. In this sense, administrative theory is concerned with the non-rational limits of the rational – the more rationality, the less important the structure.

Waldo, Dwight, (1955), “What is Public Administration?,” in Shafritz, J. M., & Hyde, A. C., (Eds.), (1992), *Classics of public administration* (pp. 170-182). Brooks/Cole series in public administration. Pacific Grove, Calif, Brooks/Cole Pub. Co.

Public administration is primarily a technology, but it is very hard to define. There are two optional definitions for public administration: 1) the organization, management, and material to achieve the purposes of government, 2) the art and science of management applied to affairs of state. The central concern for public administration is to provide public goods. It is different from the private sector in that public administration is involved in cooperative rational action rather than the antagonistic cooperation of the market. However, many people debate whether public administration is an art or a science. Waldo argues that both the science – empiricism and laws – and the art – creativity, judgment, and leadership – should exist for effective public administration. The term public administration also connotes two things: a discipline of study, and the practice of public affairs. The discipline is the science, while the practice is the art. Public administration leads to study of organization as the anatomy of government and the study management as the physiology. These two parts of public administration leaves space for one to examine the discrepancies between the structures of authoritative and habitual personal interrelations. The concept of culture allows public administration to unify these parts, in that both the formal and informal elements of the government are the expression of a society.

Weber, Max, (1922), “Bureaucracy,” in Shafritz, J. M., & Hyde, A. C., (Eds.), (1992), *Classics of public administration* (pp. 23-29). Brooks/Cole series in public administration. Pacific Grove, Calif, Brooks/Cole Pub. Co.

In a bureaucracy, laws or administrative regulations establish jurisdictional areas for which officials will be responsible. Official duties consist of a distribution of regular activities conducted by the organization. The permanent establishment of an office is a characteristic of bureaucracies. Bureaucracies are exceptions rather than the rule in organizations. They are established in civilizations with a scale requiring it, or in large businesses. Once established, super and subordinate offices are created for the appeal of decisions. Management is largely based on the administration of documents and files in bureaus. Offices are meant to be impersonal, in which the occupant's official duty is business, and where the occupant has no personal ownership over the authorities and resources of the office. Officials follow general rules and respond to decrees rather than initiating market transactions. Officials often enjoy social esteem. The purest of bureaucrats are those who are appointed. Elected officials are subordinate to party bosses, rather than the administrative system and are not experts but managers of spoils. Elected officials can endanger the expertise of bureaucracies. "Caesarianism" describes an arrangement in which elected officials appoint subordinates. In an imperial bureaucracy, favor and appointment by the sovereign is more esteemed than incumbency by election. Officials tend to try to secure life-tenure in the bureaucracy and promotion in exchange for fixed salaries, financial security, and a "career."

Wilson, Woodrow, (1887), "The Study of Administration," in Shafritz, J. M., & Hyde, A. C., (Eds.), (1992), *Classics of public administration* (pp. 3-17). Brooks/Cole series in public administration. Pacific Grove, Calif, Brooks/Cole Pub. Co.

Wilson: "it is the object of administrative study to discover, first, what government can properly and successfully do, and, secondly, how it can do these proper things with the utmost possible efficiency and at the least possible cost either of money or of energy." Public administration arises from political science after settling the question of constitution. In the United States, the constitution places the people as the sovereign of the government, but after establishing this arrangement, the executive branch of the government has grown in complexity, from a body of clerks, to public service functions, such as the building of infrastructure. Wilson writes, "Like a lusty child, government with us has expanded in nature and grown great in stature, but has also become awkward in movement."

Public administration is new in the United States, but has become tradition in Europe. The monarchs and emperors of Europe had to provide public goods to please their people, but this happened intermittently, when a wise ruler would come to power after a line of despots. Napoleon and Frederick the Great are examples. The nations of England and the United States, rather than devoting energy to improving public goods, have devoted energy to the improvement of political systems, which has led to the legislators becoming the masters of the monarchs. But after building government, running government in a democracy is difficult because of the multitude of public opinion and the diversity of the people. Reform is slow and is full of

compromise. Reformers must persuade people to support their reforms, and once the people have become accustomed to an arrangement, reformers must change the people's minds. Wilson comments, "It is getting harder to run a constitution than to *frame* one."

Public administration is a technical field, but in a democracy it is devoted to fulfilling high philosophical goals. Policy and public administration are separate, as is politics from the two. Public administration in the United States is executed by law, with Congress defining the tasks, and with the executive branch carrying out the order. Public administration in a democracy requires transparency. Sovereigns are suspicious of their servants. The way to hold government accountable is through public opinion, but the chaos and multitude of public opinion can cause confusion, too much oversight can cause a nuisance to the administration, and may interfere with technical expertise. In the American government, technical experts are needed, but cannot become a governing class, and must be responsive to the public. As such, elected statesmen will steer them.

In adopting public administration as a subject matter, some may advocate that the United States not borrow from other countries, especially those run by despots. Wilson counters by pointing to other characteristics of countries America has borrowed, including the English language, which came from a people ruled by kings and lords. Borrowing will allow us to identify our strengths and weaknesses and compare and contrast. We borrow in search of principles of public administration, rather than political science or philosophy. We will also apply public administration to a federal system with the understanding of the need for local, state, and national government. Wilson explains that by developing public administration alongside the political system of the United States, the country will serve as an even greater model of good governance.

National Level

Studies

Murdock, Clark A., et al., *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era: Phase 2 Report* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005). Located at: http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/bgn_ph2_report.pdf (accessed April 23, 2007).

The report suggests that the divided system of government in the U.S. creates friction and wasted energy in daily operations. The decentralized government structure creates complex, duplicative and excessively bureaucratic processes that can choke initiative and cause unneeded inertia, the net result of which is a government and component agencies that cannot adapt quickly to profound changes in the security environment. The report points out that, except when he invokes temporary emergency powers, the President does not have the same authority over civilian national security agencies that he has over the military. There is no national security command and control system similar to that given to the Secretary of Defense over the military. As such, there is no unity of command. With respect to structural problems, the study implies that current structure does not permit strong advocacy of conflicting ideas. The report also argues that staffs sometimes inhibit execution since they crave details as what they see as essential to oversight. Based on this, the report cautions that large staffs incentivize inaction and hinder agility. The study team also discussed two structural models, concluding that the lead-agency model is usually not sufficient since agencies tend to resist taking direction from each other—especially with respect to allocating resources. The report suggests that a lead-agency model can result in actions falling well short of what is needed and what the government is capable of achieving. However, the study team indicates that the lead-agency approach may be appropriate at the tactical level where one particular agency is most appropriate to the task at hand. The report claims that the NSC-centric model is needed to play the honest broker role in coordination, planning and oversight of interagency operations at the strategic level. The study also is critical of *ad hoc* and relationship-based practices, which may be temporarily effective, but do not hold up over time. The study claims that such practices often blur chains of command and responsibility. Cabinet agencies are identified as continuing to be the principal organizational elements of national security policy. However, it is argued that usually it is unclear which Cabinet agency has lead responsibility for specific areas. An example is NSPD 17's WMD strategy, which is broad, but does include a detailed discussion of roles and responsibilities among federal agencies. Another example is the National Response Plan, which outlines roles and responsibilities following a disaster or attack within the U.S., but it only applies to the response portion of the homeland security mission. Similarly, the National Strategy for Homeland Security is not specific enough in its delineation of roles and responsibilities to resolve responsibility debates. Confusion over roles is said to also occur when civilians are

tasked to complete a mission, but an insufficient number are available. In such situations, the military is required to take on the tasks, which creates uncertainty over which agency is in charge. This can be confusing for the agencies in the field as well as the local population.

In addition, the study argues that even at the highest level of the Executive branch, a holistic and comprehensive approach is not taken with respect to the most pressing security problems. The separate NSC and Homeland Security Council (“HSC”) are cited as evidence and the study warns that such a bifurcated national security structure is not likely to easily form integrated national security policies. The report argues that complex security issues often require detailed staff attention before consideration by the NSC’s senior committees. However, the bifurcated NSC/HSC structure means that separate organizations, with different cultures and staffs, may address such issues separately. While some NSC and HSC groups often work together, others have considerably less interaction. The report indicates that effective coordination sometimes depends on individuals or personal staff relationships. It is also suggested that the separate structures, with separate Executive Secretariats and their respective authorities, complicates the coordination process. In addition, the National Security Advisor reports directly to the President, while the Homeland Security Advisor reports to the White House Chief of Staff.

Regarding specific structural forms, the study notes that in some instances, inadequate vertical integration leads to policy decisions at the strategic level in Washington not being correctly translated into operational or tactical implementation. At the same time, poor horizontal integration leads to various agencies implementing policy independently instead of in a coordinated manner, which produces ineffective operations.

U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission), *Phase III Report: The Road Map for National Security and Addendum on Structure and Process Analyses* (2001). Located at: <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nssg/phaseIIIfr.pdf> (accessed July 11, 2007).

Among the commission’s key observations made in the Addendum, is that the current national security structure is not optimal for interagency planning or the integration of multiple agencies’ capabilities and efforts. While the post-Cold War security environment requires detailed and reasonably expeditious planning as well as sustained, integrated interagency actions, the commission argues that the NSC and National Economic Council (“NEC”) staffs are not structured in a manner to attain these goals, but instead to focus on crisis management and development of current policy and strategy. There exists no high-level body capable of coordinating interagency planning on the scale necessary. With respect to operations, it is observed that the NSC staff is structured for coordination, not operations, and Congress exercises oversight of this function by limiting the staff budget to prevent it

from growing into an operational Agency. The commission also suggests that the NSC's structural flexibility permits it to adapt well to changing national security environments. In addition, such flexibility permits the NSC to serve each president in the manner he or she requires. As such, the commission cites a CRS report that claims it would be difficult to design a uniform NSC capable of meeting the requirements of presidents who have potentially different backgrounds, work styles and policy agendas.

Regarding the interagency structure, the commission notes Jerel Rosati's observation in *The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy* (see below) that, despite a reasonably effective national security decision making structure, most Presidents rely primarily on informal consultations with close advisors. The commission also cites Robert Hunter's suggestion that the manner in which the President deals with the interagency system is more important than formal structures. Alexander George's observation that Presidential personalities and learned behaviors often move them away from formal processes and into less structured methods where they feel more comfortable is also mentioned. The commission notes that these observers and others suggest that even though Presidents have substantial control over the design and operation of formal national security processes, they tend to rely on informal mechanisms. The commission argues that during the Clinton Administration, the NSC supporting committees (NSC/PC, NSC/DC and below) did not integrate nontraditional political and economic elements into their structure, except upon invitation, despite the existence of elements at the full NSC level. One reason for the lack of systematic coordination of policy implementation may be the workload of the NSC staff, which supports the NSC/DC and NSC/PC and which usually has a more-than-full workload. As the definition of national security broadens to include less traditional areas of concern, more players and more information enter the national security structure. Accordingly, the burden on the NSC staff to coordinate the input of various interagency players grows, risking further limitation of its ability to follow up on the implementation of policy decisions. Another observation suggests there is an insufficient incentive structure for organizations to participate in the interagency process.

With respect to the NEC, the commission interviews indicate that the NEC places significant value on its lack of hierarchical structure. Because it is relatively small, the NEC perceives no requirement for an elaborate structure to manage processes or guide work through a labyrinth of offices. Staff interviews indicate that there are open, simple channels of communication that allow staff members to share ideas and concerns. As one observer noted, from the outset, the NEC "favored oral over written communications and was wary of heavy procedures." The ability to rapidly communicate within the organization and the access staff members enjoy to the director is similar to the culture of the Department of Defense's Program Evaluation and Analysis directorate. The NEC is agile and has the ability to rapidly move from one issue to the next and to focus its policy coordination talents on the most appropriate issue. The ability to do this is partly a function of its relatively flat

organization and partly because it has ready access to all Executive Branch offices as well as to the President.

With respect to the State Department, the commission observes that despite the creation of new senior policy positions for functional issues, the current structure of the department does not allow the effective coordination of regional and functional policy perspectives at a level lower than Under Secretary. In addition, during the Clinton Administration, bureaus were empowered to report directly to the Secretary of State on issues for which they have responsibility. As a result, regional and functional issues are often elevated to the highest levels before they can be coordinated or integrated. Interviews also revealed that this structure leads the Department to speak with more than one voice in interagency venues, thus diluting the strength of its argument and its influence in interagency policy formulation. This is especially the case because a great deal of interagency coordination is conducted both formally and informally at the Assistant Secretary-level and below (and thus at the bureau level). The commission believes this structure reduces the influence of the State Department with respect to other international affairs agencies and results in the poor coordination of foreign policies. A restructuring that aligns functional bureaus and country desks under regional Under Secretaries would be more conducive to integration of foreign policies and the reassertion of the Department of State as the premier voice in foreign policy in the interagency.

The commission also addressed Congress' committee structure, suggesting that it may reduce the Legislative branch's ability to compete with the Executive branch in the formulation of national security policy and oversight of its implementation. The power to formulate legislation that influences the implementation of policy is distributed among a vast numbers of Committees in the House and Senate. The traditional Committees of jurisdiction—the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the House International Relations and the Senate Foreign Affairs Committees, the Intelligence Committees, and the Appropriations Committees—now share the power to influence national security policy with the Commerce Committees, the Judiciary Committees, the House Rules Committee, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, and many more. The distribution of authority among many Committees means many opinions and perspectives now influence legislation, sometimes resulting in compromise measures rather than a sharply targeted policy. The committee referral system is also not conducive to quick action. Having to wait to vote until each committee of jurisdiction has acted on a bill reduces the effectiveness of the Congress to act on sometimes fast-developing national security issues. The result is that the Executive branch possesses the prerogative in national security policy making and implementation.

The National Commission on the Public Service, *Urgent Business for America: Revitalizing the Federal Government for the 21st Century* (2003). Located at: <http://www.brookings.edu/gs/cps/volcker/reportfinal.pdf> (accessed June 13, 2007).

The report includes a general comment that *ad hoc* layering of agencies, departments and programs greatly complicates management, expands the influence of power interests and diminishes coherent policy direction. It suggests that the federal government is currently a layered jumble of organizations with muddled public missions. Instead, structural organization should be mission-oriented. One deficit of this report is that it does not address the interagency—the area between the President and the departments. Instead, it focuses on the departments and agencies themselves. With respect to organizational problems, the report claims that federal government organizations do not follow a logical pattern, which results in public servants doubting the relevance and importance of their agencies' missions while they spend too much time coordinating or battling with counterparts in other agencies. While some programs no longer have viable missions, too many agencies share responsibilities that could be combined. These agencies are often scattered throughout the government. There is also evidence of duplication, overlap and gaps in critical government functions.¹⁰ In addition, the report argues that common departmental and agency structures and management practices are no longer appropriate approaches for a government performing complex and varied tasks. Due to differing missions, no single administrative structure or management approach is effective for all cases. Instead, an organization is required that fits each particular mission. The report identifies some examples of jurisdictional chaos, noting that new structural components are regularly added to respond to the demands of the time. Occasionally, such components are regrouped in response to a perceived national emergency, as was evidenced by the creation of the Departments of Energy and Homeland Security. Yet, such components are rarely combined to eliminate program duplication. Furthermore, missions are not realigned or even rationalized, program laps upon program and responsibilities are not coordinated. The report cautions, however, that organizational changes will not be sufficient unless accompanied by public servants who are equipped and motivated to implement public policies to the best of their abilities. Focusing on the congressional committee structure, the report notes that a mismatch of missions reduces Congress' ability to provide broad effective oversight and can lead instead to micromanagement of those aspects of agency activities that happen to be most visible.

9-11 Public Discourse Project, *Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations* (2005). Located at: http://www.9-11pdp.org/press/2005-12-05_report.pdf (accessed June 23, 2007).

This is a report card regarding progress on 9/11 Commission recommendations. There is little commentary on structural matters, however, it does note a few areas

¹⁰ See *U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission)* for further discussion of this problem (“Redundancy and overlap between organizations, as well as greatly diffused lines of authority, responsibility and accountability generally point to ‘gaps and seams.’ These generally lead to the creation of ‘patches’ or ‘workarounds,’ and the migration of functions and power to different organizations that would seem to lie outside their traditional core competencies.”)

where authorities seem to be confused. With respect to efforts to counter terrorist financing, a relatively high grade is given, but it is noted that the State and Treasury Departments are battling over turf and the overall effort lacks leadership. In regards to homeland airspace defense, the report comments on the absence of a single agency functioning as the leader for interagency responses to airspace violations. At the multilateral level, specifically focusing on a coalition against Islamist terrorism, it is noted that a permanent contact group of leading governments has not been created to coordinate such a strategy.

Department of Homeland Security, *Joint Field Office Activation and Operations: Interagency Integrated Standard Operating Procedure. Version 8.3 ed.* Washington, DC (2006).

This is a guide to using Joint Field Offices, which are designed to be temporary in nature. It does not discuss problems with the interagency system. It could be useful, however, when considering solution sets requiring temporary interagency mechanisms at the operational level.

Department of State, *Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training.* Washington, DC (2005). Located at: <http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/50309.pdf> (accessed May 3, 2007).

This is a joint report of the Inspectors General from the Defense and State Departments regarding efforts to train the Iraqi police force. It recognizes as a structural problem the fact that the State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs operates out of the Embassy in Baghdad as a parallel operation, but should instead assign its personnel to work directly within the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team ("CPATT"). While Defense and Justice (via ICITAP) are represented within CPATT, State is not. As a result, State falls on the periphery of the in-country decision-making team. This aggravates training policy problems due to the military taking a shorter-term view with a goal of training, equipping and deploying a specified number of Iraqi police personnel while State and Justice take longer-term views focused on developing the overarching criminal justice system. Eventual transition of responsibility from Defense to State suggests that State should maintain a presence within CPATT so that its views are considered in the overall process.

Eisenhower National Security Series, *Interagency Management of Spoilers to Viable Peace: Building Capabilities for Comprehensive, Coordinated Approaches: Final Report* (2006).

The report began with an assumption that in order to address disruptive or egregious behavior that has the capacity to "spoil" peace efforts, related efforts must

be considered part of other post-conflict priorities. The report concludes, therefore, that the U.S. Government needs to graduate from the existing stove-piped and often *ad hoc* responses to spoiler behaviors and their effects. The appended “Roundtable Report 3—The Assistance Community: Dealing with Influential Actors and Spoilers” suggests that the best information sharing and the greatest potential for coordination generally occurs between agency representatives within country teams and between U.S. Government representatives and members of the NGO and multilateral assistance community within areas of operations. The roundtable report argues, however, that such cooperation appear to be driven more by personalities and situations than by design and institutional intent. Other than these observations, the report and its appendices did not identify or imply any other specific structural problems.

Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint Operations*. Washington, DC (2006).

This publication provides guidance, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (“JCS”) perspective, of how to coordinate interagency, IGO and NGO activities at combatant command, JTF HQ and tactical levels. It offers a detailed overview of the major interagency (U.S. and multilateral) components, including embassy, country team, POLADs, IGOs and NGOs. The publication makes three observations of structural problems. First, it explains that a difficulty in coordinating operations among U.S. agencies relates to a lack of clear counterparts. Organizational differences exist between the military hierarchy and other U.S. Government departments and agencies, particularly at the operational level where counterparts to the geographic combatant commander seldom exist. A second observation is the determination of the lead federal agency for a given interagency activity. Overall lead authority in a complex contingency operation is likely to be exercised not by the geographic combatant commander, but by a U.S. ambassador or other senior civilian, who will provide policy and goals for all U.S. Government agencies and military organizations in the operation. The third problem identified relates to decision-making at the lowest levels, which is frequently prevented. This is due to field coordinators not having the authority to speak for their parent agencies, departments or organizations.

U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Interagency Contracting: Improved Guidance, Planning, and Oversight would Enable the Department of Homeland Security to Address Risks*. Washington, DC (2006).

This is a Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) report concerning Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) contracting and the inability of DHS’ Chief Procurement Officer (“CPO”) to ensure compliance with acquisition policies and processes across DHS and its components. According to the report, this inability results from the lack of authority given to the CPO due to DHS’ organizational

structure—the CPO has no authority over the DHS component parts. Although the CPO is held accountable for department-wide management and oversight of the acquisition function, the CPO lacks the authority and has limited resources to ensure compliance with acquisition policies and processes. The report concludes that the challenges to effectively managing the acquisition function, numerous in their own right, are further complicated at DHS by an organizational structure in which the CPO lacks direct authority over the components. Without such authority, the department cannot be sure that necessary steps to implement improvements to its acquisition function will be taken.

U.S. Government Accountability Office, *21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal Government*. Washington, DC (2005).

This report explores twelve subject areas over which the U.S. Government exercises sole or shared authority, such as national defense, homeland security, international affairs, education and employment, health care, transportation, and governance. The purpose of the reexamination is to achieve a better understanding of the challenges and opportunities posed by each of these areas. Within the report, the GAO includes a series of questions—over 200—designed to illustrate the types of difficult choices that the U.S. will need to make as it continues to assess what the federal government does and how it does it. Such an ongoing assessment is needed, according to the GAO, in order to rationalize functions through better coordination, planning and other measures in an environment of limited funds. Although the report appreciates the need for structural changes across the government—for both national security and other mission-oriented agencies—the report does not specifically identify structural problems, other than to suggest the general problem of stove-piping. The analysis of national defense challenges focuses almost exclusively on the Department of Defense. It recognizes a change in the security environment since the end of the Cold War and notes the 9/11 Commission Report’s suggestion that changes are needed across the government to strengthen national security institutions and move beyond the legacy of the Cold War. With respect to the Department of Defense, the report argues that longstanding organizational problems need to be addressed, such as the existence of stove-piped or siloed organizations and the participation of many layers and players in decision-making. The report’s health care assessment claims that it has recently become apparent that the U.S. public health infrastructure is too fragmented and uncoordinated and lacks the capacity to effectively manage a large epidemic or bioterrorist attack. In addition, it notes that the U.S. is more vulnerable to a broad range of infectious diseases due to greater global interdependence and more efficient transportation. Disease is also increasingly seen as a threat to economic growth and political stability in many nations. With respect to homeland security, the report suggests that tactics to defeat international terrorists will require intelligence, diplomacy and domestic partnerships across many actors. In addition, it notes that the homeland security mission involves federal, state, local, private sector, NGO and multilateral partnerships. Based on these and the other

subject areas reviewed in the report, the GAO observes in its section on “Governance Capacity to Meet Challenges in the 21st Century” that in many cases the government remains committed to doing business in manners based on conditions, priorities and approaches that existed decades ago and are not well suited to addressing 21st century challenges. The report suggests that some agencies need more flexible legal authorities and leadership and management capabilities to transform cultures and operations. To successfully transform government-wide, the report recommends a fundamental reexamination of outmoded organizational structures, however, it does not provide specific analysis of the current structures. It does note that federal programs are fragmented due to a policymaking process that is overly stovepiped by agency and program, with insufficient focus on how specific programs contribute to overarching, crosscutting goals and missions.

U.S. Government Accountability Office, *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy*. Washington, DC (2005).

GAO examined the extent to which U.S. public diplomacy efforts have been coordinated. In 2002, a Strategic Communications NSC/PCC was created to provide communications guidance. It drafted a national communications strategy, but the PCC was disbanded in 2003 without the strategy being issued. The Office of Global Communications (“OGC”) was created in 2003 to facilitate White House and interagency efforts to communicate with foreign audiences. The White House established the Muslim World Outreach Policy Coordinating Committee in 2004 to coordinate public diplomacy efforts focused on Muslim audiences. Also in 2004, State created an Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources in 2004 to help coordinate and direct the department’s wide-ranging public diplomacy operations. Further, the United States Agency for International Development (“USAID”) and the Department of Defense are redefining their public diplomacy roles and operations in response to the increased attention given to U.S. outreach efforts. As such, the entities involved in public diplomacy include the White House, State, USAID, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (“BBG”), and the Department of Defense (“DoD”) with funding primarily concentrated in State and BBG. State plays a leading role in two interagency coordinating bodies—the Interagency Strategic Communication Fusion Team (meets weekly and brings together program-level officers to discuss ongoing and proposed public diplomacy initiatives across the federal government) and the Interagency Working Group on U.S. Government-Sponsored International Exchanges and Training¹¹ (meets quarterly to coordinate the exchange and training activities of 12 federal departments and 15 independent agencies). The latter includes DoD, State, DoEd, DoJ and USAID as statutory members. Representatives from other interested departments and agencies participate, as do NSC and Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) representatives at their discretion. GAO reports that a lack of OGC leadership has led agencies to define and coordinate public diplomacy programs on their own, often on an *ad hoc* basis, which increases risk of program overlap and

¹¹ Established by EO 13055 (1997) and codified by Congress in 1999.

duplication, as well as diminished impact due to limited resources being dispersed over too many or even conflicting program objectives. GAO finds that the NSC's Muslim World Outreach PCC, in contrast, which interacts with embassies in Muslim countries, developed a communication strategy to direct and coordinate agency outreach efforts to the Muslim world.

U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better Integration*. Washington, DC (2005).

Departments involved in threat reduction and nonproliferation programs include Defense, Energy/NNSA, State, Commerce and DHS. The NSC's Proliferation Strategy PCC sets general policy for U.S. nonproliferation programs, but does not implement programs or control their budgets. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 requires the establishment of an interagency committee consisting of representatives from DoD, DoE, State, Commerce, DHS, DoJ and other officials deemed appropriate by the President. The report indicates that since there is potential for programs to overlap within one or more agencies, coordination is needed and can be improved when each agency's roles and responsibilities are delineated, information sharing is formalized, and procedures for resolving interagency disputes are clear. GAO finds that NSC staff guidance, when provided, improved coordination. GAO notes that no such government-wide guidance exists for border security programs and, as such, coordination suffers.

U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination*. Washington, DC (2000).

Virtually all the results that the federal government hopes to achieve require the coordinated effort of two or more agencies. This shared responsibility is the result of several factors, including the piecemeal evolution of federal programs and the complexity of public needs. GAO's work has shown repeatedly that mission fragmentation and overlap are widespread in the government and that crosscutting program efforts are poorly coordinated. Without such coordination, scarce funds are wasted, program customers are confused and frustrated, and the over all effectiveness of federal programs is undermined. This report (1) provides an overview of programs in which GAO identified mission fragmentation and overlap in 1998 and 1999; (2) discusses barriers to interagency coordination, such as missions that are not mutually reinforcing or that may even conflict, cited in GAO reports issued during the past decade; and (3) summarizes potential strategies for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of crosscutting programs. The report notes that in addition to structural barriers, interagency coordination is often hindered by incompatible procedures, processes, data and computer systems. In addition, interagency coordination difficulties are compounded, according to the GAO, in the absence of clear lines of responsibility and accountability for crosscutting program efforts. The report further suggests that the lack of clear lines of authority, coupled with disparate missions,

adds to the difficulty agencies have in developing a coordinated approach to public problems. The GAO suggests that without clearly defined roles and responsibilities, it can be difficult to determine which entity should lead federal efforts with respect to a particular mission.

Books

Alia, Craig J. *Assessing Proposals for Interagency Reorganization* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2006). Located at: <http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?p4013coll3,311> (accessed July 10, 2007).

U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan caused the U.S. Government to reassess its interagency capabilities. In the wake of these conflicts, Congress held hearings in order to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the interagency process and evaluate different remedies. Numerous organizations and national security experts testified and presented their studies analyzing the interagency process and its shortcomings. These studies presented compelling cases for change however, their recommendations failed to consider some significant factors. Much of the research focused on developing a new organizational structure without fully understanding the environment in which these organizations operate. Additionally, the studies failed to consider organizational theory and its application to the interagency process. Instead, the recommendations focused on accountability and efficiency while failing to consider information management and coordination among and between agencies. Two studies provide different approaches to organizational design. *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols* by the Center for Strategic and International Studies approached interagency reorganization using a traditional 20th century organizational design. *Protecting America's Freedom in the Information Age* by the Markle Foundation looked at interagency organization using a postmodern organizational design. These designs compete and, when considered alone, fail to fully address the problem of interagency coordination. After assessing the two studies using congressional requirements, the environment, and organizational theory, the author argues that neither the traditional 20th century organizational structure recommended by the CSIS study nor the postmodern organizational structure presented in the Markle study fully addressed all the various requirements. The author concludes that a hybrid of the two studies would best attend to the complex problem of interagency coordination. Commenting on the CSIS study, the author notes that it develops a structure designed to solve current problems rather than anticipate future problems, and that it focuses on formalizing the organizational structure and enhancing its organizational planning capability. While such a structure promotes efficiency in crisis management, long-term stability, and oversight, which resonate well with Congress, the author claims that it does not adequately address the type of structure designed to best harness U.S. Government capabilities or the technology needed to link the various agencies. Discussing the Markle Foundation's study, Alia notes that it proposes an alternative structure (a postmodern organizational structure) for DHS, looking at the vertical and horizontal integration of the department's

constituent agencies. The study recommends a peer network, based on knowledge fragmentation, with a few key hubs in order to manage and utilize available intelligence—the network formalizes the interactions between parties and permits them to draw from each other’s sources and information. Such a network seeks to build consensus and tends to take a long-term approach to problem solving, but it lacks the agility to manage a time sensitive crisis. According to the author, this study’s primary problem, compared to CSIS, is that its alternative structure focuses more on information management than decision-making and accountability. The author recommends a structure combining hierarchy and network-based function. As an example, he suggests that the Agency for Stability and Reconstruction recommended by CSIS could act as one of the key network hubs. It could draw on federal, state, local, NGO, academic and private organization expertise regarding stability/reconstruction and provide information to the Executive and Legislative branches. Otherwise, notes the author, there is a risk that the traditional 20th century hierarchical structure might not sufficiently incorporate such a diffuse knowledge base.

Arnas, Neyla, Charles Barry, and Robert B. Oakley. *Harnessing the Interagency for Complex Operations*. (Washington, DC: National Defense University, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2005).

This paper discusses models for interagency cooperation for stabilization and reconstruction (“S&R”) operations at the national, regional and country levels. The national-level models discussed include DoD’s ORHA, State’s S/CRS, CSIS’ proposed model, and a Defense Science Board model. The authors argue that S&R operations have met with mixed results at least partly due to the *ad hoc* process of organizing interagency resources. They also note that with respect to S&R operations, leadership authority is not always clear. At the national level, the president’s authority is universally accepted, but that of other high-level officials and officials in the field (ambassadors, presidential special representatives and Combatant Commanders) is less obvious. In the field, different operations may require different authority and leadership structures.

Best, Richard A., Jr. *National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment*. (New York: Novinka Books, 2001).

Best traces the NSC from its creation through each presidential administration. He identifies structural problems perceived by each successive administration which led to changes by that administration (i.e. too informal, too formal, not designed to permit high-level vetting prior to presentation to president, lack of senior-level policy implementation oversight).

Brown, Harold. *Thinking About National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983).

With respect to the economic component of national security, the author notes that the government structure does not give the president a single point of contact or advisor for economic matters relating to national security.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977-1981*. (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983).

The author does not include a problem sketch, but instead describes the Carter NSC structure and some reasons for using it. He notes that the NSC committees were chaired by the Cabinet member most appropriate for the task, except that three committees that appeared to involve potential jurisdictional conflicts and touched on the president's political interests were chaired by the National Security Advisor. In addition, the National Security Advisor was granted Cabinet status. The goal was to involve Cabinet members directly in national security decision-making while simultaneously acclimating them to working under the chairmanship of their colleagues and that of the National Security Advisor.

Bush, George, and Brent Scowcroft. *A World Transformed*. (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1998).

Scowcroft believed that the NSC organizational structure should include the NSC/PC as a mechanism for clarifying matters prior to presenting them to the president. It was hoped that this would save him time, which Scowcroft saw as the president's most valuable commodity. The authors do not provide a problem sketch, but it is noteworthy that Scowcroft participated as a member of the Tower Commission and the basic NSC structure designed by him at the beginning of President Bush's administration is quite similar to the structures retained by Presidents Clinton and Bush.

Buss, John C., "The State Department Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization and its Interaction with the Department of Defense." *Issue Paper, Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, Vol. 09-05 (July 2005)*.

The author proposes several recommendations for better DoD-S/CRS coordination. Although little attention is paid to coordination problems, he does claim that the *ad hoc* U.S. responses to post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations over the past 15 years often were inadequate.

Cambone, Stephen A., *A New Structure for National Security Policy Planning*. (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 1998).

The author acknowledges that since the end of the Cold War, changes in the security environment occurred and that, as a result, it no longer seems appropriate to rigidly segment domestic and security policy (or foreign and defense policy within the latter). He sees a confluence of domestic, foreign, economic, military and public safety policies, and points to events of the 1990s as indicators that the relative balance among these policies may shift quickly and radically. During the several years since the end of the Cold War, the author argues that a consensus was not reached within the U.S. as to whether it should pursue a new, issues-based approach to security policy, or whether a traditional interests-based approach is more appropriate. This leads to the question of how the U.S. Government is supposed to provide for the common defense and promote the general welfare of the people when no consensus exists on what defense to provide or welfare to promote? In comparison to the Cold War national security structure created by the National Security Act of 1947 (the “1947 Act”),¹² which supported steadiness of purpose and direction, Cambone argues that the new security environment requires a structure that promotes flexibility, foresight and agility. He recognizes that over the course of the Cold War, presidents shaped the national security apparatus through the creation of *ad hoc* arrangements in order to achieve such flexibility. However, there always remained—and still exists—a problem of authority. A lead agency would become responsible for policy development with support from other agencies, but a single lead agency never gained authority to direct other agencies to execute a policy or undertake operations. In the end, this often results in White House coordination of operations requiring the application of competencies and skills housed in various agencies. At the White House, this coordination responsibility usually falls on the national security advisor, who has no constitutional authority. This is problematic since the coordination often requires more talent and information than afforded by the White House structure, current law may be ignored, or an operation’s execution is too complex and requires direction from the professionals located at specific agencies. Despite these problems, Cambone does not see a need for the wholesale reorganization of the government along the lines of the 1947 Act. He believes that the current lack of consensus with respect to an issues-based or interests-based approach to security policy would limit such a reorganization’s chances of success. Instead, he proposes a reorganization of the current NSC system at the cabinet secretary level, which will permit the president to oversee and coordinate critical operations in a manner subject to the oversight of Congress and the American public. This would prevent the paralysis of the national security apparatus during the ongoing debate over how to approach security policy. Oversight would help ensure that policymakers and coordinators are responsive to the viewpoints of the public, while added flexibility would permit the structure to shift its focus across the threat spectrum.

¹² 50 U.S.C. § 401 et. seq.

Deutch, J., Kanter, A., & Scowcroft, B., “Strengthening the National Security Interagency Process,” in Carter, A. B. & White, J. P., (Eds.), *Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future*. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press [Preventive Defense Project], 2000).

In this chapter on “Strengthening the National Security Interagency Process,” the authors really deal with structural considerations. They argue that in light of the emergence of new threats since the end of the Cold War, it is necessary to improve national security management. The new threats challenge the current interagency process and NSC structure since a number of distinctions upon which the original system was built are no longer valid. The current system is not designed to transcend the old “foreign” and “domestic” boundaries, and it lacks the ability to plan, budget and coordinate the execution of integrated, long-term multi-agency policies. The authors argue that while good leadership is critical, it is not sufficient to manage the national security apparatus, which increases in complexity as new threats emerge. According to the authors, the new threats challenge the current structure in four ways: (a) prioritizing new threats may conflict with traditional departmental priorities; (b) there are organizational, political and legal barriers to effective coordination of action among multiple agencies; (c) new, critical threats are not addressed by budgeted, long-term interagency plans; and (d) fragmentation of intelligence responsibilities leads to decision-makers not always receiving adequate and timely information about new threats. Organization can either facilitate or impede the conduct of foreign affairs, which the authors divide into information gathering, decision-making, and execution. They suggest that organization is especially important at the information gathering and execution phases, specifically highlighting the absence of a program and budget planning mechanism to synchronize the execution of multiple agency efforts directed towards the same missions.

Hunter, Robert E., *Organizing for National Security*. (Washington, DC: CSIS, 1988).

Hunter argues that the use of a decentralized national security policy-making structure (i.e. Cabinet government) has not been successful since an individual department or agency is not capable of overseeing and directing a major initiative without intruding upon the equities of other departments and agencies. Policy-making based on broad consensus, which was workable during the Cold War, is no longer an option. Thus, EOP or NSC coordination is essential since they are in the unique position to understand the president’s interests and to be at the center of the information flow from Executive branch departments and agencies.

Inderfurth, Karl F., and Loch K. Johnson. *Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

The authors review the origins and development of the NSC, including its structure, staff component and historical performance. They also explore the various people who have served as National Security Advisers, identifying the types of roles that National Security Advisers perform depending on their personalities and the management styles of presidents. The authors structure the review through the use of an editors' introduction at the beginning of each chapter, which precedes articles, memoranda and other official documents that tell the story of the NSC. Although a rich problem sketch is not included, the authors present excerpts from several studies and articles that address NSC-related controversies (e.g., Iran-Contra, Congress' relationship with the NSC) and suggest reforms (e.g., the Tower Commission Report, the Hart-Rudman Commission's *Roadmap for National Security*).

Knezo, Genevieve Johanna, *Counterterrorism: Federal Research and Development, Organization, Policy and Funding*. (New York: Novinka, 2003).

The author discusses organization for research and development relating to counterterrorism. She suggests that such research and development is often fragmented across multiple departments, which may lead to fragmentation in R&D priority-setting. No other comments on structural matters are included.

Light, Paul C., *The Tides of Reform: Making Government Work, 1945-1995*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997).

The discussion does not specifically relate to the national security interagency. The author provides an analysis of federal government reform from Truman through Clinton. A helpful list of reform statues is included as well as data regarding reforms and their impacts under each president.

Lord, Carnes, *The Presidency and the Management of National Security*. (New York: The Free Press, 1988).

[REVIEWING]

Lute, Douglas E., *Improving National Capacity to Respond to Complex Emergencies: The U.S. Experience* (New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1998).

Addressing U.S. Government coordination of complex contingencies, Gen. Lute suggests that the government's bureaucratic procedures should be reformed and that such reforms, ultimately, should be wide-ranging. In the meantime, he proposes "marginal improvements" that would also be beneficial. He identifies the various parties involved in responding to complex contingencies, including U.S. Government

agencies, NGOs, multilateral alliances, Congress, the private sector and the media. While he focuses on three short-term improvements, Gen. Lute does not identify specific structural problems. However, he implies that the creation of ad hoc interagency coordination groups is not always effective in responding to complex contingencies, and that such groups are often created too late following the contingencies' emergence. He argues that PDD-56 may alleviate this problem since it mandates the establishment of an EXCOMM for planning and implementation with respect to future contingencies.

Menges, Constantine C., *Inside the National Security Council: The True Story of the Making and Unmaking of Reagan's Foreign Policy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988.

The author does not discuss structure. Instead, it is a personal account of time spent on the NSC staff during the Reagan Administration. The author does comment that interagency "turf" battles most often occurred between the NSC staff/White House and the State Department.

Miller, Paul David, *The Interagency Process: Engaging America's Full National Security Capabilities*. National Security Paper number 11 (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1993).

The author notes a need to develop means for bringing national capabilities to bear on current and future security challenges. He suggests that the core competencies of traditional and non-traditional (e.g., the private sector) interagency participants are not adequately identified and engaged, interagency cooperation is essential, and that the interagency process bogs down when disagreements between participating agencies cannot be resolved. Miller's solution set suggests that the current atmosphere does not encourage and reward consensus-building within the interagency system, and that interagency groups do not have decision-making authority sufficient to implement national policy. He does caution, however, that any authority given to a lead agency in an interagency group would need to be balanced against the statutory responsibilities of the other agencies in the group. In addition, he suggests that Executive Branch departments and agencies are not adequately connected to the interagency structure. Finally, he indicates that Executive Branch organizations are not structured in a way to support each other's efforts. Miller envisions a goal of combining centralized coordination with decentralized execution and implementation. He is a proponent of an interagency system akin to the military's unified command structure.

Woods III, Lt. Col. George J., "A U.S. Government Interagency Structure to Combat Transnational Terrorism," in Murray, Williamson. *Transformation Concepts for National Security in the 21st Century*. Carlisle Barracks, PA:

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002.
<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS24947>.

The author argues that although the U.S. national security structure system, based on the 1947 Act, has evolved in order to address a broader set of complex national security matters, the structure has not changed sufficiently to address the current threat environment. His work specifically focuses on changes to interagency structure in order to combat international terrorism over a long period of time. Citing Arquilla and Ronfeldt, the author claims that hierarchically-structured organizations face difficulties when contesting networked organizations since the former organizations are too slow to locate and act against the latter organizations. In addition, Woods argues that the concurrent use of the NSC and HSC has not succeeded in creating an integrated national security strategy, but that such structure instead leaves duplicative and competing systems. He suggests that the placement of counterterrorism and cyber-security advisors within the structures serves to add additional confusion to lines of responsibility such that, at the strategic level, solutions designed to combat terrorist networks begin to break down—a problem exacerbated by reliance on traditional bureaucratic and hierarchical systems. However, the author does note that bureaucracies and hierarchical organizations, while not ideal as mechanisms for combating terrorist organizations, are useful for foreign policy and national security decision-making since they offer (1) a division of labor allowing tasks to be organized and assigned, (2) the consideration of different ideas and perspectives due to the participation of competing organizations, (3) clear lines of responsibility and chains of command regarding task execution, (4) standard operation procedures to guide organizational behavior, (5) a written record of an organization's activity, (6) personnel systems permitting the most capable to rise along the organization's hierarchy and (7) institutional expertise that can be used for proactive planning and anticipation of events. After listing these benefits, the author notes that they exist sometimes only in theory. He then warns of bureaucracies' drawbacks—(1) they may promote self-interests ahead of national interests, (2) they compete for limited resources, (3) they may attempt to expand their roles in order to enhance their importance and values and (4) they often promote exclusiveness, secrecy, conformity among members, deference to convention and reliance upon traditional solutions to solve new problems. As such, bureaucratic organizations tend to resist change, compete with each other and sometimes disrupt the implementation of presidential decisions. Following his assessment of the current interagency system problems, Woods proposes a comprehensive set of solutions. Among them is the adoption of a network-centric organization—specifically, an all-channel network—which would augment existing hierarchical structures.

Needham, Mark D. *The Triad of National Security Legislation for the 21st Century*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2005.
<http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA432490>

The author argues that the current national security structure is obsolete and unable to deal with today's problems, especially the need for well coordinated and viable interagency solutions. He claims that there is no one in charge of national security short of the President. Although he recognizes the existence of the NSC, Needham argues that it is a tool of the President, which changes form to meet the needs of each subsequent President. Some NSC organizations performed better than others, which the author notes may be due to personalities or structural decisions. Nevertheless, Needham concludes that the NSC's strategic thought process leading to coordinated strategy is critical, and the creation of strategy in each of the U.S. Government departments and agencies, which is then brought to the NSC for coordination, will not work. He also points out the problem of budgets and authorities—DHS, for example, is a large agency, but it does not have the necessary budget or authority to compel agencies outside of its umbrella, such as the FBI or the CIA, to cooperate. Needham suggests that leadership is paramount and it can sometimes overcome poor organization. However, he also indicates that the complexities of the current security environment and the intricacies of foreign policy and defense dictate the need for a superior organizational structure.¹³ In addition, he suggests that the intelligence infrastructure is fractured and unable to cope with contemporary threats.

**O'Neil, John E. *The Interagency Process: Analysis and Reform Recommendations*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006.
<http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA449658>**

Scholars, government leaders and military professionals generally stipulate that the current U.S. national security apparatus lacks capacity to effectively implement national strategies across the interagency. The capacity in question centers on interagency unity of effort that synchronizes diverse cultures, competing interests and differing priorities of government institutions while embracing valuable expertise and experience. The NSC's interagency process, resident in the Executive Office of the President, provides advice but lacks the authority to direct responses across the U.S. Government. No single government entity possesses sufficient capacity for unilateral response, thus interagency coordination is necessary to synchronize instruments of national power and thereby apply unified strength toward resolving threats to our national security. Assessing the nature of the 21st Century security threat manifested in complex contingencies such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, and the Global War on Terrorism, is the first step in crafting an effective interagency reform strategy. Second, an analysis of the existing interagency process reveals strengths and weaknesses upon which to build greater interagency capacity. Finally, this analysis offers reform recommendations of legislative, organizational, and cultural nature to improve interagency policy implementation in support of national security. The author identifies two problems related to structure. First, other than the President, no one possesses directive authority to ensure implementation of approved policies across the U.S. Government. Second, a risk inherent in the design of the

¹³ Citation to Cebrowski.

NSC is that its organization and focus are subject to the individual management style of the President, which makes it ill-suited to long-term consistency in the interagency process. O'Neil then proposes a few structural reforms. Despite his reform proposals, the author claims that the current national security apparatus provides sufficient guidance, structure and process description for national-level interagency policy development. Thus, he argues that the interagency problem really exists with respect to policy implementation.

Severance, Paul Michael. *Characterizing the Construct of Organizational Unity of Effort in the Interagency National Security Policy Process*. Blacksburg, VA: University Libraries, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2005.

“The changes that have occurred in the global security arena since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet Union dramatically transformed the U.S. interagency national security process. More recently, the tragic events of 9-11 have further refocused national security endeavors inward to homeland security imperatives while Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom have revalidated the need effective interagency coordination. This research represents a "first cut" at characterizing the construct of unity of effort in the interagency national security process by identifying attributes of this organizational virtue. The intent was to examine the dimensionality of the construct and thus facilitate theory building by consolidating extant knowledge and identifying key success factors as well as elements threatening operational success. This study focused on the interagency national security policy process and was intended to accommodate a wider understanding of unity of effort as it applies to that area of endeavor. Multiple interviews, focus groups, and surveys from 448 military and civilian adult respondents were used in the analysis. Content analysis, analysis of variance, and principle component analysis were the primary analytic methods used. The most conceptually sound factor structure for organizational unity of effort consisted of four factors: (a) Organizational Context and Interpersonal Dynamics, (b) Leadership and Decision Making Structure, (c) Strategic Orientation, and (d) Organizational Infrastructure and Resources.”

Shoemaker, Christopher C., *Structure, Function and the NSC Staff: An Officers' Guide to the National Security Council*. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1989.

Notes that no administration has ever established an NSC system based on functional missions of the staff, but instead they create such systems based on competing personality demands and perceived systemic inadequacies of the prior administration. According to the author, this leads to “structural-functional mismatch.”

Shoemaker, Christopher C., *The National Security Council Staff: Structure and Functions*. The Land Warfare Papers (No. 3, December 1989), The Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army.

Shoemaker first describes the evolution of the NSC, followed by an analysis of the PD-2 NSC structure under President Carter and the NSDD-2 NSC structure under Reagan. He then critiques these structures based on their application to administration, policy coordination, policy supervision, policy adjudication, crisis management, policy formulation and policy advocacy. This is followed by prescriptive advice as to an NSC structure designed to fit all presidents equally well. With respect to administration, he believes the NSDD-2 structure was better at reducing informal processes. In addition, he suggests that President's Carter's reliance on the PRC and SCC, instead of convening the NSC itself, along with a practice of not circulating notes of those groups' meetings among the interagency for review, encouraged a climate conducive to "creative note taking." NSDD-2's use of numerous subcommittees diminished NSC meeting date and agenda manipulation, which could prevent an issue from ever reaching the president. NSDD-2 also created a separate secretariat for each SIG, which removed the NSC staff's administrative control over this critical function. Regarding policy coordination, the author notes that coordination was irregular under PD-2, partly due to the lack of an operational structure below the mini-SCC and PRC. Specific issues were instead coordinated by the NSC staff in an ad hoc, uneven manner. NSDD-2, on the other hand, provided detailed guidance as to the establishment and responsibilities of lower level coordinating committees, or Interagency Groups ("IGs"), some of which were further supported by their own interagency coordination working groups. Such layering and committee creation, according to the author, helps ensure that coordinated positions are presented to the NSC. Under both schemes, the NSC staff was responsible for policy supervision, but structural differences impacted the execution of this function. PD-2 included a mechanism that explicitly made supervision an NSC staff responsibility—the SCC was responsible for it and the National Security Advisor chaired the SCC—while the staff further included monitoring committee provisions in the PDs generated during the Carter administration. In contrast, NSDD-2 did not provide for a specific body to be responsible for supervision. As such the NSC staff's supervision took place within the IGs of which they were members, but not necessarily chairpersons. The author suggests that Iran-Contra might not have occurred had there been an NSC staff-led implementation committee. Regarding policy adjudication, neither administration specifically provided for such a function in its NSC organizing document. The author believes that the function was better exercised by the Carter administration's NSC staff since PD-2 created a powerful National Security Advisor position, which was filled by a person with a strong personality. NSDD-2 and the relatively weak position afforded to the National Security Advisor prevented him or his staff from effectively adjudicating policy. With respect to crisis management, PD-2 specifically assigned responsibility to the SCC and, therefore, to the National Security Advisor and his staff. NSDD-2 did not make a similar assignment of responsibility, which the author suggests allowed a serious power struggle with the Secretary of State to occur. This struggle was

resolved by NSDD-3, which established the Vice President as crisis coordinator in the NSC structure. However, the author implies that NSDD-3 was somewhat of an afterthought and not fully integrated into the overall NSDD-2 structure. As a result, the Crisis Management Center emerged within the NSC staff, which was coordinating entity involved in the Iran-Contra matter. Policy formulation was specifically assigned to the SCC by PD-2 and, therefore, the National Security Advisor and his staff were heavily involved in making policy. The author, however, notes that this was largely due to the president's desire to receive policy options from a non-departmental source, due to the National Security Advisor selection and due to the NSC staff selections. NSDD-2 did not assign this function to a structural component of the NSC system and the author suggests that policy formulation was not intended to be a function of the NSC staff in the Reagan administration. Finally, with respect to policy advocacy, the author notes that neither PD-2 nor NSDD-2 specifically provided responsibility for the function to the NSC staff. PD-2, however, did provide for a structure that facilitated this function. Since the SCC was in a powerful position within the NSC structure, the NSC staff controlling it could use the position in order to advocate policy. In contrast, NSDD-2's weakening of the NSC staff prevented them from being able to act as strong advocates. The author concludes with the thought that if necessary functions are not supported by appropriate structure, national security policy will fall into disarray.

Snow, Donald M. and Eugene Brown, *Puzzle Palaces and Foggy Bottom: U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy-Making in the 1990s*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.

Snow and Brown trace the emergence of "nontraditional" security matters following the end of the Cold War. They also address the coordination of the various interagency and other participants in national security and foreign affairs. With respect to structural matters, the authors caution that the interagency process, established "within the confines of the National Security Act," is reflective of a "national security structural bias." Due to this bias, nontraditional matters, such as economic and environmental concerns, are less likely to receive ongoing attention. As an example, the authors cite the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro where President's Bush's position conflicted with components of the U.S. delegation's position. The delegation was headed by the director of the EPA who apparently did not participate in the interagency process.

Tucker, David, *Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire: The United States and International Terrorism*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997.

Tucker identifies a structural problem regarding interagency cooperation in combating terrorism, which results from individual agency structures complicating interagency coordination and cooperation. He argues that large, hierarchical agencies consist of many offices that do not know what the other offices are doing. As a

result, misrepresentations of an agency's overall position can emerge during interagency missions. Coordination is further complicated by regional/functional and regional/global divides within an agency.

U.S. President's Special Review Board. *Report of the President's Special Review Board* ("The Tower Commission Report"). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987.

The authors suggest that there is no established formula applicable to the NSC's structure. Such structure must be flexible in order to accommodate each president's management style since the NSC functions as the system for presidential formulation and implementation of national security policy. It is also suggested that the horizontal organization of large numbers of staff officers increases the opportunity for staff members to act without sufficient oversight. Instead, the authors support the use of "clear vertical lines of control and authority, responsibility and accountability." It is noted that an NSC staff problem is the inability to maintain institutional memory due to staff turnover, especially between administrations. The authors propose three possible solutions—maintaining a small, permanent executive secretariat, creating a permanent Executive Secretary position or instituting a "pattern of limited tenure and overlapping rotation." They caution, however, that none of these solutions would work if subsequent presidents do not adhere to one of these systems. With respect to the 1947 Act, the authors contend that it is adequate in regards to the structure of the NSC system, striking a balance between formality and flexibility for the use of each president. They recommend that the National Security Advisor serve as the chairperson of NSC senior committees since it is that person who has the greatest interest in ensuring that the NSC system works.

Wittkopf, Eugene R., Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and James M. Scott, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process* (6th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2003.

The authors explore various sources of U.S. foreign policy as well as the development of such foreign policy throughout the country's history. They also address the governmental organizations and structures participating in the foreign policy process, including the NSC, its staff and the interagency system. In general, their review of the interagency system observes the same structural characteristics identified by other NSC and interagency scholars. They explain that George H. W. Bush's NSC committee structure has come to be seen as the model, and that such structure generally was replicated by Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush. However, Wittkopf, Kegley and Scott also draw attention to the first Bush administration's use of "a less formal advisory 'structure,'" which sometimes was used in place of, or in addition to, the formal NSC structure. They note that the formal and informal structures, in most policy areas, complemented each other well. However, they and other observers note that the solidarity of the informal structure, which was comprised of President Bush's closest advisors, may have contributed to

“like-mindedness” and top-down policymaking such that “the principle of informal checks and balances could not operate” and ideas from others within the NSC system would not be injected into the decisionmaking process (see Snow and Brown, p. 153). The authors also note that problems can emerge from heavy reliance on the formal NSC structures if they contain holdovers from the previous administration. In such instances, policy reviews may not be as innovative as would otherwise be the case, thereby leading to “a cautious ‘status quo plus’ policy.”

Zegart, Amy B. *Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999.

[TO BE REVIEWED]

Articles/Papers

Bacchus, William I., “Diplomacy for the 70’s: An Afterview and Appraisal,” in *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 1974).

Although the author primarily provides an assessment regarding efforts to reform the State Department from within, he draws attention to several interagency structure considerations. First, he raises two important questions regarding the State Department’s position within the interagency system. The initial question is regarding the degree to which foreign affairs activities should be located within State, or if located elsewhere, where should they be placed. The second question focuses on how foreign affairs activities placed outside State should be coordinated and to whom should such coordination authority be given. Bacchus notes that there have been a number of proposals from individuals, official commissions and quasi-official bodies, but none of them has led to a permanent solution to these questions. The author lists 19 such proposals from 1945 through 1969. He notes that a common problem regarding the proposals is that they “never satisfactorily confronted the ‘structural problem’” at the root of the two questions. An observation is made that with respect to structure in the postwar conduct of U.S. foreign affairs, agencies have proliferated and there has been a tendency towards White House centralization of important decisions. This observation regarding centralization, of course, finds further support throughout this literature review and in the Chronology. Bacchus also argues that State’s leadership ability has been reduced as other specialized agencies take on responsibilities for the increasingly technical and operational nature of programs, which run counter to State’s generalist and politically oriented viewpoint of State. He further suggests that the Foreign Service’s informal culture is often cited as a reason for State’s organizational ineffectiveness. In his introduction of several recommendations for change at the State Department, Bacchus cautions that reforms are not possible until State’s relationships with other agencies and foreign affairs participants is clarified. One of his concluding observations is that foreign affairs reforms are not impossible, but that “a realism about what can be accomplished

requires that the mechanistic or 'rational' model of organizations be supplemented by awareness of their 'natural' characteristics.”

Bogdanos, Matthew F. "Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step." *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 37 (2005)April: 10-18.

The author focuses on the significance of integrated operations and the creation of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (“JIACG”), which must permeate all phases of conflict and rebuilding of Iraq. He also addresses the development of the joint doctrine and the development of the JIACG by the U.S. Central Command, the scope and limitation of the operation of the JIACG, challenges to the JIACG operations, and issues for the Department of Defense and the NSC to address to ensure the continued existence of the JIACG. According to the author, the primary challenge to JIACGs is the lack of a single, national-level organization issuing guidance, managing competing agency policies and directing JIACG participation among the agencies. He notes that senior decisionmakers would rather plan in the traditional, vertical style since it permits them to develop plans without undergoing critique by other agencies. Other challenges suggested by the author include the absence of government-wide information sharing standards and an interagency communication architecture.

Carafano, James J. "Herding Cats: Understanding Why Government Agencies Don't Cooperate and how to Fix the Problem." *Heritage Lectures*, no. 955

The author suggests that interagency coordination works fairly well at the policy and field levels (often referred to as the strategic and tactical levels), but it is weak at the intermediate, or operational, level. He sketches out the coordination problems among eight different factors. With respect to structure, the author notes that each federal agency has a particular operational organization. Such organizations often do not match up, as is the case regarding DoD's regional commands and State's regional system. In addition, he suggests that agencies avoid supporting regional interagency headquarters as they are afraid that the agency leadership will have to relinquish policymaking authority to such headquarters.

Cebrowski, Arthur K., “Transformation and the Changing Character of War,” in *The Officer* (July/Aug 2004), 80, 6.

The author addresses the evolving global system and changes to the threat environment. Although he does not identify specific structural problems or solutions, he does suggest that the U.S. needs to do more than redefine the military piece of national security for an environment lacking a “traditional” battlefield threat. He argues that the U.S. must also forge the broader internal and international security

instruments necessary to support U.S. leadership in a world where accelerating change and increasing ambiguity are dominant features, and where threats can adapt and evolve more rapidly than the U.S. is transforming.

Cutler, Robert. "The Development of the National Security Council." *Foreign Affairs* (1956) April: 441-458.

Cutler, who was President Eisenhower's NSC executive secretary and the first Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (serving in that role twice during the Eisenhower administration), suggests that the NSC supporting-staff function should be undertaken by a permanent staff that is not subject to change following political changes. He notes that as of 1956, the same person has functioned in the NSC's executive secretary role and that such person, his deputy and the nine "think people" on the NSC staff are "scrupulously non-political and non-policymaking." They benefit the organization by providing continuity and a source of institutional knowledge. Cutler also notes that increasing the size of the NSC staff will not solve some basic interagency problems in the conduct of the federal government. While some of these problems exist within individual departments, such as DoD, they also include jurisdictional disputes at various governmental levels, which tend to perpetuate current organizations' functions within the system.

Cyr, Arthur, "How Important is National Security Structure to National Security Policy?" in *World Affairs*, Vol. 146, no. 2 (Fall 1983).

Cyr argues that there is no ideal approach to the structural organization of the U.S. national security system since structure changes based on presidential style and authority. However, he suggests that the best option would be to provide the State Department as much policy formulation discretion as possible, while giving the National Security Advisor a primary role of administrator. Such an approach would be less likely than others to result in unclear, conflicting policy declarations by senior leadership, confusion or general competition in actually carrying out decisions. Cyr discusses Theoretical (e.g. Johnson, Carter and Reagan (when Allen was NSA) administrations) and Centralized Dominance (e.g. Nixon administration) approaches to national security policy formulation and implementation. In the former, the NSC staff engage in policy discussion and analysis as opposed to administration, whereas the latter approach involves the centralization of fundamental power in the president and the National Security Advisor. The author identifies problems inherent in each of the approaches. The Theoretical approach elevates intellectual activity over policy effectiveness. The policy process is relatively informal and coordination tends to be sacrificed. Major decisions can be taken without wide coordination and policy inconsistencies become more difficult to prevent. This approach can also fail to ensure that regular attention is paid to policy areas that do not win policymakers' immediate attention. There also is the danger of policymaking authority overlaps between the NSC staff and the State Department, which can complicate and confuse

lines of authority such that orderly processes for effectively bringing different bureaucratic areas to bear on a problem. The Centralized Dominance approach focuses on control and power to such an extent that across the board coordination is undermined. The author also addresses the use of NSC committee structures, noting that presidents have differed greatly in their approaches to committees. Whereas Truman and Eisenhower had faith in formal processes, Kennedy's approach was considerably more informal. Cyr suggests that the various personalities involved in Johnson's national security policymaking system necessitated the reintroduction of more structure, which was accomplished through the creation of the SIG and IRGs, chaired by State Department personnel. This system did not continue into the Nixon system apparently due to advice Kissinger received from President Eisenhower, which suggested that DoD would not willingly accept State Department domination of the national security process. He forecasted that DoD would either attempt end-runs or counter the system by leaking information. The author then notes that a review of how NSC committees function can illuminate the limitations of the NSC as a statutory body. He suggests that there are persuasive reasons for a formal expansion of the NSC membership to include other cabinet departments due to the complexity and wide range of foreign policy issues, coordination challenges and the importance of form to function. Such an expansion of the NSC would highlight the diversity of foreign policy matters, but it would also imply, as a practical matter, the need for more permanent interdepartmental committees. Focusing on a way to maintain the NSC staff's focus on implementation, coordination and administration, the author suggests the need to strengthen the State Department's Policy Planning Staff.

Daalder, Ivo H., and L. M. Destler. "Advisors, Czars and Councils: Organizing for Homeland Security." *National Interest*, no. 68 (Summer 2002): 66.

It is not possible, nor desirable, to bring all the major homeland security functions under a single roof. What is needed is leadership, coordination and mobilization of the responsible agencies and their leaders. That is precisely the task President Bush has given Tom Ridge. Focusing on the NSC as a guide, the authors note that experience with that organization indicates the importance of supplementing formal channels of cooperation with informal channels. They observe that NSC processes are most effective when the National Security Advisor has a close, and often informal, working relationship with key counterparts at State, Defense and in the intelligence community. However, Daalder and Destler suggest that the task of the HSC is more difficult than that of the NSC since the agencies comprising the homeland security mission do not have the same history of cooperation compared to the national security community of agencies. They also note three other differences. First, the HSC needs to impact first-responders at the bottom of the government's organizational pyramid. Second, coordination must occur between federal, state and local participants. Finally, it has to link with activities that remain within the realm of the NSC.

Donley, Michael. 2005. *Rethinking the interagency system*. Hicks & Associates, Inc.: McLean. Available online through the ITEA website, located at: <http://www.ndu.edu/ITEA/index.cfm?method=main.itemlist&item=7B&resource=1>

In the first of two occasional papers, the author identifies a problem that is common to different areas of the interagency process—the need to better integrate effort, both horizontally and vertically. First, he describes certain NSC structure elements that tend to remain constant between administrations. These include (1) the NSC’s statutory members, as augmented at the President’s discretion, (2) a supporting NSC staff and (3) a hierarchy of interagency groups. Since the last couple years of the Reagan administration, this hierarchy has included Principals and Deputies committees, which are supported by regional and functional groups at the Assistant or Deputy Assistant Secretary levels. Generally, Congress has not attempted to codify the NSC interagency group structure—exceptions include the 1996 NSC Committee on Transnational Threats, a 1992 Committee on Foreign Intelligence and the 1988 Board for Low Intensity Conflict. The author notes that such congressional efforts are generally ignored in practice. The author cautions that the statutory, executive order and presidential directive framework for the NSC and its support structure no longer reflect the true activities currently taking place within the interagency above departments and agencies or between them. According to Donley, the interagency system is more complex and crowded than in the past. He also points out that the scope of national security is broader than in the past, incorporates more domestic security issues than in the past and the line between domestic and foreign security is obscured. In addition, Donley identifies the creation of national “centers” dedicated to specific missions, which have been created over the last 10 years by executive order or presidential decision directive. They are generally located and funded in a specific lead agency, staffed by personnel from other agencies participating in the respective mission and designed to ensure adequate coordination of operations across agencies at the operational level when NSC policy coordination is seen to be insufficient. Donley then summarizes the findings of recent reports suggesting a need for changes to the interagency system. He identifies a structural problem found by both CSIS’ *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols* Phase 1 report and the 9/11 Commission: the inability of designated lead agencies to speak on behalf of the President.

Donley, Michael. 2005. *Rethinking the interagency system: Part two*. Hicks & Associates, Inc.: McLean. Available online at: <http://www.hicksandassociates.com/reports/HAI-occasional-paper-2.pdf>

In the second of two occasional papers, Donley explores how Presidents generally have managed the interagency process and provides observations as to why such techniques are no longer sufficient in light of a newly emerged secured environment. Addressing horizontal and vertical integration efforts, the author highlights an

unresolved tension in current law between interagency integrators, such as the Director of National Intelligence (the “DNI”), and cabinet officials, such as the Secretary of Defense, who continue to control resources within their own agencies. Focusing on homeland security, Donley recognizes a tension in current law at the federal level between cabinet officials of generally equal standing—DHS, Defense, Justice, State, Transportation and Energy, among others. He further notes that the continuing difficulty in horizontal integration of effort at DHS underscores the limited benefit that consolidation of agencies adds to improved coordination. A second problem identified is that interagency decision-makers at the operational level are unlikely to be cabinet-level officials and, as such, their legitimacy can be questionable. This problem results from the need for such decision-makers to be far enough from the White House to have firsthand knowledge of the matter in order to focus on operational planning and execution details. However, the required distance can threaten their ability to maintain the President’s confidence and be able to quickly obtain decisions from the President to resolve interagency disputes. The location of interagency decision-makers at the operational level can complicate the authority of senior officials in Washington and the reporting chain of departmental personnel in the field. Donley points out that this is especially problematic for the State Department and Defense since the Ambassador is supposed to be the President’s senior representative in a given country, but DoD has a well-defined military chain of command, which does not include U.S. Ambassadors. With respect to Presidential management of the interagency process, Donley addresses the common decision to use the national security advisor as either a counselor or an agent. He argues that a problem with interagency management is the widely held view that the selection of one model or the other is subject only to the President’s preference and that using any model falls within an acceptable range of choice. The problem, according to Donley, is that such discretion undervalues the institutional role of the NSC staff and committee structure since it prevents applying lessons learned from prior administrations and maintaining continuity in personnel, structures and processes. The author argues that such maximization of Presidential flexibility in organizing the NSC process has not served the President or the interagency system due to the widely fluctuating NSC roles and functions and the inconsistent department and agency expectations for the NSC’s role.

Efird, Cynthia G., and Carl T. Sahlin. “Using the Information Instrument to Leverage Military Force: A Need for Deliberate Interagency Coordination.” (Washington, DC: National War College, 1994).

The authors discuss how to better bring national informational power to bear in connection with the use of military force. Focusing on the Persian Gulf and Somalia as case studies, they suggest that the agencies involved in the conflicts generally established coordination methods during the conflicts instead of during the pre-conflict planning phases, which often led to sacrifices in time and efficiency. The informal cooperation that results can suffer from a lack of communication equipment, insufficient personnel system support and an inability to sustain the cooperation at

consistent levels over the life of a mission. Efir and Sahlin argue that the case studies demonstrate that cooperation between the United States Information Agency (“USIA”) and the military is not institutionalized, prescribed or established in any official manner. The authors recommend the institutionalization of coordination between USIA (now subsumed within State) and DoD PSYOPs instead of reliance on creating ad hoc groups at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of government.

Foster, Gregory D., "In Search of a Post-Cold War Security Structure," McNair paper no. 27 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1994).

Foster argues that the manner of organizing the national security establishment carries three important results. First, it determines who addresses different issues, thereby influencing thought processes since only certain people will have access to the issue. Second, a formal structure creates a permanent pattern of interactions among a standing set of actors, which maintains a system relatively impervious to changes in leadership or participants. Finally, organizational schemes carry a symbolic component that may influence others’ perceptions of the national security establishment, the U.S. Government or the country as a whole. He suggests that structure is ultimately designed to balance the competing aims of differentiation and integration in order to achieve unity of effort. Foster also notes that open social systems interact with their governing environments. As a result, national security structure needs to be able to adjust in order to adapt to, influence and shape internal and external environments. However, Foster suggests that despite changes to the security environment, the national security establishment’s structure, including NSC composition, has changed little over time. He notes that organizational structure adequacy should be measured by organizational performance, but that it is almost impossible to establish a conclusive link between structure effectiveness and overall national performance. In addition, Foster cites Hamilton’s Federalist 70 discussion of Executive Branch “energy,” noting the argument that the first component of such energy is unity. He contrasts that with today’s reality, which includes a large plurality of individuals, organizations and activities. He further observes that the Executive Branch structure includes a large measure of institutional competition. Other structural problems include:

- a focus on international affairs to the exclusion of domestic matters
- military dominance (along with diplomatic and intelligence interests) that ignores other dimensions of security, including economics, the environment and criminal justice
- support for a natural tendency towards undertaking unfettered unilateral activity abroad instead of cooperative multilateral efforts

He argues, however, that these are simply symptoms of a deeper problem: the factionalism, partisanship, parochialism, inertia, self-interested bargaining and compromise, sub-optimization and incrementalism of bureaucratic politics.

Gorman, Martin J., and Alexander Krongard. "A Goldwater-Nichols Act for the U.S. Government: Institutionalizing the Interagency Process," in *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 39 (2005) October: 51-58.

This article argues that a fundamental mismatch exists between the international threat environment and the current national security structure. Furthermore, it suggests that the lack of national-level joint interagency organizations undermines the ability of the U.S. to develop appropriate policies and implement comprehensive strategies. The authors note that the U.S. national security decision-making process is ponderous and stovepiped, which makes it difficult to develop and implement policy. As such, complex problems that are beyond the capacity of a single agency to address are rarely engaged through the development of a comprehensive policy, but instead become the focus of poorly coordinated actions, badly integrated strategies and failed policy implementation synchronization. Gorman and Krongard focus on the separation of national security-related fields—economics, diplomacy, military, information, intelligence, law enforcement—among U.S. Government structures. The separate structures reinforce and maintain a separation of knowledge and expertise related to each field. National security is deconstructed into its component parts, which are then parceled out to individual departments and agencies. The authors suggest that the organizations then devise separate solutions to their assigned parts, resulting in a piecemeal U.S. response to most international issues. Initiatives vary in sequence and intensity and sometimes conflict. The stovepiping means that integration can only occur at the highest levels.

Gross, Gregg E., "Interagency Reform for the 21st Century". U.S. Army War College: Carlisle 2006. Available for purchase online at: <http://www.stormingmedia.us/09/0939/A093944.html>

Gross first suggests that the interagency system, at the national level, focuses on policymaking and coordination. He then comments that effective execution requires an organizational structure that provides clear delineations of authorities and tasks. With respect to authority, he notes that other than the president, no one else in the U.S. Government can order different agencies to execute tasks. This impacts unity of command and unity of effort, which the author concludes is lacking across the interagency. He suggests that organizations are stovepiped, and in crises they pursue different agendas and compete for limited resources without any one agency having authority to direct the actions of each agency. Even when a lead organization is assigned, it has only marginal authority. IN addition to problems of authority, Gross discusses the use of ad hoc crisis response groups in the interagency process. He suggests that the use of such groups leads to the creation of plans and operating procedures during the crisis, which usually results in multiple organizations pursuing different objectives, sometimes trying to use the same, limited means with insufficient resources. The author concludes that this type of response structure can

be inadequate such that success depends on the personalities of those operating at the tactical level.

Hamblet, William P. and Jerry G. Kline, "Interagency Cooperation: PDD 56 and Complex Contingency Operations," in *Joint Force Quarterly* (Spring 2000).

The authors review PDD 56, but argue that further steps towards achieving unity of effort in the interagency process relating to complex contingency operations are required. They suggest that greater coordination is necessary and that civilian agencies lack sufficient authority and accountability to execute humanitarian and nation-assistance tasks. While DoD can address such tasks, it requires coordination with civilian agencies. The authors suggest that since most emergencies transcend national boundaries, DoD needs to coordinate with the State Department at the regional level. CINCs tend to interact on a vertical basis, but cannot do so with civilian agencies on a horizontal basis since they do not have civilian agency counterparts. The State Department's regional assistant secretaries are not deployed or responsible for operations on the ground, while ambassadors, who are responsible for country-level operations, are not in positions to coordinate regional efforts. As such, the authors identify the need for a compatible operational framework. In its absence, complications arise between the State Department's country teams and DoD's regional commands.

Hammond, Paul Y. "The National Security Council as a Device for Interdepartmental Coordination: An Interpretation and Appraisal." *American Political Science Review* (Dec., 1960).

Hammond offers an assessment of initial designs for the NSC. He first suggests that Ferdinand Eberstadt envisioned the NSC as a war cabinet with some form of collective responsibility, as opposed to an advisory body. The Navy modified the national security reorganization plan. Pursuant to that modification, the NSC would have performed the functions of an executive department secretary, apparently as a substitute Secretary of Defense. The author observes that such conceptions of the NSC, especially that held by Eberstadt (and presumably Forrestal), were based on an inaccurate understanding of the Executive Branch. Cabinet government, which characterizes British government, is not recognized by the American system, in which any control of the Executive Branch is vested in the president. The appearance of a cabinet government concept, however, is not surprising. First, many commentators suggest that the initial NSC idea was designed to prevent much of the central, unorganized control exercised by President Roosevelt during the Second World War. In addition, the U.S. found itself at a disadvantage when dealing with the British during the war due to a relative lack of political-military and inter-service coordination, and the NSC (and other 1947 Act creations) was likely influenced by the system that seemed to work well in the U.K. Commentators have also suggested that the NSC was included in the initial 1947 Act recommendations and drafts in

order to induce the Navy to support service unification. The author suggests that the NSC represents two important characteristics of Navy traditions. First, it captures the Navy's view of its own importance in national policymaking. Second, it reflects an appreciation for horizontal organizational structure (or voluntary coordination). This second tradition, according to the author, is based on a belief that leaders of segments of an organization could together produce a whole policy for the entire organization and that, despite traditional War Department beliefs to the contrary, there was no need for a unified command structure at the center. Hammond also argues that the planning and operational components of national security policy cannot be separated in a workable manner. This argument is based on his observation that in politics ends and means must be tested against each other. In so testing, sufficient consensus is built for a policy to become a reality. The author concludes his article with a question: Should coordination be achieved through lateral clearance or line command? He notes that the problems with line-command solutions are usually more visible than the obstacles to effective lateral accommodations.

Lord, Carnes, "Strategy and Organization at the National Level," in Gaston, James C., ed., *Grand Strategy and the Decisionmaking Process*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1991.

The author notes that observers often fail to understand that the NSC operates within the White House structure alongside at least eight other entities involved in foreign affairs and/or national security policy. He argues that the "fundamental problem" regarding the NSC's relationship with the White House is that those surrounding the president tend to have short-term and politically oriented views. Many are inexperienced when it comes to national security matters and often see such issues as distractions and areas of potential political risk. He notes that the White House's institutional structure strongly reinforces this outlook. Whereas certain offices within the White House are fairly autonomous due to their responsiveness to specific constituencies (the author lists congressional relations, media and political affairs offices as examples), the NSC lacks such independence, which can make the imposition of strategic perspective and discipline on these other offices quite difficult when they are needed to address national security matters. The author finds that within the NSC, one problem has existed for some time—a compartmentalization of the staff and the various policy areas. This can result, on a day-to-day basis, in a lack of full coordination. It also, according to the author, prevents the NSC staff from operating strategically.

Moore, Scott W., "Today it's Gold, not Purple," in *Joint Force Quarterly* (Autumn/Winter 1998–99). Available online at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1820.pdf

"Teamwork is necessary to mount coherent counterinsurgency campaigns involving multiple agencies. Efforts to make orchestrated changes in the political,

social, economic, and military arenas involve coordination, trust, and mutual support. Organization theory suggests that therein lies the dilemma. Success requires agencies to put aside differences and work toward a common good, but organizations see competition as survival of the fittest. Cooperating can disrupt the status quo, surrender hard-earned turf, or endanger organizational culture for intangible returns and more uncertainty. Job security and organizational performance are measured, justified, and evaluated on the basis of short-term egocentric norms, providing little incentive to cooperate with outside agencies regardless of magnanimous cross agency rhetoric. Interagency coordination does make sense, but organization theory regards it as a pipe dream. That said, hippies (USAID workers) and snake-eaters (Special Operations Forces) will increasingly find themselves working together.”

Raach, George T. and Kass, Ilana, “National Power and the Interagency Process,” in *Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1995, pp. 8-13.

The authors note the need to have a close, interdependence between economic, military and diplomatic instruments of power, especially during crises. Furthermore, they argue that such interdependence needs to be routine across the spectrum of relations. However, they point out that problems, which include fractures involving process, personalities and structure, prevent the synchronization of power. The interagency participants are not fixed and they vary from crisis to crisis. While this permits the flexibility to design crisis teams based on situational needs, it also leads to the participation of team members in an unstructured environment with little interagency experience. This can prevent power synchronization. For example, a lead agency may have little experience in establishing objectives and coordinating interagency groups in the policy decisionmaking process, which may result in time-consuming meetings that lack an agenda or purpose. Information may not be sufficiently refined and policy options may not be fully developed. The authors also note that lead planning agencies may not have sufficient resources and expertise to oversee implementation. Finally, the authors argue that standing interagency working groups should be a common tool for coordination since the interagency process is negatively impacted by working in isolation until an event or crisis emerges that requires interagency coordination. The authors suggest that even when maintaining a standing interagency committee is not practicable, interagency participants should establish formal and informal connections with counterparts in the other agencies likely to be involved in future interagency relationships.

**Rhem, Kathleen T., “Increased Interagency Cooperation Vital in Global War on Terrorism,” from *American Forces Press Service – News Articles* (April 5, 2006) (accessed June 27, 2007 at <
<http://www.defenselink.mil/utility/printitem.aspx?print=http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=15550>>.**

Thomas O'Connell, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SOLIC, acknowledged work needs to be done to improve coordination and cooperation. "The interagency process we have today can work well under crisis," he said. "But even with all our efforts, the (war on terrorism) presents coordination challenges not previously faced by the (National Security Council)."

Rudalevige, Andrew, "The Structure of Leadership: Presidents, Hierarchies, and Information Flow," in *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35, no. 2 (June 2005).

The author studies information flow within the Executive Office of the President, combining classic organization theory with formal work on hierarchy and agenda setting as well as what is known about presidential staffing. Rudalevige suggests that structures often have an important effect on outcomes. He argues that just as structure must be used to induce equilibria in situations of collective decision-making, presidents must impose a limiting institutional structure, in the form of staff, upon a chaotic informational environment, which structure will greatly influence the information received up the hierarchy. As such, the president must make initial staffing and staff structure decisions in order to coax the right kind of information towards his level of the hierarchy. In effect, staff structuring decisions amount to the setting of an agenda since they will impact which policy options reach the president's level for decision and which ones are resolved at lower levels. The author focuses on two forms of informational structures—those focused on functional tasks and those tied to specific foreign or domestic "policy lines." He argues that structures centered on functional tasks will give the president the information he needs most since such a structure will ensure that generalist expertise is brought to bear on technical policy and it will force crucial policy disputes to the president's level. The alternative would involve isolating policy with specialists and resolving policy disputes through consensus before reaching the Oval Office.

Steiner, Barry H. "Policy Organization in American Security Affairs: An Assessment." *Public Administration Review* (1977) July/August: 357-367.

Steiner provides an assessment of the interagency system and NSC involvement therein. He primarily focuses on the period between 1950 and 1960. The author suggests that since decisionmaking power is dispersed throughout the system and since the various decisionmakers and organizations often disagree with each other, pressures exist to reach compromise agreements. Steiner argues that there is a need to remove systemic pressure towards agreement within the interagency system. Such agreements can lead to provisional, partial, superficial and compromised substantive decisions. Steiner suggests that the 1947 Act was designed to address at least two problems—reduction in duplication of national security activities as a means of increasing the efficiency of military, political and economic undertakings, and unification of high level leadership in order to achieve unity of will among the American people. He argues, however, that even following passage of the act, those

goals were not achieved. The author also notes that in the 1950s there was considerable duplication of efforts and responsibilities throughout the system as various organizations urgently expanded their operations in the new security environment of the Cold War. He suggests that such duplication, as well as, interagency and intra-agency competition, partly result from the federal administrative structure's loose character. He notes an observation by Paul Hammond—that the more pluralistic administrative politics are, the more resources will participants direct to gain accurate perceptions of the real world, even at the expense of internal consistency. Steiner also suggests that during the 1950s, the hope that greater unity of will among the American people would result from greater unified national security leadership was hampered by a lack of such unity among national leadership. He notes that national security leadership unity was generally in form, but not fact. Focusing on NSC operations, he argues that while the NSC frequently attends to crises, prepares long-range strategic plans and the NSC structure stimulated a great variety of interagency contacts and coordinating mechanisms through “lateral coordination,” other requirements of the national security system received less attention. Steiner suggests that an NSC deficiency was lack of policy guidance to organizations, which was at least partly due to a belief that national security organizations should be given wide latitude in determining how best to pursue policy mandates handed to them by the national security leadership. Related to his earlier observation about pressure to achieve agreement, the author notes that the NSC was deficient in encouraging dissent to prevailing policy assumptions. This results from organizations trying to take specific actions and having an interest to show how those actions are consistent with already approved policies, as opposed to arguing for policy changes in order to obtain approval for actions. The author also notes that a reason for increased centralization of decisionmaking and policy execution authority in the NSC structure over the course of the 1970s was to counter officials with vested interests in current routines from blocking actions selected at higher levels. Steiner suggests that it is curious that while there has only been a weak reliance on policy advocates from within the national security system to promote policy change, preventing mid-level officials from obstructing change is viewed as an even more important goal. As such, leaders have frequently worked around the bureaucracy instead of through it.

Thannhauser, Sarah, “Domestic Challenges to America’s Capacity to Conduct Foreign Policy.” *America’s Role in the World Working Group, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University (April 30, 2007).*

The author reports on the views of working group members with respect to interagency process failures. The working group members assert that problems exist both with respect to decisionmaking and the implementation of decisions. Agencies plan and program budgets on individual bases, which prevent coordination at that stage of the planning process. Although structural changes were recently made to address these problems, such as the creation of DHS, the Office of the DNI (the

“ODNI”) and the National Counterterrorism Center (the “NCTC”), the working group describes these organizations as “works in progress.” Several factors are cited as contributing to the lack of interagency cooperation. In regards to structure, the author notes that matters are identified as falling within one basket or another—military, diplomatic, intelligence, etc.—and then they are tasked to the agency responsible for that basket. Such agency then engages in planning and implementation strategy development. Difficulty emerges when an administration tries to integrate such plans and strategy into the interagency process, which results in “an uphill turf battle.” The budget process is also cited as a contributing factor. Among the problems presented by that process is a lack of authority, “due to legislative barriers and constraints,” that prevents agencies from shifting fund between each other even when the need to do so emerges.

Zaccor, Albert, “Security Cooperation and Non-State Threats: A Call for an Integrated Strategy.” *Occasional Paper - Atlantic Council (August 2005).*

The U.S. Government’s lack of a process or system for translating the strategic intent of the President results in a proliferation of narrow, redundant and uncoordinated foreign assistance programs that sometimes work at cross purposes. As a result, U.S. assistance is not as effective as it should be to build and maintain a global coalition to fight terror. This paper uses DoD’s Security Cooperation process as a template for a more comprehensive interagency process. COL Zaccor addresses process, resource and structural matters related to security cooperation both within the U.S. Government and in connection with NGOs and other governments. The author suggests that in addressing non-state threats, it is important to eliminate the stovepipes between military and law enforcement assets. Although the NSC committee structure is capable of producing policy, he notes that it cannot bridge the gaps between stovepipes in the execution and implementation of policy. According to the author, this is due to the relatively senior personnel on the PC, DC and PCCs who do not have sufficient time to devote to this function. In the absence of the NSC committees to fill this role, there is no organization with a mandate or sufficient staffing and authority to do so. Although these problems have led reformers to suggest the need for centralizing activities in one department or agency (Hart-Rudman: DHS; 9/11 Commission: DNI; GEN Wesley Clark: DID), COL Zaccor argues that centralization carries its own problem—for every seam that is eradicated, new ones emerge within the centralized organization and between it and other surviving organizations. He also notes that interagency efforts are hampered by the lack of clear authority, recognized by all interagency participants, to guide the security cooperation process. This lack of clear authority results from the absence of overall U.S. Government strategic planning, which gives way instead to *ad hoc*—or “ad hococracy,” as RADM William Sullivan has termed it—and department-specific planning. Zaccor proposes that an authorizing document signed by the president or the NSC is necessary to establish the required authority and to “compel interagency cooperation.”

U.S. Joint Forces Command Experimentation Results

Unified Course 04: Joint Concept Development Seminar Wargames (Naval War College, June 21, 2004)

Participants provide two relevant insights. First, they suggest the need for a global command center with interagency connections at the national strategic level. It would include representatives from outside DoD, including coalition and NGO representatives as necessary. The center's purpose would be to prioritize missions and to adjudicate the use and allocation of resources. The participants recommend that the command center include all elements of national power, noting that "a 500-pound gorilla organization" is required at the National Command Authorities level to act in a coordination capacity. The second insight suggests that a support structure for joint activity requires detailed planning and depends on interagency and multinational coordination. The report notes inhibitors, including a lack of interagency participation, which limits the span of understanding and influence in global operations. The participants also observed that there is a need for interagency and multinational relationships to be integrated into the process as early as possible.

Strong Angel: 10-20-30 Document, Civil-Military Interaction Advice (Eric Rasmussen, June 27, 2000)

The summary report includes a set of "Ten Commandments," one of which is that the military should generally not be in overall charge of civil-military interaction. It is recommended that JTF commanders be subordinated to civilian authorities whenever possible in order to reassure local populations, set expectations for levels of responsibility, minimize the military footprint, permit some mission drift while minimizing mission creep and maintain a coordinated Host Nation Support mandate. The report also includes twenty recommendations, including the necessity of a CMOC (in function, if not in physical space). In connection therewith, the report notes the need to invite partners into the CMOC and to reduce barriers (physical or otherwise) to entry. The report also observes that co-locating partners will improve cohesiveness of effort since problems can be solved in a common forum and central decisionmaking can be used to address matters originating from outside the CMOC.

Expeditionary Warrior 2006 – Final Assessment (June 2006)

The assessment contains an observation by Max Boot that the creation of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is helpful, but that it would benefit from increased personnel and funding. The assessment also observes that the absence of a single, authoritative entity to lead interagency small wars operations makes it difficult to attain unity of command and unity of effort. The participating agencies are not subordinate to a single authority, but success requires that their efforts be coordinated with those of each other and those of host nation

governments. It is reported that military officers complain about having to pursue non-military tasks in addition to overwhelming military tasks. The non-military tasks include governance and economic development matters. There are feelings among military officers that the non-military agencies have left the military to perform duties for which capability, capacity and training are lacking.

Urban – Senior Leader Review [Draft] (January 20, 2006)

SSTRO (security, stability, transition and reconstruction operations) planning requires national and international participants to understand the resources of each participant that will be available to support the range of responsibilities and tasks relating to SSTRO.

Emerald Express 06-1 – Military Support in Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief: Assessment Report, Insights and Observations (February 2006)

Interagency coordination for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief is hampered by uncertainty as to the lead agency responsible for command and control of U.S. Government efforts. If there is no U.S. Government foreign disaster response plan, the country team assumes the leading role and acts as the link between the U.S. Government and host nation government. The assessment notes that during such operations, USAID and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance act as an important planning and coordination link between State and DoD.

Joint Urban Warrior 2006 – Small Wars: Executive Report (April 2006)

The report notes that leadership for joint interagency multilateral multinational (JIMM) intervention often develops in an ad hoc manner, it is temporal and it is contextually determined. A suggestion is made that such structures should be considered early in the planning cycle. The report also recommends articulating the leadership structure in the peace agreement or other international document providing the JIMM intervention with its legal framework. It is noted that models for successful interventions include those with and without formal leadership structures. However, a consensus is emerging that it is valuable to have an overt articulation of structures for leadership, conflict resolution and resource management for all participants whenever possible. The report also argues that while NSPD 44 designates State as the reconstruction and stability operation coordinating agency, State does not have sufficient authority to compel interagency members to act.

Regional Level

Studies

Feingold, Russell, “Creation of a U.S. Africa Command,” *Memorandum from Senator’s Office of the U.S. Senate, Section 19, January 10, 2007.*

This congressional memorandum presents Feingold’s thoughts and concerns regarding the creation of AFRICOM directed towards President Bush. His first problem/concern centers on the issue of a formal, centralized combatant command in Africa would define, not contribute, to the overall U.S. Government’s strategy and objectives for the continent. Security-related concerns identified are the development of terrorist organizations, large-scale government corruption, regional conflicts, disruption the global markets, and ungoverned areas. The Congressman believes that the success of AFRICOM depends on the U.S. Government’s ability to coordinate interagency operations in the region. He addresses the fact that meeting the continent’s military needs while maintaining a soft, civilian-focused presence that emphasizes humanitarian aide, the development of democracy, and economic growth will be a challenge and potentially contradictory in the beginning. AFRICOM must be committed to properly identify the need for executing traditional combatant missions and assisting with civilian initiatives. To do this, the combatant command must incorporate interagency interests and responsibilities from the outset. This begins by creating a command that works in parallel with the Department of State. The DoD’s focus should be regional while State efforts remain largely country-specific. One of the problems with this joint effort is the fact that DoD and State cultures and procedures are not in sync. Mr. Feingold suggests that State should consider creating a new senior position so that a member of the State Department can coordinate efforts in the field on a daily basis instead of from Washington, D.C. alone.

Kolterman, Robert, *Interagency Coordination: Past Lessons, Current Issues, and Future Necessities*, (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, March 15, 2006).

This paper researches the structure of interagency coordination that led to the successful reconstruction of Germany and Japan following WWII. The author states that there is a rapidly changing global environment characterized by regional instability. Organizations at all levels, federal agencies, combatant commands, state and local governments, country teams, and NGOs must support a mutual vision in order to ensure U.S. national security and promote American interests abroad. The author stresses the importance of combatant commanders in order to achieve fully coordinated military strategy. Combatant commanders, along with JIACGs establish ad hoc groups capable of enhancing regular, timely and collaborative working relationships between various governmental agencies. The Department of State created the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to establish a specific

entity to coordinate military and civilian efforts to maximize efforts in the rebuilding of Germany and Japan.

Murdock, Clark A., et al., “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 1 Report,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies Report*, March, 2004, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/bgn_ph1_report.pdf, Accessed August 29, 2007.

This study dedicates a brief section to outlining the problems facing U.S. interagency cooperation at the regional level. The BG-N team separates the issues related to interagency and those related to the U.S. Government addressing regional issues. With regards to the interagency, the study states that there are a number of problems with the execution of the interagency. They argue that there is not enough civilian expertise within the U.S. Government and within the DoD specifically, creating a military dominance. The success of combatant commanders in regional security policy reiterates the weakness of their civilian counterparts, particularly with regards to use of resources. Another problem is the waste that occurs due to the redundancy of assignments and objectives of the various agencies. At the regional level, the combatant commanders should play a larger role in the resource allocation process where the U.S. Government utilizes the organization and command structure of the combatant commanders to organize various agencies and carry out short-term missions. The study tends to focus on developing a plan for reforming national security without paying much, if any, attention the explicitly defining the problems currently confronting U.S. national security interests.

Murdock, Clark A., et al., “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies Report*, July, 2005, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/bgn_ph2_report.pdf, Accessed August 29, 2007.

This report states that the U.S. national security structure was built in an era of predictable, relatively static threats. That structure has changed where the U.S. now faces highly agile opponents with flexible doctrine, short chains of command, and fluid processes. The challenge facing the U.S. Government today is the integration the various diplomatic, military, economic, informational agencies under the current legal and political constraints. One challenge to this integration is the issue of authority; there is not an integrated U.S. Government chain of command. This study examines the structure of the DoD and how to use it as a starting point for integration of various agencies to create more synchronization regarding the issue of national security. The cabinet agencies are identified as the principal organizing elements of national security policy, but each one continues to develop their own strategies, budgets, solutions, and institutional prerogatives to combat the issue themselves. This creates a great deal of redundancy, competition, and distrust as well as a lack of

cooperation and communication. The U.S. has entered an era in which cooperation and coordination among Cabinet agencies can make the difference between success and failure of a mission. Murdock, et al. advocate the development of a long-term national defense strategy focused on interagency cooperation. They state that without such a doctrine, policymakers lack the bigger picture they need to set the nation's priorities wisely and make tough choices, deciding where to place emphasis and where to accept or manage risk. Presently, the U.S. lacks the ability to strategic thinking and long-range planning in the national security arena.

Congress created another problem regarding the structure of national security by amending the 1947 Act, requiring the President to submit a National Security Strategy along with an annual budget request. Instead of promoting a guide for national security policymaking and resource allocation, the amendment created year-by-year snapshot regarding the state of security and the exacerbated arguments and competition over funding. The report also identifies *ad hoc* groups as contributors to the structural problems regarding interagency attempts. It prevents the ability of learning from mistakes and improving performance when similar situations arise again. Another structural problem with national security is the fragmentation that exists regarding analysis, debate, policy analysis, and execution between multiple agencies. Nothing is stream-lined and fluid. Some agencies are responsible for collecting information, others are responsible for taking that information and creating solutions, and finally there are another set of agencies involved in the implementation of those solutions.

The CSIS report continuously raises the issues of authority, bureaucracy, and funding. Three main questions develop from these issues:

1. Who will ultimately maintain control of this interagency entity?
2. What will this authority figure's staff look like, who will staff it, and how will it operate?
3. How will this entity be funded?

Ploch, Lauren, "Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa," *Congressional Research Service*, May 16, 2007.

The CRS completed a study examining the development of a combatant command in Africa. President Bush announced the intention to create AFRICOM on February 6, 2007. Its mission – to promote U.S. interests by working with African states, regional organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the region through by establishing a security infrastructure, military professionalism, and accountable governance. AFRICOM will be structured to handle sudden crises as well as promote all-term U.S. strategy for the region.

There are specific challenges facing the U.S. Government and other American-based actors interested in participating in DoD's initiative. The DoD desires a broader

“soft power” mandate aimed at proactive plans to reduce conflict and incorporate a larger civilian component to address challenges. However, this interagency coordination initiative must first recognize and address certain problems before it can proceed. One issue is span of control. The DoD wants a strong civilian presence heavily involved in the operations of AFRICOM, but there is debate over whether that position (potentially a deputy) should rotate between civilian agencies or be permanently held by State. Another problem is determining the size of this new, formal military presence on the continent. Several nations view this U.S. development as an attempt to sure up American dominance on the continent. The U.S. must also address how AFRICOM will be used in coordination with other agencies to establish and protect American resource interests; stabilize and promote African and American economic growth; assist African countries with developing a security infrastructure and maintaining it, particularly in the ungoverned regions of Africa; address the influx of terrorist organizations; and design a unified strategy for handling Africa’s health crisis. Do to the instability and chaos that currently exists throughout the continent the U.S. military presence will have to be substantial in order to achieve these goals.

Taw, Jennifer M., Marcy Agmon, and Lois M. Davis. *Interagency Coordination in Military Operations Other than War: Implications for the U.S. Army*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1997.

This study identifies the growing trend of combining civilian and military efforts to maximize contributions made from every agency involved while avoiding redundancies and contradictory efforts. The authors chose to separate the study by examining interagency process at the policy, operational and field levels.

The authors dedicate a few pages at the very beginning to explicitly identify specific problems with the current structure at these different levels and then dedicate half of their analysis to explaining the problems in more detail. The authors wanted to provide a strong problem sketch of the problems facing civil and military organizations with regards to interagency collaboration. At the policy level, while the military has a set command structure in which to assign orders and tasks civilian agencies have insufficient authority and accountability with regards to performing humanitarian and nation-assistance tasks. For example, the Justice Department initially agreed to help rebuild Haiti’s judicial system following the U.S. invasion in 1915. However, when the time came for the department’s participation they failed to follow through on their commitment and the task fell to the U.S. Army civil affairs personnel. The current system has no way to ensure that agencies assume those responsibilities that most logically fall to them. There is a tendency for the Departments of State and Defense to take charge of crises or conflicts without involving, let alone consulting smaller agencies and NGOs to pull in their expertise and manpower. These two agencies often formulate crisis management policy and protocols without examining long-term issues and goals. This often creates issues of

authority and expertise when agency engages in certain activities that another agency was explicitly designed to accomplish.

The authors identify to specific issues at the operational level. First, there is no protocol available for how civilian agencies should interact with one another as well as military services when engaged in a joint venture. Most, if not all, interagency collaboration occurs with the creation of informal *ad hoc* groups. These groups lack the demand for commitment which gives any agency an exit option for removing themselves from the effort at any time with any real consequence. In addition, there is no designation of staff or funds to support these groups and their goals. The second issue involves the combatant commanders. The combatant commanders are not required to participate in any interagency policy-making and therefore, most decline any involvement. The civilian agencies do not have counterparts the upper leadership that exists in the combatant commands and therefore it is difficult to coordinate between civil and military agencies at the regional level. When shortcomings and limitations are exposed within civilian agencies there is that expectation within the Legislative and Executive branches that the military can salvage those missions.

These issues of organizational misalignment between the civil and military agencies create problems at the field level. One issue is span of control; no one has authority or even coordinating ability to conduct interagency operations. Secondly, every agency has developed their own process and strategy for handling operations and are unfamiliar with another agency's capabilities, objectives, and limitations. Most of the agencies are used to making decisions independent of other players. The military is hierarchical, while civilian agencies have no domain over another. Another problem resides in the execution of operations. The military culture embraces rapid response and may be frustrated by the slower implementation process of civilian agencies and NGOs.

Authors do offer some recommendations to remedy some of the problems facing interagency collaboration.

Books

Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Address the Overseas Threat. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003.

Coordination of federal programs to combat terrorism overseas became even more critical as a result of the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. In response to these attacks, the federal government has taken unprecedented political, diplomatic, legal, law enforcement, financial, military, and intelligence actions to combat terrorism abroad. Among these actions is the publication of a series of new national strategies to combat terrorism. Congress asked the GAO develop baseline information identifying and describing federal programs and activities to combat terrorism overseas. This report describes the interagency framework and

policies for planning and coordinating federal efforts to counter international terrorism. It identifies the relationships between and among the new national strategies to combat terrorism. It also describes the federal programs and activities government wide to detect and prevent terrorism, disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations, and respond to terrorist incidents overseas. Finally, it provides detailed matrices of selected departments' programs and activities to combat terrorism overseas.

Buss, John C. *The State Department Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization and its Interaction with the Department of Defense.*

Over the past 15 years, the United States has been involved in seven major post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization operations. The *ad hoc* responses that characterized U.S. stabilization efforts in these missions have often proven inadequate. On each mission, our government has struggled to provide a responsive and enduring solution. The consequences have been the unnecessary loss of life, damage to infrastructure, and higher eventual costs for reconstruction and stabilization. Our unpreparedness to respond to the instability in post-war Iraq has met with sharp criticism. In response to these failings, the Bush administration established State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). This paper analyzes the function of S/CRS, examines the organization's relationship with the military, and offers the DoD policy recommendations to improve interagency cooperation with this new organization. The original document contains color images. Issue Paper Volume 09-05.

Buzan, Barry and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security.* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2003).

The authors of this book attempt to formulate a holistic understanding regarding the present condition of international security on a global scale. Buzan and Waever introduce the concept of regional security complex theory (RSCT) to explain the transition the world is experiencing in response to a global shift from bi-polar control during the Cold War to the diminished influence of global superpowers, and new state actors emerge establishing their dominance at the regional level. The world is now composed of several security complexes, each with different structures and political concerns unique to their specific region. The authors do not attempt to physically map out the formulation and development of regions but instead use their theory to highlight the emphasis placed on establishing security pockets at a regional level. The evolving security complexes of the 21st century are defined by interdependence among actors, which are inherently regional, boundaries shaped by geography, proximity, and politics. Therefore, regions are not necessarily defined by outside (specifically Western) labels but rather by the interactions and relationships of the actors involved. Buzan and Waever admit that regional security is not the most important level, but is consistently significant. The authors do not suggest that the importance of state actors has diminished in the post Cold War era. States continue to

maintain individual sovereignty as the theory remains within the boundaries of state-centric neorealist perspectives. Buzan and Waever believe that the issue of security transcends state to state relationships as globalization continues to stimulate interaction between historically isolated nations. However, states once dominated by the bi-polarization of the Cold War now experience the growing influence of recently established regional powers as well as the predominately economic presence great powers and the one remaining superpower. The United States continues to wield influence across the globe, but regional powers such as South Africa are now capable of dominating regional affairs and security issues with establishing themselves as a global great power. The authors provide case studies to support their theory by examining regional dynamics in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, the Americas, and Western and Eastern Europe. They make the argument that effects on regional security are a relatively new phenomenon requiring additional study.

Clark, Stephen A. *Interagency Coordination: Strengthening the Link between Operational Art and the Desired End State*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1999.

The thesis of this paper is that the interagency coordination process must be formalized down to the operational level while explicitly incorporating post-hostilities planning into operational art doctrine. By failing to properly plan and coordinate post hostilities actions within the interagency environment of the United States government, the Desired End State tends to get lost in the aftermath of a conflict. The lessons learned from Operations PROMOTE LIBERTY, Panama, and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, Haiti, reveal that the Department of Defense does not coordinate well within the interagency environment. Crisis Action Planning routinely occurs with in a “close-hold” environment under the guise of operational security. This eliminates the realization of any potential benefits derived from coordination within the interagency arena. Military combat actions are only one facet contributing to the realization of an overall Desired End State. What must take place is an explicit recognition within joint doctrine that not only must post-hostilities operations be planned for, but, to be successful, the planning must be accomplished in the interagency environment as part of operational art. The JTF commander must focus on the desired End State to ensure the success of his operation and he must do this in conjunction with other government agencies. As joint doctrine states, “military victory is measured in the achievement of the overall political aim and associated termination objectives.”

Critchlow, Robert D. *U.S. Military Overseas Basing: New Developments and Oversight Issues for Congress*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2005.

In August 16, 2004, President Bush announced a program of sweeping changes to the numbers and locations of military basing facilities at overseas locations, now

known as the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy or Global Posture Review, a component of ongoing force transformation efforts. Roughly 70,000 personnel would return from overseas locations from Europe and Asia to bases in the continental United States. Other overseas forces would be redistributed within current host nations such as Germany and South Korea, and new bases would be established in nations of Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Africa. In the DoD's view, these locations would be closer, and better able, to respond to potential trouble spots. In August 2005, the congressionally mandated Commission on the Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States (also known as the "Overseas Basing Commission") formally reported its findings. It disagreed with the "timing and synchronization" of the DoD overseas re-basing initiative and questioned whether a strategic vision agreed upon by all effected government agencies was guiding the re-basing. It also saw the initiative as potentially at odds with stresses on the force that the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan caused. The Commission questioned whether sufficient interagency coordination, such as State Department led basing rights negotiations, have occurred. It expressed doubts that the military had enough airlift and sealift to make the strategy work, and noted that DoD had likely underestimated the cost of all aspects associated with the moves (DoD budgeted 4 billion, the Commission estimated 20 billion). The Commission also expressed fear that the re-basing could harm military quality of life, which would in turn hamper recruiting and retention. DoD disagreed with much of the Commission's analysis. Meanwhile, advocacy groups have voiced concern about the DoD plan, arguing that it would harm long-standing alliance relationships. Other groups stated doubts about DoD planning to accommodate the thousands of troops who would be returning to the U.S. from overseas bases. The Base Realignment and Closure ("BRAC") Commission delivered its report recommending U.S. base closures to the President. The President has forwarded their recommendations unchanged to Congress. The Quadrennial Defense Review ("QDR"), a study that Congress mandates DoD to accomplish every four years to allocate missions and guide military procurement, is planned to complete in early 2006. Critics argue that the BRAC plan and the QDR should have been finalized before completing the overseas basing plan. Recent international diplomatic and security developments could further influence debate on overseas basing. Host nations such as South Korea have begun to voice limits on the use of forces based in their country. Uzbekistan, one of the test cases for the new strategy, recently evicted U.S. forces from the base in that Central Asian nation. Some analysts argue this eviction was prompted from Russia and China, who have begun to express concern with U.S. expansion of influence in the region. This report will be updated as necessary.

Lafleur, Thomas M. *Interagency Efficacy at the Operational Level*, 2005.

The interagency process is a series of hierarchical committees that set the conditions for the President to achieve national objectives by synchronizing the instruments of national power. After the fall of the Soviet Union, increased integration and coordination within the interagency process was required to contend

with increasingly complex global contingencies. This caused a colossal struggle between the President and Congress that redefined the role of the President in dealing with these contingencies. To address interagency coordination in this complex environment, President Clinton established PDD 56, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations." However, due to continued congressional pressure, organizational friction at the department level, and insular Presidential level decision making, the changes in PDD 56 were never fully implemented. What is needed is strong, supra-departmental control of the interagency process at the operational level. Such control will enable effective oversight of interagency planning and reduce departmental friction to provide the President with an integrated approach to problem solving in the post-Cold War environment. This research examines interagency interaction from the end of the Cold War through Operation Iraqi Freedom ("OIF").

Mendel, William M. and Bradford, David G., *Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Peace Operations*, (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1995).

This book argues that interagency is necessary because the military is not capable of accomplishing missions such as national assistance, peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, insurgency, and disaster relief; all of which tend to dominate the U.S. foreign policy agenda. Authors state that there is a gap between country capacities and regional capacities. At the country level, the U.S. Government has ambassadors in place who are responsible for synchronizing all U.S. capacities. However, there is nothing available structurally to carry out these same duties at the regional level. The main problem is span of control. While there are models and precedence to facilitate authority regionally, no such structure currently exists. This book advocates the combatant command structure to achieve U.S. regional objectives. Currently, civilian agencies lack a system of strategic plan and the State Department is not aligned to function on a regional basis (even though the capability is in place with a small amount of bureaucratic reshuffling). Mendel and Bradford funnel the question of structure down to one general question: how does the U.S. Government align country teams regionally. While the ambassador structure within the State Department does have its flaws, it represents an excellent starting point for integrating various military and civilian agencies together with a unified plan and process for execution. The authors provide their solution for the blending of the State Department's Country Team structure with the regional military design outlaid for the combatant commands in Chapter 6 of their book.

Nye, Joseph S., *The Paradox of American Power, Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go it Alone* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Nye warns against hubris and unilateralism. As the 21st century dawned, Americans had forgotten their fears of being overtaken by the Far East and instead

had become "arrogant about our power, arguing that we did not need to heed other nations," according to Nye. "We seemed both invincible and invulnerable." Then came September 11th. To some, the very freedoms that make up our soft power are "repulsive," particularly to fundamentalists. But "hard nuggets of hate are unlikely to catalyze broader hatred unless we abandon our values and pursue arrogant and overbearing policies that let the extremists appeal to the majority in the middle," Nye argues. There are world problems that simply cannot be tackled by one country alone, no matter how powerful: financial instability, climate change, drugs, infectious diseases, and terrorism. If the United States is bound to lead, it is also bound to cooperate, Nye writes. With the end of the Cold War America went too quickly from declinism to triumphalism. All the trends of globalization and the information age favor the growing soft power of the United States, "but only if we avoid stepping on our own message." Nye writes that "isolationists who think we can avoid vulnerability to terrorism by drawing inward fail to understand the realities of a global information age." As for going it alone, unilateralism is not a viable option; it risks undermining our soft power and invites coalitions to form against us, which would eventually limit our hard power.

Nye argues that the interests of the international community are not illusory, that they are part and parcel of our national interests, which cannot be achieved without help from other nations. This is not a new debate in American history. President Woodrow Wilson's hopes for the United States to join the League of Nations after World War I were dashed by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, who was not an isolationist but a dedicated unilateralist who didn't want American foreign policy and power to be fettered by foreigners. Nye does not argue that this country should not strike out on its own from time to time. Our interests may not always coincide with the aims of others. The international pressure to ban land mines, for example, ignored the very real need of the United States to be able to defend South Korea from a northern attack across the 17th parallel. If proposals for an International Criminal Court "cannot protect U.S. troops from unjustified charges of war crimes, they might deter the United States from contributing to the public good of peacekeeping," Nye writes. But in areas where we can cooperate with the community of nations we should. Sept. 11 has changed some of the unilateralist perceptions the current Bush administration held when it first came to power, but the need for allies to combat terror should be broadened to accept the principle that there is no going it alone in a globalized world. Nye agrees with Henry Kissinger's dictum that the "test of history for the United States will be whether we can turn our current predominant power into international consensus and our own principles into widely accepted international norms."

Pulliam, John E. *Lines on a Map: Regional Orientations and United States Interagency Cooperation*. 2005.

The purpose of this paper is to examine one narrowly-focused aspect of United States government interagency cooperation. Many of the departments, agencies, and

bureaus that contribute to our national security divide the globe into regions so that they can better manage their activities around the world. As two prime examples, the Department of State has six regions, each assigned to an Assistant Secretary of State, while the Defense Department has five, each under the responsibility of a regional Combatant Commander. It seems obvious that the way each department or agency organizes its global affairs impacts not only how it sees the world and applies programs and policies thereto, but also that these divergent regional orientations impact the interactions of the organizations with one other. The paper's thesis is that aligning the regional orientations of our departments, agencies and bureaus—beginning with the National Security Council staff, State and Defense Departments—would provide a cross-agency synergy that could dramatically outweigh the costs associated with denying each the parochial ability to draw its own lines and boundaries on the map.

Royse, James C. *Gold is the New Purple: Interagency Operations in Campaigns and Expeditions*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Operations in Afghanistan in 2001–2002 revealed an aspect of military operations that is creating new conditions for operational commanders of land forces in combat theaters. Other United States government agencies are engaged in the same area of operations during decisive operations. Doctrine and practice currently delay meaningful integration of these other government agencies until the transition phase of joint operations. The “War on Terror” has most dramatically highlighted this as the lines between the roles of the DoD and variously the Department of Justice, State Department, intelligence agencies, and others have become blurred and just as often intertwined. This condition reflects the intentional application of the elements of national power. It results from deliberate direction and coordination at the strategic level of national leadership. Joint Interagency Coordination Groups at the regional combatant command headquarters may be sufficient at times when other government agencies have the lead role. This monograph asks whether a lower operational level headquarters is more effective than the Combatant Command headquarters to coordinate interagency aspects of operations during campaigns and expeditions when the DoD has the lead role. The monograph presents case study analysis of the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama and the 1994 U.S. invasion of Haiti. Each historical case describes the planning, execution, and interagency integration with military operations. Each case is examined according to the criteria of ends, ways, means, and risk to provide insights to answer the research question. Several topics are presented to provide background and frame the problem.

Schulz, Michael, Soderbaum, Fredrik, and Ojendal, Joakim, *Regionalization in a Globalizing World: A Comparative Perspective on Forms, Actors, Processes*. New York: Zed Books, 2001.

This book discusses the emerging regions and regionalization around the world in which the authors describe as the “New Regionalism Approach.” They argue that in spite of the economic globalization of the world beginning in the late 20th century and continuing through the 21st century, there is a renewed trend of regionalism in areas such as North America (NAFTA), Southeast Asia (ASEAN), and the Middle East (GCC and the Arab Maghreb Union). The authors argue that each region has established its own unique internal dynamics but that these regions must be examined from a global perspective. Globalization and regionalization cannot be separated from one another, but rather relationships and conflict must be understood at the national, regional, and global levels. The authors state that when global powers attempt to interact with regional relationships they often find themselves dealing with elusive entities with undefined boundaries often in a state of constant flux. Most “regions” are not a fixed entity, but instead a fluid entity that may incorporate new members or sever relationships. Constant fluctuations create a great deal of volatility within the cultures, politics, and economy of the region, presenting unique challenges to establishing stability and security. This study addresses the concept of regionalization as multi-state cooperation and governance involving an open-ended process where individual states work with other actors with a loose geographic boundary for mutual benefit (economy, water, energy, security, etc.) while dealing with common challenges of conflicting interests, selfishness, and distrust. The new regions being created are multi-dimensional, encompassing states, corporations, and civil society actors covering various issues including economy, culture, politics, security, religion, and the environment. The relationship between globalization and regionalization is complex as each sometimes reinforces the other while at other times being contradictory. When attempting to deal with regional problems, outside actors must ask what kinds of actors are driving the conflict, with what means, and for what purposes. Nation-states will always remain the focal point for diplomacy and engagement, but the growing regionalization of the 21st century requires more multi-lateral communication and less bi-lateral negotiation.

Articles/Papers

Bogdanos, Matthew F. “Interagency Operations: The Marine Specialty of this Century.” *Marine Corps Gazette* 90, no. 3 (2006) March: 60-65.

This article presents an insider’s understanding of the challenges facing the development of the JIACG by Central Command and the events following its implementation. The JIACG was created in response to the events of 9/11 and was designed to synchronize the various elements of the intelligence community, military services, and national security-related government agencies to facilitate a more collaborative effort regarding the protection of the U.S. Bogdanos does not provide the reader with any description of the problem that existed before the formation of this joint venture other than eluding to the fact that the 9/11 attacks were the result of the U.S. Government’s inability to efficiently and effectively communicate between agencies. One of the problems facing any interagency is the issue of span of control.

JIACG remedied this problem by having each agency maintain operational control over its deployed members, but the senior JIACG military members would have tactical control, controlling the movements of the members in the field to accomplish specific tasks. Even with the success of JIACG, Bogdanos identifies three remaining challenges: the lack of national-level interagency guidance, the absence of information sharing standards, and the inability to publish effective doctrine. Because of the effectiveness in formulation and implementation of JIACG, the joint task force was capable of fulfill its responsibilities in Afghanistan and Iraq of finding evidence for terrorist activity and terrorist financing networks. While Combatant Commands inherently focus on regional security matters, the author focuses on interagency cooperation at the state and national level.

Bogdanos, Matthew F. “Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step.” *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 37 (2005)April: 10-18.

This article focuses on the significance of integrated operations and the creation of the JIACG which must permeate all phases of conflict and rebuilding of Iraq. It discusses the development of the joint doctrine and the development of the JIACG by the U.S. Central Command; scope and limitation of the operation of the JIACG; Challenges to the JIACG operations; and issues for the Department of Defense and the National Security Council to address to ensure the continued existence of the JIACG.

Briem, Christopher. “Joint is Dead: What is Next?” *United States Naval Institute, Proceedings* 130, no. 1, January 2004, 56-59.

Combatant commanders already have been charged with cooperating with civilian organizations. Joint Pub 3-08, Interagency Control during Joint Operations, defines doctrine for cooperation with nonmilitary organizations and clearly states, “Success in operations will depend, to a large extent, on the ability to blend and engage all elements of national power effectively.” Those elements extend well beyond DoD.

Carafano, James, and Nile Gardiner, “U.S. Military Assistance for Africa: A Better Solution,” *Backgrounders*, No. 1697 (The Heritage Foundation, October 15, 2003).

The United States faces increasing international pressure to play a more prominent role in the affairs of Africa. Humanitarian crises, civil wars occurring throughout the continent, the spread of infectious diseases, and the increase in terrorist organizations are all major security concerns for all nations on the continent. However, Africa’s own militaries are not equipped with the ability to handle these matters. The U.S. military can play an important role in helping these struggling nations, but peacekeeping is not the answer. Africa needs a strong, organized military presence in order to stabilize several of its regions and control a number of splinter

groups. The U.S. armed services can organize and support more effective African-led military forces and eventually reduce the continent's dependency on outside intervention. Africa is important to the United States because of its natural and mineral resources as well as U.S. opportunities for economic expansion. Africa is also important to U.S. national security because its vast open spaces of ungoverned or ill-governed regions provide excellent safe havens for terrorist recruitment and training. In order for the United States to have any success at meeting its security, economic, humanitarian and political goals in Africa the USG may need to consider a significantly large military presence initially to bring security and stability to regions of interest before any civilian personnel can begin their humanitarian operations. Ultimately, a formal U.S. military presence like a combatant command will eventually reduce the need for American military and civilian agencies. Africa, as a continent, will be able to resolve its own conflicts and crises as the United States serves in a more supporting or guiding role rather than in a leadership capacity.

Gardner, Jeffrey V. "Fight the 'Away Game' as a Team: Organizing for Regional Interagency Policy Implementation," *American Intelligence Journal*, Autumn/Winter 2005, 51-60.

This article discusses the problems associated with the current state of interagency cooperation regarding the formulation of policy and execution of missions overseas. Since the end of the Cold War the domination of bi-polar superpower influence has diminished allowing opportunities for regional control to emerge. Gardner states that unique problems have thus emerged at a regional level. It is impractical for the U.S. to continuously try to coordinate 260 diverse embassies. The gaps developing are at the regional level as the world has developed into pockets of unique relationships and conflicts. The U.S. now must play catch-up in order to establish presence necessary to successfully implement its own policies at the regional level. In Gardner's opinion, the regional level is the most profitable place to solve the conundrum of integrated multi-agency execution of U.S. security policy. In response to this regional instability, the U.S. requires dramatic changes to its international security apparatus to address this new regional dynamic. Gardner identifies problems facing the construct of successful interagency collaboration and the issues handling matters at a regional level. He argues against the creation of *ad hoc* groups to address regional conflicts because they do not have the institutional memory to successfully handle these unique and complex situations. Additionally, *ad hoc* groups do not address the true source of the interagency problem, which Gardner identifies as authority. Any interagency entity will require a leader with the authority to execute policy within a region. With legitimate authority, this leader will have the ability to integrate multiple U.S. Government agencies horizontally rather than working through vertical channels of rank and file. It is also important that this leader have the authority to call upon specific agencies to utilize their specific skills when necessary. The ultimate goal of this interagency authority is to bring stability and balance to the region because of its permanence. Gardner argues that the authority cannot be vested in one agency to maintain command over other agencies. He sites precedence where this lead agency

approach has been tried before and failed. He provides three different solutions to this authority issue; Combatant Commands (which still places an existing agency in command over other agencies; regional security councils; or regional interests bureaus (regional czar concept). Gardner provides strengths and weaknesses for all three solutions but advocates the regional interest bureaus. He believes that instead of collecting agencies together in each region in a traditional interagency fashion where each individual agency maintains its own autonomy and reports back to Washington directly, the agencies would be fused together into one supra-agency to truly synchronize operations. He admits that this concept of super-envoys with some type of special representative to the president is controversial, but there is precedence to support such an initiative. Gardner claims that the era of interagency is over and that a new era of supra-agency involving a horizontal integration of agencies with the capability of executing policy in order to fill the gaps created by regional instability. The U.S. Government has already begun the construction of supra-agencies through the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. The question remains on how to successfully develop a supra-agency directed towards U.S. foreign and defense policy. This article mostly refers to the relationships between state actors, but also addresses the confusion and complexity created by non-state actors on a regional and global scale, particularly with regards to terrorism.

Gibbings, Thomas, Donald Hurley, and Scott Moore. “Interagency Operations Centers: An Opportunity We Can’t Ignore.” *Parameters* 28, no. 4, Winter 1998/1999, 99.

This article reviews organizational theory and the United States Armed Forces’ interagency process in their effort to improve U.S. civil-military coordination at the theater level. It examines the idea of assigning an *interagency* team to the headquarters of each regional commander-in-chief to enhance the planning and executing of interventions during complex emergencies.

Krawchuk, Fred T. “Combating Terrorism: A Joint Interagency Approach.” *Landpower Essay*, January, 2005.

This article advocates more in-depth and unified study regarding the purpose of terrorism as well as the individuals and organizations that embody this loose network of non-state actors. It is necessary for the U.S. Government to understand how terrorist organizations utilize modern-day technology and communication to orchestrate behavior and execute their plans. Interagency is necessary to develop a comprehensive picture of terrorist mindset and strategy to aid in predicting future attacks.

Krawchuk briefly addresses concerns of growing insurgency activity in Iraq and how support stems from regional support. Understanding where and why insurgents receive support will help planners develop long-term strategies to combating this

activity. In order to develop a more comprehensive and responsive counterterrorism strategy the various national security-related agencies must systematically integrate personnel and resources to establish a network of joint interagency action teams (“JIANTs”). These teams will develop short-term as well as long-term operations directed toward addressing the root causes of terrorism, dissuading the development of future terrorists, and reduce recruiting. The emphasis is on eliminating the ideology, not just the groups of people who support it. Krawchuk specifies how JIANTs can assist ambassadors at the country-team level to host nation CT forces, support public diplomacy, coordinate civil-military relations, and promote civic action projects. JIANTs would also exist at the national and regional level, encouraging the sharing and aiding in the dissemination of information at all levels. The author does not discuss the problems JIANTs will address, but instead chooses to focus on how these teams will be assembled and operate. JIANTs would represent the interagency lead group regarding counterterrorism, coordinating with embassies and the country-team level, combatant commanders at the regional level, and national decision makers and local officials at the national level. The goal for the development of any interagency collaboration depends upon its ability to remain more fluid and adaptable than the terrorists it is intended to defeat.

Langford, Tonya. “Orchestrating Peace Operations: The PDD-56 Process.” *Security Dialogue* 30, no. 2, June, 1999, 137-149.

This article presents the history of the Presidential Decision Directive-56’ (PDD-56), the Clinton Administration’s policy to align the various agencies of the U.S. Government under a single procedural ideal for responding to and managing peace operations. This directive was the result of the failures experienced during the U.S. army ranger raid in Mogadishu in October of 1993. Langford describes that the main problems revealed from this operation was the lack of adequate policy coordination between participating U.S. Government agencies, U.S. military, the UN, and nongovernmental organizations. Nothing existed to link these various agencies together to facilitate communication, organization, and operational synergy. Once implemented, Langford describes the implementation of the directive. For the military PDD-56 did not vary much from previous and current joint military initiatives. Governmental agencies such as the Justice Department, U.S. Agency for International Development, and Departments of Commerce, Treasury, Energy, Agriculture, and Transportation have resisted the implementation of this policy.

In general, military services have been much more cooperative implementing PDD-56 policy than civil agencies. Langford identifies proper education regarding implementation and acceptance of the process as a key component to promoting the effective participation. However, there are a number of obstacles regarding the orchestration of interagency activity. Most agencies have their own language, protocol, and operational standards that often different and incompatible with the structure of other agencies. Interagency collaboration must begin at the point of formulation, not implementation. It is crucial to link decisions and policies in

Washington to events happening on the ground. To assist in this communication process Langford advocates the Multi-Agency Support Team (MAST) developed by the Joint Staff. This concept is designed to develop closer ties to local, regional and international actors while attempting to find a way to integrate the PDD-56 policies. This policy is intended to outline a clear chain of authority regarding the command of a U.S. response to a security issue by bridging the gap between civil and military organizations in peace operations.

Lay, James S., Jr. "National Security Council's Role in the U.S. Security and Peace Program." *World Affairs*, Summer, 1952, 33-63.

This article discusses the importance of the President's National Security Council (NSC) in reviewing all policy decisions regarding the security of the nation. Lay highlights the need for the NSC to ensure that any decisions made by the President regarding national security is carefully considered from all points of view by any and all members of the Executive Branch who are directly concerned with the issue in question. While the benefits of interagency created by the presence of the NSC are discussed, there is not any discussion regarding the problem the NSC was designed to handle, the problems surrounding national security, or problems surrounding the structure of an organization/council to combat these issues.

McFadden, Eric. "Contemporary Counterinsurgency Operations: History as a Guide to Assist in the Development of the Joint Interagency Task Force." *Comparative Strategy* 24, no. 4, October 2005, 361-378.

To successfully engage and destroy the increasing contemporary insurgent threat, the U.S. must develop standing, multifunctional, capabilities-based joint interagency task forces primarily focused on counterinsurgency operations. This research examines the critical elements of the British counterinsurgency campaign during the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1960. While not all inclusive, analysis of this campaign provides a starting point for annotation of critical capabilities required for the future conduct of counterinsurgency operations. These capabilities, combined with contemporary insurgent vulnerabilities, will define the critical capabilities required to derive the counterinsurgency team. Furthermore, this study proposes the requisite U.S. Government national assets necessary to shape the team. Lastly, this paper recommends the organizational structure and the team's relationship to the combatant command in order to facilitate its definitive and relative employment.

Myers, Richard B. "A Word from the Chairman." *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 33 Winter 2002/2003.

This article provides a brief synopsis of some of the literature produced by the military to provide analysis and understanding behind the motivations of modern

terrorism and developing a strategy for countering it. This piece represents a brief summary prepared by General Myers. He does not present any description of the problem currently facing the U.S. Government regarding national security, nor does he provide any definitive solutions to deal with terrorism.

Naler, Christopher L. “Are we Ready for an Interagency Combatant Command?”
Joint Force Quarterly, no. 41, 2006, 26-31.

The article focuses on the need for an integrated civil-military combatant command to serve as the model for the U.S. to reject and defeat opponents and engage regional partners. A combatant commander's headquarters and associated staff would provide the beginning for interagency reorganization. The National Security Council in the U.S. focuses on the appropriate functions for military and non-military participants and facilitates unified action in pursuit of national objectives.

Jordan, Dewey G. “Operation Unified Assistance.” *Marine Corps Gazette* 90, no. 5, May 2006, 57-58.

The purpose of this article is to highlight the importance of interagency coordination and unconventional approaches to intelligence collection and production during operations other than war. Jordan uses the interagency response to the tsunamis that hit the Indonesia in December of 2004 as an example of how well this collaboration can perform under the proper leadership. The interagency response team was an *ad hoc* group designed to assist in disaster relief and would be disbanded once the mission was complete.

Schnaubelt, Christopher M. “After the Fight: Interagency Operations.” *Parameters* 35, no. 4, Winter 2005-2006, 47-61.

The author uses the relationship between the Combined Joint Task Force-Seven (CJTF-7) and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to develop his thesis that this devolution was caused by a lack of effective interagency collaboration at the operational level; a call for an “Interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act.”

Schnaubelt, Christopher M., “After the Fight: Interagency Operations,”
Parameters, Winter 2005/2006, 35, 4, 47-62.

This article discusses combat operations in Iraq, highlighting the frustrations created by the attempts to promote interagency cooperation between military and civilian agencies.

Sieber, Otto, "Africa Command: Forecast for the Future," *Strategic Insights*, Vol. 6, 1, January, 2007.

This article discusses how Africa has become an increasing concern for the United States since the 9/11 attacks regarding terrorist activity and U.S. national security. The author attempts to answer two main questions; how important is Africa to U.S. strategic interests and how will the DoD structure AFRICOM to address these interests without resembling U.S. imperialism? There is the fear that a formal military presence will overshadow civilian and noncombatant objectives.

There is the concern that a number of regions in Africa harbor terrorist organizations and chronically unstable and war-torn territories encourage terrorist recruitment. Africa increasingly becomes an economic interest for several nations around the world, including the U.S. and the need to protect U.S. corporations and organizations becomes more necessary. The health crises in Africa (AIDS/HIV, the avian flu, famine, disease proliferation, etc.) continue to escalate requiring foreign intervention. Several government and non-governmental organization have been created to address specific issues developing on the continent. However, there lacks an entity to coordinate efforts to best maximize solutions. For significant and effective results AFRICOM must look to long-term solutions and not simply quick band-aide fixes. To develop these solutions AFRICOM must embrace interagency coordination without jeopardizing a cohesive Africa policy.

Thompson, Mitchell J. "Breaking the Proconsulate: A New Design for National Power." *Parameters* 35, no. 4 (2005-2006) Winter: 62-75.

Building on the precedent of the pacification program established during the Vietnam War, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support ("CORDS"), Thompson calls for the restructuring of the military-heavy Combatant Commands into truly interagency organizations. Noting that the institution of the Combatant Command is inherently single-agency focused and incapable of self-transformation, he recommends an organization based on the unified command structure and exemplified by CORDS.

Country Level

Studies

Carlucci, Frank and Ian Brzezinski, *State Department Reform, Report of an Independent Task Force Cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001.*

This mainly prescriptive piece proposes a “resources for reform” plan to reform the State Department. The plan entails the following: (1) a Memorandum to the President, which outlines the broad plan and priority items; and, (2) a Memorandum to the Secretary of State providing detailed rationale for the plan and the planned reform items. The Memorandum to the President featured the following recommendations: issue a Presidential Directive articulating an action plan to reform the foreign policy process; emphasize State Department renewal in the first Presidential Address to the Nation; and, propose a Resources for Reform strategy. The panel identified problems in the foreign policy apparatus that create ill-equipped foreign policy institutions and several negative consequences. These problems include the following: dysfunctional human resources and administrative policies; outdated communications and information management infrastructure; unsecured and declining physical infrastructure; Ambassadors lacking authority to coordinate personnel and resources (this issue is raised in other literature); the State Department does not have a Chief Operating Officer; State’s diplomacy has focused on information protection not providing information; and, failure to successfully cooperate at the interagency level. The result has been a serious decline in State Department morale. The report offers the Resources for Reform Action Plan (with Congress) as the prescriptive solution. Importantly, the panel urges leadership from the President and senior leaders as an effective catalyst for the required reforms. The key components include: establishing a Presidential mandate for reform; clearly outline authority for issues and tasks to various agencies; develop action items for State to immediately undertake in the reform process; and, feature consultations with Congress over the appropriate reform strategy.

Herz, Martin F., ed., *The Modern Ambassador: The Challenge and the Search*, chapter by Whitehouse, Charles S. “Running an Embassy,” pp.46-49, Report by the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service Georgetown University, 1983.

This chapter discusses the role of the Ambassador in running an Embassy. Among the tasks Whitehouse describes are the following: the primacy of ensuring that the Embassy functions in an orderly manner with clear command structures and responsibility; the successful inclusion of staff in meeting the mission goals; and, the representation of the United States to the foreign government. Whitehouse gives advice on the personal characteristics of successful Ambassadors. In addition, the piece identifies concerns such as how to carry out instructions, the level of discretion

required for issues, and other considerations such as whether the Ambassador should try to influence Washington's decision-making process.

Johnson, Ambassador U. Alexis, *The Country Team in Operation*, speech presented to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces on 14 November 1963.

Ambassador Johnson describes the Country Team as a mechanism by which the Ambassador may unify the efforts of interagency personnel. Johnson asserts that the effectiveness of a Country Team depends on the Ambassador, his willingness to use the mechanism, and "the response he able to evoke" from his use of it. Johnson describes the expansion of U.S. interests overseas, and how this led to an increase in personnel from multiple U.S. Government agencies. Moreover, he asserts that U.S. interests demand that military officers and civilian representatives work closely with one another. To illustrate his point, Johnson discusses prior instances in which the lack of unified effort led to degradation in the United States' ability to achieve its interests. Johnson stresses the role of the Ambassador as the President's representative in-country.

Jones, MAJ Christopher R., *Achieving Unity of Effort at the Operational Level through the Interagency Process Fields and Groups*. 2005. Thesis submission for Masters of Military Art and Science, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

This thesis tests the proposition of whether problems achieving unity of effort are due to the organizational structure of agencies functioning at the operational level, the operational framework wherein coordination takes place, or organizational culture. To help answer this question, this thesis will review the interaction of military and non-military organizations at the operational level during three operations: Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti (1994-1997), the Global War on Terrorism's Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (2001 to present), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2002 to present). Using Graham Allison's three conceptual models for analyzing governmental decision making, this study of the interaction of organizations through the interagency process will provide insight into where obstacles to unity of effort originate, and the potential ways in which they can be overcome.

Killebrew, Robert, Erin Simpson, Christopher Griffin, and Kate Bateman, *The Country Team in American Strategy*, December 2006.

This paper assesses how Country Teams can operate more effectively before and during counterinsurgency ("COIN") operations. The study devotes chapters to the cases of Laos and Afghanistan. The authors provide the following insights: that the most critical relationship in COIN is that between the Ambassador and the military commander. Too often this is dependent upon the personalities of these individuals.

Country Teams need to develop a resource-sharing mechanism. The authors argue that there needs to be a new Embassy structure for crisis operations. This new structure needs to be complemented by flexible funding and personnel with requisite cultural and linguistic expertise. Finally, the authors find that the tendency for Washington to centralize decision-making, and for Country Teams to look to Washington for guidance, is a critical problem. They argue that decision-making authority should be decentralized, with more authority for the Ambassador the Country Team.

Russell, Ambassador Theodore, *The Role of the Ambassador, The Country Team, and their Relations with Regional Commanders*. Course Directive Regional Strategic Appraisals, U.S. Army War College – Carlisle Barracks – Carlisle, PA 17013.

As the title suggests, the author looks at the different roles of the Ambassador, Country Team, and the Ambassador's relationship with Regional Commanders (and military personnel in embassies) in a mainly descriptive manner. Ambassador Russell identifies areas of potential tension between Ambassadors and Regional Commanders such as whether the Security Assistance Officer works for the Ambassador, the Regional Commander, or both. The piece outlines scenarios where either the Ambassador or the Regional Commander would be expected to assume the principle role. The author provides case examples of the shift in primary authority between the Ambassador and Regional Commander or the two sharing power. For example, Russell identifies the examples of convincing Haiti's illegitimate rulers to leave and the case of evacuation of American citizens as situations when the Ambassador and Regional Commander should work together. Ambassador Russell identifies the in-between stages (preparing for or withdrawing from a military operation) as the periods when shared authority between the Ambassador and Regional Commander should exist.

Stewart, Dr. Richard W., *CORDS and the Vietnam Experience: An Interagency Organization for Counterinsurgency and Pacification*. Research paper for the National War College Class of 2006. Research Fellowship, Fort McNair, Washington, DC, 1 May 2006.

Dr. Richard Stewart, the Chief Historian of the U.S. Army Center of Military History, has written one of – if not the – seminal studies of the CORDS program. Dr. Stewart describes in detail the organization and functions of CORDS, as well as its operational successes. Dr. Stewart answers the questions: Why did CORDS succeed as well as it did? What can we learn from CORDS? Why should we be careful what we try to learn from CORDS? He concludes with some observations on the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan.

U.S. Department of State, Report of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel entitled, *America's Overseas Presence in the 21st Century*, November 1999.

The piece discusses and provides prescriptive recommendations for a new design of the U.S. overseas presence. Enhancing and refocusing the role of the Ambassador is one of the main recommendations. The study notes that often the Ambassador is left with the overall responsibility, but not the authority over all of the mission's activities. Importantly, the panel noted that the Ambassador's statutory authority was often diluted by lacking the control over resources and personnel, who often view the Ambassador as the representative of State, not the President. The recommendations for restructuring American embassies include the following: enhancing the embassies' role in policy planning and implementation; and, increase training in languages, leadership, and management by making these areas milestones for agencies.

U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, 109th Congress, *Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign*, 15 December 2006.

This Committee Report discusses the increasing presence of Department of Defense personnel, particularly Special Operations Forces, in U.S. Embassies. The Committee argues that blurred lines of authority between the State Department and the Defense Department "could lead to interagency turf wars that undermine the effectiveness of the overall U.S. effort against terrorism." The low funding provided to civilian agencies leads to the bleeding of civilian responsibilities to military agencies. The Committee stresses that the Ambassador must provide strong leadership and oversight over all activities in, and operated out of, U.S. Embassies. "This includes the authority to challenge and override directives from other government agencies in Washington to their resident or temporary staffs in the embassy."

U.S. Senate Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress, *The Ambassador and the Problem of Coordination*, September 13, 1963.

This compendium of U.S. Senate documents traces the growth of interagency (non-State) activities pursued overseas, and the persistent struggle Ambassadors have faced to unify all elements of national power at the Country Team level. This committee print contains many examples of instances in which Ambassadorial authority was diluted, as well as previous attempts to unify all elements of national power.

Books

Blaufarb, Douglas S., *The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present.* (New York, NY: The Free Press 1977).

The excerpts from this piece discuss the development of the CORDS program. Blaufarb provides a detailed discussion of the steps that led to the reorganization of the mission for pacification and creation of the CORDS structure. To help explain this timeline, Blaufarb analyses the various steps, including the report from Secretary McNamara about his visit to Vietnam. The book discusses the details of the reorganization and the launch of the CORDS program and its major elements including organizational structure. The author gives reasons for the success of CORDS and its effects on the problem addressed as well as a critique highlighting flaws in the structure (such as the absence of legislation regarding CORDS) and the negative consequences. The main issue of CORDS' success stemmed from the unity of the U.S. pacification effort, but the problem remained of keeping civilian affairs separate from the military. Blaufarb makes the point that organization and resource allocation must be a reflection of policy.

Rana, Kishan S., *The 21st Century Ambassador: Plenipotentiary to Chief Executive.* (Malta and Geneva: DiploFoundation, 2004).

This author (a former Indian Ambassador) brings a wealth of experience and knowledge to this mainly descriptive piece about the role of the ambassador. The product from numerous interviews and anecdotal evidence, the book provides an account of the different roles played by the ambassador and proceeds from the pretext that this position remains relevant in implementing policy and formulation. The author highlights such themes as the increasingly complex environment under which the Ambassador operates and other issues including the following: the foreign ministry's status as no longer being the sole agency responsible for foreign relations; the increasing role of emerging sub-state entities; the increased amount of non-state actors on the international stage; the multiplied pace and number of bilateral and multilateral contacts; the commoditization of information caused by the Internet; the emergence of a higher priority on good governance concepts in politics, more expectations for governments to deliver value to their citizens; the input of technology enhancing the envoy's role; the increased number of non-foreign ministry officials at embassies, causing complications in embassy management and coordination; and, the opening of diplomacy careers to all citizens moving away from a strictly upper-class occupation.

The piece notes that diplomacy has become more important in the fast-changing international context, giving the Ambassador new responsibilities as a diplomat-manager. Importantly, the author argues that operational functionality is the primary goal for an embassy and labels the Ambassador's main functions as negotiation, promotion, and outreach. In the chapter regarding leadership in the embassy, the ambassador's key role being responsible for the well-being of the entire staff illustrates the importance for countries to have professional, motivated ambassadors

in these positions. The author provides detailed recommendations on training for an Ambassador-designate including the following: instruction on the country's objectives; issue-oriented analysis of international affairs; information regarding the objectives of other agencies in foreign affairs; management techniques; public diplomacy skills; and, other professional skills. The author also highlights the need for ambassadors to have extensive training in local languages, beyond basic levels.

The conclusions in the book offer helpful observations and suggestions for the future role of an Ambassador. These lessons include the following: the Ambassador contributes to shaping and implementing policy; the Ambassador should be viewed as the single best resource on his assigned country; Ambassadorial effectiveness depends on the individual; the Ambassador remains important as an institution, likewise, countries should try to maximize value from these individuals; improvements in diplomacy should be viewed as public goods; diplomats should be recognized more as professionals; knowledge management and other tools are transforming diplomacy; and, high performance results are dependent on empowering the Ambassadors.

Articles/Papers

Coffey, Major Ross, "Revisiting CORDS: The Need for Unity of Effort to Secure Victory in Iraq," in *Military Review* 86, no. 2 (2006) March/April: 24-34.

The article discusses the CORDS program's multi-tracked approach to counterinsurgency in Vietnam as the historical parallel for current U.S. efforts in Iraq. Coffey identifies the lack of unity of effort as the main problem hampering interagency action at the operational level because nobody is in overall charge. The question of who is in charge is the fundamental post-conflict operations question, with lack of unity of command as the key factor leading to a failure to achieve unity of effort. Problems with interagency cooperation are found at the operational level. Coffey recommends that the United States and the Multi-National Forces - Iraq adopt an approach similar to that of CORDS. Coffey prescribes that accountability through unity of command at the operational level will lead to interagency unity of effort. Coffey discusses sources that provide key counterinsurgent warfare principles, which require coordinated interagency action for success. Coffey discusses the CORDS program (including the unsuccessful efforts pre-CORDS) and reasons for its success, including the structural arrangement that partnered civilian entities with the U.S. military in Vietnam. Among the reasons for CORDS success include: the placement of one person in command with civilian and military personnel directly underneath; creation of unified civilian-military advisory teams; specialized creation of the program for Vietnam; and placement of the program under military command (which controlled the resources). One of the main lessons from CORDS was that it effectively subordinated civilian capabilities in the military command without creating the total dominance of the military in the structure. Other important contributions from CORDS included: its ability to protect the local population;

creation of a grassroots political support mechanism; and, other political as well as economic progress. Finally, the success of CORDS is demonstrated by the lack of insurgents participating in North Vietnam's conventional attacks on U.S. and South Vietnamese forces. The lesson learned from the program was evident: CORDS followed a unified command and adhered to principles of successful counterinsurgency. Coffey provided some critiques of CORDS, most importantly, the lack of national level government legitimacy efforts. In addition, the piece provides lessons for the current situation in Iraq featuring the abovementioned need for unity of command and adoption of a CORDS-like structure.

Hamlin, Lt. Col. Ross E., "The Country Team – A Model for Coordination," in *Air University Review*, (July/August 1967).

In this piece, Hamlin describes the organizational structure of typical Country Teams. He stresses that the function of the Country Team is "to advise the ambassador on important developments in the country and help to ensure coordination of all United States efforts in that country." Hamlin states that even in instances when there is a complex military command structure, the military commander is to work closely with the Ambassador in resolving problems. Beginning in 1940, with President Franklin D. Roosevelt's recognition that defense attachés needed to be placed under the direct authority of the Ambassador, Hamlin traces extensively the evolution of the Country Team through 1967.

Kennan, George F., "Diplomacy Without Diplomats?" in *Foreign Affairs*, (September/October 1997).

In this article, George Kennan examines the evolution of the U.S. Foreign Service, and identifies key challenges to its future. Among the challenges Kennan describes are the following: the difficulty of balancing two-career families with the needs of the Foreign Service; the selection process for Ambassadors; the 'fragmentation' of policymaking and diplomacy; and the upsurge in non-State Department personnel and the concomitant erosion of Ambassadorial authority.

Schnaubelt, Christopher M., "After the Fight: Interagency Operations," in *Parameters* 35, no. 4 (Winter: 47-61 2005-2006).

The author uses the relationship between Combined Joint Task Force-Seven (CJTF-7) and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to develop his thesis that this devolution was caused by a lack of effective interagency collaboration at the operational level; a call for an "Interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act."

Multilateral Level

Studies

----- ***Adapting to The New National Security Environment, The findings of a conference organized by the DACOR Bacon House Foundation, (Washington, DC: DACOR Bacon House Foundation, October 6, 2000).***

These conference proceedings begin by stating that there is a new security environment post Cold War and that confronting the challenges it poses will be made more complicated and handicapped by the use of an antiquated national security and foreign policy structure based on the 1947 Act. Recommendations are as follows:

- President must conduct a comprehensive national security review and establish priorities.
 - Lessons learned have not been implemented – need to do so.
 - Interagency cooperation is hindered by budget and resource problems stemming from fact that Department and Service heads, not NSC advisors, are accountable for their budgets.
 - Defense/Diplomacy funding imbalance should be remedied. Defense dollars have gone up, diplomacy has not.

- The nature of the threat has changed, - it is no longer a single, overarching threat – and this thus the 1947 Act is no longer suited for the threats and challenges facing the United States today. Thus must have “a new, or a least significantly modified, national security and foreign policy governmental structure.” (pg. 17).
 - “[The United States] may want to consider both a new National Security Act and a new national security strategy akin to NSC-68” (pg. 17).

- Recommend starting with The U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, chartered in 1998 to examine the inadequacies of the 1947 Act, as baseline for ideas. (The Hart-Rudman Commission)
 - The United States must be internally competent, leadership must come from presidency
 - Tone matters – “power without wisdom is unworthy”
 - Must integrate traditional as well as non-traditional elements of national power
 - Must retain policy agility
 - Must integrate domestic insecurity and international security
 - Must have a means to assess our performance and the ability to adjust

A report from the Economist Intelligence Unit, *Collaboration Transforming the way business works*, (New York: Cisco Systems, April 2007).

This report focuses on the growing need for corporations to collaborate to succeed in the global environment. While the emphasis is on collaboration in the business

community, including among competitors, the report also notes that it is increasingly necessary and beneficial for corporations to collaborate outside the traditional vertical domains, such as their suppliers and distributors, and to look toward universities and the public sector. The report specifically focuses on formal collaborative arrangements that bridge traditional geographic, institutional, and functional boundaries, and it obtained its data by way of a survey of 394 business leaders representing companies in the United States, Europe, Asia, the Pacific, and elsewhere.

A case study involving a French company that collaborated with U.S. Government agencies to provide disaster relief during hurricane Katrina, provides key insight into what can be achieved when coordination and collaboration between the private sector and the government occurs, especially during times of terrorist activity and natural disasters. Accor, a French company that owns several motel chains in the U.S. (Motel 6 and Red Roof Inn), was able to collaborate using a “mix of teamwork within its organisation and partnerships with government agencies to keep over 250 properties running and provide shelter for over 18,000 people” during Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath. Accor interacted with FEMA and the Red Cross. Problems arose in communication over payment to Accor for hurricane evacuees being housed in their hotels. There were problems communicating between local property managers and the corporate headquarters. The sharing of information through common databases and assess between locals was difficult.

To solve the problems, Accor set up an *ad hoc* (it was *ad hoc* due to the crisis nature and the limited time available) five-person crisis management team to coordinate company response. “The communication programme had the larger benefit of nurturing trust throughout the organisation. Everyone was able to trust that everyone had their best interest in mind and everyone was working toward the same goals.” (pg 23).

Lesson’s learned from this *ad hoc*, crisis collaborative response were that a sense of urgency, a common goal, leadership and organization all help a collaborative effort to succeed. Accor has since institutionalized its response to future disasters by documenting protocols for collaboration with relief agencies.

William H. Lewis and Edward Marks, *Searching for Partners: Regional Organizations and Peace Operations*, McNair Paper 58, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, June 1998).

The UN is at its limit in terms of its ability to enforce the maintenance of international peace and security. With this being the case, the United States has sought additional support from substitutes such as regional organizations. The problem is that while all, or nearly all, existing regional organizations have experience in peace operations and in working relationships with the UN, they do not possess experience in organizing multinational forces to deal with “complex emergencies”, i.e. those for which “distinctions drawn between purely military or

security enhancing operations and those entailing civilian support functions frequently prove illusory.” (pg 131)

The following obstacles would need to be overcome in order to deal with “complex emergencies”:

- An agreed upon command and control arrangement structure is essential
- Provide common training and indoctrination
- Capable logistics management system
- Common equipage
- Appropriate links to civilian authority
- Clearly and precisely written mandates that match the capability of the deployed forces
- Adequate financial support for field operations must be assured for both civil and military personnel in field.

The authors suggest that the level of integration of command within multilateral forces ought to extend only to ‘operational’ as opposed to ‘command’ control. They say that the military distinction between the two is as follows: Command applies to such matters as overall direction, discipline, morale, and logistics, whereas operational control involves tactical decisions in the field undertaken by the area commander, his staff, and subordinate commands. However, they also note that the extent to which member states are prepared to surrender control of their forces to foreign commanders remains a vexing issue.

Lute, Douglas, E. *Improving National Capacity to Respond to Complex Emergencies: The U.S. Experience, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, April 1998).*

In this report the author evaluates the way that the U.S. Government coordinates its responses to post-Cold War complex emergencies by examining three case studies: Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. There are three levels of operation: the strategic, dealing with national and international policy; the operational or theater level; and the tactical or field level. The author focuses on the strategic level since “[a]t the strategic level, few national innovations are evident, and international mechanisms to coordinate the diverse array of services necessary to limit the effects of violence are too often the result of *ad hoc* arrangements and are prey to changing interest.” (pg 2).

The author points to four requirements for a more effective U.S. policy response:

- Leadership

- A comprehensive plan
- Adequate resources
- A mechanism to monitor implementation

In summarizing the Somalia mission, which is perceived as “overwhelmingly negative”, the author notes that the U.S. acted largely through the UN and contributed significantly to both the successes and failures of the mission. Reasons for failure include lack of leadership, no comprehensive plan, too heavy a focus on military resources, and a failure to anticipate and develop a long-term strategy. The mission in Haiti was more successful overall than that of Somalia, however the nature of the problems was long-term and required sustained international engagement, something that the United States failed to head during the implementation phase, requiring instead that the burden be borne by Haitians. The U.S. mission in Bosnia represented a regression compared to successes gained in Haiti. The author notes failures in all four above-mentioned areas: leadership to mechanisms to monitor implementation.

The author suggest three steps that can lead to substantial improvement:

- Institutionalize the EXCOMM construct put forth in PDD-56 under the Clinton Administration. EXCOMM stands for Executive COMMittee and it is comprised of members of the NSC and the requisite members from the agencies that are involved in the particular operation. The key here is that the EXCOMM’s membership should be flexible and decided based upon specific constraints and conditions of the mission at hand. Also key to Lute’s suggestion is that EXCOMM contain members from multilateral agencies, as needed. Thus, for example, when considering transition to a UN operation, Lute says the EXCOMM should invite a representative from the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations to participate. “The role of EXCOMM should be to link the executive branch bureaucracies to the policy decision makers sitting on the Deputies and Principals Committees of the NSC.” (pg 32).
- Prepare contingency plans. There is a need to move beyond PDD-56 and undertake the preparation of contingency plans that outline the coordination requirements of U.S. policy options in complex emergencies. The key here is that contingency planning needs to be broadened beyond the military. “The process of producing these plans can be as important as the plan itself” because it will stimulate interagency dialogue. The contingency plans, Lute then suggests, will serve as the staring point for the EXCOMM when a crisis arises.
- Engage other multilateral players early. Today’s complex emergencies are beyond U.S. capacity alone, thus the United States must engage other multilateral contributors such as states, international organizations, and NGOs. The goal is to include these contributors at the contingency-planning level, and to do this regularly.

The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road Map; for National Security: Imperative for Change, The Hart-Rudman Commission – Phase III. (Washington, DC: February 15, 2001).

Institutional Redesign

A main focus for the Commission in terms of institutional redesign concerns itself with the State Department.

Problem: The State Department has been weakened and its resources reduced. Diplomatic efforts and foreign aid programs that were once solely under its direction have been dispersed throughout other agencies and organizations throughout the U.S. Government. Foreign policy management has fallen into the control of the NSC. Further, Ambassadors are ill prepared to deal with the emerging importance of Region over Country, and no mechanism exists to coordinate activities regionally. In conjunction, these problems disrupt the ability of the State Department to develop multilateral collaboration among international governments, NGOs, and other international organizations.

Recommendations:

- Reorganize State to have 5 Under Secretaries with responsibility for overseeing 5 regions – Africa, Asia, Europe, Inter-America, and Near East/South Asia. One, this reduces the number of people who are reporting directly to the Secretary of State. Two, these Under Secretaries will have a better ability to liaise with NGOs engaged in security activities in their given region. Three, it reduces competing U.S. goals within a specific region, increasing the ability to give one cohesive message in attempts to build multilateral collaboration.
- Redefine the responsibilities of the Under Secretary of Global Affairs. As redefined, the Under Secretary for Global Affairs would give priority to working with international organizations, particularly in consolidation and providing leadership for humanitarian and refugee assistance programs.
- The budget for State should be in one integrated Foreign Operations Budget. This would allocate all the resources in a way to carry out the President's overall goals, while integrating various programs and creating more specified/purposeful goals. Ultimately, this will lead to a clearer understanding of U.S. foreign policy among potential allies.

Another focus area for the Commission concerns the Department of Defense, with one recommendation related to structure and multilateral collaboration.

Problem: Much of the current organizational structure and responsibilities of DoD evolved during the Cold War in *ad hoc* and incremental ways. What has resulted is a

structure of unnecessary layers, duplication of activities, and inefficient delegation of authority.

Recommendation:

- The Secretary of Defense should reorganize and reduce the staffs of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the military services, and the regional CINCs. This will lead to a clearer definition of staff missions and responsibilities – reducing duplication of activities. Less redundancy will give various staffs the ability to pursue given missions requiring allied nations with more clarity.

Homeland Threat Prevention

The Commission also made various recommendations for instruments on a multilateral basis with which to prevent future attacks. They are more general than the above recommendations, and will probably come as little or no surprise.

Recommendations:

- Improvement of diplomatic efforts. Development of sound diplomatic ties with foreign governments and their people will increase chances of early warning of potential attacks, increase intelligence-sharing, and aid in cooperation with foreign law enforcement agencies.
- The United States must take/maintain leadership roles in arms control and nonproliferation. Strengthening multilateral organizations in these efforts can help persuade states and other international groups to prevent materials and weapons exportation and development.
- Increase public/private efforts to enhance security processes within international transportation and logistics networks. Multilateral collaboration within these networks will lead to more shared information concerning people and goods coming into the United States.

Thomas, James, P. *The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions*, Adelphi Paper 333, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, (New York: Oxford University Press, May 2000).

This work focuses on the military aspects of coalitions, in particular, those among the U.S., UK, France, and Germany. Coalitions are needed to lend legitimacy and aggregate military power however their political imperative has not been matched by commensurate military preparation to ensure smooth and effective operation. The author makes the case that unless the Allies “harmonize” their approach in terms of doctrine and pre-crisis planning and coordination, their ability to form effective coalitions will decline.

The author states that the United States should and will be more inclined to operate in coalitions when the circumstances do not involve vital strategic interests, such as was the case in Bosnia and Kosovo, but that it will act unilaterally for matters of vital national security. However, putting aside the question as to what constitutes U.S. involvement in a coalition, the author makes the case that the only way for the United States to ensure effective coalition operations, if and when it does choose to operate in one, is if it builds into its planning and acquisition stages a dependency on allied coalition operations. Without accepting a dependency on allied coalitions, upfront in the planning and acquisition stages, it means that potential allied contributions are viewed as additions to, rather than substitutions of, U.S. forces and capabilities. This prescription of forming *ad hoc* coalitions, the author argues, does not lead to the most effective coalitions.

The author suggests that one of the greatest areas to gain enhanced coalition cooperation between the four above-mentioned allies is via peacetime, non-institutional efforts (here he means non EU, NATO avenues). Thus he calls out the need for assessment of military threats and achieving a common operational picture vis-à-vis the development of standard procedures for the sharing and release of intelligence information during peacetime. This would then lend itself to a “harmonizing” of strategic outlook among the four allies and would make for a quicker, more unified response during times of crises.

“Senior Leader Review – Urban (Draft),” *United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Forces Development: (January 20, 2006), p 1-80*

The SLR-U was a seminar that took place on December 15th 2005 to discuss urban operational issues, implications, and proposed solutions with senior leadership to solicit their guidance for the way ahead.

Four issues were considered: battlespace awareness and actionable intelligence, influence operations, maintaining the initiative, and interagency coordination. The following five key areas of insight and associated recommended actions came out of the analysis and discussion:

- Joint, interagency, and multinational integration – creating the mechanism before the crisis to create the political and military framework for operations to work within.
- Communications – at the tactical level with the U.S. military, between elements of the U.S. Government, between members of the coalition, and with NGOs that have roles in the operational area.
- Intelligence and situational awareness – creating the right knowledge and getting it in a timely fashion to those who can act on it.

- Key operations – maintain the initiative in the UO and influencing the various urban audiences to behave in ways that are supportive of campaign objectives.
- Processes to continue to improve UO – improved lessons learned processes, metrics to understand operational progress, and ways to discover and document new solutions.

Some relevant lessons learned are as follows:

- “The military needs to leverage the additional capabilities provided by the interagency, multi-service, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and coalition partners.” (pg 3)
- “There is a requirement for a senior-level coordinating function to expedite and synchronize interagency contributions, orchestrate capabilities, support unity of command and enhance unity of effort, illuminate the setting of priorities, manage information sharing, and ensure that each organization’s roles and missions are provided for to allow them to focus on achieving common goals. Several shortfalls were identified. They include the following:
 - Interagency and multinational standards. Information needs to be organized so as to support the needs of multiple and differing interest groups. Criteria such as operational demands, timeliness, and priority requirements are examples. Goals and issues need to be commonly understood – at the levels of definition and shared frameworks...
 - Planning and Processes. We must develop an interagency planning framework and supporting doctrine for future contingencies. It should identify the critical issues and gaps of capability that need to be addressed...
 - The concept of interagency military-civilian teams is currently being developed. These efforts need to be further enhanced. Shared equipment, tactical communications, and training should be focus areas...
 - We need to develop processes to identify the key information data sets (to include timeliness requirements and priorities) needed at the tactical level, and procedures to disseminate the data rapidly. We also need to have a process to integrate the knowledge gained at the tactical level into the total information database. We need to supply direct support to the tactical units, not just the operational staffs” (pg 29)

“Multinational Experiment 4 (MNE4): Experiment Proceedings Report” *United States Joint Forces Command: (May 31, 2006), p 1-46.*

The MNE4 took place during February and March 2006 and was an experiment based on stability operations in current day Afghanistan. It focused on multinational operations within coalition and alliance frameworks. Two simulated staffs, a coalition task force headquarters staff and an NATO response force headquarters staff, participated in the experiment using the same effects-based approach to multinational operations process but slightly different staff organizations, internal processes and set of tools and technology. Subordinate component command, higher headquarters, and other external commands and agencies were represented by role players in the experiment control group. Participants included Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Sweden, UK, and NATO, as well as the United States who led the effort.

Relevant findings:

- Trust between NGOs and Military is needed. To help build trust, education is required so that each entity can learn about the other's processes, cultures, command structure, and goals and objectives.
- Clear definition and understanding of roles and responsibilities is required between all coordinating interagency participants. The following areas must be know and understood by all and about all:
 - Roles and responsibilities
 - Authority and chain of command
 - Capability and assets
- There is a need for any headquarters to be designed for adaptivity and not just flexibility. (adaptivity is the capacity for being made suitable by adjustment)

“Expeditionary Warrior 2006 (EW06): Final Assessment”, *United States Marine Corps Title X War Game: (June 2006), p 1 – 88.*

EW06 was conducted January 22-27 2006 at the William F. Bolger Leadership Center in Potomac, Maryland. Participants included the five United States services, USSOCOM, USJFCOM, OSD, the intelligence and interagency communities, and multinational partners from UK, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. EW06 was a multi-sided, complex war game simulating insurgency and drug challenges in Peru and Ecuador with the occurrence of a simultaneous earthquake in the region requiring humanitarian assistance. National governments, guerilla groups, narco-traffickers, insurgent indigenous populations and sympathizers were modeled.

General observations and lessons learned related to interagency coordination were given by conflict management expert Larry Sampler and are as follows:

- A primary challenge in complex operations is lack of common terminology, for example, the term “post conflict” is misleading because it creates a false

sense of safety when civilians are still in harm's way. Recommendation was for JFCOM to compile a common glossary. (pg 46).

- There is no such thing as an “international community” in such complex contingencies because the lack of coherence and international agreement cannot justify the term. (pg 46)
- International organizations (NATO, UN for ex) should not be assumed to have similar command and control structures, in fact UN does not have a command and control structure. (pg 46)
- It's critical to have all stakeholders participate and that personalities shouldn't be allowed to create problems. (pg 47)

Other important results:

- “The conduct of *EW 06* ... revealed that the number of disparate actors challenges our ability to achieve unity of effort. The actors range from U.S. and coalition government agencies, government and recognized leadership, military, nongovernmental aid organizations, to International organizations, etc. This wide variety of participants ... brings unique problems, including command and control, lack of clearly defined objectives and desired end state, different objectives among the participants, and cultural differences.” (pg 58).
- Thus unity of effort is not likely however unity of purpose is.
- The CMOC (Civil-Military Operations Center) or its equivalent needs to integrate civil affairs with other efforts so that all lines of operation are well coordinated. It is the primary mechanism for accomplishing control and coordination.
 - Thus CMOC must be viewed as conceptual parity with combat operations center – this is not typically the case (pg 58)
- NGOs are not a monolithic group, there is no single point of contact for all NGOs, although sometimes UN agencies try to fill this role

Books

Combelles-Siegel, Pascale, *Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations*. (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, January 1998).

This monograph examines the role of information, i.e. media, in peace support operations conducted by the NATO-led forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina from Dec. 1995 into 1997. The NATO-led forces, IFOR and later a smaller SFOR force, ran an information campaign designed to “seize and maintain the initiative by imparting

timely and effective information within the commander's intent.” (pg 2) The information command had 3 components:

- A public information (PI) campaign – this was designed to establish NATO's credibility with international media to gain support from contributing nations.
- A psychological operations (PSYOP) campaign – this was designed to influence the local population and its leaders in favor of the IFOR/SFOR troops and operations. PSYOP units were nearly all American troops.
- A civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) campaign – this was designed to inform audiences about civil-military relations and to provide information to the local populations. This was mostly U.S. Army personnel.

The author provides detail about the IFOR/SFOR structures and their ability to perform each of the three information campaigns. The central points made are that information is key to success and if the correct information isn't being disseminated, then it is almost as if it doesn't matter what transpires on the ground in terms of real action. Instead what matters is what is picked up and conveyed via the media because this is what provides the basis for the public's as well as the political elite's opinions. The author argues that in operations other than traditional war, such as peacekeeping, when dealing with inter-organizational relations, perception is often as important, if not more important, than reality.

Overall, the campaigns met with successes, but also with difficulties that limited their successes. The primary limitation was combating local propaganda and disinformation. The following reasons were given:

- There was not sufficient interaction between all staffs in charge of information such as PI, PSYOP, and CJ2 (intelligence).
- NATO's information strategy was plagued by lack of vision. Rather than focus on an end-state, they focused on arbitrary end-dates for the IFOR and SFOR missions.

Slaughter, Anne-Marie, *A New World Order*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

In this book, the author argues that we are already witnessing a “new world order.” It is one in which nation states are not disappearing but are disaggregating into component institutions which comprise government networks. Government networks are global networks of government officials: police investigators; financial regulators (for example the Financial Action Task Force (FATF); a network of finance ministers and regulators pursuing money launderers and financiers of terrorism); judges; and legislators, who exchange information and coordinate activities to combat global crime and address common problems on a global scale, not

only via the Foreign Office, but also through regulatory, judicial, and legislative channels. An important aspect of government networks is that they are held accountable because they are run by government officials, unlike NGOs, private sector entities, and international organizations.

The problem the author address is the notion that global governance is needed but feared. “This is the globalization paradox. We need more government on a global and a regional scale, but we don’t want the centralization of decision-making power and coercive authority so far from the people actually to be governed.” (pg 8) No one wants to be ruled from afar and governments are loath to give up their sovereignty. The international organizations, such as the UN, WTO, and others, rather than being sources of global governance, would become hosts for government networks. Thus, government networks are distinct from supranational international organizations and are themselves representative of a global structure of governance. “They expand regulatory reach, allowing national government officials to keep up with corporations, civic organizations, and criminals.” (pg 3) They facilitate long term cooperation between members by building trust and establishing relationships.

In summary, the author says that these government networks, which already exist, should be encouraged to expand and should be taken advantage of as a means of achieving global governance. National governments are loosing power and to create a “global power” is unrealistic. An alternative to the *ad hoc*, hodgepodge of private sector and public international organizations formulating global public policy (i.e. those who are not politically accountable) is for national governments to work through government networks, thereby “retaining primary power over public policy, but working to formulate and implement it globally.” (pg 262)

Articles/Papers

Sowers, Thomas S. “Beyond the Soldier and the State: Contemporary Operations and Variance in Principal-Agent Relations” *Armed Forces & Society*: (Spring 2005), Vol. 31, No. 3, p 385-409.

This paper takes a theoretical look at command structure using principal agent theory and analyzes the case of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Within the KFOR forces, (NATO-led security forces comprised of UK and U.S. forces) the military commanders were “dual-hatted” and had two bosses, one in their national command and one in KFOR under UN command. This article looks at the relationships between commanders and the state (here their national command), versus commanders and non-state actors, which in this case is the UN (KFOR). When U.S. and UK forces were sent to support KFOR, they were under OPCON line of command, which means that their direct command was under KFOR. However when a nation grants OPCON, it does not relinquish all control over its forces, thus, the United States and UK maintained a level of control over their forces.

This article proceeds to describe principal agent theory and performs qualitative and quantitative analysis on data collected from interviewing 17 command officers from the United States or UK. The officers were interviewed regarding who they really took orders from etc.

The results were that 1) variance exists in principal-agent relationships where multiple principals exist per one agent, as is the case for this Kosovo case study, and 2) variance exists across nationality (i.e. between the United States and UK) in terms of commanders (agents) perceived relations with their national commanders versus KFOR commanders. This second result supports the concept that domestic CM environment conditions behavior.

Analysis

Although structural problems cross multiple levels of engagement, sources generally limit the exploration of problems to one area. Although not surprising, as an author may face temporal and spatial restrictions, this limitation can skew analyses and prescriptive advice. For example, quite a few authors analyze structures at the national or regional level and then recommend creating new structures using the Country Team structure as a model. Their rationale is that the country-level structure works well. However, the country-level component of this literature review, as well as work conducted by the Country-Level Issue Team of PNSR's Structure Working Group,¹⁴ suggests that the Country Team structure also encounters problems that may diminish its value as an appropriate model for other levels of engagement.

Organizational Theory - Structural Design

Organizational designers advise that an organization consider all of its parts, both formal and informal.¹⁵ The formal construction of the organization includes its structure, formal processes, rules, plans, and budgets. The earliest literature on industrial organizations, written by theorists such as Henri Fayol and Luther Gulick, concentrated on these formal elements. Organizational theorists also specialize in related subfields, such as planning and budgeting, which led to the emergence of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System ("PPBS") from systems analysis in the 1960s, and later on strategic planning emerged from macroeconomics.

Informal aspects of the organization include its culture, the skills and competence of its people, and the dispositions of its leadership. Organizational theorists recognized these elements as early as the 1930s, but industrial organizations largely ignored these discoveries until the after World War II. Early pre-war examples of literature on this "soft" method include the Hawthorne experiments, which demonstrated the need for workers to attach meaning to their duties, and Mary Parker Follet, who wrote on the workplace as a social setting. Peter Drucker examined the "General Motors culture" in his study of the company, which he believed gave it unity of effort in a decentralized organization. In the 60s and 70s, organizational development that dealt exclusively with culture, became a popular field for behavioral scientists. With the emergence of the internet, knowledge management has become an increasingly prominent element for organizational theorists to consider.

Structure, of course, is a formal part of organization, but organizational theorists warn against neglecting the influence of the informal aspects of organizations on structure.¹⁶ In fact, other than a few principles of structural design, the most important

¹⁴ See, for example, Ambassador Robert B. Oakley and Michael Casey, Jr., "The U.S. Country Team: Strengthening America's First Line of Engagement," *Strategic Forum*, No. 227 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2007). <insert URL>.

¹⁵ See, e.g., Bernard (1938), Daft (2004), Simon (1946) and Waldo (1955).

¹⁶ See, e.g., Daft (2004), Galbraith (1995), Hammer and Champy (1993) and Ostroff (1999).

considerations in building a structure are acknowledgements of an organization's informal elements.

Organizational theorists understand that getting a group of people to work towards a common objective requires division of labor, which is the purpose of structure.¹⁷ Contemporary structural designers identify the core tasks of an organization as the heart of the structure, and view technical and administrative support as attachments. The hierarchy of a structure will include in top level policymakers who set objectives, middle managers and implementation coordinators, and lower level reporters and workers. Systems analysts viewed organizations as open systems, in which structure plots the transformation of its inputs into outputs.¹⁸ The more output an organization provides for input, the more efficient it is. As an open system, an organization's structure would have to correspond to the organization's environment. Contemporary structural designers argue that an organization's structure must respond to its business environment.¹⁹ In the past three decades, customer preferences, innovation and speed have replaced low-cost mass production as the factors that offer competitiveness in the environment. Simple, stable environments value efficiency and centralized, hierarchical structures. Complex, uncertain environments value flexibility, and decentralized, more horizontal structures.

Early organizational designers such as Gulick formulated three main dimensions of organizational structure: unity of command; span of control; and specialization (in function, objective, area, or clientele; or departmentalization to contemporary organizational designers).²⁰ Unity of command refers to lines of authority, with each subordinate only having one superior, with the intention of having an organization that is well commanded and coordinated. Span of control refers to the amount subordinates under a superior. As one moves up the hierarchy of an organization, the common practice is to reduce span of control, as tracking and understanding of subordinate activities become harder. Specialization or departmentalization is the function, objective, area, or clientele in which a worker or a group of workers becomes expert. In the 1990s, with the emergence of total quality management and reengineering, structural designers began to examine process as a way to divide units.²¹ Some organizational designers now also consider the dimension of centralization, which refers to where decisions are made in an organization.

Contemporary organizational design recognizes five types of structures to use for organizations, ranging from highly mechanistic to organic.²² The earliest type, functional structure, divides an organization into functional groups, or stovepipes. The functional structure is efficient and centralized. However, it is not very flexible and can be bureaucratic, especially as it grows. In the post-war period, the organizations began to

¹⁷ See, e.g., Drucker (1946).

¹⁸ See, e.g., Katz and Kahn (1966).

¹⁹ See, e.g., Daft (2004) and Galbraith (1995).

²⁰ See, e.g., Gulick (1937).

²¹ See, e.g., Daft (2004), Hammer and Champy (1993) and Ostroff (1999).

²² See, e.g., Daft (2004).

change into divisional structure, which divides an organization into product groups, with their own administrative and technical staff. This organization is less centralized, and focuses on products. Coordination for this structure is hard, though strong leadership and cohesive culture can compensate as Drucker describes in his study of General Motors. The matrix structure became popular in the 1980s. It arranges the organization into functional groups that intersect to create cross-functional cooperation. This is more flexible than the former structure mentioned, but can lead to conflict between functional groups if authority is not balanced toward one group or another. In the 1990s, organizational designers found they could significantly increase the effectiveness of organizations through horizontal structures. A purely horizontal organization is very flexible and decentralized. It consists of cross-functional teams organized around core processes. Stovepipes are completely absent in this organization. The most flexible and decentralized of organizations is the modular organization, in which various organizations come together to pursue a common interests, with each organization taking part through its core competencies. The internet and globalization have allowed the organizations to proliferate. Outsourcing, just-in-time inventory and supply chain management are examples of how companies use modular structure. Modular organizations possess risk of incompatible standards with each other's products and lack of unity of command. Ultimately, most organizations are a combination of structures, which organizational designers call hybrids.

In the examination and redesign of the structure of the national security apparatus, the following insights from organizational theory and practice appear to be the most relevant:

Unity of Command, Span of Control, and Specialization conflict with each other and organizations must balance them.

Early organizational theorists developed these dimensions of structure as principles and argued that by adhering to these concepts, one could solve all structural problems.²³ However, later post-war theorists such as Herbert Simon showed that these principles conflicted with each other, and had to be implemented in balanced proportions.²⁴ Span of control, for instance, conflicts with specialization. Too much specialization leads to larger and more difficult span of control for superiors. Too little span of control degrades unity of command, as a larger and more inflexible hierarchy develops. Unity of command also is complicated when there is a need for departments in the same hierarchical level to make decisions together. As for specialization, the four types—function, objective, area, clientele—can overlap and become ambiguous. Choosing to organize around one type of specialization or another creates trade-offs. Organizational designers now consider the proportion of value they assign to each dimension of structure. Organizational designer Jay Galbraith suggests mirror-imaging, in which organizations structure their divided units in a similar manner in order to facilitate smoother horizontal collaboration.²⁵

²³ See, e.g., Gulick (1937).

²⁴ See, e.g., Simon (1946).

²⁵ See, e.g., Galbraith (1995).

Stovepipes can confuse responsibilities and can lead to “buck-passing”

Organizational theorists recognize that new tasks and challenges calling for adaptability or change fall across multiple jurisdictional areas. Officials, especially in stovepiped organizations, will not devote quality attention to the issues unless directed by the top leadership in the organization. Northcote Parkinson describes how officials tend to push work to others when responsibility for the work is ambiguous. Groups tend to concentrate on their own tasks and professional issues, while neglecting to cooperate in working towards a common objective. Research and development and strategic planning groups are exceptions. Much of the literature, especially on contemporary organizational design, recommends that organizations consider the problem of stovepipes in the development of structure, while recognizing that certain functions call for arrangements that are more traditional.

Government organizations are political and cooptative

Early scholars of public administration such as Max Weber and Woodrow Wilson envisioned that public administration would be neutral and free from politics. Post-war scholars of public administration argued that this was a myth.²⁶ With changes in presidential office every four years, with Congress, the press, and special interest groups, government must respond to a plurality of “customers” who want different things. Scholars found that this makes change in government difficult, and makes officials risk-averse. Scholars describe agencies and departments seeking alliances beyond government to promote their agendas, side-stepping their superiors, neglecting the organization’s overall objectives. Several government programs found it was possible to minimize criticism and outside disturbance by allowing nongovernmental groups to participate in decision-making, or by creating a method for their views to be promoted within government. Philip Selznick, a public administration scholar, characterized this mechanism as cooptation.²⁷

Organizations require negative feedback

Organizational designers find that as open systems, organizations must keep track of the external environment to fulfill objectives as effectively as possible.²⁸ This requires officials to receive extensive and good information about the external environment, which enhance the ability to adapt. Structure affects the flow of information in an organization. It determines the lines of communication and reporting channels. Organizational designers try to structure organizations to minimize distortions and omission of information, but also to make reporting integrate information concisely.

²⁶ See, e.g., Appleby (1945), Sayre (1958) and Waldo (1955).

²⁷ See, e.g., Selznick (1943).

²⁸ See, e.g., Katz and Kahn (1966).

Horizontal organization groups teams around processes

Horizontal organizations group teams around processes, usually explained as end-to-end procedures.²⁹ Many companies, for instance, cover the process of acquisition of parts from a supplier to distribution of a finished product to the consumer or markets. In a generic stovepiped organization, processes move slowly from pipe to pipe, in which information is distorted and lost, collaboration is minimal, and where the functional groups often lose sight of the organization's objectives or even being responsive to the customer. A horizontal organization puts a cross-functional team in charge of a process. These teams consist of up to 25 people, and are customized to fit the needs of the process. Sometimes the team members switch in and out in accordance with the team's needs, while a core group oversees the process from start to finish. Some processes that reiterate require multiple teams. Processes can also be identified within a stovepipe, where reform would take place within the agency or department. Cross-functional teams can even have a subordinate team controls a sub-process that serves core process teams. Designers of horizontal organizations prioritize core processes as the first and most important for organizations to make horizontal. Designers of horizontal organizations persistently identify a spirit of collaboration as the ultimate objective, and note that organizations moving toward horizontal structures should keenly avoid actions that threaten that spirit.³⁰

National Level Structural Problems

Overarching Observations

At the national level, some overarching observations are merited. First, structural problems can impact interagency performance across all functions. While coordination difficulties are often most apparent in the execution and implementation function, planning and oversight functions also are negatively affected by structure problems. Of course, some problems, such as the absence of sufficient authority among lead agencies, impact implementation quite directly. USAID officials, for example, cannot ensure that DoD or Department of Agriculture assets will be made available to help them complete an assigned task. However, this implementation problem cannot easily be separated from planning since planners need to take potential implementation barriers into account at the planning stage.

It is also necessary to consider what constitutes the national structure. A considerable amount of the literature recognizes the NSC and its committees as the central component of national structure. More recent sources may also add the HSC system. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that national structure encompasses much more than the NSC and HSC systems. Interagency processes sometimes occur directly between departments and agencies without much, if any, NSC or HSC involvement. In addition, *ad hoc* and more permanent coordinating organizations, such

²⁹ See, e.g., Daft (2004), Hammer and Champy (1993) and Ostroff (1999).

³⁰ See, e.g., Hammer and Champy (1993), Ostroff (1999) and Woolridge and Micklethwait (1996).

as the NCTC, are often created within the interagency system. Although the NSC and HSC generally exist at the center of many coordination efforts, other organizations and relationships at the national level must be considered.

A portion of the literature comments on structure as it relates to long-term, strategic planning across the interagency apparatus.³¹ Strategic planning requires a cooperative interagency approach in order to address diverse threats and opportunities while also orchestrating the tools of national power and, if necessary, developing additional tools. The literature generally suggests that such planning should occur within an organization that falls outside of any particular department or agency. The NSC is, for the most part, recognized as the natural forum due to the interagency composition of its staff and its location at the center of the Executive branch. However, two factors limit the NSC staff's ability to engage in long-term strategy. First, the staff's responsibilities often require it to focus on shorter-term planning, crises and implementation coordination and oversight. Second, the NSC and its staff are located within the Executive Office of the President, which usually means staff turnover can be relatively high, with changes occurring at least every four years. As a result of such turnover and structural changes, the NSC staff's role can change and institutional knowledge can be lost, thereby impeding long-term strategic planning, which requires some degree of consistency over time.

A final observation is that structures at the national level often reflect the current, or most recent, security environment. Organizations are created in response to perceived needs to address security threats and opportunities. These organizations may be permanent, semi-permanent or temporary. They also may exist within a single department or agency, or they may fall within the space between agencies or between agencies and the president. The literature notes that the flexibility of the system, which permits such creations, is important since the security environment can change at varying speeds.³² However, the new organizations must evolve along with the security environment to ensure their continued effectiveness. The PNSR Chronology of National Security Structures³³ demonstrates a number of organizational creations, many of which can be traced to specific changes in the security environment.

Problem Identification

The review of literature illuminated nine principal structural problems at the national level. The following table lists those problems and indicates how frequently they are discussed within the national-level annotated bibliography. It also lists some other problems suggested by the literature.

³¹ See, e.g., Zacor (2005).

³² See, e.g., Hart-Rudman Commission (2001).

³³ The PNSR Chronology of National Security Structures can be found at <http://www.pnsr.org/products/>. Please note that The PNSR Chronology of National Security Structures is periodically updated. Should you have any comments, suggestions, additions or deletions regarding the Chronology, please email them to ShabatM@ndu.edu.

Principal Structural Problems	Frequency
Unity of Command	
Insufficient Authorities	17
Unclear Lead Responsibilities	14
Use of <i>Ad Hoc</i> Structures	12
Horizontal Integration Difficulties	11
Vertical Integration Difficulties (Stovepiping)	6
Structural Bias Towards “Traditional” Matters	6
Rigid NSC/HSC Bifurcation	5
System does not Account for Informal Structures	5
NSC System Flexibility is a Blessing and a Curse	5
Other Structural Problems	
Structure not Conducive to Advocacy of Conflicting Ideas	
Structure can Lead to Watered-Down Policy	
Non-Structural Problems	
Knowledge Management needed for <i>Ad Hoc</i> Structures	
Need to Address Foreign-Domestic Security Divide	
Expansion of National Security Scope	
Matters of Culture	

Table F1. National Problems Identified in Literature Review

Insufficient Authorities

The literature identifies two general problems associated with insufficient authorities. Commentators note that only the president has the authority to require a department or agency to act.³⁴ As a practical matter, delegated presidential authority does not work. Any other interagency coordinator, whether it is a designated “lead agency,” a cabinet secretary or a member of the NSC staff, cannot manage and harmonize the necessary interagency participants in order to implement policy. Unity of command does not produce unity of effort. Other sources focus on legislation and other barriers that limit the authority of departments or agencies to shift funds between each other even when doing so is critical for success.³⁵

Unclear Lead Responsibilities

Confused leadership responsibilities—another unity of command issue that may result from a variety of factors—impedes interagency coordination.³⁶ Some commentators attribute leadership confusion to the existence of multiple agencies engaged in the same function. Others argue that it may result from the insertion of mission coordinators within the interagency process. Both the literature and studies of changes to national security structures, many of which are identified in The PNSR Chronology of National Security Structures, reflect the use of “lead agencies” in

³⁴ See, e.g., Arnas, Barry and Oakley (2005).

³⁵ See, e.g., Thannhauser (2007).

³⁶ See, e.g., Murdock et al. (2005).

interagency policy planning, implementation and oversight. However, the above-discussed insufficient authorities can undercut the ability of a “lead agency” to effectively lead interagency groups.

Use of Ad Hoc Structures

It is commonly acknowledged that interagency structure must be flexible enough to adapt to changing security environments and emergent threats. The creation of *ad hoc* organizations and structures provides such flexibility. However, some literature cautions against the use of *ad hoc* structures for two reasons.³⁷ First, the structures are temporary and their eventual dissolution often leads to a loss of institutional knowledge. An effective knowledge management system that could preserve such knowledge would mitigate this problem. Second, the literature suggests that *ad hoc* organizations are inefficient. They are often created as interagency vehicles to address crises and other challenges that fall outside the capacity of permanent structures. As a result, the organization and its members are forced to establish standard operating procedures, member relationships and planning mechanisms while simultaneously responding to an emergency which is less efficient.

Horizontal Integration Difficulties

Integration problems across stovepiped organizations are frequently cited in the literature,³⁸ where it is common to observe that classical 20th century hierarchical structures are not designed to counter the highly informal, networked structures employed by various adversaries. However, the idea that departments and agencies approach national security missions from their respective stovepipes is hardly a new concept. One motivation for the passage of the 1947 Act and its 1949 amendment³⁹ was to better integrate the vertical structures of the military services and those between the military and civilian organizations, especially the State Department. Despite the 1947 Act, subsequent legislation and the creation of interagency organizations, vertical integration remains problematic. Problems inherent in deep hierarchies include greater response times in changing environments, the predetermination of information acquisition and flows and the creation of organizational power centers, all of which are seen in the private sector to reduce the agility of an organization.⁴⁰ It is suggested that departmental policymakers favor stovepiped structures because they permit the agency or department to conduct planning and budgeting without input or interference from other agencies and departments. However, with respect to a complex national security matter requiring competencies from various organizations, stovepiped planning means that multiple,

³⁷ See, e.g., Murdock et al., (2005) and GAO, *U.S. Public Diplomacy* (2005).

³⁸ See, e.g., Bogdanos (2005).

³⁹ P.L. 216 (August 10, 1949).

⁴⁰ James G. Roche and George E. Pickett, Jr., “Organizing the Government to Provide the Tools for Intervention,” in Arnold Kantor and Linton F. Brooks, eds., *U.S. Intervention Policy for the Post-Cold War World: New Challenges and New Responses*. (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994).

independently created plans need to be integrated in order to address the national security matter. This requires time and effort, which leads to inefficiencies that might not otherwise occur if stovepipes were integrated at the planning stage.

The integration of interagency participants across horizontal lines can be difficult for other reasons, including the lack of counterparts.⁴¹ This is most noticeable at the regional level, where the relationship between regional Combatant Commanders and the various Ambassadors within their regions is usually cited. It is least noticeable at the tactical or local level, where Ambassadors often know the other agency representatives who are nominally subordinates and not counterparts. The absence of appropriate participants at the regional level hampers the processes around which true horizontal organizations are created, and the absence of counterparts on a country team tends to obscure interagency conflict and push it into informal venues. Some commentators, therefore, suggest that horizontal integration can only be accomplished at the national level where counterparts among undersecretaries and assistant secretaries tend to exist. However, others observe that such senior officials simply do not have the time to dedicate to integration and oversight functions, especially regarding the numerous activities at the regional and country levels of engagement. In the vocabulary of organizational theory, span of control is too large at this level to permit effective integration and oversight.

Vertical Integration Difficulties

Integration problems also occur within hierarchical organizations. Sometimes, an agency representative to an interagency group may misrepresent the parent agency's position on a matter due to poor intra-agency communications. Policy understanding at one level of the agency may not be in agreement with the understanding at other levels.

Structural Bias Towards "Traditional" Matters

The structure of the national security system is generally designed to address a particular security environment. Some commentators argue that there exists a bias within this structure towards "traditional" national security matters.⁴² The NSC statutory structure is most often cited as an example. Other than making the DNI (replacing the Director of Central Intelligence) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (replacing the JCS) statutory advisers to the NSC in 2004 and 1986, respectively, the statutory constitution of the NSC has not changed since 1958 when the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board's NSC membership transferred to the President. The flexibility of the 1947 Act provides the president with the discretion to add non-statutory members. Although recent presidents have taken full advantage of this flexibility, it is suggested that an expanded scope of national security threats requires the permanent

⁴¹ See, e.g., Joint Chiefs of Staff (2006).

⁴² See, e.g., Deutch, Kanter and Scowcroft, "Strengthening the National Security Interagency Process" (2005).

addition of officials from key departments and agencies that can be expected to frequently bring their core competencies to bear on national security matters. Although not covered by this review of national level problems, it may be that similar structural biases exist at the regional and country levels as well. In any event, the structural bias causes greater attention to be paid towards “traditional” security matters even though “nontraditional” matters may merit increased awareness.

Rigid NSC/HSC Bifurcation

A few authors note the current bifurcation of the NSC and the HSC, although they admit that certain members and staff personnel overlap between the two organizations. Nonetheless, it is suggested that any separation serves to prevent effective planning across the foreign-domestic boundary.⁴³ Other commentators point to this bifurcation as the symptom of a larger problem—the continued existence of a foreign-domestic boundary despite an increasing overlap between foreign and domestic national security threats and opportunities.

System does not Account for Informal Structures

Some of the literature argues that the national security system and its participants recognize the system’s formal structures while failing to account for and integrate the various informal structures that exist and their impact on policy.⁴⁴ As noted in the section on organizational theory, these informal aspects of an organization are important.⁴⁵ Some of these structures are temporary, while others are more permanent. Until the true nature of informal interactions is recognized, one commentator believes that successful reforms will be difficult to achieve. Others point out that during the planning phase for a particular mission, interagency decisionmakers may assume that plans will be implemented through the use of formal structures when, in fact, informal structures at the tactical level are in control. Finally, at least one author notes that formal and informal structures each have advantages and disadvantages, which might be resolved through a hybrid structure. However, he notes that recent studies have generally focused on creating either a new formal or informal structure.

NSC System Flexibility is a Blessing and a Curse

The flexibility of the NSC system appears to be both a blessing and a curse.⁴⁶ It is noted that the “NSC mechanism provides the flexibility...to capture and coordinate the talents” resident in various government organizations, while also remaining “fluid

⁴³ See, e.g., Foster (1994).

⁴⁴ See, e.g., Wittkopf, Kegley and Scott (2003).

⁴⁵ See, e.g., Hammer and Champy (1993), Ostroff (1999) and Woolridge and Micklethwait (1996).

⁴⁶ See, e.g., Donley, *Rethinking the Interagency System: Part Two* (2005).

enough to respond to the operating styles of individual presidents.”⁴⁷ Although such flexibility allows the president to add members to the NSC and to design the committees (i.e. the Principals Committee, the Deputies Committee, and Policy Coordination Committees/Interagency Working Groups) as they best fit his management style or a given crisis, a drawback is apparent. One of the NSC system’s roles is to act as a central coordinating mechanism. However, system flexibility leaves the mechanism subject to revision. As demonstrated by The PNSR Chronology of National Security Structures, numerous changes to interagency structure and process have been made over the course of history. This can create confusion in the departments and agencies, which expect coordination to occur pursuant to set operating procedures and through established structures.

Other Observations

In addition to the aforementioned structural impediments to an efficient, well-coordinated interagency process, commentators observe other ways structure contributes to problems at the national level. Some note the lack of a permanent, high-level organization with sufficient authority to provide interagency participants with guidance and coordination. Others suggest that the structure is not conducive to the advocacy of conflicting ideas, and that it instead creates a pressure to compromise with respect to policymaking and planning. This issue is partly a function of processes and incentives to present agreed policy proposals to senior leadership. However, stovepiping also contributes to this problem. Organizations conduct planning and related budgeting within their stovepipes. Following that process, interagency participants attempt to integrate their planning with each other. Since initial planning occurs without input from the other organizations, at least portions of the various plans end up being incompatible, which requires negotiation between the participants and compromises between their positions. This has the effect of creating watered-down policies and plans. Finally, at least one commentator notes that the various problems inherent in bureaucratic politics serve to impede the interagency system.

Non-Structural Problems

As indicated above, knowledge management is associated with structural problems since the preservation of institutional knowledge is particularly important when *ad hoc* structures are used. In addition, the issue of NSC/HSC bifurcation appears to underscore an overarching issue—whether and how foreign and domestic security should be segregated. Similarly, the reported bias towards “traditional” security matters indicates a need to assess whether the scope of national security should be broadened and, if so, which departments and agencies would be most directly impacted. Finally, formally rigid vertical national security organizations may contribute to the lack of a mission-oriented culture in interagency matters.

Sample of Solutions Recommended

⁴⁷ Roche and Pickett (1994) at p. 212.

In an attempt to address problems of authority and unity of effort, Stephen Cambone proposes the creation of a National Security Directorate (“NSD”), which would have the president as its director.⁴⁸ In addition, he proposes the dual-hatting of five cabinet secretaries who would remain in charge of their Executive branch departments while also serving as Principal Members of the NSD. The NSD would handle national security matters of a critical nature, while a cabinet secretariat would address more routine national security issues. Each of the dual-hatted would lead a mission-focused, interagency sub-directorate within the NSD. Personnel would be assigned to the sub-directorates from their home departments as necessary. In many ways, this structure resembles the relationship between the armed services and the combatant commands in DoD. Among the other features of this solution is the creation of an advisory council to the president, which would essentially replace the NSC, although much of the NSC’s role would already be subsumed by the NSD and cabinet secretariat. ADM (Ret) Paul D. Miller also advocates a structure akin to the militaries unified command structure.⁴⁹

Focusing on the need to maintain some degree of formal hierarchy while also reaping the benefits of a less formal structure of relationships, Craig Alia recommends a structure combining hierarchy and network-based function.⁵⁰ He suggests that mission-focused agencies could act as key hubs within the network. Such hubs could draw on expertise in government, academia and the private sector regarding the mission at hand while remaining subject to oversight by the Executive and Legislative branches. The use of a networking is designed to incorporate knowledge from scattered sources.

Regional Level Structural Problems

Overarching Observations

According to some authors, the new global security environment now consists of several security complexes, each with different structures and political concerns unique to its region. Developing security gaps are often at the regional level as the world has developed into pockets of unique relationships and conflicts.⁵¹ While authors debate the reasons requiring a formal interagency structure, all agree that better interagency collaboration is necessary because the military is incapable of accomplishing certain missions on its own, such as national assistance, peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, insurgency and disaster relief—all of which constitute an increasingly prominent facet of U.S. domestic and foreign security policy.

⁴⁸ Cambone (1998). But see Carnes Lord, “NSC Reform for the Post-Cold War Era,” in *Orbis*, Vol. 44, Issue 3 (Summer 2000), who offers a critical assessment of this solution.

⁴⁹ Miller (1993).

⁵⁰ Craig J. Alia, *Assessing Proposals for Interagency Reorganization*. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2006). Located at: <http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?p4013coll3,311> (accessed July 10, 2007).

⁵¹ Gardner, Jeffrey V. “Fight the ‘Away Game’ as a Team: Organizing for Regional Interagency Policy Implementation,” *American Intelligence Journal*, Autumn/Winter 2005, 51-60.

The main problem revealed at the regional level from studies of specific operations is the lack of adequate policy coordination between participating U.S. Government agencies, the U.S. military, the UN and nongovernmental organizations. It is crucial to link decisions and policies in Washington, DC to events in the field, but currently, a regional structure does not exist to facilitate planning, communication, and operational synergy among these various participants. Disjointed, or sometimes non-existent, interagency collaboration inevitably leads to performance shortfalls and sometimes failed interventions (Vietnam, Somalia, Iraq, and Haiti), vulnerabilities to attack (U.S.S. Cole, the World Trade Center) or a lack of crisis response preparation (Hurricane Katrina).

Problem Identification

Regarding matters at the regional level, the review of literature identified six main structural problems. The following table lists those problems and indicates the frequency of their discussion within the regional-level annotated bibliography.

Principal Structural Problems	Frequency (33)
Insufficient Authorities	17
Use of <i>Ad Hoc</i> Structures	15
Horizontal Integration Difficulties	19
Vertical Integration Difficulties (stovepiping)	15
U.S. Military overshadowing Diplomatic/Civilian Objectives	8
The Gap between Country-Level and Regional-Level Operations	5

Table F2. Regional Problems Identified in Literature Review

Insufficient Authorities

The literature identifies the two main problems regarding insufficient authorities at the regional level as the lack of:

- (1) authority to conduct joint civilian and military operations; and
- (2) inadequate civilian leadership to command operations at a regional level.

At the regional level the U.S. Government lacks an integrated civil-military chain of command. While the military has a set command structure to assign tasks at the regional level, civilian agencies lack sufficient authority and accountability to carry out their specific duties and responsibilities. For example, in September 1994, the U.S. military led a multinational and multi-agency force into Haiti under Operation Uphold Democracy. Even though the strategic planning through interagency coordination was deemed a great success, the unified plan quickly deteriorated during execution. Several civilian agencies chose to diverge from the original plan and to carry out their responsibilities through their own agency protocols. As a result, both combat and

humanitarian operations experienced delays which placed both military and civilian personnel in harm's way.⁵²

The second problem is how to integrate civil authority and the combatant commands—a central theme in the formation of the African Combatant Command (“AFRICOM”). The Department of Defense wants a strong civilian presence heavily involved in the operations of AFRICOM, but there is debate over whether that position (potentially a civilian deputy commander) should rotate between civilian agencies or be permanently held by State. Currently, most civilian agencies lack a counterpart to the combatant commander with the same authority to conduct their specific agency operations at a regional level. Even if such counterparts existed, there is no structure for bringing them together to integrate their activities.

Use of Ad hoc Groups

Forty-six percent of the literature reviewed identified *ad hoc* groups as major contributors to the structural problems regarding interagency coordination. They impede the U.S. Government's ability to learn from mistakes and improve performance when similar, future situations arise. The literature identifies specific issues at the regional level. First, there is no protocol available for how civilian agencies should interact with one another or with military services when engaged in a joint venture. Most, if not all, interagency collaboration occurs with the creation of informal *ad hoc* groups. These groups lack cannot demand commitment, as agencies always have the option of reducing or even withdrawing its effort at any time without any real consequence. In addition, *ad hoc* groups are often created informally where there is no designation of staff or funds to support these groups or their goals.⁵³ *Ad hoc* groups cause instability and confusion and can lead to slow execution. They also can confuse the issue of who is in charge.

The use of *ad hoc* groups also undermines the ability to develop long-term goals. Currently, the U.S. Government relies heavily on the combatant commands to orchestrate both combat and non-combat operations. Most initiatives are designed to address immediate crises without any long-term strategy. According to some, Congress exacerbated this problem by amending the National Security Act of 1947, requiring the President to submit a National Security Strategy along with each an annual budget request.⁵⁴ Instead of promoting a guide for national security policymaking and resource allocation, the amendment created a year-by-year snapshot of the state of security, forcing agencies to compete over yearly funding rather than formulating long-range strategies. Most of the literature states that new regional relationships are forming with significant regularity, each with unique multi-dimensional challenges that encompass various states, corporations and civil society actors covering a number of issues including economy, culture, politics, security, religion and the environment. Nearly all of the

⁵² Gibbings, et al. (1998).

⁵³ Murdock et al. (2005).

⁵⁴ Murdock, et al. (2005).

literature agrees that the current interagency structure of the U.S. Government is not properly prepared for the regional challenges that lay ahead.

Horizontal Integration Difficulties

Forty-six percent of the literature identifies redundancy and competition as a major problem. The cabinet agencies are identified as the chief organizing elements of national security policy, but each one continues to develop its own strategies, budgets, solutions and institutional prerogatives to advance national policies. This independence creates redundancy in assignments and objectives. It also stimulates competition for funding and recognition, creating fragmentation among the agencies with regards to research, analysis, policy formulation and execution. As agencies conduct their business independently of one another, the larger, more powerful and/or heavily funded agencies often dominate policy formulation and implementation. There is a tendency for DoD or State to take charge of crises or conflicts without involving, let alone consulting, smaller agencies and NGOs.⁵⁵ This can lead to redundant efforts that complicate authority issues or counterproductive efforts as one agency engages in activities that another agency was explicitly designed to accomplish.

Further complicating interagency cooperation, is the fact that many of the departments, agencies and bureaus that contribute to U.S. national security divide the globe into regions differently. State recognizes six regions, each assigned to an Assistant Secretary of State, while DoD organizes around five regions (the addition of AFRICOM will make it six), each under the responsibility of a regional Combatant Commander. Meanwhile, the Office of the Secretary of Defense organizes the world into five regions that vary considerably from the combatant command structure. The way each department or agency organizes its global affairs not only impacts how it sees the world and applies programs and policies thereto, but also affects the manner in which agencies interact with one another. Every agency has its own language, protocol and operational standards that are often different from those of other agencies, making them structurally incompatible. The Department of Defense has combatant commanders in place to orchestrate military movement and operations from a regional framework. State also has regional coordinators, the assistant secretaries, but these individuals are not field operatives. Instead, they coordinate from Washington, DC with Ambassadors at the country level. State emphasizes the Country Team structure, choosing to maintain U.S. interests at the country level.

A majority of sources (57 percent) indicate that structural differences in agency operations create confusion between civilian and military agencies, which leads to frustration and issue avoidance. Authors who identify this lack of communication as a principal problem for interagency collaboration argue that this conflict-avoidance behavior precludes access to important civilian expertise within the U.S. Government—within DoD specifically—creating a military dominance. The success of Combatant Commanders in regional security policy reiterates the weakness of their civilian

⁵⁵ Taw (1997).

counterparts, particularly with regards to use of resources.⁵⁶ The U.S. Government currently lacks a structural entity to coordinate efforts between military and civilian agencies at the regional level to best maximize results.

U.S. Military Overshadowing Diplomatic/Civilian Objectives

As DoD continues to prepare for the October activation of AFRICOM, several concerns about its specific implementation echo general concerns about how the United States will conduct operations at the regional level. A quarter of the literature questions how the U.S. Government will promote American interests at the regional level without relying heavily on the military. Half of those authors specifically address how a formal, centralized combatant command in Africa may define, without sufficient interagency collaboration, the overall U.S. Government strategy and objectives for the continent.⁵⁷ In order for the United States to have any success at meeting its security, economic, humanitarian and political goals in Africa the U.S. Government may need to consider a large military presence initially to bring security and stability to regions of interest before any civilian personnel can begin their humanitarian operations.⁵⁸ However, the authors who address this concern unanimously agree that a large, formal U.S. military presence will only escalate overall violence within the region and may alienate the United States from host countries in Africa and outside state actors with African interests.

The Gap Between Country-Level and Regional-Level Operations

The civilian agencies do not have counterparts to the upper leadership that exists in the combatant commands and therefore find it difficult to coordinate between civil and military agencies at the regional level. It is crucial to link decisions and policies in Washington, DC to events happening in the field. For example, State has regional assistant secretaries in place whose responsibility it is to facilitate communication between embassies within specific regions. These individuals are meant to coordinate activities and share information horizontally between Country Teams as well as funnel information and assignments vertically through State's chain of authority. However, as already mentioned, these regional assistant secretaries are located in Washington, DC and do not have a field presence in the regions they represent. The Department of Defense, through the combatant commands, dominates activity at the regional level while State, through the ambassadors, dominates country-level management. As a result, there is a disconnect between military and civilian operations.

⁵⁶ Murdock et al. (2004).

⁵⁷ Feingold, Russell, "Creation of a U.S. Africa Command," *Memorandum from Senator's Office of the U.S. Senate*, Section 19, January 10, 2007.

⁵⁸ Carafano, James Jay and Nile Gardiner, "U.S. Military Assistance for Africa: A Better Solution." *Backgrounder*, no. 1697 (The Heritage Foundation, 2003).

Sample of Solutions Recommended

Authors provide various solutions to resolve the challenges facing the U.S. Government regarding the implementation of interagency collaboration at the regional level. Some of these solutions include increasing the Combatant Commander's authority, creating regional security councils or creating regional czars.

Twenty-five percent of the authors agree that regional interagency collaboration should be conducted through the combatant commands. There is historic proof that these commands have had success with operations at the regional level. Two authors agree that DoD serves as an ideal starting point for the integration of various agencies to create more synchronization over the issue of national security. They argue that the U.S. Government must look beyond interagency collaboration and consider the formulation of a strong, supra-departmental control of the interagency process at the operational level.⁵⁹ Such control will enable effective oversight of interagency planning, reduce departmental friction and provide the president with an integrated approach to problem solving in the post-Cold War environment. The U.S. Government has already begun the construction of supra-agencies through the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. The question remains on how to successfully develop a supra-agency directed toward U.S. foreign and defense policy. Twenty-five percent of the literature shows concern for funneling civilian missions through the Combatant Commanders. Military activity would overshadow civilian operations even more, exacerbating the conflict between military and civilian agencies over mission execution.

A substantial percentage of the literature (65%) suggests expanding the responsibilities of the regional assistant secretaries in State to create a permanent deputy position within the combatant commands so that State and DoD operations at the regional level are integrated. This is one of the solutions being considered for implementation at AFRICOM. However, this option fails to address how other civilian agencies will be included in a regional structural entity.

A quarter of the literature states that the U.S. military should function in a more assistive and protective role to the civilian agencies that are dispatched to complete operations dedicated to humanitarian aide, economic growth and the development of new democracies. In this capacity, the military would preserve its traditional combatant responsibilities. Authors who focus on the existence of a structural problem within State at the regional level suggest that State should either reassign the regional assistant secretaries to offices in the field or create a mirror counterpart of the Washington, DC position in the field.

Country Level Structural Problems

The relevant literature reveals numerous problems that impede the Country Team's ability to function in a unified manner. The sources reviewed not only discuss

⁵⁹ Lafleur (2005); Gardner (2005).

structural issues impeding unity of effort, but also other issues for the Country Team. Although there are not many works dedicated to analyzing country team level structural problems, several main issues are covered by the literature. Problem areas include coordination of increased numbers of agencies operating out of Embassies; issues involving Ambassadorial authority, which is mentioned in several sources as a major issue inhibiting unity of effort; and the disparity in resources that State possesses compared to other agencies and DoD.

Span of Control

- First, an increased number of agencies at embassies has led to enhanced difficulty in unifying United States Government activities. Specifically, the literature notes the increasing amount of non-State personnel at embassies as a problem. In addition, one piece noted that State does not have a Chief Operating Officer, which it considered a major problem. Although presented as a problem, the actual problem was poor management, which the author thought a Chief Operating Officer would resolve.

Insufficient Authorities

- Second, the erosion of the Ambassador's authority inhibits country team performance. For example the literature discusses Ambassadors lacking authority to coordinate personnel and resources. Structural impediments leading to a lack of unity of effort hamper interagency action at the operational level because nobody is in overall charge, which is the fundamental post-conflict operations issue. Furthermore, authors highlight the blurred lines of authority between State and DoD. These blurred lines of authority contribute to areas of tension between the Ambassador and Regional Commanders in such situations as whether the Security Assistance Officer works for the Ambassador, the Regional Commander, or both. Another piece discusses this same issue in the framework of the difficulty determining when the Ambassador or the Regional Commander should assume primary authority or whether the two should share power in various situations. The literature notes that Ambassadors have overall responsibility, but not authority over all mission activities. This issue is highlighted by the Ambassador lacking control over resources and personnel. Finally, the literature points out the problem that the Ambassador is most often seen as the representative of the State Department, not the President's representative.

Resource-oriented Issues

- Third, the literature discusses the lack of resources that State has at its disposal as compared to other agencies. The issue of organization and resource allocation not reflecting policy is related to this overarching problem. At the country level, the low levels of civilian agency funding lead to transferring of responsibilities to

military agencies. Finally, the literature discusses the lack of a developed resource-sharing mechanism at the country level.

Principal Structural Problems	Frequency
Unity of Command	
Insufficient Authorities	9
Other Problems	
Resource-oriented Problems	4
Span of Control	3

Table F3. Country-Team Problems Identified in Literature Review

In addition, the Country Team literature illustrates other issues besides the three main problem areas. These additional structural problems such as the following:

- Separating civilian affairs from military ones (Vertical);
- Fragmentation of policymaking and diplomacy due to Washington-based policy formulation (Vertical); and
- Centralized Washington-based decision-making authority with the Country Team looking for guidance (Vertical).

The other non-structure topics identified in the Country Team literature include training issues, morale, the decision-making process and others including the following:

- Dysfunctional human resources and administrative policies (Non-Structure-Human Resources/Process);
- Outdated communications and information management infrastructure (Non-Structure-Knowledge Management);
- Unsecured and declining physical infrastructure (Non-Structure-Resources);
- The focus of State's diplomacy on information protection instead of providing information (Non-Structure-Strategy);
- Serious decline in State Department morale (Non-Structure-Culture);
- Difficulty in balancing two-career families with the needs of the Foreign Service (Non-Structure-People);
- Selection process for Ambassadors (Non-Structure-Process); and
- Inadequate training for Country Team personnel (Non-Structure- Human Resources).

The literature featured several solutions for handling structural problems at the country level. The most prominent solution recommended was reinforcing the ambassador's authority. Increasing resources for country teams, and allowing ambassadors the flexibility to move resources between accounts is also a popular recommendation. Finally, other solutions from the literature include improving the training for Ambassadors and other Embassy personnel.

Multilateral Level Structural Problems

Overarching Observations

In summarizing the literature in terms of problems related to structure that impact multilateral relations, either favorably or adversely, one is tempted to conclude that structure is not considered a major factor. Instead, it is process and strategy that are the key contributors to ensuring strong, effective, multilateral engagements. This conclusion likely stems from the fact that the literature dwells on problems identified through case studies, such as the U.S. interventions in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. Historically, in these cases *ad hoc* collations came together in the short term to handle a crisis situation. The center of focus in these cases is the “endgame” event, where the U.S. has already made the decision to collaborate and the case concerns the details of the mission and how it is carried out. When the cases are looked at through such lenses, it is natural to focus on the military, humanitarian, and peacekeeping units that collaborate to carry out the respective missions and the level of success with which they integrate into the overall mission picture. Naturally problems such as unclear chain of command or authority, difficulties in sharing information, communication and cultural misunderstandings, lack of trust among collaborating members, etc. loom large.

Even when the problem involves chain of command and authority that clearly pertain to structure, a structural solution is not likely since the disparate parties frequently are not responsible to a common authority. Because the structural breakdown occurs in the integrated product, a product for which no one country claims full ownership, it is not feasible to address those problems with structural fixes within the U.S. components. Instead, process and strategy must be worked so that when the teams integrate, the inconsistencies in their internal structures are minimized. For example, when U.S. military forces were embedded in NATO KFOR units in Bosnia, neither NATO nor the U.S. army would have noted an internal structural problem related to chain of command, however with the two entities cooperating, their dual structures interfered with one another and lead to confusion. This is more a problem of process than structure; the process of integration of two command units was not clearly elucidated and followed.

However, if one considers the U.S. multilateral relations that precede the decisions to deploy troops and humanitarian aid, one would look at diplomatic engagements, multilateral talks, negotiations, strategizing and bargaining. These precursor multilateral engagements are routine, they are typically done within the context of formal IOs, such as the UN, and they are carried out by U.S. Department of State officials representing the U.S. Government’s foreign policy agenda. It is here at this level of multilateral engagements that one would expect structure within the U.S. interagency to play a greater role. Future literature updates will examine this area more closely.

Summary of Problems

The following list itemizes the problem areas discussed in the literature review herein and is organized in order of greatest to least frequently referenced. The problems are also tabulated in Table F4. As will be noted, many of the problems do not deal specifically with structure, and those that clearly relate to other PNSR working group domains are so indicated. Problems that are less frequently noted are not necessarily less important.

The following problems were most frequently mentioned (three or more sources):

- Lack of funding and resources. There exists a large Defense/Diplomacy funding imbalance. Defense dollars have gone up, diplomacy dollars have not. (Not a structural problem per se, but it limits the structure that can be put into place.)
 - Lack of direct control over funding and resources. Those handling the purse strings aren't always those planning and allocating funds for the mission.
- Failure to engage multilateral support early enough, waiting instead for crisis-level situation to develop. (Problem in strategy and process, but often leads to bad structures put in place *ad hoc*)
- Lack of information sharing. Causes stem from lack of will to share, often resulting from lack of trust, and lack of means to share, such as common database, etc. (Strategy and Process)
- Lack of common goals, or lack of understanding between members. (Process – communication/education problem)
- Lack of leadership (Personnel)

The following problems were mentioned by at least two sources:

- Lack of trust between coalition or otherwise collaborating members.
- Lack of training with regard to cultures, protocols, and authority or chain of command structure of other members' systems. For example, NGOs often not knowledgeable about military chain of command structures and vice-versa.
- Too much reliance on *ad hoc* formation of coalitions and/or other multilateral arrangements.

The following problems were only mentioned by a single source, but are deemed significant:

- The United States (and more broadly the world) should embrace and make greater use of “government networks” to conduct global governance. A government network is composed of government employees from multiple countries. (Structure)
- The United States does not currently *depend* on coalition and/or multilateral members for its mission. Instead it assumes that contributions will be in addition to its own contributions, which are greater than need be as a result. (Strategy)
- In operations other than traditional war, such as peacekeeping, when dealing with inter-organizational relations, perception is often as important, if not more important, than reality. Thus U.S. national security system participants must understand the importance of, and plan for, adequately getting U.S. message out to sources of the media. (Strategy and Process)
- There is a need for assessment of military threats and achieving a common operational picture vis-à-vis the development of standard procedures for the sharing and release of intelligence information during peacetime between U.S. allies and would make for a quicker, more unified response during times of crises. (Process)

Principal Structural Problems	Frequency
Unity of Command	
Insufficient Authorities	1
Unclear Lead Responsibilities	4
Use of <i>Ad Hoc</i> Structures	4
Structural Bias Towards “Traditional” Matters	2
Non-structural Problems (Most are Process and Strategy related)	
Resource-oriented Problems	
Insufficient funds for State	4
Lack of control over funds	1
Failure to engage in multilateral support early enough, wait till crisis (strategy)	2
Lack of information sharing (Process, strategy, culture)	4
Lack of trust among multilateral members (culture, strategy)	3
Lack of leadership (personnel)	4
Lack of communication/ links with civil/military elements	3
Lack of means for common assessment of threat and implementation	2
Lack of sufficient planning (strategy)	3
Lack of training and education among members (culture, process)	3
Lack of common goals among multilateral members	3

Table F4. Multilateral Problems Identified in Literature Review

Legal Impediments

As noted, the literature identifies legal barriers preventing agencies from allocating funds between each other based on the requirements of a given task or mission. Other than this, no specific legal impediments to interagency coordination were identified at the national, regional or multilateral levels. At least one source, however, did raise the question of Congress’ power to create interagency coordinating mechanisms, such as the NSC. Similar concerns were raised during the time leading up to passage of the 1947

Act. However, the Constitutional question was averted since President Truman treated the NSC as an optional advisory source.

The review of country-level literature reveals a few potential legal impediments. Although the statutory authority of the Ambassador already exists, other legal issues remain. For example, since country team lines of command are not codified, the responsibility for functional roles as well as overall country team leadership authority lacks a clear foundation in law. In addition, funding problems exist, such as restrictions on interagency resource shifting, whose remedy requires a legal solution.

Although not an impediment, a review of the 1947 Act noted that Section 402(a) continues to list two statutory members whose positions no longer exist—the Director for Mutual Security and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. These positions transferred over the course of a few reorganization plans ending in 1958.

We expect to identify additional legal impediments during the course of the Project on National Security Reform. For a more detailed discussion, see the work product produced by the Legal Working Group.