Literature Review Summary

Hudson Institute

Although the attacks of September 11, 2001 catapulted the issue of U.S. interagency performance in foreign policy to new prominence, scholars, policymakers, and others have long debated the optimal U.S. national security establishment. After the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, early literature centered on the National Security Council. In the decades after the Vietnam War, this literature became increasingly critical as commentators reacted to foreign policy setbacks and new challenges to the national security system. From the 1980s on, intelligence issues, the threat of terrorism, and the challenges of interagency emergency response became common topics for commentary. The September 2001 terrorist attacks intensified these concerns and resulted in a major overhaul in how the United States manages homeland security threats.

In identifying flaws in interagency performance in foreign policy, policymakers and pundits alike continually cite failings in interagency coordination as a particularly critical problem. There is a diverse body of literature that attempts to illuminate the reasons behind these problems while recommending specific solutions—as well as more general advice—for strengthening interagency performance in support of foreign policy.

I) The Cold War Period

The U.S. National Security Structure

Within the executive branch, the National Security Council (NSC) is responsible for advising the president with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies related to national security. Yet, analysts believe that the NSC lacks sufficient authority to successfully mandate interdepartmental coordination.[1]

Created by the National Security Act of 1947, the NSC was intended to bring the various department heads responsible for national security together to make recommendations to the president. Although the NSC does not have any actual authority to make policy, it is regarded as a cabinet-level group that can carry significant influence within the executive branch. After the National Security Act laid the foundations for the current national security system, analysts of the U.S. security apparatus focused special attention on the National Security Council structure. Much of the early literature on the NSC concentrated on discerning the Council's proper structure, role, and authority in government.

Different presidents have organized and used the NSC in different ways, thereby underscoring the malleable nature of the institution. I. M. Destler's article "National Security Advice to U.S. Presidents: Some Lessons from Thirty Years," observes that presidents tend to design their NSC to coordinate foreign policy on the basis of their personal objectives rather than to provide objective analysis of the national security situation. Destler also charts the evolution of the NSC from a transparent interdepartmental advisory group to an established, formal national security structure. Foreshadowing future analysts' recommendations addressing overall homeland security, this article stresses the need to combine domestic and foreign policy perspectives in order to create a complete national security posture.[2]

Alfred Sander notes that President Truman emphasized the advisory nature of the council and only began to make a significant use of the body after the start of the Korean War.[3] Paul Hammond remarks that under the Eisenhower administration, the NSC was viewed as a talking group where top officials could discuss national security matters

[1] Bert B. Tussing, and Kent H. Butts, "Annual Collins Center Senior Symposium: Aligning the Interagency Process for the War on Terrorism," *Center for Strategic Leadership Issue Paper*, Vol. 11-05 (June 2005).
[2] I. M. Destler, "National Security Advice to U.S. Presidents: Some Lessons from Thirty Years," *World Politics* 29:2 (January 1977), pp. 143-176.
[3] Alfred D. Sander, "Truman and the National Security Council, 1945-1947," *Journal of American History* (1972) September: 369-388.

and make recommendations for the government as a whole, not just with regard to their particular department or agency.[4]

According to Edward Kolodziej, I.M. Destler, and other commentators, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations adopted an *ad hoc* approach towards the NSC that resulted in much more informal membership and procedures for the Council.[5] During a 1970 congressional subcommittee hearing on national security and international operations, Henry Kissinger said the approach "of the 1960s often ran the risk that relevant points of view were not heard, that systematic treatment of issues did not take place at the highest level, or that the bureaucracies were not fully informed as to what had been decided or why."[6]

Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski writes that the Eisenhower administration also tried to institutionalize, through procedures and secondary bodies, the council's role as a decision making and policymaking body. More generally, Brzezinski delineates two systems of foreign policy: the Presidential system, where the president is intimately involved in the prosecution of foreign affairs, and the Secretarial system, where the president allows an authoritative cabinet secretary to steer foreign policy. Brzezinski discusses the problems of "over-personalization" that he believes diminished NSC strategic coherence during the Johnson and Kennedy administrations but also details the pitfalls of "over-institutionalization" that undermined NSC innovation during the Eisenhower administration. Ultimately, Brzezinski favors a Presidential system of foreign policy characterized by orderly procedures as well as a clearly defined relationship with the president. Brzezinski also concludes that the NSC should be engaged in policy planning, coordination, and implementation, even advocating the establishment of new NSC machinery to monitor implementation activity.[7] When serving as the National Security Advisor under President Jimmy Carter, Brzezinski accordingly established a smaller NSC that emphasized effective policy oversight.[8]

Arthur Schlesinger, however, criticizes the traditional, vertical, top-down administrative structures of the Eisenhower presidency and endorses the "increasingly horizontal arrangements" that reflect "the way that presidents like FDR and JFK operated instinctively," since these structures better correspond to the present threat environment.[9]

In the 1970s, the Nixon administration established a particularly strong NSC led by an authoritative National Security Advisor. The administration believed that a council establishment responsible for policy making and implementation for all major issues within clearly defined NSC structures and procedures would most effectively promote creative, systematic, and effective policy.[10]

Charles Yost criticizes the expansion of NSC authority that occurred under the Nixon-Kissinger period. He maintains that the council had detrimentally usurped the traditional role of the State Department. While finding fault with the over-politicization of both the State Department and the NSC, Yost recommends that the State Department should have sole responsibility for foreign policy decision-making, with the NSC confined to the role of a small deliberative body for major strategic issues involving both military and foreign affairs.[11] In contrast, in his 1972 monograph, *Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organization*, Destler argues that both the Kennedy and Nixon systems of foreign policy possessed strengths and weaknesses. In general, Destler

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[4] Paul Y. Hammond, "The National Security Council as a Device for Interdepartmental Coordination: An Interpretation and Appraisal," *American Political Science Review* (December 1960).
[5] Edward A. Kolodziej, "The National Security Council Innovations and Implications," *Public Administration Review* (November/December 1969), pp. 573-585.
[6] U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations. "The National Security Council: Comment by Henry Kissinger" March 3, 1970. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970).
[7] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The NSC's Midlife Crisis," *Foreign Policy*, No. 69 (Winter, 1987-1988), pp. 80-89.
[8] Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983).
[9] Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "Effective National Security Advising: A Most Dubious Precedent," *Political Science Quarterly* (Fall, 2000), pp. 347-351.
[10] U.S. Congress, "Comment by Henry Kissinger."
[11] Charles W. Yost, 1971, "The Instruments of American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* (October 1971), pp. 59-68.

concludes that an ideal NSC structure entails a high degree of presidential involvement combined with an effective system of delegation.[12]

In the 1970s and 1980s the national security system faced heightened challenges and suffered numerous setbacks. Unsurprisingly, commentary on the NSC in the 1980s and 1990s became increasingly critical. In his memoirs, Brzezinski labels the first six years of the Reagan administration as a period of NSC "degradation" characterized by malfeasance in Iran-Contra, a ballooning bureaucracy, and a loss of purpose. In writing about his own tenure as National Security Advisor, Brzezinski also describes the problem of interagency rivalry at the NSC, illustrating how the State and Defense Departments impeded interagency harmonization by continually resisting NSC coordination.[13] Flora Lewis' 1981 article for *The New York Times* critiques the NSC's effectiveness under President Reagan. She points to persistent and increasingly harsh turf battles as well as a lack of coordination and proper policy consideration.[14]

When discussing the interagency coordination role of the NSC, many authors over the past half-century are quick to point out its position as a Presidential tool with no independent authority of its own. Brzezinski remarks that the NSC can be very influential, but only when the president decides to take the lead in foreign affairs. The influence of the body wanes if a department secretary is given the primary authority to handle international issues.[15]

The position of National Security Adviser (NSA) is similarly malleable according to the person filling the position and the attitude of the president. According to David Hoffman, President George H.W. Bush wanted his NSA to follow an "honest-broker" model by generally adopting a low public profile and being able to provide comprehensive advice when called upon.[16] Brzezinski describes the more active role that he adopted as President Carter's NSA, which included taking on some oversight responsibilities such as clearing State Department cables.[17] John Burke, writing in *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, argues that since 9/11, Condoleeza Rice's role as an honest broker has declined, partially because of changing expectations on the part of the President about the role of the NSA.[18] Thus, under the current government organization, the functions of both the NSA and the NSC itself can change according to very different interpretations of their roles by top policymakers.

Pre- and post-9/11 recommendations on improving the NSC's ability to coordinate the interagency process have focused on expanding its authority or scope in some way. In *Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future*, John Deutch, Arnold Kanter, and Brent Scowcroft recommend increasing the planning and coordination authority of the NSC while limiting its power to implement interagency operations.[19] They also advocate integrating domestic agencies into the NSC and establishing a much closer relationship between the NSC and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in order to guarantee the feasibility of interagency operations. Gregory Martin, writing for the Army War College after 9/11, recommends the creation of a Director of National Security Operations within the NSC, who would be responsible for monitoring the implementation of national security strategy.[20]

Successive commentators describe the problem of integrating the NSC processes with the departmental structure of the U.S. cabinet. As early as 1949, Sidney W. Souers' examination of the first two years of the NSC concluded that interdepartmental unity of purpose was critical for an effective national security structure.[21] In his 1960 analysis for

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[12] I. M. Destler, *Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organization* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972).
[13] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*.
[14] Flora Lewis, "Foreign Affairs: The Policy Blind," *New York Times*, September 18, 1981, p. A35.
[15] Brzezinski, "The NSC's Midlife Crisis."
[16] David Hoffman, "President Scales Back National Security Council." *Washington Post*, February 3, 1989, p. A08.
[17] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*.
[18] John P. Burke "The Contemporary Presidency: Condoleezza Rice as NSC Advisor: A Case Study of the Honest Broker Role," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, vol. 35, no. 3 (2005), pp. 554-575.
[19] John Deutch, Arnold Kanter, and Brent Scowcroft, B., "Strengthening the National Security Interagency Process," in Ashton B. Carter and John P. White, J. P., eds., Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), pp. 265-283, http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/KTE_ch10.pdf.
[20] Gregory M. Martin, *Enhancing American Interagency Integration for the Global War on Terrorism* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006), http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA449233.
[21] Sidney W. Souers, "Policy Formulation for National Security," *American Political Science Review* (June 1949), pp. 534-543.

the *American Political Science Review*, Paul Hammond argues that NSC policymaking is impeded by the "cabinet level problem" where departmental self-interest leads cabinet members to issue overly vague policy recommendations.[22]

Non-NSC Concerns

In assessing the national security structure of the United States, scholars have also offered critiques of the other major institutions, besides the National Security Council, that help determine American foreign policy. Reflecting a broader trend toward disillusionment with the U.S. national security system and American foreign policy, in 1985, I. M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb, and Anthony Lake offered a sweeping critique of U.S. foreign-policy making. In their article, "Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy," they identify organizational disarray, a widening disconnect between the president and the bureaucracy, a credibility gap, over-politicization, and other perennial problems.[23] Similarly, James Kitfield's 1995 book *Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War*, discusses micromanagement, demoralizing doctrine and policy conflicts, and a failure of leadership as critical national security flaws from the era of the Vietnam War.[24]

The failures attributed to U.S. policy formation and execution during the Vietnam War, along with other perceived military problems, led to a major effort during the 1980s and 1990s to reform the U.S. Department of Defense, which aimed, among other goals, to improve its ability to cooperate with non-DOD agencies. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions, the National Defense Panel of 1997, the Hart-Rudman Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security, and the final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) each represent an important effort to redesign government capacities to deal with new security challenges.

An initial focus was improving the manner in which the individual military services operated together. A pioneering 1985 Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services criticized the organization, decision-making procedures, and interagency performance of the Department of Defense. The authors faulted the DOD for failures including limited mission integration at the policy-making level, an imbalance between service and joint interests, redundancy, inadequate joint advice, and a lack of clarity regarding strategic goals.[25] The critique helped provide the basis for the major reforms the DOD adopted after the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. The perceived success of these reforms in turn drove subsequent momentum to improve U.S. interagency coordination across the U.S. national security establishment.

II) The Transition Decade

A decade later, the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces proposed post-Goldwater-Nichols reforms to address the DOD's "unclear future" in the face of rapid change and evolving national security policies. The Commission urged improved efficiency, responsiveness, management, and jointness at the Defense Department.[26] Writing for *Parameters*, John E. Lange focused on the need for the government and, more specifically, the Defense Department, to address interagency challenges like those posed by the Rwanda refugee humanitarian relief crisis in 1994. Though skeptical about his recommendation's chances for success, Lange hoped the military would become more open to executing missions other than warfighting.[27]

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[22] Paul Y. Hammond, "The National Security Council as a Device for Interdepartmental Coordination: An Interpretation and Appraisal," *American Political Science Review* (December 1960), pp. 899-910.
[23] I. M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb, and Anthony Lake, "Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy," *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 79, no. 2 (June 1985), p. 576.
[24] James Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War (Washington and London: Brassey's, 1995).
[25] Committee on Armed Services (Staff), "Defense Organization: The Need for Change, Staff" Report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985).
[26] Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) of the Armed Forces report to Congress, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Directions for Defense*.(May 24, 1995), http://www.fas.org/man/docs/corm95/corm_pr.htm.
[27] John E. Lange, "Civilian-Military Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance: Lessons from Rwanda", *Parameters* (Summer, 1998), pp. 106-122.

In his 1998 monograph, *Getting Agencies to Work Together*, Eugene Bardach concludes that bureaucratic cultures often deter collaborative activities.[28] In 2000, the GAO illustrated the existence of substantial mission fragmentation and overlap as a result of poor interagency coordination.[29] In 2001, Richard Best highlighted coordination problems between intelligence and law enforcement agencies in spite of NSC oversight coordinative mechanisms.[30]

In calling for government reform to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War world, a number of analysts and policymakers focused on U.S. deficiencies in combating the terrorist threat even before the events of 9/11. As far back as the early 1980s, Robert Taylor recommended that the U.S. national security structure reorient itself to combat terrorism more effectively. In particular, Taylor urged the government to address such shortcomings as inconsistent policymaking, ineffective organizational coordination and communication, and a lack of a strategic force capable of dealing with terrorist events.[31]

The fact that Dan Carney and Chuck McCutcheon identified similar problems in interagency coordination in U.S. counter-terrorism efforts in a 1998 piece in *CQ Weekly* suggests that many of these issues were not effectively addressed in the interim.[32] In 2000, the GAO criticized the synchronization of U.S. government efforts against terrorism. The GAO report also faulted the government for failing to establish a national terrorist response strategy with clearly defined outcomes.[33] In 2001 Kevin C. Coyler characterized U.S. efforts to prepare against terrorism as disjointed and inefficient. He urged the government to adopt an improved organizational structure.[34]

Complex Contingency Operations

The issue of how the United States could best respond to the series of international conflicts that arose after the end of the Cold War became an object of great attention in the national security literature in the 1990s. These "complex contingency operations" saw major U.S. military interventions in Haiti, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia. The Bosnia and Kosovo operations, as well the intervention in East Timor, also raised complex issues related to coalition politics.

Complex contingency operations are uniquely taxing on the American security architecture because they typically demand a much greater degree of interagency cooperation and coordination than standard military operations. They regularly require the active participation of multiple branches of the U.S. armed services, many civilian U.S. agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and non-governmental organizations like the World Bank Group (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Health Organization (WHO) —as well as supranational bodies (e.g., the United Nations, the European Union) and other sovereign nations. Neyla Arnas, Charles Barry, and Robert Oakley postulate that the *ad hoc* nature of these operations has contributed to the difficulty the interagency process has encountered in responding to them.[35]

Students of these interventions see unhelpful policy discontinuities, especially between presidential administrations, in how the U.S. government responds to complex emergencies. Even within administrations, the substantial amount of staff rotation mandated by protocol impedes the creation of a coherent doctrine of cooperation. Douglas Stuart

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[28] Eugene Bardach, *Getting Agencies to Work Together* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998).
[29] *Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination.* (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000).
[30] Richard A. Best Jr., *Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S.* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2001).
[31] Robert W. Taylor, "Managing Terrorist Incidents." *The Bureaucrat* 12, no. 4 (Winter, 1983/1984), pp. 53.
[32] Carney, Dan, and Chuck McCutcheon, "Who's in Charge when Terror Strikes?" *CQ Weekly* 56, no. 29 (July 1998), pp. 18: 1921.
[33] Raymond J. Decker, Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination: GAO-01-14. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000.
[34] Kevin C. Colyer, *Command and Control Structure for Joint Interagency Counterterrorism Operations Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction within a Regional Commander-in-Chief's Area of Responsibility*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2001), http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll2,413.
[35] Neyla Arnas, Charles Barry, and Robert B. Oakley, "Harnessing the Interagency for Complex Operations," *Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University*, August 2005, http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/Def_Tech/DTP%2016%20Harnessing%20the%20Interagency.pdf.

adds that "there is a high turnover and the injection of new talent, at times inexperienced and equipped with new predispositions about national security, at the top echelons of American government every time the part that controls the White House changes."[36]

Another concern manifested especially in the U.S. interventions during the 1990s has been a lack of coordination between the U.S. military and U.S. civilian agencies. For example, observers see the Haiti intervention as evincing a lack of cooperation between the Agency for International Development and the Department of Defense. USAID officials were unable to transport gear because they could not effectively communicate with DOD officials. In the post-conflict phase, U.S. military planners were surprised that their civilian counterparts were not immediately ready with nation-building programs. Development planners were upset that the military refused to accept responsibility for civic action and nation-building efforts at the outset, although that policy had been determined at the strategic level. Observers also believe the U.S. military failed to appreciate the potential value of non-governmental organizations in assisting with the -intervention recovery.[37]

In contrast, Donald Dreschler argues that, during U.S. involvement in the Kosovo crisis in 1999, the State Department effectively subordinated the Department of Defense to its lead.[38] According to his interpretation, this unexpected role reversal yielded surprising results—rapid military *and* post-conflict operational success. He speculates that the State Department's leadership abilities, combined with its capacity to make concessions to its military counterparts, helped make military and post-conflict success a possibility. Kosovo can therefore be viewed as a paradigm of functional and effective State-Defense cooperation.

A more common view is that the Department of State lacks sufficient financial, personnel, and other resources to lead the U.S. response to complex contingencies.[39] According to Douglas Stuart, "The Department of State, which has a responsibility to conduct foreign affairs, is a veritable pauper."[40] This "paucity of operational capability in the State Department," also referred to as a lack of civilian "surge capacity," is emblematic of the resource disparity between the military and civilian sectors.[41] The CSIS Beyond Goldwater-Nichols project concludes that this phenomenon is by no means limited to the State Department. According to its analysis, "Most civilian agencies do not focus on the conduct of operations and therefore lack an operational culture. Consequently, even though these agencies may be tasked with performing critical tasks in a particular operation, they generally lack personnel who are trained and ready for these missions as well as the authorities and resources to rapidly deploy them and to quickly establish programs in the field."

The effects of these limitations were disastrous for the U.S. stabilization mission in Haiti in the early 1990s. Non-existent levels of communication on tactical, strategic, and operational levels made coordination between the military and political components of the operation impossible, and the resulting lack of dialogue between agencies doomed the mission.[42]

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[36] Stuart, Douglas T., *Organizing for National Security*, November 2000, Strategic Studies Institute of the National war College, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=299. See also General Edward C. Meyer and Thomas R. Pickering, "Forward Strategic Empowerment: Synergies Between CINCs, the State Department, and Other Agencies," *A Panel Report from the Center for the Study of the Presidency*," August 2001, http://www.thepresidency.org/pubs/ForwardStrategic.pdf

[37] Margaret Daly Hayes, "Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti—A Case Study," *National Defense University*, http://dodccrp.org/publications/pdf/Hayes_Interagency.pdf

[38] Donald Dreschler, "Reconstructing the Interagency Process after Iraq," *the Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol 28, No. 1 3-30 Feb 2005.

[39] Ronald N. Light., "Joint Vision 2020's Achilles Heel: Interagency Cooperation Between the Departments of Defense and State," May 2004, *Naval War College, http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA426040&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf*

[40] Douglas T. Stuart., Organizing for National Security, November 2000, Strategic Studies Institute of the National War College, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=299

[41] Michelle Flournoy, and Shawn Brimley, "In search of harmony: orchestrating 'the interagency' for the long war," Armed Forces Journal, July 2006 http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/07/1857934; Margaret Daly Hayes, "Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti—A Case Study," *National Defense University*, http://dodccrp.org/publications/pdf/Hayes_Interagency.pdf

[42] Margaret Daly Hayes, "Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti—A Case Study," *National Defense University*, http://dodccrp.org/publications/pdf/Hayes_Interagency.pdf.

Many authors believe that establishing regular and frequent contact between federal agencies is vital to building a rapport and trust between personnel. Part of the challenge for developing a routine, meaningful dialogue in the interagency space is that many executive agencies do not speak with a single voice. Morton Halperin, the former director of the Policy Planning staff at the State Department (1998-2001), recalls that multiple representatives from a single agency were often sent to interagency meetings with varying (and often discordant) agendas and talking points.[43] Intra-agency unity is, in many ways, fundamental to the task of promoting interagency unity. Once a dialogue commences, cultivating relationships in various agencies will ensure future operational and strategic success.

The related problem of insufficient regional collaboration is also cited by multiple authors as an impediment to strategic cooperation between constituent elements of executive agencies.[44] While bureaucratic cooperation at the highest levels of agency command is integral to strategic interagency cooperation, coordination in the various bureaus of executive agencies around the world is also required.[45] A panel report from the Center for the Study of the Presidency, chaired by General Edward C. Meyer and former U.S. Ambassador to the UN Thomas R. Pickering, underscores the importance of "creating relationships in Washington and in the field that strengthen the ability of military and State Department leaders to operate regionally in a more coherent fashion."[46]

III) Pre-9/11 Recommendations for Improving Interagency Coordination Processes

Thus the pre-9/11 interagency literature, like much of the literature after 9/11, has faulted disparate cultures, interdepartmental friction, poor information sharing, and departmental self-interest for contributing to the poor performance of interagency coordination.

Scholars propose a number of solutions to deal with these underlying issues. In their 2000 piece, Deutch, Kanter, and Scowcroft, while identifying defects in the U.S. national security structure and U.S. interagency processes, nevertheless caution against a "wholesale overhaul" of the system. They instead recommend delineating clear lines of responsibility in the interagency process, giving the NSC greater authority for coordination of interagency programs, and more efficiently aligning policy instruments to primary national security threats and objectives.[47]

To lessen the influence of independent agency cultures, Thomas Gibbings, Donald Hurley, and Scott Moore, recommend establishing a permanent interagency operations center for each of the U.S. military's geographic commands.[48] To improve information sharing, Sharon S. Dawes' 1996 article "Interagency Information Sharing: Expected Benefits, Manageable Risks" advocates addressing the issues of information systems interoperability, differing departmental terms and reference systems, and sharply defined boundaries between agencies' responsibilities, among other issues.[49]

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[43] Morton Halperin, "Reform for its Own Sake: Two Blue-ribbon commissions offer some sound advice, some serious omissions, and one real clunker," *American Foreign Service Association*, http://www.afsa.org/fsj/may01/halperinmay01.cfm

[44] Feil, Scott, "Building Better Foundations: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction," *The Center for Strategic and Internatinoal Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology*, The Washington Quarterly 25:4 pp.97-109
Autumn 2002Sunil B. Desai, "Solving the Interagency Puzzle," *Hoover Institution Policy Review* February/March 2005. http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3431461.html

[45] Sunil B. Desai, "Solving the Interagency Puzzle," *Hoover Institution Policy Review* February/March 2005. http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3431461.html

[46] General Edward C. Meyer and Thomas R. Pickering, "Forward Strategic Empowerment: Synergies Between CINCs, the State Department, and Other Agencies," A Panel Report from the Center for the Study of the Presidency," August 2001, http://www.thepresidency.org/pubs/ForwardStrategic.pdf

[47] Deutch, Kanter, Scowcroft, "Strengthening the National Security Interagency Process".

[48] Thomas Gibbings, Donald Hurley, and Scott Moore, "Interagency Operations Centers: An Opportunity We Can't Ignore," *Parameters*, (Winter 1998).

[49] Sharon S. Dawes, "Interagency Information Sharing: Expected Benefits, Manageable Risks," *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, vol. 15, no. 3. (Summer, 1996), pp. 377-394.

Carnes Lord's "NSC Reform for the Post-Cold War Era" calls for improving government effectiveness through reformed interagency procedures, budgeting practices, information management, and personnel policies.[50] Anthony Zinni's *A Military for the 21st Century: Lessons from the Recent Past*, echoes the commissions of the 1990s in calling for military transformation and a reevaluation of the national security decision-making structure in order to manage U.S. foreign and security policy more effectively in the face of uncertain threats.[51]

A recurring recommendation to improve interagency coordination has been to better educate civil servants on interagency processes and allow for routine short-term rotations of service among U.S. government agencies. In 1980, Philip Odeen argued that interagency cooperation would be facilitated by encouraging members of departmental staffs to work outside their home departments.[52] In *Interagency Operations: Coordination through Education*, Robert Smith advocates establishing an interagency professional education system and introducing interagency curriculum at the National Defense University to improve interagency coordination.[53] Mark Walsh also proposes enhanced interagency training as a partial solution to inadequacies in interagency emergency response policy and capabilities.[54] Douglas Stuart likewise calls for "a systematic effort to develop civilian and military cadres that are experts in interagency policy coordination, integration, and operations."[55]

A recurring recommendation by analysts for reducing the problem of differing bureaucratic cultures is for the United States to adopt an agreed standardized doctrine to define how U.S. government agencies responds to complex emergencies. Michelle Flournoy and Shawn Brimley complain that, some fifteen years after the conclusion of the Cold War, the U.S. government has yet to adopt a strategic planning mechanism for foreign or domestic policy.[56] A report by the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) similarly observes that: "Unlike the military, which has a doctrine and a standard approach to planning operations, the U.S. government as a whole lacks established procedures for developing integrated strategies and plans."[57] The report also warns that the lack of an agreed doctrine also hampers multinational coalition interventions in complex emergencies.

A National Defense University workshop panel echoes these sentiments, with participants recommending that policymakers "develop both doctrine and procedures for civil-military planning for emergencies like disaster assistance, humanitarian assistance, and peace-keeping operations in which civilian and military are likely to be co-equal and co-terminus participants."[58] According to Albert Zaccor, improving the interagency process does not require a major reorganization, only the development of a common conceptual framework "with the associated policies, procedures, and organization to implement that doctrine." Zaccor recommends the publication of a Presidential Directive (PD) on Security Cooperation and the subsequent development of an interagency planning process based on this PD.[59]

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[50] Carnes Lord, "NSC Reform for the Post-Cold War Era," *Orbis* vol. 44, no. 3 (Summer, 2000), pp. 433-450.
[51] Anthony C. Zinni, *A Military for the 21st Century: Lessons from the Recent Past.* (Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, July 2001).
[52] Philip A. Odeen, "Organizing for National Security," *International Security*, Vol. 5, No. 1, (Summer, 1980), pp. 111-129.
[53] Robert E. Smith, Interagency Operations: Coordination through Education, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2001).
[54] Mark R. Walsh, "Complex Emergencies: Under New Management," *Parameters* 28, no. 4 (Winter, 1998-1999), pp. 39-50.
[55] Stuart, Douglas T., Organizing for National Security, November 2000, Strategic Studies Institute of the National war College, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=299
[56] Michele Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, "Strategic Planning for National Security—A New Project Solarium," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 41, Second Quarter, 2006, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/4119.pdf.;
Sunil B. Desai, "Solving the Interagency Puzzle," *Hoover Institution Policy Review* February/March 2005.
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3431461.html
[57] Clark A. Murdock., et al., "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era—Phase I Report," *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, March 2004, http://www.ndu.edu/library/docs/0403BGN.pdf
[58] Hayes, Margaret Daly, "Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti—A Case Study," *National Defense University*
http://dodccrp.org/publications/pdf/Hayes_Interagency.pdf
[59] Zaccor, Albert. "Security Cooperation and Non-State Threats: A Call for an Integrated Strategy." *Occasional Paper - Atlantic Council* (2005) August

Desai argues that both a coherent doctrine and planning culture can be inculcated in the interagency process following the pattern set by Goldwater-Nichols, which solidified standard operating procedures by establishing a strong doctrine for the Department of Defense. Since then, a joint culture among the branches of the armed forces has emerged, enabling all military personnel to cooperate in the spirit of the American mission. This could easily happen for the interagency process, Desai believes, if momentum for reform grows within and beyond current interagency circles.[60]

Although the Clinton administration's 1997 Presidential Decision Directive 56 aimed to improve interagency response to emergencies by establishing standard procedures to govern the U.S. response, some authors found that problems continued. In "Complex Emergencies: Under New Management," Mark R. Walsh characterizes U.S. emergency response as *ad hoc* despite PDD-56, although he argued that the directive possessed great potential. Walsh proposed creating an interagency team to develop policy for responding to emergencies and to help ensure that PDD-56 received the strong interagency and NSC support it needed to succeed.[61] In contrast, Tonya Langford identified flaws in PDD-56. She was particularly concerned that the directive failed to integrate regional and international efforts.[62]

Other observers have sought to address perceived flaws in the national security establishment and improve government capacity to manage post-Cold War challenges through a reorganization of the U.S. national security system rather than a simple change in doctrine. The 1993 National Partnership for Reinventing Government (formerly the National Performance Review) labels government ineffective and advocates a number of measures to improve interagency performance, though the Commission largely failed to implement these recommendations. [63]

Several other pre-9/11 government commissions advanced organizational recommendations for improving interagency coordination. The 1997 National Security in the 21st Century Report of the National Defense Panel calls for broad government transformations to address long-term issues facing U.S. defense and national security. It recommended establishing a fully integrated national crisis center, streamlining the transfer of funds within and among agencies, aligning bureaus and unified commands' geographic designations, and institutionalizing an interagency long-range strategic planning process. The National Defense Panel also advocated reviewing the entire national security structure to anticipate and shape changes in the international environment and making improvements to interagency effectiveness through the establishment of a cadre of interagency professionals.[64]

The Hart-Rudman Commission in many ways followed logically upon the National Defense Panel review. Their common theme was to create greater operational flexibility in a stove-piped, 1947-era bureaucracy and to anticipate future, unconventional security challenges. Most importantly, the Commission advocated creating an independent National Homeland Security Agency with a single person of Cabinet rank responsible for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security. It called for the appointment of an OSD Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security who would oversee DOD activities in this area and to promote the provision of necessary resources. The Commission endorsed making homeland security a primary mission of the National Guard.

Further, the Commission recommended the president personally guide a top-down strategic planning process linked to resource allocation decisions throughout the government. In this capacity, the president would prepare an overall national security budget, supplementing the budget submissions of the individual national security departments and agencies, which would focus on the country's most critical strategic goals. The members urged that the NSC Advisor and NSC staff should return to their traditional role of coordinating national security activities as honest brokers and resist becoming policymakers or high-profile operators. Overall, Hart-Rudman called for the relevant

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[60] Sunil B. Desai, "Solving the Interagency Puzzle," *Hoover Institution Policy Review* February/March 2005. http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3431461.html

[61] Mark R. Walsh, "Complex Emergencies: Under New Management," *Parameters*, vol. 28, no. 4 (Winter, 1998-1999), pp. 39-50.

[62] Tonya Langford, "Orchestrating Peace Operations: The PDD-56 Process," *Security Dialogue* 30, no. 2 (June 1999), pp. 137-149.

[63] National Partnership for Reinventing Government (formerly the National Performance Review).

[64] Report of the National Defense Panel: Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century.

departments and agencies involved in foreign operations to cooperate more in regional planning and in anticipating unconventional security challenges.[65]

Like many analysts, Gabriel Marcella highlights coordination problems between the Departments of State and Defense. Marcella, like many analysts, found that differing agency cultures, resources, and goals generally underpinned interagency friction. Marcella concluded that the lack of a singular authority in interagency efforts constituted the greatest challenge to successful interagency collaboration. To improve coordination, Marcella proposed the creation of a new national security structure wherein the functions of the State and Defense departments would be more closely synthesized.[66]

Other pre-9/11 analyses emphasized the importance of improvements in leadership and technology for making national security structures more effective. James Kitfield and Arthur Schlesinger underscored the necessity of strong leadership, with Kitfield calling for leadership at several levels and Schlesinger more specifically urging the president to maintain active direction of foreign policy.[67] The 1997 National Defense Panel urged the integration of technologies, the transformation of the U.S. industrial base and infrastructure, and the development of a unified, multimedia, communications system to improve the effectiveness of U.S. performance in foreign and security policy.[68] By emphasizing the importance of developing American scientific and technological expertise, the 2001 Commission on National Security/21st Century also underscored the importance of technology for the national security system.[69]

Some commentators refrain from offering specific recommendations, preferring instead to provide general guidelines for reform. In 1972 I.M. Destler warned that in dealing with bureaucracies one must understand how bureaucracies work and how individuals work within bureaucracies.[70] In "Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail" John P. Kotter investigated why reorganizations fail and proposed eight necessary stages towards the successful transformation of any organization.[71] In 2000, David Tucker maintained that, "…the interagency process may not be as incompetent as the military believes." He advised that before attempting reform, one must understand the interagency process and realize that the process is, in fact, "a network disguised as a hierarchy," which he thought had advantages. Tucker recommended general procedural and technological solutions to interagency flaws, arguing against a massive structural reorganization of the national security apparatus.[72]

A few analysts consider the existing NSC structure as having performed fairly effectively at promoting interagency coordination. For example, a publication by the Henry L. Stimson Center values the NSC for forging common institutional policies out of the viewpoints of disparate agencies. The report recommends expanding the NSC model down to lower levels of government to increase the effectiveness of U.S. foreign affairs initiatives.[73]

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[65] U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, *Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change.* Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century. Available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nssg/PhaseIIIFR.pdf (Feb 2001)

[66] Joseph R Cerami, James F. Holcomb, Martin L. Cook, Robert H. Dorff, David Jablonsky, Michael G. Roskin, R. Craig Nation, Gabriel Marcella, Don M. Snider, John A. Nagl, John F. Troxell, Arthur F. Lykke, Richard A. Chilcoat, and Jane E. Gibish. *U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy* (2001), http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS11754.

[67] James Kitfield, *Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized The American Style of War* (Washington and London: Brassey's, 1995); Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "Effective National Security Advising: A Most Dubious Precedent," *Political Science Quarterly* (Fall, 2000), pp. 347-351.

[68] Report of the National Defense Panel: Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century.

[69] U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, *Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change.* Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century. Available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nssg/PhaseIIIFR.pdf (Feb 2001)

[70] I. M. Destler, Presidents, *Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organization* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972).

[71] John P. Kotter, "Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail," *Harvard Business Review*, (March-April 1995), pp. 61.

[72] David Tucker, "The RMA and the Interagency: Knowledge and Speed vs. Ignorance and Sloth?" *Parameters* 30, no. 3 (Autumn 2000), pp. 66. at http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00autumn/tucker.htm

[73] Schall, John, ed., Equipped for the Future: Managing U.S. Foreign Affairs in the 21st Century. The Henry L. Stimson Center: Washington, DC, 1998, http://www.stimson.org/pdf/ausr1.pdf

Many authors, however, have argued for a more formalized NSC structure and expanded authority to make national security policy. According to Odeen's "Organizing for National Security," which appeared in the summer 1980 issue of *International Security*, the NSC should coordinate the foreign policy decision making process and advise the president. In this role, the NSC would identify essential national security issues, force decisions, push interagency policy implementation cooperation, and ensure that clear alternatives to policies put forward by different departments are seriously weighed and researched. In addition, Odeen urged the NSC to ensure that departmental decision making on issues that clearly belong to one department but affect other departments incorporate the concerns of those other agencies. More generally, Odeen advocated a prominent NSC, arguing that past administrations had suffered national security problems due to their failure to rely on the Council. [74]

Brzezinski believes that these reforms would make the body more capable of integrating national diplomatic, military and financial efforts to achieve national security goals.[75] Matthew Bogdanos, writing in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, cited the NSC's inability to formulate a credible interagency plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom as one of the key reasons why other agencies had to "volunteer" to participate in the war effort rather than be assigned specific areas of responsibility.[76]

The arguments against an expansion of NSC authority have been largely based on the lack of constitutional authority for such a body. Robert Cutler's 1956 *Foreign Affairs* article, "The Development of the National Security Council," worried that the NSC might disrupt the proper constitutional flow of power from the president to his cabinet.[77] Paul Hammond argues that the NSC was designed as a small advisory panel that lacks the membership and legitimacy to make policy in a democracy. In his assessment, only the president and Congress have such authority.[78]

Hammond raised an alternative explanation for the NSC's often limited effectiveness in promoting interagency coordination: the possibility of factionalization within the council itself. He fears that relying on cabinet level officials to make NSC recommendations leads to vague statements based on the lowest common denominator of agreement because secretaries are unwilling to discuss the failures of their departments with the broader council. Instead, department secretaries took their concerns directly to the president, which undermined the effectiveness of the NSC as a coordinating body or a talking group.[79]

Fred Greenstein and Richard H. Immerman argue that the National Security Council requires more coherence and organization. In "Effective National Security Advising: Recovering the Eisenhower Legacy," they maintain that an ideal NSC system would include a separate organ for policy implementation and be led by a National Security Advisor that serves as a process manager, not a policy advocate. They also point to the Eisenhower-era Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) as an effective body for turning NSC recommendations into concrete policy. [80]

Gregory Martin recommends establishing a new senior position on the NSC staff: the Director of National Security Operations (DNSO). The DNSO would be supported by a small interagency staff and monitor the implementation of national security strategy as well as close the gap between operational planning and execution.[81]

Some authors believe the NSC's close relationship with the presidency taints its ability to be an effective, impartial integrator. John Lucynski argues that while the NSC was originally intended to inspire unity among the various elements of the national security apparatus, it now appears to be used as a means of bringing other agencies in line

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[74] Philip A. Odeen, "Organizing for National Security," *International Security*, Vol. 5, No. 1, (Summer, 1980), pp. 111-129.
[75] Brzezinski, Zbigniew, "The NSC's Midlife Crisis," *Foreign Policy*, No. 69 (Winter, 1987-1988), pp. 80-89.
[76] Bogdanos, Matthew F, "Interagency Operations: The Marine Specialty of This Century," *Marine Corps Gazette* Vol.90, Iss. 3 (March 2006), pp. 60-66.
[77] Cutler, Robert. "The Development of the National Security Council." *Foreign Affairs* (1956) April: 441-458.
[78] Hammond, Paul Y. "The National Security Council as a Device for Interdepartmental Coordination: An Interpretation and Appraisal." *American Political Science Review* (1960) December.
[79] Hammond, "The National Security Council as a Device for Interdepartmental Coordination."
[80] Fred I., Greenstein and Richard H. Immerman, "Effective National Security Advising: Recovering the Eisenhower Legacy," *Political Science Quarterly* (Fall, 2000), pp. 335-345.
[81] Gregory M. Martin, *Enhancing American Interagency Integration for the Global War on Terrorism.* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006).

with an agenda dictated exclusively by the president.[82] Sunil Desai argues that the National Security Act of 1947 failed to give the NSC the necessary authority to develop a coherent interagency doctrine. Without it, he claims, the effectiveness of the NSC organizational structure has degraded over time as each new generation of employees becomes weaker and weaker due to their lack of standardized training.[83]

In *Public Administration Review*, W. Henry Lambright proposes that the government use the Committee on Environment and Natural Resources (CENR) as a model for future interagency cooperation at the committee level. According to Lambright, following the CENR example will lessen interagency rivalry through the selection of a high level bureaucrat from a small agency to lead interagency committees and the instilment of a common goal among committee members. Moreover, the CENR model would encourage the fulfillment of four prerequisites for effective collaboration: common interests, presidential and congressional support, group leadership, and group authority. [84]

IV) Managing Domestic Emergencies after 9/11 and Katrina

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, brought to light major problems in the U.S. government's organizational planning and response capabilities as they applied to acute domestic emergencies. Many analysts anticipated these potential problems well in advance, but their warnings failed to generate successful efforts to rectify them.

Calls for the U.S. to prepare a response to the possibility of a terrorist attack on U.S. soil came as early as the middle of the 1980s, when Robert Taylor produced a report calling the American capability to respond to terrorism limited and the policy mechanisms for doing so chaotic.[85] More than a decade later, Dan Carney and Chuck McCutcheon again emphasized the seriousness of the situation when they published a report asserting that, despite the obvious threat of a terrorist attack (there had already been multiple attacks on U.S. targets overseas, in addition to the first attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993 and the 1995 destruction of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City), the U.S. continued to lack a coordinated plan for adequately responding to a terrorist attack.[86]

In 2000, John Deutch, Arnold Kanter, and Brent Scowcroft wrote that the creation of a Department of Homeland Security would directly address modern threats and was the best long-term option to ensure security. However, in the pre-9-11 climate in which they were writing, they did not believe Congress would be willing to create an agency along these lines. Even post-9/11 Congress did not quite create the expansive organization the authors envisaged, which would have had jurisdiction over all functions relating to domestic security that involved foreign threats (including those performed by the FBI, DEA, INS, BATF, Customs, Coast Guard, National Guard, and FEMA).[87]

In that same year, an assessment by the Hart-Rudman Commission also recommended that the government create a new agency tasked specifically to oversee domestic security issues. This agency would be referred to as the National Homeland Security Agency, and it would be responsible for planning, coordinating, and integrating the activities of the various government agencies that dealt with domestic security. Additionally, the Commission recommended that the National Guard be reequipped and re-tasked to make its primary mission one of homeland defense.[88]

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[82]Colonel John A. Lucynski III, United States Army, "An Interagency Reform Act: Preparing for Post-Conflict Operations in the 21st Century," *USAWC Strategy Research Project*, March 2005, http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA432527&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

[83] Sunil B. Desai, "Solving the Interagency Puzzle," Hoover Institution Policy Review February/March 2005. http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3431461.html

[84] W. Henry Lambright, "The Rise and Fall of Interagency Cooperation: The U.S. Global Change Research Program", *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Jan-Feb. 1997), pp. 36-44.

[85] Taylor, Robert W. "Managing Terrorist Incidents." *The Bureaucrat* 12, no. 4 (1983/1984) Winter: 53.

[86] Carney, Dan, and Chuck McCutcheon. "Who's in Charge when Terror Strikes?" *CQ Weekly* 56, no. 29 (1998) July 18: 1921

[87] Deutch, J., Kanter, A., & Scowcroft, B. (2000). Strengthening the national security interagency process. In Carter, A. B. & White, J. P., (Eds.), Keeping the edge: Managing defense for the future (pp. 265-283). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press [Preventive Defense Project]. Available from http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/KTE_ch10.pdf.

[88] The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century (The Hart/ Rudman Commission) Phase 3 report. (April 2000 - February 2001)

In response to the attacks on New York and Washington, the President authorized the creation of the Office of Homeland Security (OHS). While the new agency possessed a clear mission, it lacked a similarly clear understanding of its authority, its organizational structure, and exactly how it would accomplish its goal of securing the American homeland.[89] The literature over the next few years would be rife with argument over these issues. Ashton Carter considers the development of OHS not a catalyst for interagency cooperation, but rather an impediment. He maintains that the creation of an additional agency further complicates the already complex bureaucracy and interagency relations that many were faulting for the security community's failure to prevent the 9-11 attacks.[90]

Richard Clarke caustically observes that it is "easier to waste time on reorganization than it is to accomplish anything concrete." Clarke opposed the subsequent creation of the Department of Homeland Security on these grounds.[91]

Some authors believe that the creation of the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council by President George W. Bush in the wake of September 11 further handicapped the National Security Council's ability to serve as an effective consensus-building and integrative organization.[92] They worry that the HSC, comprised by representatives of twenty-two federal agencies, has added yet another bewildering layer of bureaucracy to the national security landscape. According to the authors, the decision-making and enforcement processes for the NSC and HSC are different, personnel for the organizations receive dramatically different training, and there exists no formal bridge between the two organizations. The result is that an NSC and HSC with similar, if not redundant, objectives now compete for interagency space.

Several authors complain that the Homeland Security Council is also ineffective as an actor and integrator in its own right.[93] Lynn Davis believes that the coordinating function of the Office of Homeland Security is merely rhetorical, that it is terminally unable to "translate its various coordinating responsibilities into practice."[94] William Newmann of Virginia Commonwealth University argues that in addition to competing with the already-established National Security Council and duplicating existing homeland protection efforts, the Homeland Security Council is problematic in that it "has no representation from the state or local level, nor from organizations that represent the functionally based institutions that are operating at those levels—police, firefighters, emergency medical technicians, and hospitals." In short, its vertical coordination is weak despite the essential role that local emergency personnel play in disaster response.[95]

In September 2002, just as Bush announced his intention to turn the OHS into a Department of Homeland Security, *Public Administration Review* presented a symposium of articles discussing the potential department.[96] William Newmann, in his contribution titled "Reorganizing for National Security and Homeland Security," astutely points out that homeland security is merely a part of national security. This means any effort to manage homeland security must bring cohesion to agencies traditionally separated by domestic law and national security functions—a separation enshrined in operation, law, and tradition. For this reason, he believes it would be more difficult to impose unity through a large department, which would necessarily need to take over both domestic and international

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[89] *Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short-and Long-Term National Needs.* Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, Nov. 2001

[90] Carter, Ashton B. "The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism." *International Security* 26 (2001/2002) Winter: 5-23.

[91] Clarke, *Against All Enemies*, 90.

[92] Sunil B. Desai, "Solving the Interagency Puzzle," Hoover Institution Policy Review February/March 2005. http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3431461.html; Davis, Lynn, "Organizing for Homeland Security," RAND Issue Paper, 2002, http://192.5.14.110/congress/terrorism/phase2/organizing.pdf

[93] Ashton Carter, "The Architecture of Government in the face of terrorism," International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3, (Winter 01/02) p. 5-23

[94] Lynn Davis, "Organizing for Homeland Security," RAND Issue Paper, 2002, http://192.5.14.110/congress/terrorism/phase2/organizing.pdf

[95] William Newmann, "Reorganizing for National Security and Homeland Security," Public Administration Review, September 2002, Vol 62 Special Issue

[96] Stephen Sloan, ed. "Organizing for National Security: The Challenge of Bureaucratic Innovation in the War against Terrorism." Public Administration Review 62, Special Issue (September 2002).

roles to cover all functions related to homeland security, than to develop a process through which agencies can cooperate (although he acknowledges that this too would be very difficult).

At about this time, Ivo Daalder and L.M. Destler authored an article again contending that it is neither desirable nor possible to bring all the major homeland security functions under a single umbrella.[97] Instead, they focus on the need for leadership, cross-governmental coordination, and mobilization of the relevant agencies and their leaders.

Further reservations came from Stephen Brummond, who posited that a more effective organizational strategy for homeland defense would resemble the federalized system embodied in the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council. A new department, he argued, would merely consist of "moving colored boxes around on an organizational chart." [98] Michael Donley and Neal Pollard agreed, proposing that the new department assume an NSC type structure. These ideas were nothing new; four years earlier John Schall recommended use of the NSC model for building interagency coordination at the strategic level, writing that "the model should not only be maintained, it should be replicated."[99] Nonetheless, the newer presentations of these ideas were well timed and thus well received. In their proposed DHS based on the NSC model, the tools to achieve security would stay in different agencies. DOJ, DOS, and DOD would not merge, but come to the same table in the DHS, where they would discuss policy and plans. Implementation would then move back to the agencies. In essence, DHS would *be the interagency*.

Others endorsed alternative means to strengthen the effectiveness of the new homeland security body. Basing his recommendations off of past attempts at reorganizing the Department of Defense, J.R. Barnes proposed, among other things, that the director of OHS be given unquestioned authority to run the agency; and that a distinction and separation of command be made between administrative and operational matters within OHS (subject to the authority of the director of OHS).[100]

A few reports, including those by Katherine Peters[101] and another by Arnold Holcomb et al.,[102] stressed the need for OHS to oversee a policy of coordination and information sharing between existing government agencies. In addition, a Joint Inquiry Staff Proposal from December 2002 recommended that to facilitate the gathering and sharing of information related directly to terrorism, OHS should establish and house a counterterrorist intelligence fusion center.[103]

William Waigh and Richard Sylves round out the *Public Administration Review* special issue with "Organizing the War on Terrorism," which focuses on the local level of homeland security. The authors express concerns that a focus on WMD and terrorism will crowd out discussion on the more "routine" emergencies—such as natural disasters. Their view was proven right when "routine" Katrina slammed into the New Orleans levies, overwhelming the local first responders and leaving the national responders holding empty sand bags.

However, other writers point out that the DHS should not take too much control for emergency response into their hands. Despite recent calls for the contrary, writes Christopher Clayton, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina it would be antithetical to the U.S. system of governance and its philosophical underpinnings for local responsibilities and response to be "federalized" too early and for the DoD to assume the lead agency for responding to Incidents of

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[97] Daalder, Ivo H., and L. M. Destler. "Advisors, Czars and Councils: Organizing for Homeland Security." National Interest, no. 68 (Summer 2002), p. 66.
[98] Brummond, Stephen M. *Restructuring for Homeland Security: What is really Necessary?* Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, (July 4, 2003). Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA415078.
[99] Schall, John, ed., Equipped for the Future: Managing U.S. Foreign Affairs in the 21st Century. The Henry L. Stimson Center: Washington, DC, 1998. Universal Resource Link located at: http://www.stimson.org/pdf/ausr1.pdf. p. 11.
[100] Barnes, J. R. (2002, June 26). "Reorganizing for homeland security: Lessons from 50 years of organizing and reorganizing the Department of Defense," in *Journal of Homeland Security.* Retrieved December 19, 2003, from http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Commentary/barnes26June2002.html
[101] Peters, Katherine McIntire. "The Challenge." *Government Executive* 34, no. 10 (2002) July: 10-14.
[102] Holcomb, Arnold W., William E. Perkins, Alec Mally, Juris Kiukucans, and Mark Boettcher. "Homeland Security Mobilization Requires Greater Coordination." *National Defense* 87, no. 586 (2002) September: 41.
[103] Joint Inquiry Staff Proposals for Reform within the Intelligence Community, *Final Report. The Context: Part One: Findings and Conclusions*, December 10, 2002.

National Significance.[104] Their job is to support through coordination, not step outside of the Beltway and into an environment likely entirely unknown to them to take charge.

One way to get past this epistemic ignorance of the local which is inevitable within a national planning system, is to regionalize DHS. At a hearing on Homeland Defense/Homeland Security on May 4, 2006, John Marsh, Frank Cilluffo, and James Carafano recommended regional interagency offices, based on the regional FEMA offices, be established to better coordinate federal responses to disaster areas.[105] Lynn Davis recommends the National Guard should be given the federal mission of conducting homeland security (HLS) activities. This would allow National Guard units to collaborate more closely with the FEMA and other civilian organizations in the event of a domestic emergency.[106]

One of the problems with the DHS is that it lacks its own muscle in the event of another terrorist attack. In such an event, in relies on DOD's Northern Command. However, how they will cooperate remains uncertain. According to James Kitfield, this need for the clarification of Northern Command's authority in the event of an emergency was an issue that deserved special importance. Although the National Response Plan apparently delineates decision-making authority to the Director of DHS, Kitfield believed that without further clarification there would likely be confusion as to what role Northern Command will play. In the event of a terrorist incident, which is intrinsically ambiguous in form, the burden of responsibility is supposed to fall to DHS, with Northern Command acting in a support role.[107] Chris Hornbarger argues that DOD must authorize Northern Command to interact directly with DHS to develop federal and national (intergovernmental) domestic incident contingency plans under the supervision of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. Hornbarger also believes, unlike some authors, that the legal authority for the commitment of DOD assets to domestic incidents exists under current federal law, despite the DOD's strict interpretation of *Posse Comitatus*.[108] As part of an effort to address the unclear relationship and differing missions of DHS and DOD, Michael Pitts proposes that DHS and DOD strive to merge their two missions into one all encompassing strategy to achieve national security and defense.[109]

Hurricane Katrina and other Natural Disasters

On the domestic front, natural disasters have tested the efficacy of various interagency reform efforts, highlighting the need for greater coordination and planning. Hurricane Katrina, the greatest natural disaster to hit America in the 21st Century, served to underscore some of the problems inherent in post-crisis relief efforts. Prior to its landfall, natural disasters were sparsely discussed in much of the literature pertaining to interagency reform, overshadowed by the growing threats of terrorism and failed states. In the wake of the event, however, numerous recommendations were made in an effort to analyze and solve some of the problems plaguing interagency cooperation with regards to natural disasters.

Before Hurricane Katrina hit on August 23, 2005, most of the literature pertaining to interagency reform was focused on averting man-made security contingencies, including terrorist attacks and post-conflict peacekeeping missions. Some of these reports, however, did make recommendations on improving interagency cooperation for natural disasters. The 1993 final report of the National Performance Review called for the creation of an interagency Ecosystem Management Task Force to minimize future risks of natural disasters, one of the numerous recommendations it made for, "creating a government that works better and costs less."[110] Similarly, the National

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[104] Clayton, Christopher M. *National Emergency Preparedness and Response: Improving for Incidents of National Significance.* Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA448938.
[105] Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Hearing On Homeland Defense/Homeland Security, May 4, 2006. Federal News Service, Washington, D.C.
[106] Lynn Davis, Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations, RAND, 2007.
[107] Kitfield, James, "Military's Northern Command Steps up Response Efforts" *National Journal*, September 2, 2005.
[108] Hornbarger, Chris (Major). "Katrina Lessons-Learned: National Contingency Planning for Domestic Incidents." Available http://www.dean.usma.edu/sosh/Academic%20Program/Courses/ss493/LESSONS/Military%20Role%20in%20Homeland%20Security/Katrina_Lsns_Contingncy_Planning.pdf
[109] Pitts, Michael J. *A Road Map for National Security: The Intersection of the Departments of Homeland Security and Defense.* Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 6 2006. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA448441
[110] National Partnership for Reinventing Government (formerly the National Performance Review). 1993. Universal Resource Link located at: http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/nprrpt/annrpt/redtpe93/index.html.

Defense Panel, in a report released in 1997, recommended the creation of a national crisis center with employees from various government agencies to deal with future security vulnerabilities, particularly natural disasters.[111]

President Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive 56 created an Executive Committee with the task of planning and organizing seamless interagency cooperative missions in "complex contingency operations," including natural disasters. Mark Walsh and Michael Harewood, however, expressed their doubts on EXCOMM's potential for success, citing the need for extensive support from the executive and legislative branches. They did, however, commend the President for attempting to solve problems related to interagency dissonance.[112]

On October 1, 2002, the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), a Department of Defense combatant command, was created. As described by various authors, FEMA and NORTHCOM were designed to play two separate roles in the event of a natural disaster, the former heading the operation, with the latter providing support.

Yet, Daalder and Destler highlighted the *regional* character of FEMA, and claimed that any attempts to place homeland security operations under one umbrella would be detrimental to the success of interagency missions.[113] According to them, in case of a natural disaster, regional FEMA offices should be in charge of efforts to alleviate the crisis because their employees know so much about the area. Clark Lystra concurs with this argument, claiming that Department of Defense resources, of which NORTHCOM is a subsidiary component, should only be used when all local and regional channels of aid have been exploited.[114] Scott Shepherd and Steve Bowman further reinforce this argument, claiming that knowledgeable regional authorities should guide NORTHCOM operations.[115] To facilitate seamless cooperation, they also call for annual joint training sessions.

Post-Katrina Policy Recommendations

Though in theory FEMA was supposed to lead the entire planning effort, supported by NORTHCOM, in reality this never happened. FEMA's response to the incident was too slow, and the effects of the hurricane so disastrous that the National Guard ended up taking control of relief efforts. In effect, therefore, the Department of Defense overtook the Department of Homeland Security in dealing with Katrina because its components, including the National Guard and NORTHCOM, were the only ones capable of tangibly helping the victims of the disaster. Minimal and sluggish planning, attributable in part to a lack of experience, led many authors to call the initial Katrina relief efforts a "failure."[116]

While observers of the U.S. government response to Katrina rapidly concluded that it was a failure, they differed over how to improve the U.S. response. Christopher Clayton argues that a federalized response to the relief effort should have occurred later, following the implementation of FEMA plans.[117] In his view, the National Guard was the only agency with the *de facto* ability to achieve tangible results, but it lacked adequate guidance at the time from federal authorities. In the future, Clayton argues, FEMA should devise plans to be implemented immediately by all other agencies. To facilitate interagency cooperation, he advocates holding more joint training sessions.

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[111] National Defense Panel. 1997. Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century. Universal Resource Link located at: http://www.dtic.mil/ndp/FullDoc2.pdf.
[112] Mark R. Walsh and Michael J. Harwood, "Complex Emergencies: Under New Management", *Parameters*, Winter, 1998.

[113] Daalder, Ivo H., and L. M. Destler. "Advisors, Czars and Councils: Organizing for Homeland Security." National Interest, no. 68 (2002) Summer: 66. Universal Resource Link available at: http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/zselden/Course%20Readings/Daalder.pdf.
[114] Clark R. Lystra, "Requesting Department of Defense Assistance for Domestic Incidents," *Guardian* 7, no. 2 (2005) August: 21-23.
[115] Shepherd, Scott, and Steve Bowman. *Homeland Security: Establishment and Implementation of the United States Northern Command.* Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2005. Universal Resource Link available at: http://www.ndu.edu/library/docs/crs/crs_rs21322_10feb05.pdf.
[116] "Volume 1: Executive Summary and Overview," *Performance Evaluation of the New Orleans and Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Protection System: Final Report of the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force*, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, March 26, 2007, https://ipet.wes.army.mil/.
[117] Clayton, Christopher M. *National Emergency Preparedness and Response: Improving for Incidents of National Significance.* Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006.

Gregg Gross shared a similar view to Clayton's, citing a lack of leadership as the reason for the Hurricane Katrina response's initial failure.[118] According to his analysis, members of the National Guard and NORTHCOM lacked proper guidance, which led to subsequent inefficiencies. To remedy this problem, Gross recommends the creation of more regional interagency groups entrusted with more resources, authority, and responsibility. Each group should be led by a regional ambassador, who would form a close relationship with his national counterparts. If endowed with greater authority and responsibility, then, regional groups can help direct the efficient usage of federal human resources.

John O'Neil takes this idea a step further, claiming that the internal structure of these regional groups is as important as their existence. Although he complains about poor leadership during the response to Katrina, he also emphasizes the uninformed nature of mid-level planning-agency employees.[119] If these mid-level employees do not understand the works of their own agency, they cannot provide guidance to their subsidiaries. He recommends planning agencies invest more capital in their mid-level employees.

Hornbarger, like the preceding authors, also acknowledges lack of leadership as the primary cause for the failed initial response to Hurricane Katrina. He takes a unique angle, however, in calling for the creation of coauthored contingency plans between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security. Instead of centering the dialogue on FEMA, NORTHCOM, or the National Guard, Hornbarger emphasizes the need to coordinate the activities of their parent agencies. He wants to remove bureaucratic hurdles preventing NORTHCOM from directly engaging in discussions with DHS and DOD. To facilitate the growth of a cohesive relationship, Hornbarger wants the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security to apply for joint grants from Congress for projects relating to natural disasters.

Davis favors further specialization of the role of the National Guard. The lack of leadership caused mayhem in the wake of Hurricane Katrina because the National Guard was not ready for immediate deployment, and had other responsibilities to attend to. Davis claims that these problems can be ameliorated if the National Guard is given the official federal responsibility of conducting homeland security activities, which would enable it to collaborate in greater depth with FEMA and other regional organizations, focusing on the task at hand.[120] Specialization will enable the National Guard to increase its quality of task execution. Davis also calls for the creation of basic contingency plans for natural disasters to be implemented if FEMA fails to deliver guidance immediately. This is an insightful proposal, because it would help solve some of the problems associated with delayed planning, which took a huge toll on the initial relief efforts of Hurricane Katrina.

After the advent of Hurricane Katrina, the formerly-neglected issue of interagency reform with relation to natural disaster relief has gained some belated attention. Hurricane Katrina put previous interagency cooperation theories to the test, leaving behind mixed results. The literature suggests that lack of leadership was the main cause of the initial failure of the response to Hurricane Katrina. There is heavy dispute, however, as to which agency should be in charge, or what changes should be implemented in the existing system. The diversity in recommendations may seem problematic, but it also serves as an arbiter of hope. Debates will continue and various hypotheses will be tested, which will hopefully lead to a sound solution to the problem of leadership in interagency reform efforts with regards to natural disasters.

Improving Intelligence Analysis and Information Sharing

Analysis of how to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the intelligence community (IC) have become more common during the last decade. Furthermore, whereas reports on the community from the 1970s and 1980s focused largely on legality and propriety, the last decade has seen the spotlight shift to issues of coordination.[121] Having

[118] Gross, Gregg E. 2006. Interagency Reform for the 21st Century. U.S. Army War College: Carlisle.
[119] O'Neil, John E. The Interagency Process: Analysis and Reform Recommendations. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006. Universal Resource Link located at: http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA449658.
[120] Lynn Davis, Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations, RAND, 2007.
[121] Eleanor Hill "Joint Inquiry Staff Statement: Proposals for Reform within the Intelligence Community," October 3, 2002, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/100302hill.html.

placed critical emphasis on the need for a seamless intelligence community, the events of 9/11 continue to fuel reforms aimed at improved information sharing for the purposes of national security.

Loch K. Johnson reviews problems associated specifically with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in a 2000 article for the *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.* He concludes that the DCI lacked sufficient resources and authority, and was hobbled by widespread interagency rivalry. Though Johnson hopes to avoid an overly centralized intelligence community, to address his concerns he recommended better integrating the DCI into the intelligence community, requiring DCI concurrence for the appointment of all intelligence program directors, expanding DCI involvement in the intelligence budget preparation, endowing the DCI with the power to redirect intelligence community funding, and institutionalizing the process whereby intelligence officers complete rotations in different agencies.[122]

9/11 set in motion a concerted effort to remedy the intelligence community's perceived weaknesses. In order to conduct this evaluation, a number of national-level commissions produced studies examining the state of interagency intelligence cooperation. In one such study, the Joint Inquiry Staff put forth a number of recommendations to improve the sharing of intelligence. The staff proposed creating a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) who would serve as the president's principal advisor on intelligence, integrating the collection and analytic capacities of the NSA, FBI, and CIA, institutionalizing joint training and interagency responsibilities for employees within individual agencies, and improving Congressional oversight.[123]

Similarly, the *Final Report on 9/11 Commission* cites a lack of resources and poor incentives for cooperation between agencies as major obstacles to an effective intelligence community. Its authors note that while individual establishments such as the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) have made individual progress, cooperation between these bodies remains deficient. Government involvement and congressional oversight also received among the worst ratings given by the Report.[124] The report urges clear information-sharing procedures and performance evaluations as potential means of encouraging the necessary cooperation.[125]

The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction presented its final report to the president in 2005. Among its findings, the Commission concluded that the intelligence community "has too little integration and too little innovation to succeed in the 21st century. It rarely adopts integrated strategies for penetrating high-priority targets; decision-makers lack authority to resolve agency disputes; and it develops too few innovative ways of gathering intelligence." Echoing the recommendations of other commissions, it proposed the creation of an integrated intelligence community structure under the DNI, the organization of the IC towards specific missions, and the expansion of the Information Sharing environment to include all intelligence information. The report's comprehensive analysis stresses the importance of addressing interagency issues as well as department-specific concerns.[126]

Gaps in Congressional oversight were the dominant focus of the *Investigation into the Lack of Coordination between Federal Agencies*, as compiled in the 2003 Congressional Record. In the Record, the Department of Justice is criticized for their unwillingness to provide information to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs which hampers the Committee's investigations concerning national security. At the time, the DOJ had denied the Committee's requested information on persons who had been the subject of terrorism investigations, citing its policy of "not providing Congress with information about people who have been investigated but not prosecuted." The

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[122] Johnson, Loch K. "The DCI and the Eight-Hundred Pound Gorilla." *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 13 (Spring, 2000), pp. 35-48.
[123] Joint Inquiry Staff Proposals for Reform within the Intelligence Community, "Final Report. The Context: Part One: Findings and Conclusions," December 10, 2002, http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/congress/2002_rpt/intelfindings.pdf.
[124] 9-11 Public Discourse Project, "Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations" (Washington, D.C., 2005), http://www.9-11pdp.org/press/2005-12-05_report.pdf.
[125] **"**The Final Report of the 9/11 Commission," The 9/11 Commission (2004), http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.
[126] "Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction Report to the President: Overview of the Report," Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (May 31, 2005), http://www.wmd.gov/report/overview_fm.pdf.

Committee on Governmental Affairs, however, remained adamant that the ability to obtain information on individuals being investigated for terrorist activity should not be obstructed by bureaucracy.[127]

An attempt to remedy similar problems of information sharing arose four years later with the passage of the Improving America's Security Act of 2007 which mandated that the Secretary of Homeland Security "designate an information sharing and knowledge management officer who shall report to the Chief Intelligence Officer regarding coordinating the different systems used in the Department to gather and disseminate homeland security information." The Act also included provisions to make gathered information available to members of other government agencies.[128]

Flows of information within the intelligence community are another matter of concern. In his guide to reorganizing the structure and roles within government, Thomas Stanton stresses the need to assure information flows to the proper level of government for consideration and possible action. Combining related government programs to provide an organization focus, clear prioritization, and accountability can help facilitate the collection and exchange of intelligence.[129] Both 9/11 and the war in Iraq are commonly cited as instances where poor quality information resulted in tactical setbacks. Christopher Cox notes that failures in these cases both highlight the flaws in cooperation between the 15 separate intelligence agencies and underscore the need to improve the quality of information gathering resources to better meet national and homeland security objectives. Cox promotes improved communication and interoperability between domestic law enforcement and intelligence collectors, a union opposed by many experts of national security, as one solution to this problem.[130]

Even among agencies that have shown marked progress in interagency coordination, the problem of poor information sharing persists. In his article on interagency operations, Matthew Bogdanos presents the example of the U.S. Central Command's Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) as an example of this situation. While the Joint Staff found the JIACG "integrated U.S. government objectives, creating a forum for interagency operational planning and coordination," the absence of information sharing standards hindered efficient communication within the intelligence community. Bogdanos believes that establishing a protocol within individual agencies for the sharing of information will not only encourage the necessary communication, but also incentivize other agencies to follow suit.[131]

Most observers believe that one of the greatest requirements for achieving effective interagency coordination in the war on terror is effective communication and information sharing, and yet they identified recurring problems in this area. In 2002, Richard B. Myers, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stressed that the imperatives of countering terrorist threats required discarding the Cold War "need-to-know" approach toward information sharing and instead advocated relying on a more inclusive "need to share" principle. In his assessment, such a view would improve agency integration and allow for rapid decision-making.[132]

The Homeland Security and Advisory Council (HSAC) reaffirmed General Myers' recommendation in its 2007 *Report of the Future of Terrorism Task Force*. HSAC recommends combining foreign and domestic intelligence into one National Intelligence Estimate and enhancing information sharing and cooperation between local, state, federal, and international agencies. In its authors' assessment, restructuring the intelligence community, including integrating it better into the work of the Department of Homeland Security and the National Security Council, should be a priority in intelligence reform.[133]

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[127] *Investigation into the Lack of Coordination between Federal Agencies*, Congressional Record – Senate, 108th Congress, 1st Session, 149 Cong Rec S 15948 (November 25, 2003).
[128] *Improving America's Security Act of 2007*, Congressional Record – Senate, 110th Congress, 1st Session, 153 Cong Rec S 3400, (March 20, 2007).
[129] Thomas H. Stanton "Moving toward More Capable Government: A Guide to Organizational Design," IBM Center for the Business of Government (Washington, DC, 2002), http://www.businessofgovernment.org/pdfs/StantonReport.pdf.
[130] Christopher Cox, "Change is Now Inevitable," *Wall Street Journal*, July 22, 2004, p. A12.
[131] Matthew F. Bogdanos "Interagency Operations: The Marine Specialty of This Century," *Marine Corps Gazette*, vol.90, no. 3 (March 2006), pp. 60-66.
[132] Richard B. Myers "A Word from the Chairman," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 33 (Winter 2002/2003), p. 1.
[133] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security and Advisory Council, *Report of the Future of Terrorism Task Force* (2007).

According to Michael Warner and J. Kenneth McDonald, President Bush's signing of Executive Order 13355 ("Strengthened Management of the Intelligence Community") gave the DCI marginally more authority." Power was further consolidated at the top through the signing of Executive Order 12333, increasing DCI autonomy, and the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, which helped to redefine "national" intelligence. In their review of existing intelligence studies, Warner and McDonald found several recurring themes: the need to sustain intelligence capabilities in peacetime; keep the intelligence community responsive to the Congress and the president; and hold a single individual responsible for the coordination of intelligence efforts. Warner and McDonald argue that many of the 9/11 Commission Report's recommendations have been implemented successfully. They attribute this result to strong political leadership on behalf of intelligence reform.[134]

More effective utilization of resources for national security purposes constitutes another strong argument for intelligence community integration. In a contribution to *Joint Force Quarterly*, Marine Corps General and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Peter Pace makes the case for "resource leveraging" by promoting the sharing of intelligence as well as the incorporation of information from non-intelligence agency sources. General Pace suggests that making this type of cooperation issue-specific produces more precise solutions to national security problems and makes more efficient use of resources both inside and out of the intelligence community.[135]

G. Gregg Webb seeks to draw lessons for contemporary policy debates in his case study of the effective intelligence liaison between the FBI and State Department from 1940 to 1944. Webb argues that President Roosevelt's creation of the Special Intelligence Services, which were located within the FBI but required DOS approval to conduct foreign intelligence tasks, forced collaboration between the agencies and an effective (though temporary) sharing of information. Webb encourages further analysis of this partnership and the integration of its more advantageous aspects into the structure of the modern day intelligence community.[136]

Despite the fact that calls for more fluid information sharing are one of the most prevalent suggestions in intelligence reform, there are those that reject the importance of such reform. In his remarks at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, James Woolsey maintained that information sharing is not necessarily the solution to improved intelligence methods. While he thought "sharing the right pieces of intelligence in the right circumstance can be extremely useful and provide the government a lot of leverage," he cites the story of the decoded Enigma machine in WWII as an instance of successful intelligence utilization in the absence of information sharing. Woolsey also rebuffs the claims that the events of 9/11 indicate a serious coordination problem within the U.S. foreign intelligence community and that the solution to this problem must be community reorganization. Rather, he suggests more minor gaps existed within particular agencies, such as the FBI, and that these specific weaknesses are what need to be addressed.[137]

Outdated information technology is viewed by many as a technical obstacle hindering intelligence gathering and sharing. While updating this technology should be an easy step to improving information networks and a move which should spark little controversy, critics of the intelligence community find themselves frustrated by the persistence of this problem. In an assessment of the State Department, the Foreign Affairs Council Task Force explains how a lack of funding and resources has resulted in a reliance on ineffective technology, which in turn makes communication within the DOS and between other agencies very difficult.[138] In his book *Securing America's Future: National Strategy in the Information Age*, Daniel Gerstein echoes the call for updated technology systems. Claiming that U.S. methods and procedures remain anchored in the Industrial Age, he suggests U.S. national security strategy will suffer because of an inability to reap the full benefits of the Information Age. Gerstein argues the lack of emphasis on improved technological means stems from U.S. national security strategies that lean toward the use of military and political hard power, while neglecting soft power methods. He argues that it is these soft

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[134] Michael Warner and J. Kenneth McDonald, U.S. "Intelligence Community Reform Studies Since 1947," (April 2005).
[135] "A Word from the Chairman," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 41 (April 2006), pp. 1-4.
[136] G. Gregg Webb, "Intelligence Liaison between the FBI and State, 1940-44." *Studies in Intelligence*, vol. 49, no. 3 (2005) 25-38.
[137] James R. Woolsey, "Remarks at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies," (Washington, DC, January 30, 2006), http://blueskybroadcast.com/client/sycoleman/eisenhower/docs/trans.pdf.
[138] Foreign Affairs Council Task Force. "Secretary Colin Powell's State Department: An Independent Assessment," (Washington, D.C., 2004), http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_04-06/fac/fac_task.html.

power methods—based in economic, social, and cultural realms—which demand the advanced information technology critical to our intelligence capabilities.[139]

Many technological advances, such as digital cameras for reconnaissance purposes, have already improved intelligence gathering capabilities. Nevertheless these innovations tend to be mission specific, may be of limited availability, and are best suited for intelligence gathering, not information sharing, purposes.[140] Some observers such as Eric Chabrow suggest that the creation of a website gateway for technology-related information resources can foster interagency cooperation. These databases would provide easy access to a store of valuable information, including technical reports, journal citations, and federal websites.[141] Such opinions are expanded upon by Kurt Fuller in his own book, *Leading at the Speed of Light: New Strategies for U.S. Security in the Information Age.* Fuller emphasizes the need for leadership to evolve alongside the technology it wields. He contends that skills must adapt to ensure that leaders are capable of performing in a constantly changing data- and information-rich environment.[142]

Information Operations (IO), a key component of national security and military strategy, is commonly cited as a body in need of modernization. In his assessment of the current status of Information Operations, Brad Ward describes the IO goal of "information superiority" as, "The capability to collect process and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same." However, limited approval authority, restricted influence over operations and tactics, constraining security procedures, and confusion over various agencies' responsibilities have resulted in debilitating coordination and dissemination problems. Accordingly, Ward emphasizes the need for the United States to capitalize on its technological advantages to achieve "information superiority" and an integrated Information Operations system.[143]

A study by Robert David Steele likewise finds that IO's focus has shifted over the years from the protection of critical infrastructures and prevention of electronic espionage to analysis and interagency information sharing. Steele stresses the importance of continued monitoring of global intelligence in all languages and presses for further improvements on the three IO elements: Strategic Communication, Open Source Intelligence, and Joint information Operations Centers. Advanced technologies are again deemed essential in IO innovation. Unlike most recommendations for intelligence reform which advocate top-down restructuring, however, Steele's methods can be implemented through a piecemeal approach.[144]

A final section of intelligence research looks beyond the internal gaps in the intelligence community to analyze the more external effects of intelligence gathering on institutions outside the IC and individual American citizens. In this sense, Richard Best suggests that collaboration between law enforcement and intelligence agencies has raised significant legal and administrative difficulties, particularly in the post-9/11 era. Furthermore, concerns have emerged that the increased use of information derived from intelligence sources in judicial proceedings sets a standard for obtaining information through underhanded means, potentially undermining civil liberties.[145]

V) The Global War on Terrorism

Perhaps no single issue requires more interagency effort and coordination—at least in terms of the number of U.S. federal, state, and local agencies involved—than the U.S. prosecution of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). From September 11, 2001 to the present, a myriad of U.S. public entities have redefined their missions and

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[139] Daniel M. Gerstein, *Securing America's Future: National Strategy in the Information Age*, (Praeger Security International: September 2005).
[140] Dewey G. Jordan "Operation Unified Assistance," *Marine Corps Gazette*, vol. 90, no. 5 (May 2006) 57-58.
[141] Eric Chabrow "Interagency Cooperation," *InformationWeek*, no. 920 (December 23, 2002), p. 14.
[142] Kurt Fuller, *Leading at the Speed of Light: New Strategies for U.S. Security in the Information Age (Issues in Twenty-First Century Warfare)* (Potomac Books: November 2006).
[143] Brad M. Ward, *Strategic Influence Operations: The Information Connection.*(Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2003), http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA415825.
[144] Robert David Steele. *Information Operations: Putting the "I" Back into DIME*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College 2006), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB642.pdf.
[145] Richard A. Best, Jr. *Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S.* Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (Washington, DC, 2001).

refocused their policies and priorities towards addressing the threat of terrorism at home and abroad. Analysts generally agree that "a new scale of extra-military cooperation beyond existing expectations or plans" is necessary to achieve success in countering terrorism.[146] Unfortunately, authors also generally agree that the current U.S. interagency system is not optimized for this task.

Recurring Problems

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States offered a series of recommendations on U.S. foreign policy, homeland security, and intelligence reform. With respect to the latter subject, its members called for creating a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) that would consciously draw on the Goldwater-Nichols model and combine a joint intelligence function with joint operational planning, thus serving as "a civilian-led unified joint command for counterterrorism."[147] The Commission also advocated establishing a Senate-confirmed National Intelligence Director (NID) in order to oversee both the national intelligence agencies and the newly proposed national intelligence centers. These bodies would integrate experts from a collection disciplines against common targets such as counterterrorism and nuclear proliferation.[148] The Commission also emphasized the importance of strengthening Congressional oversight of intelligence and homeland security.

The 9/11 Public Discourse Project, an informal successor to the official 9/11 Commission, gave overall government progress in the area of information-sharing a "D" grade in its final assessment of how well the U.S. government was implementing the recommendations of the original commission. It assessed U.S. government performance according to such criteria as providing incentives for information sharing, developing a government-wide "trusted information sharing" network for interagency activities, and using performance evaluations to encourage more effective communication. The authors of the Public Discourse Project's Final Report on the 9/11 Commission reaffirmed the 9/11 Commission's earlier criticisms regarding insufficient resources, minimal incentives, poor presidential backing for creating an improved information-sharing environment, and the existence of numerous complaints regarding information sharing.[149] Subsequently, the Department of Homeland Security's Advisory Council, in its most recent Report of the Future of Terrorism Task Force, also identified continued problems in this area and described increased information sharing between federal, state, and local law enforcement and intelligence agencies as critical to the success of future interagency efforts against terrorism.[150]

Marine Corps General Peter Pace argued that the lack of a figure below the level of president with the authority to direct agencies to work together in countering terrorism was yet another hindrance to the U.S. government's prosecution of the war on terror. In his assessment, this problem leads to faltering policy execution due to stovepiping and poor coordination.[151]

Analysts also believe that bureaucratic cultures plague interagency coordination in the GWOT. Martin Gorman and Alexander Krongard maintain that the current national security structure is not conducive to interagency operations because government culture rewards "bureaucratic self-interest" instead of agency sacrifices for a common goal.[152] In their assessment, without a new culture of cooperation, U.S. GWOT-related efforts will suffer from bureaucratic wastefulness and operational redundancies because they are conducted in a "piecemeal" fashion that prevents any long-term planning or progress.

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[146] Briem, "Joint Is Dead, p. 56.
[147] *The 9/11 Report*, p. 403.
[148] The Commission explicitly drew on DOD experience in describing the centers as "the unified commands of the intelligence world—a long-overdue reform for intelligence comparable to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols law that reformed the organization of national defense" (p. 22).
[149] 9-11 Public Discourse Project. *Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations* (December 5, 2005), at: http://www.9-11pdp.org/press/2005-12-05_report.pdf.
[150] U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security and Advisory Council (HSAC). *Report of the Future of Terrorism Task Force* (January 2007).
[151] Jim Garamone, "Discussion Needed to Change Interagency Process, Pace Says," *American Forces Information Service* (September 17, 2004) at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/n09172004_2004091704.htm
[152] Martin J. Gorman, and Alexander Krongard, "A Goldwater-Nichols Act for the U.S. Government: Institutionalizing the Interagency Process," *Joint Force Quarterly* no. 39 (October 2005), pp. 51-58.

In "Solving the Interagency Puzzle," Sunil Desai concludes that, while most of the necessary tools for successful U.S. prosecution of the war on terror exist, "the essence of the problem is that the entire interagency community is dominated by individual agency cultures rather than a common interagency culture."[153] Desai sees the lack of a coordinated interagency doctrine, personnel policies that reward dedication to the home agency, and disparate values, polices, and goals as fatal obstructions to a national security interagency system capable of fighting the war on terrorism.

In contrast, Tim Lannan, in his article "Interagency Coordination Within the National Security Community: Improving the Response to Terrorism," does not consider cultural differences to be a major problem. Instead Lannan believes that a "common threat-oriented objective" is often sufficient to overcome bureaucratic cultural differences.[154]

A small contingent of authors raises questions surrounding the role of strategic information campaigns in the war on terrorism. Rather than complaining about inadequate interagency information sharing, these authors focus on the inability of agencies to coordinate sufficiently well to develop effective U.S. public diplomacy efforts. Jeffrey Jones argues in his paper "Strategic Communications: A Mandate for the U.S.," that the resources currently allocated to information campaigns targeting terrorism are "insufficient by a factor of ten."[155] He believes that, with the dissolution of the U.S. Information Agency and the increase in propaganda by groups like al-Qaeda, serious interagency coordination is needed to ensure the United States can counter its terrorist adversaries in the battle for "hearts and minds."

Similarly, Jeryl Ludowese questions why, given the importance of the battle of ideas, the U.S. government has not substantially increased its funding for strategic communication and information campaigns in the same way that it has for other political, diplomatic, economic, and military efforts related to the GWOT.[156] In Ludowese's view, the United States has not developed a coherent strategy to communicate effectively with foreign audiences.

Policy Recommendations

To improve coordination of interagency activities and unity of effort in the GWOT, Gen. Pace suggests creating a "joint interagency task force" where designated cabinet or agency heads would take the lead on individual counterterrorism initiatives and direct personnel from different agencies. Gen. Pace believes that the creation of his "joint interagency task force" structure would help to overcome cultural problems because it would improve interagency trust and allow personnel to become acquainted with agencies other than their own. He also proposes better connecting incentives and promotions to interagency work. Making promotion contingent on interagency service is likely to quickly increase the level of interest in interagency cooperation and education about other agencies.[157]

Desai urges greater integration, education, and interagency initiatives to overcome cultural differences. Before the creation of any joint interagency headquarters, Desai suggests merging the National Security Council with the Homeland Security Council and creating a national interagency "university" to provide a similar education to all personnel, but particularly senior-level officials, across all agencies.[158]

Gorman and Krongard believe that nothing short of a legislative mandate will solve the cultural woes of the current interagency national security system. In their analysis, reform legislation should mandate structural and cultural changes to the system while providing for low-level strategy development, an interagency approach to policy

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[153] Sunil B. Desai, "Solving the Interagency Puzzle," *Policy Review* no. 129 (February/March 2005), p. 57.
[154] Tim Lannan, "Interagency Coordination Within the National Security Community: Improving the Response to Terrorism," *Canadian Military Journal* Vol. 5, No. 3 (Autumn 2004), pp. 49-56.
[155] Jeffrey B. Jones, "Strategic Communication: A Mandate for the United States," *Joint Force Quarterly* no. 39 (Fall 2005), pp. 108-114.
[156] Jeryl C. Ludowese, *Strategic Communication: Who should Lead the Long War of Ideas?* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006). Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA449416.
[157] Jim Garamone, "Discussion Needed to Change Interagency Process, Pace Says," *American Forces Information Service* (September 17, 2004) at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/n09172004_2004091704.htm
[158] Desai, "Solving the Interagency Puzzle."

implementation, and an interagency governing board, similar to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would evaluate interagency progress on a variety of national security efforts.[159] Colonel Lucynski also considers aggressive and robust legislation that completely restructures institutions and doctrine necessary in order to effectuate meaningful change.[160] Desai argues, however, that Congressional intervention is not necessary and that swift presidential action in the form of an internal directive or executive order could achieve sweeping results: "By executive order, the president can establish the basic doctrine, create—within his executive office—an office with the authority to develop it, and direct all executive branch agencies to submit proposals for aligning their regional structures and implementing personnel exchange programs such as those described here."[161]

Jeffrey Jones calls for creating an integrated interagency national strategic information policy that would unite the plethora of U.S. agencies dealing with public diplomacy and give them a common task and vision in the GWOT. To help achieve this objective, he favors creating regular interagency discussion forums that would involve representatives from the DOS, USAID, and the White House Office of Global Communications' (OGC) public diplomacy branches.[162]

A 2005 GAO report on the lack of a national communications strategy also advises the President to "revitalize the position of Director of the Office of Global Communications and provide clear direction to the OGC to form a unified approach." In addition, the GAO report suggested that in order to achieve a truly integrative approach to strategic communication efforts, the OGC should coordinate not only with DoS and USAID but also DOD and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.[163]

One unique proposition for improving unity of effort in the GWOT comes from Ashton Carter's *International Security* essay on "The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism." Carter deems solutions such as designating a lead agency, creating the Department of Homeland Security, and appointing a "terrorism czar" largely ineffective and inefficient.[164] Instead, he favors dividing up counter- and anti-terrorism duties according to a timeline. Various agencies would be assigned to tasks such as detection, prevention, protection, interdiction, containment, attribution, and analysis and invention. After performing its assigned task, an agency would not be involved in any later functions. According to Carter, this approach would streamline GWOT-related efforts by reducing the excessive breadth of GWOT-related activities currently undertaken by each U.S. government agency.

VI) Afghanistan, Iraq, and Post-Conflict Stability Operations

The current post-conflict stability and reconstruction operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are pushing the existing interagency "system" to its limit. Several authors have found major problems in the preparation and execution of both operations. Nevertheless, analysts also identify several key successes achieved in Iraq and Afghanistan and attempt to use these accomplishments as the basis for timely recommendations on improving interagency coordination across myriad fields.

<u>Recurring Problems</u>

[159] Martin J. Gorman, and Alexander Krongard, "A Goldwater-Nichols Act for the U.S. Government: Institutionalizing the Interagency Process," *Joint Force Quarterly* no. 39 (October 2005), pp. 51-58.
[160] Colonel John A. Lucynski III, United States Army, "An Interagency Reform Act: Preparing for Post-Conflict Operations in the 21st Century," *USAWC Strategy Research Project*, March 2005, http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA432527&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
[161] Sunil B. Desai, "Solving the Interagency Puzzle," *Hoover Institution Policy Review* February/March 2005. http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3431461.html
[162] Jeffrey B. Jones, "Strategic Communication: A Mandate for the United States," *Joint Force Quarterly* no. 39 (Fall 2005), pp. 108-114.
[163] U.S. Government Accountability Office, *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy*. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005). Available from http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05323.pdf.
[164] Ashton B. Carter, "The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism," *International Security* 26 (Winter 2001/2002), pp. 5-23.

Though Combatant Commanders swiftly and successfully executed the initial combat portions of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the literature describes the transitions to stabilization and reconstruction in these theatres as failures, particularly in Iraq. In the assessment of many authors, the problems in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other post-conflict operations derive from a lack of "unity of effort" – a broad criticism that encompasses communication failures, bureaucratic clashes, poor leadership, and the absence of interagency doctrine. For example, Peter Roman underlines the failure of military and civilian institutions to cooperate effectively in the operation when assessing the need for a Goldwater-Nichols type effort at the interagency level.[165] Donald Dreschler of the School for Advanced Air and Space Studies, describes Operation Iraqi Freedom as but the most recent example of "the failure associated with inadequate interagency planning."[166] According to the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Interagency planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) may be the best example of a need for revolutionary interagency reform."[167]

Analysts are particularly critical of collaboration between the Department of Defense and the State Department. They detail several causes for this poor interagency coordination including a lack of dialogue between the two agencies, competing priorities and philosophies, and a general state of interdepartmental conflict. For example, Robert Mendenhall points to a failure of the Departments of State and Defense to create an effective interagency working environment to plan for postwar efforts in Iraq ahead of time. While DOS spent nine months planning for the post-war situation, DOD spent only two months planning prior to the invasion and disregarded the suggestions offered by the State Department.[168]

According to Donald Dreschler, the State Department was virtually ignored by the DoD during preparations for the Iraq war. More surprisingly, when DOD finally consulted with State, the latter failed to properly involve its own Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping Office in the Political-Military Bureau—renowned for its successes in Kosovo. Due to "internal bureaucratic politics," the regional bureau and functional bureaus did not integrate their planning activities.[169]

The Iraq case illustrates an important conceptual point: the transnational nature of the twenty-first century security environment means that not everything can be managed, compartmentalized, and disaggregated. That is a difficult challenge to meet in the modern bureaucratic era, when organizational structures for dealing with given geographic areas vary from agency to agency, so much so that it is at times impossible to discern counterparts or brother/sister organizations. For example, the National Security Council and State Department regions do not correspond to those of the DOD or CIA. The National Security Council recognizes six operational regions; the DoD and CIA recognizes five.[170] For other agencies, organization seems to vary from location to location.[171] Also striking is the divergence between the levels of jurisdictional authority enjoyed by regional leaders of each agency, which Desai observes is easily detectible.[172]

Though James Hearn highlights President Bush's creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) at DOS as a possible means to avoid these prewar planning problems in the future, he

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[165] Peter Roman, "Can Goldwater-Nichols Reforms for the Interagency Succeed?" *The Henry L. Stimson Center*. April 19, 2007. http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?

[166] Dreschler, Donald, "Reconstructing the Interagency Process after Iraq," *the Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol 28, No. 1 3-30 Feb 2005

[167] Clark A. Murdock., et al., "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era—Phase I Report," *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, March 2004, http://www.ndu.edu/library/docs/0403BGN.pdf

[168] Robert K. Mendenhall, *Pre-War Planning for a Post-War Iraq* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2005).

[169] Donald R. Drechsler, "Reconstructing the Interagency Process After Iraq," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 1 (February 2005), pp. 3-30.

[170] Sunil B. Desai, "Solving the Interagency Puzzle," *Hoover Institution Policy Review* February/March 2005. http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3431461.html

[171] Neyla Arnas, Charles Barry, and Robert B. Oakley, "Harnessing the Interagency for Complex Operations," Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, August 2005. http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/Def_Tech/DTP%2016%20Harnessing%20the%20Interagency.pdf

[172] Sunil B. Desai, "Solving the Interagency Puzzle," *Hoover Institution Policy Review* February/March 2005. http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3431461.html

expresses concern that the office's prospects for success will remain questionable as long as it ignores the need to work with DOD in providing security for S/CRS projects.[173]

Interagency problems in Afghanistan and Iraq extend well beyond DoD-DoS rivalries to encompass other civilian and non-governmental organizations as well. Christopher Briem's examination of military-NGO relationships in Iraq and Afghanistan leads him to conclude that "an inability or unwillingness" on the part of the military to "leverage these [NGO] resources can only promote mission failure." Unfortunately, these relationships often are characterized by clashing cultures. In addition, the military in both Afghanistan and Iraq has found dealing with the plethora of NGOs operating in their region to be overwhelming.[174] Craig Currey also finds that a failure to address and organize military-civilian-NGO coordination effectively has led to redundant efforts, misunderstandings, and an overreliance on the military for humanitarian assistance.[175]

Outside the realm of "unity of effort", the United States experienced other major problems during the post-conflict phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. Craig Currey attributes many of these problems to the reactive, *ad hoc* nature of stability and reconstruction efforts in both areas. The military planners and Combatant Commanders responsible for an operation typically respond with whatever help from nearby NGOs or civilian agencies they can muster. Similarly, Gregg Gross, in his report on interagency reform in the 21st century, deems the *ad hoc* nature of planning for post-conflict reconstruction efforts (as executed in Iraq and Afghanistan) to be the main problem with the current interagency structure.[176] This nature of planning prevents agencies from proceeding beyond "crisis mode" and impedes their ability to create preventive, long-term plans for dealing with post-conflict stability operations. Yet, a lack of "sound doctrine" at the national level often lies behind the ad hoc nature of U.S. management of stability operations.

Several authors focus on the problem of uncertain authority in post-conflict stability operations. This problem manifests itself both when it is unclear who is in charge and when multiple, conflicting lines of authority exist. While not unique to the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the magnitude of these conflicts has made the problem both more visible and perhaps more serious in this context.

Christopher Schnaubelt's article, "After the Fight: Interagency Operations," focuses on difficulties in establishing and maintaining clear authority in Iraqi post-conflict interagency operations. The lack of an unambiguous leader between the two main organizations concerned with the planning and execution of Iraqi reconstruction, the Congressional Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), as well as questions surrounding their respective authorities, engendered problems relating to synchronizing efforts and executing orders.[177]

Opinions diverge among authors on whether interagency coordination problems in Iraq and Afghanistan derive mostly from difficulties at the operational level or whether strategic-level failures are largely to blame. Alan Mangan cites the latter issue as the underlying obstacle to effective interagency coordination. He claims that all recent efforts to plan, organize, and build resources for stability and reconstruction operations have been hampered by the absence of a grand strategy to guide operations.[178]

Those authors who take the "operational-level view" highlight a perceived lack of direction from the president and National Security Council, bureaucratic infighting in Washington and overseas, cultural differences between agencies, and an inherent aversion in many civilian agencies to the execution of long-term planning. Thomas LaFleur suggests that if the Bush administration had implemented Presidential Decision Directive-56, a directive

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[173] James J. Hearn, *Departments of State and Defense : Partners in Post-Conflict Operations: Is this the Answer for Past Failures?* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006).
[174] Christopher Briem, "Joint is Dead: What is Next?," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 130, no. 1 (January 2004), pp. 56-59.
[175] Craig J. Currey, *A New Model for Military/Non-Governmental Organization Relations in Post-Conflict Operations* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2003).
[176] Gregg E. Gross, *Interagency Reform for the 21st Century* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006).
[177] Christopher M. Schnaubelt, "After the Fight: Interagency Operations," *Parameters* (Winter 2005-06).
[178] Alan F. Mangan, *Planning for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations without a Grand Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2005).

adopted during the Clinton administration to ensure effective interagency cooperation, then some departmental level friction in Iraq might have been averted.[179] Major General Henry Stratman cites "philosophical and operational" differences as the major hurdles to overcome in creating effective interagency initiatives for the steady reconstruction of Iraq.[180]

Policy Recommendations

While the authors agree that the United States needs more effective interagency coordination in Iraq, Afghanistan, and future stability and reconstruction efforts, analysts disagree regarding how extensive agency reforms must be in order to solve this problem. Some authors favor creating new agency structures whereas others want to adjust existing bodies.

Several analysts conclude that only congressionally mandated change, implemented through binding legislation, will correct operational-level interagency deficiencies. For example, Christopher Naler ("Are We Ready for an Interagency Combatant Command?") advocates legislation to create an Interagency Combatant Command (IACC) that would harness all the diplomatic, military, economic, and informational elements of national power to institutionalize interagency cooperation. The IACC would have a number of Directorates, each with a Commander and two deputies (one civilian and one military) that would organize coordination between agencies.[181] Similarly, Robert Morris's examination of the military-NGO interagency relationship leads him to call for an "NGO coordination center" that could streamline NGO efforts to assist DOD and DOS and develop interoperability guidelines and strategies.[182] A 2005 Congressional Research Service Report calls for a permanent mechanism for joint civil-military operations to rectify the current *ad hoc* nature of the system, though the report does not elaborate on what form such a mechanism would take.[183]

Schnaubelt and Bogdanos prefer a less radical solution. They endorse giving greater authority and roles to Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs such as those employed in Afghanistan) in future stability and reconstruction efforts. According to Bogdanos, JIACGs "avoid the insular pitfalls of individual agencies by maintaining an unprecedented flow of information."[184] He also maintains that they work through the "honest broker" principle and allow all agencies involved in an operation to participate in its planning.

Another approach would entail realigning the geographic responsibilities of military and civilian agencies. John Pulliam, in *Lines on a Map: Regional Orientations and US Interagency Cooperation*, thinks that one problem arises from the fact that regional divisions within DOD and DOS do not match up. He believes that realigning each bureau and denying each agency the ability to "draw its own map" would enhance interagency coordination.[185]

Some authors recommend instituting a national-level interagency doctrine to strengthen interagency coordination at the strategic level. For example, James Jay Carafano favors enacting legislation obligating the executive branch to implement a distinct post-conflict doctrine that is developed in-theater with military personnel and regional interagency teams. Of this project, he writes that "experience and knowledge about peace operations have never

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[179] Thomas M. Lafleur, *Interagency Efficacy at the Operational Level* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2005). Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA435932.
[180] Henry W. Stratman, "Orchestrating Instruments of Power for Nationbuilding," *Joint Force Quarterly* no. 41 (April 2006), pp. 32-37
[181] Christopher L. Naler, "Are We Ready for an Interagency Combatant Command?", *Joint Forces Quarterly* Issue 41, (2nd Quarter 2006), p. 41
[182] Robert. Morris, "Train Like we'll Fight," *Armed Forces Journal* 142, no. 9 (April 2005), p. 36.
[183] Nina M. Serafino and Martin A.Weiss, "Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Capabilities: The State Department's Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization," *Congressional Research Service* (January 19, 2005). Available online from http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-7335:1.
[184] Matthew F. Bogdanos, "Interagency Operations: The Marine Specialty of This Century," *Marine Corps Gazette* Vol.90, Iss. 3 (March 2006), pp. 60-66.
[185] John E. Pulliam, *Lines on a Map: Regional Orientations and United States Interagency Cooperation* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2005)

been incorporated into mainstream military thinking in any major, systematic way."[186] Creating doctrine to guide interagency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan in this fashion would require strong leadership from the president.

Other authors downplay the need for such a doctrine. Stratman does acknowledge that no doctrine was in place to guide the transition from the CPA to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, or from the CJTF-7 to the MNF-I. Nevertheless, he claims that constantly reassessing and redefining the situation on the ground and molding actions to reflect those conditions—which requires flexibility that an excessively rigid doctrine might prevent—along with a high commitment to teamwork and a shared vision would be more than sufficient for successful interagency operations.[187]

Despite this difference, most authors agree that presidential leadership can play a critical role in ensuring the success of post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Without presidential engagement and the promotion of a shared long-term vision for interagency projects, the potential for failure rises significantly. Thomas LaFleur advocates presidential "supra-departmental" control over the interagency process to ensure all pieces move along smoothly.[188] Vicki Rast, in *Interagency Fratricide*, echoes this sentiment by emphasizing that leaders in the executive branch must ensure the interagency process functions smoothly. To this end, the president must energize the interagency process if it stalls and establish a clear strategic vision for the overall project.[189]

More generally, authors made a plea for educating civilian and military leaders on the importance of interagency cooperation and how to function in an interagency setting. Such education can include simulations and exercises that provide opportunities to practice interagency operations in a controlled environment. In addition, lower-level employees at both civilian and military agencies would benefit from short rotational stints in different agencies where they would build up personal contacts and relationships in an interagency fashion and become familiar with the operational philosophies and bureaucratic cultures of other agencies. The creation of an interagency "spirit" and culture could help break down departmental parochialism and agency cultural barriers to communication and information-sharing.[190]

VII) Analysis

Not everyone thinks the task of interagency reform is Herculean, as have many of the authors cited above. Deutch, Kanter, and Scowcroft suggest changes "more evolutionary than revolutionary."[191] The authors argue that the system worked very well until recently, but believe that new threats present challenges for the interagency process and NSC structure because a number of distinctions upon which the original system was built can no longer be assumed. These new threats may conflict with traditional priorities of agencies, requiring coordinated action by several agencies and flexible resource allocation. Still, the authors do not believe these shortcomings necessarily mean a "wholesale overhaul of the system" is required. They point out that "simply establishing clearer responsibility, especially in the interagency context, for taking and implementing decisions would make a big difference."[192]

Common opinion seems to hold that the greatest difficulties confronting interagency coordination are:
1. Poor information sharing
2. Lack of unity of effort and coordination among agencies during operations
3. Lack of unity of command
4. Poor planning

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[186] James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., and Dana R. Dillon, "Winning the Peace: Principles for Post-Conflict Operations," *Heritage Foundation Backgrounder* #1859 (June 13, 2005).
[187] Henry W. Stratman, "Orchestrating Instruments of Power for Nationbuilding," *Joint Force Quarterly* no. 41 (April 2006), pp. 32-37.
[188] Thomas M. Lafleur, *Interagency Efficacy at the Operational Level* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2005).
[189] Vicki J. Rast, *Interagency Fratricide: Policy Failures in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2004).
[190] Kenneth O. McCreedy, *Waging Peace: Operations Eclipse I and II -- Some Implications for Future Operations* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2004).
[191] Deutch, Kanter, and Scowcroft, "Strengthening the national security interagency process," 2000.
[192] Deutch, Kanter, and Scowcroft, "Strengthening the national security interagency process," 2000.

But according to some, these are mere symptoms, and not the real illness. The "the essence of the problem," as Desai points out, is parochialism and the lack of an interagency culture.[193] This is most evident in the constant tensions between DOD and DOS. This does not mean they should be merged or have some common authority other than the president placed about them. The tension is healthy when balanced. However, many believe it has tilted heavily towards the DOD since the end of War War II. Meanwhile, DOS has atrophied. Now the DOD and DHS and local emergency responders are facing off. The legal impediment of *Posse Comitatus* has assumed large importance for some authors.

There is a need, as Destler stresses, to combine domestic and foreign policy perspectives. One without the other is a limited view on what is needed for national security.[194] The solutions generally offered to deal with the perceived shortcomings of the current system as follows:
1. Centralization behind an existing agency; lead agency
2. Creation of a region-centered structure
3. Creation of a new agency/agencies or new positions
4. Presidential centralization
5. Government-wide Goldwater-Nichols

In many cases, people see one thing as a problem and its antithesis as the solution; if decentralization is the problem, then centralization is the solution; if the problem is the network nature of the government, the solution is a better hierarchy. But in reality, according to many authors, it is a balance of these tensions that could bring about efficiency and safety. Philip Odeen points out that effective organization for national security decision making requires determining "where centralization is essential and where decentralization makes sense."[195] Centralization will help plan and manage, but decentralization will keep the system adaptable and civil liberties intact. The interagency structure and process is all about dealing with such tensions.

Tucker's analysis also argues against massive structural reorganization along the lines of a new National Security Act and instead urges building on current flexibility by placing responsibility for reform with individual agencies while limiting the NSC to a coordinating role.[196] Clement's report concludes that a blend of the current system, a lead-agency model, and an NSC-centric model is most likely.[197]

Unity of effort does not mean literal unity. Laipson thinks moderate solutions may be preferred, writing that "We need to strike the balance right, preparing… for maximum effectiveness in interagency activities, but understanding that most of the workforce will and probably should remain in their individual disciplines."[198]

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[193] Sunil B. Desai "Solving the Interagency Puzzle." *Policy Review* 129 (February/March 2005) 57.
[194] I. M. Destler. "National Security Advice to U.S. Presidents: Some Lessons from Thirty Years," *World Politics* 29:2 (January 1977) 143-176.
[195] Philip A. Odeen, "Organizing for National Security," *International Security* 5:1 (Summer, 1980) 111-129.
[196] David Tucker. "The RMA and the Interagency: Knowledge and Speed Vs. Ignorance and Sloth?" *Parameters* 30:3 (Autumn 2000) 66.
[197] David Clement. *Improving the Efficiency of the Interagency* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006). Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA449531.
[198] Ellen Laipson with Olga Romanova eds., *Improving the Interagency Process to Face 21st Century Security Challenges* (Henry L. Stimson Center Workshop Report, October 2005).

National Security Reform Bibliography

I. National-level Commissions and Studies on Interagency Reform

9-11 Public Discourse Project. *Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations*. 2005. Available from http://www.9-11pdp.org/press/2005-12-05_report.pdf.
This report provides a useful assessment of progress towards implementing the 9/11 Commission recommendations as of December 2005. While not all of the report's evaluations are relevant for the purposes of assessing interagency coordination, Part II of the report, which considers the implementation of 9/11 recommendations for reforming the institutions of government, provides insight into the effectiveness of recent interagency reforms. While awarding the establishment of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) "B" marks, the report acknowledges that much work remains to be done on these structures. The authors of the report urge the DNI to achieve substantive reform of the intelligence community by smashing stovepipes and creating unity of effort. In the end, they determine that DNI leadership, the president, and congressional oversight will ultimately determine the success of the DNI. Furthermore, the report states that the NCTC lacks sufficient resources and personnel to perform its intelligence and planning roles. At the FBI, the report gives the creation of an FBI national security workforce a "C" grade, noting that the FBI's shift to a counterterrorism posture has not been institutionalized and remains plagued with serious deficiencies. The authors of the report are even more critical of progress toward establishing incentives for information sharing, awarding the government a "D" mark in this regard. The report criticizes the establishment of minimal incentives, a lack of high level government support for the program manager for information sharing, and the continued existence of complaints about poor information. Overall government-wide information sharing also receives a "D" in this report. Insufficient resources and presidential backing for information sharing are noted. The report advocates establishing firm information sharing policies and procedures as well as a system of performance evaluation in order to better encourage information sharing. For homeland airspace defense the report awards the government a "B-," noting that awareness and information sharing have improved but that such policies are not yet comprehensive. For improved performance, the report recommends the establishment of a single agency that will direct the interagency response to airspace violations. Finally the report advocates further reform of congressional intelligence oversight, giving efforts in the area a grade of "D."

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era: Phase 1 Report.* 2004. Available from http://www.ndu.edu/library/docs/0403BGN.pdf.
Beyond Goldwater-Nichols (BGN) is a working group of the Center for Strategic and International Studies charged with the task of assessing and evaluating various options for reforming the defense and intelligence structures in the United States; one of the focal points in this and other BGN reports is the issue of interagency cooperation. In the section entitled "Improving Interagency and Coalition Operations," the panel underscores the importance of cooperation in the twenty-first century strategic environment—particularly in complex contingency operations—when it notes impressionistically that "the past decade of experience in complex contingency operations, from Somalia to Iraq, has demonstrated that success requires unity of effort not only from the military but also from across the U.S. government and an international coalition." *The working group argues that the nature of contemporary global politics will mandate U.S. participation in operations that, by their very nature, demand a "high degree of integration and coordination."* Unfortunately, panel members conclude that status quo efforts to promote integration, coordination, and interoperability are grossly insufficient, and that a renewed focus on cooperation between federal agencies will be essential to future operational success: "*Because the U.S. military will rarely operate outside the interagency and coalition contexts, its unmatched capabilities to win wars will be squandered if the United States and the international community more broadly do not also develop the capabilities needed to win the peace*." The report identifies several factors that currently preclude an adequate level of interagency integration: 1) No doctrine—"*Unlike the military, which has a doctrine and a standard approach to planning operations, the U.S. government as a whole lacks established procedures for developing integrated strategies and plans*… This ad hoc approach has thwarted institutional learning and often hindered performance"; 2) No planning culture and lack of civilian integration—"Whereas military officers are taught to see planning as critical to success in operations and trained in its finer points, this notion is largely foreign to other agencies like the Departments of State and Treasury. With the exception of the Agency for International Development (AID), which

plans long-term development projects, the civilian agencies tend not to have dedicated planning staffs or expertise"; 3) Lack of NSC leadership—Furthermore, there is little capacity on the National Security Council staff dedicated to integrating strategies and plans or monitoring their execution… A strong NSC role as integrator is necessary to counteract agency parochialism, identify potential disconnects and synergies, and elevate contentious issues to the Deputies and Principals for decision, preferably before American lives and treasure are on the line"; 4) Civilian deployment capacity—"Another source of poor U.S. performance in complex operations is the lack of rapidly deployable experts and capabilities in most civilian agencies. Most civilian agencies do not focus on the conduct of operations and therefore lack an operational culture." The BGN panel accordingly makes several policy recommendations to ameliorate the problems plaguing the current model for interagency cooperation: first, they *advocate the designation of a Deputy Assistant to the President on the NSC as having the lead responsibility for integrating agency strategies*; second, each presidential administration should commission an extensive review of the previous administration's success and/or failure in complex contingency operations and revise existing doctrine to ensure future success; third, Planning offices for the secretaries of all relevant federal agencies should be formed; fourth, for each military or federal agency operation, the president should designate a *single person* in charge of agency integration; fifth, Congress should "establish a new Agency for Stability Operations... that is charged with: assessing and preparing stability operations; organizing, training, and equipping civilian capabilities for such operations, and rapidly deploying civilian experts and teams to the field"; finally, Congress should mandate the creation of interagency training centers, exchange programs, and ensure that adequate funding is delivered to these and all other interagency initiatives.

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era: Phase 2 Report*. 2005. Available from http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/bgn_ph2_report.pdf.
This follow-up report to the "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols (BGN): Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era" Phase 1 report assesses and makes recommendations on interagency policymaking and execution, and Defense Department reform. Its major theme is that "in an era of fast-moving, unpredictable challenges, government should be more agile." Its proposals emphasize the need to eliminate redundancies that produce inefficiency and bureaucratic conflict, while assuring maximum alignment of authority and accountability. Key recommendations include: establishing a Quadrennial National Security Review and a classified National Security Planning Guidance to formulate national security strategy; creating joint NSC/OMB mission area reviews for national security priorities; developing a national security career path that gives personnel incentives to gain education and experience outside their home agency; holding regular NSC-chaired interagency summits in each region of the world; building more deployable civilian operational capacity; folding the Homeland Security Council into the National Security Council; and converting the National Defense University into a National Security University.

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. *9-11 Commission Report.* 2004. Available from http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf.
The 9-11 Commission's final report reviews government deficiencies related to 9/11 and argues that the United States must transform its national security institutions so that it can respond to new threats and challenges with quickness, imagination, and agility. Key recommendations include: creating a National Counterterrorism Center for joint operational planning and joint intelligence on terrorism; developing information procedures that provide more incentives for sharing information and establishing a government-wide "trusted information network"; strengthening congressional oversight by establishing a joint intelligence committee or a single committee in each house that combines authorization and appropriations powers and creating a single, principal point of oversight and review for homeland security; and accelerating the process for national security appointments.

U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century. *Phase III Report: The Road Map for National Security.* 2001. Available from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nssg/phaseIIIfr.pdf.
In this report, the Commission concludes that significant changes must be made to the structures and processes of the U.S. National Security apparatus. The Commission offers organization change in five key areas: 1) ensuring the security of the American homeland; 2) recapitalizing America's strengths in science and education; 3) redesigning key institutions in the Executive Branch; 4) overhauling the U.S. Government's military and civilian personnel systems; and 5) reorganizing Congress's role in national security affairs. The specific recommendations of the Commissions include the creation of an independent National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA), new office of Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security to oversee DOD activities, doubling of the federal research budget by

2010, the passing of a new National Security Science and Technology Education Act to produce the needed number of professionals in science and engineering, and a redefinition of the responsibilities of the Under Secretary for Global Affairs. In this assessment of the next twenty-five years, the Commission provides both a strategy (Phase II) and a program of reform to achieve that strategy (Phase III). The report is tempered with the realization that most recommendations will not be implemented due to lack of determined leadership or appropriate method. Key recommendations include: *developing a top-down strategic planning process for national security linked to the allocation of resources*; reducing the number of Senate-confirmed political appointments; expanding the National Security Education Act of 1991; establishing a National Security Service Corps; merging congressional national security appropriations subcommittees with their respective authorizing committees; and forming a permanent congressional consultative group on national security.

U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century. *Road Map for National Security: Addendum on Structure and Process Analyses*. Washington, DC: United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, 2001. Available from http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/nssg/www.nssg.gov/addedumpage.htm.
The USCNS/21 seeks to identify how the interagency and inter-branch processes currently operate, as it recognizes that in order to make credibly recommendations to improve the national security apparatus it is first important to understand how the apparatus functions. According to the report, *the NSC is playing an increasingly large role in national security, which is both positive, in that it is small and agile, and negative, as it is dependent on many departments and agencies* and frequently intimidates other "interagency players" with its authority, often even encroaching on the authority of other branches. Additionally, there is often a tendency towards informal processes over formal ones, which can lead to "cut corners." *One weakness in all interagency planning is that there is not enough attention paid to long-term planning, as all agencies are more focused on crisis mode.* Many people lack training and experience, as there is presently no top-level body that can coordinate interagency planning on the scale necessary. The 21st century security environment requires closer integration of economic strategy and policy with more traditional security and foreign policy activities. While this was partially alleviated by the formation of the NEC, the NEC itself has problems, namely that its staff is much smaller than that of the NSC, is not yet codified into law, and it has very limited long-range planning aspirations, rarely even planning a year in advance. The DOS has inadequate funding, a disconnect between policy-making and program and resource planning and doesn't integrate regional and functional policies well, often simply adding new functional bureaus to deal with a more complicated global environment, which has been ineffective. The DOD dramatically needs to be reshaped, as it does not adequately take advantage of new information technology. Additionally, it is best during crises and less adept at long term planning, and the DOD needs to improve its sharing of information with other organizations. The Executive and Legislative branches do not consult effectively enough to satisfy the demands of the new security environment. *The budget process needs to be revamped, as at the present there is no single process or document that links the national security strategy to executive branch resource allocation decisions*. Often there is a fair bit of redundancy and overlap between organizations. The report goes as far as to say, "at present the United States is unprepared organizationally and functionally for the scale and nature of emerging threats to the American homeland." Problem of recruiting and training are likely to become even greater, as government salaries cannot compete with the private sector. Policies exist for interagency monitoring of policy implementation, under PDD-2 and PDD-56, but they are rarely fully observed.

The National Commission on the Public Service. *Urgent Business for America: Revitalizing the Federal Government for the 21st Century*. 2003. Available from http://www.brookings.edu/gs/cps/volcker/reportfinal.pdf.
Report argues that the notion of public service and the organization of the U.S. government are in disarray. It asserts that the government is unable to attract or retain many talented personnel, and that the government's structure and operations are "a mixture of the outdated, the outmoded and the outworn." Key recommendations include: reorganizing government into a limited number of mission-related executive departments, with managers of their operating agencies chosen for their operational skills and given the authority to develop management and personnel systems appropriate to their missions; giving the president expedited authority to recommend structural reorganization of agencies and departments; realigning congressional committee oversight to match the mission-driven reorganization of the executive branch; speeding and streamlining the presidential appointments process, and reducing the number of political appointments; increasing judicial, executive, and legislative salaries to ensure a reasonable relationship to salaries for comparable jobs outside government; developing flexible personnel management systems that meet the special needs of operating agencies; simplifying and accelerating the recruitment

of federal employees; and formulating and enforcing clear standards for outsourcing that advance the public interest and do not undermine core competencies of government.

National Partnership for Reinventing Government (formerly the National Performance Review). "Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less," 1993. Available from http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/nprrpt/annrpt/redtpe93/index.html.
The final report of the National Performance Review (NPR), "Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less," encourages agencies to find more effective means of doing government business. The NPR report contained 384 major recommendations covering 27 federal agencies and 14 government systems, such as procurement, human resource management, and budgeting. These recommendations include: 1) Create an Interagency Regulatory Coordinating Group; 2) Provide government-wide leadership, direction, and commitment for effective management of the executive branch; 3) Direct department and agency heads to designate chief operating officers; 4) Establish a bipartisan, bicameral workgroup, including executive and legislative branch representatives, to serve as a forum for identifying and resolving issues of mutual concern; 5) Use multiyear performance agreements between the President and agency heads as a tool or guide for downsizing, reengineering, partnering across established boundaries, and empowering teams with authority, skill and accountability; 6) Establish an interagency program to improve the federal government's procurement workforce; 7) Use the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service and DoI's Bureau of Mines cooperative research project as a model to take the lead in developing an interagency program of research and development and implementation of mine cleanup on federal lands, beginning with a thorough inventory of mining sites; 8) Provide interagency funding mechanisms for joint development financial systems projects; 9) Establish an interagency team to develop a plan for improving federal information technology acquisitions; and 10) Establish a high-level Interagency Ecosystem Management Task Force to begin development of a number of cross-agency ecosystem management demonstration projects.

National Defense Panel. *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century*. 1997. Available from http://www.dtic.mil/ndp/FullDoc2.pdf.
This report focuses on the broad transformations needed to address the long-term issues facing U.S. defense and National Security. The key recommendations include: 1) Review the entire national security structure to better anticipate and shape changes in the international environment; 2) Establish a cadre of interagency professionals; 3) Establish a fully integrated, national crisis center; 4) Develop a unified, multimedia communications system; 5) Streamline the transfer of funds among and within agencies; 6) Improve a coordination between State and Defense Department; 7) Implement geographic and functional bureaus and unified commands. and 8) Establish an interagency long-range, strategic planning process.

II. National-level Commissions and Studies on Defense/Intelligence/Emergency Reform

Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction Report to the President, *Overview of the Report* (May 31, 2005). Available from http://www.wmd.gov/report/overview_fm.pdf.
The initial responsibility of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction was, "to find out how the Intelligence Community erred in Iraq and to recommend changes to avoid such errors in the future." Ultimately, the report offers case studies, covering Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan, in an attempt to uncover the intelligence community's capabilities and flaws. The commission draws lessons from these studies and focuses on how to make the new DNI intelligence structure effective. The report concludes that *the intelligence community "has too little integration and too little innovation to succeed in the 21st century. It rarely adopts integrated strategies for penetrating high-priority targets; decision-makers lack authority to resolve agency disputes; and it develops too few innovative ways of gathering intelligence*." The report proposes detailed solutions to address these issues. Key recommendations are to: create an integrated intelligence community structure under the DNI; establish a National Counter Proliferation Center which, with a small staff, will oversee analysis on WMD across the IC; *and organize the intelligence community around missions.* The DNI needs management structures and processes than ensure strategic, community-level focus on priority missions. The report also proposes the establishment of DNI "Mission Managers" who will be responsible for creating strategies related to one intelligence target. It recommends information sharing should be improved by requiring the information sharing Program Manager to report to the President through DNI and expanding the Information Sharing

Environment to include all intelligence information. Also, the DHS-IC relationship should be strengthened by eliminating a 1980s Treasury Department order that requires high-level approval for all Immigration and Customs Enforcement information sharing. Addition recommendations are to: create a new "integrated collection enterprise" process for managing collection that is harmonized with intelligence priorities; reorient the Department of Justice to facilitate intelligence gathering; *create a single office, under the authority of an Assistant Attorney General for National Security, with responsibility for counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and intelligence investigations*; more fully integrate the FBI into the intelligence community under the DNI; create a new Human Intelligence Directorate within the CIA to coordinate all human intelligence operations overseas; create an Open Source Directorate within the CIA. This report is intelligence-centered, providing a useful description of problems in the intelligence community as well as detailed recommendations for IC reform. In proposing solutions, the report addresses both interagency issues and concerns regarding specific departments.

Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, *Hearing on Homeland Defense/Homeland Security,* Federal News Service, Washington, D.C. (May 4, 2006).
This testimony, from a serious of experts (John Marsh, Frank Cilluffo, and James Carafano) on various aspects of utilizing and improving the National Guard and Reserves. Their recommendations for improving interagency cooperation with the Guard and Reserves, specifically in the event of a terrorist attack or a natural disaster are as follows: regional offices, based on the regional FEMA offices, should be established to better coordinate federal responses to disaster areas, especially during the initial 72-hour time period; these offices should contain representatives from DOD, DHS, HHS, Transportation, Guard and Reserve, local and state governments, NGOs, and the private sector; joint planning, training, and exercises should be implemented and undertaken under U.S. NORTHCOM or the recommended regional FEMA offices; the establishment of a Homeland Security University to support the creation of effective and joint doctrines for homeland security and defense situations; JIATF, a highly successful counter-narcotics operation, should also serve as a model for developing interagency doctrine for transnational threats; elevate the National Guard Bureau, incorporating it into the Joint Chiefs of Staff; also elevating National Guard Bureau to the deputy commander of US NORTHCOM (this recommendation was disputed among the witnesses, but initially recommend by Frank Cilluffo); the establishment of five national units that can deploy rapidly, assess the situation, and quickly restore basic services and infrastructure (the units would include parts that resembled FEMA regional teams, Army Corps of Engineers, while providing almost civilian police force capabilities).

Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) of the Armed Forces, *Directions for Defense.* Report to Congress, the secretary of defense, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (May 24, 1995). Available from http://www.fas.org/man/docs/corm95/corm_pr.htm.
This article focuses on the "unclear future" for the DOD amidst "rapid change, diverse contingencies, limited budgets, and a broad range of missions to support evolving national security policies." The commission recommends improving unified military operations (increasing jointness), making support more efficient and responsive, and improving defense management and direction.

Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. *Report of the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.* 1999
"The U.S. Government is not effectively organized to combat proliferation." This report makes recommendations for individual agencies involved in the fight against proliferation and suggests improvements to their interagency organization and communication. The report suggests a high level of Presidential leadership and the creation of a new council that would work to centralize anti-proliferation activity. First and foremost, effective organization and well defined policy options are vital to a successful anti-proliferation plan because of the large number of agencies that are involved. The report explores the WMD threat emanating out of areas such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea, China, and Russia. Given the variation of weapons (chemical, nuclear, biological) and infinite number of places and ways they can be used, extensive interagency work will be required to cover the immense breadth of the proliferation threat. The skeletal structure of the report's recommendation starts with Presidential leadership and the clear definition of U.S. anti-proliferation policy options. Next, an intelligence system must be equipped to deter attacks. Finally, an effectively organized interagency process with clearly defined responsibilities for individual agencies is needed to oversee this immense operation of deterrence and response.

The commission devotes a considerable amount of time in the report to recommendations for the interagency process. A working relationship between Congress and the Executive is vital and will only develop if communication on the issue of proliferation exists. Also, delineating the anti-proliferation process would help both this relationship and interagency organization. A well defined beginning to end procedure for policy development would eliminate overlapping work done by two or more agencies and would allow a tangible entity for the budgetary process to address. The report suggests that interagency coordination be the responsibility of one authority. This could be the Secretary of State, Defense or a new head of agency position. Efficiency and accountability will bring the anti-proliferation process more attention and more energy.
The commission's centerpiece is the creation of a National Director of Combating Proliferation. The National Director (ND) would oversee the interagency process to measure the total amount of work done throughout involved agencies. It is the ND's responsibility to determine what kind of technology, support and reorganization is needed to improve the process. Transparency will be vital to the oversight, coordination, and evaluation of the interagency process that this report calls for.

The report does well to identify the fact that the unique threat of WMD will require a technologically savvy response. In order to keep technology acquisition efficient a government wide plan should be instituted to put suppliers in direct contact with the anti-proliferation effort. The WMD threat is also unique in that it extends beyond U.S. borders. Therefore, the response must be international. The number of agencies that would work with foreign countries and international organizations could result in too many contact points. In order to increase efficiency, international cooperation on the level of individual agencies must be well coordinated. The report's solution to this potential problem is a single well defined policy and one exit point for outgoing intelligence.
The report goes into detail on improvement efforts individual executive agencies could make to the anti-proliferation process. This involves the creation of anti-proliferation Directors in most agencies whose job it would be to coordinate activity within their respective agency. The ND should have access to the resources of each executive agency in order to maximize the Council's capabilities. An example of this would be consultation with the Attorney General on the legal limitations of anti-proliferation operations. The commission sees a substantial lack of coordination in the proliferation efforts between agencies. The main recommendations are the centralization of authority on proliferation activities. These activities most notably include technology acquisition, intelligence and intelligence sharing, and interagency communication.

Committee on Armed Services (Staff), ***Defense Organization: The Need for Change,*** **Report to the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate. US Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C. 1985.**
This report provides a general overview of various agencies within the government, like the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military, as well as Congress, in order to assess the organization of the agencies and their overall effectiveness. The study is critical of the organization and decision-making procedures of the Department of Defense and Congress. The report points to the fact that the Department of Defense is so large and complex that it complicates any measures that try to solve problems the agency may be having. Because of the increasing and changing demands of protecting United States security interests in the dynamic international environment, there have been a number of problems that have arisen, and the report makes note of some of these: Limited mission integration at the Department of Defense's policy-making level; Imbalance between service and joint interests; Imbalance between modernization and readiness; Inter-service logrolling; Inadequate joint advice; Failure to adequately implement the concept of unified command; Unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort in the top management headquarters of the military departments; Predominance of programming and budgeting; Lack of clarity of strategic goals; Insufficient mechanisms for change; Inadequate feedback; Inadequate quality of political appointees and joint duty military personnel; Failure to clarify the desired division of work; Excessive spans of control; Insufficient power and influence of the secretary of defense; and Inconsistent and contradictory pattern of Congressional oversight. For each agency mentioned, there is a general discussion of its organization/framework, problem areas and causes, descriptions of solutions to problem areas, an evaluation of alternative solutions, and final recommendations.

Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives (Staff Study). ***IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century,*** **Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives,** ***One Hundred Fourth Congress.*** **Washington, DC: GPO.**
The intelligence community has been largely shaped by the Cold War, which created intelligence norms such as the organizations and relationships found throughout the IC. The study aims to determine which intelligence norms are

outdated and need to be revised. The guiding concept behind the IC21 is to identify the type of IC that will best address the national security threats into the 21st century. The study breaks down its recommendations into two categories. The first part discusses those recommendations with the purpose of being introduced as a bill and the second part discusses those that should be considered by the Executive through non-legislative means. *The first proposal by the study emphasizes the need for the IC to function as a corporate entity. Another key issue that the study deals with is the role of the Director of Central Intelligence. The study calls for a closer relationship between the President and the DCI and the DCI's direct control over the Clandestine Service, which should be separate from the Central Intelligence Agency.* Further, the Secretary of Defense should work in unison with the DCI to appoint the directors of the National Foreign Intelligence Program. And to allow the DCI to transfer limited amounts of money between NFIP programs or agencies, Section 104(d) of the National Security Act requires amendment. The study also urges for the reestablishment of a Committee on Foreign Intelligence and the creation of additional Deputy Director of Central Intelligence positions to promote "corporateness." Moreover, the Director of Military Intelligence should have authority over the Joint Military Intelligence Program and the Tactical and Intelligence-Related Activities. To solve the collection management process, technical collection activities and first-tier exploitation should consolidate into a single agency, the Technical Collection Agency. Another agency, the Technology Development Office, should perform the research and development functions. To assure that the DCI can oversea the entire intelligence process, the National Intelligence Evaluation Council should be established to evaluate IC-wide collection and production. As readily seen from the legislative proposals, the study suggests the creation of these new agencies under the purview of the DCI will advocate the "corporateness" of the IC. In addition, the study recommends non-legislative suggestions to improve production capabilities, efficient budgeting, personnel cooperation, and research and development. The study also details its recommendations to expand IC technical collection capabilities, to increase the Clandestine Service's role in operations overseas, to properly evaluate IC centers, to facilitate appropriate information sharing between law enforcement agencies and to invest in IC communications infrastructure to ensure its capabilities in the future. In the aggregate, the study postulates that the international situation has changed since the Cold War and for the IC to function properly, the creation of new agencies are needed along with other changes to ensure that the IC21 can attend to the national security threats it faces.

Hill, Eleanor (Director, Joint Inquiry Staff), *Joint Inquiry Staff Statement: Proposals for Reform within the Intelligence Community* (October 3, 2002). Available from http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/100302hill.html.
This hearing focused on how the Intelligence Community could and should be changed to strengthen and improve the ability of the U.S. government to counter terrorist threats. It gives an excellent history of reform:
Since Congress passed the National Security Act in 1947, numerous independent commissions, experts, and legislative initiatives have examined the growth and evolving mission of the Intelligence Community. In general, it states, these reports identified several areas where improvement was needed, including: 1) Development of a strong national security strategy; 2) Information sharing with other federal agencies and with state and local government organizations; 3) Greater emphasis on human intelligence; 4) Additional resources for analysts and linguists; and *5*) *Restructuring the distribution of responsibilities and authorities between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense*.
This Joint Inquiry focused on particular themes in a series of studies.

The 1995-1996 Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, commonly referred to as the Aspin-Brown Commission, included the following among its key findings: 1) Intelligence agencies must be integrated more closely with the law enforcement community; 2) Intelligence agencies must function more closely as a "Community"—there was insufficient central authority and too many administrative barriers that impeded cooperation; 3) The process for allocating resources to intelligence agencies was severely flawed—workforces were not aligned to needs, multiple personnel and administrative systems were inefficient, and modern management practices needed to be utilized; and 4) The confidence of the public in intelligence matters needed to be restored.
In 1996, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence conducted a review of the Intelligence Community and published a staff study entitled, "IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century." Its key findings included: 1) The Intelligence Community would benefit greatly from a more corporate approach to its basic functions, e.g., stronger central management, reinforced core competencies in collection, analysis, and operations, and a consolidated infrastructure; 2) The DCI required additional authorities to manage the Community as a corporate entity; 3) There was little collaboration between collection agencies and all-source collection management; and 4) The National Security Act and existing Executive Orders were sufficiently flexible to allow

improved cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence without blurring the important distinction between the two.

General William Odom, one of the witnesses at this hearing, authored a report in 1997 entitled: "Modernizing Intelligence: Structure and Change for the 21st Century." The report included the following observation: "*No organizational reform can overcome the absence of effective leadership and management, but dysfunctional organizational structure can neutralize the efforts of the best leaders.*" The report also included the following key recommendations: 1) Strengthen the role of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) in providing unique national-level analysis, and overseeing analysis and production throughout the Intelligence Community; 2) Separate the Directorate of Intelligence from the CIA and subordinate it to the DCI through the NIC; 3) Require the DCI to conduct a structural review of the Intelligence Community every five years; and 4) Restructure CIA by giving it two major components—the national clandestine service (NCS) and a component for handling overt HUMINT. Designate the Director of this restructured organization as the national manager for HUMINT.
In 2000, the National Commission on Terrorism, led by Ambassador Paul Bremer, found that, among other things: 1) The FBI, which is responsible for investigating terrorism in the United States, suffered from bureaucratic and cultural obstacles to obtaining terrorism information; 2) The Department of Justice applied the statute governing electronic surveillance and physical searches of international terrorists in a cumbersome and overly cautious manner; 3) The risk of personal liability arising from actions taken in an official capacity discouraged law enforcement and intelligence personnel from taking bold actions to combat terrorism; 4) The U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities lacked the ability to prioritize, translate, and understand in timely fashion all of the information to which they have access; and 5) The law enforcement community was neither fully exploiting the growing amount of information it collected during the course of terrorism investigations nor distributing that information effectively to analysts and policymakers.

Among the Commission's key recommendations were the following: 1) The Attorney General should ensure that the FBI is exercising fully its authority for investigating suspected terrorist groups or individuals, including authority for electronic surveillance; 2) Funding for counterterrorism efforts by CIA, NSA, and FBI must be given higher priority; and 3) FBI should establish a cadre of reports officers to distill and disseminate terrorism-related information once it is collected.

Finally, the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, recommended that steps should be taken to: 1) Ensure HUMINT collection remains a central core competency; 2) Improve watchlisting and language capabilities; 3) Ensure consumers receive the most reliable reporting and that sufficient analysis is applied; and 4) Share information more completely.

Joint Inquiry Staff Proposals for Reform within the Intelligence Community, *Final Report. The Context: Part One: Findings and Conclusions* (December 10, 2002). Available from http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/congress/2002_rpt/intelfindings.pdf.
This review of the events surrounding September 11 revealed a number of systemic weaknesses that hindered the Intelligence Community's counterterrorism efforts before September 11. If not addressed, the authors warned, these weaknesses would continue to undercut U.S. counterterrorist efforts. Some faults prior to September 11 included: 1) Failure to adequately adapt, to meet the challenge posed by global terrorists focused on targets within the domestic United States; 2) Gaps between the collection coverage provided by U.S. foreign and U.S. domestic intelligence capabilities; 3) U.S. foreign intelligence agencies paid inadequate attention to the potential for a domestic attack; 4) The CIA failed to watchlist suspected terrorists aggressively, reflecting a lack of emphasis on a process designed to protect the homeland from the terrorist threat; 5) Lack of an effective domestic intelligence capability. The authors also had the following critiques about pre-9/11 operations: 1) Neither the U.S. Government as a whole nor the Intelligence Community had a comprehensive counterterrorist strategy for combating the threat posed by Usama Bin Ladin; 2) An accumulation of intelligence priorities, a burdensome requirements process, the overall decline in Intelligence Community funding, and reliance on supplemental appropriations made it difficult to allocate Community resources effectively against an evolving terrorist threat. Inefficiencies in the resource and requirements process were compounded by problems in Intelligence Community budgeting practices and procedures; 4) The Intelligence Community's understanding of al-Qa'ida was hampered by insufficient analytic focus and quality, particularly in terms of strategic analysis. Analysis and analysts were not always used effectively; 5) The Intelligence Community was not prepared to handle the challenge it faced in translating the volumes of

foreign language counterterrorism intelligence it collected; 6) The Intelligence Community's ability to produce significant and timely signals intelligence on counterterrorism was limited by NSA's failure to address modern communications technology aggressively, continuing conflict between Intelligence Community agencies, NSA's cautious approach to any collection of intelligence relating to activities in the United States, and insufficient collaboration between NSA and the FBI regarding the potential for terrorist attacks within the United States. 7) The U.S. Government does not presently bring together in one place all terrorism-related information from all sources. Within the Intelligence Community, agencies did not adequately share relevant counterterrorism information, prior to September 11. This breakdown in communications was the result of a number of factors, including differences in the agencies' missions, legal authorities and cultures; 8) Serious problems in information sharing also persisted, prior to September 11, between the Intelligence Community and relevant non-Intelligence Community agencies; 9) The Intelligence Community did not effectively develop and use human sources to penetrate the al-Qa'ida inner circle; 10) During the summer of 2001, when the Intelligence Community was bracing for an imminent al-Qa'ida attack, difficulties with FBI applications for Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) surveillance and the FISA process led to a diminished level of coverage of suspected al-Qa'ida operatives in the United States; 11) The Intelligence Community depended heavily on foreign intelligence and law enforcement services for the collection of counterterrorism intelligence and the conduct of other counterterrorism activities; 12) There was no coordinated U.S. Government-wide strategy, and reluctance in some parts of the U.S. Government, to track terrorist funding and close down their financial support networks.

The recommendations were: 1) Congress should amend the National Security Act of 1947 to create and sufficiently staff a statutory Director of National Intelligence who shall be the President's principal advisor on intelligence and shall have the full range of management, budgetary and personnel responsibilities needed to make the entire U.S. Intelligence Community operate as a coherent whole. The Director of National Intelligence should be a Cabinet level position; 2) The National Security Council should prepare a U.S. government-wide strategy for combating terrorism, both at home and abroad; 3) The position of National Intelligence Officer for Terrorism should be created on the National Intelligence Council; 4) Congress and the Administration should ensure the full development within the Department of Homeland Security of an effective all-source terrorism information fusion center; 5) The FBI should strengthen and improve its domestic capability as fully and expeditiously as possible; 7) *Congress should review the scope of domestic intelligence authorities to determine their adequacy in pursuing counterterrorism at home and ensuring the protection of rights guaranteed under the Constitution*; 9) The House and Senate Intelligence and Judiciary Committees should continue to examine the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and its implementation thoroughly, particularly with respect to changes made as a result of the USA PATRIOT Act; 10) Make NSA a full collaborating partner with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the war on terrorism, including fully integrating the collection and analytic capabilities of NSA, CIA, and the FBI; 11) The Committees should also consider issues pertaining to whether civilians should be appointed to the position of Director of the National Security Agency and whether the term of service for the position should be longer than it has been in the recent past; 12) Recognizing that the Intelligence Community's employees remain its greatest resource, the Director of National Intelligence should require that measures be implemented to greatly enhance the recruitment and development of a workforce with the intelligence skills and expertise needed for success in counterterrorist efforts. Including: *Congress should consider enacting legislation, modeled on the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, to instill the concept of "jointness" throughout the Intelligence Community. By emphasizing such things as joint education, a joint career specialty, increased authority for regional commanders, and joint exercises, that Act greatly enhanced the joint warfighting capabilities of the individual military services. Legislation to instill similar concepts throughout the Intelligence Community could help improve management of Community resources and priorities and insure a far more effective "team" effort by all the intelligence agencies. The Director of National Intelligence should require more extensive use of "joint tours" for intelligence and appropriate law enforcement personnel to broaden their experience and help bridge existing organizational and cultural divides through service in other agencies. These joint tours should include not only service at Intelligence Community agencies, but also service in those agencies that are users or consumers of intelligence products. Serious incentives for joint service should be established throughout the Intelligence Community and personnel should be rewarded for joint service with career advancement credit at individual agencies. The Director of National Intelligence should also require Intelligence Community agencies to participate in joint exercises….*

The authors also advised that steps should be taken to increase and ensure the greatest return on this nation's substantial investment in intelligence, including: 1) There should be sustained, long-term investment in

counterterrorism capabilities that avoid dependence on repeated stop-gap supplemental appropriations; 2) Long-term counterterrorism investment should be accompanied by sufficient flexibility, subject to congressional oversight, to enable the Intelligence Community to rapidly international agreements, including extradition and mutual assistance treaties, would strengthen U.S. counterterrorism efforts.

Other recommendations were that: Congress should improve its oversight of the Intelligence Community; over-classification should be confronted so as to expand access to relevant information for federal agencies outside the Intelligence Community, for state and local authorities, which are critical to the fight against terrorism, and for the American public; and finally, Congress and the Administration should ensure the full development of a national watchlist center that will be responsible for coordinating and integrating all terrorist-related watchlist systems.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Staff). ***Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign,*** **Report to the Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 2006. Available from http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_senate_committee_prints&docid=f:31324.pdf.**
This report focuses on the increasing friction between the Departments of State and Defense in executing the anti-terror campaign. The expanding role of military personnel in international counterterrorist efforts has created vulnerabilities for interagency turf wars. *Funding for civilian activities has remained stagnant, whilst the military has taken further steps to enhance its influence in various foreign countries. The author finds this to be quite troubling, arguing that embassies need to become the focal point of all international counterterrorism efforts.* Embassies, in coordination with the Secretary of State, present civilian diplomatic channels through which international counterterrorism efforts can be centralized. Key Recommendations are: 1) Ambassadors should be given more responsibility and authority in the anti-terror campaign by being in charge of approving all military-related programs implemented in the country. They should also have the authority to "challenge and override directives from other government agencies in Washington to their resident or temporary staffs in the embassy."; All security assistance, including section 1206 funding (for military affairs), should be included under the authority of the Secretary of State to facilitate the coordination of civilian and military counterterrorist efforts; The legislative branch should increase funding for civilian foreign affairs agencies to levels requested by the President; The Secretary of State should expand the Department of State's Regional Strategic Initiative to include regular meetings devoted to devising regional responses to terrorism. Such meetings should include personnel of senior level, including interagency officers and ambassadors.

Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. ***Counterterrorism Intelligence Capabilities and Performance Prior to 9-11: A Report to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Minority Leader,*** **July 2002. Available from http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_rpt/hpsci_ths0702.html.**
The principal objective of this report and the work of the Subcommittee was to review the counterterrorism capabilities and performance of the Intelligence Community before 9-11 in order to assess intelligence deficiencies and reduce the risks from acts of terrorism in the future. The Committee notes early that all USG agencies charged with the counterterrorism mission should agree on a single definition of terrorism, something lacking. The Subcommittee supports a standard definition as follows: *"Terrorism is the illegitimate, premeditated use of politically motivated violence or the threat of violence by a sub-national group against persons or property with the intent to coerce a government by instilling fear amongst the populace."*

Summary Findings and Recommendations Across Agencies include: *The CIA needs to institutionalize its sharp reorientation toward going on the offensive against terrorism*. And also: 1) CIA leadership must ensure that HUMINT collection remains a central core competency of the agency, and should develop additional operational tools, in conjunction with other appropriate agencies (FBI, etc,), penetrate terrorist cells, disrupt terrorist operations and capture and render terrorists to law enforcement as appropriate. More core collectors need to be put on the streets; 2.) CIA should ensure that a management structure is in place to steward the multiyear investments needed to build new platforms to collect on terrorist targets; 3) CIA should lead an effort to improve watchlisting to ensure that all relevant agencies have access to a common database of up-to-date terrorist person-related data. The creation of a terrorism watchlisting unit at CIA may be a useful first step; 4) The 1995 guidelines on the recruitment of foreign assets and sources must be rescinded immediately, and replaced with new guidelines that balance concerns

about human rights behavior and law breaking with the need for flexibility to take advantage of opportunities to gather information on terrorist activities, as required by law.

The summary finding regarding FBI is that *FBI's main problem going forward is to overcome its information sharing failures.* And also: 1) "Ensuring adequate information sharing" should be communicated throughout the Bureau as the Director's top priority, and a clear strategy incorporating the personnel dimension, the technical dimension, and the legal dimension of the information-sharing problem should be developed and communicated immediately; 2) Improve intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities; 3) Address foreign language shortfalls; 4) The FBI Director should review the IT implementation strategy to ensure that it incorporates plans to facilitate the necessary information sharing processes needed within the intelligence.
The summary finding regarding NSA is that *NSA needs to change from a passive gatherer to a proactive hunter - a revolution in how it conducts its work.* And also: 1) NSA should review its processes for setting collection and analysis priorities to ensure that appropriate resources and effort are devoted to important targets like CT; 2) In conjunction with the community, NSA should develop a long-term strategy for ensuring appropriate number of linguists are available as well as ensuring a structure for surge linguist capabilities in unanticipated crisis areas; 3) NSA should review its signals research and target development effort to ensure that long-term objectives in the counterterrorism effort are met, especially in follow-on phases beyond the campaign in Afghanistan; 4) NSA must define and implement an integrated system that can follow a target across the global intelligent network; 5) NSA should work with an outside body of experts on resource management and organizational restructuring to ensure that its organizational reform efforts currently underway appropriately align current mission needs, expected future needs, resources, and organizational processes and structures.

The authors also advised creating senior staff positions within the leadership of both parties to coordinate and address terrorism and homeland security issues, and budgets, in conjunction with the existing committees of jurisdiction. The Subcommittee also listed important questions to assist in setting the Subcommittee's agenda going forward. They are equally informative for many studies. The questions included: *What will the end-state homeland security architecture need to look like? What are the key intelligence-related components necessary in such an architecture? Where they do not yet exist, how must we begin to build them? How should we rebalance America's need for security—and strong intelligence and warning—with other American ideals, such as economic prosperity and personal liberty. What ought to be the legal framework guiding the homeland security intelligence collection and analysis missions?*

U.S. White House. "The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned," *The White House,* March 2006. http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/index.html. 228 pages.
This lengthy document is parsed into seven chapters and 5 appendices. The theme is "lessons learned" for a natural disaster, the response for which is widely seen as inadequate and ineffective. The main issue at stake, the central question implicitly asked, is whether or not the National Response Plan (NRP) of 2004 was appropriately executed as designed or if there were/are fundamental flaws in its original composure. In the end, coordination between local, state, and federal authorities proved far more difficult than appeared on paper. The scope of the paper, however, is focused on the Federal role in the response effort. The authors write that "Our current system for homeland security does not provide the necessary framework to manage the challenges posed by 21st Century catastrophic threats." Regarding Katrina directly, they write, "The Federal response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrates that the Department of Defense (DOD) has the capability to play a critical role in the Nation's response to catastrophic events" and "The Department of Homeland Security should lead an interagency review of current policies and procedures to ensure effective integration of all Federal search and rescue assets during disaster response" (Ibid). However, they maintain that "The Federal government cannot and should not be the Nation's first responder."
In the concluding sixth chapter, the report focuses on "Transforming National Preparedness" as the most critical component to improve future preparedness. Two priorities for this transformation are identified as: 1) implementation of a comprehensive National Preparedness System, and 2) foster a new, robust "Culture of Preparedness" in the citizenry.

The report is "organized in a manner to give the reader the most comprehensive and clear understanding possible of what happened during the federal response to Hurricane Katrina" and in particular, to analyze federal efforts that failed so as to provide a framework for improved future preparedness. Early chapters set out a comprehensive chronology of the storm's development as well as an assessment of the hurricane and its resultant flood as "the most

destructive natural disaster in US history." "Only by understanding what the storm was, and was not, can appropriate and measured assessment of the response take place," the report claims and appropriately, the study offers detailed information on the death toll, property damage, communications problems, and economic difficulties caused by Katrina. This information prepares the reader for the analysis that follows: a "National Preparedness Primer" that explains how the federal response system was organized pre-Katrina, an analysis of "lessons learned" from the incident, and finally, a guide to "transforming national preparedness." The report highlights the need for more unified management, control, and command of homeland security activities and stresses the dangers of complex bureaucratic federal government structures when the Nation is faced with a catastrophe, whether caused by nature or a terrorist attack. In addition to improving operational activities—search and rescue, communications, evacuation, debris removal, and medical support—the study also sets a goal of making decision-makers on federal, state, and regional levels more knowledgeable about emergency plans.
The report's recommendations ultimately center on two points: (1) creating a "comprehensive" National Preparedness System and (2) promoting a "new, robust Culture of Preparedness." Developing an effective National Preparedness System would benefit from examining the more successful national security strategy as a model, a structure which "is built on deliberate planning that assesses threats and risks, develops policies and strategies to manage them, identifies specific missions and supporting tasks, and matches the forces or capabilities to execute them." Most importantly, the National Preparedness System would provide for unified command and strengthen operational capabilities. The System would be enhanced by advancing a "Culture of Preparedness" which accepts that disasters will occur on a national level, stresses initiative, and enables the multiple levels of government, the public and private sectors, and individual citizens to understand their roles and impact on homeland security activities. The report concludes with appendices that list, among other information, more than 125 technical recommendations to federal agencies and responders.

III. Congressional Record

Congressional Record – Senate. Tuesday, Nov. 25, 2003. 108th Congress, 1st Session. 149 Cong Rec S 15948.
Investigation into the Lack of Coordination Between Federal Agencies.
The Department of Justice is being criticized for their unwillingness to provide information to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. By failing to provide this necessary intelligence, the Department of Justice is hampering the investigations concerning national security that the committee is undertaking. Members of this particular committee had requested information about persons who had been the subject of terrorism investigations between September 1991 and September 2001. The response of the Department was a denial of the request along with the following reason: "The primary reason cited was that the Department had a longstanding policy of not providing Congress with information about people who have been investigated but not prosecuted". Previously, the FBI and the INS were part of the same overall Department of Justice and could thus share information legally. However, after the INS had been moved from the Department of Justice to the Department of Homeland Security and renamed the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, the Department of Justice cited the Privacy Act when refusing to share information with other departments. The Committee on Governmental Affairs stresses how important it is to US national security to share information about the naturalization and permanent residencies of all those who are being investigated for terrorist activity. The Committee on Governmental Affairs will continue to investigate these matters concerning cooperation between the FBI, INS and Department of Justice, and states that "*it is deeply disturbing to bureaucracy trumped national security and common sense*."

Congressional Record – Extensions. Monday, May 21, 2007. 110th Congress, 1st Session. 153 Cong Rec E 1108.
Introduction of the Ocean and Coastal Mapping Integration Act.
The mapping and charting of the U.S. coasts and marine waters is an issue that is of great national importance. The mapping of these waters provides seafarers with nautical charts that enable them to safely navigate their vessels. The maps are also used to locate and protect cultural resources and natural formations, identify sensitive habitats, manage and conserve fishery resources and protected species, as well as identify sources of energy and ensure that energy development is done in a way that is compatible with other uses of the oceans. Currently there are ten agencies, along with dozens of private entities, academic institutions, and state and territorial agencies that conduct these various activities in an uncoordinated manner. One problem is the use of various techniques in collecting data, which results in incompatibility when one compares the data between different agencies. Another problem is the issue of redundancy, where one agency is not aware that a particular area has already been investigated by another and proceeds to waste time and resources collecting data from that area. There is no "central port" from which all of

this data could be accessed and easily obtained. The U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy released a report "recommending actions needed to improve ocean policy in the United States." The Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife, and Oceans also held a hearing on March 29, 2007 "to learn of the most pressing problems with our current ocean management system." The most commonly cited problem was the lack of coordination between federal agencies and other levels of government. This is the reason why the Ocean and Coastal Mapping Integration act is being introduced. Among the suggestions of this act is the recommendation that "existing federal mapping activities be consolidated and coordinated, and that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) lead this effort". The National Research Council, the NOAA, as well as the United States Geological Survey have also identified a strong need for coordination. "Their findings included a need for a consistent spatial framework, increased access to geospatial data and mapping products, and increased inter- and intra- agency communication, cooperation and coordination."

Congressional Record – Extensions. Wednesday, April 26, 2006. 152 Cong Rec E 613. *Introduction of the National Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act of 2006.*
The United States relies extensively on the personnel of the National Guard in order to provide the nation with a sense of security and safety. The National Guard is a component of the Department of Defense that has been vital to the Department's accomplishments both at home and abroad. This proposed bill would do a number of things to elevate the status of the National Guard. They include: representation at the highest levels in the Department of State, establish the National Guard Bureau (NGB) as a joint activity of the Department of Defense rather than merely the Departments of the Army and Navy, and provide a seat on Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. *This bill would also require the National Guard to, "in coordination with the State Adjutant Generals, identify gaps between Federal and State emergency response capabilities which might best be filled through military assistance to civil authorities and to make recommendations for National Guard programs and capabilities to fill those gaps, in coordination with the States."* The Committee on Government Reform and the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina have conducted investigations into the role that the National Guard has played during various national events. The ones that concern interagency cooperation or lack thereof are as follows: 1) State governors have supplemented the nation's airports with National Guard personnel. The NG is also frequently used to support U.S. Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Border Patrol in post-9/11 security matters; 2) The NG continuously supports State security missions, Federal security missions under "Operation Noble Eagle" and overseas military operations; 3) *The NG is its State's primary emergency response force,* working with local civil authorities, such as law enforcement, fire departments, and other emergency service providers; 4) "The Department of Defense, the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force have not sufficiently integrated the National Guard into planning, procuring or decision-making"; 5) "The Department of Defense does not adequately resource or equip the National Guard for its current operational missions. Currently National Guard receives only 4.5% of the Department of Defense's budget"; 6) When developing its Future Total Force Strategy, the Air Force has failed to adequately consult Air National Guard leaders and State Adjutants General; 7) The Department of Defense and the National Guard must plan and exercise together in order to prepare for local emergencies. The lack of coordination of the National Guard and active duty forces hampered the military response to Hurricane Katrina; 8) There is not enough insight into State response capabilities or adequate communication with governors, which is what contributed to a lack of understanding between these agencies during response efforts to Hurricane Katrina. *Overall, there seems to be a lack of communication between state actors and the national agencies that coordinate responses to national disasters such as Hurricane Katrina.* Transparency must become a top priority if the National Guard is to function as an agent that protects the national security of the American people.

Congressional Record – Senate. Tuesday, March 20, 2007. 110th Congress, 1st Session. 153 Cong Rec S 3400. Improving America's Security Act of 2007.
Regarding information sharing within the Department of Homeland Security, this bill mandates that the Secretary shall "designate an information sharing and knowledge management officer who shall report to the Chief Intelligence Officer regarding coordinating the different systems used in the Department to gather and disseminate homeland security information." For other sources of information, i.e. state, local, and private sector, the chief intelligence officer is required to establish department-wide procedures and policies for the integration of information gathered from these various sources as well as make the relevant information available to members of the department and other agencies within the government.

Congressional Record – Senate. Thursday, March 25, 2004. 108th Congress. 2nd Session. 150 Cong Rec S 3167. Drug Trafficking and Terrorism.
Senator Grassley states that "while the link between terrorists and drugs has been make countless times publicly, we, as a Nation, have yet to attack the problem with an approach that is consistent and successful." The departments in charge of catching and prosecuting drug traffickers do not take full advantage of the resources available to them. Because this is such a widespread problem, the United States needs the help of other nations in prosecuting these criminals. Mr. Grassley advocates communication between law enforcement agencies nationally and internationally. He also states that it is vital that interagency cooperation regarding this matter become a priority because "no one agency has all of the tools, information, resources, or skills to get the job done alone." It is also important to be able to count on local law enforcement agencies because "they know best what's going on in their communities and often have the best, most effective approach to stem the flow of crime within their borders." Thus, the best way to try to solve this problem would be to try to implement a system of information sharing and coordination among the various agencies that work with catching and prosecuting drug traffickers.

IV. Books

Alia, Craig J. "Assessing Proposals for Interagency Reorganization," *School of Advanced Military Studies Monographs* (May 26, 2005). Available from http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,311.
"Assessing Proposals for Interagency Reorganization" examines two interagency reform studies, the Center for Strategic and International Studies' "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols" and the Markle Foundation's "Protecting America's Freedom in the Information Age" in order to understand and compensate for the flaws of the respective studies while capitalizing on their respective strengths. The author chose these reports because he determined that they effectively represented the two competing organizational theories that affect interagency structure. In undertaking this assessment, the analysis provides a useful summary of the studies and new proposals for reform. The paper's author, Craig Alia, acknowledges the present problems of interagency coordination and states that the, "*…inability to coordinate actions and to share information contributed to the terrorist attack on 9-11 and impeded efforts in the conflicts that followed those attacks.*" Alia's analysis briefly iterates coordination problems, outlines congressional goals for reform, and conveys three critical government shortcomings, as proposed by Hans Binnendijk: a lack of an organizational structure capable of harnessing U.S. government capabilities, an absence of technological linkage across agencies, and the nonexistence of a decentralized planning process coordinated by the NSC. Alia concludes that the interagency process has a dual nature, formed of determinant and emerging strategies, and is in reality a "network embedded in a hierarchy." Given this conclusion, the analysis determines that interagency reforms must account for both determinant and emerging strategies in the interagency process. According to these criteria, Alia finds that recommendations for interagency reform presented at congressional hearings, much like the reforms that created the Department of Homeland Security, fail to properly consider environmental and organizational factors. More specifically, the CSIS study, which was designed according to 20th century organizational theory, sees *structure as the solution to interagency reform*. Though providing some useful recommendations, the study only addressed deliberate strategy and its proposed reforms failed to provide a means for both technological linkage and an organizational structure capable of harnessing U.S. capabilities. The Markle Foundation study, which was designed according to postmodern organizational structure, focuses on *information management as the solution to interagency coordination problems*. Again, while effectively addressing problems of interagency coordination, the Markle study, which did not address the physical requirements of crisis response, failed to provide comprehensive reforms because it lacked an effective deliberate strategy for interagency coordination. *Alia concludes that the approaches of the two studies must be combined to create a "hybrid" reform which considers the hierarchical system (deliberate strategy) and the informal interagency network (emerging strategy). Such reform would create a single, post-modern networked entity that is singularly accountable and responsible for operations.* More specifically, organizational theory could be used to shape the CSIS recommended Agency for Stability Operations and establish an agency with hierarchy and postmodern connectivity characterized by knowledge diffusion. Alia also underscores that any reform must ensure that the interagency is capable of interacting with state and local governments, academia, and private institutions with relevant knowledge.

Arnas, Neyla, Charles Barry, and Robert B. Oakley, "Harnessing the Interagency for Complex Operations," Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University (August 2005). Available from http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/Def_Tech/DTP%2016%20Harnessing%20the%20Interagency.pdf.

Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq—these are the locations of the most recent U.S. stabilization and reconstruction operations, and success has been limited in almost all locations, claims Neyla Arnas of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Charles Barry, retired U.S. Army officer, and Robert Oakley, former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Zaire, and Somalia. "Harnessing the Interagency for Complex Operations" postulates that *the ad hoc nature of these operations has played a large role in the failure*: "The United States has been involved in S&R operations for the past 15 years with mixed success because of the ad hoc nature of pulling together interagency resources." There must be a doctrine—"an efficient, commonly understood model to guide USG actions"—if success is to be achieved in the twenty-first century. This doctrine must also mandate cooperation between the civilian and military sectors—"Fighting and winning wars is more than a military undertaking. It requires achieving political goals that go beyond defeat of an enemy force." Indeed, myriad aspects of complex operations in foreign countries—cultural, economic, and socio-political—demand an integrated response by the federal government. Iraq has raised a whole series of questions about interagency operations, naturally, as abject failure there has often been attributed to a lack of integration. Arnas, Barry, and Oakley believe that "military forces can, with their resources, reconnect some essential services, but their efforts cannot approach the standards requires for S&R success without additional assistance, especially over the long term." A second impediment to strategic cooperation between agencies is a *lack of authority and leadership*. "The relationships among other top-level interagency officials are not as clear. In particular, the span of control and authority of both the senior civilian representative—ambassador or President's Special Representative—and the senior military commander in the field are often hard to define." The trio also notes that hierarchies vary from agency to agency in regions abroad—often, they argue, organizational structures of the State Department, CIA, and DOD vary in operational environments abroad. Arnas, Barry, and Oakley highlight a proposed model for interagency cooperation proposed by the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability Operations (S/CRS): "Only the S/CRS model has a conceptual structure that address national policy and strategy through tactical level implementation." If the S/CRS model isn't politically palatable, or is unworkable for any reason, they enumerate a series of changes that must be made, at a minimum, for interagency cooperation to move from the planning stages to reality: *"At a minimum, the following would help interagency collaboration and coordination: A bargain between DOD and civilian agencies in which civilian agencies agree to participate in complex operations and the Defense Department agrees to help provide them with the capacity to do so"; Unity of command in the field; complex contingency planning; and enhanced NSC leadership are equally vital.*

Bardach, Eugene. *Getting Agencies to Work Together.* Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998.
In an effort to provide a conceptual framework for understanding the benefits and difficulties of interagency collaboration, Bardach offers both theoretical analysis and advice to practitioners on "creating value through collaboration." For Bardach, interagency collaboration involves those activities by agencies that are "intended to increase public value by having the agencies work together rather than separately." While collaboration in many circumstances may amplify public value, collaborative activities are often deterred by a bureaucratic culture that aims to distinguish an agency's mission and operations. This "pluralism problem" is often encouraged by emphasis on democratic concepts that concentrate on accountability. However, Bardach explains, "Substantial public value is being lost to insufficient collaboration in the pubic sector…Political and institutional pressures on public sector agencies in general push for differentiation rather than integration, and the basis for differentiation is typically political rather than technical." To overcome this hurdle, Bardach suggests that practitioners enhance what he calls "purposiveness," the blending of individual creativity and favorable conditions for interaction and collaboration. The book explains this process through craftsmanship theory, which compares collaboration to the craft-like skill of building a house. Both construction of a house and interagency collaboration depend on certain variables, such as creativity, skill, and resources. Though many chapters are devoted to theory, Bardach also analyzes several case studies in order to provide a more concrete explanation of the book's concepts and give advice to practitioners. He also develops a more practical angle by discussing "smart practices" that practitioners can rely on to promote interagency collaboration. Though the work does not delve into the challenges posed to interagency collaboration by federalism and many chapters are overly conceptual, it does provide useful insight for collective decision-making.

Best, Richard A., Jr. *Intelligence Issues for Congress.* Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005.
Best examines the U.S. Intelligence Community reorganization in light of new 21st Century threats. He notes the enhanced interest by the executive and legislative branches for greater cooperation amongst various agencies comprising the Intelligence Community. Of major concern are new and emerging transnational threats, which

continue to evolve. The Intelligence Community and Congress have a strong determination to overcome these new threats. *A significant issue is the disparagement between data collected and data analyzed*. The Intelligence Community has a considerable amount of information but lacks the personnel with the appropriate skill sets to assess that data. The reorganization of the U.S. Intelligence Community is put into the context of the post-Cold War era. During the Cold War, the Intelligence Community was focused on training in specific language areas, and making contacts with high-profile figures. In the post-Cold War era, the Intelligence Community must analyze data in a variety of language areas and their dialects. Not only does the Intelligence Community have to maintain contact with high-level figures in countries around the globe, but also ordinary individuals that may pose a potential threat. For best, this drastically changes the way the Intelligence Community collects and analyzes signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, and human intelligence. In addition, specialists in measurement and signatures analysis are highly-trained professionals that are difficult to retain in the Intelligence Community because of their potential for greater advancement in the private sector. Budgetary issues particularly with regards to Congress are explored, as are issues specifically geared toward military intelligence. There is a concern on the legislative level that the U.S. military analysis lacks the language skills and regional familiarity to focus available intelligence to conduct strategic analysis. A suggested manner to mitigate these shortcomings is to forge greater collaboration of intelligence agencies and their capabilities. The recent effects of the 9/11 attacks have prompted Congress to look at a serious reorganization of the Intelligence Community. *There is greater emphasis on the need for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to share information*, particularly with the newly-created Department of Homeland Security. Best goes on to describe counter-terror efforts of the Intelligence Community with regards to the Israeli-Palestinian situation, Iraq, Missile Defense, Kosovo/Operation Allied Force, the 9/11 Investigations, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, and counterintelligence.

Best, Richard A., Jr. *Intelligence Community Reorganization: Potential Effects on DOD Intelligence Agencies.* Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2004.

Best provides a brief overview of intelligence agencies operating under the Department of Defense: The National Reconnaissance Office, The National Security Agency, The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence components of the military services. He describes the roles these agencies play as part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program. Best explains the duties of the Secretary of Defense with regards to the national intelligence missions of defense agencies, and the formation of the position of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence. In the 9/11 aftermath, a strong need for intelligence agency reform was founded. Proposals included the formation of a National Intelligence Director to oversee a unified budget for intelligence reflecting the priorities set by the National Security Council. Much of the blame for the 9/11 intelligence failure falls upon the regulatory framework that created a wall between foreign intelligence and law enforcement. Critics argue the creation of this position undermines the traditional role of the Secretary of Defense. *At any rate, it is widely accepted that a communications barrier contributed to the 9/11 failure*. Congress enacted legislation to mitigate such problems, which not only created different but in some cases, also institutions. The Patriot Act seeks to improve communications by allowing law enforcement and foreign intelligence to share information; the newly created Department of Homeland Security, receives and analyzes foreign intelligence and related law enforcement information, and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, provides integrative analytical functions. These initiatives, in addition to technological innovation, have torn down, or at the very least lowered the barrier to communications amongst intelligence agencies. Nevertheless, critics argue such *reforms are futile unless the political will exists to force intelligence organizations to implement a uniform set of security standards, particularly with regards to data storage and retrieval*. Bureaucratic obstacles and the unique cultures surrounding each intelligence agency prevent such action. In 2004, the Intelligence Authorization Act created a pilot program allowing CIA and DIA analysts to access signt (signals intelligence) contained in NSA databases, but not published in formal NSA reports. The 9/11 commission encouraged acceleration of this project. In 2004, the office of the Director of National Intelligence was formed. The DNI has significantly greater budgetary authority than the DCI. Nonetheless, the authority to allocate funds does not mean that the DNI has the authority to direct day-to-day operations, which has been in the traditional stewardship of the DCI. The DCI has a history of coordinating tasks and providing information to government consumers with NSC guidance. The Joint Intelligence Community Council (JICC): Comprised of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and other top officials, advises the DNI with regards to establishing requirements, budgets, financial management, and monitoring and evaluation of intelligence agencies' performance.

Best, Richard A., Jr. *Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S.* Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2001.

This report looks at the separate roles and missions and distinct identities of intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Coordinating their efforts has raised significant legal and administrative difficulties that have been only partially overcome despite the creation of elaborate coordinative mechanisms under the oversight of the National Security Council. Some observers also have expressed concerns about the greater use of information derived from intelligence sources in judicial proceedings, fearing that it may lead to over-reliance on surreptitious means of information collection and, thus, undermine civil liberties. Other observers have cautioned that redirecting intelligence assets to collect information for legal cases may reduce support available to military commanders and policymakers. Some others believe that there may also be an overemphasis on law enforcement in dealing with problems rising abroad. The report notes the employment of covert actions by intelligence agencies in certain law enforcement efforts.

Best, Richard A., Jr. *National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment*. New York: Novinka Books, 2001.
Best examines the role of the National Security Council and its evolution since its formation via the National Security Act of 1947. The NSC is studied in detail from its earliest beginnings in the Truman Administration to the George H.W. Bush Administration. Due to the date of publication of this book, Best is only able to comment very little on the current George W. Bush Administration. The book is organized into two parts. The first deals with the organizational of the National Security Council in the various administrations where the second part the History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997 gives an historical context the modus operandi of the administrations in power.

Best, Richard. *Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization, 1949-2004*. CRS Report for Congress, September 24, 2004.
This piece provides an overview of efforts to reorganize the U.S. Intelligence Community since its beginnings in 1947 with the passage of the National Security Act, which established the statutory framework for the U.S. Intelligence Community. Best describes a range of proposals from the 1940s onwards that attempted to reform the Intelligence Community, ranging from a total dissolution of the Central Intelligence Agency, to expanding the powers of the Director of Central Intelligence. These proposals are examined within an historical context, most notably in three periods: post-World War II era, the Cold War era, and the post-Cold War era. Best notes that broadening the powers of the CIA were most desired in the 1950s, as the Cold War emerged, where as subsequently in the 1960s and 1970s, during the Vietnam and Watergate crises, there was a desire to investigate the actions of the Intelligence Community. The end of the Cold War, Best posits, brought about an examination by the executive and legislative branches, of the roles, capabilities, management, and structure of the Intelligence Community.
Best presents proposals from the Truman Administration onward.
Best concludes that the current trend with regards to U.S. Intelligence Community reorganization is toward more executive and congressional oversight. He maintains that the influence of the Department of Defense within the Intelligence is pervasive and that the current interest in reorganization has widespread interest in light of the September 11th attacks.

Binnendijk, Hans and Stuart E. Johnson, *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*. Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University Press, 2004.
This edited volume is essentially a representation of "military requirements for the stabilization and reconstruction phase of military operations" in light of the recent U.S. military experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. The authors contend that while the United States is adequately transforming its armed forces to leverage technology and information, it is "not nearly as well prepared to respond promptly to the lawlessness, destruction of the civilian infrastructure, and attacks on coalition forces that followed hard on the defeat of the Iraqi military."
The theme of the book is concerned with "the stabilization and reconstruction capabilities needed by the U.S. military." This theme pivots around the introduction of "a new concept of operations" that promises to bridge the gap between the end of traditional combat operations and start of the reconstruction or nation-building process. One of the major problems identified herein is that with increased efficiency in war-fighting capability, the United States has increased the tempo of warfare and decreased the time to plan (adequately and appropriately) for stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations. The proposed solution to the problem is to engage in the S&R mission "concurrently with the defeat of the enemy military" so that there is no longer a gap between the war-fighting and nation-building phases of major conflict. The S&R capabilities that the U.S. military needs to implement the

authors' proposed strategy (to concurrently plan for nation-building while major combat operations are still underway) are outlined in nine chapters, the conclusions of which are summarized in the following matrix of broad and specific recommendations: 1) the creation of "two joint military headquarters to organize units critical to the S&R mission (S&R JCOMS), 2) the fielding of "two S&R division-equivalents with joint assets" (each comprised of active duty and reserve personnel), and each of these divisions should be "rapidly deployable with four brigade-size S&R Groups that include Military Police, Civil Affairs, Engineers, Medical, and PSYOP supported by a tactical combat capability", 4) concurrent planning/deployment for major combat and S&R missions, 5) the addition of instruction in S&R operations, "civil military cooperation, interagency planning, media relations, and negotiations." To facilitate teaching this level and scope of material, the book recommends adding instructors with backgrounds "in sociology, law, and psychology", 6) incorporation of interoperable communication systems, non-lethal weapons, and other tools, 7) besides creation of the National Interagency Contingency Coordination Group, create Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) "with representatives from other federal agencies embedded in a J-10 directorate and C-MAC", 8) "establish a multi-agency civilian rapid response capability to deploy with [military] S&R forces, and, finally, 9) "strengthen international S&R efforts by identifying countries with niche capabilities, training and equipping an international peacekeeping force, and encouraging NATO to develop an independent &R force that mirrors the proposed U.S. force." The authors of this book focus only on problem identification and solution recommendations for the U.S. military; they do not include Government-wide programs or initiatives save the creation of a "National Interagency Contingency Coordination Group (NIACCG) under the National Security Council with responsibility for planning" (p. 130). The book, overall, provides an excellent conceptual platform to bolster military planning (and structure on a more limited basis to implement or facilitate the planning), but, critically, it lacks in-depth discussion of multi-agency cooperation. For example, it is not clear even after reading Chapter 8 on "Interagency Cooperation" what role civilian agencies should play in S&R efforts; the answer for the authors seems to lie solely in the purview of the U.S. military with small, civilian teams playing only a support role on a very limited basis. While a good read for those interested in how to better prepare and equip the U.S. military to better respond to S&R once conflict is ended, this book is a poor reference for anyone who wants to get a clearer picture of the interagency process in and between civilian and defense agencies. The authors have made it clear that they do not have a firm handle on what role civilians should play in post-conflict operations; they seek to know that they should "be in there somewhere near the end", but when, where, and how they will interact with U.S. military forces remains unexplored and is only vaguely referenced in Chapter 8.

Brummond, Stephen M. *Restructuring for Homeland Security: What is really Necessary?* Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2003. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA415078.
The challenges of improving homeland security in the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 and subsequent events, such as the anthrax outbreak and sniper shootings, have revealed numerous deficiencies of governmental functioning in the prevention and response to terrorist attacks, as well as operational adaptation by response agencies and officials at all levels of government. In analyzing the post-September 11 challenges faced by the U.S. national security apparatus and the new threat environment, homeland security and strategy, this strategic research paper *recommends giving the Office of Homeland Security and Homeland Security Council greater authority in planning and coordinating interagency programs. The report also stresses the importance of a partnership between Homeland Security and the Office of Management and Budget to ensure the "power of the purse" to complete its missions*. In making Homeland Security a statutory entity, furthermore, Congress guarantees its permanence. The stated aim of this interagency model is a top-down reform to provide powerful protection from the bottom-up.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977-1981*. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983.
Zbigniew Brzezinski reflects upon his experience as the National Security Advisor to Jimmy Carter. He begins by explaining that his situation is unique, as his position in the Administration was largely contingent on his relationship with the president, as "The Assistant neither runs a large department nor has a precisely defined mandate" (17). As a result, even though his experiences were largely unique, indicating that the position can change depending on personality, nonetheless his memoirs include a number of valuable observations about the structure of the NSC and other organizations: First, there is no codified way in which the NSC must meet, yet Brzezinski and Carter decided to formalize the meetings, creating a firm structure of two committees, the Policy Review committee (PRC) and the Special Coordination Committee (SCC); The PRC was chaired by the appropriate Secretary,

depending upon the topic under consideration, to deal with foreign policy issues, defense policy issues, and international economic issues (59); The SCC was chaired by the Assistant for National Security Affairs and it was charged with being the body that created the decision-making framework for intelligence policy issues, arms control, and crisis management (59); Brzezinski and Carter also formalized the paperwork process for Presidential decisions; Prior to a PRC or SCC meeting either a formal Presidential Review Memorandum would be commissioned or simple policy papers (61); The PRC or SCC session would either create a unanimous recommendation for the President or a report that created alternative policy recommendations (61); The Presidential decision would be transmitted to the pertinent departments through either a formal Presidential Directive or by a decision memo (61); The PRC/SCC system ensured that all decisions that reached the President were fully discussed, though the process was often time-consuming. Disagreements within the PRC or SCC often resulted in direct Presidential involvement in the matter (66); This system allowed the PRC to be responsible for establishing long-term policies, while simultaneously allowing the National Security Adviser to maintain large amounts of control over crisis management, which aroused criticism about Brzezinski, as some thought he was usurping excessive authority (63); There were interagency rivalries, such as when the DCI desired to brief the President but Brzezinski insisted upon doing it himself (64) or when the DOS or DOD tried to evade NSC coordination and Brzezinski forced them to comply with oversight (71); Oversight was particularly important to Brzezinski, who required major cables from the State Department to be cleared with the NSC first. Brzezinski also helped to draft major Presidential speeches (72); Brzezinski cut the NSC from 50 people (under Kissinger) to 30 (74) and attempted to counter-balance his "Hawkish" tendencies with more liberal staff members (75); Brzezinski suggests that *the President increasingly needs someone to coordinate the departments, especially State and Defense, and this person can either be the Secretary of State or the National Security Assistants* (534).

Bush, George and Brent Scowcroft. *A World Transformed*. New York: Vintage Books, 1998.
Bush and Scowcroft offer a behind the scenes account of a watershed era for international politics. The volume covers the period from 1989 to1991, and focuses primarily on the Tiananmen Square incident, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf War. Bush and Scowcroft briefly mention their reconstitution of the National Security Council. On the date of his inauguration, January 20, 1989, President Bush issued a National Security Directive providing the charter for NSC administration. The Policy Review Group was enlarged to a Committee, the Deputy National Security Adviser managed the Deputies Committee, and a Principals Committee screened matters for the NSC to consider. Eight Policy Coordinating Committees assumed regional and functional responsibilities in place of the multiple interagency groups from the Reagan era (18-19, 30-56). Despite the rich analysis of foreign policy at the end of the Cold War, there is no more discussion of interagency cooperation in *A World Transformed*.

Buss, John C. *The State Department Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization and its Interaction with the Department of Defense.*
Colonel Buss's master thesis examines the last 15 years of major post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization operations in which the United States has been involved. Buss argues that the ad hoc responses that characterized U.S. stabilization efforts in these missions have often proven inadequate; on each mission, the U.S. government has struggled to provide a responsive and enduring solution. The consequences, according to Buss, have included unnecessary loss of life, damage to infrastructure, and higher eventual costs for reconstruction and stabilization. In response to these failings, the Bush administration established the U.S. Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). Buss thus analyzes the function of S/CRS, examines the organization's relationship with the military, and offers the Department of Defense policy recommendations to improve interagency cooperation with this new organization. *Buss views the separation of the DOD and the State Department and S/CRS office as impossible to maintain, as the two departments are inextricably linked by a strategy of conflict prevention*. To strengthen the interagency relationship and improve future stabilization and reconstruction efforts, Buss recommends that the DOD and DOS 1) align their regions to synchronize planning and execution efforts; 2) be fully joined during the deliberate planning process; 3) appropriately man the S/CRS military liaison office; 4) better share education and training opportunities; and finally 5) share information. Finally, Buss stresses the importance of funding for the success of the S/CRS office.

Cerami, Joseph R., James F. Holcomb, Martin L. Cook, Robert H. Dorff, David Jablonsky, Michael G. Roskin, R. Craig Nation, Gabriel Marcella, Don M. Snider, John A. Nagl, John F. Troxell, Arthur F. Lykke,

Richard A. Chilcoat, and Jane E. Gibish. *U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy*. 2001. Available from http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS11754.

"Tomorrow's warrior will likely work with civilian counterparts across a spectrum of activities short of war," predicts Gabriel Marcella, a professor of strategy at the United States Army War College, in Chapter 7 of Organizing for National Security. And they'll cooperate over areas traditionally managed by single agencies, he claims. Among them: "strategic planning and budgeting, humanitarian assistance, peace operations, counter narcotics, counter terrorism, security assistance, environmental security, human rights, democratization, civil-military relations, arms control, intelligence, war planning and termination strategy, command and control forces, continuity of government, post-conflict reconstruction, technology transfer, crisis management, overseas basing, alliances, non-combatant evacuations, and homeland defense." Chapter 7, entitled "National Security and the Interagency Process: Forward into the 21st Century, offers a compelling and prescient commentary on interagency cooperation and coordination. "All of the instruments of national power are deployed. Yet the challenge of strategic integration, of bringing the instruments into coherent effectiveness, remains," Marcella warns. Marcella argues that the transition to an interagency model from status quo compartmentalization and departmentalization has been met with a series of challenges, some of which have frustrated agency efforts to effectively and efficiently cooperate. "It has not been an orderly evolution, in part because of serious structural and cultural impediments." He proceeds to enumerate these stumbling blocks precluding effective interagency action: (1) Lack of a lead agency OR coordinating and integrating organizational structure—"'Nobody is in charge' is an often-heard criticism of the interagency process. By delegating responsibility, control becomes more diffused, and the policy effort is diluted." He continues: *"The principal problem of interagency decision making is lack of decisive authority; there is no one in charge… There is too much diffusion of policy control."* (2) Personnel turnover/executive discontinuity—"There is a high turnover and the injection of new talent, at times inexperienced and equipped with new predispositions about national security, at the top echelons of American government every time the part that controls the White House changes." (3) Asymmetrical resource division—"Asymmetrics in resources are another impediment. *The Department of State, which has a responsibility to conduct foreign affairs, is a veritable pauper. Indeed, the military has more money to conduct diplomacy*." (4) Agency parochialism, lack of personnel management programs that promote the interagency—"Finally, the personnel systems of the various agencies of the US government do not promote professionalization and reward service in interagency jobs. *What is needed is a systematic effort to develop civilian and military cadres that are experts in interagency policy coordination, integration, and operations." The end of the cold war requires a new national security structure that more closely integrates the functions of the state and defense departments*.

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the U.S. Army. *Play to Win: The Final Report of the bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction.* Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the U.S. Army, 2003.

This report looks at top priority issues that the United States needs to address in terms of its strategic approaches towards failed states, in order to enable them to successfully rebuild themselves following conflict. The report makes specific recommendations in relation to the substantive pillars of post-conflict reconstruction – security, justice and reconciliation, economic and social well-being, and governance and participation – as well as crucial "enablers" that facilitate successful engagement: strategy and planning, implementation infrastructure, training and education, and funding. This "holistic" approach to address the problem of post-conflict reconstruction, according to the report, will build capacity to deal with a broad range of interrelated issues. Commissioned by the Association of the U.S. Army and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction is made up of 27 individuals with extensive experience in the U.S. Congress, military, various executive branch agencies, international organizations and NGOs. Specific recommendations include: 1) the people of the country in question must "own" the reconstruction process and be its prime movers, 2) coherent international strategy based on internal and external parties' interests is crucial, 3) security is the most important element of reconstruction, 4) success is made through representatives and stakeholders on the ground, 5) intervention (by force) should avoid undermining local institutions, 6) mechanisms needed to rapidly mobilize and coordinate needed resources, 7) universal accountability is essential and, finally, 8) the timing of operations must be driven by circumstances on the ground.

Clark, Keith C., and Laurence S. Legere. *The President and the Management of National Security: Report for the Institute for Defense Analyses*. New York: Praeger, 1966. p. 147-172

The chapter focuses on four major problems within the Department of State, which include interdepartmental operations, planning, resource allocation, and internal organization (147). The key recommendations are as follows: Create a task force in times of crises consisting of persons with relevant contingency experience (149); *Assign either the military commander or ambassador to govern all civil and military operations*, and hold more regional-political military conferences during crises in foreign countries to improve overseas coordination (151); Expand the SIG/IRG role to include oversight of policy implementation and expand the mandate of the Foreign Service Inspection Corps in overseas operations to improve monitoring capabilities (151); Reestablish the Contingency Coordinating Committee to handle interagency coordination of contingency planning (155); Expand the State Department-Budget Bureau cooperation to include a joint review of other foreign-affairs agencies' budget submissions and official expenditures to the president (156); *Create a larger State Department by abolishing offending agencies and merging them into the department* (167); The authors also suggest that an alternative national-security system could be to create a *White House-centered system that would eliminate the any State Department primacy* (171).

Clayton, Christopher M. *National Emergency Preparedness and Response: Improving for Incidents of National Significance.* Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA448938.
This report examines the national emergency management system in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, identifiying areas in need of improvement in contingency planning and early consolidation of effort, as well as in coordination between federal, state, and local agencies in coping with Incidents of National Significance. These suggested improvements are supported by the idea that *"federalizing" is a response appropriate only under the direst of circumstances*. Furthermore, the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security and the states should better partnership in planning for, exercising for, and responding to Incidents of National Significance. Legislating change and establishing specific requirements in law for cooperative DHS, DOD and state training and exercising would establish minimum requirements for regional planning (to ultimately be developed and maintained at NORTHCOM) and preparedness and, ultimately, better response. Clement stresses the need to better shape the efforts and responsibilities of the federal agencies with reality and codify, train to, and exercise them so that the national response capability reflects the professionalism of the state and local.

Clement, David J. *Improving the Efficiency of the Interagency.* Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA449531.
Clement's report examines three options of changes (similar to those implemented in 1986 by the Goldwater-Nichols Act) throughout the interagency in order to improve efficiency in the Department of Defense (DOD) operates. *These options are: using the current system (maintaining the status quo), change to a lead-agency model, or change to an NSC-centric model.* The viability of each option is measured using five factors: suitability (will it work?); feasibility (does the US have, or is it willing to commit, the resources to do it?); acceptability (legally and morally - who is affected?); unity of effort; and risk. Unity of effort, as a key factor, is weighed with a 2X multiplier. Clement concludes that a blend of the three models is most likely given Congress's involvement. For lasting change in interagency, a new federal law may be required. The report closes with a scoring matrix for the three options analyzed.

Colyer, Kevin C. *Command and Control Structure for Joint Interagency Counterterrorism Operations Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction within a Regional Commander-in-Chief's Area of Responsibility.* Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2001. Available from http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll2,413.
Major Colyer's report stresses the threat of state or nonstate actors conducting terrorism utilizing weapons of mass destruction against U.S. personnel, property, or other locations of U.S. interest outside the continental U.S. or its territories represents a serious threat to U.S. vital interests. Colyer argues that the system remains disjointed and inefficient in spite of the contributions of numerous U.S. government agencies. Colyer's study thus presents a command and control structure designed to meet the requirements of the operation to solve this dilemma. The study first examines the WMD counterterrorism environment and the agencies currently involved to determine what is required to counter the threat. From this a set of command and control criteria is established to compare against current command and control models. The results of comparing the requirements to current models revealed two gaps in the command and control of these operations. Ultimately, Colyer aims to 1) achieve control at the national level of policy, budget, and direction of capabilities; 2) bridge the gap between national and theater strategic levels

and operational level command and control; 3) *combine crisis management with consequence management under a single authority*; and finally 4) integrate interagency intelligence support with directive authority over intelligence consolidated in a single entity. To reach these objectives, Colyer *proposes the granting of budgetary authority to the newly created office of National Security Council office for Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness as well as the formation of a standing JIATF for WMD counterterrorism to provide the operational command, control, communications, and intelligence support* to bridge the gap between the strategic level lead federal agency to executing elements.

Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. Report. "The Organization of Intelligence." Chapter 7. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975.
The authors of this report believe that some of the difficulties in intelligence work are "rooted in the very nature of the intelligence community." This is because: 1) There are large number of separate, but necessary, entities with different histories, missions and chains of command; 2) *The bulk of the budget and manpower was within the DoD, but the SecDef should not direct national intelligence*; 3) The services are pursuing technology without proper analysis; 4) DCI has limited authority outside the CIA, which results in their focusing on CIA matters. The result has been excess collection, gaps in analysis, inefficient acquisition programs, and sometimes a lapse in standards of conduct. The commission believed that more direction and oversight was needed. Along these lines, they expressed regret that the role of the DCI as principle advisor to the President and NSC, and thereby their role as responsible for coordinating the activities of the entire intelligence community, was never fully carried out. The Commission recommends: 1) *It is not possible or desirable for the DCI to have line authority over the entire Intel Community. But without this, he needs to be as close to the President as possible. (Recommend office in White House and direct access to President*; 2) CIA should be renamed the Foreign Intelligence Agency and the DCI the Director of Foreign Intelligence, to stress the overseas nature of their work; 3) The Presidents Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board should be strengthened (in line with Rockefeller Commission recommendations); 4) The 40 Committee should be reinvigorated, to avoid lax authorization for covert activities; 5) The Hughes Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, should be amended so President doesn't approve covert activities; 6) NSCIC should be reinvigorated to inform intelligence community about the needs of policy makers; 7) Foreign Service reporting should be reinvigorated; 8) Economic Intelligence should be gathered and analyzed by State, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, and the Council of Economic Advisors; 9) National Intelligence Estimates process should be strengthened; process for drafting should be centralized in a small staff answerable to DCI; 10) An annually revised multi-year plan for the allocation of intelligence responsibilities should be drafted; It should be used to draft a consolidated intelligence budget vetted by the existing Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee and OMB.

Cordesman, Anthony H. *American Strategic and Tactical Failures in Iraq: An Update.* Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006. Available from http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060808%5Firaqfailures.pdf.
It is one of the ironies of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) the Bush Administration issued in February 2006 that many of its recommendations mark a de facto rejection of many of the major strategic assumptions the Administration made in coming to power and in shaping the invasion of Iraq. An Administration that came to office focused on the emergence of China as a potential rival now focuses on a "long war" with Islamic extremists and non-state actors. The QDR shows that the US has had to recognize that no war is meaningful if it simply defeats the enemy. It is the quality of conflict termination and the lasting grand strategic impact of war that matters. Stability operations and nation building are now accepted as critical tools and priorities for both the military and joint civil and military action. A naive unilateralism has been replaced with a new emphasis on allies and international cooperation. American performance in public diplomacy may still be grossly inept, but its importance has been recognized. The US has been less frank in admitting to strategy changes in conducting stability operations: how much they cost; how long they can take; and just how difficult they can be. In the case of both Afghanistan and Iraq, the US is already involved in wars and operations that have lasted, and will last, far longer than originally anticipated. In the case of Iraq, the US is claiming a degree of success it has not really achieved, understating the time required to bring lasting stability, and understating the cost, risk, and sacrifice involved. The fact that the US can win virtually any conventional war does not mean it can win every peace. There is an understanding that the US needs major reforms and improvements in the quality of its intelligence and in the way the policy community uses intelligence, although the Administration and the Congress have done far more to blame the intelligence community for its failures than to admit their own gross failures at the policy level. There is an explicit understanding in the

QDR that war is not simply the task of the Department of Defense (DOD), and that "jointness" goes far beyond the US military. It is still unclear whether this understanding will lead to an effective new interagency structure to plan, fight, and terminate conflicts, or carry out crisis, peacekeeping, and homeland defense activities. *It is likely that any real success in creating effective new institutions will take another catalytic war or major failure, and lie at least a decade in the future*. There has, however, at least been the recognition of the need to bring together every major element of the executive branch and intelligence community, provide clear and effective central direction, and deploy the proper mix of civil-military capabilities in the field. More generally, the QDR recognized that the US military must vastly broaden its focus. It still needs to be able to fight decisive conventional wars and nuclear conflicts. However, it must be shaped to fight terrorist and extremist movements, deal with complex insurgencies, and fight ideological battles with both state and non-state actors. It needs the force posture, deployability, and special skills for long, low-level wars in areas where the ability to understand different beliefs, social customs, and languages is as critical to success as military technology. The rhetoric is so far better than the plan, but the essential military tools for stability operations, nation building, peacemaking, and crisis operations are now a priority. It is clear that US strategy recognizes that power projection is pointless unless the US knows what to do once power is projected. (Introduction text)

Cordesman, Anthony. *Cyber-Threats, Information Warfare, and Critical Infrastructure Protection*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group Inc, 2001.
In this 2001 volume, Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies details the dangers posed by information war and examines the evolving policy response on the part of various federal, state and local government agencies and the private sector. While Cordesman applauds the progress in the U.S. government's efforts to assess the cyber-threat and improve its capabilities in cyber-intelligence, he maintains that our current response posture is inadequate to stem the ongoing threat of cyber-terrorism. Key Recommendations include: Develop a clear central point for the handling of cyber-defense and cyber-warfare in the intelligence community. In 2001, every department and agency in the government was responsible for protecting its own critical infrastructure; Create a Presidential Task Force to review the broad need to deal with all of the emerging threats to the American homeland, including cyber-warfare. The task force should also draft recommendations and a Presidential Decision Directive for the next President; Clearly define the limits of federal aid and responsibility in defending against a cyber-attack; Further explore liability issues arising from participation by private sector companies in the information sharing process. Cordesman's recommendations focus primarily on enhancing cooperation and communication between the various government agencies, industry, and foreign allies. In the six years since this landmark study was conducted, the federal government has addressed many of Cordesman's concerns. Most notably, the creation of the National Cyber Security Division in 2003 has provided the federal government with a centralized cyber security coordination and preparedness function.

Critchlow, Robert D. *U.S. Military Overseas Basing: New Developments and Oversight Issues for Congress*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2005.
On August 16, 2004, President Bush announced a program of sweeping changes to the numbers and locations of military basing facilities at overseas locations, now known as the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy or Global Posture Review, a component of ongoing force transformation efforts. Roughly 70,000 personnel would return from overseas locations from Europe and Asia to bases in the continental United States. Other overseas forces would be redistributed within current host nations such as Germany and South Korea, and new bases would be established in nations of Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Africa. In the Department of Defense's view, these locations would be closer, and better able, to respond to potential trouble spots. In August 2005, the congressionally mandated Commission on the Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States (also known as the "Overseas Basing Commission") formally reported its findings. It disagreed with the "timing and synchronization" of the DOD overseas re-basing initiative, and questioned whether a strategic vision agreed upon by all effected government agencies was guiding the re-basing. It also saw the initiative as potentially at odds with stresses on the force that the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan caused. The Commission questioned whether sufficient interagency coordination, such as State Department led basing rights negotiations, has occurred. It expressed doubts that the military had enough airlift and sealift to make the strategy work, and noted that DOD had likely underestimated the cost of all aspects associated with the moves (DOD budgeted 4 billion, the Commission estimated 20 billion). The Commission also expressed fear that the re-basing could harm military quality of life, which would in turn hamper recruiting and retention. DOD disagreed with much of the Commission's analysis. Meanwhile, advocacy groups have voiced concern about the DOD plan, arguing that it would harm long-standing

alliance relationships. Other groups stated doubts about DOD planning to accommodate the thousands of troops who would be returning to the U.S. from overseas bases. The Base Realignment and Closure Commission delivered its report recommending U.S. base closures to the President. The President has forwarded their recommendations unchanged to Congress. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a study that Congress mandates DOD to accomplish every four years to allocate missions and guide military procurement, is planned to complete in early 2006. Critics argue that the BRAC plan and the QDR should have been finalized before completing the overseas basing plan. Recent international diplomatic and security developments could further influence debate on overseas basing. Host nations such as South Korea have begun to voice limits on the use of forces based in their country. Uzbekistan, one of the test cases for the new strategy, recently evicted U.S. forces from the base in that Central Asian nation. Some analysts argue this eviction was prompted from Russia and China, who have begun to express concern with U.S. expansion of influence in the region. This report will be updated as necessary.

Currey, Craig J. *A New Model for Military/Non-Governmental Organization Relations in Post-Conflict Operations.* Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2003. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA415114.
In this USAWC Strategy Research Project, Col Currey puts forward a directive model to govern interaction between nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the military. Currey argues that the current reactive, ad hoc model in which military planners respond to on-the-ground operational and NGO situations does not serve the national strategy. The directive model Currey alternatively proposes directs appropriate resources to the primary critical relief functions that provide security, food/water relief, shelter of civilians, medical treatment, demining, restoration of infrastructure, return of displaced persons, and restoration of government and police functions in post-conflict operations with its emphasis on humanitarian relief missions. Currey characterizes the military/NGO interaction as one of four possible manners: reliance, assistance, autonomous, or adversarial. Knowing these model relationships before a conflict enables the military planner to synchronize military resources, area coverage, and military/NGO actions better. Currey's plan for implementation involves an annual weeklong interagency conference under USAID in which NGOs, DoD, State Department, and various other contributing agencies would establish roles and missions.

Decker, Raymond J. *Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination: GAO-01-14.* Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000.
Eight federal agencies now have teams that can respond to a terrorist attack involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Each team varies in size, structure, geographical scope, and task. The teams do not duplicate one another. They have unique capabilities and functions, and many have experience dealing with different types of agents and weapons. The type of terrorist incident would determine which team would be most appropriate to respond. GAO found that federal agencies lack a coherent framework to develop and evaluate budget requirements for their response teams because there is no national strategy with clearly defined outcomes. To improve interagency cooperation, federal agencies have participated in several group activities. For example, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Interagency Steering Group, led by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, is identifying federal response teams that could respond to different terrorist scenarios. Federal, state, and local agencies have also participated in major field exercises that simulated urban terrorist acts. These efforts could go a long way toward improving the operational coordination of federal response teams.

Destler, I. M. *Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organization.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972.
The book attempts to present what scholars say about foreign affairs governmental process, explain what has happened in foreign affairs government since 1960, and access the utility of specific organizational devices. In the past, many solutions to bureaucracy have been enacted (p. 17). Specifically, separating operations and policy, joining authority and responsibility, creation of a new central office, strengthening of career service, and the elimination of overstaffing are discussed at length. Generally, the advantages of the reforms are attempting to deal with the problems bureaucracies bring: inability to look at the larger picture, having hierarchy that enables people to blame others easily, a lot of paperwork, potential of a spoils system, and specialization to the point where one person cannot work outside their field. However, looking into these changes does show some positive aspects bureaucracies have. When dealing with any kind of bureaucracy, one must remember two potential problems. First, the machine itself – how bureaucracies work – and people – how individuals working within the bureaucracies work. No matter the solution to organizational issues, the President must be an integral part of it. The president ultimately has the

power and responsibility. And as Nuesdat says, the president has the power to persuade and bargain, which is essential to getting any policy passed. Additionally, the President has the potential to understand the flow of issues, constraints, channels and ways to maneuver within the bureaucracy. There has been two main ways foreign affairs has been dealt with: Kennedy was in favor of a personal loose style. The president was to be in the center of it all. His major impact on foreign affairs was the interagency task forces. Johnson basically continued in this vain with his Tuesday Lunches. The general style was: daily contact, exceptional aides, recognize futility of mechanical solutions, and foreign policy is political and president can influence (p. 112). In contrast, Nixon was in favor of more structure, formal, and through analysis. Planning and operations was distinct. However, Nixon did have heads of all the departments dealing with operations represented on the planning board. Nixon's major contribution to the national security was the National Security Study Memorandum, which led to a more powerful White House and policy being enacted. Kissinger and Nixon had centralized power, but were difficult to contact quickly. In talking about the State Department, Destler states that the main problems are responsiveness, resistance to change, inadequacies in carrying out Presidents decisions, the failure to lead, and the Department doesn't seem to have control over its own house (meaning it is difficult to decipher who is responsible for what). All of these problems really reflect the subculture and internal politics for the State Department where competition and compromise breed. However, the Department does have bargaining advantages when it comes to foreign policy. It has the presidents support in a comprehensive policy role. And, it serves as "international" communicators. Additionally, responsiveness is usually interpreted by effectiveness and timeliness. It is dangerous to assess foreign policy in these terms as it might play into politics. If the State Department is to gain the power back that it once had it must: (1) develop and analyze the widest range of policy options, (2) challenge and evaluate the expertise of others, (3) take the broadest view of issues and mandates, (4) write good, concise information for high-level positions, and (5) respond quickly and appropriately to the Presidents needs (249). The main objective in coherent policy is to ensure that low-level decisions reflect high-level purpose. This can be done by four formal approaches (1) organizational integration, (2) formal policy guidance, (3), foreign affairs programming, (3) and general fixed-membership coordinating committees. All four are good ways to possibly strengthen foreign policy. Destler makes some ultimate observations that might help "fix" the organizational problems of foreign affairs. The president must build "central organizational strength spanning several hierarchical levels and … provide key men at each level with the leverage, the motivation, and the mandate to fight for the President's prirorities in the bureaucratic political arena" (256). This is achieved through the President having faith in the Secretary of State. And the Secretary of State needs to be responsive to the President and present for day-to-day actions (261). *The conundrum is that while the State Department is suppose to protect the state, it can only be done with the help of others. This can sometimes compromise security and increase the bureaucracy already in existence.* The best way to fix bureaucracy and to have foreign policy work effectively is to have a combination of organizational tools and balance the best aspects of bureaucracy with the best aspects of individuals. Additionally, there needs to be an understanding that this changes over time and space.

Destler, I.M., Leslie H. Gelb and Anthony Lake, *Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy*.

According to this text, the United States has lost a coherent sense of national interest—"the enduring purposes of policy that flow from values, geography and the place in the hierarchy of world power." It has become too political—partisan and ideological. This isn't to say that it hasn't been political before, but rather that the national sentiment both by the public and the elites were still towards the same goal. Today that isn't necessarily true. In the last 1960s the center began to be pulled by extremists. Additionally, campaign rhetoric began to control foreign policy—examples include the Bay of Pigs, Vietnam War, ambiguity in SALT I, and lifting the grain embargos. However, the President isn't the only person to blame for the foreign policy breakdown, Congress and the media should be as well. Election rhetoric and promises really have affected foreign policy. Presidents have made commitments they wouldn't otherwise have done. Both sides portray the nation as weak and the enemy gaining power, which needs to be rectified by some "new" reforms. Nixon changed the rhetoric a bit by making it more realistic. However, the goals remained unrealistic. The Iran Hostage Crisis is a perfect example of a President trying to use foreign policy as a political issue in a campaign. It is also a perfect example of how such issues trap presidents. It shows how presidents time and again give the impression that there can be peace and containment without losses, which is simply not true. Today presidents have to deal with bureaucracies that take their foreign-policy agendas and run with it, while the opposition begins the campaign against it. The Establishment was a group of bipartisan men who exercised power over American defense and foreign policy. They were white, educated, rich men. Their dogma was center. And administration-to-administration there was continuity. Now there is change. Both Truman and Eisenhower preferred "barons" and encouraged the formal development of interagency processes.

Kennedy and Johnson gave more power to the "courtiers," which led to the uneasy coexists with senior Cabinet members. After this accomplished policy courtiers – for example, Kissinger and Brzezinski – became national figures. There has been an increase in reliance in White House courtiers, which has led to an increased in fluctuation policy context. This has given more power to the executive. The authors conclude that systems will always breakdown. It's inevitable. The inconsistency has had major impacts however. Some inconsistencies have been wounded leadership, organizational disarray, widening gap between the president and bureaucracy, policy pendulum, credibility gap, narrowing basis of support, quick fix and political theater, narrow 'political window' for serious diplomacy, and politics and ideology.

Deutch, J., Kanter, A., & Scowcroft, B. (2000). Strengthening the national security interagency process. In Carter, A. B. & White, J. P., (Eds.), ***Keeping the edge: Managing defense for the future*** **(pp. 265-283). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press [Preventive Defense Project]. Available from http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/KTE_ch10.pdf.**

This "report" suggests changes "more evolutionary than revolutionary." Of note; the authors disagree with those who believe formal organization is not important as long as one has strong leadership—for them organization is vital. The authors believe that new threats present challenges for the interagency process and NSC structure because a number of distinctions upon which the original system was built can no longer be assumed: 1) There is no longer a clear distinction between peace and war; 2) There is no longer a clear distinction between foreign and domestic; 3) There is no longer a clear distinction between "domestic" law enforcement and "national security"; 4) Effective action can no longer be anything other than dependent on coalition response; 5) Most important, effective outcomes are now dependent on integration of economic and military measures.

Effectively dealing with the new threats will challenge the existing organizational structure in four major ways: *1) The high national priority given to defeating the new threats may conflict with traditional priorities of agencies; 2) Success often requires coordinated action by several agencies, accompanied by flexible resource allocation*; 3) Interagency plans supported by multi-year budget commitments are not in place to address critical threats; 4) Fragmentation of responsibilities for collecting, analyzing, and distributing intelligence means that policymakers do not always receive adequate and timely information about these new threats.

The authors do not believe these shortcomings necessarily mean a "wholesale overhaul of the system" is required. They point out that *"simply establishing clearer responsibility, especially in the interagency context, for taking and implementing decisions would make a big difference."* However, some changes will be needed. The authors shun proposals that place too much responsibility for planning and executing programs in the White House (Stephen A. Cambone, The Commission to Combat Proliferation, and Anthony Lake). They classify other approaches for dealing with the perceived shortcomings of the current system as follows: 1) Greater centralization: through creation of a "super department" or a "super NSC staff." One proposal would create a second vice president for foreign affairs or a super cabinet agency. Another would change the Secretary of Defense into a Secretary for National Security (whose role would also be domestic); 2) Creation of a region-centered structure: which would consist of Regional Under Secretaries, "double-hatted" in the Departments of State and Defense (with the regions based on Unified Military Commands). A more radical approach would be to abolish the Departments of State and Defense, in favor of regional departments that contain the diplomatic, economic, and military instruments; 3) Creation of a Department of Homeland Defense: that would include all functions relating to domestic security that involved foreign threats (including the FBI, DEA, INS, BATF, Customs, Coast Guard, National Guard, and FEMA). These authors see benefits and faults in each of these concepts: 1) The DOD has a proven capacity to manage complex operations, but the SecDef job is already huge and infringement of civil liberties would be a concern; 2) Regional Organization would provide for good coordination but represents such a huge change from the current structure that it may not be feasible; 3) The creation of a Department would directly address the new threats and is the best long term option. However, in the pre-9-11 climate in which they were writing, they did not believe Congress would be willing to create an agency along these lines.

These authors recommend: 1) The President should give the NSC greater authority and capacity to carry out planning and coordination — but not implementation — of interagency programs. The advantage of this was that it was close to the present way of doing business. The primary disadvantage was that the arrangement does not closely conform to the organizational principle that *policy instruments should be aligned as closely as possible to the main national security threats and objectives*.

Exact changes to the process, the authors say, should focus on integrating the traditional "domestic" agencies into the NSC process, and improving interagency action by establishing clearer authority and responsibility for "interagency" issues. To do this: 1) The President should establish a new interagency process to manage better the tension between national security and law enforcement responsibilities. "Specifically, national security concerns should take precedence over law enforcement concerns with regard to threats to the homeland." This would require some programs be shifted from DOJ to DOD; 2. The President should give the Director of Central Intelligence greater authority to accomplish his or her responsibilities effectively.

The Director of Central Intelligence needs authority in three specific areas: 1) Must be able to ensure an integrated collection plan across all disciplines; 2) Must have authority to create a community-wide acquisition plan for the development of new technology and the acquisition of new systems; 3) Should have the authority to develop, with the support of the DOD and the FBI, and subject to presidential approval and subsequent congressional notification, plans for covert action to prevent or respond to the new threats. These plans should include peacetime information operations. This would represent a limited shift of responsibility from the Secretary of Defense to the DCI for intelligence activities bearing on the new threats.

They stress that, while the DCI's authority for *planning* intelligence activities to address the new threats would be expanded, responsibility for program *execution* would remain with the existing agencies. They further advise that: 3) The President should strengthen the ability of the NSC to plan, direct, and coordinate interagency programs that build capability for meeting the new range of threats. This activity would involve several agencies — including the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and "domestic" agencies that do not routinely participate in the NSC process — and often a multi-year effort will be required. *The heart of the recommendation is to assign responsibility for the preparation of necessary interagency plans to the NSC, with the active support of OMB.* To supervise and coordinate this expanded planning and programming function, they propose the creation of a new position at the level of Deputy National Security Advisor. This individual would have the responsibility and authority to run a process that sets interagency program priorities. Separating responsibility for planning and coordination— to be placed with the NSC and OMB — from the responsibility for program execution, which remains with the agencies, would split authority and responsibility for overall outcome. The authors think this is slightly "undesirable" but an ok compromise.

Ford, Jess T. *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy: GAO-05-323.* Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2005.
The war on terrorism has focused attention on the important role U.S. public diplomacy plays in improving the nation's image. The United States has undertaken efforts to "win hearts and minds" by better engaging, informing, and influencing foreign audiences; however, recent polling data show that anti-Americanism is spreading and deepening around the world. GAO was asked to examine to what extent U.S. public diplomacy efforts have been coordinated and whether the private sector has been significantly engaged in such efforts. The White House has launched several recent initiatives designed to promote the coordination of U.S. public diplomacy efforts, but the government does not yet have a public diplomacy communications strategy. In 2002, a Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating Committee was created to help provide central direction to communication efforts. The committee drafted a national communication strategy, but the committee was disbanded in 2003 and no strategy was issued. In 2003, an Office of Global Communications was created to facilitate White House and interagency efforts to communicate with foreign audiences. According to a recent report by the Defense Science Board and comments by agency officials, the office has not implemented this role. Although a national communications strategy has not yet been developed, the White House established the Muslim World Outreach Policy Coordinating Committee in 2004 to coordinate public diplomacy efforts focused on Muslim audiences. The group is in the early phases of drafting strategic and tactical communications plans. In addition to White House efforts, the State Department created an Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources in 2004 to help coordinate and direct the department's wide-ranging public diplomacy operations. Further, the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Department of Defense are redefining their public diplomacy roles and operations in response to the increased.

Foreign Affairs Council Task Force. "Secretary Colin Powell's State Department: An Independent Assessment." Washington, D.C., 2004. Available from http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_04-06/fac/fac_task.html.

This report focuses on changes that need to be made within the State Department primarily in terms of institutional culture and resources. The commission cites Secretary Powell's outstanding leadership in addressing these problems, but lays out specific areas that still need to be fixed. The department is woefully under-funded and this lack of resources plays out in poor infrastructure, manning shortfalls (including in regions such as the Middle East), and outdated information technology that makes communicating within the department at with other federal departments very difficult. With regards to institutional culture, Foreign Service officers are viewed as "arrogant" and Congressional staffs in particular find the State Department to be very difficult to work with and to obtain information from. Secretary Powell has made improving State-Congress relations one of his top priorities but the report recommends that State adopt more professional development programs such as those used by the DOD to improve relations with Congress. Finally, the report points out the generally passive attitude that State has regarding diplomacy; the department emphasizes gathering information about the positions of foreign countries rather than explaining America's position on issues. The war on terror places a much greater emphasis on these activities and the department should increase their efforts in this area.

Fuller, Kurt. *Strategic Targeting and the War on Terrorism.* Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2003. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA414935.
In this paper, Fuller outlines a strategy for synchronizing ends, ways and means in support of the global war on terror. He subsequently argues in support of an organizational modification to focus interagency effort through a structured process of intelligence collection, followed by a precise targeting methodology that produces the required effects by attacking the threat centers of gravity. *Fuller proposes the creation of a strategic level interagency targeting board, on equal footing with and inclusive of the National Security Council (NSC), which is solely responsible for prosecuting the strategic planning and execution of the war on terror*.

Gerstein, Daniel M., *Leading at the Speed of Light: New Strategies for U.S. Security in the Information Age (Issues in Twenty-First Century Warfare)* (Potomac Books) Nov 2006.
As the world moves into the Information Age, globalization continues to alter the customary relationships among peoples, societies, and nations that evolved during the Industrial Age. Author Daniel Gerstein, however, maintains the United States still follows an Industrial Age framework for national security. Despite such recent changes as creating the Department of Homeland Security and the post of a director for national intelligence, the current U.S. national security strategy remains based on the National Security Act of 1947. To advance the U.S. response to the particular demands of the Information Age, Gerstein proposes nothing short of overhauling our nation's security strategy and, more important, complementary changes to the U.S. approach to strategic leadership. Beginning with the foundations of leadership, Gerstein addresses four key abilities that the twenty-first-century leader must master for the Information Age: 1) to develop and communicate a vision; 2) to incorporate new tools for analysis and for enhancing the leader's judgment or reasoning skills; 3) to gain greater perspective in developing national strategies; and 4) to promote the three I's—imagination, innovation, and initiative. While theories and accepted methods of leadership remain relevant, they must be augmented with new and improved concepts. The fundamental premise of the book is that leadership skills will require changes and enhancements to ensure that leaders are capable of performing in a data- and information-rich environment that is often uncertain and challenging.

Gerstein, Daniel M., *Securing America's Future: National Strategy in the Information Age*. Praeger Security International, Sep. 2005.
As the world moves further into the Information Age and the ensuing increased levels of globalization, the ability to harness all of the elements of national power in an integrated, coordinated, and synchronized manner will be even more critical for the United States to successfully defend itself. Gerstein argues that the United States as a nation is largely unprepared to reap the full benefits of the Information Age and unable to address an increasing threat level because its methods, procedures, and ways of thinking remain anchored to the Industrial Age that is rapidly being left behind. To understand and adapt to this emerging environment, the United States must re-examine the development and the implementation of national security strategy. Gerstein examines the history of U.S. national security strategy, and he analyzes the results and conclusions of several capstone documents, including the National Security Strategy of the United States (2002), the Homeland Security Strategy of the United States (2002), the Commission of National Security/21st Century, and the 9/11 Commission Report. After evaluating the execution of U.S. national security strategy, Gerstein maintains that U.S. efforts today are more heavily weighted to the use of "hard power"—political, military, and intelligence resources—for achieving strategic goals and objectives. A strategy that incorporates more fully the elements of national power, including "soft power" such as economic,

social, cultural, and informational capabilities will better serve the interests of the nation. In addition, Gerstein proposes a new way of looking at strategy. Typically, strategy has been defined as the linking of ways and means to achieve ends while mitigating risk. In the future, we must factor environment into any discussion.

Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2007. *Department of Homeland Security: Ongoing Challenges in Creating an Effective Acquisition Organization*
This report discusses the challenges DHS faces in creating an effective acquisition organization with the proper level of authority and accountability. The report also reviews the effectiveness of the DHS investment review process and its continued reliance on contracting for critical services. The report is merely an assessment of current DHS practices and procedures and does not offer any recommendations on how to correct current DHS shortcomings. Key Findings are: DHS lacks clear accountability for acquisition decisions and spending; DHS Chief Procurement Officer has established an acquisition oversight program but still lacks authority to achieve the department's acquisition goals; DHS needs to improve its Investment Review Process; DHS needs to improve oversight and review of inter agency contracts.

Hansen, Rosemary and Rife, Rick. *Defense is from Mars and State is from Venus: Improving Communications and Promoting National Security*. Palo Alto: Stanford University, May 1998.
The U.S. National Security Strategy has changed from containment to global engagement. The DOD and DOS are the main tools used to accomplish foreign policy goals and they have struggled to redefine themselves in this post Cold War environment. The US is now a hegemon expected to do too much in too many places. The DOD is no longer a tool used only after all DOS diplomacy options have been exhausted. Foreign policy is now the simultaneous use of strength and diplomacy. Close cooperation is essential now that both agencies are expected to expand their areas of operation with decreased budgets. When these polar opposites can learn to work together national security will be strengthened. The authors employ Myers Briggs Type Indicator to show differences in personalities between the two departments. Foreign Service Officers (INTJ) and Military Officers (ISTJ) analyze information differently. DOD personnel value discipline, teamwork, efficiency, and achievement. DOS personnel value competence, intellectual ability, and individual achievement. These personality types influence and become dominant in their respective institutions. The institutions' problem solving techniques are similar to their personality types and often clash when forced to cooperate. *The DOD sees things in black and white, uses linear, sequential problem solving that arrives at one final solution and has well-defined intermediate goals. The DOS sees a world of gray, looks at problems from many different angles, values the broader picture and often uses a brainstorming approach.* When the two styles of brainstorming and rigid presentation come together in meetings they often conflict to the point that the personnel view each other as incompetent. This tension must be properly managed if cooperation is to be useful. Each agency has qualities that help it thrive. They should use each other during their missions in order to capitalize off of these respective strengths. Constructive interaction and more interaction period are vital. "With familiarity grows understanding." This must start at the top and percolate down through the departments. Concludes that DOS must learn to use a more hierarchal model with one authority during their problem solving process (will facilitate cooperation with DoD) and make continued training part of the DOS career path; while DoD/DoS must allow personnel to integrate into the other agency's education programs, create more joint service positions, reward interagency contacts, develop joint crisis exercises

Hearn, James J. *Departments of State and Defense: Partners in Post-Conflict Operations: Is this the Answer for Past Failures?* Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA449353.
In this report, Hearn examines the role combatant commanders play in the Phase Four, Post-Conflict period. Using recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as evidence, Hearn highlights the difficulties and challenges in coordinating, managing, funding, staffing, and succeeding in an environment that, while post-conflict, remains hostile. Hearn presupposes that a shift from military to civilian control is the objective, but spends more time deliberating the details of this shift (who, when, how, etc.). Currently, the Department of State is charged with the post-conflict lead through the newly created Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), but the Department of Defense must still provide security and other related duties to allow this to succeed. Hearn examines National Security Presidential Directive-44 and DOD Directive 3000.05 with sensitivity to their probable capability of addressing the reconstruction and stabilization failures since the end of World War II. Hearn concludes that in spite of the "rosy picture" painted by these directives, future success remains elusive. For the directives to be successful, Hearn suggests that: 1) R/S planning and execution be identified as career-enhancing for both civilian

and military personnel; 2) DOD parochialism be minimalized in order to mentor States to fulfill the requirements under NSPD-44 and DOD 3000.05 and 3) government inculcate culture in USG agencies and departments to institutionalize the R/S mission. If and when these conditions are met, the DOD and State Department may succeed in establishing a capacity required for future expeditionary missions.

Hiebert, Mark. *US National Security Strategy in Response to 11 September 2001.* Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, Air War College, 2001.
The events of September 11, 2001 were a result of a complex, deliberate, and preplanned effort. These events caught the United States off guard and ultimately shocked the country and indeed the world. In the aftermath of these attacks, the US is left with a challenge of huge proportions. The US government must prevent further attacks, rescue and recover at the attack cites, investigate, hunt down and bring to justice those organizations and individuals responsible for the attacks. In order to do this correctly, and in contrast to recent military conflicts, we must use all the instruments of national power-together. The stakes are too high to get it wrong. This effort attempts to coordinate all the instruments of US national power, to weave them into a comprehensive national security strategy to respond to the attacks of 11 September. It is presented as a proposal letter from the National Security Council Principals Committee to the President on the way ahead after 11 September. The methodology used to research this effort involved articles and subjects search and subject matter expert interviews. This paper addresses three parts of the response: the immediate plan of action, the homeland security, and the international war on terrorism. It also recommends several new directives and initiatives: a director of public diplomacy, director of homeland security, new level of interagency cooperation, a reexamination of our foreign policy, and a new direction for US government agencies. The coordination of the instruments of power along with these directives and initiatives provide our best chance to be successful in our war on terrorism.

Holshek, Christopher J. *The Scroll and the Sword: Synergizing Civil-Military Power.* Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA449439.
Holshek identifies clear lessons emerging from the strategic environment. Foremost is that a successful long-term national security strategy must bring together military and non-military elements of power early and often. Greater use of civil and "soft" power is both more desirable and decisive in winning the peace and the "war of ideas." Holshek argues that failure to realize this opportunity, at many decision-making levels, can cost many lives as well as immense amounts of credibility and treasure, threatening to undermine long-term U.S. grand strategy. Increasingly, Holshek claims, national security and military strategic thinkers are appreciating the need to leverage softer, civil elements of national power as represented in the interagency process and the private sector. However, a unifying concept of national strategic principles for synergizing civil-military power has yet to find full articulation. These principles may be found, among other places, in the evolving concepts of civil-military operations (CMO) as a way and capabilities like Civil Affairs (CA) as a means. At all levels and across the operational spectrum, evolving CMO and CA are at the forefront of stability, transition to peace, reconstruction, and counterinsurgency operations. Meanwhile, demand for Army CA, itself in a state of dynamic change, has exhausted supply. Indeed, as the strategic and operational value of CMO and CA becomes more apparent, Joint and Army doctrines struggle to address asymmetric and ideological challenges and place CMO and CA in appropriate context. Holshek ultimately seeks to identify that strategic context, a conceptual hierarchy, and principles for synergizing civil and military elements of power. These principles include: 1) *CMO and CA are synergistic and integrative as ways and means; 2) CMO and CA are inherently joint, interagency, and multinational; and 3) applied CMO and CAO involve a strategic, enabling style of leadership.*

Hook, Steven W. *U.S. Foreign Policy: The Paradox of World Power.* 2005.
Explores the decision-making process, the public and private actors which affect it, and challenges policymakers face in conducting defense, national security, economic, and trade policies, and in major transnational issues; argues that the strengths which enabled the US to become the lone superpower have paradoxically made it increasingly vulnerable.

Jones, Christopher R. *Achieving Unity of Effort at the Operational Level through the Interagency Process Fields and Groups.* 2005. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA436932.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has employed its armed forces in a host of contingency operations in countries such as Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. More recently, the United States has undertaken operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the larger Global War on Terrorism. Throughout each operation, the military was not

the lone instrument of national power employed in the region. As such, these operations have proved particularly complex as the U.S. military has experienced difficulty achieving unity of effort with other involved U.S. governmental agencies through the operational-level interagency process. *Chris Jones's thesis tests the proposition of whether problems achieving unity of effort are due to the organizational structure of agencies functioning at the operational level, the operational framework wherein coordination takes place, or organizational culture*. To help answer this question, this thesis reviews the interaction of military and non-military organizations at the operational level during three operations: Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti (1994-1997), the Global War on Terrorism's Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (2001 to present), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2002 to present). Using Graham Allison's three conceptual models for analyzing governmental decision making, this study of the interaction of organizations through the interagency process will provide insight into where obstacles to unity of effort originate, and the potential ways in which they can be overcome.

Kenney, Steven L. *The National Security Strategy Under the United Nations and International Law.* Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2004. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA423785.
In this study, Colonel Kenney examines the National Security Strategy as an invocation of escalation of the right of self-defense as it prosecutes the Global War on Terrorism. Kenney highlights the validity that can be conferred on the National Security Strategy due to: 1) the failure of the UN to enforce its charter, essentially abandoning the purposes of the UN; 2) the continued use and threat of use of preventive self-defense by many states and previous U.S. administrations; 3) state practice; 4) customary international law; 5) the slowly changing body of international law that is responding to and inferring more significance due to the rise of transnational terrorists and WMD proliferation over state sovereignty. Kenney closes with an emphasis on preventive self-defense as a tool of last resort, utilized only after meticulous consideration coupled with efforts exercising all elements of national power.

Keskel, Kenneth. *Doing Things that can't be done: Creating a New Defense Establishment.* Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, Air War College, 2002. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA420702.
In this research report for USAF Air War College, Air University, Lt. Colonel Keskel identifies several defects in the Department of Defense organization. Based in the Cold War mindset (inefficient in responding to rapid changes in our modern, global environment), Keskel critiques: 1) the organization bureaucracy; 2) service parochialism; and 3) structure ill-equipped to respond to joint, interagency, and coalition partners. Keskel ultimately recommends a major restructuring of the DOD to develop a force structure that supports emerging missions that are within fiscal constraints while simultaneously improving "jointness" and the objectives outlined in national security guidance.

Kolterman, Robert F. *Interagency Coordination: Past Lessons, Current Issues, and Future Necessities.* Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA448331.
Planners developing military strategy to accomplish national security strategy must integrate with other contributors. Processes and mechanisms to achieve interagency coordination are formal for senior leader integration but less formal, or non-existent, for routine coordination across a variety of topics below the assistant secretary level. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 1944-1949, achieved and sustained critical components of coordination (senior leader involvement, thorough integration, and sustained interaction) and coexisted during the development of the National Military Establishment. Joint doctrine recognizes the need for integration with other US Government organizations and leaders have adjusted national level processes to ensure integration of the elements of power. To achieve coordination, senior leaders must recognize and enforce sustained interaction and encourage thorough subordinate integration at or below the assistant secretary level.

Lafleur, Thomas M. *Interagency Efficacy at the Operational Level.* 2005. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA435932.
Major Lafluer argues for strong, supra-departmental control of the interagency process at the operational level. Such control, Lafluer claims, will enable effective oversight of interagency planning as well as reduce departmental firction to provide the President with an integrated approach to problem-solving in the post-Cold War environment. In arriving at this conclusion, Lafluer examines the interagency interaction from the end of the Cold War through Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Lake, Anthony. *Six Nightmares: Real Threats in a Dangerous World and How America Can Meet Them* (Boston: Little Brown, forthcoming 2000).

Anthony Lake describes six 'nightmares' that could threaten national security. They range from an anthrax attack to economic policies. In general, Lake writes, as the world becomes more integrated, there are more access points for destruction. *Lake insists that our government is too compartmentalized. Thus, the solution is to create a position that could go above these departments and work together.* Lake suggests that the armed forces and Intelligence Community move away from acting jointly to truly work in an intergraded fashion.

LeMay, Michael C. *Public Administration: Clashing Values in the Administration of Public Policy*. Princeton, NJ: Recording for the Blind & Dyslexic, 2005.
Michael LeMay uses a "clash of values" approach that gets to the heart of how administrators make decisions and implement public policy.... The "clash of values" theme [provides] students with a sense of how values connote principles, goals, or standards that an individual, class, organization, or society holds dear. A secondary theme investigates the roles that public administrators play throughout the policy process, including targeting a problem, placing it on the government's agenda, structuring the alternatives that elected officials use, implementing public policy through the programs and procedures they largely determine, and finally, evaluating the success or failure of a policy. [This book] describes the reorganization of the national bureaucracies following the 9/11 attacks that prompted the enactment of the Patriot Act and the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security.

Lewis, Leslie, Roger Allen Brown, and John Y. Schrader. *Top to Bottom and End to End: Improving the National Security Agency's Strategic Decision Processes.* Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2005.
Examines how the National Security Agency is making changes to improve its decision-making processes across its network of intelligence and Department of Defense units. The NSA has established a new Corporate Review Group and an Office of Chief of Planning, Capabilities, and Performance, that monitor decisions and provide guidance to the Director of NSA to ensure that overall decision-making is complementary. The report concludes that the on-going work has been successful, but that improvements are still being made.

Light, Ronald N., "Joint Vision 2020's Achilles Heel: Interagency Cooperation Between the Departments of Defense and State," May 2004, *Naval War College, http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA426040&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf*.
Ronald Light of the Naval War College argues that there is a "clear and compelling need" for interagency reform. He begins with a historical analysis of interagency operations, claiming that the military now operates independently from civilian agencies, largely, in part, because of President Bill Clinton's lackluster relationship with the Pentagon. The consequences of that growing chasm between the civilian and military sectors have been manifold—there is now an "atrophying State Department" and operations between civilian sectors and military branches are at an all-time low. Reform must begin with the military, he claims: "*Just as the service began the process of achieving joint interoperability nearly 20 years ago, DOD must embark on a determined journey to realize greater, effective interagency cooperation and coordination, especially between the military and the Department of State.*" It is imperative that reform begin now, "in the midst of DOD transformation," an obvious allusion to the "Revolution of Military Affaris" elucidated and advocated by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Light's recommendations include: 1) Expanding existing agency exchange and interagency promotion programs—"For DOD, this means, reinstating the 50% reduction in exchange billets previously cut"; (2) Involving State in training exercises and joint programming—"For example, DOD should fund State participation in Millennium Challenge and other joint and combined exercises such as Cobra Gold, Balikatan, and Yama Sakura, in Thailand, the Phillippines, and Japan, respectively"; 3) Establish more political advisor positions—"A useful starting point is to establish political advisor-like billets at service component command headquarters. These billets would provide earlier opportunities for commanders and staffs to interact with State professionals"; 4) *Expand State budgeting control*—"State requested 27.4 billion in 2004, which funds the US government's diplomatic engagement and operation of 261 embassies, consulates, and posts in 180 countries around the world; DOD's 2004 budget request was nearly 380 billion.

Lindblom, Charles E., "The Science of 'Muddling Through'," *Public Administration Review*, 1959, as reprinted in Shafritz and Hyde, eds., *Classics of Public Administration*, 4th ed., Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1997.
This article discusses the benefits of using a successive limited comparison (SLC) decision-making model over a rational comprehensive (RC) model. The RC model consists of identifying objectives that a policy should accomplish, collecting information about all the important factors that pertain to an objective, and then performing

some sort of analysis on that information in order to arrive at the optimum policy for a particular situation. The author claims that while this method is generally taught in bureaucracy's, it has very little actual utility because it is impossible to know all the important factors, it is very difficult to assign relative values to the factors and objectives that you do know, and finally different people have different definitions of objectives in the first place. The RC model instead ends up being a very limited tool because it requires a great deal of simplification (of objectives, factors, values, etc.) and is only suitable for low-level problems (improving traffic flow over a bridge, for example). The author instead recommends using a SLC model which focuses on analyzing two or more specific policies. Rather than try to comprehensively examine every aspect of a problem, the SLC model focuses on making small, incremental policy changes that build off of previous experience. Policy A, for example, might accomplish objectives a, b, and c but with a risk of consequences d and e, while Policy B would accomplish objectives a and b but with a risk of consequences f and g. the SLC model is an attempt to codify the way that many government administrators make decisions because of the impracticality of the RC method.

Ludowese, Jeryl C. Strategic Communication: Who should Lead the Long War of Ideas? Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA449416.
In this report for USAWC, Colonel Ludowese identifies our national challenge as one of articulating a grand strategy that balances the effective uyse of all instruments of national power—diplomacy, information, military, and economy—to achieve national objectives. Ludowese argues for the development of a coherent strategy to communicate effectively with world audiences. Ludowese's paper reviews past government initiatives to integrate strategic communication and analyzes the governmental agencies which are positioned to craft our national communication strategy and/or lead the strategic communication interagency effort: the Department of State, the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, or a separate Executive agency.

Mangan, Alan F. *Planning for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations without a Grand Strategy*. Strategic Studies Institute, 2005. Available at: *http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display-papers.cfm?q=233*
All efforts presently underway in the United States Government (USG) to plan, organize, and build resources for future stabilization and reconstruction operations are handicapped by the absence of a grand strategy. The Department of State and the Department of Defense, in coordination with several other departments and agencies of the USG, several intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, and allies and friends, are ambitiously attempting to build new capacities and institutionalize new processes that will better enable the USG and its like-minded partners to conduct political interventions into fragile, failing, failed, and post-conflict states to rebuild those states' institutions of civil governance. All of these efforts are handicapped by the absence of a grand strategy that links them with—and links together—the array of adjacent USG plans to, among other things, align diplomacy and development assistance, secure and defend the U.S. homeland, combat terrorism, cooperate with theater security partners, counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and conduct major combat operations to win decisively and achieve enduring results. Not only should the USG plans be linked, but also the participation with the USG in these and similar operations of allies and partners and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations needs to be addressed with sufficient specificity to guide investment in U.S. capacity as a measurable subset of global capacity. Absent grand strategy, which presumably accomplishes the above and more, planning and building resources for stabilization and reconstruction operations amounts to pre-planning responses to anticipated crises on a case-by-case basis.

Martin, Gregory M. *Enhancing American Interagency Integration for the Global War on Terrorism.* Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA449233.
Martin's essay identifies opportunities to enhance interagency integration at the strategic and operational levels for the global war on terrorism. It begins with an assessment of strategic leadership in the formulation and implementation of national security strategy and policy, in general, and counterterrorism strategy and policy, in particular. *Martin concludes that the nation lacks an institutionalized mechanism within the National Security Council structure to monitor the implementation of national security and counterterrorism strategy and policy.* The essay also identifies a pronounced gap in the nation's capability to integrate all the elements of national power at the operational level. It further recommends the establishment of a new senior position on the NSC staff, the Director of National Security Operations (DNSO), supported with a small interagency staff, to monitor the implementation of national security strategy and policy and to close the national operational planning and execution gap. The essay then proposes several initiatives to enhance the capabilities of selected, key existing interagency counterterrorism

capabilities and new enabling capabilities to enhance interagency integration in the pursuit of national security and counterterrorism objectives.

McCreedy, Kenneth O. ***Waging Peace: Operations Eclipse I and II -- some Implications for Future Operations.*** **Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2004. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA423621.**
In this study, Lt. Colonel McCreedy argues that postwar operations are complex civil-military endeavors that require clear lines of authority and astute, politically attuned leadership. Reviewing the historical lesson of Operation ECLIPSE, planned by the Allies in May 1943 as an order that would govern the occupation of Germany by the western Allies, McCreedy approaches Iraq ECLIPSE II as an effort of the Combined Forces Land Component. McCreedy concludes that waging peace requires an overwhelming force on the ground, especially in its early phases, information dominance and application of economic and political means from other government agencies. The most significant lesson, according to McCreedy, concerns the relationship between the decision to go to war and the outcome. The decision to go to war involves a calculus that the application of force will set the conditions that will allow the state to achieve its policy aims. The first step, going to war, must be linked to the last step, ordering the resulting peace, to ensure the achievement of policy objectives. This necessarily requires statesmen to wield all instruments of national power in a coordinated campaign on a battlefield where force is not the primary determinant of success. Yet McCreedy argues that the national security structure (as currently configured) is inherently inefficient for waging peace. Wholesale changes therefore must be made in the culture of government, to inculcate an interagency spirit that transcends departmental parochialism. Interagency training, a common doctrine for planning and management, and removal of barriers to information and communication are essential to build mechanisms for interagency cooperation and truly joint planning and operations.

McKinney, Floyd A. ***Interagency Coordination: Picking-Up Where Goldwater-Nichols Ended.*** **Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA449263.**
The United States faces a strategic landscape characterized by uncertainty and asymmetrical threats that will challenge conventional thinking regarding interagency roles, missions, and coordination. The current interagency structure is framed by the National Security Act of 1947, which mandated a major reorganization of the foreign policy and military establishments of the U.S. Government. Notwithstanding the original intent of the NSA, many in academia and government suggest subsequent legislations have unintentionally weakened the interagency process. This paper will answer the question, is there a need for a "Goldwater-Nichols-type" initiative to enhance integration of all the instruments of power of the United States? This analysis starts with an examination of the key factors which led to the National Security Act of 1947 in an effort to determine measurable causal factors. The author then assess the current strategic environment against these foremost factors in order to answer the thesis question. The paper shows qualitative similarities in the challenges confronting the United States following World War II and today, and explains why the National Security Council is ill-equipped to deal with the challenges of the 21st century.

Mendenhall, Robert K. ***Pre-War Planning for a Post-War Iraq.*** **Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2005. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA432654.**
The postwar situation in Iraq following Operation Iraqi Freedom was a result of failed planning efforts between the U.S. State Department and Defense Department. The State Department spent over nine months planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. OSD assumed postwar planning just two months prior to the invasion; while disregarding the efforts, team, and information already completed by the State Department's Future of Iraq Project. Disagreements and personal beliefs at the heads of the State Department and Defense Department lead to a failed postwar planning effort. The situation in Iraq after the removal of Saddam Hussein was not what the U.S. expected. OSD believed that following the removal of Hussein from power, U.S. and coalition forces would be greeted as liberators by the Iraqi people. Soon afterwards looting and lawlessness ensued. U.S., coalition, and Iraqi security forces have been battling an insurgency making it extremely difficult to establish effective governance and reconstruction. Over 1500 U.S. military and countless Iraqi civilians have been killed, most after major combat ended. Recommendations are made to avoid risk of such failure in postwar efforts in future military operations. *Postwar planning must be done early with emphasis in the interagency process with the overall objectives of the U.S. as the goal, not personal agendas.*

Murray, Williamson. ***A Nation at War in an Era of Strategic Change.*** **Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004. Available from http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdffiles/PUB580.pdf.**
The U.S. military faces significant strategic challenges as it continues to transform the force and improve

interagency integration into joint operations, all the while engaging in active combat operations associated with the Global War on Terrorism. This collection of essays by the students enrolled in the Army War College's Advanced Strategic Art Program highlights some of these strategic challenges with an emphasis on lessons learned through past experience. The thesis varies with each individual essay, from Commander Knott's focus on the need for institutional intellectualism to Colonel Jones's critique of the Abrams Doctrine.

Needham, Mark D. *The Triad of National Security Legislation for the 21st Century.* Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2005. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA432490.
Needham's report emphasizes America's need to revise its national security apparatus for the environment of the 21st century. In particular, he presents three vital pieces of legislation aimed at improving the effectiveness, cooperation, and coordination of all actors on the national security stage. First, Needham argues that our current national security structure is obsolete and unable to deal with today's problems, especially the need for well-coordinated and viable interagency solutions. Second, he points at our intelligence infrastructure as fractured and unable to cope with contemporary threats. Third, he argues that the Goldwater-Nichols legislation of 1986 was influential in jump-starting the process of jointness in the Department of Defense but the status quo leaves much to be desired in dealing with our new and complex missions. To deal with the current and future threats, Needham claims, the United States must enact all three parts of the "triad of legislation."

O'Neil, John E. *The Interagency Process: Analysis and Reform Recommendations.* Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA449658.
O'Neil argues that our current national security apparatus lacks capacity to effectively implement national strategies across the interagency. The capacity in question centers on interagency unity of effort that synchronizes diverse cultures, competing interests and differing priorities of government institutions while embracing valuable expertise and experience. *The National Security Council's interagency process, resident in the Executive Office of the President, provides advice but lacks the authority to direct responses across the U.S. Government. No single government entity possesses sufficient capacity for unilateral response, thus interagency coordination is necessary to synchronize instruments of national power and thereby apply unified strength toward resolving threats to our national security*. O'Neil identifies the assessment of the nature of the 21st century security threat manifested in complex contingencies such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, and the Global War on Terrorism as a crucial first step in crafting an effective interagency reform strategy. From here, O'Neil analyzes the existing interagency process to reveal strengths and weaknesses upon which to build greater interagency capacity. Finally, his analysis offers reform recommendations of legislative, organizational, and cultural nature to improve interagency policy implementation in support of national security. O'Neil's suggestions include: 1) Invest in training, education, and resources toward mid-level managers to understand and apply interagency processes; 2) Reform the legislative process to lead the way for long-term change; 3) *Create a Director of Interagency Coordination subject to congressional oversight for policy implementation*; and 4) Improve interagency coordination and implementation to enhance our national capacity to defend national interests at the far edges of the empire in a globalized, 21st Century world.

Pitts, Michael J. *A Road Map for National Security: The Intersection of the Departments of Homeland Security and Defense.* Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA448441.
The country remains in transition, because of the tragic events of 9/11: the federal government, our military, and the American way of life are in transformation. Four years after September 2001, homeland security experts continue realigning a new department and defining the roles and responsibilities of twenty-two combined legacy federal agencies and 188,000 employees. Likewise, a dozen years after the Cold War, defense experts continue determining the most important features of the national strategic landscape. During this period of adjustment, Americans have reasonable expectations that law enforcement will secure our homeland and warfighters will defend this great nation. Our leadership will only meet these expectations through a shared strategic vision for securing and defending our future. This project reviews the roles and responsibilities of the Departments of Homeland Security and Defense as legislated by the United States Congress and articulated in the President's National Security Strategy and supporting strategies. It then examines the intersection of homeland security-homeland defense missions as one department provides a law enforcement capability and the other a warfighter capability-each to secure our homeland and defend our nation. Finally, this analysis recommends the development of a shared plan for orchestrating homeland security and national defense.

Posner, Paul L. *Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness* . Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2002. Available from http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02547t.pdf.
This report discusses the coordination necessary among federal, state, and local governments when preparing emergency response strategies for terrorist threats and implementing these strategies in the event that an attack does occur. Key Recommendations are*: A national strategy should be created that incorporates the efforts of federal, state, and local governments to improve the country's ability to respond effectively against terrorist threats or attacks*. This strategy should very clearly stipulate the responsibilities of each level of government. It is absolutely crucial that any strategy include measurable performance goals and that organizations be held accountable for achieving these objectives so that the strategy is fully and efficiently implemented. The national strategy should designate an organization that will provide leadership and focus to the groups associated with the process. Several federal departments, such as FEMA, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of Transportation currently contribute to leadership efforts, but effective interagency coordination is not evident. The report provides relevant, although rather general, recommendations that are important to keep in mind if a national strategy is developed to increase regional and national preparedness for terrorist attacks. Tools for providing resources to local and state governments are extensively discussed, as is the importance of setting measurable, objective performance goals. These concrete recommendations seem more realistically attained than those found in other reports.

Pulliam, John E. *Lines on a Map: Regional Orientations and United States Interagency Cooperation*. 2005. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA433020.
The purpose of this paper is to examine one narrowly-focused aspect of United States government interagency cooperation. Many of the departments, agencies and bureaus that contribute to our national security divide the globe into regions so that they can better manage their activities around the world. As two prime examples, the Department of State has six regions, each assigned to an Assistant Secretary of State, while the Defense Department has five, each under the responsibility of a regional Combatant Commander. It seems obvious that the way each department or agency organizes its global affairs impacts not only how it sees the world and applies programs and policies thereto, but also that these divergent regional orientations impact the interactions of the organizations with one other. The paper's thesis is that *aligning the regional orientations of our departments, agencies and bureaus, beginning with the National Security Council staff, State and Defense Departments, would provide a cross-agency synergy that could dramatically outweigh the costs associated with denying each the parochial ability to draw its own lines and boundaries on the map.*

Rast, Vicki J. *Interagency Fratricide: Policy Failures in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia.* Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2004.
Policy Failures in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia analyzes the dynamics of interagency cooperation, examining interagency frictions, resources, and alternative visions as well as the context that frames interagency policymaking and the effect such factors have on decision making and policy in instances of U.S. coercive intervention. The basic theme repeated in this study is the government's inability to achieve coordinated, comprehensive planning as a result of interagency conflicts. While the author focuses on how interagency friction influences termination and withdrawal policies, specifically examining the cases of the Bosnia crisis and the Persian Gulf War, a number of conclusions relevant to the more general study of interagency problems as well as reform emerge. The author, Vicki J. Rast, *concludes that interagency conflicts turn the interagency process, which is intended to bridge the gaps in the executive branch, into a process of negotiation which generally results in diluted policy outcomes.* In undermining policymaking, conflict is therefore a critical flaw in the interagency process. In the specific cases of termination and withdrawal policies, policy dilution leads to policies of war termination (ceasefire) without the achievement of conflict termination (sustainable peace). Through the use of quantitative and qualitative analysis the author identifies defects in leadership, the absence of strategic vision, dissimilar organizational cultures, different worldviews, and the absence of an integrated interagency planning mechanism as the underlying frictions which prevent the effective development of crisis analysis, end-state vision, termination criteria, and termination strategy in interagency policy. Rast also devotes a significant portion of her analysis to both describing interagency policy making, through an examination of rational choice theory, and illustrating the influence of factors such as leadership, domestic politics, and the media on the interagency process. Though the majority of the study examines processes and problems, it does conclude that the interagency process must be overhauled intellectually and

structurally. With regard to such reform, the author additionally places special emphasis on leadership. For Rast, leaders in the executive branch need to ensure that the interagency process functions properly, to energize the interagency process in cases of coercive intervention, and to establish a clear, unified, and visible strategic vision for U.S. foreign and security policy.

Reighard, Robert D. *Security Cooperation: Integrating Strategies to Secure National.* Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA449543.
According to Lt. Colonel Reighard, events following 11 September 2001 have confirmed the importance of interagency cooperation in the execution of many national strategies. To win the war against terrorism, sustain regional stability, expand trade and development, maintain friendly ties to global powers, and deal with such transnational challenges such as weapons of mass destruction and international crime, Reighard continues, cooperation across all levels of government is critical. As the President's National Security Strategy makes clear, U.S. foreign policy is not confined to short-term unilateral or bilateral defense efforts. Regional security requires a long-term, cooperative, multilateral civil-military effort to assure allies and friends, to dissuade potential adversaries, to deter aggression, and to defeat our enemies. Theater Security Cooperation, a major DOD program, incorporates specifically designed activities within specific geographic, economic, political, and military situations to achieve national strategy objectives. This paper assesses the U.S. capability and capacity to implement global and Theater Security Cooperation strategies to support national security goals. Reighard concludes with the following recommendations to enhance interagency cooperation: 1) define what is and what is not security cooperation with a common doctrine; 2) issue security cooperation guidance for the U.S. government via the National Security Council to complement the strategic guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense; 3) *distinguish OMB as the lead in tracking planned resource allocations against the President's mandated priorities*; 4) *revise geographic responsibilities to align with a modified five DOS regional bureau structure* and 5) distinguish the NSC as the lead of an interagency effort to create a common regional framework that could be used across the U.S. government.

Roberts, Steven J. *Unilateral Man Hunting is the Strategic Operating Environment Structured to Allow the Department of Defense to Conduct Unilateral Man Hunting Operations.* Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2004. Available from http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll2,247.
In this thesis, Major Roberts attempts to dissect existing guidance regarding three primary areas required at the macro-level for mission success: access to intelligence, access to operating areas, and authority to conduct operations. While current legislation provides a framework for interagency cooperation while it established firewalls to limit the unilateral capability of any single element, the President retains the authority to clarify this legislation and shape the strategic environment for his subordinate elements through the use of Presidential Policy tools, such as the Executive Order. Roberts examines the change of DOD strategic focus following the tragedies of 9/11, highlighting the global campaign against terrorist organizations as an attempt to restore homeland security. Roberts also explores Cold War era policy and legislative structure, illustrating the difficulty of unilateral operations under current legislative and policy guidance for military leadership. To resolve the inherent problems of a strategic operating environment, Roberts recommends the articulation of a presidential policy to: 1) identify priority of effort for the executive elements; 2) identify an executive department or agency as the lead for each effort; 3) articulate the role of the NSC in mitigating risks, coordinating limited assets, and mediating disputes; and 4) establish a process to allow for routine review. *The first step, Roberts contends, is identifying the lead—but Roberts simultaneously recognizes that this is also the most difficult challenge of the framework he proposes*.

Rooms, Travis E. *Beginning with the End in Mind: Post-Conflict Operations and Campaign Planning.* Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2005. Available from http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,369.
Accepting that post-conflict operations are part of campaign planning continues to be a challenge for the U.S. military. This monograph proposes that current Joint and U.S. Army doctrine is deficient in addressing the importance of post-conflict operations to campaign success. For the purpose of this monograph, the definition of post-conflict operations is Stability and Support Operations conducted after the conclusion of major combat to achieve the strategic policy objectives for peace. This monograph addresses three central questions. First, is there a need for post-conflict planning in the campaign process? Brief case studies of U.S. military actions in post-World War II Germany, Panama, and Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrate the importance of post-conflict planning and the effects of inadequate execution. The U.S. military and the U.S. Army in particular, have a long history of conducting post-conflict operations, showing that it is a consistent aspect of the framework of war. Second, what

conditions are necessary to achieve success in the post-conflict environment. This study identifies five conditions: national and domestic security, a governing body, a judicial system, an economic system, and a populace capable of making the first four work. To achieve these conditions requires an interagency planning process oriented to establishing a legitimate host nation governing body. The U.S. Joint Forces Command is developing systems to address post-conflict planning and execution in the Security, Transition, and Reconstruction and Operational Net Assessment concepts, as well as the Joint Interagency Coordination Group organization. Third, is the conduct of post-conflict operations the decisive phase. Successful conclusion of major combat is not the culmination of U.S. military involvement in a campaign. Conflict termination and the transition from combat to Military Operations Other than War must be part of campaign planning to ensure conditions are set effectively for the transition to and execution of post-conflict operations. Post-conflict operations create conditions in which governments can pursue a stable peace. This study concludes that PCO is the decisive phase of operations and offers a planning model based on academic and doctrinal sources. Additional conclusions are that the U.S. military acknowledge its leading role in planning and executing post-conflict operations, major war games should incorporate post-conflict planning and execution, and the Department of Defense should pursue the developing Joint Interagency Coordination Group concept.

Royse, James C. *Gold is the New Purple: Interagency Operations in Campaigns and Expeditions.* Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA435851.
In this monograph, Major Royse recommends a balanced adaptation of the organizational structure, the process, and the leadership model for interagency coordination in concert with military operations. The aim of this balanced approach, according to Royse, is to ensure a lower operational level headquarters is more effective than the Combatant Command headquarters in coordinating interagency aspects of operations during campaigns and expeditions when the DOD assumes the lead. As evidence, Royse points to operations in Afghanistan in 2001-2002 as experiences that revealed an aspect of military operations that is creating new conditions for operational commanders of land forces in combat theaters.

Other United States government agencies were engaged in the same area of operations during decisive operations. *Doctrine and practice currently delay meaningful integration of these other government agencies until the transition phase of joint operations.* The "War on Terror," furthermore, has most dramatically highlighted this as the lines between the roles of the Department of Defense and variously the Department of Justice, State Department, intelligence agencies and others have become blurred and just as often intertwined. This condition reflects the intentional application of the elements of national power. It results from deliberate direction and coordination at the strategic level of national leadership. Joint Interagency Coordination Groups at the regional combatant command headquarters may be sufficient at times when other government agencies have the lead role. This monograph asks whether a lower operational level headquarters is more effective than the Combatant Command headquarters to coordinate interagency aspects of operations during campaigns and expeditions when the DOD has the lead role. The monograph presents case study analysis of the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama and the 1994 U.S. invasion of Haiti. Each historical case describes the planning, execution, and interagency integration with military operations. Each case is examined according to the criteria of ends, ways, means, and risk to provide insights to answer the research question. Several topics are presented to provide background and frame the problem. The balanced approach Royse proposes offers an opportunity for operational level military commanders to improve the application of all instruments of national power from all of the capable agencies during decisive operations.

Schall, John, ed., Equipped for the Future: Managing U.S. Foreign Affairs in the 21st Century. The Henry L. Stimson Center: Washington, DC, 1998. Available from http://www.stimson.org/pdf/ausr1.pdf.
The report explores how best to organize the U.S. Government to conduct foreign affairs, and determines how to link resources effectively with the nation's ongoing foreign policy needs. It identifies the missing elements ("disconnects") in the way the U.S. Government currently conducts its international relations and suggests specific structural and procedural remedies in several areas—from information technology to interagency coordination, from the role of embassies to interaction with the business community.

Key recommendations are to: Build interagency coordination at the strategic level, leading to a forging of individual institutional views into a consistent U.S. foreign policy. Use the successful model of the National Security Council, which harmonizes the views of the State Department, Defense Department, CIA, and other national security and

foreign policy agencies against the backdrop of Administration policy; Put flexibility in the personnel system to bring out the best in the people it recruits and to develop the expertise it will need in the future; Reform budget to ensure greater consistency in funding for foreign affairs; Size embassies based on local circumstances to make possible a U.S. presence in all nations at lower cost; Build interagency coordination in the field by consolidating the existing foreign services and strengthening the link between the Departments of State and Defense; Upgrade the State Department's information and communications capabilities; Allow the foreign affairs establishment to represent U.S. business interests abroad more effectively and to access the expertise of the private sector (25). The report and recommendations, while focused primarily on Foreign Affairs, discusses improved interagency coordination both at strategic and field levels. Recommends use of the NSC model for coordination stating that, "the model should not only be maintained, it should be replicated."

Serafino, Nina M. and Weiss, Martin A., *Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities.* Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006. http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/data/2006/upl-meta-crs 8473/RL32862_2006Jan26.pdf?PHPSESSID=5899a51235349c678a0e64ec75ca39c8.
The views on the desirability and relative costs of post-conflict state-building operations, as well as on the need to create new and improve existing civilian institutions to carry them out have become more favorable after the September 11th attacks. There is greater agreement about the perception that international terrorism can exploit weak, unstable states has convinced many policymakers of the need to strengthen U.S. and international capabilities to foster security, good governance and economic development, especially in post-conflict situations. Thus the government created the State Department's new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to help address our longstanding security concerns. The progress of the S/CRS has been deeply hampered by Congress' unwillingness to fund its endeavors. The full potential of the new S/CRS cannot be explored because of the financial roadblocks that Congress has placed on it.

Severance, Paul Michael. *Characterizing the Construct of Organizational Unity of Effort in the Interagency National Security Policy Process.* Blacksburg, VA: University Libraries, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2005.
The sea state changes that have occurred in the global security arena since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet Union dramatically transformed the U.S. interagency national security process. More recently, the tragic events of 9-11 have further refocused national security endeavors inward to homeland security imperatives while Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom have revalidated the need effective interagency coordination. This research represents a "first cut" at characterizing the construct of unity of effort in the interagency national security process by identifying attributes of this organizational virtue. The intent was to examine the dimensionality of the construct and thus facilitate theory building by consolidating extant knowledge and identifying key success factors as well as elements threatening operational success. This study focused on the interagency national security policy process and was intended to accommodate a wider understanding of unity of effort as it applies to that area of endeavor. Multiple interviews, focus groups, and surveys from 448 military and civilian adult respondents were used in the analysis. Content analysis, analysis of variance, and principle component analysis were the primary analytic methods used. The most conceptually sound factor structure for organizational unity of effort consisted of four factors: Organizational Context and Interpersonal Dynamics, Leadership and Decision Making Structure, Strategic Orientation, and Organizational Infrastructure and Resources.

Shepherd, Scott, and Steve Bowman. *Homeland Security: Establishment and Implementation of the United States Northern Command.* Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2005. Available from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RS21322.pdf.
Shepherd and Bowman explore the establishment and implementation of the United States Northern Command, a Department of Defense organization for homeland defense efforts and coordination of military support to civil authorities. Congress may explore whether NorthCom's structure that allows it to pull forces and capabilities throughout DOD will be adequate during a disaster or national emergency and whether its interagency relationships and information sharing capabilities are sufficiently developed to handle an emergency. Issues outlined for Congress are organization, interagency relationships, information sharing, and future strategy. Interagency relationships, Shepherd and Bowman contend, could be improved through training and exercise (similar to the Congressionally mandated TOPOFF) aimed at enhancing communication. Future strategy, conversely, is a separate topic to be

addressed in “Homeland Defense and Civil Support,” a strategy paper put out by the DOD Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense.

Sistare, Hannah. *Government Reorganization: Strategy and tools to get it done*. Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2004. http://www.businessofgovernment.org/pdfs/SistareReport.pdf.
Sistare makes the case that large-scale reorganizations can be an important tool for the president and Congress to improve executive branch management. Arguing that we should no longer allow the difficulty of government reorganization to serve as an excuse for not addressing the issue, Sistare begins her report with an exploration of the historical difficulty of accomplishing government reorganization. She identifies four driving forces for reorganization: to make government work better, to save money, to enhance power, and to address pressing problems. Sistare then explores the strategies we’ve used for reorganization in the 20th century: commissions, presidential reorganization authority, executive branch reorganization staff, and congressional initiatives. She describes the experience and history of each, outlining the advantages and disadvantages she perceives. Finally, Sistare divides 21st century reorganization into four “paths”: virtual reorganization, coordination mechanisms, commissions, and reorganization authority. Sistare suggests that the reorganization be launched with the enhancement of the institutional capacity of government to determine where organization change would improve government performance and/or emphasize the ongoing nature of the reorganization process. Sistare’s report also makes recommendations of new approaches to Presidential Reorganization Authority to address the concerns of members of Congress and those who will be affected by organizational change. Finally, Sistare concludes with the outlining of “next steps” for policy makers to address today’s need for organization reform, including: 1) establishment of a government-wide personnel policy to underlie any reorganization plan; 2) continue the effort in the House to rationalize jurisdiction over homeland security agencies and issues; and 3) start on the limited, specific reorganization of the federal food safety system, on which considerable work has already been done.

Smith, Robert E. *Interagency Operations: Coordination through Education.* Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2001.
This monograph examines the possibilities of improving interagency coordination through an established educational system. The national security interests of the United States rely on the efficient and effective application all instruments of power. The Department of State and Department of Defense are typically responsible for the direction, implementation, and enforcement of foreign policy. *However, threats to national security in the twenty-first century may require a more multifunctional interagency approach with diverse capabilities. A single organization does not have these required capabilities.* Through a collaborative effort of various government agencies and departments, these capabilities are available. The interagency process is the national level system to coordinate the actions of government agencies in national security affairs. Interagency operations require the cooperation of participating organizations. This monograph researched the development of joint military operations to illustrate necessary actions required to achieve this synergistic effort. From the Unified Command Plan of 1947 to a “unified action” concept of 2001, the military has gained insight into the difficulties of service coordination and cooperation. Significant to this study was the lesson learned concerning education and the development of a joint force. An outcome of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was the requirement for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to oversee the educational development of joint specialty officers (JSO) in order to fill joint duty assignments. The joint professional military education (JPME) curriculum balanced service specific and joint educational requirements. JPME provides a common reference for joint duty officers to collectively plan military operations. This monograph concludes that a professional education system can improve interagency coordination through a shared learning experience. Recognizing the bureaucratic difficulties associated with coordinating and directing government agencies, an expanded educational system can benefit the interagency effort by producing individuals knowledgeable in their profession. Similar to the JSO, individuals who comprehend the interagency system and understand its participants can provide the necessary link to facilitate planning and execution. This study proposes the design of an interagency curriculum to achieve professional development similar to the JPME process. Additionally the monograph recommends instruction of the interagency curriculum at the National Defense University (NDU), senior and intermediate level service colleges and a combined interagency institution. The monograph advocates the addition of government agency personnel to the student body and faculty mix of NDU and service schools.

Sopher, Terry R. *Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGS): A Temporary Solution to a Long Term Requirement.* Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2004. Available from

http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA423755.
The value of JIACGs at the Combatant Commands has been proven to the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. Customs Service, and Department of State. The authority and understandings that established JIACGs are sufficient. What remains problematic, and has been the single largest contributor to periods of less than optimal interagency coordination, are the missing means—people. The type of personnel required in the JIACGs cannot be grown overnight ; however, they can be groomed and trained. They must be assigned for a period of not less than two years, and they require some education in the interagency process. To task the agencies and departments to provide this out of hide assures non-compliance. To provide the departments and agencies with a specific means/incentive to man/ participate in the JIACGs would go a long way in ensuring interagency coordination at the Combatant Commands in support of national security interests.

Souchet, Brian E., Sr. *War Termination, Joint Planning and the Interagency Process Fields and Groups.* 2004. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA425975.
Over the past fifteen years, the United States military has highlighted its ability to successfully integrate its forces into a highly effective fighting machine. Despite numerous military success, however, the U.S. has not been as effective in making a smooth political transition once the military objective has been met. A key element in each of these failures has been the lack of an effective planning mechanism for war termination and post-hostilities transition. Using Operations Just Cause, Desert Storm, and Iraqi Freedom as case studies, it becomes apparent that many of these termination failures are a result of deficiencies at the national level, and not just the combatant commander level. *Remedies which exist solely at the combatant commander level are bound to be ineffective. The case is made for a permanent, joint, interagency planning group controlled directly by the National Security Council to deal with the issues of war termination and post-hostilities transition.*

Stanton, Thomas H. *Moving Toward More Capable Government: A Guide to Organizational Design*. Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2002. Available from http://www.businessofgovernment.org/pdfs/StantonReport.pdf.
In his 2002 report for the Center, Thomas Stanton sets forth reasons why reorganizations are often needed: "There are a number of sound reasons to create a new organization or to reorganize. These include the need to: 1) combine related programs from disparate governmental units to provide an organizational focus and accountability for carrying out high-priority public purposes; (2) help assure that information flows to the proper level of government for consideration and possible action; (3) change policy emphasis and assure that resources are more properly allocated to support high-priority activities; and (4) determine who controls and is accountable for certain governmental activities."

Steele, Robert David. *Information Operations: Putting the "I" Back into DIME.* Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006. Available from http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB642.pdf.
According to Steele's report, Information Operations (IO) has matured from an early emphasis on the protection of critical infrastructures and against electronic espionage in the past year and is now more focused on content and on interagency information-sharing. The value of information—all information, not only secret information—and the value of global monitoring in all languages, 24/7, has been clearly established by the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI). This monograph defines and discusses three IO elements: Strategic Communication (the message); Open Source Intelligence (the reality); and, Joint Information Operations Centers (the technology). These elements are further discussed in relation to six "IO-heavy" mission areas: information operations generally; peacekeeping operations (reactive); information peacekeeping (proactive); early warning (conflict deterrence, proactive counterterrorism); stabilization and reconstructive operations and homeland defense and civil reform. It concludes with a strategic overview of the various conceptual and technical elements required to meet modern IO needs, and provides a requirements statement that could be tailored to the needs of any Combatant Commander, service, or agency. Steele's recommendations include: 1) *the creation of a National Information Council (NIC), coequal to the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Economic Council (NEC) to harness the distributed intelligence of the nation and world*; 2) increase intelligence and information-sharing; 3) expand the extraordinary Earth Science information-sharing initiative to include sharing information about disease, crime, poverty, and other nontraditional threats; 4) free the Open Source Agency (OSA) from the U.S. intelligence community affiliation or direct oversight; 5) establish an office for Information-Sharing Treaties and Agreements; 6) establish JIOCs within each Combatant Command (COCOM) as well as a DOD JIOC; 7) sponsor a summit and

ongoing Wiki website on the four "opens" that will energize information-sharing in the future: open source software, open source information, open (electromagnetic) spectrum, and open hyperdocument system (OHS) and 8) issue an antitrust waiver for a private sector OSINT skunkworks that will fully integrate and test all available open sources, software, and services. Steele concludes with an emphasis on an educated citizenry.

Stubbs, John B. *Superterrorism and the Military Instrument of Power MF*. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 1998.
Stubbs believes that an entirely new policy framework for counterterrorism can be devised in the face of the superterrorism threat using contemporary war theory and the revision of the military instrument of power (MIOP) application policy. Superterrorism has emerged as terrorist have exited the negotiation room and become determined to cause international destruction with newly available technologies such as; chemical, biological, and nuclear weaponry. Superterrorism is a present and significant threat to U.S. security and is one that the U.S. is not necessarily ready to confront. The author identifies the new threat as complex, fluid, and dynamic. Classification into groups such as state sponsored, state complacent, or non state terrorism is difficult and poses a problem to agency response efforts. He writes that we can define the use of MIOP as applicable to international terrorism, because the numerous and powerful law enforcement agencies in the U.S. are able to counter the domestic terrorism threat. However, these domestic entities must be ready to cooperate with other internationally focused agencies for the purpose of information gathering. A key part of this analysis is how to best use MIOP. Stubbs contends that this must begin with intelligence and detection. In order for the intelligence to be useful and for MIOP to be able to act, diplomacy and resolve must have one strong and single voice coming from the numerous U.S. government agencies. This helps the individual U.S. counterterrorism effort and the building of an international consensus against terrorism. *The author sees a general reluctance in the U.S. to resort to MIOP for fear of the consequences that accompany any military action. He believes this would change after a successful attack. To prevent any sort of attack the President must work with MIOP to facilitate engagement and strikes against terrorist and states that support terrorist organizations.* This calls for national security statements that are consistent with the policy definition of MIOP and its abilities to deter and preempt attacks.

Stubbs wants the reader to gain an appreciation for the magnitude and immediacy of the superterrorism threat. He offers no specific procedural or policy recommendations except that the current system is inadequate and must be revised. With an understanding of the threat should come an understanding that the current MIOP application policy is far too limited. One must apply realist logic to the superterrorism threat to recognize the system as a whole is not ready. A response to superterrorism is going to be required long before any kind of international consensus is formed.

Tanous, Stephen M. *Building a Psychological Strategy for the U.S.: Leveraging the Informational Element of National Power.* Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2003. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA414554.
The "informational" element of national power is often referred to in vague terms without association to specific overarching objectives or explicit ways or means. The other elements of national power—military, diplomatic, and economic—are guided by strategies, policies, or organizations. However, there is no overarching guidance to realize the psychological value inherent in the exercise of these elements of U.S. national power. Recognizing this deficiency, this paper argues for a psychological strategy." *A national psychological strategy would require a standing bureaucracy to work with the interagency, particularly the National Security Council and the Departments of State and Defense,* to develop overarching themes and messages in order to provide an informational backdrop" for all government activities affecting domestic and foreign audiences. The keys to successful implementation of a national psychological strategy are integration of public diplomacy, public affairs, international military information and coercive diplomacy, supported by the means to understand and communicate with foreign audiences and gauge both domestic and foreign reaction to U.S. plans, policies, and actions. The nation has the resources and expertise to execute an effective psychological strategy which will make the difference for the U.S. in the 21st century.

Taw, Jennifer Morrison, Marcy Agmon and Lois M. Davis. "Interagency Coordination in Military Operations Other Than War: Implications for the U.S. Army," RAND Arroyo Center, 1997. http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR825/.
The bottom line argument posed by this article is that due to a variety of factors, namely population growth, population migration, and urbanization, the U.S. military will increasingly face a "humanitarian or nation-assistance

component." This landscape, therefore, predicates the U.S. military depending on and working with civilians in future non-combat operations known in military parlance as "Military Operations Other Than War" (MOOTW). According to the author, "this growing nexus of civilian and military efforts requires increased coordination to maximize each player's contribution and to avoid both redundancies and contradictory efforts."

One key issue, the author notes, is that "*civilian agencies have insufficient authority and accountability when it comes to performing given humanitarian and nation-assistance tasks.*" The very nature of MOOTW, coupled with the above fact, further "muddies the distinctions between civilian and military control." *There are bureaucratic and cultural forces at work that inherently prevent a smooth operating environment in and between civilian and military personnel, who are accountable to superiors with agendas, budgets, and political priorities that are quite often not in harmony with facts on the ground.*

Some recommendations put forward in the paper are: 1) "educating Army personnel and civilians about each other's capabilities, limitations, expectations, requirements, organization, objectives, and methods" (presumably to remove knowledge barriers and facilitate communication); 2) seek clarity on who has operational authority and at what points in the conflict (when do major combat operations end and post-conflict operations begin?). Notwithstanding, the author points out that the Army was successful in its "Moot-wa" operations in Operation Just Cause in Panama, Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti, and various operations in Bosnia.

More generally, the author acknowledges the beneficial impact that Goldwater-Nichols had on the armed forces, and notes the limitations of the National Security Act of 1947 to similarly transform civilian agencies. Again, *the keys to solving the problem of civilian and military interagency cooperation is education (both military and civilian), clarification of operational authority, anticipation of expanding requirements, overcoming operational differences, better utilization of coordinating structures, and clarifying missions (objectives and outcomes).*

US Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations. *The National Security Council: Comment by Henry Kissinger*. March 3, 1970. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970.
While the National Security Council serves as an advisory body, it is the President himself that makes the actual decisions with regard to any foreign policy issues. Mr. Kissinger also notes, "*The more ad hoc approach of the 1960s often ran the risk that relevant points of view were not heard, that systematic treatment of issues did not take place at the highest level, or that the bureaucracies were not fully informed as to what had been decided and why.*" All major issues will now be treated within the framework of the National Security Council, and "the system of supporting subcommittees which the president set up is intended to present distinct options, together with their pros and cons and implications and costs, rather than a single policy recommendation founded on bureaucratic consensus". The subcommittees also introduce flexibility with regard to the channels through which an individual must travel in order to present issues to the Council. Mr. Kissinger then states that there are certain requirements for leadership in the 1970s, and these requirements must be met in order to have positive effects. They consist of the following: Policy must be creative; Policymaking must be systematic. Policymakers must force consideration of problems before they become an emergency; Policymakers must know the facts; Policymakers must be prepared if a crisis occurs. For this purpose, the Washington Special Actions Group was created in order to draft contingency plans for possible crises; Policy must have effective implementation.

US Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations. *The National Security Council: New Role and Structure.* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969.
Since January 20, 1969, the president has moved to restore the National Security Council to the role that was set for it by the National Security Act of 1947: "to advise the president with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the government to cooperate more effectively in matters surrounding national security." At the time of the writing of the report, the following steps had been taken to implement the new plan for the agency: The NSC will become the principle forum for consideration of policy issues on which the president is required to make decisions; The NSC will meet regularly; Supporting NSC committees will be organized to prepare forward planning for the meetings of the council. The committees will have a duty to establish all pertinent facts and present all

options to the council, whether they are pros, cons, or total costs for projects. A full range of choices will be presented to the National Security Council upon completion of investigations.

The president has also given the State Department authority in the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activity of the United States. The Department will also play a central role in the National Security Council system and participate in all meetings as well. "The resources of the Department and its associated agencies will provide the strongest possible support to the President's desire to use the National Security system for an orderly examination of our foreign policy objectives."

Wagley, John R. *Transnational Organized Crime: Principal Threats and U.S. Responses*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006. Available from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33335.pdf.
Foreign Affairs analyst Wagley discusses the growth and nature of transnational organized crime to the United States national security and global stability, tracing its growth to the end of the Cold War and increasing globalization. The report opens with extensive background of the issue, including the defining of terminology. Next, Wagley discusses U.S. policy response (particularly the functions of multiple federal agencies involved in key federal programs and initiatives) and then outlines issues for policy consideration. In the conclusion, Wagley emphasizes the necessity of an improved understanding of international organized crime's dynamic as it stands to help Congress coordinate, fund, and oversee anti-crime policies and programs. The improvement of data collection, establishment of a clear picture of the relative threats posed by particular criminal activities, and closer scrutiny of the nexus between crime and terror could all facilitate the government's approach to the crime. Finally, stronger international law enforcement cooperation as well as more effective government partnerships with the private sector may prove beneficial in combating transnational organized crime.

Ward, Brad M. *Strategic Influence Operations: The Information Connection.* Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2003. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA415825.
In this paper, Colonel Ward analyzes the U.S. Government's current approach to conducting strategic influence operations within the international environment. Specifically, this paper conducts a comparative analysis of the fundamental approaches that the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the National Security Council/ White House utilize internationally. Based on this analysis, Ward makes recommendations that magnify information techniques to further USG strategic objectives. Ward suggests that: 1) the USG expand the horizon of its informational programs; 2) establish a U.S. sponsored forum that allows for active participation of coalition partners/allies, United Nations, and Non-governmental Organization actors; and 3) some provision be made for the allocation of manpower and funding to support these initiatives. Ward concludes with an emphasis on the need to leverage the economic and technological advantages of the USG for "selling American democracy."

Westin, Susan S. *U.N. Peacekeeping: GAO's Access to Records on Executive Branch Decision-Making.* Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2001. Available from http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS48874.
GAO sought access to records that documented the decision-making process for peacekeeping operations from Departments of State and Defense and the National Security Council.

Woods, George J. *A U.S. Government Interagency Structure to Combat Terrorism.* Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2002. Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA404516.
Woods begins by declaring, "Our current national security structure has not kept pace to deal with new terrorist organizations," and goes on to state "networks must be used to defeat other networks." The report suggests how to make the United States security apparatus more flexible by reducing redundancies and clarifying bureaucratic roles. Woods describes a system that he believes will better posture the US government for "netwar." He states, "Adding all-channel network structures to augment current hierarchical organizations rather than dismantle them and replace existing structures in the midst of [the GWOT] is the optimal solution." Thus his main focus is the addition of interagency units at all levels to coordinate existing bodies. Key recommendations: 1) Eliminate the current redundancies of NSPD-1 and HSPD-1, and integrate both responsibilities under the National Security Council; 2) *Establish a three-advisor sub-set of the NSC to specifically deal with the Global War on Terror consisting of a Counterterrorism Advisor, a Homeland Security Advisor, and a Cyber Security Advisor*; 3) Suggests the creation of Interagency Coordination Groups to be attached to commandant commanders, which will be advisory and consist of representatives from relevant agencies and departments; 4) Citing the success of IAJTF-E, he suggests the

widespread use of Interagency Task Forces; 5) Recommends that the Defense Department use JFCOM to "[create] interagency doctrine at the operational and tactical level" (JFCOM has to some extent begun to assume this role. They state, "A fully networked joint force is necessary to achieve successful military operations. USJFCOM's goal is to develop a joint force with the ability to fight both as a joint U.S. force and to operate as part of a combined force with allied, coalition and interagency partners." For information see http://www.jfcom.mil/about/abt_j8.htm)

IV. Journals/Discussion Papers

Abramson, Rudy, and Gaylord Shaw. "Bush Report Urges Bigger Anti-Terrorism Role for Security Body," *Los Angeles Times (Pre-1997 Fulltext)* (January 25, 1986).
Citing the need for improved coordination of the U.S. response to terrorism, a task force headed by Vice President George Bush has urged President Reagan to enhance the role of the National Security Council but has *rejected proposals that he designate an anti-terrorism czar*, Administration officials told The Times on Friday.

Barnes, J. R. "Reorganizing for homeland security: Lessons from 50 years of organizing and reorganizing the Department of Defense," *Journal of Homeland Security* (June 26, 2002). Available from http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Commentary/barnes26June2002.html.
The author primarily presents 18 key lessons from DOD restructuring and organization that apply to the creation of a Department of Homeland Security. Broadly, he recommends the establishment of both support and operational commanders, with the emphasis being on a direct operational chain of command to the agency head and the President.

Bensahel, Nora. "Mission Not Accomplished: What Went Wrong with Iraqi Reconstruction," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 29:3 (June 2006) 423-473.
In this article, Bensahel argues that the prewar planning process for postwar Iraq was plagued by myriad problems, including a dysfunctional interagency process, overly optimistic assumptions and a lack of contingency planning for alternative outcomes. These *problems were compounded by a lack of civilian capacity during the occupation period, which led to a complicated and often uncoordinated relationship with the military authorities who found themselves taking the lead in many reconstruction activities*. Taken together, these mistakes meant that US success on the battlefield was merely a prelude to a postwar insurgency whose outcome remains very much in doubt more than three years later.

Bogdanos, Matthew F. "Interagency Operations: The Marine Specialty of This Century," *Marine Corps Gazette* 90:3 (March 2006) 60-66.
The author argues that effective interagency coordination is "the best way to defeat today's threats," and traces the development of U.S. Central Command's Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) after the September, 11 2001 attacks to illustrate the rapid effectiveness of properly harmonized government synchronization.
The set-up of the JIACG described by the author is calibrated to ensure it can operate in multiple interagency environments while maintaining tactical synergy in counterterrorism-related initiatives. During planning, all relevant agencies are involved and allowed to shape plans before they are in their final draft. Every product released from a JIACG is released without indicating which agency within the group proposed it, so that all proposals receive equal consideration. This "honest-broker" principle is proving especially effective. JIACG avoids the insular pitfalls of individual agencies by maintaining an unprecedented flow of information between its members, so that certain agencies actually "learn more about one another's activities through JIACG than through traditional channels." JIACG also maintains situational awareness among all its members through daily reports that cut out duplication of effort and generate collaborative, multiagency solutions.

Although the Joint Staff found that JIACGs "integrated US government objectives, creating a forum for interagency operational planning and coordination," three major challenges remain – the lack of national level interagency guidance, the lack of information sharing standards, and a failure to publish effective doctrine. Here, unity of effort and enlightened leadership will be necessary within the National Security Council to make any forward progress, keeping in mind that *centralization of interagency coordination in the highest levels of government is not the solution, but clearer inter- and intra-agency guidance is.*

The author also explores the ordeal of convincing agencies to "volunteer" to support Operation Iraqi Freedom given the lack of a directive from NSC designating a clear interagency plan. Integrating these disparate elements of national power requires not just inspired leadership but "knowing each agency's core competencies, culture, method of operation, and internal metrics of success." Based on this JIACG was able to tailor each request for help to each agency so they could provide properly organized and resourced teams to CentCom.

The author recommends four steps for the Marine Corps to take the lead in developing a national doctrine for interagency coordination. These include: establishing an interagency executive steering group to drive the establishment of doctrine, creating a series of Marine Corps interagency protocols that encourage others to follow their lead, including robust interagency training and education in senior leader development programs, and adding active duty and Reserve billets for interagency-trained officers on all staffs at the regiment level and higher. These changes should spur other services, and eventually the NSC, to implement similar interagency procedures and doctrine.

Bogdanos, Matthew F. "Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step," *Joint Force Quarterly* 37 (April 2005) 10-18.
Focuses on the significance of integrated operations and the creation of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) which must permeate all phases of conflict and rebuilding of Iraq. Development of the joint doctrine and the development of the JIACG by the U.S. Central Command; Scope and limitation of the operation of the JIACG; Challenges to the JIACG operations; Issues for the Department of Defense and the National Security Council to address to ensure the continued existence of the JIACG.

Braun, William. *Irregular Challenges: Implications for U.S. and Allied Force Transformation,* Summary and analysis, 2006 Eisenhower National Security Series, AUSA Convention Conference (Oct. 4, 2005). Available from http://www.eisenhowerseries.com/pdfs/final_06/ausa-2005_final_report.pdf and http://www.eisenhowerseries.com/events/06-01/index.php.
A panel headed by Rear Admiral (Ret.) Richard Cobbold considered the implications of irregular challenges on U.S. and allied force transformation along three themes: planning for effects-based operations; force sizing and equipment modernization; and organizing structures, acquisition and support to improve agility radically. The first and the last mentioned interagency topics. In planning for effects based operations, there was a recognized need for the diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) instruments of national power to be woven together to achieve results. The *military, they wrote, "may need to be suboptimized (used to less than the maximum degree of ther possible output) to achieve desired effects.*" There was also a recognition that the number of diverse players in any irregular warfare operation complicates planning.

Regarding organizing command structures, acquisition, and support to improve agility radically, the panel stated that: 1) "Rapid and radical vs. incremental change is required to preempt or counter an agile asymmetric enemy"; 2) *Granularity, but not the principles, of public accountability must suffer to achieve required change*; 3) Institutions and bureaucracies must develop an ethos of change; 4) Transatlantic cooperation is required to optimize long- and short-term initiatives and resource distribution. Unfortunately, the implications of these were not detailed.
In a separate speech, Major General (Ret.) J.B.A. Bailey, stated that the notion of information superiority and intelligence dominance on a transparent battlefield is delusional and has misguided our actions. He claims "We would be better off assuming information inferiority and proceeding from there in determining how to plan, organize and equip for success." He also gave a nod to issues of legality, asking, "How does a coalition force commander reconcile multiple national rules of engagement (ROE) when planning an operation? Finally, he advises that, to achieve unity of effort and meet the challenges of synergistic interagency Operations, *there may need to be a Viceroy figure. However, he admitted that "Issues of national chains of authority and the melding of institutional cultures and ethos probably make such a suggestion infeasible. Therefore, our optimum course may be to muddle through the contradictions and complexities more effectively than we have in the past."*

In another speech, Orville E. "Bud" Hay claimed the new The Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) "Capstone Concept for Joint Operations" was groundbreaking in that it addresses the military's role in the context of an interagency environment. He claimed that the ability to meet these new challenges starts with policy, concepts and doctrine (created by JFCOM). He said, "We have identified gaps in our translation of strategy to policy, and authorities as we

examine international, interagency, and civil relationships. This analysis has implications down to the tactical level of the three block war."

When asked "How does a general force train and educate to meet the demands of an expanded mission set that includes governance, reconstruction, urban management, and economic market development?" the group had varied responses. One perspective was not doing it, these are interagency missions. The military is responsible for providing an adequately secure environment, and that is all. This seemed to ignore the fact that the military is one of these agencies. Another position suggested the military should simply have a "can do" attitude. While he did not believe the military should be used as "firefighters" to conduct missions because others can not, Admiral Cobbold suggested the military might be "capable of orchestrating the interagency effort through its culture of planning and central control." When asked "If the military is out of the nation-building task, who has the resources to do it?" there seemed to be consensus that "there isn't anybody" and "we need to build that capability in the interagency." The military, for its part, should be an enabler, providing security for whatever interagency capacity is developed.

Briem, Christopher. "Joint Is Dead: What Is Next?" ***Proceedings*** **130:1 (Jan. 2004) 56.**
Proclaiming the Goldwater-Nichols idea of joint warfighting as "an intermediate step that became obsolete almost overnight" in the wake of September 11, Briem argues for a "new scale of extramilitary cooperation beyond existing expectations or plans" to fight the war on terror. The line between military and civilian roles in ensuring U.S. national security has blurred so much as to be indistinguishable. Indeed, civilian and military roles are even reversing in some instances in Afghanistan and Iraq. It will take interagency cooperation beyond DOD and law enforcement agencies to successfully plan, gather intelligence for, and execute operations during and beyond the situation in Iraq. Though the military may be loathe to increasing civilian interaction, it must find some way to cope as peace-keeping and nation-building become the most common reasons for deployment of military force in the future. NGOs, which are often at odds with the policies of the US government and often equally loathe working with military detachments, cannot be ignored by combatant commanders because they bring crucial and unique resources to these situations. As the author states, "*an inability or unwillingness to leverage these resources can only promote mission failure*." *He adds that interagency cooperation and the involvement of foreign and non-DOD agencies in the execution of military operations should be seen as "force multiplier."*

Briem brings up a number of challenges to getting interagency and intermilitary cooperation to be effective. One challenge of increased interagency cooperation will be "getting vastly different bureaucracies to understand each other." As well, the author sees a huge challenge in restraining competition between military services as they become more integrated, yet also harnessing and exploiting the often positive results such competition provides. Briem also notes that each branch of the armed forces must question and potentially redefine its role in the continuing war on terror. "Dealing in a more complex organizational environment will require more flexible thinking at all levels of the chain of command." He suggests numerous ways to utilize Navy personnel and equipment in conjunction with commercial merchant vessels and foreign crewmen to approach the war on terror from new angles.

In addition, just as "network-centric" warfare has emerged to redefine the battlespace, "network-centric" will become the only practical way for interagency operations to function. In order to manage, understand, and exploit the resources interagency cooperation brings together, a decentralized network structure will be required.

Brown, Shannon, ed. "Resourcing Stability Operations and Reconstruction," Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Series Symposium (March 23, 2006).
This report focuses on the difficulties faced through stability and reconstruction efforts, i.e. "nation building." The report is broken down into four sections: history, issues and challenges, challenges for the future, and challenges specifically related to Iraq. Although the historical analysis of past American reconstruction efforts is a useful tool for understanding the difficulties and challenges faced by those tasked to rehabilitate a nation, the key aspects of the report concern recent American reconstruction efforts in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and the need to learn from these experiences. Key findings/recommendations are: Nations must better assess the risks associated with intervention and nation-building; An overwhelming military presence for an extended amount of time is required to guarantee security before any reconstruction effort can take place; Local populations must be engaged at the managerial level for any reconstruction effort to be considered legitimate and therefore successful; Reconstruction cannot succeed without the presence of strong supportive allies; A plan for reconstruction should be considered prior

to military engagement; Economic growth and security is the path to winning "hearts and minds"; Reconstruction efforts must be measured in decades; An objective local judicial system capable of defining the rule of law is essential to establishing legitimacy in the new national government; The military must be better prepared to handle security and reconstruction efforts, and that preparation is currently underway; The use of the private sector and civilian contractors are beneficial to establishing staying power and long-term continuity; Vast improvements need to be made in the area of inter agency coordination; The US must improve its area knowledge and language skills in Iraq; The US military must better prepare itself to wage a counterinsurgency; The US lacks basic competence in the economics of nation building in societies whose economic structures, ability to execute reforms and projects, and perceived values differ significantly from its own; The US must reassess whether or not its objective in Iraq is tenable and act accordingly.

Our planning and execution of security and reconstruction efforts in Iraq can only be described as a failure. The passage of DOD Directive 3000.05—a development that should have occurred years ago—should be viewed as a step in the right direction, but is still years away from being successfully implemented.

Brown, Stuart. "Building America's Anti-Terror Machine," *Fortune* 146:2 (July 22, 2002) 99-104.
Describes the need for the federal government to develop a decentralized computer network to integrate information stored in public and private sector databases and to build unprecedented interagency cooperation to deter and respond to domestic terrorist attacks; some focus on the use of geographic information system mapping software.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, "The NSC's Midlife Crisis," *Foreign Policy* 69 (Winter 1987-1988) 80-89.
In his 1987-1988 article "The NSC's Midlife Crisis," Zbigniew Brzezinski examines the role of the National Security Council (NSC) and investigates how the president should utilize the organization. While dealing with a different bureaucratic era, this analysis identifies NSC pitfalls and provides recommendations for a more effective National Security Council that still bear consideration. Brzezinski assesses the NSC in accordance with two patterns of presidential leadership. In the presidential system, where presidents are intimately involved in defining national strategy, the head of the NSC becomes an increasingly important and influential policy player. In the secretarial system, where the president permits a cabinet secretary to assume direction of foreign policy, the NSC head is less influential. With the NSC's role in Iran-contra as a closing reference point, Brzezinski also identifies three distinct phases in the NSC's history and exposes problems that afflicted the NSC machinery during each phase. From 1947-1960 the NSC underwent a period of institutionalization that peaked under Eisenhower. During this time the NSC acted as both a decision-making and policymaking body. Ultimately, however, institutionalization resulted in the NSC losing its proclivity for innovation. The NSC became more highly personalized from 1960-1980. In this phase the NSC machinery was dismantled and practices became more casual. Nevertheless the head of the NSC generally acquired more prestige as an acknowledged policymaker and, during the Nixon administration, attained the rank of most senior White House aid, coequal with cabinet secretaries. According to Brzezinski, *over-personalization resulted in diminished NSC strategic coherence during these years*. The author's third phase of "degradation" took place during the first six years of the Reagan administration. During this period the NSC lost its presence in the White House and its place as a policy-making and policy-coordinating institution. The size of NSC swelled and pace declined as the NSC bureaucracy ballooned. Brzezinski's historical analysis leads him to conclude that *the NSC is a necessary organ in need of more orderly procedures and a more clearly defined relationship with the president*. Ideally, the NSC should be engaged in policy planning and coordination. Strategic planning should be entrenched in the NSC machinery with crisis management concentrated in the White House. *Under no circumstances should the NSC become involved in intelligence or sustained bureaucratic operations*. The most effective NSC would be comprised of 30-40 senior staffers from intelligence, the armed services, the Foreign Service, and academia. Moreover, the president should make it clear that the office of the national security advisor carries the authority of the White House. Finally, Brzezinski notes that *the NSC must pay more attention to policy implementation. In this regard he advocates the establishment of new machinery to monitor implementation activity*. In closing, the author underscores the importance of an effective National Security Council and argues that, "To maintain its position in the world and advance its interests, the United States needs to maximize the impact of its diplomatic, military, and financial resources. That can only be done if the NSC system is permitted to perform as its creators originally intended some 40 years ago."

Burke, John P. "The Contemporary Presidency: Condoleezza Rice as NSC Advisor: A Case Study of the Honest Broker Role," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 35:3 (2005) 554-575.

The role of honest broker has often been seen as a contributor to effective presidential decision making. This article explores the broker role of National Security Council Advisor Condoleezza Rice during three crucial decision-making episodes in George W. Bush's first term: 1) deliberations in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and the decision to go to war in Afghanistan; 2) deliberations that led to the war in Iraq; and 3) deliberations concerning Iraq's postwar stabilization and reconstruction. The article finds that the broker role declined over time. This decline does not appear to be linked to other roles of the NSC advisor such as policy advocacy, but it does appear to be affected by problems of organization and management as well as its fit with presidential expectations and support of the broker role.

Burke, John P. "The Neutral/Honest Broker Role in Foreign-Policy Decision Making: A Reassessment," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 35:2 (2005) 229-258.
This article examines the impact of the "neutral" or "honest" broker role in presidential decision making, particularly as applied to the job of National Security Council adviser. It provides further evidence of the positive and continuing contribution of the role to effective decision making, which has been expressed both in theory (Alexander George's formulation of the related concept of the "managerial custodian" in the 1970s) and in practice (the broker role of the Eisenhower-era NSC special assistants). At the same time, it considers the feasibility of additional tasks such as policy advocacy, public visibility, political watchdog, and operational assignments, which have been embraced, to varying degrees, by more recent NSC advisers but were largely absent in the Elsenhower era and rejected by George as appropriate to the custodian role. The article also examines the applicability of the broker role in light of differing presidential decision-making needs, different advisory structures, and the issue of bureaucratic leverage and personal influence. Attention to the broker role remains relevant not only in understanding classic decision failures (the expansion of troop commitments in Vietnam in 1965) and successes (Indochina in 1954) but in gaining perspective on more recent decisions, such as Iran-Contra during the Reagan years and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and issues surrounding its postwar reconstruction in the George W. Bush presidency.

Byman, Daniel. Strengthening the Partnership: Improving Military Coordination with Relief Agencies and Allies in Humanitarian Operations. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000.
Humanitarian interventions are often referred to as "complex contingency operations" because they often go beyond disaster relief and include such tasks as protecting refugees, securing humanitarian aid, and restoring civil order. "Because military support for humanitarian assistance during conflict will probably continue at a huge tempo in the coming years, the United States Air Force, and the military in general, must know and work with a wide range of actors, including U.S. government agencies, allied governments and their militaries, host nations, international organizations, and nongovernment organizations." The purpose of this particular study is to examine how to improve coordination between the U.S. military and relief agencies during these humanitarian missions. What drives these various actors to participate in relief efforts varies slightly between types of agencies. Media coverage, domestic opinion, grassroots efforts, and refugees all provide incentive for the U.S. to react to these situations. "Military missions in complex contingency operations typically fall into five general categories: providing humanitarian assistance, protecting humanitarian assistance, assisting refugees and displaced persons, enforcing a peace agreement, and restoring order." However, these military missions often encounter problems that hamper their overall effectiveness, particularly when interacting with NGOs in the process. Many times, both the militaries and NGOs involved must deal with a "wide range of different and often competing or diverging actors" and thus it is difficult to reconcile the varying interests present among these actors. Other problems present in the differing relief strategies of the military and NGOs is different organizational structures (NGOs being more decentralized), the desire to maintain neutrality (many NGOs prefer to maintain neutrality), and a general lack of understanding between the personnel of these two types of agencies. One big overarching problem is that "*many NGOs, believing that the United States approaches humanitarian relief in an ad hoc manner, hesitate to devote resources to improving ties to the military because the military may withdraw abruptly during a crisis or not help at all.*" With regard to the military, the report recommends that certain key personnel in this agency are familiar with the most relevant players within the NGO structure in humanitarian missions. Also, at the same time, the military should make sure to familiarize the NGO with its own structure and key players, in order to foster a reciprocal understanding and cooperation and eliminate any suspicions on the part of the NGOs. The report also recommends that the military improve information sharing and also the action of bringing in NGOs into the planning process of humanitarian missions. This paper hypothesizes that if the military can initially establish a beneficial relationship with a few key NGOs, then once others see that missions and the new cooperative strategy have proven to be

effective, other NGOs will be more likely to join in and collaborate with military agencies in humanitarian efforts. Though this report emphasizes military-NGO cooperation, the author hopes that these reforms can be implemented across a variety of other U.S. government agencies, such as the Department of Defense and the Department of State, so that U.S. effectiveness can be increased in future humanitarian assistance.

Byrd, Miemie Winn. "Combating Terror with Socioeconomics: Leveraging the Private Sector," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 46 (2007).

This article emphasizes the importance of creating stable socioeconomic environments in developing countries—specifically the Philippines—in order to discourage frustrated citizens from joining terrorist organizations. Establishing this sort of environment requires cooperation from many different sectors and agencies, especially the military and private businesses. Recommendations to incorporate several sectors in efforts to establish sustainable environments in unstable countries are valid, but given past difficulties with interagency organizations, a horizontal structure does not seem like an effective method for producing strategies. Instead, a specific committee should be established to provide direction and develop a unified approach. It recommends the Department of Defense should cooperate with other groups to develop an interagency counterterrorism effort dedicated to creating a sustainable economic environment. These stakeholders may include U.S. governmental departments, private businesses, non-governmental organizations, local governments, and other nations.

Cambone, Stephen A., "A new structure for national security policy planning" *Center for Strategic and International Studies* 20:3 (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 1998).

A New Structure for National Security Policy Planning criticizes the current national security structure as a Cold War era design and provides a proposal for new legislation to replace the National Security Act of 1947. Cambone explains that the goal of his work is to "develop an intellectual and operational framework for national security policy planning…intended to serve as a practical guide to changes that can be made today as well as to foster further debate." His recommendations present a logical structural reformation designed to provide the president with greater unified command over the information and bureaucracy integral to national security policy planning. *Cambone's vision centers on the creation of an institution called the National Security Directorate (NSD), which would "develop, plan, and execute policies and operations as assigned by the president as NSD director."* As part of the Office of the President, the NSD would unify five directorates, each led by a cabinet secretary and responsible for a different aspect of security affairs, including crisis management, home defense, regional affairs, finance and trade, and science and technology. *The new national security structure would also require dismantling the National Security Council and giving its advisory role to a committee of the cabinet secretaries of the NSD directorates along with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).* Likewise, the National Security Adviser would be replaced by the cabinet position of Deputy Director of the NSD (DDNSD), for which the president may select the vice president. Interagency cooperation is integral to Cambone's plan, as he envisions the NSD staff including a "cadre of senior civil servants, who could operate across department lines… (and) would be drawn from departments and agencies throughout the government responsible for the development and execution of policy." Cambone's recommendations are orderly and precise but it is unclear whether Congress would favor such an overhaul of the national security structure. Though Capitol Hill may ultimately take some of the proposals to heart, in the short-term, the work may be expected to fulfill Cambone's second stated goal of "foster[ing] further debate."

Carafano, James J., and Dana R. Dillon, "Winning the Peace: Principles for Post-Conflict Operations," *Heritage Foundation Backgrounder* 1859 (June 13, 2005).

In this piece, Carafano and Dillon point out that there is no written strategy (doctrine) to guide policymakers in military interventions and post-conflict operations, otherwise known as "military peace operations". These operations are defined in the article as peacemaking (actions to end conflict), peacekeeping (enforcing peace once conflict is ended), and post-conflict operations (restoration of infrastructure and order in conflict zone). The latter of these three definitions, as the title of the article suggests, is the focus of the remainder of the exposition as it is, by the authors estimation, "the only essential and appropriate task for U.S. military forces."

The impetus, the authors claim, is on the Congress to draft legislation that would hold the executive branch accountable for drafting and implementing a comprehensive "interagency strategy for addressing the challenges of stabilizing countries after a conflict." *The failure to develop "sound doctrine," it is argued, will result in ad hoc and perhaps inadequate planning for this most vital aspect of fighting war—winning the peace post facto.* Nevertheless, the authors cede that "post-conflict operations are among the most difficult to plan and execute, even under the best

of circumstances." The conditions that create this "fog of peace" demand an injection of realistic expectations into the formulation of any future post-conflict doctrine.

The authors drive home their case with 7 principles that they identify as crucial to obtain positive outcomes in any post-conflict operation: 1) the President should determine clear, concise national objectives and stick to them, 2) elimination of the regime but preserve the government, 3) formulation a vision of the end state and develop a plan that will accomplish it, 4) the operations should be multilateral and inclusive without compromising U.S. national objectives, 5) and should involve many different U.S. agencies and thus require interagency coordination, 6) unity of effort is essential, 7) and, finally, lessons learned need to be documented and implemented.
The crux of the argument posited by these authors is that "experience and knowledge about peace operations have never been incorporated into mainstream military thinking in any major, systematic way." The way to resolve this problem, the article reads, is to enact legislation that obligates the executive branch and its cabinet members to develop and implement a distinct post-conflict doctrine to guide post-conflict operations. Accordingly, this doctrine should be developed in-theater in partnership with regional interagency teams, where U.S. military personnel play a pivotal role in leadership, training, and implementation.

Carafano, James J. "Herding Cats: Understanding Why Government Agencies Don't Cooperate and how to Fix the Problem," *Heritage Lectures* 955. Paper presented to the Conference on Interagency Operations: Cultural Conflicts Past and Present, Future Perspectives, hosted by the Center of History, Political Studies, Institute of Paris (June 15-16, 2006).
This speech outlines some of the major challenges facing the interagency reform process and presents some recommendations for a road forward. Carafano points out that interagency operations function relatively well at the policy level (each department has a fairly defined idea of how it will support national objectives), and at the practice level (members of various agencies on the ground manage to figure out effective ways to accomplish objectives), but *breaks down at the operational planning level* (preparing for emergencies such as Hurricanes or another domestic terrorist attack, for example). *Interagency cooperation is complicated by eight factors: different agency traditions, congressional funding of individual departments, the lack of coherent interagency professional development, overlapping operational districts, limited capacity to actually conduct operations (besides DOD, CIA, FBI), the lack of inspectors general for interagency operations, political fears of "big government", and the inadequacy of effective operational models for interagency operations.* The help improve cooperation within the federal government, the author recommends developing new, more effective operational models for interagency operations and the development of a national / homeland security university to develop organizational doctrine.

Carlucci, Frank. "What State Needs: Resources for Reform," Council on Foreign Relations and Center for Strategic and International Studies (May 2001). Available from http://www.afsa.org/fsj/may01/carluccimay01.cfm.
In this report, Carlucci briefly outlines generally accepted problems within the State Department, and then lays out the recommendations developed by the CFR/CSIS task force, which he headed. He argues that poor human resource policies, dilapidated infrastructure and facilities, a lack of clear boundaries of authority and responsibility among the highest levels of the department, and a professional culture that avoids engaging in public diplomacy, have led to a crisis of morale among employees as well as a severe workforce shortage. To fix these problems, the task force developed the "resources-for-reform" action plan. This plan would require State to convince Congress that fundamental reform is underway. Convincing Congress that true reform is happening is crucial to the entire action plan because it rests on the idea that State will be rewarded with resources to further reform once concrete steps have been taken. Carlucci points out that numerous attempts to reform the State Department over many decades have resulted in expensive failures, leading Congress to be skeptical of allocating resources to State.
Three concrete steps are recommended to assure that reform takes place: the President must take a clear and active role in pressing for reform, a clear division of authority must be made between the various departments within the national security structure, and progress must be made in fixing fundamental institutional and infrastructural problems. For the President's part, he needs to declare State reform a national security priority and then follow up by using his access to the public to reinforce the need for reform among the general population. To establish a clear division of authority between the various departments, the secretary of State needs to be reaffirmed as the President's top advisor and spokesman on foreign policy. Likewise, ambassadors need to be given more authority over officials from other departments operating within their embassies. Finally, a yearly presentation of an integrated national security budget should be developed which would increase understanding and cooperation

among the various departments involved in national security policy. The final task Carlucci identified, reforming institutional and infrastructural problems, calls for multiple steps to be taken. Budget and management should be recentralized and reintegrated with the policy-making process with the deputy secretary as the top manager over the entire operation. Next, the personnel selection and recruitment process should be improved, professional development opportunities should be expanded and the quality of life for employees and their families enhanced. Third, the department should embrace public outreach and make more of an effort to explain its policies to the American public. Fourth, the department needs to change the way its buildings and infrastructure are managed by establishing an "Overseas Facilities Authority" which would introduce higher levels of privatization into the process, leading to more efficient management. Finally, the secretary and his subordinates should regularly engage Congress to keep members apprised of the progress being made. Carlucci believes that if the recommendations of the task force are followed, morale will be boosted, the department's central role in foreign policy will be revitalized, and a joint undertaking with Congress will have started that will further the reform process.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Institute for International Economics. "Special Report: Policymaking for a New Era," *Foreign Affairs* 71:5 (Winter 1992/1993) 175-189.
A bipartisan commission cosponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Institute for International Economics provides recommendations for reorganizing the US government for the post-Cold War era. It says that, to make the government work effectively, it is essential to break down the bureaucratic walls still separating increasingly interrelated issues. Organizing the government requires, first and foremost, organizing the presidency. *This commission recommends placing all policy coordination in 3 coequal councils: the National Security Council, the Economic Council, and the Domestic Council.* The commission recommends against tying the vice-president down to specific assignments. Three areas beyond the White House that demand attention are trade, competitiveness, and the environment. Foremost among the exeuctive agencies that require reevaluation are the intelligence community and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the foreign aid programs, and the nuclear laboratories.

Carney, Dan, and Chuck McCutcheon. "Who's in Charge when Terror Strikes?" *CQ Weekly* 56:29 (July 18, 1998) 1921.
Lawmakers say US plans to counter chemical and biological attacks by terrorists or other nations are badly coordinated. Pres Clinton's coordination efforts have helped but have only partially mollified Congress.

Carreau, Bernard. "Transforming the Interagency System for Complex Operations," National Defense University, Center for Technology and National Security Policy (2007).
Mr. Carreau makes the case in this article that the U.S. military has gone a long way to transform its ability to wage effective warfare, primarily through acumen in the application of advanced technology on the battlefield. With the challenges of stabilization in global war on terror (that is to imply Iraq and Afghanistan) serving as the litmus, Mr. Carreau argues that the "other" vital component of war-fighting is the ability of the United States "to build a full-spectrum civil-military capability for stability operations." The solution, offered here, is a "renewed focus on interagency and international partners" to fill the gap and complete the military transformation that is necessary and sufficient to not only fight wars, but also to engage in stabilization and reconstruction efforts as well as other "complex contingencies."

Taking a case study approach, the author examines three interagency initiatives undertaken after World War II; the Marshall Plan, the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development support (CORDS) program in Vietnam, and Presidential Decision Directive 56 (Managing Complex Contingency Operations, Pres. Clinton, 1997). Mr. Carreau does an excellent job of summarizing the timeline of events in these three cases, but leaves the reader with facts only; he doesn't provide subjective observations from which to draw conclusions. The inclusion of these studies or "fact sheets" is distracting and rather pointless.
After leaving the Clinton era behind without any sense of saliency or closure, Mr. Carreau takes the reader to the present lineage of bills and directives that were spawned under the Bush Administration after September 11. The author provides a buffet of information about these laws and enactments, but in an *al la carte* manner that leaves one wondering when the relevancy of their addition will become clear; it never does. The conclusion makes some intriguing observations that do not relate to the text of the article, but are useful nevertheless. This 23-page

juggernaut would have been best presented as a 3-5 page essay with the introduction and conclusion intact, the body of the text is canon fodder that yields no profit to the reader.

Carter, Ashton B. "The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism," ***International Security*** **26 (Winter 2001/2002) 5-23.**

Ashton Carter points out the problems associated with most of the current models for dealing with catastrophic terrorism. Terrorism does not neatly fall into the realm of a foreign threat (to be dealt with by the State or Defense Departments) or a domestic crime (to be dealt with by federal law enforcement agencies such as the FBI). Carter, Professor of Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government and Co-director of the Preventative Defense Project, proffers an assessment of interagency operations in diachronic perspective. There have been four models of failure, he claims—command and control (mastered by the Clinton administration), lead agency, Department of Homeland Security, and White House Coordinator. *The practice under the Clinton administration of designating agencies to be in charge in the case of foreign and domestic terrorism was too focused on dealing with acts in progress and made no provision for any sort of preventative or responsive measures*. Clinton's command and control model made demands on specific agencies and then failed to provide funding. The Treasury, force example, was designated as the lead agency in charge of cyberterrorism. These demands—essentially unfunded mandates—presupposed an ability in agencies that, in all likelihood, did not have them. *Designating a "lead agency", the second common approach, generally left a single agency to handle a problem (such as monitoring terrorist suspects in the U.S.) by itself because other agencies refused to surrender money and effort to support a mission that wasn't theirs.* The lead agency model was equally unsuccessful because of jurisdictional limits and other legal restrictions. *The third approach of creating a new Department of Homeland Security would only serve to complicate the issue of interagency cooperation by adding a new agency into the mix.* The transition to the Homeland Security Council model came in 2001/2002 after the terrorist attacks on the United States. This organizational model—which brought twenty-two federal agencies under the control of a single bureaucracy, turned out to be a catastrophe, with overlapping jurisdictions, complete and total bureaucratic sluggishness, and poor coordination. The inability of the new coordinating/integrating agency to solve the anthrax attacks of 2002 are underscored as great evidence of this. The final general approach of *designating a "terrorism czar" to coordinate actions from within the White House is bound to be ineffective because the position has no inherent authority over department securities and thus has no power to implement any changes.* The author recommends dividing up anti-terrorism actions according to a timeline of activities (detection, prevention, protection, interdiction, containment, attribution, and analysis and invention) and assigning various responsibilities to each federal agency. The U.S. Customs authority, for example, would be responsible for working with other agencies on the detection and prevention activities, but would have nothing to do with the other activities. Carter believes that, simply linking agencies will not be sufficient—the challenges of the current operational environment demand a deeper level of integration. A true architect is needed for overhaul; "this program should cover all phases in the war against catastrophic terrorism—detection, prevention, protection, containment, attribution, and analysis and intervention."

Chabrow, Eric. "Interagency Cooperation," ***InformationWeek*** **920 (December 23, 2002) 14.**

Focuses on the effort of federal agencies to create a Web site gateway for technology-related information resources in the U.S. Access of citizens to technical reports, journal citations, databases, and federal Web sites.

Ciamporcero, Alan Francis. "The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and the Beginning of the Cold War," ***State University of New York at Albany*** **(1980).**

Most Cold War historians argue that the postwar conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union began as a contest over Eastern Europe, and at some point in early 1946, American policy-makers reached a consensus on a policy of confrontation. This paper suggests that revisions in both these hypotheses are necessary. First, the Pacific and Far East played as important a role in the developing conflict as Europe. The Soviets very much wanted influence in the Pacific, especially in Japan, and, as it became clear that such a role would be denied them, became more rigid in their European policies. In addition, it is inaccurate to characterize the American policy as the result of a developing consensus. In fact, the American Secretary of State, James Byrnes, attempted to reach a compromise with the Soviets in the final months of 1945. He was unable to do so, however, because he held only a tenuous grip on the foreign policy process. Rather than a developing consensus, the American policy was the result of the options of the Department of State being foreclosed by the actions of other agencies of the government.

Clark, Stephen A. Interagency Coordination: Strengthening the Link between Operational Art and the Desired End State. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1999.

The author studies the problems that a lack of interagency coordination caused in the restoration operations in Panama and Haiti. He writes that the Joint Task Force in both situations had to plan for post-hostilities to be successful, and not just purely military objectives. In both operations, the military failed to "restore emergency services and provide for the protection of civilians." Usually, military leaders can come to an understanding on what needs to be done strategically, but those at the operational level do not possess the same level of understanding. Through "operational art," the Department of Defense has a joint doctrine that guides major campaigns. The author suggests that "it is here that a significant change can be made to elevate post-hostilities operations to a phase within operational art planning and not simply as an annex." Moreover, the author stresses the importance in clearly defining a Desired End State from where regressive planning should begin. Due to "close-hold" procedures in Operation Promote Liberty, no consequential interagency coordination occurred. Had coordination been better, " the military planners might also have learned how long it would take to actually receive any of the required funding for many of the emergency relief operations." The author also claims that other problems in Panama included the lack of a Desired End State, isolating planning to within the Department of Defense and the nonexistence of an overall interagency plan. Although Uphold Democracy learned from the lessons in Panama, operational art was still done in isolation from the interagency process. The first attempt at comprehensive interagency cooperation did not occur until one week before the operation's execution. Also, "no one had planned for the dissolution of Haitian security forces or the total collapse of the government." And like Panama, planners at operational level were unaware of agreements at the strategic level. Since Panama and Haiti, there have been numerous joint doctrines addressing the necessary improvements in military planning and interagency coordination. *The author identifies the missing components in each doctrine and concludes that what must takes place is an "explicit recognition within joint doctrine that not only must post-hostilities operations be planned for, but, to be successful, it must be accomplished in the interagency environment as part of operational art."*

Clawson, Patrick. "Tuning the Instruments of National Power," *Joint Force Quarterly* 10 (Winter 1995-1996) 82-88.

In this article, the authors argue that the U.S., since the end of the Cold War, is currently undergoing a series of "revolutions" in how it must act to ensure its vital interests around the world, while bemoaning funding cuts in defense and international programs. While often prescient, the authors' concerns are relatively outdated due to the mere age of this article (published in Winter 1995). They argue that the world has changed in three major ways. First, geostrategy now focuses on troubled or transitional states instead of great power politics. Second, they argue that the continuing advances in information technology holds the key for maintaining economic growth and super-power status, as well as reinforcing the global trend of open societies. Third, the nature of governments, including the US government, has dramatically shifted to place the paramount priority on domestic concerns, noting that the US from FY1985 to FY1995 has cut funding for defense 34 percent and international programs 46 percent. Once establishing their view of the new international order, the authors offer several suggestions as to how to best utilize America's instruments of national power. First, resources need to be shifted to where the threats truly are. The rise of transnational threats such as terrorism, narcotics, and non-proliferation require an increase in attention paid to federal law enforcement agencies. Moreover, the sheer diversity of these threats, combined with cuts in funding, require increased interagency cooperation. Second, the article argues that the military will increasingly be forced into humanitarian and peace operations. To this end, the authors urge the implementation of only limited goals in these scenarios and the formulation of joint doctrines to established these restricted aims. Third, the article advocates greater cooperation with the private sector. The private sector stands as not only the best way to maintain the information technology edge, but foreign investment in other countries can help to cement market economies and democratic policies, such as private property rights, in transitional and third world states. Also, private humanitarian organizations are often better equipped than the US government to handle certain aspects of peacekeeping or crisis situations.

Coffey, Ross. "Revisiting CORDS: The Need for Unity of Effort to Secure Victory in Iraq," *Military Review* 86:2 (March/April 2006) 24-34.

Unity of effort is the key component to any counter-terrorism strategy, according to this article. The author discusses the relative success of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program during Vietnam, which sought to remove local support for the Viet Cong through cooperation between U.S. civilian and military authorities. A CORDS team was eventually developed for each of the 250 districts in South Vietnam and

focused on activities such as increasing the level of security for the populace or increasing economic development in the area. *The author emphasizes the importance of unity of effort through unity of command that the CORDS program relied on because it created a system of accountability for improving security in a particular area*. The CORDS program was grafted onto the larger military command structure in Vietnam which initially caused some reservations on the part of civilian workers who feared that they would be misunderstood and misused by their primarily military commanders. However, CORDS allowed civilian agencies to access military funds and equipment (such as engineers to build roads or airlift capabilities to transport materials) which proved to not only be a great enabler for their work, but also took a significant burden off the relatively meager budget of their supporting agencies. While the CORDS program obviously wasn't enough to win the war in Vietnam, it is a solid example of the greatly increased effectiveness in interagency operations that unity of effort can deliver.

Collins, Joseph J. "Planning Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan," *Joint Force Quarterly* 41 (Spring 2006) 10-14.
The article focuses on the security threat and the plans that leaders make for the diplomatic and military power to meet this threat. According to the author, *it is necessary to involve the interagency community in the military aspects of the planning process to achieve security objectives.* The author also suggests recommendations to improve mid-range planning in the U.S. which include the need of a new charter for complex contingency planning, interagency experience, gain legitimacy and others.

Cox, Christopher. "Change is Now Inevitable," *Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition)* (July 22, 2004) A12.
The 9/11 commission's report on the U.S. intelligence community recommends increasing cooperation between the 15 separate intelligence agencies. Notable failures, especially those connected to 9/11 and Iraq, underscore the need to improve the overall quality of information gathering resources in order to better meet national and homeland security objectives. The author also points out the need to provide for greater communication and interoperability between domestic law enforcement and intelligence collectors.

Cropsey, Seth. "Janus and the God of Jointness," *Armed Forces Journal* (June 2006).
Cropsey surveys the status of interagency effort in the wake of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, characterizing the fusion of future and past, terror and legislation as a manifestation of the two-faced Roman god Janus. The demands of future conflict change the way we defend ourselves and, according to Cropsey, transcend the measures Congress set in place twenty years ago with Goldwater-Nichols. Technological advance, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the rise of radical Islam leave us today with a strategic environment of opposites—unconventional vs. conventional, low-tech vs. high-tech, nonstate vs. state—that demand more from the U.S. military than adjustments of the power equation at high command. Cropsey argues for a "focused and practical" vision of jointness that serves a strategy that necessitates fighting at conflict's polar opposites. Cropsey perpetuates the Janus metaphor with a suggestion that we look both forward and backward, although our "backward" might be better focused on distant history than the recent past of the Cold War. The 2006 QDR also weaves into Cropsey's argument as an example of the varied approach to warfare necessary for future success (the military mission's emphasis is divided into "Homeland Defense," "War on Terror/Irregular Warfare," and "Conventional Campaigns" rather than restricting exclusively to the latter). Cropsey concludes that victory will be best facilitated by armed forces that possess the capability to "look at the future, switch gears, adapt, forge new ideas and make them work."

Cutler, Robert. "The Development of the National Security Council," *Foreign Affairs* (April 1956) 441-458.
The National Security Council was shaped under President Eisenhower to be a discussion-based source of policy recommendations to the President. The purpose of the NSC is to bring together the heads of various agencies related to national security and let them freely and openly present their disparate views on national security matters. A large portion of the article is devoted to discussing the actual workings of the then current NSC. The article concludes with some speculation as to whether the NSC should have an increased staff and/or responsibilities. The author feels that a greater workload for the council would dilute its primary function of synthesizing expert advice for the President. "The larger the staff, in connection with policy-making, the more work it makes for itself and the less work it does for its chief." *The author also worries that increasing the NSC's policymaking powers would interrupt the proper constitutional flow of responsibility from the President to his cabinet.*

Daalder, Ivo H., and L. M. Destler. "Advisors, Czars and Councils: Organizing for Homeland Security," *National Interest* 68 (Summer 2002) 66.
In this article, *Daalder and Destler argue that it is neither desirable nor possible to bring all the major homeland security functions under a single umbrella.* Instead, they focus on the need for leadership, cross-governmental coordination, and mobilization of the responsible agencies and their leaders (the task President Bush has given to Tom Ridge in the new Office of Homeland Security). Daalder and Destler reiterate the basic organizational need of homeland security as one of addressing activities that are highly diffused and decentralized, and they stress that priority should be given to establishing collaborative, positive-sum personal relationships at senior levels. The report concludes with two keys to success: 1) Tom Ridge must convince his cabinet colleagues that their ability to get things done depends upon their cooperation within the coordinated process he runs and 2) the backing of the President in this effort.

Davis, Lynn. *Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations*, (RAND, 2007).
Davis' report examines the military response to Hurricane Katrina as a case study providing useful lessons for military preparedness and response to future terrorist attacks, particularly those involving simultaneous attacks in different regions of the United States or the use of weapons of mass destruction. In addition to providing background materials on how the National Guard and active-duty military are organized to respond to domestic emergencies in general, the study concentrates on specific problems that surfaced during the Katrina response. In particular, Davis notes that the National Guard response was insufficient to meet the needs of the destroyed region largely because the National Guard relies on volunteers. This problem was compounded by the fact that many guardsmen from out of state experienced difficulty in relying on air and ground transportation to reach the hurricane site, thus delaying their response. Davis also focuses on the Bush administration's deferred decision to deploy active-duty Army and Marine land forces and observes that military personnel lacked "unified command and control (C^2) structure" in responding to Katrina. After identifying and analyzing these problems, Davis' report provides a series of recommendations to address them and make military responses to domestic emergencies "quicker and more robust." The recommendations include the following: The National Guard should be given the federal mission of conducting homeland security (HLS) activities. This would allow National Guard units to collaborate more closely with the Federal Emergency Management Organization (FEMA) and other civilian organizations in the event of a domestic emergency; Every National Guard unit should be prepared and capable of rapid deployment. If a unit is deployed overseas, a designated unit should be ready to replace it for HLS activities; State governors should be more adequately prepared to call their National Guard units to active duty for out of state emergencies; The Air National Guard or contingency plans involving commercial airlines should be ready to facilitate deployment of National Guard units to out of state emergencies; Though command and control issues are difficult to analyze outside the context of a specific emergency, a variety of C^2 plans, which give varying responsibilities to federal and state task forces, should be developed. Establishing such plans in advance would allow an appropriate, pre-designed plan to be selected in the event of an emergency.

Davis, Lynn, "Organizing for Homeland Security," *RAND Issue Paper*, 2002. Available from http://192.5.14.110/congress/terrorism/phase2/organizing.pdf.
Lynn Davis of the RAND Corporation presents a study of interagency processes in diachronic perspective. Davis claims that each and every non-governmental and academic commission studying interagency operations—the Gilmore Commission, the Hart-Rudman Commission, the National Commission on Terrorism, and the CSIS *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols* working group—have arrived at the same conclusion: that historical and existing models of interagency cooperation and integration are wholly inadequate. None of the models the United States government has adopted thus far—NSC/NEC, the Director of Central Intelligence, or the Office of National Drug Control Policy—have been successful, and it appears, based on all available evidence, that the Homeland Security Council, the new interagency coordinating organization, will be a similar failure. The Office of Homeland Security is terminally unable to "translate its various coordinating responsibilities into practice." Empirically, its coordinating function has been confused and merely rhetorical—even though its organizing legislation uses the term "coordinating" multiple times: "*But there is often a very fine line between coordination and operations, and strong pressures will develop—indeed they are already evident—for the office to take on operational responsibilities.*" Davis argues that vertical integration, the task of bridging the gap between the national and local/provincial levels, will be the most challenging for the highly centralized United States government: "Perhaps the most difficult organizational challenge will be that of finding ways to ensure cooperation among federal, state, and local officials." Existing executive orders in effect offer "no guidance as to how this is to be accomplished."

Dawes, Sharon S., "Interagency Information Sharing: Expected Benefits, Manageable Risks," *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 15:3 (Summer, 1996) 377-394.
In this article the author first provides an overview of the literature on interagency cooperation and summarizes the benefits and risks that the literature identifies. The article then goes on to present the findings of a study that surveyed the opinions on information sharing of a large number of governmental professionals from a wide range of different departments and agencies. According to the articles summary the literature on interagency information sharing has a number of technical, organizational, and political benefits. Technically data management can be streamlines and intergovernmental information infrastructure can be developed. Organizationally generally available data can be used to solve internal agency problems and provide a more complete picture of government-wide initiatives, and information sharing can foster important professional relationships. Politically shared information can provide previously unavailable alternative solutions to governmental problems, greater government accountability due to the public accessibility of information that informs government decisions. Perhaps most importantly, however, is the fact that interagency information sharing can expose gaps and redundancies in public policy information gathering and dissemination among the different departments and agencies. This observation appears to have relevance in the case of all forms of interagency cooperation. The article also summarizes the barriers that exist in these same general categories. Technically interoperability of information systems is a perennial concern, less obviously, agencies may refer to the same piece of data using different terms and an agreed reference system would have to be established. Organizationally *interagency information sharing does not always fulfill the self-interested goals of particular participating agencies.* Moreover, even though organizational conditions may be in place it often requires a general crisis for agencies to become active participants in the information sharing process. Politically the barriers to information sharing are the relationships that effect the decisions of departments that are external to it. These special interest groups can affect an agencies willingness to share information. More generally *agencies are often unwilling to share information because it is their source of power, it is a commodity that belongs to the agency*. Finally, the sharply defined boundaries between the responsibilities of different agencies can hinder information sharing. Agencies can be threatened by encroachment on their territory by another agency. The remainder of the article examines the results of a 1990-91 study in New York State concerned with examining whether the benefits and barriers outlined in the interagency literature were actually the concerns of people employed by government agencies. Among the 53 agencies included there were 173 usable responses to the study. Respondents were in "strong agreement" with the opinion that interagency information sharing would lead to: "broad policy initiatives, builds strong professional relationships, and supports integrated services." Major concerns of the respondents were: the potential of sharing for the solving of "domain-level problems," the reinforcement of valued relationships that could result from sharing, the degree to which sharing might threaten program integrity, the additional costs that might be incurred by the participants in the sharing process. Fifty percent of respondents, designated "confident", saw information sharing as a high benefit low risk endeavor, while 33.1% of respondent, designated "cautious", saw sharing as a high benefit/high risk undertaking. Interestingly, among both the confident and the cautious, when it came to their desired form of legislation regarding interagency cooperation, they both agreed that agencies should be given permission to share information but that they should not be forbidden from sharing unless permitted. "General authority imparts legitimacy without mandating process."
In order to promote information sharing among government agencies the author recommends the dissemination of two new information concepts. "Information Stewardship" refers to the promotion of a conception that sees government agencies as stewards of information rather than "owners" of it. The concept of "Information Use" emphasizes the fact that information is a commodity of wide use within the whole of government and not just the province of one agency.

Desai, Sunil B. "Solving the Interagency Puzzle," *Policy Review* 129 (February/March 2005) 57.
Sunil Desai of the Hoover Institution begins "Solving the Interagency Puzzle" with an acknowledgement that coordinating multiple federal agencies, hundreds of thousands of personnel, and billions of dollars is an extraordinary feat—but failing the challenge would be catastrophic: "The stakes of poor coordination among the various agencies that wield the instruments of national power, however, are exceptionally high—a reality that struck home for all Americans and most of the world on September 11, 2001." *Agency culture is the salient variable in Desai's analysis of the interagency conundrum, described as "the essence of the problem" and regarded as a systemic issue that must be addressed by a series of sweeping, revolutionary reforms.* But isn't changing an agency's culture an impossibility? No, says Desai. "Presuming that organizations that make up the interagency community are so bureaucratically entrenched in their individual cultures that they cannot embrace a broader interagency culture is

neither prudent nor correct. *In the past, similar forecasts were made about the U.S. military's ability to overcome strong individual cultures and form a strong "joint" culture to improve interservice coordination. Not only have these predictions proven wrong, but the overwhelming success of joint military operations has encouraged calls for an even stronger joint culture."* This too, could happen for interagency operations should initial joint missions be strategic successes. Desai then identifies four barriers that must be overcome by any successful reform package: 1) No doctrine—"The interagency community lacks a doctrine parallel to the military's joint doctrine. As a result, the structure and procedures used for interagency coordination have changed with every presidential administration, thereby exacerbating the problem; 2) Integrating authority—the NSC and HSC function more as agencies than they do unifying forces; "an organizational doctrine is most likely to be respected and followed when there is a single authority, properly designated and independent of the organizations subject to the doctrine; 3) Regionalism—Geographic regions aren't aligned. NSC-State 6 regions, DOD – 5 and CIA – 3 varying levels of authority placed on regional leaders in the field; 4) Parochialism—A joint doctrine will go a long way here, personnel programs, training "Also important to developing a joint culture among the military services have been interservice personnel assignments[…] Personnel from all agencies should be required to receive training in interagency coordination." Desai concludes with an observation about implementation. Though Congressional action would be favored in this particular case, it is entirely possible for the president to create a doctrine and make necessary structural reforms through executive order—in a manner similar to Bush's decision to establish the Office of Homeland Security. "While there will no doubt be parochial resistance to such an effort, the U.S. military was able to overcome substantial similar resistance to the development of a joint culture."

Defense Science Board, *2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities*, (Washington: Department of Defense, December 2004). Available from www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reorts/2004-12-DSB_SS_Report_Final.pdf.
The "2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities," conducted by the Defense Science Board makes recommendations for improving, "…U.S. effectiveness across the spectrum of activities from peacetime through stabilization and reconstruction," and considers what the U.S. can do in peacetime to harness the elements of national power and perhaps avoid the necessity of large-scale hostilities. Given increasing U.S. involvement in reconstruction and stabilization efforts, this report underscores the urgency of reform. While acknowledging present flaws, the report focuses on proposing changes in two dimensions: management discipline and building and maintaining fundamental capabilities necessary for successful stabilization and reconstruction. Though the report targets improved performance in stabilization and reconstruction, a number of the study's conclusions are relevant to the general study of interagency coordination and cooperation. In the category of management discipline, the authors of the report determine that the discipline exhibited by the military in planning and preparing for combat operations should be extended to stabilization, reconstruction, intelligence, and general peacetime activities. To achieve such discipline, the report advocates the creation by presidential directive of new coordination and integration mechanisms in the form of Contingency Planning and Integration Task Forces for countries where U.S. intervention is relatively likely. These task forces should be staffed by personnel from all involved agencies and should be complemented by joint interagency task forces, a national center for contingency support, and focal points dedicated to stabilization and reconstruction planning and implementation at each regional combatant command. In conjunction with management discipline, the study urges the U.S. government to build and maintain its stabilization and reconstruction, strategic communication, asymmetric warfare, and knowledge, understanding, and intelligence, capabilities. To improve reconstruction and stabilization capabilities, the report more specifically advocates a stronger partnership and working relationship between the State and Defense Departments, a DOD commitment to stabilization and reconstruction operations, and the establishment of the State Department as a locus for integration of reconstruction vision, knowledge, and coordinated strategy. For enhanced strategic communication, the Defense Science Board recommends that the president establish a permanent organizational structure within the NSC to oversee a revolution in U.S. strategic communication supported by public and private sector components. While urging intelligence reform, the report cautions that, "…the focus of this reform must shift from rearranging organizational boxes," and instead focus on substantive problems such as the need for coordinated personnel policy, improved network and data architecture for information sharing, and the harmonization of special operation forces, covert action, and intelligence.

Department of Defense. *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations.* Version 2.0. August 2005. Available from http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/approved_ccjov2.pdf.

This document defines a concept as "a notion or statement of an idea--an expression of how something might be done." In light of this, the document here proposes a framework for thinking about how a joint/interagency operation might be undertaken. It does not deal with organization but with "ways of thinking."

Most instructive for us is the admission that "Achieving [strategic] objectives requires integrating joint force actions with those of interagency and perhaps multinational partners… Toward these ends, military power must be postured to enhance other instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic). Specifically, the Department of Defense must be prepared to support other agencies in proactive engagement/theater shaping as well as post-crisis/conflict reconstruction operations. Conversely, during combat operations, the Defense Department will normally be the supported agency. In all cases, it is necessary to integrate all appropriate agencies and partners through unified action."

Destler, I. M. "National Security Advice to U.S. Presidents: Some Lessons from Thirty Years," *World Politics* 29:2 (January 1977) 143-176.
The purpose of National Security Council has changed overtime in part to the variable of who is president and what he believes should be the role of the NSC, and who is on the National Security Council. *While the formation of the NSC was to create a transparent interdepartmental group, it has evolved into less of advisory role into more of a formal process and staff to the president role.* The most consistent purpose has been for the President to design a group that will coordinate his personal foreign policies. *The conundrum facing National Security Council is that those who have the most power to influence the President are insiders, and insiders frequently do not see the outside situation accurately.* Thus, the NSC has reflected more than molded national security and foreign policy.
The author stresses repeatedly the need to combine domestic and foreign policy perspectives. One without the other is a limited view on what is needed for national security. However, one person having the role of both National Security assistant and Secretary of State is a mistake.

Donley, Michael. "Rethinking the Interagency System," *Hicks and Associations Occasional Paper #05-01* (March 2005). Available from http://www.hicksandassociates.com/reports/HAI-occasional-paper.pdf.
"It is time to consider new directions for the interagency system in which the National Security Council (NSC) plays a primary role," argues Michael Donley of Hicks and Associates. Donley cites the CSIS Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase I report, the 9/11 Commission, the Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study, as well as internal State and Defense reforms, as evidence of an emerging consensus that interagency operations need significant and sweeping reforms. "Recommendations from the CSIS, 9/11 Commission, and Defense Science Board studies reinforce the need for closer integration of effort of both horizontal and vertical dimensions: horizontally across all elements and agencies of national power; and vertically up and down all levels of government—not just the senior cabinet level committees of the current NSC process, but also down through the mid-level agency leadership and front line experts who executive US policies on the ground." "it is no longer possible simply to equate the interagency system with the NSC policy making process[…] A new national security architecture is required to incorporate the roles and functions of new organizations and processes that reside in the interagency space between the President and individual departments and agencies."

Donley, Michael. "Rethinking the Interagency System, Part Two," *Hicks and Associates Occasional Paper #05-02*, May 2005. Available from http://www.hicksandassociates.com/reports/HAI-occasional-paper-2.pdf.
Michael Donley, a former US Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, identifies four macro-level challenges that must be overcome to have optimal levels of interagency cooperation and interoperability: (1) horizontal and vertical integration of effort—"the processes of intelligence collection, analysis, production and dissemination, distributed across many national security departments and agencies, require integration of effort not only across agencies, but vertically within these processes to support the US government's overall intelligence output." (2) Legitimacy of decision makers below the president—"The essence of the problem[…] is the legitimacy of decision makers below the president. At the operational level, interagency decision makers must be sufficiently distant from the White House to permit first hand knowledge of the mission and/or region and be allowed to focus on the details of operational planning and execution. At the same time, these decision makers must be close enough to the White House to have the President's confidence and be operating within a legitimate interagency process capable of rapidly obtaining decisions from the president to resolve disputes or challenges from cabinet departments and agencies." (3) Weakness in planning and coordination at the operational level—"It has two primary dimensions: Lack of culture and/or capacity for planning in some agencies, and lack of capabilities for deploying and sustaining

their expertise abroad." (4) Lack of institutional support for interagency cooperation—"there is more work to be done in sorting through the interagency mechanisms necessary to bring these capabilities together and to foster interagency capabilities and expertise over time." The latter half of Donley's paper focuses on potential solutions, both legislative and executive, that might ameliorate some of the problems discussed. He begins by suggesting that the role and legal authority of the National Security Council be expanded. *Donley argues that the NSC's traditionally close ties to the President would give it a mandate broad enough to develop credibility amongst other agencies.* He also advocates the creation of new interagency structures that will help coordinate interagency operations at the operational level, something he believes is lacking in all current models. Finally, he suggests creating a lead agency as a potential solution. Donley believes that a "legislative moment," heralded by a period of intense dialogue—a path followed by Goldwater-Nichols—will be crucial for interagency reform: "There are certainly faster ways to get legislation passed, but the up-front effort produced long term results. It established the foundation for more integrated and effective joint military operations and a new and still-growing system in DoD[…] In a city where many new ideas are thrown against the political and bureaucratic wall."

Downie, Richard D. "Defining Integrated Operations," *Joint Force Quarterly* 38 (2005) 10-13.
In this article, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies director Colonel Downie presents his perspective on integrated operations. Downie suggests that first the terminology used to define operational concepts be standardized and, toward that goal, offers a taxonomy of terms to describe various types of integrated and interagency operations. Downie discusses integrated, interagency, multinational, and domestic operations and provides examples for each italicized term. The aim of this report, according to Downie, is to provoke debate on "how to describe more accurately and efficiently today's nontraditional operations."

Drechsler, Donald R. "Reconstructing the Interagency Process After Iraq," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28:1 (February 2005) 3-30.
In the February 2005 Journal of Strategic Studies, Donald R. Drechsler illuminates the problems of interagency coordination before and after Operation 'Iraqi Freedom.' Though advocating reform, Drechsler's analysis focuses on interagency failings in postwar planning and concludes that, "Although no amount of coordination could have anticipated some of the events that occurred after the end of major combat operations, a better-coordinated postwar plan may have been able to marshal sufficient resources to accomplish the priority mission…" The author devotes the majority of his study to exploring the failure of State and Defense Department coordination. He describes the U.S. government's planning for the Iraq war and its aftermath, paying special attention to how diplomats and the military cooperated before and after the initial invasion. The analysis determines that the Iraq war planning process was characterized by a lack of coordination wherein different agencies, and critically the State and Defense Departments, created independent plans, the majority of which were not integrated until January 2003. *Poor coordination was fostered by cultural, structural, and bureaucratic factors including the pursuit of isolated initiatives by multiple agencies at various headquarters, a lack of counterparts between the State and Defense Departments, competing priorities, philosophies, and interests among departments, as well as general interdepartmental conflict.* Overall, the interagency process did not address interdepartmental planning concerns and contingencies. The author contrasts the failures of this process with the success achieved in postwar planning for Kosovo under the Clinton administration's employment of Presidential Decision Directive 56. Drechsler argues that this example could have served as a useful template for the political-military planning process to produce unified political-military plans. Unfortunately, the corporate knowledge contained in PDD 56 did not seem to transfer between administrations. At the conclusion of the Clinton administration, which had been perceived as having a poor military record (largely due to failures in Somalia and Haiti) and low levels of civilian-military cooperation, President George W. Bush reinvigorated US military strength, particularly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and changed the paradigm. The dramatic transfer of power constituted a complete role reversal from Kosovo, one that ultimately had a deleterious effect on the state-defense relationship. Planning for Iraq followed two parallel tracks—diplomacy and war preparation, and any attempt to link the two was only part of the Bush administration strategy to use diplomacy as an avenue to eventual war. After the war began, the fragmentation of the planning process continued: "The State Department, CENTCOM, and OSD all worked on postwar plans in multiple locations, but little of the planning was fully coordinated." Inexplicably, the State Department's Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping Office (East Asia Bureau), which was largely responsible for operational success in Kosovo, was not asked to integrate its experiences into Iraq planning activities. Other problems cited by Dreschler include the lack of regional counterparts for agencies, absence of State Department planning expertise,

and the disunity of planning in multiple faraway locations. "Although no amount of coordination could have anticipated some of the events that occurred after the end of major combat operations, a better-coordinated postwar plan may have been able to marshall sufficient resources to accomplish the priority mission: postwar stability and reconstruction mission in Baghdad," Dreschler concludes. Moreover, for Drechsler, Iraq proved that high level State-Defense coordination was insufficient for ensuring interagency cooperation. To avoid future failures, the author concludes that, "A more comprehensive interagency approach is necessary to harness the talent and resources of the various departments." More specifically, Drechsler advocates both the entrenchment of State-Defense cooperation at all levels and the institutionalization of a singular political-military doctrine similar to PDD 56 which would unite agencies in their efforts. Many challenges still exist to integrate two diverse executive departments.

Feil, Scott, "Building Better Foundations: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction," *The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Washington Quarterly*, 25:4, Autumn 2002, pp.97-109.

Colonel Scott Feil, US Army (Ret.), is executive director of the Association of the United States Army's Program on the Role of American Military Power and codirector of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project. His Autumn 2002 article in the Washington Quarterly, "Building Better Foundations: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction," assesses established interagency procedures for peacekeeping operations and other complex contingency operations. Feil begins with an optimistic portrayal of current military engagement. The US is generally very successful in peacekeeping and complex contingency operations, he argues. Our presence in countries abroad is often crucial to stabilizing democratic regimes, eliminating insurgencies, preventing genocides, maintaining order and stability, and broadly, ending the loss of life. He posits the following suggestions that he argues will make post-conflict intervention and peacekeeping operations more successful: 1) There must be a "unity of security effort"—The President must designate a "lead" agency"—the NSC, State, Defense, CIA, USAID, DOJ, Treasury, a US Ambassador, or DOD—in command to facilitate interagency operations. The lead agency model eliminates agency parochialism and "turf battles" that often compromise missions." Furthermore, a "unity of security effort" would eliminate the "stovepiping" that often plagues interagency operations and would help to create an environment that is conducive to "clear direction and effective and efficient action"; 2) Eliminate the problem of "regionalism" by interagency training, aligning regions, and integrating NGO communities with USAID humanitarian teams.

Fick, Barbara. "Integrating Partner Nations into Coalition Operations," *Joint Force Quarterly* 41 (April 2006) 20-25.

US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has had a great deal of success in integrating partner nations into large multinational forces primarily through the use of large scale exercises and frequent education and engagement on the part of SOUTHCOM. Latin American nations now frequently take part in multinational operations such as the reconstruction of Haiti or Operation Iraqi Freedom. SOUTHCOM organized a humanitarian relief scenario in Guatemala which simulated a hurricane striking the country. This exercise allowed the various Guatemalan relief and government agencies to practice responding to such a disaster, and was credited with greatly improving the government's response when Hurricane Mitch struck the country shortly thereafter. Other operations coordinating more than a dozen countries have focused on security concerns such as an attack on the Panama canal, and are credited with greatly improving the multinational coordination capabilities of forces in the region.

Flournoy, Michele A. "Did the Pentagon Get the Quadrennial Defense Review Right?" *Washington Quarterly* 29:2 (Spring 2006) 67-84.

In this article, Flournoy critiques the most recent QDR, commending it for some welcome refinements in U.S. defense strategy but ultimately condemning it for falling short of its objectives and devolving into budget-driven horse-trading. Flournoy suggests four key criteria for determining whether or not the 2006 QDR has been successful from a strategic perspective: 1) determine if the QDR provides a sound framework for setting strategic priorities for the department; 2) judge whether the QDR reshapes armed forces in a way that better prepares them to meet 21st Century threats and opportunities; 3) determine whether the QDR promotes initiatives to enhance the capabilities of interagency and international partners who are instrumental to the U.S. ability to accomplish its strategic objectives; and 4) determine whether the QDR has developed a political strategy to gain the support of key stakeholders inside and outside of the Defense Department, such as the armed services, combatant commanders, and Congress. Flournoy claims the 2006 QDR was really two reviews that combined progress made with opportunities missed and failed to articulate a comprehensive, long-term vision for strategy and investment. Finally, Flournoy raises questions about whether incumbent administrations should be required to conduct these exercises.

Flournoy, Michele A., and Shawn W. Brimley. "In Search of Harmony: Orchestrating the 'Interagency' for the Long War," ***Armed Forces Journal*** **(July 2006). Available from http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/07/1857934.**

Michelle Flournoy and Shawn Brimley of CSIS liken current interagency operations to a discordant, disharmonious orchestra in their article "In search of harmony: orchestrating 'the interagency' for the long war." US intervention in Somalia and the seemingly interminable 'War on Terror' prove, according to the pair, that "American instruments of statecraft and strategy have rarely worked well enough together to produce noteworthy melodies or pleasing harmonies." "Recent years have dramatically reinforced what was a growing concern among policymakers and analysts in the 1990s, namely that interagency coordination was a persistent weakness that both prevented effective strategic planning and risked strategic failure in the conduct of complex operations." *Flournoy and Brimley cite Goldwater-Nichols as legislation that was effective for stemming parochialism within the Department of Defense, but conclude that a much stronger antidote will be needed for the myriad problems that they observe*: (1) Inconsistent, inadequate planning—"…poor interagency planning at the strategic level consistently undermines effectiveness and can greatly increase risk[…]The most significant strategic planning occurs in the Defense Department and, while even this process has flaws, elements of that planning can and should be replicated throughout the national security community." (2) Absence of standard operating procedures, metric for interagency operations—"For a variety of historical reasons, there is no standard NSC-led approach to interagency operations across multiple agencies. This must change." (3) Civilian operational capacity—"The State Department's struggles to rapidly deploy personnel to staff the US embassy in postwar Kabul, for example, and the Coalition Provisional Authority in postwar Iraq are illustrative of the challenges that plague the system." (4) The NSC as "integrator"—Flournoy and Brimley argue that the NSC should play a more active role, mediating disputes between agencies, and establishing a more formalized forum for policy discussion and strategic planning. (5) Cultural problems—"Creating a cadre of civilians that are truly "national security" professionals would go a long way to developing an interagency culture of "jointness" that revolutionized the military 20 years ago.

Flournoy, Michele A., and Shawn W. Brimley. "A New Project Solarium," ***Joint Force Quarterly*** **41 (2006) 80-86. Available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/4119.pdf.**

"For a country that continues to enjoy an unrivaled global position, it is both remarkable and disturbing that the United States has no truly effective strategic planning process for national security," say Michelle Flournoy and Shawn Brimley of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. They argue that conflicts of the twenty-first century demand a strategy of agency integration and cooperation, anchored by a firm set of principles enshrined in a doctrine and standardized process of strategic planning. But "more than four years after September 11, 2001, there is no established interagency process for assessing the full spectrum of threats and opportunities endemic to the new security environment and identifying priorities for policy development, execution, and resource allocation." The pair identify a series of strategic challenges in today's security environment: (1) Budgeting and resource allocation—"*Existing processes for ensuring that national security policy priorities are reflected in how agencies allocate resources are weak. Today's budgeting processes are largely unchanged from the Cold War era. Agencies generally prepare their own budgets in stovepipes.*" (2) Routine interaction between high-level agency officials—"Moreover, there is no established process for bringing together senior national security officialst to identify long-range threats and opportunities and consider their implications for US policy and capabilities." (3) Long-range planning—"The government currently lacks both the incentives and the capacity to support strategic thinking and long-range planning in the national security arena." Flournoy and Brimley recommend establishing a Quadrennial National Security Review that is parallel to the Quadrennial National Defense Review, form an interagency threat assessment process that supports the QNSR, codify a semi-annual summit for broad national threat assessment, and finally, conduct NSC/OMB regional budget management reviews. "The United States is at a crucial point, facing new and challenging threats as well as unprecedented opportunities in the national security domain. Yet, at this critical juncture, the Government lacks an interagency process to ensure that national security decision-making at the highest levels is informed by the long view—a considered assessment of the future security environment and how the Nation can best protect and advance its strategic interests, objectives, and priorities over the long term."

Freedberg, Sydney J., Jr. "Shoring Up America," ***National Journal*** **33:42 (October 20, 2001) 3238.**

Government in recent years has made great strides in connecting its different bureaucratic boxes to each other. But despite all the liaison officers and interagency coordination centers, sometimes the left hand still doesn't even know

the right hand exists. Rep. [Curt Weldon] tells a story about a back-channel meeting he had at the height of the Kosovo conflict with a shadowy Serbian power broker, Dragomir Karic.

Friel, Brian and Paul Singer, "Gaps remain in government strategy for handling natural disasters," *National Journal*, October 28, 2005. Available from http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?filepath=/dailyfed/1005/102805nj1.htm.
This article contends that the level of fiduciary investment in national preparedness and response is inadequate to close the gap between well-intentioned programs and "needless" vulnerabilities. The reasons for this gap, according to the author, is partly by virtue of the manner in which disaster programs are created in this country; after the fact. He uses a quote to drive home the point that, as a nation, we're "getting ready for the disasters that we've already experienced." The consequence is ad hoc planning, which may contribute to ad hoc funding (due to variance in budget priorities). In other words, inadequate funding isn't really the problem, it is the lack of understanding of how disaster planning and response takes place in the United States by not only lay citizens, but also emergency managers. Implicitly, the author wants the government to be prepared ubiquitously for all disasters, but acknowledges that "all-hazards" approaches are really "disaster-specific" programs that revolve around budgets appropriated by state, local, and even federal officials with competing priorities and concerns.

To combat his own cynicism, the author concludes the article by pointing to the pinnacle of interagency success, the National Interagency Fire Center in Boise, Idaho. This "best model of coordination, prevention, and reaction" spends most of the money it receives directly on its mission to fight fires. The Center is adept in combating the "most-complex wildfires" through the success of the Incident Command System. The author cedes that the Center should be a model "for all other disaster-response efforts." This, in fact, occurred in the 2004 National Response Plan, which adopted the Incident Command System and renamed it the National Incident Management System.

Despite these attempts, the article concludes that not enough effort is being made to coordinate lessons learned among the different disaster-response disciplines (wildfire-fighters and earthquake engineers among two prominent examples). *The current narrow mindset of planning "disaster-by-disaster" is not tenable in the long-run, especially if the nation faces a large, unprecedented man-made disaster*, like terrorism involving a nuclear or biological weapon.

Fuerth, Leon. "Strategic Myopia: The Case for Forward Engagement," *National Interest* 83 (Spring 2006) 57.
The US's ability to foresee and respond to increasingly complex and networked threats is handicapped by an archaic and compartmentalized interagency that dates from the Cold War. Here, Fuerth stresses that policymakers must network responses and see beyond categories to react potentially dire and threats.

Fuerth, Leon. "Structurally Unsound," *The Washington Post* (October 19, 2003) B07.
Much has already been said about national security adviser Condoleezza Rice's "new" responsibility for coordinating the reconstruction of Iraq, but there is at least one very significant observation left to be made: This event signifies the failure of the Bush administration's basic overall model for managing national security.

Garamone, Jim. "Discussion Needed to Change Interagency Process, Pace Says," *American Forces Information Service* (September 17, 2004). Available from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/n09172004_2004091704.htm.
As Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Pace elaborated on earlier comments advocating interagency reform. On September 17, 2004 Pace again identified the interagency process as flawed. While the process effectively defines problems and devises solutions, Pace stated that policy execution falters because of gaps between agencies which result from poor coordination and stovepiping. In the absence of a singular executive authority capable of ensuring collaboration and directing the various agencies involved in the implementation of specific policies, the General indicated that these problems would persist. *General Pace's solution is the creation of a "joint interagency task force" structure where a designated cabinet head (or other agency lead) would assume authority over a specific mission.* This lead would have the authority to direct personnel from different agencies, though a process of checks to this authority whereby an employee could express concern through his or her respective agency would exist (similar to the practice used in the military). Pace also indicated that interagency reform should not limit itself to areas of counterterrorism and security. Finally the General stressed the importance of interagency education

and service. Pace suggested the introduction of incentives encouraging interagency qualification, perhaps making promotion contingent upon interagency service. For Pace, the benefits of reform are substantial. Change to the interagency process would reduce the gaps in policy implementation and make the system quicker and more flexible. Moreover, a new structure would improve interagency trust and allow personnel to gain a better understanding of the various departmental cultures. Though Pace urged that the interagency process was ready for reform, citing the near retirement of a large number of senior civilians, he qualified his statements as suggestions: "I don't have the answers. I just hope I can spark discussion about what the best ideas are."

Garamone, Jim. "Pace Proposes Interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act," *Armed Forces Press Service* (September 7, 2004). Available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=25384.
In September 2004 Marine Corps General Peter Pace, then vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, advocated federal government reforms similar those mandated by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. While addressing a Marine Corps Association/Naval Institute forum, General Pace stated that a critical flaw in U.S. government capability was the lack of an authority below the President with the power to direct different agencies. The General indicated the U.S. was operating below capacity stating, "We need as a nation to be able to harness all of the elements of our national power as we move forward for the next decades in fighting terrorism." *Pace suggested reform wherein cabinet officials would abdicate some authority and allow a designated agency head to assume authority over executive agencies for a particular situation via a "Joint Interagency Task Force."* The General explained that, "This would give to the cabinet officials the authority we currently give to our combatant commanders when we assign them missions." Pace admitted that similar reforms enacted by the Goldwater-Nichols Act for the U.S. Armed Services had been difficult for service chiefs to accept. Nevertheless General Pace expressed confidence that government reform along the lines of The Goldwater-Nichols Act would prove highly effective since after this act, history, and most specifically operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have, "…shown us that by giving up some of their service prerogatives, the service chiefs got back much more than they gave up, as joint chiefs." The General concluded by stating that his remarks were intended to inspire debate and action on necessary reform.

Gibbings, Thomas, Donald Hurley, and Scott Moore. "Interagency Operations Centers: An Opportunity we Can't Ignore," *Parameters* 28:4 (Winter 1998/1999) 99.
The authors of this article purport to provide the reader with an examination of the US government's interagency culture and suggest, as a means of improving interagency cooperation on the ground during actual operations, the *establishment of a permanent interagency operations center in the staff of the US regional Commander-in-Chief of each of the U.S. militaries geographic commands*. Such an organization is required because crisis response becomes especially difficult when they require civilian agencies and international volunteer organizations to coordinate their activities with the military chain of command and objectives.

As it stood at the time of the article's publication, crises were first addressed by an Interagency Working Group (IWG) composed of representatives from the different departments and agencies involved. The ad hoc IWG comes to a consensus on a course of action and this policy is then passed to each agencies' operators on the ground who meet, often for the first time, in the crisis zone where they are meant to implement that policy. This organization exposes a possible hurdle in all interagency operations. If, when the members of the different agencies tasked to work together, meet for the first time when under pressure to perform by their superiors this can have adverse effects on operations. Moreover, if the agencies involved are not familiar they are unaware of the operating procedures and, in the case of the military, doctrine of the other organizations. Both of these factors can serve to undermine cooperation. By placing a permanent Interagency Operations Center (IOC) in each of the headquarters of the regional military commanders-in-chief (CINC) many of these problems might be avoided or mitigated. Because they are placed within a specific region the IOCs could be tailored to the crisis needs prevalent in the region. They can also become familiar in advance with the different government, non-governmental, and volunteer agencies working within the region. IOCs can become familiar with their personnel and their procedures and form important professional relationships. Moreover, through planning, special exercises, and conferences with the regional agencies the first night jitters in the event of a real crisis could be greatly reduced. At the time of writing the regional commands employed ad hoc civilian-military operations centers (CMOC), which had some successes but also encountered numerous problems; as the authors demonstrate through concrete examples from Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda. IOCs would deploy to the crisis area in the region armed with important regional connections and experience and could avoid many of the difficulties of the ad hoc CMOCs. In short, through the IOCs the US military geographic commands would have the necessary interagency resources to implement policies formulated in

Washington on the ground in crisis areas. In the end, however, the success if individual IOCs would depend on the attention – time, money, and equipment – given to them by the regional military commanders-in-chief.
Besides providing a recommendation for interagency coordination on the ground, the authors also point out a number of problems specific to operational level interagency problems and to interagency cooperation generally worth noting. First, that NGOs and volunteer agencies dislike being associated with military operations, which affects their readiness to cooperate. Second, organizations often function through standard operating procedures and doctrine and fear changes that threaten the efficiency that their procedures have brought about. Third, agencies may have little or no knowledge of the internal operations of agencies that they are meant to work with.

Gorman, Martin J., and Alexander Krongard. "A Goldwater-Nichols Act for the U.S. Government: Institutionalizing the Interagency Process," *Joint Force Quarterly* 39 (October 2005) 51-58. Available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1139.pdf.
The authors of "A Goldwater-Nichols Act for the U.S. Government", Martin J. Gorman and Alexander Krongard, determine that "…a fundamental mismatch exists between the international threat environment and the current national security structure…" Gorman and Krongard illustrate the overall flaws of the present National Security system and conclude that the structural and cultural problems plaguing the interagency process can only be addressed through legislation in the form of a new national security act which would update the 1947 National Security Act and institute reforms similar to those mandated by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. In presenting their argument, the authors enumerate *several key flaws of the present national security structure including a division of knowledge and expertise, poor policy coordination and integration, a lack of national joint interagency organizations, and a government culture which rewards bureaucratic self-interest.* Structural flaws make policy difficult to develop and implement while the culture of bureaucracy promotes wasteful redundancies and bureaucratic infighting. As a result, U.S. foreign policy often reacts in a "piecemeal" fashion to critical international issues and events. The authors cite the "conflation principle" to describe the exacerbation of interagency flaws that has resulted from factors such as globalization and the communications revolution. This analysis is also critical of recent national security reform proposals and enacted reforms, arguing that measures such as The Homeland Security Act and The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act will be unable to succeed unless the existing national security structure is overhauled. The article also provides a detailed description of necessary reforms to this structure. The authors' envisioned reform legislation would mandate structural and cultural changes, streamline decision-making, and create new paths for policy as well as strategy development and implementation. This new national security act would ideally provide for low-level strategy development, an interagency approach to policy implementation, the establishment of national-level, joint interagency issues-focused organizations as well as the *creation of an interagency governing board (similar to the JCS).* Legislation would also aim to assign current national security organizations less authority while making the National Security Adviser a source of independent advice to the president.

"This article argues that a fundamental mismatch exists between the international threat environment and the current national security structure and that the lack of national-level joint interagency organizations undermines the ability of the United States to develop appropriate policies and implement comprehensive strategies." Gormand and Krongard assert that a "conflation of problems" is currently on the global security radar, and that solutions must draw from studies of religion, polity, economy, and ecology—it short, the problems of the contemporary security environment are dynamic, interrelated, and inherently complex. The two argue that these security threats are met by a US defense architecture that is disjointed, compartmentalized, and geared to respond to Cold War-era threats from Russia—one that is grossly unprepared for the challenges of the twenty-first century. They use two examples to illustrate this argument. The first is opium production in Afghanistan, the production of which was virtually unaffected during the first year of Operation Enduring Freedom because its connection to terrorism and the threat it posed to both political pluralism and stability had not yet been identified. In a similarly disturbing case, during before the 9/11 Commission, Condoleeza Rice and Donald Rumsfeld testified "that it took over 7 months to formulate a coherent, regionally-based counterterrorism strategy that was originally scheduled to be briefed to the Principals Committee the week of September 11." Gormand and Krongard believe that specified personnel from existing agencies should be placed under a national-level, joint interagency issue-focused organizations that would be responsible for coordinating interagency operations as well as establish flexible and responsive strategic planning mechanism. They conclude with an acknowledgement that Congressional action will be necessary to implement interagency reform: "Equally important, these models show the need for executive-legislative cooperation for any

proposal to change the national security system. Obviously, Congress would enact any legislation, appropriate the funding for new organizations, and oversee implementation."

Greenstein, Fred I., and Richard H. Immerman. "Effective National Security Advising: Recovering the Eisenhower Legacy," *Political Science Quarterly* (Fall 2000) 335-345.
In this article, the author outlines the Eisenhower system of national security advising as the premier policy-planning process for a president. He breaks down this process into five key components. First, the president needs to actively determine his policy through a structured and organized procedure. He points out that even though Eisenhower, with his long years of military planning, was perhaps the most effective president at organizing America has seen, this trait should still be carried on in modern presidents. Second, the National Security Advisor should be an orderly and methodical process manager, not a policy advocate. His job should entail the management of discussion, ensuring all policy options reach the president, not pushing his own views. Third, the National Security Council (NSC) should have its debate pre-framed by the time of its meetings. Eisenhower used a Planning Board, consisting of assistant secretaries for planning for the respective bodies of the NSC, that would fully flush out the views of their department and then brief their respective NSC members. The Planning Board, which met usually twice a week, was also instructed to clearly outline any "policy splits" or interdepartmental disagreements so that these splits could be debated at the NSC meetings. Fourth, the NSC must be utilized as a forum for rigorous debate. To that end, the NSC should meet regularly at a standard time and place, and the president should be present as much as possible. The authors note that Eisenhower's NSC met 366 times over his presidency, close to once a week, and that Eisenhower himself presided over these 329 of these meetings. At these meetings, NSC members were encouraged to act as general presidential advisors, not as department loyalists, and healthy and productive debate ensued, often over the policy splits outlined by the Planning Board. *Finally, a separate organ of the NSC should be created for the implementation of the NSC's decisions. Eisenhower's Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) fulfilled this function by turning the NSC's conclusions into concrete written policy. The OCB worked closely with the NSC itself by reporting its written policy back to the Council and also cooperated with the Planning Board, as the executive officer of the OCB would attend Planning Board meetings.*

Gross, Gregg E. *Interagency Reform for the 21st Century,* (U.S. Army War College: Carlisle, 2006). Available from http://www.stormingmedia.us/09/0939/A093944.html.
In this age of transnational threats, asymmetric warfare, and unipolar power, the U.S. has shown its drastic need for a more fully integrated interagency structure, especially when dealing with post-conflict and crisis situations. The author notes that this problem has been identified and addressed, usually by presidential directives, since the Clinton administration, yet has never been truly corrected, leading to such initial failures as the response to Hurricane Katrina and the post-conflict stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom. *The main problems identified by the author in these post-conflict or crisis areas are the lack of unity of command and effort and the ad hoc basis of both the planning and body assembled to deal with the crisis.* Thus, the article proposes the establishment, through congressional legislation, of regional interagency working groups. The *groups should be headed by a regional ambassador, to whom the country ambassadors would report directly to (in lieu of the Secretary of State), and would have control over the Joint Force Commander of the region immediately after the end of combat operations, as well as authority over nearly all the resources and personnel in the region.* Working on a full-time basis with the regional military commands and embassies of the region, these groups should resemble an embassy's country team except with full representation of all relevant federal agencies. These agency representatives should have reach-back capabilities to tap into the full resources, information, and personnel from their respective departments. Furthermore, these groups should be tasked with formulating fully integrated security and engagement plans for possible regional contingencies and possess an expeditionary capability not on a volunteer basis. While sure to meet with resistance from a variety of agencies, this new legislation is viewed as essential by the author to correct the *ad hoc* and ineffective processes that currently dictate crisis or post-conflict operations.

Guest, Katie Rose. "The Ideology of Terror: Why We Will Never Win the War," *Journal of American Culture* 28:4 (2005) 368-376.
The winner of the "Best Graduate Student Paper Award" at the 2005 American Culture Association Conference argues that terror has become the dominant theme of the ruling ideology in the US. President George W. Bush won the 2004 presidential election because he made terror the key "Ideological State Apparatus" (ISA) in American culture. By declaring a "War on Terror," Bush presented terror as a universal Evil that must be met with force and repression for the sake of national security. Use of the language of terror to convince the public that fear is essential

for national safety is examined, along with the link between Bush's decision making and fundamentalist Christianity; the self-perpetuating nature of terror; and ways in which the terror ISA determined what qualities are needed in a US president, justified the attack on Iraq, and permitted the infringement of rights implicit in the USA Patriot Act. It is concluded that the first step toward breaking free of the terror ISA is recognizing its hold on the government, the media, and society in general.

Halperin, Morton. "Reform for its Own Sake: Two Blue-ribbon commissions offer some sound advice, some serious omissions, and one real clunker," ***American Foreign Service Association,***
http://www.afsa.org/fsj/may01/halperinmay01.cfm
Morton Halperin, the former director of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department from 1998 to 2001, offers a sobering assessment of interagency reform in "Reform for its Own Sake." His article commences with a blistering indictment of the recommendations made by the Hart-Rudman commission—recommendations to create five new regional undersecretaries and abolish functional bureau. While well-intentioned, Halperin argues that this proposal would do nothing more than the existing structures to address the networked problems of a globalized world: "Nor could these officials deal effectively with such matters as humanitarian and refugee crises or environmental and trade policy." *He insists that agencies work best and in harmony when they speak with a single voice—usually from one or two people.* "North Korea policy, where first Bob Gallucci and then Wendy Sherman had this mandate, is a case in point," he adds. "No one doubted who spoke for State and department officials were able to lead an effective interagency process." Creating multiple regional bureaus, as Hart-Rudman, makes little since to Halperin, who believes that "someone has to be clearly in charge and wield authority of the government working under the policy direction of the Secretary of State."

Hammond, Paul Y. "The National Security Council as a Device for Interdepartmental Coordination: An Interpretation and Appraisal," ***American Political Science Review*** **(December 1960).**
This article examines the strengths and weaknesses of the National Security Council as a whole and then applies that analysis to the question of its utility as an interdepartmental coordinator. Under Eisenhower, the NSC functioned as a talking group designed to bring together all the officials pertinent to national security and make recommendations to the President on national security matters. The author points out the "cabinet level problem" whereby many NSC members refuse to freely discuss important matters in the committee because of potential damage to their organizations. Rather than discuss issues in the NSC, department secretaries instead try to privately address their concerns with the President himself, which allows them to better protect their organization from adverse consequences. As a result, NSC recommendations tend to be vague, and represent only the lowest common denominator of opinion rather than detailed and thorough discussion. The author also discusses the "democratic policy-making problem" which arises from the fact that the NSC does not have any authority to make policy. By design, the NSC is designed to allow a very small number of people to discuss and formulate national security policy, but this structure does not allow the body a wide-enough range of consensus to create policy in a democracy. "What President is so infallible that he can predict in the political isolation of the NSC what will be politically possible in the future, or so rigid that he will never change when he is wrong?" *In contrast to the NSC, the author says that the only other type of government machinery to coordinate national security policy would be a private Presidential staff with no operating responsibilities. Such an organization would avoid the loyalty conflicts that arise from an NSC-type organization, but would also be limited in its influence with other departments precisely because they have no inherent responsibility and thus have no prestige or means to force cooperation from the various departments.* The author does not provide a concrete recommendation as to which of these two options the government should pursue: "In the end, the question of how best to achieve interdepartmental coordination of national security policy must be answered by weighing these two major alternatives against each other, or by finding the optimum mixture of them. As the query can be put in the more practical terms of increments, should the NSC staff be strengthened with a view to its becoming an independent force in NSC deliberations? Or should civilians without administrative responsibilities be added to the Council?"

Hannah, Robert Todd. "A Transformed Coast Guard Bridges the Civil-Military Divide," ***Proceedings*** **131:8 (August 2005) 51-54.**
In the years since 9/11, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has developed a wide range of interagency capabilities that allow it to function both with civilian law enforcement agencies as well as with other armed forces. Historically, military cooperation with civilian law enforcement has been ineffective (as shown by the use of U.S. Marines to quell the 1992 Los Angeles riots) and is generally marked by a lack of understanding between the military and

civilian agencies as well as communication difficulties caused by the lack of civilian access to classified material. The USCG is generally asked to perform a wide variety of functions and has developed a number of key interagency capabilities and resources that could be applied to the larger DOD effort to improve its own interagency cooperation. Among these resources is the Unclassified Common Operational Picture which the USCG developed to give civilian port authority partners the ability to monitor port activities on an unclassified network, while still retaining the ability to connect to the military classified network if the need arises. Moreover, the USCG established joint centers to provide space for every pertinent agency (Coast Guard, Navy, civilian port authorities) to meet in one central area, improving communication and coordination.

Hannah, Robert Todd. "The Common Operational Picture: the Coast Guard's Window to the World," ***Proceedings*** **(2006) 65-8.**
While this article mostly describes the new common operational picture (COP) technology and the benefits it brings to the U.S. Coast Guard, the author does briefly highlight implications for interagency communication. The Coast Guard's implementation of COP will allow for increased sharing of information between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security. The common operational picture technology will greatly increase the quantity and quality of data available to the Coast Guard. Among its features, COP provides geographical information, surveillance, and intelligence about ports and vessels, all of which is relevant both to DOD and DHS. The USCG, therefore, can act as an intermediate agency providing information to each department so that DOD and DHS do not have to commit resources to attain data that is already being collected by the USCG.

Hayes, Margaret Daly, "Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti—A Case Study," ***National Defense University***
http://dodccrp.org/publications/pdf/Hayes_Interagency.pdf
Margaret Daly Hays of National Defense University claims that military intervention in Haiti during the 1990s offers a compelling and instructive case study for those analyzing interagency cooperation (or lack thereof). During the 1994 mission, a series of strategic errors involving interagency operations compromised the mission. She then proceeds to enumerate them: 1) Protracted policy evolution period—the evolution of policy over the use of force contributed substantially to high levels of confusion and lack of coordination. 2) No dialogue between agencies—Hays reports that communication on tactical, strategic, and operational levels was sorely lacking. In a compelling example of this disjunction, Hays cites an instance during which AID officials could not procure transport gear because of ineffective communication with the DoD. 3) Civilian-military coordination was lacking—"US military planners were surprised that their civilian counterparts were not immediately ready with nation-building programs. Development planners were upset that the military refused to accept responsibility for civic action and nation-building efforts at the outset, although that policy had been determined at the strategic level." 4) Lack of coordinating agency and interagency doctrine—"Throughout the workshop, senior civilian participants argued that the US government needs to develop both doctrine and procedures for civil-militrary planning for emergencies like disaster assistance, humanitarian assistance, and peace-keeping operations in which civilian and military are likely to be co-equal and co-terminus participants." The "who's in charge" chain-of-command question remained unanswered throughout the operations. 5) Insufficient civilian "surge capacity"—State was unable to deploy an adequate number of personnel after combat operations ceased.

Hoffman, David. "President Scales Back National Security Council," ***The Washington Post (Pre-1997 Fulltext)*** **(February 3, 1989) A08.**
Under the system, the staff of the council is largely devoted to policy coordination among the various departments. Brent Scowcroft, the president's national security adviser, was a member of the special review board headed by former Sen. John G. Tower (R-Tex.), who is [Bush]'s designee for defense secretary, that studied the NSC system in 1986-87 and recommended many of the basic points included in the Bush directive. Scowcroft, who served in a low-key fashion when he was president Gerald Ford's national security adviser, has been cited as a model for the "honest broker" function that Bush said he wants his adviser to follow.

Holcomb, Arnold W., William E. Perkins, Alec Mally, Juris Kiukucans, and Mark Boettcher. "Homeland Security Mobilization Requires Greater Coordination," ***National Defense*** **87:586 (September 2002) 41.**
A combined, interagency effort between military, government, non-government, and business emergency-response

resources is necessary for the US to be able to react to and recover from a terrorist attack with weapons of mass destruction.

Hook, Steven. "Domestic Obstacles to International Affairs: The State Department under Fire at Home," *Political Science and Politics* 36:1 (2003) 23-29.
The distrust of the State Department and its diplomatic milieu is deeply embedded in U.S. political culture which excludes them from even the areas of its primary responsibility such as the development and articulation of foreign policy, the conduct of private and public diplomacy and the transfer of foreign assistance. The diminished role of the State Department has almost become a conventional part of the U.S. foreign-policy process. *Instead, the military and foreign economic policy is increasingly centered in the White House.* Foreign Service officers have cramped working conditions, modest pay, chronic personal shortages, and faulty communications systems. The Overseas Presence Advisory Panel stated that the U.S. embassies, consulates, and specialized missions were "near a state of crisis." The State Department suffers from a chronic gap between its stated goals and the means by which these goals are pursued since it has problems in gaining budget support from Congress and the White House. The spending on International Affairs (non-defense spending) has declined steadily from its peak of 17% in 1947 to less than 1% in 2001.

Early leaders dismissed the practice of diplomacy as a collusive game played by monarchs, priests, and feudal despots. Legislators complain about management problems in the department, its lack of clearly defined goals, poor coordination, and, most recently, its lack of responsiveness to terrorist threats before and after the 9/11 attacks. They benefit from framing the legislators as defenders of citizens' interests at home against the wasteful practices of rootless bureaucrats. Diplomats and aid programs simply consume public resources and get in the way.
The creation of the National Security Council effectively produced two foreign ministries, with the White House-based NSC having greater access to the president and more impact on strategic and crisis decision making. The role of the Secretary of State has remained low. The ability to actually impact policy is reserved for others in the White House. An ingrained mistrust of the State Department has only been propelled by an embedded sense of national exceptionalism where the citizens believe that the United States has the necessary resources to go it alone. With the State Department taken a secondary role to the NSC, they focus on the day-to-day conduct of diplomatic relations and the administration of non-military programs. These are even impossible to carry out effectively when those responsible for international affairs are under attack at home. Thus, the United States government should make it a priority to use the resources available by the State Department, but must first address the daunting task of challenging the conventional mistrust of the State Department.

Hornbarger, Chris. "Katrina Lessons-Learned: National Contingency Planning for Domestic Incidents." Available from http://www.dean.usma.edu/sosh/Academic%20Program/Courses/ss493/LESSONS/Military%20Role%20in%20Homeland%20Security/Katrina_Lsns_Contingncy_Planning.pdf.
Major Chris Hornbarger analyses the case study of Hurricane Katrina with respect to interagency cooperation between the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense, concluding that such cooperation was insufficient. *He argues that DHS and DOD must develop common, integrated national contingency plans for domestic incidents that include the commitment of specific DOD assets even in the context of a contemporaneous major theatre war overseas*. The author includes a timeline of military activity with regards to Hurricane Katrina, text of Section 886 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 with regards to Congressional understanding of the *Posse Comitatus* Act, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 regarding the Management of Domestic Incidents, the Insurrection Act, and the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act as well as excerpted opinions on the restrictions of *Posse Comitatus*, or lack thereof. Key Recommendations include*:* DoD and DHS must together develop contingency plans for specific domestic incident scenarios that meet the same standards of specificity, coordination, commitment of assets, and resourcing as US government planning for major theatre wars overseas; DoD should maintain its stance that civilian agencies remain in the lead for domestic incidents, however as the agency with the greater assets, resources, and expertise; DoD must reverse its policy of not committing specific assets to domestic incident contingency plans; DoD must rapidly complete a legal review of military authorities in appropriate consultation with other federal agencies and the Congress as directed by the *National Strategy for Homeland Security;* DoD must authorize NorthCom to interact directly with DHS to develop federal and national (intergovernmental) domestic incident contingency plans under the supervision of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense; DoD must partner with DHS when interacting with the Congress

during the authorization and appropriation process for a coordinated and integrated DoD-DHS domestic incident program and budget; DoD must apportion organic forces to NorthCom as necessary to support the specific plans developed above. Hornbarger does a fine job outlining the problem he sees in DoD-DHS interaction and planning. *He argues that the legal authority for the commitment of DOD assets to domestic incidents exists under current federal law, despite the DoD's strict interpretation of Posse Comitatus*. The author's recommendations to resolve the problem are well devised; however, he fails to fully develop the means of implementation of these recommendations.

Howard, Melissa Margaret. "Organization and Reorganization as Manifestation of Public Policy: National Security Emergency Management," *Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University* (August 1992).
This dissertation discusses the administrative mechanisms used to execute the president's federal inter-agency program for national security emergency preparedness (NSEP). The research examines NSEP organizational history starting with its formal creation in 1933, and focusing on its most recent structure, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (during the 1978-1990 period). The dissertation explores formal organizations as manifestations of public policy. The critical events of recent NSEP history resulting in the redefinition of the public policy are the focus of this case study. The findings are: 1) that reorganization has been a significant aspect of NSEP history; 2) that the formal and informal relationship of an organization and its leadership with the White House constitute a critical aspect of organizational design; 3) that the task of coordination is a murky one rife with hazards; and 4) that the effectiveness of a reorganization can be undermined by its implementation.

Howard, Peter. "The Growing Role of States in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the State Partnership Program," *International Studies Perspectives* 5:2 (2004) 179-196.
States can and do play an important role in contemporary U.S. foreign policy. This article discusses the growing role of states through an investigation of the State Partnership Program (SSP). The SSP pairs state National Guards with the militaries of other countries through U.S. military engagement programs. The state-level National Guard then becomes the primary site for implementing U.S. military engagement programs. Both a federalism and decision-making perspective, however, are unable to recognize this role. The decision-making bias of foreign policy analysis affords states a limited international role and minimal influence in shaping the policies of the government toward other countries. An implementation perspective, however, reveals a growing role of states carrying out U.S. foreign policy, including the "high politics" of national security issues. States give decisions meaning through the practice of policy implementation. A detailed case study of the Maryland-Estonia partnership illustrates how an implementation perspective can recognize a growing role of states in shaping U.S. foreign policy.

Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force "Volume 1: Executive Summary and Overview," *Performance Evaluation of the New Orleans and Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Protection System: Final Report of the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force,* (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, March 26, 2007) 147 pages. Available from https://ipet.wes.army.mil/.
This volume summarizes the main conclusions and lessons learned drawn from the performance evaluation data of eight other volumes (there are a total of nine volumes, including this executive summary and overview, in the report known as "the performance evaluation for hurricane Katrina"). The report was created by the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force (IPET), comprised of government, academic and private industry experts and scientists, established by the Army Chief of Engineers. The report, in general, seeks to answer 5 basic questions: 1) the hurricane protection system; 2) the impact of the storm; 3) the performance of the levees and floodwalls; 4) the societal-related consequences of the flooding from the storm; and 5) the risk and reliability of the hurricane protection system before and repairs and improvements. This report is a product of interagency cooperation (as the title of the reporting body implies), but the main text of the findings focus primarily on property damage and risk analyses related directly to the physical properties of the hurricane protection system. An examination of the "organizational and jurisdictional issues that impacted the effectiveness of the physical hurricane protection system" are supposedly detailed in the "Hurricane Performance Decision Chronology Study."

Jean, Grace. "Lack of Military-Civilian Coordination Hinders War-Zone Rebuilding Efforts," *National Defense* (Feb. 2007).
This short article is a report of the observations and conclusions presented at the "training and simulation industry's annual conference." One of the major interagency problems identified on the ground in rebuilding Iraq and

Afghanistan, the author states, has been that there is little interaction between DoD and civilian agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and that there is not mechanism in place to guide their interactions. Even though the Department of Defense made interagency training part of its 2 billion dollar "Training Transformation" budget "…little progress has been achieved in making the interagency coordination a priority item in military exercises." Even if major exercises could be held by the military, one NGO delegate pointed out, the limited staff available to aid organizations means that they would often be unable to attend. This is one reason why simulations appear to have such potential in this realm. One of the more rudimentary problems is unfamiliarity with the way in which the military operated. One of the delegates at the conference proposed the establishment of a simulation of a forward operating military base that could be accessed via the internet. Participants could then come to understand how to begin to interact with military forces in the field. Other delegates at the conference took the simulation idea further and proposed that in the future live interactive internet simulations could bring together the disparate groups of the interagency community so that they could learn from one another in real time. An officer in charge of Army training simulations thought the idea was a good one but was skeptical that the technology would be available in the near future to make such a simulation a reality. Simulation might be one way for the Department of Defense to advance its interagency training of military personnel, which a Government Accountability Office report of 2006 criticized as insufficient to prepare military personnel for "today's complex, multinational, interagency operations."

Johnson, Elizabeth. "Office of Management and Budget/Defense Department Relations, 1970-1986," ***The American University*** **(1987).**
Numerous studies have shown that the Defense Department suffers from poor performance in several key areas. These studies have not generally focused on an important source of DOD's problems: *senior policy makers do not adequately integrate DOD's budgets and programs into overall national security objectives.* Neither have they investigated intra-executive branch coordination involving the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) or OMB-DOD interaction. This dissertation addresses such matters. It examines OMB/DOD relations from 1970-1986, considering OMB's limited review of the defense budget and ensuing unaddressed defense problems. It also analyzes the suggestion that, with presidential backing, OMB could play a more influential role in ensuring that defense policy is coordinated with presidential objectives. This suggestion is addressed by examining the problems experienced when Congress established the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), within OMB to unify federal procurement policy. DOD was responsible for 90 percent of government procurement and resisted OFPP's establishment and its reform initiatives. Largely as a result of DOD's resistance, OFPP was unsuccessful in attempts to unify federal procurement and procurement problems remain unaddressed. The intensity of DOD's resistance to OFPP demonstrates the difficulties that can be expected to plague procurement reform efforts. This study reveals that OMB would face significant constraints in assuming a major role in the oversight of defense reforms. Constraints include internal OMB limitations and the perceived legitimacy of such a role. This dissertation also offers some limited suggestions that would enable OMB—the President's central White House-level staff for budgetary matters—to play a more effective role in defense budget review. These limited recommendations include restoring OMB's staff size to pre-Reagan levels and discontinuing the joint OMB/DOD review of the defense budget. Obviously, OMB's effectiveness in defense budget review depends on the support of the President, Defense Secretary, and Congress.

Johnson, Haynes. "Panama and Lessons Unlearned," ***The Washington Post*** **(October 13, 1989) A02.**
The collapse of the United States effort to persuade Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega to step down as leader of Panama resulted from a series of miscalculations and a fundamental lack of coordination among the agencies responsible for policy toward Panama, according to American officials and diplomats.

Johnson, Loch K. "The DCI and the Eight-Hundred Pound Gorilla," ***International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*** **13 (Spring 2000) 35-48.**
According to Loch Johnson, the DCI has critical responsibilities in guiding national intelligence, but his power is checked by lack of funding and resources, interagency rivalry, and limited authority. Attempts at providing the DCI more leverage have been largely unsuccessful. Johnson suggests that the DCI be better integrated into the intelligence community, but that military intelligence, which curbs DCI influence and empowers the Secretary of Defense at DCI's expense, should remain a priority. While *Johnson warns against an overly centrist community structure, which might diminish useful competition that results in a diversity of policy views, he asserts that increased centralization of the system is necessary at this time.* His recommendations include: 1) DCI be made a

full, statutory member of the NSC; 2) Introduction of a requirement of DCI concurrence for the appointment of all intelligence program directors; 3) Expanded DCI involvement in preparing the annual intelligence budget; 4) Extend existing program to rotate officers through different agencies to promote cohesion; and 5) Provide the DCI with the authority to redirect community resources when necessary. Johnson also makes a few good general points: First, that attempts at community integration through "fusion" centers and task forces, as well as bridges built between CIA and the Pentagon proved unsuccessful. Second, that the biggest obstacle to any DCI establishing a coordinated community is the Secretary of Defense. Of the approximately $26bil/yr spent on intelligence, the SecDef controls 85%, but the agencies take orders from both the DOD and DCI. (38) Other government officials or agencies can also override DCI management to suit their respective purposes over those of the intelligence agency, such as the Secretary of State or CIA. And finally that support for military operations (SMO), used to create transparency on the battlefield and provide troops with essential intelligence, has become a commonly used tool for agencies in budget negotiations. But SMO detracts from non-military intelligence needs of the DCI.

Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint Operations.* Washington, DC: JCS, 2006.
Volume I discusses the interagency, intergovernmental organization (IGO), and nongovernmental organization (NGO) environment and provides fundamental principles and guidance to facilitate coordination between the Department of Defense, and other US Government agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and regional organizations. It is a doctrine for "ways of thinking" and of little use when examining how things actually work and what organizational changes must be made. Conceptually it is sound, of course, speaking in truisms about how "The integration of US political and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into action have always been essential to success at all levels of operation." But for our purposes, it is not useful. Volume II describes key US Government departments and agencies, IGOs and NGOs — their core competencies, basic organizational structures, and relationship, or potential relationship, with the Armed Forces of the United States. It is unwieldy and of doubtful value, considering there is no easy way to find a particular capability, as it is organized by agency.

Joint Forces Command, The United States. "The Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series, Pamphlet 6," *Doctrinal Implications of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)*, June 2004, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/other_pubs/jwfcpam6.pdf
In the pamphlet, "Doctrinal Implications of Joint Interagency Coordination," the Joint Forces Command notes that "response to challenges facing the nation today most often requires a multi-agency, interdisciplinary approach that brings many diverse skills and resources to the Federal Government and other public and private organizations to bear." Network-centric capabilities will be crucial to "winning the peace" in the future, and will require full integration of all available resources. "The JIACG represents a modest start to transforming the joint and interagency arena to achieve policy aims using the integrated application of select instruments of power."

JFQ Forum, "An Interview with Thomas F. Hall," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 43 (4th Quarter 2006) 8-11.
This *JFQ* article consists of an interview with Thomas Hall, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. Speaking mainly about the National Guard and Reserve force, Secretary Hall does mention several topics relating to interagency cooperation. First, he makes the point that the Guard and Reserve are increasingly being integrated into the Active force to form what has been termed the "Total Force." As part of this effort, the Guard and Reserve are training alongside Active forces, at sites such as the Joint Readiness Training Center, with modern weaponry and equipment instead of "legacy" equipment and are being integrated into military planning doctrine by institutions such as the National Defense University. Second, Secretary Hall stressed the importance of Guard and Reserve units for homeland security and disaster relief. He stated that the Department of Defense, acting through the NorthCom, would continue to maintain and encourage interagency cooperation by supporting the lead federal agency, as it had when deploying National Guardsmen in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

Jones, Jeffrey B. "Strategic Communication: A Mandate for the United States," *Joint Force Quarterly* 39 (Fall 2005) 108-114.
In this article, Jeffrey Jones argues for the implementation of a comprehensive strategic information policy from the national to the tactic level. With nearly instant access to current information around the world, this article asserts that the lines between public diplomacy, public affairs, and military information operations are increasingly blurring. Furthermore, he argues that this area has been disregarded and that the resources allocated to it are insufficient by a "factor of ten," especially after the dissolution of the U.S. Information Agency and the propaganda challenge posed

by Al Qaeda and similar groups. Therefore, *the article proposes an integrated national strategic information policy for peacetime, as well as during crises and post-conflict operations*, and a standing forum, joining groups such as the State Department's public diplomacy operations, the White House Office of Global Communications, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. During peacetime, these efforts could help to influence our allies and neutrals by reassuring them of America's good intentions, assuring them of our capabilities, and persuade them to support our policies. During crises, the theater level components of this strategy, including independent and standing theater level standing committees working with regional institutions, NGOs, and even universities such as the regional centers of the National Defense University, could aid U.S. forces in Phase 0 and beyond of any potential conflicts. Examples of utilizing strategic information include preparing the theater by using proactive measures to shape and reduce the sources of conflict, aid democratic transitions, and increase regional dialogue; tactically preparing the battlefield by encouraging dissension, defection, and surrender and countering adversarial media and enemy misinformation; or even countering genocide encouragement by neutralizing entities such as hostile radio stations, as was proposed in Rwanda. During post-conflict operations, strategic information can be used to engage the populace on a personal level to obtain funding for important local or regional projects, explaining U.S. and coalition actions, and spreading positive news to world audiences. All of these uses can and should be measured by paying close attention to the populace and its respective demographics, the elites whose actions and messages impact decision-makers and the populace, and the actual leaders themselves to determine whether the U.S. is both getting its message across and also listening to what actually needs to be done. While Jones does not assert that strategic information is any more important than statecraft or military actions, he does state that it should be placed on par with these actions, which clearly has not been done thus far.

Jordan, Dewey G. "Operation Unified Assistance," *Marine Corps Gazette* 90:5 (May 2006) 57-58.
Dewey Jordan provides a case study in interagency cooperation under emergency circumstances, using Operation Unified Assistance (tsunami response). Established assets such as space-based surveillance were generally of little use for this particular type of mission because of their lack of availability, but improvised assets (such as intelligence officers with digital cameras in helicopters) provided a great deal of intelligence information that was vital to mission accomplishment. Interagency cooperation was vital in addressing the following priorities: determining the extent of emergency assistance required within Indonesia; determining the state of mobility and logistics infrastructure; determining the health hazards and risk to aid personnel; and finally identifying force protection threats in the region.

Kapucu, Naim. "Interagency Communication Networks During Emergencies: Boundary Spanners in Multiagency Coordination," *The American Review of Public Administration*, 6 2006; vol. 36: pp. 207 - 225.
This article examines the problem of effective interagency communication among organizations and the role of information technologies to achieve effective communication and decision-making goals in emergencies. It explores what factors contribute to effective interorganizational communication and decision making and what factors inhibit their development. The theoretical framework draws on the literature of emergency communication and social capital, with a particular focus on communication and decision making under conditions of uncertainty. The study applies this framework to study the relationships that emerged among public, private, and non-profit organizations following the World Trade Center disaster on September 11, 2001, in New York City. The article indicates the importance of developing a strong communication system with other organizations before a disaster occurs to establish appropriate communication in which effective interagency coordination will take place at the time of a disaster.

Kaufman, Greg. "Orchestrating Foreign Policy: US Interagency Decisions Post-September 11," *Harvard International Review* 24:2 (Summer 2002) 20.
The four instruments of national power are: military, diplomatic, economic and informational. Greg Kaufamn argues that at any time, any one of these instruments may necessarily be preferred over the others, but the purpose of the interagency process is to "develop an agreed national approach that maximizes the coordinated application of these instruments." Kaufmann concludes that the interagency process is healthy.

Kelleher, Patrick N. "Crossing Boundaries: Interagency Cooperation and the Military," *Joint Forces Quarterly* Autumn 2002, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1932.pdf
The need for "interagency linkages" is obvious, according to Patrick Kelleher, Operations Officer with the 2nd Force Services Support Group and former Commandant of the Marine Corps National Fellow in the Office of US Foreign

Disaster Assistance at USAID. “In the past, narrowly defined responsibilities were carried out in spite of interagency rivalry. But in a multipolar world characterized by asymmetric threats and MMOTW (military operations other than war), the traditional lines of authority must be overcome.” Kelleher identifies existing commitments to interagency cooperation: 1) National Security Directive 1 (February 2001)—“redefined interagency arrangements under policy coordination committees to manage development and implementation of national security policy”; 2) Joint Pub 3-08, *Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations*, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff execute most interagency coordination on the strategic level”; 3) Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*—“outlines the requirement for an integrated and coordinated response.” The author points to existing operations directed by the US Southern Command as a prototype for future operations: “the coordinated approach used at US Southern Command offers a model for institutionalizing linkages between humanitarian/development communities and the military.” Though ad hoc, they have, to date, been fairly successful. Kelleher’s recommendations including putting senior humanitarian advisors on command staffs and having a forum for agencies to interact and plan on the regional level.

Kitfield, James, *Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized The American Style of War* (Washington and London: Brassey’s, 1995).
“Historians usually discuss military history in terms of battlefield conquests. Very few focus on the day-to-day decisions and peacetime victories that shape the military organizations that fight those battles. James Kitfield takes this unique perspective in *Prodigal Soldiers*. He uses defining moments from the lives of several military leaders to explain the metamorphosis of the American military from defeated pariahs in 1972 to heroes in 1993.”
Prodigal Soldiers is not a work of military history. It is collection of anecdotes of military leadership. “Kitfield shows that evolution is impossible when leaders do not have the moral courage to expose and to correct institutional weaknesses; defeat is inevitable when any military organization is unwilling to evolve.”

Kitfield illustrates his analysis with events from the lives of several top military leaders. General Barry McCaffrey receives the most attention, although Kitfield also highlights Generals Chuck Horner, Tom Draude, Mike Myatt, Jack Galvin, William DePuy, Colin Powell, and Admiral Stanley Arthur. He focuses on how these leaders were shaped by defeat and went on the shape the future victories. Much of the focus is on how doctrine and policy conflicts led to command and control failures, which in turn destroyed morale and integrity. Command and control failures flowed directly from the dissonance between doctrine and policy. The Pentagon kept a tight reign on the scope of the conflict, not allowing the doctrine of using overwhelming force to be implemented. Thus, *Vietnam would be fought largely by an Army divorced from one of its fundamental sources of support (the Reserves).*
Meanwhile, in Vietnam, General Westmoreland made company level command decisions from Saigon and would not allow local command discretion. The micromanagement was extreme. As is well documented:
“Not only was Washington sending down detailed target lists, but they were also specifying the day and sometimes hour of attack, the types of weapons that could be used, in some cases even the approach aircraft could take to the target! If a mission was canceled because of factors that Washington had somehow over-looked–like bad weather–then it could not be rescheduled without first clearing it with the Pentagon (46).” Kitfield also notes how the rotation policy caused unit cohesion problems, and ineffective training brought unprepared soldiers to the battle–both with tragic results. By 1967, “the war and the way they were fighting it had simply ceased to make any sense. And in the vacuum of logic, a certain lawlessness had crept in (82).”

When the leaders left Vietnam, they recognized the need for doctrinal change, realistic training, and public support. “Though they did not yet realize it, [the] *willingness of junior officers to openly question their superiors, and of superior officers to admit mistakes in front of their subordinates, was beginning to fundamentally change the culture of the Army*. An organization that would once have considered such behavior little short of insubordination began to encourage self-criticism in an effort to get at the truth. Officers who thrived in that environment were those who rededicated themselves to learning their craft, who liked to get down and mix it up with the troops intellectually, and who led from the front physically (311).”

This eventually led to the reform of Goldwater-Nichols, an event the authors follows from the view of insiders. Still, this section is not given enough detail. The victory of creating TRANSCOM and SOCOM is also only given some mention. In his prelude, he hints that it was the power and authority of Schwarzkopf, handed to him by Goldwater-Nichols, that led to the success in the Gulf War. But the reasons remain in anecdotes and are thus sort of inaccessible for large scale analysis.

Kitfield, James. "Military's Northern Command Steps up Response Efforts," *National Journal* (September 2, 2005).

In civil emergencies, the U.S. military is often called up to provide command-and-control, communications, air- and sealift, search-and-rescue, emergency medical response, and manpower. Since the establishment of Northern Command, this assistance is no longer ad hoc. NorthCom, one of the Pentagon's joint, unified commands headed by a four-star flag officer, would assume this role. This article provides a little insight into the chain of command that involves NorthCom. In the event of a crisis, "The first question we have to ask and answer, along with all the agencies we work with, is, Who is in charge?" according to Navy Capt. Brad Johanson, chief of NorthCom's Joint Operations Center. In the event of a natural disaster like Hurricane Katrina, FEMA is the lead agency, with NorthCom in support. In a wildfire, the Agriculture Department will take the lead, through its National Interagency Fire Center. In the case of a terrorist infiltration where military assets are helping to monitor the situation, the FBI will usually be in charge.

Given acute sensitivities about military operations on U.S. soil, and given the provisions of the *Posse Comitatus* Act, which prohibits the U.S. military (although not the National Guard) from engaging in law enforcement activities, who is in charge of NorthCom is a sensitive issue. "It's extremely important that we bring clarity to this question of 'who's in charge' long in advance of an actual crisis, or else the potential for chaos and delay on the scene will be very real if, God forbid, we are actually confronted by one of these nightmare scenarios. So this is not an abstract argument," said Retired Coast Guard Adm. James Loy, who is now a senior counselor for the Cohen Group in Washington. "While the Defense Department will have the legal responsibility to assist civil authorities, when requested, in the event of a serious crisis—and indeed has resources, troops, and capabilities that no other agency can duplicate—the new rubric outlined in the National Response Plan clearly identifies the secretary of Homeland Security as the guy at the top making judgments about how the federal government will respond."

This article claims there may be confusion due to Northern Command's two hats, one for "homeland defense" and another for "homeland security." In the former, Northern Command is directly responsible (along with its sister agency NORAD, or the North American Aerospace Defense Command) for repelling an enemy attack on the United States. But for "homeland security," response to terrorist attacks or other major disasters, Northern Command would fall under the tasking of DHS. *"Northern Command's mission to protect the homeland against foreign threats is separate and distinct from its mission to provide support to civil agencies in the event of a terrorist attack of catastrophic proportions,"* said David Heyman, director of the Homeland Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

The vast destruction left in Hurricane Katrina's and ensuing events show how much the military is needed in catastrophic circumstances. They just will not be in charge, something hard for the military to get accustom to. "It's essential that we at Northern Command not be overbearing or overstep our responsibilities," said Mal Johnson, chief of interagency coordination at Northern Command. "That said, we can't just sit back passively and wait until someone asks for our help. We have to look ahead and anticipate what kind of assistance we'll most likely be asked to provide, so that we can reduce our response time and be an aggressive supporter."

Kolodziej, Edward A. "The National Security Council Innovations and Implications," *Public Administration Review* (November/December, 1969) 573-585.

This article compares the proposed NSC structure of the Nixon administration to the more ad hoc structure used by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The Nixon administration intends to have a smaller NSC with more specifically defined roles and responsibilities for each member. The author says that the *greater inclusion of under secretaries of state paradoxically weakens the relative authority of the Secretary of State in the national security apparatus because his subordinates are now responsible to both him and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs*. Some time is also spent the appropriate role of Nixon's expanded NSC. By increasing the emphasis and responsibility of the NSC, there is a possibility that the President's confidence in his security staff will become diffused through an increased number of advisors, which could isolate key members such as the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from the rest of the council which would in turn divorce his planning from the operational expertise provided by other members. The paper concludes with the recommendation that members of the NSC must be willing to take direct responsibility for the results of their advice.

Ellen Laipson with Olga Romanova eds., *Improving the Interagency Process to Face 21st Century Security Challenges, Henry L. Stimson Center Workshop Report* (October 2005). Available from http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?ID=324.

In October 2005, the Henry L. Stimson Center, in partnership with the Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Series, hosted a workshop entitled Improving the Interagency Process to Face 21st Century Security Challenges. The report of this workshop includes papers on interagency issues as well as a detailed overview of the workshop's discussions. Finally it should be noted that Appendix B of this report provides a useful list of additional publications on the subject of interagency process reform. The "Workshop Summary" of the conference broadly outlines workshop panelists' assessments of interagency cooperation as well as their recommendations for potential improvements to the interagency process. This summary briefly discusses a "trend" toward interagency reform, citing the recommendations to reform the National Security Act of 1947 made by the 9/11 Commission Report and the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction as critical catalysts supporting this movement. Most importantly, the summary provides an overview of various policymakers, officials, and analysts' differing opinions on reform, giving a short, yet varied, look at different interagency reforms under consideration. Workshop participants also maintained varied opinions on the nature and extent of the problems which confront interagency coordination. Nevertheless, the workshop summary details some consensus. *Common opinion held that the greatest difficulties confronting interagency coordination were poor information sharing, the lack of unity of purpose among agencies, and an inability to react on an interagency level to crisis situations.* Participants agreed that the Homeland Security Act would not solve the problems of the interagency process and argued that reform cannot be limited to specific issue areas. There was also consensus that interagency cooperation is more difficult in Washington than in the field and that analysis of field success stories could provide useful insight for broader interagency reform. Finally, the workshop generally concluded that with any reform, specialization and interagency mobility must be balanced in order to maximize the effectiveness of the national security structure. "Innovations in Interagency Cooperation: The Iraq Survey Group Case," written by Charles Duelfer, illustrates that the workings of the Iraq Survey Group can provide insight into improving the effectiveness of interagency groupings. While this article focuses on explaining the history, processes, and success of the Iraq Survey Group, the author concludes that organization around a "…defined and agreed mission" could prove useful in ensuring success in other interagency policy or functional teams. The second paper of the report, "The Interagency Process Abroad: The Ambassador is the Key," almost exclusively addresses the interagency process at foreign missions. The author underscores the importance of strong leadership to interagency effectiveness and reinforces the tenet that the interagency process functions far better abroad than it does in Washington, DC. The final paper included in the report of the workshop, "Getting the Balance Right," deals with the possible drawbacks of reform. The author, Ellen Laipson, underscores the importance of specialization for national security and urges that in attempting interagency reform, "*We need to strike the balance right, preparing… for maximum effectiveness in interagency activities, but understanding that most of the workforce will and probably should remain in their individual disciplines.*"

Lamb, Christopher J. *Before the Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee on Implementing the Global War on Terror: Overcoming Interagency Problems.* Statement to the House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives March 15, 2006. Available from http://www.ndu.edu/ITEA/index.cfm?method=main.itemlist&item=7B&resource=1.

Christopher J. Lamb, in his testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives, highlights the need for greater interagency coordination. He divides his testimony into four parts. First, he cites a few figures and quotations from high-ranking government officials in various Departments discussing the significant lack in interagency coordination. Second, he claims that the lack of interagency coordination is a severe problem by referring to historical examples. *American failures in Grenada, Panama, and Haiti, in particular, showed the inherent lack of communication between the Departments of State and Defense,* which resulted in diplomatic crises. In contrast, Lamb gave the example of the Bosnian Train and Equip Program, which was a success, attributable mainly to the fact that it involved interagency cooperation. Third, he describes some of the causes of the current lack of interagency coordination, the central *two being a weak NSC, and resource imbalances between different agencies; a weak NSC results in the proliferation of turf wars due to the lack of a centralized source of authority, and the Department of Defense's grossly superior resources fosters a hostile and competitive atmosphere amongst various government agencies.* Fourth and finally, to remedy these weaknesses, Lamb calls for the creation of an empowered cross-agency team, one similar to the Task Force created in the Bosnian Train and Equip Program, to coordinate counterterrorist efforts. Membership will be handpicked by the President, and the team will be empowered by senior

officials in the NSC, Department of Defense, and Department of State. This group would be a "decision-making entity with control over resources," not just an "advisory body (18)." They should be endowed with plentiful resources and directive authority over other agencies. The Executive and Legislative branches should work together to select the members of this group, paying close attention to applicants' respective credentials. Lamb recognizes that his proposal will be seen as "radical and impractical (19)," but he believes that it is the best way to overcome the many hurdles hindering successful interagency coordination.

Lambright, W. Henry, "The Rise and Fall of Interagency Cooperation: The U.S. Global Change Research Program," *Public Administration Review* 57:1 (Jan-Feb. 1997) 36-44.

The author of this article sets out to tell the story of the interagency Committee on Environment and Natural Resources (CENR). According to the author the CENR is a useful model for future interagency cooperation by committee and its history has numerous lessons to offer. The event or "trigger" that brought about a need for the formation of the CENR was the broad public concern, in 1985, over the ozone hole over the Antarctic. The scientific research that was required to address this issue clearly required an interagency approach. The author summarizes the history of the establishment of the committee from which a number of lessons for interagency cooperation can be gleaned. First, concerning the selection of the head of the committee it was first decided to name Tony Calio the head of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. However, this decision made the other agencies nervous that Calio was attempting to make his agency the head of the committee. This interagency rivalry problem was later resolved when a high level bureaucrat from a small agency was chosen to head the committee, no doubt, as the author implies, because he was not a threat to the other agencies. Second, all the agencies involved in the committee had a similar goal, to further scientific research relating to the global environment, but no one agency could do so alone, they all had pieces of the puzzle and, therefore, it was in the interest of each to promote the effective work of the CENR. *Third, and most importantly in both the case of the CENR and the lessons derivable for future interagency work, the committee had the keys to the treasury*. Any agency that sought to participate in research seen as within the scope of the CENR's mission had to first be approved by the CENR before they could receive the additional funding for research. In effect agencies had to show how their work would contribute to the goals of the CENR. In effect the CENR became a guarantor of funding and status to the agencies that made it up. In the end, according to the author, the CENR met the four major requirements for interagency success: 1) the CENR channeled common interests among the agencies both in goals and in the fiscal means to attain those goals; 2) the CENR was supported by a "constituency" of the Presidents and Congress who sought to identify themselves as doing something about the environmental issue that had been triggered in the mid-1980s; 3) the CENR had high "morale" based on a high degree of support for their efforts; 4) the CENR possessed the leadership that wanted to see the interagency system work and had the power to ensure that it did. When any one of these criteria was undermined throughout the history of the CENR it declined.

Lange, John E., "Civilian-Military Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance: Lessons from Rwanda," *Parameters* (Summer 1998).

John Lange's article provides an analysis of the interagency environment and interactions surrounding the humanitarian relief of the 1994 Rwandan refugee crisis. The magnitude of the crisis was so great that it overwhelmed the capacity of the humanitarian organizations. The U.S. military, having the capabilities and expertise required for its alleviation, where called in. The military deployed rapidly and executed a plan that also enabled them to depart rapidly when their mission was completed avoiding the specter of "mission creep." The author accepts that the military will inevitably become involved in numerous humanitarian missions. The central point of the author, however, is that it is essential for those who want the US military to undertake such operations to understand that the culture of the U.S. military will always see them as secondary to their central mission of warfighting. Moreover, this view of the primary role of the military was, and no doubt is still, shared by a number of members of Congress. According to the author, those who think that the military must either change with the times or be changed coercively, through an altered curriculum, reeducation of new recruits and selective officer promotion, underestimate the power of the military and their civilian allies to resist such reforms. The author also brings up a very important point when he shows how the context in which an agency finds itself can effect its interaction within an interagency context. For example, during this period, the U.S. military was still feeling the adverse effects of the broad perception that their mission in Somalia had been a failure. They had witnessed how, due to poorly defined objectives, by both military and political leadership had allowed the mission to be expanded beyond what was reasonable. With the mission in Rwanda the military was certain to define their objectives clearly in order to allow a quick withdrawal and an unequivocal declaration of success. *The U.S. military's desire to avoid*

"mission creep" caused then to come into conflict with civilian humanitarian organizations and government aid agencies who saw the mission in a far more long-term sense. This observation leads to another important point regarding the fact that different organizations can have different definitions for the same objective. The military saw their mission as relieving the immediate crisis that had been precipitated by the massive influx of refugees. Once the refugee camps had become relatively calm the military considered their mission completed. As one officer put it, once the massive bloodletting had been staunched and essential infrastructure put in place, "our mission was over." Needless to say, this did not suit the long term view of the other participating agencies. In 1998, when the author was writing, he opined that there was little hope of a major change in the Pentagon.

Langford, Tonya. "Orchestrating Peace Operations: The PDD-56 Process," *Security Dialogue* 30:2 (June 1999) 137-149.
The Presidential Decision Directive-56 was instated by Clinton to address "political/diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence, economic development, and security components" in "responding to collapsed states, small wars, and natural disasters." However, according to Tonya Langford, the problem with PDD-56 is that it fails to really integrate efforts on the regional and international levels. For example, an outsider's assessment of the 1993 Task Force Ranger raid in Mogadishu showed that U.S. government agencies, the U.S. military, the UN, and NGOs were not communicated or coordinating completely. The recommendation was that "mandatory interagency networking and cooperation were critical to both the planning and the execution stages of multifunctional peace operations." Also, resources and political authority are again issues raised in interagency work. This isn't restrained to the United States. Tony Blair's cabinet is establishing the Joint Defence Centre with a mandate to: "formulate and develop high-level joint strategic doctrine; lead the UK's contributions in promoting doctrine for civil-military operations and peace support operations in conjunction with other government departments, NGOs, and the wider international community, and provide long-term conceptual assessment." This and PDD-56 is helping shape the multilateral effort. It encourages voices to be heard during the planning process, where coordination efforts can be harmonized.

Lannan, Tim. "Interagency Coordination Within the National Security Community: Improving the Response to Terrorism," *Canadian Military Journal* 5:3 (Autumn 2004) 49-56.
Tim Lannan provides a uniquely Canadian viewpoint on improving his country's attempts at interagency coordination to better prepare Canada for a September 11-magnitude terrorist attack. The author highlights current collaborative efforts to create a "coherent networked national security 'team'," which have already resulted in the creation of a new Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) and the appointment of a national security advisor to the Prime Minister. However, while these new tools are a boon for Canada, according to Lannan, the true challenge comes in integrating these new offices with existing intelligence, law enforcement, security, and military apparatuses to raise the country to an acceptable level of preparedness against terrorist attack. After defining "interagency coordination," the author emphasizes that the process must be practiced during peacetime as well as throughout conflict, so that crucial relationships and ties have been made within and among the agencies to allow them to perform as a team during a crisis. Lannan also discusses the merits and drawbacks of institutionalizing interagency coordination. *Although institutionalization streamlines decision making processes, it can also "eliminate independent thinking among the different component agencies." For most agencies, it makes more sense to harmonize interagency cooperation between them than to attempt actual integration*. The author has numerous recommendations on creating an interagency model to effectively fight terrorism. The model must be a "reasonably concentrated body capable of harnessing the full potential of the various agencies." Instead of planning with ad hoc teams, a small but dedicated interagency liaison staff would be more effective in responding and coordinating agencies in a crisis. A balance must be struck between the number of participants in an interagency operation, the speed of decision-making, and operational security. The model should also *resemble both a hierarchy and a network to make rapid decisions possible but maintain flexibility and adaptability in a time of crisis*. Finally, although "cultural differences and internal political struggles will always be factors" in coordinating interagency operations, a common threat-oriented objective will often overcome these barriers to efficient cooperation.

Lemann, Nicholas. "Without a Doubt," *New Yorker* 78:31 (October 14-21, 2002) 164.
Lemann's article is the result of a series of interviews with Condoleezza Rice in mid-2002 as well as significant research on the then-National Security Adviser. Over the course of the article, Lemann traces the path of Rice's career, from her earliest education through her appointment as National Security Adviser. The article was written at a time when there was some speculation that Vice-President Cheney would either resign or be unable to serve a

second-term due to health reasons and Rice would potentially be nominated to take his place. Substantively, the article is about Condoleeza Rice more than the policies of the Bush Administration. Nonetheless, it is a fine look at a National Security Adviser. The article speaks little about interagency interaction, although the NSC is certainly at the epicenter of the current debate. The article's value is simply as a portait of one of the most recent National Security Advisers, *particularly interesting because Rice has subsequently left that post to serve as Secretary of State, a position that has in some cases been usurped by the NSC*. Over the course of her professional career, Rice has consistently emphasized the interests of the United States over any sort of idealistic or moralistic foreign policy. However, her time in the Bush administration has seen a shift toward a moral basis for Foreign Policy that is consistent with the President's instincts on what should guide the country, leading the author to speculate that perhaps Rice is functioning as a presenter, taking the President's broad notions and articulating them as specific and clear strategies.

Lewis, Flora. "Foreign Affairs: The Policy Blind," *New York Times. (Late Edition, East Coast)* (September 18, 1981) A35.
"It is now clear this hasn't worked. Nothing doesn't take the place of something. The NSC no longer heads key inter-agency committees dealing with major questions like arms control negotiations, relations with the Russians, the Middle East and so on, and there isn't any real coordination. There are persistent and increasingly harsh battles for turf, and decisions are made without adequately weighing the factors involved." (Direct pull quote)

Lord, Carnes. "NSC Reform for the Post-Cold War Era," *Orbis* 44:3 (Summer 2000) 433-450.
The time is ripe to assess the merits of the more important recent critiques of the National Security Council system and to determine whether and how it needs to be redesigned. Many changes in areas such as personnel recruitment and training, information management, budgeting practices, and interagency procedures could significantly improve the way Washington conducts its business.

Lucynski, John A. "An Interagency Reform Act: Preparing for Post-Conflict Operations in the 21st Century," USAWC Strategy Research Project, March 2005. Available from http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA432527&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf.
Colonel John Lucynski, of the United States Army, posits the thesis that current levels of interagency cooperation are inadequate, evidenced by the unanticipated attacks on the United States during September 11 and the evident failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that *dramatic—not incremental—change must be pursued posthaste*: "Complex contingency operations require the traditional interagency partners—State, Defense, CIA, and NSC staff—to work together closely and demand that other agencies—Treasury, Commerce, Justice, Transportation, and others—join the process as well. *Evolutionary changes, minor incremental changes within the current structure, are insufficient to genuinely improve the interagency process*." Lucynski identifies several impediments to strategic cooperation in the status quo: 1) No coordinating agency/entity—"under the current system, no single agency is responsible for executing post-conflict planning and coordination"; (2) Executive discontinuity—"to further complicate the interagency process, every time the presidency changes, new procedures are established to conduct interagency cooperation"; and 3) Parochialism/agency culture. Lucynski advocates sweeping overhaul for interagency processes by the Congress, which he believes provides a structure and forum for deliberative decision-making—the best possible approach to interagency reform. "Only with the support of Congress and corresponding legislation will reform be possible," he concludes. *Lucynksi advocates a legislative reform package that grants jurisdiction and total legal authority over interagency affairs (as well as adequate funding) to the Office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (constituent element of the State Department) and ensures passage of the Lugar-Biden Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2005.* Practical interim measures should be taken, he argues, including the integration of agency post-conflict operations training.

Lystra, Clark R. "Requesting Department of Defense Assistance for Domestic Incidents," *Guardian* 7:2 (August 2005) 21-23.
The Department of Defense offers a wide variety of resources and capabilities to federal disaster response teams and knowledge. *Generally, DOD should only be utilized after local, state, and federal emergency response capabilities prove to be insufficient.* The article discusses the actual mechanism and paperwork whereby the Department of Homeland Security requests assistance from the Department of Defense. Other federal agencies should specify

objectives that need to be accomplished in their request (i.e. transport 15 tons of medical supplies at a certain time) rather than a specific request for units or capabilities (i.e. 10 C-130 cargo planes).

Macgregor, Douglas A. "Transforming Jointly," in *Transforming America's Military*, ed. Hans Binnendjik (2002) Chapter 8. Available from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2002/Transforming%20Americas%20Mil%20-%20CTNSP%20-%20Aug%202002/10_ch08.htm.

Douglas Macgregor's chapter focuses on potential reform within the Defense Department to maximize the benefits of military transformation. Macgregor argues that technological transformation within each of the armed services is not sufficient. He advocates organizational and structural change directed at interoperability. He sees "jointness" as critical to the continued efficacy of the United States Armed Forces. Key recommendations include: 1) Shift from threat (scenario)-based planning to Capabilities-based planning; 2) Reorganization of Armed Forces into multi-service Joint Task Forces (JTFs) with each service providing "tailorable force modules" and joint command at the three-star level and above; Emphasize effects-based operations creating synergy between air, naval, and ground forces that complements each within a common framework/plan. The chapter is exclusively devoted to transformation within the Department of Defense. Macgregor is chiefly concerned with inter-service cooperation. He recognizes that the recommendations may be opposed by the individual services as result of competition for resources within the Department. Analysis of interagency cooperation is absent.

Mansager, Tucker B. "Interagency Lessons Learned in Afghanistan," *Joint Force Quarterly* 40 (January 2006) 80-84.

In his 2006 article "Interagency Lessons Learned in Afghanistan," Tucker B. Mansager evaluates the performance of the U.S. interagency process while focusing on interagency effectiveness in foreign conflict situations. Mansager concludes this process is highly flawed and argues, "Action is required; the system will not improve by itself." The article provides a substantial analysis of interagency problems in conflict areas, drawing upon examples from Operation Enduring Freedom, and also iterates the more general flaws which hinder the interagency system as a whole. The author argues that existing interagency structures do not facilitate policy implementation or overarching integration and, more specifically, often hinder the work of Joint Force Commanders. *Organizational problems in the interagency structure, especially agencies' differing geographic groupings, exacerbate coordination difficulties* by forcing JFCs to coordinate with several different country teams and by undermining the ability of agencies to cooperate at low levels. *Problems of uncertain authority as well as cultural differences between agencies also promote interagency friction and hinder effective cooperation.* In advocating several interagency reforms, this study details the work of the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan as a successful example of interagency cooperation. In citing the effectiveness of this organization's collocation of senior military and diplomatic leaders, its engagement in consensus building, and its use of military planning in support of the U.S. Ambassador to improve interagency policy implementation and planning, Mansager recommends that these practices be entrenched throughout the interagency process. The author also advocates realignment of geographic organizational structures as well as support for leaders with cooperative mindsets as iterated in the 2004 analysis, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era.

McFadden, Eric. "Contemporary Counterinsurgency Operations: History as a Guide to Assist in the Development of the Joint Interagency Task Force," *Comparative Strategy* 24:4 (October 2005) 361-378.

To successfully engage and destroy the increasing contemporary insurgent threat, the U.S. must develop standing, multifunctional, capabilities-based joint interagency task forces primarily focused on counterinsurgency operations. This research examines the critical elements of the British counterinsurgency campaign during the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1960. While not all inclusive, analysis of this campaign provides a starting point for annotation of critical capabilities required for the future conduct of counterinsurgency operations. These capabilities, combined with contemporary insurgent vulnerabilities, will define the critical capabilities required to derive the counterinsurgency team. Furthermore, this study proposes the requisite U.S. government national assets necessary to shape the team. Lastly, this paper recommends the organizational structure and the team's relationship to the combatant command in order to facilitate its definitive and relative employment.

McLamb, Joseph S. "Is it Time to Abandon the Military Decisionmaking Process?" *Military Review* 82:2 (March/April 2002) 98-102.

Joseph McLamb describes the difficulties hampering the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), particularly those of inadequate training/experience and lack of synchronization between commanders and their staff. He makes suggestions for improving the process. McLamb defines MDMP as the method of assessing different options to address a situation (from humanitarian aid to conflict management) in order to determine the best solution. The author does not mention interagency decision making.

Meyer, Edward C. and Thomas R. Pickering, "Forward Strategic Empowerment: Synergies Between CINCs, the State Department, and Other Agencies," *A Panel Report from the Center for the Study of the Presidency*," August 2001, http://www.thepresidency.org/pubs/ForwardStrategic.pdf
This report from the Center for the Study of the Presidency is the product of discussion and policy debate by a panel of experts—chaired by former U.S. ambassador to the UN Thomas Pickering and retired General Edward C. Meyer—convened to discuss issues relating to cooperation between and integration of federal agencies. The report begins by describing the intensely interrelated nature of global security problems found in the modern security environment—"dramatically multifaceted [and] increasingly interrelated," these threats require a heightened level of cooperation between various federal agencies. The panel proceeds to make a series of policy recommendations that seek to enhance existing levels of cooperation and as well as open additional avenues for future coordination: 1) Augment existing joint education programs and establish new opportunities for interaction between employees of various agencies during training—"For example, the Nimitz Center (Asia), the Marshall Center (Europe), the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (Latin America), and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, under the joint tutelage of the National Defense University (DoD) and the Foreign Service Institute (State), could conduct joint simulations training with rising diplomats and military officers"; 2) Reduce problems associated with turnover, regionalism by renewing relationships in Washington and beyond—"A specified term of at least three years should be set for the PolAd, thus reducing turnover and increasing consistency[…]A formal interface between the CINC structure, the Ambassador, the regional Assistant Secretary of State, and the relevant agencies needs to be institutionalized"; 3) Establish a Regional Interagency Contingency Planning Center to enhance coordination between federal agencies (e.g., State, Defense) on a *regional* level—"…these Centers would convene representatives from relevant agencies and departments to co-develop cohesive crisis management simulations and concerted preventive measures."

Moore, Scott W. "Today it's gold, not purple." *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn/Winter 1998–99). Available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1820.pdf.
Scott W. Moore, in his article, "Today it's Gold, not Purple," underlines the importance of interagency operations. Purple, he claims, represents "jointness," a past paradigm commonly associated with the Vietnam War in which failed civilian-military joint operations took place. Gold, the new "vogue" color, represents interagency operations. Though they require more coordination than the preceding jointness paradigm, these interagency operations are now necessary in devising solutions to complex regional problems. Moore evokes examples from El Salvador in 1980-1992 to illustrate his point, a case in which the U.S. Military Group (MILGP) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) combined to successfully conduct counterinsurgency efforts in the region. He found that the successful interagency operations stemmed from trust and shared experience. Based on this main finding, he gave four recommendations: 1) Hold interagency exercises that are more realistic and difficult than mere joint operations. Members of each agency need to be prepared for all contingencies; 2) Invest in the people who conduct these interagency exercises by encouraging cultural immersion, thus increasing familiarity amongst members of each agency; 3) Educate leaders, including policymakers, diplomats, and commanders. Leaders must guide their respective agencies into developing trust for others. There is no set equation that leaves diplomacy to the Department of State, and war to the Department of Defense; 4) Create interagency organizations on all levels, beginning with the highest. Contemporary civil-military operations are complicated, and thus require much more practice and coordination. The best way to encourage such practice would be via creation of interagency organizations.

Morris, Robert. "Train Like We'll Fight." *Armed Forces Journal* 142:9 (April 2005) 36.
Effective coordination between NGOs and the military is essential to many of the missions currently being performed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some efforts have been taken to include NGOs in DOD exercises, but no systematic coordination has taken place, especially at upper-levels of the military command. The article outlines several areas of difficulty with increasing NGO / DOD effectiveness. First, while many NGOs are willing to work with the military in the field, other organizations such as the State Department and USAID feel that NGOs should

only work through them (this problem is made worse by the fact that the State department in particular does not have the capabilities to effectively support a large number of NGOs*). Also, there is no consistent path or mechanism for NGOs to get information from the government, every particular operation usually develops its own ad hoc way to communicate information*. Finally, many State department programs channel money to a small number of well established aid organizations, which excludes many of the smaller NGOs that operate in areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Some areas of success have been the Commander's Emergency Response Program in Iraq where military commanders can directly allocate funds to improve humanitarian conditions in areas under their control. NGOs have found this program very helpful because of the relatively easy access to funds that it offers. The author recommends some sort of NGO coordination center (which might have to operated by a third-party on account of NGO reservations about working directly for a government) which can develop some sort of interoperability procedure for various operations.

Murdock, Clark A., and Richard W. Weitz. "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: New Proposals for Defense Reform." ***Joint Force Quarterly*** **38 (July 2005) 34-41.**
This article summarizes the Center for Strategic and International Studies' Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era: Phase 1 Report. The six principles guiding the CSIS team formed to tackle defense reform are laid out. Issues include the organizational structure of the Department of Defense, effective resource allocation, competent civilian defense professionals, interagency and coalition operational success, and congressional oversight. The agenda for Phase 2 is outlined in closing.

Myers, Richard B. "A Word from the Chairman," ***Joint Force Quarterly*** **33 (Winter 2002/2003).**
General Myers stresses the importance of agency integration for rapid decision-making. Myers uses examples of military coordination to emphasize the importance of interagency cooperation. *Many of his examples suggest that determining which particular agencies should coordinate should be based on the demands of each specific mission*. His recommendations include: "Financial services, law enforcement, diplomatic efforts, and commercial activities both at home and abroad, as well as humanitarian and civil organizations, must *be included in all appropriate phases [of operations], from planning to combat to the transition to a lasting peace*"; Agency culture should change from an attitude of "need to know" to "need to share." *Myers believes protecting overclassified information is detrimental to our national security.* Because fighting terrorism involves unconventional warfare, interagency cooperation is all the more important. Sharing intelligence can help prevent future terrorist attacks.

Naler, Christopher L. "Are we Ready for an Interagency Combatant Command?" ***Joint Force Quarterly*** **41 (2006) 26-31.**
Chris Naler's article seeks to define an operational mechanism by which all of the elements of U.S. national power, represented by the different agencies that make up the US government, can be brought to bear within the geographical combatant commands in order to facilitate the global strategy required to win the war on terrorism through defeating and deterring adversaries and engaging allies and undecided states and regions. The author argues that the establishment of such a mechanism would require a sea change in the interagency community, one that can only be brought about through legislation requiring disparate agencies to cooperate. The legislation would be like the Goldwater-Nichols reform of the armed services, which required much interagency compromise to bring about the "jointness" that, although recognized as necessary by military theorists and practitioners, had required coercion through legislation to bring about. Reforming the interagency, the article contends, will require a similar catalyst. The *Interagency Combatant Command (IACC) that Naler outlines would harness all the diplomatic, informational, military, economic, law enforcement, financial, and health and environmental elements of US national power*. Each of these elements would comprise a directorate under each of the Commanders of the U.S. geographical combatant commands. The Commander would have two deputies below him, one civilian and one military. Agency representative would remain in close communication with their agency heads in Washington and with the other agency representatives in the region, and would provide relevant information to the combatant commander. Each directorate would be headed by a mid-level representative of an agency; respected agency members with long experience and recognized authority within the agency. Each agency would be responsible for selecting these directors and the rest of their representatives in the IACC. These positions should be assigned to individuals been groomed for certain desirable positions within the agency. Regarding authority, Naler suggests that, although it is a controversial issue, the commander of the IACC report to the Secretary of Defense in order to retain the existing chain of command. Although the author and other military practitioners might perceive this as the obvious choice, it

is doubtful that the other members of the interagency will see it that way. Who the combatant commander reports to is a major legal hurdle to Naler's suggested IACC. "The commander's oversight would be similar to a tactical control relationship, directing the other agencies only in the roles and missions prescribed by their cabinet level secretaries." The author ends by suggesting some of the ways that interagency cooperation could be facilitated, besides the necessary coercive legislation. Primarily, Naler concentrates on the role of education in interagency cooperation. DOD should lead the way by expanding its education to include the cultures, roles, and missions of the other US agencies within the National Security Strategy. He also proposes the establishment of a National Security University modeled on the Marshall European Center for Security Studies, where members of the different agencies can come together in an environment of common dialogue, gain understanding of one another, and form professional relationships.

Newmann, William, "Causes of Change in National Security Processes: Carter, Reagan, and Bush Decision Making on Arms Control," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* (March 2001).
The central focus of this paper is the causes of change in president's national security decision-making process and the relationship between policy and process. The author first discusses the different analytical tools that political scientists and international relations theorists have used to look at the causes of presidential decision making. The three main paradigms encountered are organizational process, bureaucratic politics, and presidential management. The author points out that these three paradigms are usually considered mutually exclusive but goes on to suggest that it is closer to the truth to say that all three exist within a presidential administration at the simultaneously. Regarding attempts to understand the interagency process, especially at the executive level, this appears to be a very useful framework for ensuring that analysis of the causes and effects within the interagency process are all taken into account. An administration is a combination of the effects of its organization (organizational process), the ambitions and competitions between government officials (bureaucratic politics), and attempts by the president to gain control of the decision making process. But perhaps the most important aspect of this paper as it relates to the interagency process is the case studies that the author provides regarding arms control and the use of the interagency process by three different presidents. In all three cases that the author presents, Carter, Reagan, Bush, the presidents found the standard interagency process, which for all three had a similar structure from the beginning of their terms of office, inadequate to formulate the policies that they felt they needed at the time. *All three presidents went over the heads of the interagency process and made ad hoc committees of trusted advisors and cabinet members and then presented the world and the interagency with a fait accompli.* All three presidents were reacting to changes in the domestic and international political environment and the standard interagency process was incapable in their eyes of providing the policies that they thought necessary at the time. The author point out, however, that after the initial policy was formulated and announced outside of the interagency process, if the policy was successful, the policy was then funneled back into the interagency process where the details of its implementation were then hammered out. The changes in the interagency process were temporary ones to deal with changes in the political environment. The author is also aware that there are a number of problems that this ad hocery raises. It is possible, for instance, that the president has misread the political environment.

The paper's arguments and conclusions obviously bear significance for any attempt at interagency national security reform. Most importantly the paper points out that although the National Security Council is the formal interagency body at the executive level there is often another more important group of advisors that the president surrounds himself with in a crisis. All three presidents in the case studies often employed their National Security Advisors heavily and other trusted members of their cabinet in ad hoc committees to formulate foreign policy. The paper, then, exposes some of the possible limits of a reform to the standard interagency structure. Even if legislation could be brought about to reform the interagency it is not at all clear that such reforms would keep the president from bypassing the interagency in favor of an ad hoc process that can produce more timely decisions more along the lines of the president's political views, especially in a crisis.

Newmann, William, "Reorganizing for National Security and Homeland Security," *Public Administration Review*, September 2002, Vol 62 Special Issue
William Newmann here articulates the nature of the changed global security reality. The 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States—in conjunction with the decentralization of political violence (attributed to the conclusion of the Cold War) and the globalization of the economy—have transformed the function of the United States government. No longer able to respond in an *ad hoc* nature to threats in the new security environment, it is now, first and foremost, a "decision-making organization," one forced to parse unthinkable amount of intelligence data and make a strategic

calculation as to which threats are real and imagined. “The new aspects of this threat necessitate a new organizational design,” he follows, and “an interagency process appears to be the only practical method of making decisions concerning the diverse range of issues involved in homeland defense.” The current model—the Homeland Security Council—is less than ideal for a whole host of reasons. *Newmann notes that “the Homeland Security Council has no representation form at the state or local level, nor from organizations that represent the functionally based institutions that are operating at those levels—police, firefighters, emergency medical technicians, and hospitals*. This vertical coordination needs serious attention if the different levels of government are to be fully prepared for responding to new threats.”

Odeen, Philip A. “Organizing for National Security,” *International Security* 5:1 (Summer, 1980) 111-129.
The author argues that one of the most seminal decisions that a President can make between their election and their inauguration is their selection of an Assistant for National Security Affairs and the staff that will serve as “coordinators of the [NSC decision making] process as well as personal advisors to the President”; *any significant National Security reform, the author would not doubt contend, would require an appropriate appointment to this position.* Lack of reliance on the staff of the National Security Council and overly informal organizational frameworks for making and, most importantly, implementing the decisions of the President and the executive in the past has resulted in National Security failures.

Major responsibilities of the NSC staff should include identifying essential national security issues and forcing decisions on them. The NSC staff should also ensure that clear alternatives to those policies put forward by the different government departments and agencies are researched and seriously considered during the decision making process. Further, when decisions relating to subjects which are technically the province of one specific department but have clear implications for other departments the NSC staff should see to it that the legitimate concerns of the other departments are addressed during the decision making process. The Cold War example that the author presents is the procurement of nuclear weapons by the Department of Defense, which clearly had diplomatic implications for the Department of State’s goals regarding nuclear disarmament. In addition, the NSC should be closely involved in crisis planning. Here the author makes an important point when he points out that crisis planning is not undertaken because we think we can predict the future but in order to make the different actors aware of the capabilities and concerns of the other departments and agencies involved. *Finally, National Security Advisor and the NSC staff should be highly active in ensuring that decisions made by the NSC are implemented. The author alludes to a possible problem in national security reform efforts; that decisions taken by the NSC may not necessarily be implemented.*

Given these responsibilities, to fulfill their duties properly the Assistant for National Security Affairs and the NSC staff should “be protective of the President’s interests and loyal, yet able to work well with the Departments”, thereby furthering interagency cooperation and the implementation of Presidential decisions. An additional important evaluation for an effective organization for national security decision making is determining “where centralization is essential and where decentralization makes sense.” In addition, *one specific suggestion of interest by the author is to encourage the movement of members of departmental staffs to other departments after a time to increase a general understanding among different departments of one another’s capabilities.* This should facilitate interagency cooperation.

Odom, William E. “The Cold War Origins of the U.S. Central Command,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* (Spring 2006).
In this article the author seeks to trace the origins of U.S. Central Command from its inception in the Carter Administration. Without the insistence of Carter and the ingenuity of National Security Advisor Brzezinski CentCom would have never come into being, and, the author suggests, the successes that the US military achieved in that region might not have been possible. In 1977 Carter called for a massive reassessment of the balance of capabilities between the US and the USSR. The study that was produced, Presidential Review Memoranda 10 (PRM-10), which assessed “the military balance, economic balance, political institutional balance, intelligence capabilities, and others,” gave particular significance to the Persian Gulf region as an area of political and strategic importance to the US. This study lead to Presidential Directive 18 (PD-18), which “stipulated that the projection of US forces into the Persian Gulf during a crisis must be as high a priority as the reinforcement of US troops in Korea.” PD-18 ordered the Pentagon to create a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) to the Gulf. The Department of Defense was not pleased with this assessment and, in a good demonstration of interagency stubbornness, “largely

ignored" PD-18. However, the fall of the shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought the establishment of the RDF to the fore again and Carter was not pleased when he discovered how little progress was being made. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was another major even that began to put pressure on the different agencies involved to come up with a strategy for the region but the pressure was not strong enough. National Security Advisor Brzezinski and his staff, of which the author was a member, recognized the need for a comprehensive strategy and went ahead with planning in the areas of military, diplomatic, economic, and intelligence capabilities. *If it was not for the NSC planning the president would have been completely at the mercy of the department experts for his policy options*. The NSC staff formulated the broad strokes of a plan and presented the Persian Gulf Security Framework to the president who approved. Only then was the policy then presented to the Secretary of Defense and State. In order to orchestrate a policy shift that would have been bogged down in bureaucratic wrangling without presidential support the NSC staff formulated a plan, got the approval of the principal, then brought it to the Secretaries of Defense, who approved of the plan, and State, who disapproved, and only then brought it to a meeting of the NSC. Moreover, armed with their prior planning the NSC staff and the president could ask specific questions or require specific actions on the part of the principle agencies. This fact provides a recommendation for future staffing of the NSC staff. *The staff should possess as much of the expertise that the departments possess as possible in order to ensure that the president is not at the mercy of the policy recommendations of the departments.*

The paper is also a useful portrayal of how events can alter the opinions of a president and alter his decision making. Carter came into office hoping to reduce U.S. presence in the region, which he did through policies in 1977. However, through major events like the fall of the shah of Iran, the Iranian hostage crisis, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it became clear to Carter that disengagement was not the answer and from this realization the US moved to gain military bases in the region through security guarantees and economic and military assistance.
On the ground the implementation of the policy proved more difficult. The region of the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia was divided between EUCOM and PACOM on land and sea respectively. This was the source of much inter-service rivalry. But this foot dragging too was overcome by events when the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and an apparent shift in Soviet strategic planning that designated the region a "theatre of military operations" caused the Pentagon to become concerned about their military readiness in the region. The chairman of the JCS began planning at the joint level to form the RDF Joint Task Force. But the Secretary of Defense did not seek explicit presidential backing for the policy and the unified command was not formulated until the next Secretary of Defense, Weinberger, sought and received it, from Reagan, which pushed through the formation of the unified command. Regarding the case in question then, *it is clear that much interagency foot dragging and gridlock can be significantly overcome by direct presidential approval or censure of specific offending parties*. For example, Carter wrote a note to Secretary of Defense Brown, regarding command-and-control in the Gulf region, directly asking him "Who is in charge? PACOM? EUCOM? or who?" This put direct pressure on Secretary of Defense Brown and accelerated progress.

Owens, Mackubin Thomas. "Conformity Needs Competition." *Armed Forces Journal* (2006) June
This assessment of the performance of the U.S. armed forces since the passage of Goldwater-Nichols reveals that the act has not been as effective as its supporters claimed nor as bad as its detractors warned. The act's greatest success, claims author Mackubin Thomas Owens, has occurred in the area of military operations by increasing the authority of the combatant commanders to bring it into balance with their responsibilities. But Goldwater-Nichols has also created some potentially serious problems that have to do with the nature of jointness itself.

Pace, Peter. "A Word from the Chairman," *Joint Force Quarterly* 41 (April 2006) 1-4.
Pace here stresses importance of intelligence community integration. Provides examples of counterdrug operations, Iraq counterinsurgency, and reconstruction post-Hurricane Katrina as instances of successful interagency cooperation. Recommendations are to: 1) Explore cross-agency planning guidance; and 2) Establish a more consistent relationship in education, training, and exercises related to national security. Promoting broader interagency partnerships important because non-military aspects may define a particular national effort. Mission requirements may demand diverse skill sets, expertise, and authority. Groups outside the intelligence community may also be able to contribute valuable expertise. Pace cites the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S), a group focused on counterdrug operations, as an example of agency cooperation.

Pascual, Carlos. "An Interview with Carlos Pascua," *Joint Force Quarterly* 42 (Summer 2006) 80-85.
Article focuses mainly on the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and mentions a handful of ways in which coordination between military and civilian sectors plays a role. The article describes the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (OCRS) (within DOS) as an attempt to foster interagency processes. OCRS draws together military and civilian professionals with diverse expertise. The Office is also comprised of distinct sectors that handle specific issues. It stresses importance of coordination between military and civilian sectors in handling conflicts and reconstruction. Finally, it suggests nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary organizations (PVOs), and industry/private sector have important roles to play in the design, development, and management of programs.

Pasquarett, Michael, and James Kievit. A Blueprint for a Bold Restructuring of the Organization for National Security Phase One: The Military Combatant Commands and State Department Regional Bureaus. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Center for Strategic Leadership, Army War College, 1997.
This work recommends a restructuring of major portions of the Department of Defense as well as the Department of State in order to increase the effect of U.S. policy implementation. This restructuring is merely the first step in a much broader series of reforms that would eventually target a restructuring of the "military service departments and the offices of the Secretary of Defense and State and of other strategic-level national security organizations." This report focuses on "improving the alignment between the Department of State bureau system and a unified combatant command of the Department of Defense, and the restructuring of these commands to improve their effectiveness and make better use of available resources." Because both the Department of State and Department of Defense have a command structure that dates back to the pre-World War Two era and the current international state is rapidly and constantly evolving, these proposed reorganizations can be seen as an important step to increase the efficiency of the departments. While the old system was centered on dealing with the past, bipolar, Cold War atmosphere, currently the U.S. has been experiencing a decline in the threat of an immediate military confrontation. Thus, the current time is an opportune one in order to initiate the much-needed changes in department structure.
This report first recommends a *realignment of the Department of State regional bureaus and the Department of Defense regional commands with a reassessment of geographic responsibilities*. A second recommendation is to reduce or eliminate existing subordinate offices of regional combatant commands and replace them with both Operational Planning Group (OPG) organizations and Standing Joint Task Force (SJTF) headquarters. An OPG is an interagency "virtual corporation" that focuses on the accomplishment of a particular mission while bringing "the expertise of government and non-government interagency actors together with military strategic and operational planners and operators to improve the coordinated application of all elements of national power." These OPGs will also hopefully expose various interagency actors to one another when formulating policy recommendations. The SJTF will act as the "musculature" of the new Department of Defense combatant command structure. It is hoped that the "JTFs can ensure the effective execution of U.S. policy without the resource redundancy found in multiple service component headquarters." An anticipated result of these restructurings is that the "U.S. national security team will more effectively implement national security policy and will make more efficient use of national security resources."

Peck, Michael. "'Dysfunctional' Interagency Coordination Hampers Domestic Deployment of Drones." *National Defense* 90, no. 630 (2006) May: 30.
The latest FAA guidance expresses the agency's concerns about the dangers of UAVs operating amid aircraft lacking transponders, as well as objects that may not appear on radar, such as parachutists and gliders. Attempts to hammer out a common policy between the FAA on one side, and Department of Homeland Security and the Defense Department on the other, haven't been harmonious. Nonetheless, UAVs are certain to play a much greater role in homeland security.

Peters, Katherine McIntire. "The Challenge." *Government Executive* 34, no. 10 (2002) July: 10-14.
The federal government's existing structure is ill-suited for managing the threats of the 21st century, claims Katherine Peters. In an attempt to change that, the White House has proposed the most ambitious restructuring of federal agencies in a half century. The exact form of the new Department of Homeland Security was still being negotiated on Capitol Hill when the article was written. However, the mission of homeland security, in whatever way it is defined, was not something Peters considered new. Peters explores four important aspects of any future homeland security plan—border security, critical infrastructure protection, the promise and limitations of technology

and the ability of local firefighters, police and health care workers to respond to an attack. In the government's battle against terrorism, the new Homeland Security Department will have to be a model of interagency cooperation. If not, Peters states, the new department will repeat the mistakes of the past.

Peters, Katherine McIntire. "Security Vs. Bureaucracy." ***Government Executive*** **34, no. 4 (2002) April: 18-19.**
Declining state resources, key leadership vacancies at federal agencies and a poor track record of working effectively with state and local officials all will hinder the Bush Administration's efforts to bolster defenses against terrorism. What is more, when it comes to managing the flow of people and goods across U.S. borders, no single federal organization is responsible for security. Instead, multiple agencies with sometimes conflicting missions control separate aspects of what many consider to be the single most important factor in protecting the nation from terrorism at home. Six months into his tenure as the first White House chief of homeland security, Tom Ridge is crafting a national strategy that will establish a protocol for federal, state and local agencies to prepare for and respond to terrorist attacks. The strategy will be a multi-year blueprint for organizing, equipping, staffing and funding the myriad organizations across government—from the CIA to county health departments—that contribute to domestic security. It will fall to Ridge to make sure the country gets $38 billion worth of security out of the president's 2003 budget. Given the challenges, even in areas where there is widespread consensus, it will not be easy.

Petterson, Jeanine. "A Review of the Literature and Programs on Local Recovery from Disaster," ***Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center, Institute of Behavior Science, University of Colorado,*** **December 1999. 62 pages. Available from http://64.233.179.104/scholar?hl=en&lr=&q=cache:jQm6OL2MSjcJ:www.wildfirelessons.net/Library/RiskMgt/LitReviewLocalRecovery.pdf.**
This dated article contains information about disaster recovery programs as well as mitigation and prevention strategies. Drawing on a handful of case studies from various programs across the nation, much of the data therein is no longer relevant because of the bureaucratic changes that have been instituted since September 11. For example, the author pivots her presentation around concepts that contribute to lessons deemed "important to the potential development of a community recovery assistance team (CRAT) program." The bulk of the article is interesting, at least from a historical point of view, and contains some of the best known work done to date (from the 1970s through the 1990s). The article also contains a 3 page bibliography that may be of some use.
Furthermore, some fundamental (and perhaps, at the time, arcane) literature is reviewed in the article that informs our current understanding of disaster mitigation and recovery. In example, Petterson references the discussion of the interrelation of "the different phases of emergency management, including preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation in Role and Britton (1995). She mentions pioneers of the field that have "discovered" fluid, dynamic stages of recovery (Berke and Beatley, 1997; Berke et al., 1993; Rubin, 1995) rather than the straightforward linear process espoused by Haas (1977) and others (Mileti, 1999).

Other literature that Petterson draws upon are not time-bound, such as the view that "virtually every study on community recovery emphasizes the value of planning for these events ahead of time. Local officials that have faced disasters emphasize that recovery planning should be an ongoing, organization-wide process that has the full support and involvement of top officials" (Wilson, 1991). This adage seems as relevant today as it was over 20 years ago, regardless of whether the disaster was man-made or a naturally occurring event. *Taking the time to properly plan and prepare (Eadie, 1991) helps prevent the impulse that many emergency managers might have to "start over" in their well-intentioned effort to get it "right" the next time around (Spangle, 1991).* The article also heavily references reports from the National Academy of Sciences (1990) and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (1997), both of which address response issues relevant to local communities following natural disasters like earthquakes and hurricanes.

RAND. "What Have We Learned About Establishing Internal Security in Nation-Building?," ***RAND Research Brief*****, 2005. http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9135/index1.html**
Comparing nine nation-building efforts in terms of how successful they were at establishing internal security, we found that, with two exceptions, most efforts were either unsuccessful or mixed. These findings were driven by differences in initial conditions in each country, as well by the inputs (e.g., the amount of financial assistance provided) and outputs (e.g., training). Based on these findings, we highlight six overall lessons learned that can help

policymakers in current and future nation-building efforts. This research brief from RAND highlights six (6) cross-cutting lessons from the nine case studies on nation-building (in the following countries: Panama, El Salvador, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, East Timor, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq): 1) Give as much attention to planning post-conflict internal security as to planning combat operations, 2) Negotiate a peace treaty or formal surrender. 3) Fill the security gap quickly with U.S. (and allied) military and constabulary forces, 4) Develop a comprehensive doctrine for post-conflict internal security reconstruction, 5) Build mechanisms to ensure faster mobilization of personnel, funds, and equipment and, finally, 6) Focus on outcome measures to shape programs. The report highlights three "key implications" based on these six lessons: 1) the establishment of security is essential immediately following the end of major combat operations (the perennial point of view is echoed throughout the literature reviewed, especially in military circles); 2) the creation of a secure environment entails not only incorporation of local police units, "but also ensuring a functioning justice system" and, finally, 3) "the case study analysis indicates some very rough guidelines for success. In the more successful cases examined, *international troop and police levels* were at least 1,000 soldiers and 150 police per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively; after five years, domestic police levels were more than 200 police per 100,000 inhabitants; *total financial assistance* was at least $250 per capita for the first two years of reconstruction; and the *duration of security assistance* lasted at least five years."

Redd, Steven B. "The Influence of Advisers and Decision Strategies on Foreign Policy Choices: President Clinton's Decision to use Force in Kosovo." *International Studies Perspectives* 6, no. 1 (2005): 129-150.
In the following paper, Steven Redd analyzes the influence of advisers and domestic political factors on President Clinton's decision to use force against Slobodan Milosevic and the Serbs in Kosovo in March 1999. He presents an analysis and examination of President Clinton's decision-making process, using press reports, personal speeches, etc, attempting to trace the process by which Clinton came to the decision to use force in Yugoslavia. Specifically, using the poliheuristic theory, Redd argues that President Clinton's decision was influenced by noncompensatory domestic political calculations and the strong influence of his Secretary of State, Madeleine K. Albright. Examining how advisers interact with one another, their status in the advisory group, and the manner in which presidents solicit information from advisers will further our understanding of how, when, and under what conditions national security-level decision makers make decisions.

Relyea, Harold C. "Organizing for Homeland Security," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 33:3 (September 2003) 602.
For much of the twentieth century, *Congress and the president were rivals for determining the organization of the executive branch*. According to Harold Relyea, the events of September 11, 2001 did not end that contest. The president sought to be the architect of new arrangements for protecting and maintaining homeland security, a nebulous term seeking to be a policy concept. Initial institutions created to exert leadership and coordination on behalf of the president were the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council, simultaneously established by an executive order. Several months later, the president called for a new administrative organization, and steadfastly pursued the mandating of a Department of Homeland Security, composed of existing entities of his choosing and vested with managerial flexibilities he considered to be essential. Ultimately, he largely obtained what he wanted in the legislation mandating the department.

Rhem, Kathleen. "Increased Interagency Cooperation Vital in Global War on Terrorism," *American Forces Press Service News Articles*, April 5, 2006 http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=15550
"Improving cooperation and coordination among government agencies is vital to winning the global war on terrorism and ending circumstances that drive people to terrorism," says one DOD official quoted in this American Forces Press Service news article. The article then references the latest quadrennial defense review report that describes the current operational environment—the current threat of terrorism, which is a dispersed network of linked cells, requires a dramatic shift away from the Cold war mentality. "Critical issues outside the traditional military realm—for example, stopped the spread of religious fundamentalism and improving economic conditions—make interagency cooperation even more vital." Rhem then quotes Thomas O'Connell, the Department of Defense's assistant secretary for special operations and low-intensity conflict, who, during prepared remarks before the House Armed Services Committee last year, said: "The interagency process we have today can work well under crisis. But even with all our efforts, the (war on terrorism) presents coordination challenges not previously faced by the

(National Security Council)." Chief among the problems he cited as impeding adequate levels of cooperation is an insufficient civilian response/surge capability: "US servicemen and women need their civilian colleagues."

Roman, Peter, *Can Goldwater-Nichols Reforms for the Interagency Succeed?* The Henry L. Stimson Center (2007). Available from http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=431.
In this concise backgrounder on interagency reforms, Peter Roman, director of the Domestic Preparedness Program and a senior associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center, argues that the current system of interagency cooperation and coordination is fundamentally and terminally broken. "The inability of departments and agencies to implement national security policies in a coordinated and integrated manner," he writes, "has been cited across a wide range of incidents and policy areas, from the September 11 attacks to post-invasion Iraq, and countless others." Roman notes that several policy experts—most notably, former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Peter Pace—and numerous defense panels—including the 9/11 Commission and the Iraq Study Group—have suggested interagency reforms using the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (alternatively given the eponymous title Goldwater-Nichols) as a model for potential legislation. *Roman, however, demurs at the suggestion, asserting that Goldwater-Nichols was first and foremost a solution to an intradepartmental—one that likely would be incapable of resolving the infinitely more complex issues of interagency cooperation and coordination.* While he applauds proposed initiatives to promote professional development programs that force interagency interaction and "establishing interagency task forces, interagency professional educational programs, and requiring interagency assignments prior [to] promotion to senior ranks, among other proposals," he argues that none of these initiatives address larger, systemic problems precluding functional interagency interoperability. *"Who owns the interagency?" he asks—Roman also implicitly raises a whole host of questions: what agency will be responsible for coordinating interagency operations? A new one or existing one? Will one person, a panel, a large organization administer interagency operation? How will the legal authority be established? How will this be reconciled with the existing organizational structure and chain of command? None of these questions have been addressed by existing proposals, he contends, and must be grappled with before any sensible policy can be crafted.*

Sander, Alfred D. "Truman and the National Security Council, 1945-1947," *Journal of American History* (September 1972) 369-388.
Alfred Sander chronicles the negotiations that took place during the Truman administration to create the National Security Council. Truman had originally favored the unification of the armed services under a single department. Fearing that the whole idea would fail because of objections by supports of the Navy, comprises were struck. Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall, concerned about the peacetime competition amongst the armed services for appropriations, proposed the idea of a single department for the armed services. Marshall assumed that Congress and the American public would support the army's proposals. James Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy, suggested instead interdepartmental committees as a substitute for departmental unification. The National Security Council would consist of the secretaries of state, war, navy, and air and would be presided over by the President.
Truman originally recommended that there should be a single department of national defense, and a single chief of staff; he had clearly chosen the army plan over that of the navy. There was no mention of a national security council or a national security resources board. The Thomas Bill (S. 2044) provided a "Council for Common Defense" that only included the secretary of state, a secretary of common defense, and the chairman of the national security resources board. Still facing opposition from the Naval side since there was still a single overall secretary, Truman, in his second unification plan to Congress, compromised with the Navy side and added the service secretaries to the council's membership. The National Security Act provided a National Security Council comprised of the secretary of state, the secretary of national defense, the secretary of the army, the secretary of the navy, the secretary of the air force, and the chairman of the national security resources board. The council became just "advisory to the President" because of the budget bureau's fear that the bill would ensure foreign policy would fall under the domination of the military. The Senate prescribed that the President become a member of the Council during its passing through Congress. After the National Security Act had passed and the National Security Council had been founded by law, more of the procedural details were worked out through Presidential memorandums. The purpose of the Council was solely to advise the President on matters of national security; the Council would be considered as a cabinet-level group, but not as one replacing the cabinet; and the executive secretary should be the President's man rather than that of the Council. Of note, *Truman emphasized the advisory nature of the Council for the first three years since its creation in 1947. Thus, it was only after the Korean War started, that prompted him to seek greater assistance from the National Security Council.*

Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. "Effective National Security Advising: A Most Dubious Precedent." ***Political Science Quarterly*** **(2000) Fall: 347-351.**

Especially now that the world is entering the digital age, the traditional, vertical, top-down administrative structures of the Eisenhower presidency are all the more wrong according to Arthur Schlesinger. "The vertical arrangements of the past are being replaced by increasingly horizontal arrangements—which is the way that presidents like FDR and JRK operated instinctively." Dwight D. Eisenhower was a military man who was accustomed to the ways of the military (rigid, orderly, hierarchical structure). His system of detailed organization failed with respects to foreign policy. In contrast, "Kennedy, who accomplished more of note in foreign affairs…in a thousand days than the Eisenhower model produced in two-thousand nine-hundred and twenty days." (348)

Two of the most distinguished members of the Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, which Eisenhower himself created, warned Eisenhower about the complete independence of the CIA and its operations. Eisenhower continued to ignore his own Board's warnings and recommendations. "All too often the Department of State knows little or nothing of what the Deputy Director of Plans (covert action) is doing. In some quarters this leads to situations which are almost unbelievable because the operations being carried out by the DD/P are sometimes in direct conflict with the normal operations carried out by the Department of State."

As proof, Schlesinger cites that the Bay of Pigs failure is the residue of the Eisenhower administration and not the result of independent actions by the Kennedy administration. Eisenhower recommended to Kennedy on the day before his inauguration that the plan for the Bay of Pigs should be continued at full speed ahead. And finally, Allen Dulles, then CIA director, warned JFK of a political explosion in the United States if a former naval lieutenant dared veto an operation organized and recommended by the supreme commander of the greatest amphibious landing in history (referring the Normandy Invasion during World War II).

Schlesinger claims that if we can learn anything from the past, it is that Eisenhower's national security machinery failed to bring planning and coherence into his conduct of foreign affairs. Therefore, we should learn from the successful policies of the FDR and JFK administrations and have the presidents act as, virtually, their own chiefs of staff.

Schnaubelt, Christopher M. "After the Fight: Interagency Operations." ***Parameters*** **35, no. 4 (2005-2006) Winter: 47-61.**

As an instance of a case study of the pitfalls and possible solutions of contemporary interagency cooperation this article is valuable for any study of interagency cooperation in general. The author analyzes the interagency relationship between the Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which were charged with cooperating to bring about the objectives set out for the post-major combat phase of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The two organizations failures to cooperate and the subsequent failure of stability operations exemplify, according to the author, why the Department of Defense (DOD) must make effective interagency cooperation their "highest priority." The article begins by dispelling the myth that the central cause of the failure to stabilize post-conflict Iraq was a lack of post-conflict planning. It was clear the author points out, from the three objectives that Paul Wolfowitz presented to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: 1) "Building capable Iraqi security forces; 2) "Nurturing Iraqi capacity for representative self-government"; 3) "Reconstruction of Iraqi infrastructure and restoration of essential services," that the DOD understood that stability required interagency cooperation. The failure was not in a lack of a plan but in a lack of a mechanism to implement the plan – enter the CPA and the CJTF-7.

The CPA and CJTF-7 were collocated and were meant to lead a civil/military effort to stabilize Iraq through a combination of military operations, security sector reform, political and economic reforms, and reconstruction efforts. The problems that made their cooperation problematic are highly valuable as examples of problems that could present themselves to any attempt at interagency cooperation. *The first and perhaps most important problem was a lack of clear authority and responsibilities for the military and civilian elements of the CJTF-7 and the CPA.* According to an April 29, 2004, Congressional Research Report, "the lack of an authoritative and unambiguous statement about how this organization was established, by whom, and under what authority leaves open many questions." Neither organization was clear on how their efforts were to be synchronized, how CENTCOM operational-level plans were to be translated into tactical level orders. When it came to military leaders, as one Senior CPA official explains, there could be great variance among commanders within the same brigade, some using

untraditional methods to achieve results other going about "business as usual." Although the author doesn't mention it directly this is an instance of the effect that an internal conflict can have on interagency cooperation. There is a conflict within the US military between those leaders who seek to adapt to a new security environment that requires the military to develop more nation building capabilities and those leaders who are of the opinion that the militaries main employment should still be preparation for major combat operations. As the author does point out directly, there is no other organization other than the US Army that can accomplish the kinds of nation building objectives that the US government requires. This intra-agency conflict is one specific example of how such conflicts can undermine effective interagency cooperation.

Establishing authority was further muddled by the fact that the CPA could interface directly with the National Security Council while the CJTF-7 had to go through CENTCOM, the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Regarding authority, it appears that the staffs involved where left to their own devices to determine which organization was in the lead. Where no authority was apparent the different organizations perceived it through their institutional prejudices. Many of those on the military staff of CJTF-7 thought that their superior officer was in charge, whereas among the civilian staff of the CPA Paul Bremer was seen as the leader. Both perceptions were understandable given the lack of a clear statement of authority, but the CPA perception was reinforced by the presence within their staff of a large number of Senior Executive Service personnel. Here lies another interagency lesson: The perception of the authority which staff members possess within their own organizations does not suddenly disappear when they are assigned to an interagency command center. If one wants organizations to appear equal within a cooperative decision center then there ought to be equal representation of higher level staff members in order to demonstrate equal authority and a common interest in the success of the interagency operations underway. The author provides a number of other examples of institutional prejudice hampering interagency cooperation.

Another way that a lack of clear authority effected operations was that it encouraged the members of the organization to resist policies that went against their judgment of the situation, especially if the policy is propagated by a group seen as invading the "turf" of the resisting organization. The example given by the author is the requirement by the Office of National Security Affairs, for quotas for security force recruitment. The militaries central role as trainers of the Iraqi security forces and the lack of clear authority for the policy of quotas caused military staff to resist the policies implementation.

One of the articles best examples of a problem encountered in interagency cooperation is his analysis of the difference between the decision processes of the CJTF-7 and the CPA. The CJTF-7 employed the detailed and formal US Army Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) whereas the mostly civilian CPA used far less formal process that was often less ponderous than the US Army's. As a way of resolving the interagency puzzle at the operational level in a post-conflict environment, the author recommends that the current Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) attached to each geographical combatant command need to be given more authority and more attention. In addition, an education for civilian and military leaders that emphasizes the necessity and mechanisms of their cooperation is required. In this, the author contends, DOD should take the lead. Successful examples of interagency operational mechanisms include the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and the Embassy Interagency Planning Group (EIPG) established by the Combined Forces Command Afghanistan. In conclusion, using the armed services struggle towards "jointness," the author argues that most major institutional reforms require someone "at the top to push through reform."

Serafino, Nina, et al., Congressional Research Service "Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Capabilities: The State Department's Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization," *Congressional Research Service*, January 19, 2005. Available from http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-7335:1.
The purpose of this report is to introduce to the reader to the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (known as "S/CRS") created in 2004 by the 108th Congress. This office was created in response to the challenge to organize and "enhance U.S. government structures" to improve the effectiveness of post-conflict operations. S/CRS is comprised (as of January 2005) of 37 officials from State, USAID, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, Army Corps of Engineers, Joint Forces Command, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Treasury Department (http://www.state.gov/s/crs/c12937.htm).
According to this CRS Report, "The United States developed its contributions to the earliest international "peacekeeping" operations of the 1990s on an *ad hoc* basis, with little inter-agency planning and coordination, and

often with the U.S. military in the lead." The evolution-from-experience process of post-conflict operations led to the signing of PDD-56 in 1997 by President Clinton, which was never fully implemented. The motivation for enhanced post-conflict operations today is fuelled largely by the insurgency in Iraq where it is clear that the U.S. military is encountering difficulty of simultaneous engagement in providing both security and resources for reconstruction. Therefore, this conflict has "reinvigorated calls for planning and coordination reform."
The CRS Report mentions a number of studies commissioned after September 11 and identifies five key points that roughly summarize their collective findings: 1) *the ad hoc system of interagency response needs to be replaced with a permanent mechanism for joint civil-military operations*; 2) methods to rapidly deploy civilian and military personnel need to be devised and implemented; 3) preventive action should be considered (and prioritized); 4) enhance multinational capabilities to carry out mission and better coordinate international aid, and, finally; 5) flexible funding arrangements are needed (the Report notes that multilateral funding options are preferred over unilateral and bilateral arrangements because it helps to instill confidence in the recipient nation that there is an absence of bias or an agenda on the part of the benefactor).

The S/CRS has a number of mission-critical responsibilities; 1) monitor relevant resources and capabilities of all organizations, government and otherwise, that are available to respond to post-conflict operations; 2) determine appropriate non-military response; 3) plan that response; 4) coordinate the development of interagency contingency plans for that response and, finally; 5) coordinate training of civilians to perform stabilization and reconstruction (S&R). Since the CRS Report is outdated, it is hard to estimate the current activities and successes of S/CRS; however the Report notes that, regardless of what actions are proposed, "Congress would have to approve any major restructuring of U.S. government agencies, as well as any possible authorities necessary to carry out new or reorganized functions." The major question left unanswered, therefore, is what government agencies should be restructured and to what extent (namely, in this case the Department of State but also, as should be obvious, the National Security Council).

Souers, Sidney W. "Policy Formulation for National Security." American Political Science Review (1949) June: 534-543.
Sidney Souers, as the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, which was created in 1947 by the National Security Act, explains the process of policy formulation in the Council. His analysis of the Council is of the first two years and basically just outlines what the Council is and what purpose it is to serve. The Council's function is "to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security." The Council advises and the respective departments carry out the responsibility to implement the policies approved of by the President, by the authority delegated to them by the President. The Council's small staff, headed by the executive secretary, is organized into three groups: staff members, secretariat, and consultants. The different departments represented on the Council details one of their best officers to serve as staff members. The secretariat is comprised of "small nucleus of career personnel…to supply continuity and to take the national or over-all point of view." The consultants are those that are designated by each Council member to advise and assist the executive secretary in the conduct of Council business. Council papers usually originate in the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State and are forwarded as working papers to the Council's staff. The staff meets to analyze the facts and reconcile differing opinions on the issue and the staff report is submitted to the consultants. The consultants, as the chief policy and operational planners, consider the report, amending it as desired, and the report is circulated to the Council members themselves and placed on the agenda for the next Council meeting. At the Council meeting, the members discuss and act on the report on the basis of briefs prepared by their respective staff aides. On the basis of the Council's action, the executive secretary forwards the report to the President and the President approves or disapproves of the recommended course of action. If approved, the implementation is assigned to the coordinator, usually the Secretary of State since it deals with foreign affairs. The procedure may seem time-consuming, but when necessary the process is very speedy. Souers states, "the most efficient conduct of these affairs will not safeguard our national security unless all departments concerned are striving to achieve the same clearly defined and well understood objectives." If all the organizations work together with the same goal, our nation's security, the National Security Council, can prove one of the most valuable means to ensuring the protection of our national security and for safeguarding international peace.

Steiner, Barry H. "Policy Organization in American Security Affairs: An Assessment," *Public Administration Review* (July/August 1977) 357-367.

This article is about one the process of policy organization in national security decision making, which defines what national objectives are necessary, distinguished alternative uses of capabilities to attain them, decides among these alternatives, and then implements the actions decided upon. Steiner concludes that the five ways in which national security policy making affects American security interests have been unequally served, even through the creation of the new National Security Council. Regardless of the urgency, organizational politics will have a place in determining how the issues are dealt with. The Five Ways that National Security Policy Making affects American security interest: 1) it can enhance national authority and leadership providing a central mechanism for public definition and popular understanding of issues; 2) it can supply continuity in the making of decisions by adapting decisions in advance to several different and plausible environments; 3) it can be a means of realizing consensus on policy matters by responsible officials who may often approach issues in different ways; 4) it can supply administrative guidance and direction to specific national efforts in the security field; 5) it can encourage thorough debate about alternatives prior to the making of decisions.

Steiner claims the the National Security Council has failed because: 1) Instead of bringing general agreement on ways to manage that conflict, paradoxically stimulated organizational differences on how to act; 2) The idea that more unified policy leadership would contribute to greater national unity of will was compromised by the fact that unity at the highest governmental levels was mainly in form, not in fact; 3) there was a lack of adequate policy guidance to national security organizations, including the military establishment and the intelligence agencies; 4) *The NSC failed to encourage dissent to prevailing policy assumptions.* NSC leadership had a much stronger interest to show how these initiatives were consistent with policy already decided-upon than to argue for a chance in policy; 5) There was s tendency of NSC policy papers to refrain from discussing how policy objectives would be supported by material resources.

Although the struggle for political attention, the protection of organizational vested interests, and the competition for effective operating authority will continue to affect what the U.S. does in national security affairs, organizational politics should not serve to give the president unlimited power, but neither should policy organization satisfy every national security need. There must be a compromised balance between these two extreme positions. The organizations must be given the adequate authority to fulfill the purposes for which they were originally created for.

Stratman, Henry W. "Orchestrating Instruments of Power for Nationbuilding," *Joint Force Quarterly* 41 (April 2006) 32-37.
Maj. Gen. Stratman provides a compelling case study of interagency planning and cooperation in the war on terror by examining critically the June 2004 creation and integration of the U.S. Embassy Baghdad and the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I). With the dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority and Combined Joint Task Force-7, it fell to these two bodies to build a stable and secure Iraq through coordinated, complimentary measures, not competition. Given the "philosophical and operational differences" between the two establishments, ensuring the political, economic, and social reconstruction of Iraq while also creating a safe, stable environment for such initiatives to take place was a significant challenge.

Before the US Embassy and the MNF-I took over in Iraq, an Interagency Transition Planning Team was set up to evaluate the lack of progress in country thus far make a framework for coordination between the Chief of Mission (John Negroponte) and the commander of the MNF-I (Gen. George Casey). Soon after the two leaders took over, they chartered an interagency strategy review to establish communication ties and jointly reevaluate the status of the insurgency in Iraq. With the less-than-positive results, the MNF-I staff was reorganized and two deputy chiefs of staff were appointed to achieve "greater integration and coordination of diplomatic and economic strategies" with the Embassy.

These preliminary efforts, taken before major new reconstruction projects were underway, helped ensure the later success of joint Embassy-MNF-I initiatives, including the 2005 Iraqi elections. According to Stratman, the high level of organization between *"two inherently disparate organizations is attributable to three key factors: the high-level commitment to teamwork [expressed by Negroponte and Casey], the establishment of forums for robust information exchange and planning, and the optimal organization and integration of large staffs." Great lengths were taken to synchronize both staffs through recurring meetings, routine briefings, and new forums to address priorities regarding reconstruction and the counterinsurgency effort.*

The author highlights three "key outcomes" that speak for the effectiveness of interagency cooperation in Iraq: the publication of a classified Joint Mission Statement that focused Embassy and MNF-I priorities and identified political, security, and economic tasks to be achieved, the publication of a follow-up Mission Statement after the 2005 elections to articulate the way forward and build the new Iraqi government's capacity, and a classified cable sent between DOS and DOD whose political and security objectives for Iraq aligned precisely with those of the interagency team in Iraq.

The Embassy and MNF-I also worked tirelessly with the new Iraqi government to help Iraqi leaders analyze issues, develop policy guidance, and promote management strategies to help the Iraqi government to "assimilate information and issues commensurate with their capacity to govern." Crucially important to the author is the recognition that no doctrine outlined steps necessary to achieve such an integrated and successful interagency relationship. Everything was "built from scratch" and redefined as the situation on the ground changed, and would have been impossible without a high commitment to teamwork and a shared vision for Iraq's future. The lessons learned from this experience should apply to future interagency endeavors.

Taylor, Robert W. "Managing Terrorist Incidents," *The Bureaucrat* 12:4 (Winter 1983/1984) 53.
The major elements of the U.S. government effort to combat terrorism are the Executive Committee on Terrorism, controlled by the Special Coordination Committee and the National Security Council, and the Working Group on Terrorism, made up of executive agencies responsible for coordination and control. A study of this effort indicates a somewhat chaotically limited policy response that takes a number of forms without common objectives and goals. There are 5 areas concerning the antiterrorism program's organizational design that have major shortcomings; they involve: 1) historically inconsistent policymaking; 2) a lack of effective organizational coordination and communication; 3) problems of definition; 4) the absence of a strategic police or military force that can deal rapidly with terrorist events; and 5) the failure of US legislators to adequately address the international ramifications of terrorist events. The US must develop organizational strategies that are capable of facing the demands required by the challenge of terrorists.

Thompson, Mitchell J. "Breaking the Proconsulate: A New Design for National Power," *Parameters* 35:4 (Winter 2005-2006) 62-75.
In this article, Thompson builds on the precedent of the pacification program established during the Vietnam War, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) to call for the restructuring of the military-heavy Combatant Commands as true, interagency organizations. Noting that the institution of the Combatant Command is inherently single-agency focused and incapable of self-transformation, Thompson recommends an organization based on the unified command structure and exemplified by CORDS. Ultimately, Thompson pushes for an interagency structure similar to that imposed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act (the JIACGs, Thompson claims, have not been effective). A transformation of institutional culture will be necessary, and the Combatant Commands themselves are intrinsically single-agency focused. Only civilian leadership, Thompson argues, will recreate these commands as interagency organizations capable of "harnessing and projecting America's 'soft' power."

Tucker, David. "The RMA and the Interagency: Knowledge and Speed Vs. Ignorance and Sloth?" *Parameters* 30:3 (Autumn 2000) 66.
"The RMA and the Interagency: Knowledge and Speed vs. Ignorance and Sloth?" defines and assesses the effectiveness of the interagency process using military opinion of the interagency as a springboard for discussion. Though acknowledging the problem of interagency friction, the author, David Tucker, contrasts historic and continued military criticism of the interagency process with interagency successes in Libya and Haiti, concluding that, "…the interagency process may not be as incompetent as the military believes." For Tucker, the successes and failures of interagency coordination demand that we establish a better understanding of the interagency process before attempting reform. The author's analysis characterizes the interagency process as "a network disguised as a hierarchy" with different decision modes and speeds as well as vertical and horizontal dimensions. *The interagency is strengthened by its dual nature since hierarchy is best for crisis-management mode while the interagency's network characteristics facilitate long-term planning.* While this analysis does not provide specific reform proposals it iterates a number of reform pitfalls and suggestions. According to Tucker, the strength of the interagency's dual nature must be maintained if not better exploited in any interagency reform. The author also argues that vertical integration, especially Washington's openness to field knowledge, should be heightened. The author argues that

interagency coordination will be unlike military jointness and cautions against the tendency, common in the military, to see interagency problems like inter-service problems. Tucker advocates structuring interagency groups on an individual basis by weighing the relative importance of speed, security and inclusiveness. The study recommends that the procedural and technological solutions often favored by the military will be most useful in permitting effective horizontal and vertical interagency operational dialogue but less useful in decision-making processes which rely on achieving consensus. The author is skeptical of corporate management ideas and encourages a decentralized experimental approach to improving the interagency where the development and implementation of a number of different solutions are permitted. Finally, *Tucker's analysis argues against massive structural reorganization along the lines of a new National Security Act and instead urges building on current flexibility by placing responsibility for reform with individual agencies while limiting the NSC to a coordinating role.*

Tussing, Bert B., and Kent H. Butts. "Annual Collins Center Senior Symposium: Aligning the Interagency Process for the War on Terrorism." ***Center for Strategic Leadership*** **11-05 (June 2005).**

This panel summary noted "A recurring theme among the panelists' discussion was that the National Command Authority's focus (and the NSC's as a reflection of the same) was 'too close in.'" One participant voiced particular concern over the current proclivity to "analyze from the top of the pinnacle," rather than depending upon the tiers of analytical development that should be utilized in executive decision making. Some members of the forum suggested that this malaise was due partially to the so-called "CNN effect" and partisan politics, which focused the Administration on defending its policies instead of "taking the longer view." Perhaps as a "trickle down" effect of this tendency, another member of the forum bemoaned the fact that top level executives were being "held hostage by two or three PCC's [Policy Coordination Committee meetings] a week" resulting in an inability of anyone in the National Security structure to "get out ahead of the game." Participants held that this inability *has resulted in the Nation's leadership becoming ensconced in "short-term, almost tactical-level" deliberations,* reacting to world events rather than pursuing a path of preemptive forecasting that would allow the government to identify challenges and threats early or even before they occur, and prevent crises before they happen. The members noted new initiatives, such as the Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, USAID'S Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, and the National Counterterrorism Center, all of which claimed some authority/responsibility for this kind of forecasting. At the same time, members were concerned that these efforts would be disjointed and fail to draw upon potential synergies. *One participant suggested that the new initiatives reflected an "unfortunate tendency to establish new organizations" to handle functions that should reside in the NSC. Another suggested that, on the contrary, these new centers "should actually feed the NSC."*

The symposium suggested that a more elemental problem in the interagency's handling of the war on terrorism, and indeed other evolving "complex contingencies," was the fact that we have made no real effort to reconstruct that process to address a remarkably transformed world environment. One panelist charged that we continue to apply a "Cold War model" to address both opportunities and threats for which it is no longer suited. This centralized, "stove-piped" construct is particularly burdensome in dealing with rapidly evolving regional issues.

One participant suggested that a focused and informed national policy will always be essential in the regions, but that it should be accompanied by an operational flexibility that will allow combatant commanders to respond quickly to issues as they develop. This observation highlighted the fact that there still exists no State Department counterpart to the Regional Combatant Commander. The forum suggested that executing proactive measures to address terrorism and/or its causes at a regional level will require artistry and the authority to overcome a diplomatic structure bounded solely by borders. *One suggestion for overcoming this Westphalian paralysis was to establish a "regional ombudsman."* This individual would be a Presidential appointee who would work closely with the regional bureaus, but would ultimately be responsible for crafting strategies that utilize the breadth of the interagency's capabilities to deal with terrorism, and the conditions that foster terrorism, within the regions. Working in concert with the theater's combatant commander, this official could devise means of implementing national strategies and develop measures of effectiveness to gauge success in achieving unique regional objectives.

Focusing more on the domestic front, members of the forum were concerned that the interagency was "still struggling over parsing out responsibilities for the war on terrorism." Panelists noted that from the domestic perspective, the war is far less about conventional military actions and more about criminal activities with political purpose, and suggested that the U.S. National Security architecture was not organized for this purpose. They noted pervasive ties between criminal activity and terrorism, ranging from narco-terrorism to money laundering and beyond, provide another aspect of a threat to our people both inside and out of the country. These activities, characterized by one member of the forum as "counter-stability criminal activities," are "networked, coordinated,

and organized," and will demand a new focus of all elements of national power through the interagency to defeat them."

U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, State Department Reform – Report of an Independent Task Force Cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Council on Foreign Relations: New York, NY, 2001.
Written to advise the incoming Bush administration, the report aims to input on the inadequate structure and poor execution characteristic of the Department of State. It is separated into two memorandums, one that addresses the president and the other that addresses the secretary of state. The main course of action calls for a "resources-for-reform" plan, which aims to rejuvenate the U.S. foreign policy apparatus by enacting fundamental reforms in order to receive the necessary resources from Congress to modernize and revitalize the foreign policy apparatus. In the memorandum to the president, there is a strong emphasis urging the President to issue a directive to designate the secretary of state as the "principal spokesman on foreign policy" and "declare reform of the Department of State to be a national security priority." The memorandum to the secretary of state delves into more detail regarding the task force's recommendations and provides the rationale for these reforms. The "resource-for-reform" plan of action recommends that the Department of State modernize its outdated communications and information management infrastructure, provide incentives to attract adept Foreign Service Officers especially in the its legislative affairs bureau, centralize its budget and management authorities, and transform its culture to promote public diplomacy over confidentiality. Other key proposals in the memorandum include the initiation of an integrated national security budget and designating the "national security adviser a coordinative role in policy development and oversight." The report concludes urging the administration to immediately implement its recommendations to establish a foundation for its partnership with Congress to strive towards similar endeavors.

U.S. Department of Defense. *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support.* Available from http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA435357.
Directed by the Strategic Planning Guidance (March 2004), this Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support focuses on achieving the Defense Department's paramount goal: securing the United States from direct attack. The Strategy is rooted in 1) respect for America's constitutional principles, 2) adherence to Presidential and Secretary of Defense guidance, 3) recognition of terrorist and state-based threats to the United States, and 4) commitment to continue transformation of U.S. military capabilities. This Strategy covers a 10-year time frame and requires an active, layered defense that seamlessly integrates U.S. capabilities in the forward regions of the world, the global commons of space and cyberspace, geographic approaches to U.S. territory, and within the United States. In order to be effective, this Strategy will require superior intelligence collection, fusion, and analysis; calculated deterrence of enemies; a layered system of mutually supporting defensive measures that are neither passive nor ad hoc; and the capability to mass and focus sufficient warfighting assets to defeat any attack. This active, layered defense employs tactical defenses in a strategic offense. It maximizes threat awareness and seizes the initiative from those who would harm us. The objective is to defeat potential challengers before they threaten the United States at home. Within the lead, support, and enable framework for homeland defense and civil support, DOD is focused on the following paramount objectives: 1) achieve maximum awareness of potential threats; 2) deter, intercept and defeat threats at a safe distance; 3) achieve mission assurance; 4) support civil authorities in minimizing the damage and recovering from domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) mass casualty attacks; and 5) improve national and international capabilities for homeland defense and homeland security.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security and Advisory Council (HSAC). 2007. *Report of the Future of Terrorism Task Force*
This report assesses future threats that the US will face in the next five years; fine-tunes departmental structures and processes to meet those threats; and offers recommendations on how to better prepare and engage the American public for present and future challenges. Generally, it believed that the threat and magnitude of terrorism directed against the US and her interests will increase in the coming years and the US must respond with a comprehensive, innovative, and flexible plan to combat the threat. Key Recommendations are to: Establish an Office of Net Assessment (ONA) within DHS whose function will be to analyze and predict the scope and nature of future terrorist threats; Adopt Quadrennial Security Review (QSR) to frequently reassess threats and define how and what is needed to meet those threats; Combine foreign and domestic intelligence into one National Intelligence Estimate; Direct the Radicalization and Engagement Working Group (REWG) to better understand the radicalization process; Enhance intellectual diversity within the counter-terrorist community; Communicate to and educate the public in a

more clear and precise manner; Further engage the Muslim community to enhance cooperation and mutual respect; Enhance information sharing and cooperation between local, state, federal, and international agencies; Develop program to address and combat prisoner radicalization; *Integrate DHS into the NSC.*

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Planning Scenarios," Draft Version 20.2, April 2005.
National Planning Scenarios offers fifteen high-impact emergency cases that can be used, either as planning guides or as bases for simulation exercises, by federal, state, and local authorities assessing capabilities and resources for responding to domestic emergencies. As the report explains, "These scenarios are designed to be the foundational structure for the development of national preparedness standards from which homeland security capabilities can be measured because they represent threats or hazards of national significance with high consequence." The report assumes that each attack scenario is perpetrated by the "Universal Adversary," which represents "foreign terrorists, domestic radical groups, state-sponsored adversaries, [and] in some cases, disgruntled employees."
Each scenario begins with a description of the particular threat as well as a detailed explanation of how the attack has been theoretically perpetrated. This overview is followed by an analysis entitled, "Planning considerations," which examines various conditions that will impact response decisions, including geographical factors, weather conditions, a timeline of events, casualties, or difficulties that may be expected in the aftermath of the attack, and a list of assumptions which have been made in developing the scenario. This analysis also provides information on the homeland security "missions" that would need to be carried out following the attack as well as recommendations on who or which entity could best carry out the mission and how the task should be accomplished. For most scenarios, the missions involve prevention/deterrence, infrastructure protection, preparedness, emergency assessment and diagnosis, emergency management/response, hazard mitigation, evacuation/shelter, victim care, and investigation/apprehension. Finally, the study undertakes an examination of long-term implications of each attack scenario, such as secondary hazards, fatalities/injuries, property damage, service disruption, economic impacts, and health issues.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Joint Field Office Activation and Operations: Interagency Integrated Standard Operating Procedure. Version 8.3 ed. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2006.
The Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) provides a strategy for coordination among federal departments and agencies in the event of actual or potential Incidents of National Significance by developing a "comprehensive national all-hazards process for activating, establishing, operating and demobilizing the Joint Field Office (JFO)." The JFO, a temporary federal establishment that serves as a multiagency coordination center and performs the traditional roles of the Joint Operations Center (JOC), the DHS/FEMA DFO, and the Joint Information Center (JIC), oversees prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery actions. The development of the JFO SOP is part of an effort to carry out Homeland Security President Directive-5 and implement a "new single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident management." The JFO SOP relies on principles detailed in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) such as information-sharing and resource allocation and combines best practices of a variety of incident management activities, including law enforcement investigation, intelligence, security, and response and recovery operations.

Key Concepts included in the JFO SOP: Guided by a senior leadership JFO Coordination Group, the JFO supports on-scene incident management activities by implementing a disaster response and recovery program and coordinating support that may extend beyond the incident site; The JFO structure is "flexible, scalable and adaptable to the size, scope, and requirements of the specific incident." This flexibility enables the facility to effectively respond to natural disasters, terrorist incidents, and National Special Security Events (NSSEs); The SOP addresses administrative, logistical, and management issues to allow effective implementation and operation of the JFO when responding to an incident that requires a coordinated federal response; The SOP discusses in detail the roles and responsibilities of federal, state, local, tribal, private-sector, and nongovernmental actors in incident management activities; SOP information on the concept of operations includes a JFO Coordination Cycle that facilitates information-sharing, resource allocation, and response and recovery oversight by "defin[ing] a sequential pattern of meetings, information exchange, planning, logistics, and finance/administration activities"; The SOP provides logistical guidance by addressing such issues as JFO personnel, funding, mapping/charting/geodesy, medical services, and administrative reporting.

U.S. Department of State, Overseas Presence Advisory Board. "Report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Panel on Overseas Security." Washington, D.C., 1985. Available from http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/inman/index.html.

The Counter-Terrorism Cooperation section of this report details the role that various federal agencies would play in the event of a terrorist attack. The Director of the Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning is responsible for coordinating the following responsibilities. The Department of State is the lead agency in handling terrorist incidents abroad involving United States interests. It participates in appropriate analysis and dissemination of intelligence; manages security programs for non-military U. S. Government facilities abroad; coordinates emergency planning and crisis management for United States missions abroad; and generally develops and implements policies to deal with international terrorism, including international conventions and bilateral agreements. The Department of Justice advises on legal aspects of dealing with terrorism and coordinates legislative proposals. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is the lead agency in handling most domestic terrorist incidents, including intelligence collection and investigation of criminal acts of terrorism. The Federal Aviation Administration is the lead agency in handling terrorist incidents involving aircraft in flight or under flight conditions and also coordinates with other governments in all matters relating to flight security. The FAA and the FBI have a memorandum of understanding to clarify possibly overlapping responsibilities and to foster close cooperation. The Central Intelligence Agency represents the other agencies in the Intelligence Community when they are not direct participants: manages systems for collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence relating to terrorist threats; maintains intelligence liaison with other governments; participates in incident management support teams as appropriate; and performs other functions. The Department of Defense performs substantial services in support of emergency planning for posts abroad and plays a lead role in executing such plans; provides expertise regarding terrorist weapons of all types, including nuclear and CBR; participates in collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence regarding terrorist plans and activities; provides special units that might be called upon to intervene in terrorist episodes abroad; and generally manages security programs for military facilities abroad. The Department of the Treasury has several bureaus involved in anti-terrorism. The Secret Service is responsible for, among other duties, protection of Heads of State or Heads of Government visiting the United States; the Bureau of Customs is involved in controlling international movements of weapons; and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms has legal responsibilities and expertise concerning illegal weapons and explosives.The Department of Energy has responsibilities and expertise regarding nuclear weapons.The National Security Council chairs the Terrorist Incident Working Group, which coordinates agency responses to specific terrorist incidents, including the use of military forces. The Office of the Vice President supports the Vice President in his role as chief crisis manager for the President.

U.S. General Accounting Office, *Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination.* Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000.

Virtually all the results that the federal government hopes to achieve require the coordinated effort of two or more agencies. This shared responsibility is the result of several factors, including the piece meal evolution of federal programs and the complexity of public needs. GAO's work has shown repeatedly that mission fragmentation and overlap are widespread in the government and that crosscutting program efforts are poorly coordinated. Without such coordination, scarce funds are wasted, program customers are confused and frustrated, and the over all effectiveness of federal programs is undermined. This report (1) provides an overview of programs in which GAO identified mission fragmentation and overlap in 1998 and 1999; (2) discusses barriers to interagency coordination cited in GAO reports issued during the past decade; and (3) summarizes potential strategies for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of crosscutting programs.

U.S. General Accounting Office, *Interagency Contracting: Problems with DOD's and Interior's Orders to Support Military Operations*. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2005.

This report from the GAO deals with interagency contracting problems, specifically a case wherein the Department of the Interior contracted on behalf of the Department of Defense and multiple procedural breakdowns ensued. Interagency contracts are often used as a way to expedite the often long and complicated procedure of awarding government contracts by placing task orders against established indefinite quantity contracts. In this instance, the DOD, facing an urgent need for interrogation, intelligence, and logistics services, turned to Interior who awarded a private firm, CACI, the contract on an existing GSA information technology contract. However, the GAO discovered evidences of multiple breakdowns in this process, including issuing orders that were beyond the scope of the underlying contract, not complying with additional DOD requirements when issuing task orders, not properly

justifying decision to use interagency contracting, inadequate monitoring of contractor performance, and allowing, or even encouraging, the contractor to play an inappropriate role in the procurement process. Several steps have been taken already by the DOD and Department of the Interior to remedy the situation. Interior has plans to evaluate its use of GSA contracts in FY2006 with a targeted performance review, has clarified for its contracting activities the requirements for competition when ordering on behalf of DOD and its legal review policy, has updated COR requirements and provided new guidance for BPA and GSA contracts. The DOD has instituted new procedures for reviewing and approving interagency contracts that address many of the problems exposed in the GAO's report, including verifying the appropriateness of the scope of the underlying contract and ensuring that DOD-unique requirements and regulations are fulfilled. The GAO has further recommended that Interior ensures management reviews of contracting offices emphasize adequate training for officials, ensure that incentives to exercise due diligence and compliance with all rules and regulations are present in performance measures, and verifying that CORs are properly designated or orders are issued to other agencies with proper training when contracts are awarded. The GAO further recommends for DOD that it develop a mechanism to track the implementation of its new policies that established procedures for reviewing and approving the use of non-DOD contracts, confirming that military services and agencies have ample opportunity to share information on how they are implementing these new policies.

U.S. General Accounting Office, "Building Security: Interagency Security Committee Has Had Limited Success in Fulfilling Its Responsibilities", ***Report to Congressional Requesters,*** **Sept, 2002.**
This report by the US General Accounting Office seeks to outline the successes and failures of the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) since its inception as a result of Executive Order 12977 in October 1995 following the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah federal builing. In its anaysis of the history and reasons for the failures of the ISC the report provides some key insights into the interagency process and the hurdles that it can encounter.
The chair of the ISC was the General Services Administration. The central responsibility of the ISC was to bring together in an interagency setting the disparate agencies that occupy the numerous federal buildings in the US and security experts in order to enhance their security through the formulation and oversight of implementation of federal building security policy and standards.

Among the members of the ISC that the reporters consulted the most common positive comment was that the ISC provided a venue in which many different agencies could discuss security issues of general concern. However, as the report points out and as most of the members involved with the ISC recognized the committee failed to achieve many of its most important goals. The first major reason for the ISC's failures was reported as lack of "consistent and aggressive" leadership by the GSA. To give only one example, it was widely recognized that it was necessary for the ISC to promulgate criteria for building construction in order to enhance federal building security, but although the criteria were established and the ISC approved of them the GSA was very slow in publishing the criteria. The GSA official questioned said that it was feared within the GSA that the publishing of the requirements would undermine the ability of the GSA to purchase and lease property. The interests of the lead agency were threatened by the ISCs work and the lead agency chose self-interest over the interagency goals. The ISC was also hindered by the fact that they did not have an independent source of funds and thus participating agencies were required, for example, to pay for the time their experts spent in meetings and consultation with the ISC. Limited agency budgets, especially of the smaller agencies involved, were less and less likely to be spent on ISC time, especially considering the manifestly ineffective operation of the committee. The main drain on the committee's effectiveness was its inability to make decisions, indeed, their inability to decide on how decisions should be made. It would be through the decision process that the power of the different agencies would be decided and there was some concern over the role of the smaller agencies in relation to the larger ones. Also the ISC was hindered by the fact that it did not have any authority over the security arrangements of federal buildings not controlled by the GSA, the Department of Homeland Security still under consideration at the time, appeared to be empowered with such authority and, according to the reporters, would be more effective as a result. In addition the failure of the committee was manifested in the fact that of the thirteen working groups that the ISC established through its history eleven of them were inactive as of July 2002. Furthermore, many of the agencies originally involved in the ISC were unable to comment for the report discussed here as they had not been present at ISC meeting for a number of years. These pour attendance numbers were probably a result of the failures discussed above and are a good example of how an interagency process can die with a whimper rather than a bang.

According to the report, as a result of the attacks of 9/11 the GSA stated that it was heading a revitalization of the ISC. The following meetings were well attended and that failures and necessary steps towards success were acknowledged by the majority in attendance. *Clearly this is an example of how political catalysts can motivate agencies to work cooperatively. Regarding agencies concerned with federal building security the attacks on the World Trade Center was a wake up call to a new and more dangerous threat environment. The event may have served to drive the agencies into one another's arms in search of ways to deal with new surroundings.*

U.S. General Accounting Office. "National Preparedness: Technology and Information Sharing Challenges," GAO-02-1048R, *GAO Reports* (August 30, 2002).
This report responds to specific questions related to GAO's testimony. Specifically, this report discusses(1) what incentives could be used by agency managers to encourage more effective cooperation and coordination of information pertaining to homeland security; (2) what legal or regulatory barriers exist that hinder effective electronic communication among federal agencies, with state and local government organization and the private sector; (3) what steps could be taken to protect information in shared databases while allowing full use in homeland security context; (4) how challenges to leveraging the United States' strengths can be met and if there are models in the military or elsewhere that may be of assistance; (5) GAO's opinion of the progress being made by government on the challenges to developing and implementing a national preparedness strategy for homeland security; (6) why Extensible Markup Language is useful for better information sharing; and (7) if agencies are currently implementing any customer relationship management technologies.

U.S. General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Address the Overseas Threat," *Report to Congressional Requesters*, May 2003
This GAO publication is a helpful starting point in the study of interagency cooperation in the current US Administration. However, the report provides no recommendations and no criticisms of the current National Security system as it states that time will tell as to effectiveness and it is as yet too early. The report provides the broad outlines of the framework that has been put in place to facilitate the global war on terrorism. The main documents guiding policy related to the war on terrorism are the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, National Strategy for Homeland Security, and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. The National Security Council is responsible for coordinating the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSSUAS). In order to more effectively fulfill the counterterrorism aspect of this strategy the NSC established the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) in order to coordinate policy among different agencies and departments. This group has further working groups which deal with specific interagency issues: coordinating interagency exercises for example. The CSG is chaired by the Director for Combating Terrorism, established by National Security Presidential Directive 8 (NSPD-8). The Director is located within the NSC and reports to the National Security Advisor. Besides NSPD-8 the report also notes Executive Order 13228, which established the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security who heads the new Department of Homeland Security. In addition to these the report also mentions Executive Order 13286, which sets out the policy for protecting critical infrastructure and mitigating the results of an attack on that infrastructure. These three orders the report considers to be the major counterterrorism orders which relate to interagency cooperation. The report also explains that there are a number of National Strategies and that they are arranged in a hierarchical order with the NSSUSA at the top and the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* and the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* below it. Other strategies relating to terrorism provide more specific guidance to particular aspect of the fight against terrorism, like money laundering and cyber security. At the ground level interagency teams meet at US embassies around the world to coordinate bilateral efforts to fight terrorism. In addition, "regional military commands have interagency coordinating groups that coordinate military operations with non-military tools".

All those strategies with elements relating to terrorism are listed with a short summary on Table 2 of the report. As it provides no recommendations regarding the new interagency framework there is little insight provided into the interagency process by the report. Though again it is useful as a starting point as it defines the roles of the different government agencies in both coordinating and carrying out policies related to countering terrorism.

U.S. General Accounting Office, *Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short-and Long-Term National Needs.* Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2001.
According to U.S. intelligence assessments, the United States now confronts a range of diffuse threats that put increased destructive power into the hands of small states, groups, and individuals and threaten our values and way

of life. These threats range from incidents of terrorism and attacks on critical infrastructure to cyber attacks, the potential use of weapons of mass destruction, and the spread of infectious diseases. A framework to address these challenges will require leadership with to develop and implement a homeland security strategy in coordination with all relevant partners, as well as the ability to marshal and direct the necessary resources. The recent establishment of the Office of Homeland Security is a good first step, but a series of questions must be addressed regarding how this office will be structured, what authority its Director will have, and how this effort can be institutionalized and sustained over time. While homeland security is an urgent and vital national priority, the U.S. should recognize the range of challenges facing our government in other areas not as visible or urgent. As the country responds to these urgent priorities of today and the enduring long-term requirements related to homeland security, the nation still must address short-term and long-term fiscal challenges that were present before September 11, 2001, and that remain today.

U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy: *Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005. Available from http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05323.pdf.
Summary and Key Focus Area: This report examines the coordination of public diplomacy efforts attempting to establish and uphold positive public opinion of the United States in communities abroad. Committees and organizations in the White House, the State Department, the Department of Defense, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) and USAID are included in the analysis. The authors additionally comment on the degree to which the State Department has been able to coordinate with the private sector to engage in public diplomacy endeavors. Key Recommendations are: Take an active approach towards promoting pro-American sentiment and clarifying foreign policy decisions in other nations by creating a national communication strategy (4). This change in communication processes should be placed at a high priority, for it directly impacts national security (11); Revitalize the position of Director of the Office of Global Communications to fit the President's description found in the executive order that created the position (4). This requires that a national communication strategy be developed, for at the moment, individual organizations are following their own strategies and creating ineffective results (23); Require the Office of Global Communications to play an integrative role in the work toward improving public diplomacy, coordinating the DOD, BBG, USAID, and State Department in order to ensure efficient and substantial results (4); Encourage the President to provide direction to the OGC in order to create a unified approach (5); Instruct the BBG to incorporate programming suggestions from other organizations (such as the DOD, State, and USAID) in their broadcasts (10); Ensure that sufficient resources and support are allocated to public diplomacy (14); Acquire needed resources by encouraging cooperation between the State Department and the private sector. A strategy must be developed and aggressively pursued in order to accomplish this integration (21).
In summary, growing anti-American sentiment is becoming a considerable threat to national security and it is important to create a unified, national organization that leads public diplomacy efforts. However, as the report illustrates with its numerous examples, organizations that have attempted to address this threat in the past have failed to get their initiatives off the ground. Insufficient resources and attention, as well as the difficulties of bureaucracy, are likely to hamper the success of the OGC as they have for each preceding organization.

U.S. Government Accountability Office. "Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season," *GAO Report,* GAO-06-712, June 2006. Available from http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06712.pdf. 39 pages.
This report contains information about coordination problems encountered by the Red Cross and FEMA during the 2005 Hurricane season (includes Katrina and Rita). The level attention given to these problems stems from the fact that these organizations are required to work together according to the 2004 National Response Plan (NRP). Lack of understanding, comfort, and agreement about their proper management roles and communication standards led to disagreement and "strained working relationships and hampered their efforts to coordinate relief services for hurricane victims."

In conclusion, this report emphasizes the need for improved working relationships and clarifications about the roles that each organization need to play before a major disaster strikes again lest mistakes from the past be doomed to repetition. This level of communication and coordination can only come through direct engagement, in part, enabled by proper oversight from the Office of the Inspector General at the Department of Homeland Security.
The report includes other recommendations paraphrased below: 1) FEMA should work with the Red Cross as soon as possible to "reach agreement on operating procedures that they will both use in the event of an incident of

national significance", 2) mediation to reach this agreement may be required (as evidenced by lack of progress toward this end), 3) the Red Cross should adopt ESF-6 staff rotations, primarily using permanent personnel to retain institutional knowledge and, finally, 4) FEMA should consult the Red Cross for input into the resource tracking system designed by FEMA to meet the needs of those requesting FEMA assistance.

U.S. Government Accountability Office. "Interagency Contracting: Improved Guidance, Planning, and Oversight Would Enable the Department of Homeland Security to Address Risks."
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is quickly becoming one of the foremost departments in extensive acquisitions, especially interagency contracting, spending $17.5 billion in FY2005. Interagency contracts allow for quicker and more convenient acquisitions than establishing a new and competitive contact, however due to the rather intricate and problematic system, the GAO has labeled interagency contracting as a "government-wide high-risk area." This report, an independent review of DHS interagency contracting, evaluated 17 cases totaling $245 million and found several faults with DHS procedures including lack of guidance on all types of interagency contracts, lack of specific criteria to help determine what type of contract is needed, and lack of effective oversight. The first GAO recommendation is the establishment of consistent, comprehensive guidance for all types of acquisitions, including interagency contracts through GSA schedules and government-wide acquisition contracts (GWACs). Second, DHS should establish specific criteria that can be used by acquisition officers to determine, and then justify, which type of contract is needed for each particular order. Third, the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer has the outlines of a department-wide acquisition oversight program, yet lacks both the resources and enforcement authority to implement it and ensure compliance.

Ullman, Harlan. "A New Goldwater-Nichols Bill - Part One." ***U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*** **(May 2007).**
Ullman outlines the military culture and failures that led to the development of the Goldwater-Nichols act, and then compares this situation to the present condition of inter-agency cooperation. More specific recommendations are promised in part II which should appear soon.

Villanueva, A. B. "Downsizing Bureaucracy: A Caveat Emptor," ***Journal of Social, Political & Economic Studies*** **22:3 (Fall 1997) 335-344.**
Downsizing is used as a way to make government work better and cost less. There are many options in the actual way to downsizing—cutting across the board, attrition reduction or reduction in force. The downsizing being used is buyout. This has been mainly targeted to middle management. This group has the most expertise and experience. Additionally, they aren't politically motivated. It might be more beneficial to cut those who are politically motivated, those of high level positions, or those with little experience, lower level positions. However, this isn't what happened in bureaucracy. While this alternative is good for keeping individuals happy in and outside bureaucracy, it's potentially hurting government efficiency.

Warner, Michael and J. Kenneth McDonald, ***U.S. Intelligence Community Reform Studies Since 1947*****, (April 2005).**
The main purpose of this report was to review 14 major intelligence reforms since the end of World War II. Only the Dulles Report (1949), the Schlesinger Report (1971), the Church Committee Report (1976), and the 9/11 Commission Report (2004) were able to achieve significant success in the changes they proposed (p 4).
Both the process and substance of each report are key to the ultimate success. The process is it's political sponsorship, who and when is supporting the report is important. If those supporting it are part of the National Security Community / the White House or Congress or become DCI usually have larger impacts. Additionally, if the report is drafted during an election year or before / during a war also seem to garner more attention and lead to change. Obviously, if the actual report is also written clearly and thoroughly analyzed, it has a larger impact as well. The substance also influences how influential the report is. *Recommendations that have called for power to be directed toward the Director of Central Intelligence or the Office of the Secretary of Defense have had more influence.* Generally, the reports and commissions on intelligence emphasized: 1) the need for intelligence during periods of peace; 2) responsiveness by the IC to Congress and the President; 3) and having one individual responsible for the coordination of intelligence efforts in all areas—military, civilian, foreign, domestic, analysis and operations.

Waterman, Shaun. "Embassies In 'Turf Wars'?" ***Washington Times*** **(January 17, 2007) 12.**
The presence of military personnel in U.S. embassies around the world is causing problems with some host

countries, according to a recent report. *The State Department and Defense Department should coordinate the role of military personnel in the embassies to avoid turf wars.*

Walsh, Mark R. and Michael J. Harwood, "Complex Emergencies: Under New Management," *Parameters* 28:4 (Winter 1998) 39-50.
This article sets out to explain the development and structure of Presidential Decision Directive 56. The directive was promulgated by the Clinton White House in 1997 and its goal was "to define a specific US national governmental policy planning process--one related to managing complex emergencies--to achieve unity of effort within and among the responsible federal agencies." The tragedy that was the US mission in Somalia in 1994 highlighted the weaknesses that existed in the US interagency aspects of the mission. The directive sought to do this through the establishment of a planning structure that was versatile enough to incorporate both the traditional participants, of State Department, Department of Defense and National Security Council, and the less traditional government and non governmental agencies.

The 'complex contingency operation' was described by the National Security Advisor as "crises, including some resulting from natural disasters, [that] require multi-dimensional responses composed of several components such as political, diplomatic, intelligence, humanitarian, economic, and security". The challenge was to make a planning and execution process that could deal with such a complex problem. As the highest interagency committee in the US government, the National Security Council's participation was therefore essential.

Should PDD-56 succeed US responses to complex emergencies would be less confused, mobilization would be faster, and planning would identify and help direct the tasks of different participating departments. In addition, "policy gaps and redundancies" could be identified sooner, planning with less traditional agencies could become more efficient, resource shortages could be perceived in advance. Finally, this preparation would allow for the swift development of a national strategy that could direct operational and lower level planning.

The main process that PDD-56 tries to propagate throughout the whole interagency community is the Political-Military Implementation Plan. *This planning process seeks to bring together all the relevant participants and to form a comprehensive assessment of the crisis before any action is taken. This is a very important point as many interagency problems arise from different agencies defining the same crisis differently.* To paraphrase Clausewitz, never get into a crisis without first knowing what kind of crisis it is. "The plan includes assessments, mission, objectives, end-state, concept of operations and organization, preparatory tasks, functional tasks that broadly apply to crisis responses, mission specific tasks, and participating agencies' mission area plans." Prior to the implementation of the plan the participants rehearse the plan to refine their coordination.

The final important aspect of the PDD-56 is the fact that it requires interagency training. This is accomplished through annual interagency exercises where lessons learned from past complex contingency operations are discussed and simulations are ran to familiarize the participants with the political-military implementation plan process. Participants include the relevant departments and agencies and numerous educational institutions like the National Defense University and the National Foreign Affairs Training Center. The author notes that PDD-56 has great potential but requires the strong support of the interagency community and the NSC especially to retain a high place on the national security policy agenda. The US Army too, which will not doubt be involved in future complex contingency operations, should realize its vested interest in the success of PDD-56.

Webb, G. Gregg. "Intelligence Liaison between the FBI and State, 1940-44," *Studies in Intelligence* 49:3 (2005) 25-38.
Most intelligence reform point towards areas in which there has been mishaps and major disasters. However, situations in which interagency cooperation has worked should also be worked should also be analyzed as a way to reform intelligence. Between 1940 and 1944, the State Department and FBI were able to work together in a manner that was both efficient and cooperative. The relationship between the Bureau and Department of State had been tense due to the overlapping nature of both mandates in the domestic security world. The two disagreed on who had the authority and how to implement policies. However, this confusion in their relationship can't only be attributed to the two departments, the MID, ONI, the President and other high-ranking officials have had a hand in it at as well. In 1940, President Roosevelt issued a directive requiring the FBI to create the Special Intelligence Services. The caveat was that this group could only conduct foreign-intelligence tasks when the Department of State deemed so.

This forced the two agencies to work together. It was a combination of personalities and institutional aspects that led to the success of SIS. One reason the historically adversarial duo worked was that they were both involved with the development and implementation of the project. One example is "the assignment of SIS agents as "legal attaches" in US missions throughout Central and South America" (8). Another is the communication used by SIS was through the embassies. Another reason is the two men in charge – Hoover and Berle. One had the skills needed for Bureaucracy, the other a scholar. The knowledge of how things are done and what should be done worked well together. Berle was not interested in day-to-day management, unlike his predecessor Messersmith who was a nemesis of Hoover's. In return, Hoover kept Berle updated on SIS activities. Nevertheless, it would be naïve to imply that the relationship between the two was the only relationships helping the situations. The governments and embassies the two men worked with also helped shape intelligence. A third reason is that Hoover was fine with the other agencies taking over foreign-intelligence. He was firmly against blurring of authority and other agencies trying to take over domestic-intelligence. However, the cooperation at the top level didn't always trickle down to lower levels. Ambassadors, for example, were not always supportive of the missions. The anti-FBI forces helped shut down Hoover, but the result didn't lead to a stronger State Department. The power was shared with other agencies – Central Intelligence Group, MID and ONI.

Weinstein, Jeremy M., John Edward Porter and Stuart E. Eizenstat. *On the Brink: Weak States and US National Security,* (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, May 2004). 79 pages.
The authors of this book focus on the dangers posed by weak and failing states to American security interests and global economic growth more broadly. The "spillover effects" of governments in crises—where institutions lack the ability to act on behalf of the good of the population—affect entire regions and not just the people confined to the borders of the state(s) in question. Because a deficit in one state affects the welfare and stability of all states (particularly in the case of developing countries that possess significant resources and influence), focused attention and renewed engagement to build "accountable national institutions that can meet citizens' needs and take full part in the working of the international community" is considered in this book to be a "strategic imperative".
The authors contend that the United States must reduce "capability gaps" in weak states in three areas: 1) the ability to control territory; 2) meet basic needs of population; and 3) provide legitimacy through effective, transparent governance. There are several key recommendations that the authors believe, if adopted by the United States, would increase its ability to meet these challenges and increase global security. *One such idea is to create a "Cabinet-level agency that incorporates all aspects of development policy*" to highlight the strategic saliency of development to U.S. national security. The bottom line for the authors is to present a blueprint of how the United States can (at least partially) transfer the burden of responding to failed and weak states from the U.S. military to civilian institutions. The outcome of creating a Cabinet-level agency along with the proposed creation of a National Security Council directorate for weak and failed states will presumably allow the United States to "consolidate and reform its assistance programs", which the authors view as an investment in prevention. By organizing for success on the home-front at the highest levels, it is argued, the United States will send a strong signal to the international community that it is committed to addressing the problem at its core (by addressing the three aforementioned capability gaps).

Weldon, Curt, et al., "Improving Interagency Coordination in the Global War on Terrorism and Beyond," FDCH Congressional Testimony, Armed Services Committee (April 4, 2006).
Participants are counter-terrorism officials from the Department of State, Department of Defense, and the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC). Observations include: 1) Today's terrorist threat is multi-layered, both geographically and tactically; 2) Major shift in US interventions abroad: new mission of stability, security, transition and reconstruction—Iraq or Afghanistan for example; 3) Today's interagency coordination is not sufficient. Difficulties in policy-changing, but better practice on the field—reconstruction in Iraq or fight against drug trade in the Caribbean for example. Recommendations are: 1) Need for a coordinated response involving all US national powers—diplomacy, information, intelligence and covert action, economic power, military power, and the rule of law; 2) DOD should increasingly share its resources with other agencies (expertise, training, funds); 3) Need for more cooperation between civilian and military agencies. Good practice examples cited are: 1) Policy Coordination Committees (chaired by National Security Council staff); 2) NCTC: facilitated intelligence coordination, particularly between foreign and domestic intelligence agencies. Allowed better communication between White House and Departments; 3) Joint Interagency Task Force: efficient in the stabilization/reconstruction phase; 4) Interagency Country Teams (under the authority of US embassies) connected in a Regional Strategic Initiative (e.g. group with Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines).

Whittaker, Alan G., Frederick C. Smith, and Elizabeth McKune. *The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System*, Research Report (Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, U.S. Department of Defense, August 2005 Annual Update) Available from http://www.virginia.edu/cnsl/pdf/NSC-Report-2007.pdf.
In their efforts to expose the complex bureaucracies that are involved in the U.S. national security policy process and to unearth the interagency relationships therein, Whittaker et al largely succeed. This paper could be used, interchangeably, as a primer for new federal employees in the Departments of State or Defense, for students of national security policy, Congressional staff interested in reforming the 1947 National Security Act, or at any of the military academies and still succeed in educating the reader about how the national security policy process is structured and how it works.

While this annual report is ironically marked by redundancies of explanation and is wonkishly verbose, strong topic sentences and contextual—and, more importantly, contemporaneous—examples of interagency relations makes this report an important read for serious national security scholars.
This report delves into the National Security Council's organizational structure and policy process, specifically explaining the NSC membership, key departments and agencies and their relevance to the national security process. Within each section the authors provide a detailed explanation of the stated roles of each agency and agency officials and shed light on how this is actually done in practice. Appendices to this report serve to help the reader to visualize the hierarchy of each NSC department.

The depth of explanation and analysis the authors provide for each NSC member, Presidential advisor, NSC agency and of the role each actor plays in the policy process allow for poignant closing recommendations to find a way to streamline the national security process. *The authors believe deficiencies exist in: how the NSC actors define areas of responsibility, develop common doctrine, unify procedures, and enhance the efficacy and effectiveness of interagency operations. While the authors believe the national security process operates fairly manageably "because it involves a limited number of key players," who know how the system works and how to work with each other, they do not see the newly formed Homeland Security Council (HSC) as having a similarly simple interagency operation.*

Woolsey, James R. "Remarks at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies," Washington, D.C., January 30, 2006. Available from http://blueskybroadcast.com/client/sycoleman/eisenhower/docs/trans.pdf.
Woolsey's remarks focused on coming up with a strategy to deal with these current radical Islamic movements, which he believes has created demands on the intelligence community "that are extraordinarily different from those we had to face during the Cold War." During the Cold War, according to Woolsey, the US ran an intelligence system that fit this enemy and this strategy reasonably well. The CIA and the rest of American intelligence during the Cold War did really a rather good job on Soviet military capability, both strategic and tactical. But now, the threat is almost the opposite of that the Soviet Union posed, decentralized rather than large and bureaucratic. Woolsey asks "Is our solution reorganization? Have we mastered the situation by establishing a Director of National Intelligence, as recommended by the 9-11 Commission? Well, in my judgment, there was a need for close FBI/CIA cooperation; closer than has historically been the case. I think that probably could have been dealt with by a Deputy National Security Advisor to the President charged with that and only that very important and difficult job; but the 9-11 Commission's excellent narrative of what took place leading up to 9-11 resulted in a set of forty or so recommendations, some of which had something to do with that narrative, but several of which, I would submit, had nothing to do with it. And one was the need to establish a Director of National Intelligence in order to pull together what the NSA [National Security Agency], the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], the DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], the National Reconnaissance Office, etc., were doing. *I don't believe the history of 9-11 suggests that there was a serious coordination problem within the foreign intelligence community of the United States. It was principally within the FBI and between the FBI and intelligence.*"

He also expressed his opinion that the *establishment of a Homeland Security Department has been skewed, in that in now includes twenty plus agencies rather than the original four that had been suggested.*
Woolsey also does not believe sharing information is necessarily the solution. He said he thought "sharing the right pieces of intelligence in the right circumstance can be extremely useful and provide the government a lot of

leverage. However, he cited the story of the breaking of the Enigma machine in WWII as an instance in which there was virtually no sharing and it constituted perhaps the most successful and effective use of intelligence in modern history. Woolsey only recommended minor changes. First, a move more toward reliance on Nonofficial Cover Officers (NOCs). And second, a broadening of whom our intelligence services – not only the CIA, but everyone, talks to. Outside Intelligence reform, he said that the US should pay a lot more attention to the resilience of its infrastructure.

Yeatman, Richard M. "JIATF-South: Blueprint for Success," *Joint Force Quarterly* 42 (Summer 2006) 26-27.
This article analyzes the setup of JIATF-South, a counter-narcotics interagency operation, and proposes it as a working blueprint for integrating agencies into an effective organization. The first cornerstone of JIATF success is its successful integration of all appropriate agencies, even at the leadership levels. While technically operating under the DOD, the Director is a Coast Guard rear admiral and the Vice Director comes from Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Officers from the DEA, CBP, and FBI are all located in the Joint Intelligence Operations Center to ensure proper information sharing and cooperation, and the liaisons from the various agencies involved often take turns leading actual operations, planning sessions, or simply serving as command duty officer or intelligence watch officer on the floor of the operations watch center. This concrete integration builds trust among the respective agency representatives and promotes actual information sharing between agencies and even several foreign countries. Thus, when a plane suspected of transporting narcotics needs to be tracked across several countries' airspace and then interdicted on the ground by DEA or Customs agents, the process is nearly seamless. JIATF-South also recognizes the differing metrics for success employed by various agencies. For instance, the DOD measures success by amount of drugs seized, yet the law enforcement agencies gauge success by number of arrests and prosecutions. JIATF-South has effectively worked to raise the levels of all relevant metrics, thus satisfying not just one department, but all those involved. Finally, the author notes that building a truly efficient and effective interagency organization requires time to build interpersonal and interoperability relationships, as JIATF-South has had sixteen years of continuous operations to build relationships, trust, and experience. Accordingly, a proper and realistic timetable must be established which allows for the organization and its processes to develop.

Yost, Charles W. "The Instruments of American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* (1971).
Charles Yost's 1971 article concerns the relative positions of the Department of State and the National Security Council in the formulation and implementation of American foreign policy, concluding that the NSC had significantly usurped the traditional role of the State Department. The author provides a history of the shifting of authority from the Secretary of State and his department to the National Security Adviser and his staff. Yost points particularly to the administration of FDR during which the authority of the State Department was dispersed into a number of Federal agencies on account of FDR's personal style as a president as well as the limited skill of his appointed Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. *The result of this diffusion of foreign policy power was an imbalance of decision-making towards military instruments and solutions.* Despite attempts by a number of Secretaries to restore the Department of State, aided by the Foreign Service Act of 1946, the National Security Council, created by the National Security Act of 1947, became the new center of gravity for foreign policy decision-maker. The National Security Adviser enjoyed greater access to the President than the Secretary of State, contributing to the shift in decision-making influence. Yost criticizes the politicization of both the NSC and the Department of State (particularly the appointment of ambassadors) as well as the falling prestige and expertise of the Foreign Service. *He argues that foreign policy decision-making should return to a single agency in the Department of State, with the NSC relegated to its intended role as a small, permanent, non-partisan body deliberating on major strategic issues at the intersection of military and foreign affairs*. Key Recommendations are: 1) The Secretary of State should have the full confidence of the President and be given wide latitude in the daily administration of American foreign policy; 2) When in Washington, the Secretary of State should meet with the President almost daily; 3) When abroad on official duties, the Secretary should be in daily contact with the President, who should also be in regular contact with the Acting Secretary; 4) Three or four officers on the White House Staff should be responsible for keeping the President aware of the activities of the State Department and major developments in foreign affairs; 5) The NSC should return to its intended role as discussed supra; 6) The Secretary of State should have precedence over other agency heads, including Defense, in coordinating foreign policy. In cases of major disagreement of jurisdiction, the President should decide; 7) The White House, under direction of the President, must be responsible for implementing these recommendations and ensuring the proper functioning of the foreign policy decision-making system; 8) Within the State Department: the Policy Planning Staff should be restored as the chief source of strategic

direction for the department, political ambassadorial appointments should be limited to no more than 10% of the total, the success of the department depends on the quality of foreign service professionals it attracts.
Yost's article is now thirty-six years old, however, the foreign policy decision-making environment has not changed significantly in the intervening period. Many of his suggestions retain their merit. Nonetheless, concrete means of implementation, such as Congressional legislation, must be developed. Ultimately, the President must serve as the driving force behind reform.

Zaccor, Albert. "Security Cooperation and Non-State Threats: A Call for an Integrated Strategy," Occasional Paper, *Atlantic Council* (August 2005).
In this paper, Albert Zaccor uses DoD's Security Cooperation process as a template for a more comprehensive interagency process. According to Zaccor, the *lack of a process for translating the strategic intent of the President* in the U.S. Government results in a proliferation of narrow, redundant, and uncoordinated foreign assistance programs that sometimes work a cross purposes. Consequently, U.S. assistance is not as effective as it could or should be to build and maintain a global coalition in the fight against terror. Once we recognize the "inescapable interagency nature of the problem of integrating Security Cooperation activities," Zaccor argues, we can implement low-cost institutional solutions to the problems presented by doctrine, authority, funding, process, and organization. These recommendations include: 1) the publication of a Presidential Directive (PD) on Security Cooperation; 2) the development of a detailed interagency planning process based on the PD; 3) the issue of USG Security Cooperation Guidance on a bi-annual basis; and 4) the reexamination of funding of Security Cooperation Activities throughout the USG.

Zinni, Anthony C. *A Military for the 21st Century: Lessons from the Recent Past*. (Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, July 2001).
This article deals with military transformation and the need to reevaluate our decision-making structures in order to provide proper guidance in a world of uncertain threats. No specific recommendations are made for interagency reform.