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Human Capital Working Group Literature Review

Introduction:

The Human Capital Working Group conducted its literature review with a focus on both broad interagency issues as well as more specific aspects of the human capital and resources dimension. The scope of the literature review included primary source documents, such as U.S. Government papers and the publications of national commissions, as well as secondary source documents, such as books and journals. The research was conducted with an eye towards three perspectives: meta, macro and micro. From the meta perspective, we examined how human capital and resources figured into larger issues of interagency reform.

Common themes included the importance of human capital and resources to reforming the ways and means through which individuals interacted with one another as well as with interagency structures and processes. Tying into other aspects of the Project on National Security Reform (the “Project”), this meta perspective highlighted the interconnections between human capital and the larger re-conceptualization of interagency functioning. Examining links between knowledge management and guiding principles, this perspective is focused on why human capital is crucial to the functioning of the interagency system and establishes the importance of human capital across the broader conceptual framework of the Project.

Concurrently, the macro perspective is centered on examining how human capital contributes to existing difficulties and what role it plays in realizing potential solutions. Analyzing the importance of human capital and resources across the interagency system, this perspective cast relevant literature in the light of agency stovepipes, with a focus on how policy and management issues are endemic to the entirety of the interagency system. Establishing core issues that are shared by most agencies in the system, the macro lens identifies general problems and links the conceptual framework with the agency-specific issues. The literature review also applied a micro perspective, focusing on the literature that identified problems within specific agencies. Extrapolating these issues to the macro level, we were able to identify larger, recurring themes that appeared common to most agencies. This aspect of the literature review is focused on the problem identification within aspects of the system, with a functional prerogative on establishing how human capital impacts agency effectiveness and operations.

Through the application and expansion of these perspectives (meta, macro, and micro), we identified three core trends/themes within the literature that were common to each perspective and central to the understanding of the extant human capital

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challenges within individual departments/agencies as well as across the interagency system more generally. They include: 1) leadership and management; 2) human resources/personnel policy and incentives; and 3) skills, education and training. The following section outlines the key components highlighted in our source material and examines how these components impact the overall scope and content of the Project.

Core Trends/Themes:

Leadership & Management:

Two schools of thought have principally influenced the evolution of U.S. national security leadership and management. The first, and more commonly accepted, school of thought is that national security leadership and management evolved to suit presidential preference and priority. Zbigniew Brzezinski for instance asserted that, the “NSC’s relationship to the president and its dependence on his working style determined its evolution.”¹ The second school of thought posits a structural explanation, asserting that the initial framework outlined in the National Security Act of 1947 (“NSA ‘47”) – the design of agencies and the delineated roles of both the executive and legislative branches – drove the evolution of U.S. national security leadership and management.²

Irrespective of which school one adheres to, the literature generally identifies five facets central to modern agency leadership and management within the national security system:³ (1.) information management, (2.) policy guidance (3.) implementation of personnel procedures, (4.) *intra-* and *inter-*agency conflict resolution and (5.) organizational goal design. The literature emphasizes that the present and future national security system will continue to face an asymmetric set of threats. Therefore, just as enemies often leverage “decentralized decision-making,”⁴ national security leadership must adjust its decision-making process – allowing for greater flexibility and adaptability – to better identify, target, and neutralize the asymmetric threats that will continue to dominate the national security environment.

The literature also identifies a series of cultural themes pertaining to leadership and management that, if properly introduced, could facilitate greater “jointness” across the national security system. They include:

¹ Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 1987. “The NSC’s Middle Crisis.” *Foreign Policy* 69 (Winter). p.80

² Zegart, Amy B. 1999. *Flawed By Design: The Evolution Of The CIA, JCS, and NSC*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. p.107

³ For the purposes of consistency herein, the term System will be used throughout to identify the national security System and its host of partner agencies and departments. In other relevant publications, the term “System” may be used. Thus, in distinguishing between the intelligence System and the broader national security System, the term was chosen for the latter.

⁴ Chu, David S.C., Nurith Bernstein. 2003. “Decision-making for Defense.” In *New challenges, new tools for defense decision-making*. Santa Monica: RAND. p.31

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1. *Cohabitation of primary agency goals and overall national security goals.* While missions differ dramatically across the System, the national security leadership should look to reform its management structure to facilitate greater mission alignment among individual departments/agencies to insure bottom line outcomes are effectively addressed.
2. *Periodic internal and/or personnel transformation as an ingrained agency way of life.* Building off of the U.S. military's Professional Military Education (PME) model, the national security leadership and management should look for ways to incorporate that "execute, evaluate, and adjust" mindset into the broader national security system mindset. To successfully negotiate the 21st century national security environment, these transformative techniques must become a welcomed and accepted aspect of interagency behavior.
3. *Building a new joint culture that promotes career diversity/core competencies.* While these concepts do exist within the national security system, they remain largely confined to the military. National security leadership and management should look to adapt "jointness" initiatives such as the Joint Specialty Office (JSO) program into a broader interagency model that includes both civilian and military components. Additionally, the design, implementation, and execution of such model should provide enhanced value for not only the individual but the specific agency and the national security system overall. In order to accomplish this type of comprehensive transformation in cultural mindset/outlook and properly define this new sense of "joint" interagency behavior, the leadership and management must identify and encourage a set of core competencies.
4. *Regular interagency conferences at not only the senior level, but mid-management levels as well, in order to address programmatic problems.* Although this already takes place in very unofficial ways, a more summit-like atmosphere may result in greater cohesiveness, more concrete decision making and less opportunity for a "dominant-agency" to shape mission objectives.

Human Resources/Personnel Policy & Incentives:

When evaluating which areas of the federal government require the most talented personnel and the most integrated HR strategy, national security is arguably one of the most critical. Given the complex nature of national security issues, the threats involved, and the inherently small margin for error, every agency within the System must possess the HR/PPI tools necessary to cultivate and maintain a robust human resource framework. The literature asserts that these tools are often most effective when applied/examined across the four following sectors:

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- Recruitment/compensation
- Training/certification
- Tracking
- Evaluation/promotion

Employed strategically, the literature suggests that these tools enhance an agency's capacity to 1) acquire and retain the best people; 2) provide them with the appropriate training and place them in positions where they can enhance institutional performance and contribute to overall mission success; 3) more readily reward strong performers and hold poor performers accountable; 4) ensure greater transparency and clarity for employees and managers; and 5) cultivate a pool of talent that will ensure the agency's durability, flexibility, and responsiveness.⁵ Conversely, the literature warns that the absence of such tools places agencies in the unenviable position of having to expend valuable time and resources training/developing employees to reach a baseline level of competency rather than cultivating them for further advancement. Additionally, agency performance may suffer due to talent gaps in various sectors or to the lack of effective evaluation and oversight. Finally, overall agency effectiveness could diminish in the long term without an established talent pipeline from which to draw new leadership and senior staff to strategically plan for the agency's future. Put simply, a joint HR/PPI framework strategically implemented across the System would provide decision makers with more options and assets – thereby strengthening U.S. operations at home and abroad. A disjointed HR/PPI framework reduces options and diminishes the effectiveness of U.S. national security efforts on the ground.

Skills, Education & Training:

While the United States military has a long tradition of using the academic study of history and warfare to prepare its future leaders throughout their careers (i.e. the establishment of West Point and the Naval, Coast Guard, and Air Force Academies, the Army, Naval, Air and Marine War colleges, and the National Defense University), its civilian counterparts within the national security system lack a similar institutionalized framework for preparing its leadership cadre. The result of the U.S. Military's training is the most cohesive, professional and knowledgeable military force in the world. This continual "joint" training model has enabled the U.S. Armed Forces to work together more efficiently and effectively in times of war and crisis.

Military training has been associated with increased performance in demanding circumstances. A recent study by Korn/Ferry International explored the relationship between the skills military personnel acquired on active duty and their high level of

⁵ Office of the Director of National Intelligence; "The US Intelligence Community's Five Year Strategic Human Capital Plan" June 22, 2006

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success as Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in private industry. Korn/Ferry found that six traits learned in the military were a fundamental part of CEO success. These traits include:

- Learning how to work as part of a team;
- Organizational skills, such as planning and effective use of resources;
- Good communication skills;
- Defining a goal and motivating others to follow it;
- A highly developed sense of ethics; and
- The ability to remain calm under pressure.⁶

Despite the relative success and prevalence of U.S. military jointness, this phenomenon is not widespread in the U.S. Government. In particular, the ability to integrate resources and skills is nearly non-existent in interagency endeavors. While agency and department employees are dedicated, knowledgeable professionals and most agencies are proficient at their core competencies, there is very little synergy in the interagency. This may be attributed to the lack of emphasis on training in government agencies in general and the interagency in particular. Training, skills and exercises are not generally a top-level concern in government unless something has gone awry. Even then, programs to bolster these areas and funding to expand them are often secondary to other efforts. After 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina there was a public outcry for more services, more security and more oversight. Yet little consideration was given to the tremendous training challenge involved in creating numerous new jobs and re-training employees to work in the interagency realm.

[Note: There is reference to cultural themes under “Leadership and Management,” but does any of the literature regarding HR/PPI or education/training address the need to instill specific cultures in agency personnel? For example, the Structure literature review reveals an apparent need to develop mission-oriented or results-oriented cultures in interagency groups. In addition, the Knowledge Management literature review notes that a culture of trust, sharing, teamwork and promoting a common vocabulary is essential for a knowledge management system to work well.]

⁶ “Military Experience and CEOs: Is There a Link?” Korn/Ferry International, online at: <http://www.kornferry.com/Library/ViewGallery.asp?CID=1741&LanguageID=1&RegionID=23>

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National Security Reform Bibliography

Human Capital & Resources Working Group

June 30, 2007

Notes: [BJE] = Brian Ellision, Nicholas Lesher [NGL], [ECS] = Erich Schwarz,

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1. National-level Commissions and Studies on Interagency Reform: Key Recommendations and Assessments

COMMISSION/STUDY: *High-Risk Series: An Update*, GAO-01-263 [BJE]

Summary and Key Focus Area: This report examines six high-risk areas of government including: strategic human capital management; information security weaknesses; ensuring that major technical investments improve services; basic financial accountability; reducing inordinate program management risks; managing large procurement operations more efficiently.

Key recommendations:

Strategic Human Capital Management – Challenges in Key Areas (p. 71)

- Strategic human capital planning and organizational alignment
- Leadership continuity and succession planning
- Acquiring and developing staffs whose size, skills, and deployment meet agency needs
- Creating result-oriented organizational cultures

Assessment: This is a highly functional, yet dated “assessment of the methodologies and criteria used to determine which federal government programs and functions should be designated as high risk.”

COMMISSION/STUDY: *Human Capital, Insights for U.S. Agencies from Other Countries’ Succession Planning and Management Initiatives*, GAO-03-914 [BJE]

Summary and Key Focus Area: Leading organizations engage in broad, integrated succession planning and management efforts that focus on strengthening both current and future organizational capacity. As part of this approach, that organizations identify, develop, and select their human capital to ensure that successors are the right people, with the right skills, at the right time for leadership and other key positions. Agencies in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom implement succession planning and management initiatives that are designed to protect and enhance organizational capacity (summary). Agencies took on the characteristics and applications illustrated below in key recommendations.

Key recommendations:

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- Receive active support of top leadership (8)
- Link to strategic planning (10)
- Identify talent from multiple organizational levels, early in career, or with critical skills (13)
- Emphasize development assignments in addition to formal training (14)
- Address specific human capital challenges, such as diversity, leadership capacity, and retention (16)
- Facilitate broader transformation efforts (19)

Assessment: This is a relevant assessment of title subject. It may also benefit the Processes WG.

COMMISSION/STUDY: *Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations
Critical to the 9/11 Commission's Proposed Reforms [BJE]*

Summary and Key Focus Area: In response to the 9/11 Commission's recommendation for transformation of the intelligence community, the study examines four relevant criteria: (1.) Sustained leadership and the role performance management systems; (2.) human capital "flexibilities" that serve to aid in performance management systems; (3.) lessons learned by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in post-9/11 transformation; (4.) GAO's findings on the necessary factors that must be considered in the government's security clearance process for national security appointments. One of the key hurdles that the study cites in all intelligence community transformation is the need to move from a "need to know" community to a "need to share" one.

Key recommendations:

- Lengthen the terms served by directors of intelligence agencies similar to the FBI's ten year term.
- There may be a need to hire a limited number of individuals on a term-appointed, non-competitive basis.
- FBI has adopted a critical-skill hiring policy for its high priority areas and thus this may prove successful elsewhere.
- If a new agency is established for the security clearance process, it would need to deal with not only the ground-up initialization, but the existing backlog of clearance applications and the lack of a government-wide database.
- Top leadership coupled with an integrated set of strategic goals should drive transformation.
- Implementation goals should be on a timeline to show progress and momentum (See p.5 Table 1 "Key Practices")
- Human capital concerns are crucial to the transformations recommended by the 9/11 Commission.

Assessment: This is particularly relevant in considering the necessity to manifest prompt yet secure placement of candidates into the intelligence/national security community's critical areas. The problem, as the report points out, is that there are too many clearance applications for the process to be as slow as it is currently. To this end, valuable and in some cases desperately needed, human capital remains temporarily un-utilized.

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COMMISSION/STUDY: *Roadmap for National Security: Imperative for Change, Phase III Report* [BJE]

Summary and Key Focus Area: Phase III recommendations include the establishment of a “National Homeland Security Agency to consolidate and refine the missions of the nearly two dozen disparate department and agencies that have a role in U.S. homeland security today.” (Roadmap for National Security, vi) Most of this report offers recommendations on “organizational change” that require congressional legislation.

Key recommendations:

- Ensuring* the security of the American homeland
- Recapitalizing* America’s strengths in science and education
- Redesigning* key institutions of the Executive Branch
- Overhauling* the U.S. government’s military and civilian personnel systems; and
- Reorganizing* Congress’s role in national security affairs

Assessment: This reports cuts across *Vision and Guiding Principles, Structure and Processes*, however most adequately fits with that of *Structures*.

COMMISSION/STUDY: *Urgent Business for America: Revitalizing the Federal Government for the 21st Century* [BJE]

Summary and Key Focus Area: Report argues that the notion of public service and the organization of the U.S. government are in disarray. It asserts that government is unable to attract or retain many talented personnel, and that the government's structure and operations are “a mixture of the outdated, the outmoded and the outworn.”

Key recommendations:

- Reorganizing government into a limited number of mission-related executive departments, with managers of their operating agencies chosen for their operational skills and given the authority to develop management and personnel systems appropriate to their missions (2003, 14).
- Giving the president expedited authority to recommend structural reorganization of agencies and departments (17).
- Realigning congressional committee oversight to match the mission-driven reorganization of the executive branch (17).
- Speeding and streamlining the presidential appointments process, and reducing the number of political appointments (18-19).
- Increasing judicial, executive, and legislative salaries to ensure a reasonable relationship to salaries for comparable jobs outside government (22).
- Developing flexible personnel management systems that meet the special needs of operating agencies (27).
- Simplifying and accelerating the recruitment of federal employees (27-30).
- Formulating and enforcing clear standards for outsourcing that advance the public interest and do not undermine core competencies of government (31).

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Assessment: Washington-based, public service-focused reforms. [Note: This was taken from the larger PNSR bibliography. Many of the recommendations discussed in this study are relevant to the People Working Group, so it has been included in our bibliography].

COMMISSION/STUDY: A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management GAO-02-373SP, March 2002 [NGL]

Summary and Key Focus Areas: This detailed report elaborates on previous GAO identified Human Capital (HC) challenges facing the Federal government as a whole and the recent steps taken by GAO, OMB, and OPM to effectively address them. It puts forth a model designed to assist federal agencies in their efforts to more effectively manage their HC, identifies “critical success factors”, and offers pointers on how best to incorporate these factors into an agency’s HC strategy through a variety of in-depth case studies.

Assessment: The individual case studies provide helpful detail and are particularly relevant to HR/Personnel policy & incentives sub-section of the People WG.

COMMISSION/STUDY: *Human Capital: Effective Use of Flexibilities Can Assist Agencies in Managing Their Workforces* GAO-03-2, December 2002 [NGL]

Key recommendations: The report surveys the Federal government’s ability to effectively employ human capital flexibilities and identifies/recommends six key practices:

1. Planning strategically and making targeted investments
2. Ensuring stakeholder input in developing policies and procedures
3. Educating manager and employees on the availability and use of flexibilities
4. Streamlining administrative process
5. Building transparency and accountability into the system
6. Changing the organizational culture

Assessment: This is a valuable document from a personnel policy/incentives perspective. It offers specific examples of available HC flexibilities and examines practical opportunities for implementation.

COMMISSION/STUDY: The US Intelligence Community’s Five Year Strategic Human Capital Plan; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 22 June 2006 [NGL]

Summary and Key Focus Area: This plan addresses the personnel and human capital components of the Intelligence Community’s National Intelligence Strategy (NIS). It outlines a vision (Integrating National Intelligence “Service”) as well as lists stated goals and objectives.

“Service” Vision: ODNI’s vision consists of two primary components, “Transformation through Integration” and “Unity without Uniformity”

Stated goals:

1. Build an agile, “all-source” force
2. Win the war for talent

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3. Strengthen culture of leadership at all levels

Assessment: Provides insight into ODNI's overarching HC strategy and is a useful sketch of how ODNI envisions its role as the overarching/coordinating body across the IC. But the language is somewhat vague in parts and does not provide specifics that would give the reader a more detailed understanding of how ODNI intends achieve its vision and meet its stated goals.

COMMISSION/STUDY: Six Trends Transforming Government; IBM Center for The Business of Government 2006 [NGL]

Summary and Key Focus Areas: This study examines various opportunities for transforming government so that it possesses the tools necessary to meet 21st Century problems. The study identifies six trends that would help government achieve such a transformation:

1. Changing the rules
 - Facilitates managerial flexibility (“letting” v. “making” managers manage)
 - Increases accountability
 - Pushes authority to lower levels where day-to-day expertise is greatest
 - Allows for a ‘tailored’ approach to Human Resource Management (HRM)
2. Using Performance Management
 - Necessary to meet 21st century needs of job market competition, etc.
 - Implementation is tricky and can potential reduce/retard successful transformation to a more productive system
3. Providing Competition Choice, and Incentives
4. Performing on Demand
 - Comprises four characteristics: responsiveness, focus, variability, resilience
 - Fosters greater horizontal integration of processes and infrastructure
5. Engaging Citizens
6. Using Networks and Partnerships

Assessment: The first, second, and fourth trends outlined in the document were the most applicable to the People WG and to HR/personnel policy & incentives in particular. It would also be applicable to Structure WG.

COMMISSION/STUDY: An Assessment of the Implementation of the Department of Defense National Security Personnel System; OPM May 2007 [NGL]

Summary and Key Focus Area: Federal agencies are attempting to accelerate efforts to construct alternative personnel systems (APS) to grow leadership and enhance personnel performance. Given DOD's size, OPM's assessment of DOD's effort to implement NSPS will provide other federal agencies with valuable lessons-learned that should inform their attempts to implement similar systems.

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Assessment: OPM's assessment provides significant detail of DOD's NSPS implementation process. OPM assessment methodology and framework offers the reader a glimpse into what worked and what didn't work from strategy/planning to implementation/execution.

COMMISSION/STUDY: An Assessment of the Implementation of the Department of Homeland Security Alternative Personnel System; OPM May 2007 [NGL]

Summary and Key Focus Area: OPM's evaluation framework exposes where DHS has succeeded in implementing APS components, where it has encountered obstacles, and offers recommendations as to how DHS can improve upon its efforts.

Key recommendations:

- Sustained commitment from agency leadership throughout the planning/implementation process, not simply the design phase;
- Stakeholder involvement is critical (open channels of communication for leadership, management, employees, and unions) to successful implementation of any new APS model; will also reduce back end "costs" (legal proceedings, etc.) that impede transition efforts;
- Leadership must devise and effectively implement a communications strategy that provides a transparent open and clearly articulated description of the new system guidelines entail and how they impacts personnel, process, and structure;

Assessment: Despite the fact that DHS has routinely underperformed across the board on HR related issues, OPM's assessment of its efforts to implement a new APS model highlights the difficulties inherent in any transformative personnel process. The assessment also provides a useful evaluation and description of the various factors that can contribute to a more efficient, effective, and successful transformation.

COMMISSION/STUDY: Interagency Transformation, Education and After Action Review (ITEA) Home Page. www.theinteragency.org [new site URL: <http://www.ndu.edu/itea/>] [BY]

Summary and Key Focus Area: ITEA was established by the NDU in 1997 to improve coordination among the departments and agencies responsible for crisis planning and response, focusing on education, research and gaming. It aims to shed light on the roles, capacities, limitations and cultures of all the contributing elements, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IOs).

Assessment: Contains useful briefings, publications, and information about events and curriculum.

TESTIMONY: "Statement of John S. Pistole, Executive Assistant Director Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence, Federal Bureau Of Investigation, Before The House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security," August 23, 2004. <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress04/pistole082304.htm> [BY]

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Assessment: May be useful to examine how the FBI has centralized management of its Counterterrorism Program with regard to limiting stove-piping, ensuring consistency of priorities and strategy across the organization, integrating operations domestically and abroad, and to improving coordination and make senior managers more accountable. Also, look into the FBI's newly established formal analyst training program.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTIVE: Presidential Decision Directive / National Security Council 56, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations," Washington, D.C., 1997. [This PDD is unavailable or still classified. The following link is an analysis of PDD-56 from NDU: www.ndu.edu/library/n1/98-ASE-05.pdf **[BY]**

Assessment: PDD-56 emerged from Lt. Wesley Clark, Dick Clark, Thomas McNamara, and Ted Warner's perceived failure of the U.S. operation in Haiti to apply the lessons learned from our engagement in Somalia. Specifically, they identify the dangers of: ad hoc and conflicting policy objectives, lack of strategic clarity and planning, absence of discipline among the agencies to commit and coordinate the required resources. PDD-56 articulates the necessity for the interagency process to plan, monitor, and assess U.S. participation in complex contingency operations using a standard, integrating framework.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTIVE: *President's Management Agenda – DOL Results*, U.S. Department of Labor in the 21st Century http://www.dol.gov/dol/pma/pma_results.htm **[BY]**

Assessment: By implementing the President's Management Agenda (a strategy for improving management of the federal government), the DOL notes success in five areas, three of which are relevant for our purposes:

- Strategic management of human capital
 - Developed linkages with business schools
 - Developed a more results-oriented performance plan
 - Developed core competencies for mission critical occupations
- Competitive sourcing
 - Government saves costs by having federal and private sector service providers compete to perform functions like data collection and administrative support
- Budget and performance integration
 - Stands to avoid the problem of allocating budget money and not monitoring performance

2. National-level Commissions and Studies on Interagency Reform: Sources

Human Capital, Insights for U.S. Agencies from Other Countries' Succession Planning and Management Initiatives, U.S. General Accounting Office GAO-03-914. Washington, D.C.: Sep 2003. <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03914.pdf>

Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical to the 9/11 Commission's Proposed Reforms, U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO-04-1084T, Washington, D.C.: Sep 2004. <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d041084t.pdf>

The National Commission on the Public Service. 2003. *Urgent Business for America: Revitalizing the Federal Government for the 21st Century*. Universal Resource Link located at:

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<http://www.brookings.edu/gs/cps/volcker/reportfinal.pdf>

Roadmap for National Security: Imperative for Change, Phase III Report, U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, February 15, 2001.

<http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nssg/PhaseIIIFR.pdf>

Human Capital: Increasing Agencies' Use of New Hiring Flexibilities; GAO-04-959T, 13 July 2004

High-Performing Organizations: Metrics, Means and Mechanisms for Achieving High Performance in the 21st Century Public Management Environment, GAO-03-343SP, 13 February 2004

3. National-level Commissions and Studies on Defense Reform

Source: Binnendijk, Hans and Stuart E. Johnson, ed., Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2004. [Online at: http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/S&R_book/S&R.pdf]. [ECS]

Summary and Key Focus Area: The primary focus of this report is on building a force capable of carrying out successful stabilization and reconstruction in former combat zones. It deals extensively with the U.S. military effort to transition from combat operations to those designed to restore normal conditions in Afghanistan and Iraq. For the purposes of the People working group, it offers a contemporary perspective on interagency cooperation.

Key recommendations:

- Proposes joint S&R commands and details their organizational model (Ch. 3 and 4).
- Changes to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) program curricula to include S&R issues, taught by interagency personnel familiar with those operations (Chapter 6).
- Ensuring the personnel system recognizes and advances personnel with “language and negotiations skills and interagency experience” (Chapter 6).
- S&R joint/interagency training as a unit (Chapter 6).
- Creation of a National Interagency Contingency Coordination Group (NIACCG) and Joint Interagency Coordination Groups to ensure interagency coordination and cooperation exists both before and during crisis situations (Chapter 8).

Assessment: The most useful elements of this book for the People working group are the education, skills and training elements discussed in Chapter 6. A list of key skills for military leaders (pp. 90-91) may be useful in articulating the goals of a JPME program as well as a joint interagency education program.

Source: Center for the Study of the President, *Forward Strategic Empowerment: Synergies between CINCs, The State Department, and Other Agencies*, A Panel Report. August 2001. [Online at: <http://www.thepresidency.org/pubs/ForwardStrategic.pdf> ; Report of a panel co-chaired by General Edward C. Meyer, USA (Ret.) and Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering. (Washington, DC: CSP, 2001).] [ECS]

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Summary and Key Focus Area: This report establishes a need for joint education programs that provide senior military and diplomatic leaders with an appreciation of the roles of each in regional U.S. actions. It also advocates a stronger relationship between the military and State Department in Washington.

Key recommendations:

- “Develop joint education and training mechanisms for future military and diplomatic leaders” using the National Defense University and Foreign Service Institute.
- Orientation programs for new high-level military and diplomatic officers.
- Strengthen the ties between military and political leaders regionally.
- Decentralize the State Department and make ties to the military stronger in the field.
- Create Regional Interagency Contingency Planning Centers (RICPC) for each regional military commander to orchestrate military cooperation with DoS country teams.
- Other organizational changes designed to promote a stronger relationship between diplomats and military officials in the field.

Assessment: The key elements of this report for the People group are the proposals for joint education that makes high-level military and diplomatic officials aware of the tools that each can provide to the other.

Source: Interagency Transformation, Education and After Action Review (ITEA), “Development of Educational Programs for Joint Interagency Coordination Group,” *Interagency News, Vol 4, Issue 9* (Jul 04), www.ndu.edu/ITEA/storage/556/issue_9_Revised.pdf [BY]

Summary and Key Findings: The ITEA conducted an educational program for the JIACG. Key lessons identified include: 1) need for interagency agreement on the difference between the terms “homeland security” and “homeland defense,” as well as clearer lines of authority and responsibility between Northern Command and DHS; 2) information sharing due to differences in technology and classification hinders interagency coordination; and 3) effective interagency planning requires strategic guidance and the active participation of a broad range of civilian organizations at all stages of the planning effort. The ITEA is currently developing similar educational programs for U.S. Central Command and U.S. Strategic Command.

Source: Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resources Strategy, Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2000. Link to PDF found at: <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports.htm> [BJE]

Summary and Key Findings: This study examines the DoD’s post-Cold War challenges that arose in the 1990’s, particularly within the human resource dynamic between the civilian and military personnel. DoD is constantly faced with the external reality of private sector competition. It recognizes (circa 2000) that today’s military personnel are not only expected to be victorious on the battlefield, but also take on the role of diplomats, humanitarians, and rebuilders. Although operations in the 1990s showed success in this regard, there are signs that “quality and capability of the force is beginning to erode from the record highs of the mid-1990s” (v). There was a recognized coming crisis of talent and quality depreciation and decrease. In

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addition, this study is concerned with political appointments of civilian personnel, military retirement options, health care, and housing.

Key recommendations:

- Move to a more seamless integration of active and reserve components with a single, integrated personnel and logistics system;
- Shift military personnel from general support to direct combat and combat support, leveraging the transformation of the logistics and support systems;
- Constitute a task force to study and develop a plan that will merge, over time, the Army and Air Force reserve units with their respective National Guards;
- Place priority focus on attracting and retaining the needed military personnel who are motivated and qualified to serve and lead;
- Institute changes and provide the resources necessary to meet recruiting and retention goals and reduce training base and first-term attrition;
- Place added emphasis on improving quality of life, overcoming problems with job satisfaction and retention, and strengthening commitment to service;
- Continue to restructure the military retirement system to provide earlier vesting, a 401K-type option, benefit portability, and different service lengths and retirement points depending on military needs;
- Continue to restructure the military retirement system to provide earlier vesting, a 401K-type option, benefit portability, and different service lengths and retirement points depending on military needs (79);

This source could also go under the *structure* sub-heading as well.

Source: Marcum, Cheryl Y., Lauren R. Sager Weinstein, Susan D. Hosek and Harry J. Thie, *Department of Defense Political Appointments: Positions and Process*, Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2001, [Online at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1253/]. [BY]

Summary and Key Findings: RAND studied the political appointee process for the Defense Dept. and found that the number of such positions have increased, as well as the procedures and processes that these individuals have to go through. Candidates have to provide extensive financial and background information, which also limits their financial and investment options while in office, and constrains their business and employment options after they leave office. The functions of these positions are narrowing, the positions are taking longer to fill, and the average length of tenure is decreasing, leaving open lots of empty positions or positions that are filled by “acting” officials. The study also points to disincentives in the appointment process as well as post-appointment restrictions. Nevertheless, it seems that candidates have not considered these negative factors to be enough of a deterrent to seeking these positions, and the majority express satisfaction with their jobs.

Source: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies: Seminar XXI. <http://web.mit.edu/semxxi> [BY]

Summary: Seminar XXI brings together senior military officers, government and NGO officials, and executives in the national security policy community to analyze key policy issues by

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examining countries and problems critical to American interests. Seminar XXI hosts a variety of conferences throughout the year that are open to the public on a reservation basis.

Assessment: Making contact with Seminar XXI could be useful both in terms of networking and educational opportunities.

4. Books

Camm, Frank. 2003. "Adaptive Best Commercial Practices to Defense." In *New Challenges, New Tool for Defense Decisionmaking*, ed. S. E. Johnson, Libicki, Martin C., Treverton, Gregory F., et. al. Santa Monica: RAND. Pp.211-246 [BJE]

In preparing the military – particularly the individual soldier – for the transformation sought for the twenty-first century, the chapter suggests that DoD be encouraged to emulate “best commercial practices” (BCPs). There are non-combat areas within DoD that could adopt the efficiency practices of BCPs. These areas include administrative services, generic business and personnel services, education and training, sourcing, and the elements of base operations, medical care, information services, logistics, and civil engineering. BCP’s are typically process-based and thus can “transform strategic priorities into requirements...or labor and material inputs into serviceable parts” (213).

Hellriegel, Don and John W. Slocum, Jr., *Organizational Behavior*, 10/e, Beauceville-Quebec: Thomson South-Western, 2004. [ECS]

Hosek, James R., and Rand Corporation. 2004. *Attracting the best: how the military competes for information technology personnel*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand National Defense Research Institute. [BJE]

Hosek, James R. . 2003. "The Soldier of the 21st Century." In *New Challenges, New Tools for Defense Decisionmaking* ed. S. E. Johnson, Libicki, Martin C., Treverton, Gregory F. et. al. . Santa Monica: RAND. Pp. 181-209. [BJE]

As the chapter maintains, “versatility and leadership” are the premier qualities of the 21st century soldier. There must be a systematic approach to recognizing the factors inherent in versatility and leadership. “Adaptable processes” need to be built and manifested (181). Thus, dynamic workforce planning models are advantageous over “rigid, input-output planning models. Versatility is the ability to address and engage in multiple activities with equal ease. Training, experience and aptitude are the cornerstones of versatility. While this chapter addresses primarily the qualities of the soldier, there are inherently relevant revelations applicable to the entire national security community. Leadership can be strengthened through further training, education and experience (188). To this end, a leader should “be able to identify key objectives, allocate resources efficiently toward them, foster unit cohesion, and motivate personnel to perform at high

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levels” (188). Strong leadership will be able to improve performance and thus cohesion by improving the use of resources of the unit under uncertain circumstances (189).

The chapter would also be helpful for those studying *processes*.

Jaffee, David, *Organization Theory: Tension and Change*. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2001. [ECS]

Katzenbach, Jon R., *Why Pride Matters More Than Money: The Power of the World’s Greatest Motivational Force*, New York: Crown Business, 2003. [ECS]

Maslow, Abraham H., Deborah C. Stevens and Gary Heil, *Maslow on Management*, New York: John Wiley, 1998. [ECS]

Michaels, Ed, Helen Handfield-Jones, and Beth Axelrod. 2001. *The War for Talent*. Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press. [BJE]

The authors describe talent as the “sum of a person’s abilities – his or her intrinsic gifts, skills, knowledge, experience, intelligence, judgment, attitude, character, and drive. It also includes the ability to learn and grow.”(xxi) The key abilities that an organization looks for in individuals in order to weather the storm of a competitive market are those of leadership, strategic thinking and communications. The book is based on the results of three studies conducted by McKinsey & Company involving 77 and over 6000 managers of American corporations. The objective of the study was to face the premise in modern business talent has risen to greater importance than capital, strategy and R & D.

Where the dynamic was once, scarce jobs, people in need of companies, loyal employees and job security and accepted job packages, it is now that companies need people, people are mobile, demand much more and scarce talent as, opposed to machines, bear competitive advantage. It is people rather than material resources that gain competitive advantage. Thus, whether a bull or bear market, talent is always going to be in high demand, as it is the lifeblood of all other facets of business. The study finds that as a result of competitiveness in seeking talent, companies adopt nontraditional recruiting practices. This will continue to be more so the case in years to come. As a result, the study finds that organizations must develop the talent they currently have in order to attract more. “Those companies that weave development into the fabric of their organization will attract more talent, hold onto it longer, and perform better in the long run.”(97) This is achieved through a differentiation and affirmation in the talents of people. 65% of the people surveyed in management positions replied to the question of *not feeling valued is a big reason why people leave* with answers of *critical* or *very important* to reasons: “don’t feel valued by my company” and/or “insufficient reward or recognition.”(129) The conclusion drawn from this is that these are areas in which organizations could inexpensively change, which would yield higher retention rates and subsequently attract better talent.

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Schank, John F., Harry Thie, Margaret C. Harrell, United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Staff., and National Defense Research Institute (U.S.). 1996. *Identifying and supporting joint duty assignments: Executive Summary*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand. [BJE]

The research conducted for this book utilizes a supply and demand model to evaluate and address the implementation constraints to the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986. The demand-side research focused on providing a process for measuring joint content and understanding the implications of such a process. The supply-side focused on determining an aggregate account of the amount of joint content services that ought to be provided. Recommendations on the demand side include: (1) Billets should be ranked according to their joint content; (2) the size of the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) should be based on the number of joint positions; (3) a methodology should be implemented to determine critical billets; (4) DoD policy should recognize O-3 grades for joint credit; (5) Goldwater-Nichols should be amended to allow in-service billets for grades O-4 to O-6. (xii, 17). Supply-side recommendations include: (1) The services should make/request official changes to make appropriate promotion comparisons; (2) annual promotion board data and moving averages should be included in reports; (4) Below-zone, within-zone and above-zone comparisons should be combined in order to simplify promotion comparison calculations (xiii, 33-34).

Thie, Harry J. 2003. "Planning the Future Military Workforce." In *New Challenges, New Tools for Defense Decisionmaking*, ed. S. E. Johnson, Libicki, Martin C., Treverton, Gregory F., et. al. Santa Monica: RAND. Pp.157-79. [BJE]

This chapter examines military workforce planning. Particularly relevant is the section on human capital. Although directly applicable to the military, it may prove beneficial across the broad spectrum of civilian agencies as well. Human capital comprises the "skills, knowledge and abilities"(159) that may be drawn upon in order to successfully meet the mission's objectives. These three attributes can lead to better organizational efficiency in well understood by leadership personnel. The personnel within an organization are never static in these regards, and thus may need frequent reevaluation. Total efficiency of manpower is the utilization of human resources which yield the highest amount of productivity. The chapter also addresses historical "revolutions" in composition, characteristics and attributes. For instance, in 1985 the enlisted force had greater ability in terms of aptitude, than ever before. While officers have always been college graduates, there is upward trend of NCOs and POs with this distinction. In turn, this translates to a more effective, efficient, highly-skilled and motivated military workforce.

Seven trends were cited as considerations of personnel force planning in the year 2010: (1.) U.S. military size will shrink; (2.) threats that are known will become varied threats; (3.) the mission of global conflict will switch from unitary in nature to that of selective and flexible; (4.) Single missions for units will become multiple missions for units; (5.) variable hierarchies will replace the existing fixed hierarchies; (6.) advanced weaponry will become integrated systems and processes; (7.) service oriented missions will yield to joint operational missions. All of this will culminate in the need to be extremely adaptable on both an individual as well as an organizational level.

The chapter would also be helpful for those studying *processes*.

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Thomas, Kenneth W., *Intrinsic Motivation at Work*, San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc., 2000.[BJE]

Vandergriff, Donald E. 2006. *Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with the Changing face of War*. Washington DC: Center for Defense Information. [BJE]

The 21st century security environment will be characterized with various conventional and unconventional threats, many of which the world has never seen before. This requires adaptive training/learning tools for the combatant commanders. The soldier in this environment will require intuitiveness, critical thinking techniques, creativity, self-awareness and social skills. Thus conventional training techniques are not sufficient for an ever-changing battlefield in fourth-generation warfare. Education and training should be broad in its initial onset. There is an ever-growing need to institutionalize adaptability. Depending on immediate needs, a soldier may be required to perform a broad and possibly unanticipated set of tasks. “Leaders’ ability to be adaptable will guide decisions on how to accomplish their missions, while also helping them to recognize and compensate for differences in the temperament and ability of other Army officers, NCOs and civilians through unit training and professional development” (114). The text develops the adaptive course model (ACM) which illustrates the image of the adaptive student soldier emerging from a “leader-centric course.” The soldier can: “rapidly distinguish between information that is useful in making decisions and that which is not pertinent; avoid the natural temptation to delay their decisions until more information makes the situation clearer; avoid the pitfall of thinking that once the mission is underway, more information will clarify the tactical picture; feel the battlefield tempo, discern patterns among the chaos, and make critically important decisions in seconds (80).

This assessment of the changing environment within the military’s context of battle relies on traditional hierarchical dynamics but with horizontal adaptive applications.

Wilson, James Q., *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*, Cambridge: Basic Books, 1989. [ECS]

Zegart, Amy B. 1999. *Flawed By Design: The Evolution Of The CIA, JCS, and NSC*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. [BJE]

Zegart roots the formation of a new theory for national security bureaucracies that distinguish between the vastly opposing interests and power structures of Congress and the Executive and more so national security agencies and other domestic agencies. She maintains that, when it comes to national security, the executive branch has enjoyed far more influence over the formation of agency. Because of this, the existing theories of bureaucracy and institutional creation are flawed when attempting to address national security, for if one comes at the issue with the same intentions as one might, say the DMV, the agency’s existence and character are misunderstood. Furthermore, from this many questions are raised that are imperative considerations in theory development.

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If we consider the three factors of national security agency evolution: (1.) structural choices at birth, (2.) the ever-changing and growing political interests of those related to it, (3.) “exogenous events,” (Zegart 1999, 42) we can start see the questions that rise to the top. In addition to Zegart’s questions concerning presidential autonomy on this realm, bureaucratic power sources, we might consider other. Are power sources irrelevant within national security agencies unless we consider the exact and timely issues that they face individually? Or, is the post-9/11 paradigm of U.S. national security decision-making a hierarchical environment that is cooperative at a lower bureaucratic level between all agencies? Do different competing forces issue power to opposing branches, bureaucracies and individuals at separate intervals, creating a confusing paradox in the long run? Are national security agencies indeed, as Zegart says, “not designed to serve the national interest.”? (Zegart 1999, 52)

The CIA’s formation is a good example of too many bureaucratic cooks in the kitchen, vying for control over power interests, not least of which the party of individuals campaigning for an agency for the centralization of intelligence. In addition, because the agency was *flawed* from the outset, this logically could have had some degree of effect on its policies and practices in the early to middle years of its existence. The non-aligned covert nature of its mission is manifested by its makeup. Whether this is good or bad for U.S. foreign policy, is neither the nature of this study nor useful in any broad conception of the agency. This is due in large part to the group-level perturbations that occur in formation.

5. Journals/Discussion Papers

Source: Carafano, James Jay, *Herding Cats: Understanding Why Government Agencies Don't Cooperate and How to Fix the Problem*, Heritage Lecture #955, *Delivered June 15, 2006. Online at: <http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl955.cfm> [accessed 16Feb07] [ECS]

**Paper presented to the Conference on Interagency Operations: Cultural Conflicts Past and Present, Future Perspectives, hosted by the Center of History, Political Studies, Institute of Paris, June 15–16, 2006.*

Summary and Key Focus Area: This paper provides a top-down view of interactions between government agencies and offers potential solutions for fostering interagency cooperation. It identifies the relative success of high and low-level cooperation, but a general failure in mid-level interagency cooperation. The inability of agencies to “coordinate interagency challenges outside of Washington” is the key theme.

Key recommendations:

- Replace the current Unified Command Plan that facilitates interagency cooperation under the direction of the National Security Council.
- Utilize Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATF) to encourage interagency cooperation, planning and execution over large geographic areas.
- Establish a “Homeland Security University” with a curriculum that provides “a suitable construct to frame interagency operations” to educate professionals across the interagency spectrum.

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Assessment: The most useful recommendation for the People group proposes establishing a “Homeland Security University.”

Source: Carafano, James Jay, “Missions, Responsibilities, and Geography: Rethinking How the Pentagon Commands the World,” *Backgrounder*, no. 1792, 2004. [Online at: www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg1792.cfm] [ECS]

Assessment: The author argues that a new Unified Command Plan (UCP) is necessary to increase interagency cooperation in a post-Cold War world. A system of three Combatant Commands (CoComs) supported by three Joint Interagency Groups (JointGroups) is proposed to this end.

Source: Cianci, Salvatore M., [A National Security Service Corps \(NSSC\): Is the Defense Leadership and Management Program \(DLAMP\) a Viable Response?](#), Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2001. (<http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA390509>). [ECS]

Assessment: Recommendation to create a “cadre of professionals in the national security arena” by combining the DoD Defense Leadership and Manning Program (DLAMP) and National Security Service Corps (NSSC) Program. In particular, the author recommends “tailor[ing] the DLAMP and NSSC strategic paradigms into a single framework.” The strategic paradigms of DLAMP (page 3) and NSSC (page 4) and discussion of a synthesis of the two programs (page 7) may be useful for the People group. The authors’ specific recommendations are detailed on pages 11-14 and offer ideas on retaining and rotating national security professionals through PME billets to spread joint experience efficiently.

Note: The cited 1997 National Defense Panel report “Transforming Defense: National Security for the 21st Century” may serve as a useful additional resource for the People group since it proposes developing a joint cadre of professionals in the same spirit as the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.

Source: Graham, LTC Jennifer L., “The Problem of How to Create National Security Officers (NSOs): Human Capital and Cadre Development” 2005 [NGL]

Summary and Key Focus Area: To effectively address the National Security issues of the 21st century, a new cadre of practitioners is required, designated by Graham as National Security Officers (NSOs). Development of this specialized group would hinge on the establishment of a “joint” framework, based upon strategic human capital management principles, designed to cut through entrenched agency-specific behavior/biases by emphasizing interagency operability and experience (civilian, military, and law enforcement). Graham makes the case that successful creation of such a cadre is stymied by the following factors: 1) current structural realities within the national security framework; 2) an absence of constructive criticism that might provide “road maps” or “plans ahead”; and 3) a disjointed sub-optimal implementation process that impedes

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maximum return on investment. In an attempt to present her own constructive “road map”, Graham analyzes prior attempts within individual agencies or departments to address interagency “jointness”, articulates her own NSO development model, and then evaluates four potential development options (*Kick Start*, *Silver Bullet*, *Fort Knox*, and *Mandarin*) to build a case for the option with the “highest likelihood of strategic human capital development success”. To effectuate this NSO model, Graham asserts that legislative and executive branch action are required to establish the infrastructure, resources and checks and balances “needed to overcome institutional impediments”.

Key Recommendations:

- Define core competencies
- Mandate interagency assignments
- Establish NSO program manager to oversee selection
- Establish Board of Directors (BOD) to act a final selection authority
- Establish NSO Association (NSOA) to monitor and ensure certification
- Stand up Program Management Office (PMO) to oversee administration
- Stand up a National Security University (NSU)
- President should appoint PMO director with Senate approval

Assessment: LTC Graham’s thesis lays out an extremely useful and practical blueprint for how one would actually go about establishing and developing a specialized interagency cadre. The practical/operational components that she examines are often overlooked in other analyses/evaluations of the interagency system vis-à-vis reform/transformation. Her argument might have been strengthened if she examined the opportunities and obstacles inherent in an effort to integrate existing program components (DLAMP, ICO, SIS, etc.) into her proposed framework.

Source: Locher, James R. III, “Has it worked? The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act,” *Naval War College Review*, Autumn 2001. [Available online at: <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2001/Autumn/art5-au1.htm>] [BY]

Summary: Reviews Defense organization from early in our nation’s history, including the difficulties posed by the rivalry between the Army and Navy, and the weak National Security Act of 1947. It also describes how JCS chairman David Jones’ announcement that the system was “broken” in 1982 led to the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

The main problems to be addressed were:

- Imbalance between service and joint interests
- Inadequate military advice to the political leadership (advice being watered down)
- Insufficiently qualified (either by education or experience) of military officers serving in joint-duty assignments
- Imbalance between responsibility and authority of each unified commander (vast responsibilities and weak authority)
- Confusing and cumbersome operational chains of command
- Ineffective strategic planning
- Ineffective mechanisms for supervising or controlling supply and service functions for agencies

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- Confusion about roles of service secretaries
- Unnecessary duplication in military department headquarters
- Congressional micromanagement

The main objectives of G-N Act were:

- Strengthen civilian authority
- Improve military advice to the president (in his constitutionally specified capacity as commander in chief of the armed forces), secretary of defense, and National Security Council
- Place clear responsibilities on the unified commanders in chief for mission accomplishment
- Ensure that a unified commander's authority is commensurate with his responsibilities
- Increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning
- Provide for the more efficient use of resources
- Improve joint officer management
- Enhance the effectiveness of military operations
- Improve Defense Department management and administration

Source: Treverton, Gregory F. and Tora K. Bikson, *New Challenges for International Leadership: Positioning the United States for the 21st Century*. Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2003. link to PDF: http://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/2005/IP233.pdf [BJE]

Summary: The U.S. is producing substantive too few future leaders of “depth with international experience and outlook.” The article reports the findings of a major study aimed at examining three central sectors of American life: Government, for-profit and not-for-profit. The solution to this potential crisis is in “bringing together government and higher education, foundations, intergovernmental organizations and the for-profit sector,” in order to draw upon the strengths of each. Because of the opportunities, both financially and otherwise, that private industry offers, the government is finding it difficult to attract and retain the brightest and most sought after talent. In addition to the education sectors, the three main sectors each have defined roles in manifesting the desired future workforce.

The study finds that on the government side, in order to internationalize the current workforce it should increase the use of the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA), facilitate lateral movement both in and out of government and improve hiring processes (5). In building future leadership, the study finds that the government should expand internship and cooperative programs, target fellowships, relax the barriers to career inter-mobility (conflict of interest laws), fund leadership study and reserve some proportion of senior positions in any agency to the career service (5). Overall, the government will need to be much more flexible in the choices it provides potential future leaders.

Source: U.S. Department of State, “Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)” briefing to the Interagency Requirements for Regional Stability/Capacity

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Building Research and Development conference on 3 Dec 2004.

http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~robins/Regional_Stability_Conference_Dec_2004.pdf [BJE]

Summary: The central problem recognized in this report is that post-conflict stabilization periods have shown tendencies of “institutional instability,” and subsequently may lead to further conflict. It cites the work of the Interagency Working Group (IWG) charged with “examining research and development activities required to support physical, social, and administrative systems to enhance political and social stability in regions of concern around the world” (2). In recognizing that current and future post-conflict stabilization missions will likely require robust R&D efforts across a broad system of disciplines (economic sciences, biology, computer and information sciences, educational tools, engineering), the IWG put together a series of workshops to examine the requirements and priorities in these situations.

Methods and general tools stabilization have not been fully realized, however, there are four (not-necessarily sequential) phases. First, *basic stabilization* is concerned primarily with the rule of law and basic human security needs such as food security and humanitarian assistance. Second, *confronting core causes of conflict* aims at gaining community trust and partnerships with local entities and thus proves to be a potentially destabilizing point. Third, the development of an *infrastructure for a market democracy* in the form of a supply side mechanism must be created. Fourth, the *development of a civil society and accountability in a society* will act as the demand side of democracy.

The IWG pointed out several areas in which post-conflict stabilization and capacity building would require inter-agency cooperation due to their complex and multifaceted nature. Recognizing the simultaneous need for security of civil and military personnel in performing stabilization operations, the IWG recognized five requirements: *anticipatory understanding, detection, pre-emption, protection and consequence management*. Furthermore, in order to sustain lasting rule of law beyond initial stabilization and security operations, the institutionalization of justice and reconciliation are necessary. *This includes planning framework and tools, institution foundation tools, forensics, judiciary and law enforcement and public understanding*. In addition to stabilization, security and an established/functional judicial structure, the IWG pointed out that *economic and social well-being, governance and participation, intelligence and planning* were also extremely important areas to address in an interagency capacity.

Requirements of the IWG are as follows:

- Seamless interagency and multi-leveled collaboration employing a common “language”
- Improve capabilities for information collection, sharing retrieval and analysis.
- Enhance capabilities to influence the inter-relationships and dynamics of the public power relationships, through deeper understanding of cultural, religious and language-based dynamics.
- Planning and evaluation should be improved in order to determine progress and prioritization.
- Increased and improved tools, approaches and systems of communication
- New capabilities for infrastructure protection

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- Tools necessary to establish “institutional pillars” of judiciary free of corruption and effective, fair selection process
- Governance must be legitimate and election process must be improved

Many more findings from each of these workshops have and will continue to be made available.

Another IWG workshop was scheduled: “Identifying Interagency Capability Gaps in Regional Stability Operations/Capacity Building,” February 23, 2005,

6. Web Resources

Source: Barr, Stephen, “Why You Can’t Just Run Off and Join the Foreign Service.” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A57574-2004Oct23?language> [ECS]

Assessment: Details the process of the Foreign Service job application process in general and the oral exam procedures in particular. This article emphasizes how competitive the application process for Foreign Service Officers is and the characteristics of successful applicants. A link in the article leads to an interesting set of multimedia presentations designed to give one a feel for the FSO job (on the State Department website at: <http://www.careers.state.gov/careers/abroad2.html#beginpage>).

Source: Johnson, Stuart E., and National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy. *A new PPBS process to advance transformation*. Center for Technology and National Security Policy National Defense University 2003 [cited. Available from access online version <http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42320> [BJE]

Source: National Defense University, Mission Statement. <http://www.ndu.edu/info/mission.cfm> and National Defense University, Special Programs. <http://www.ndu.edu/capstone> [BJE]

Source: “National Security Act of 1947, The.” The United States Intelligence Community, http://www.intelligence.gov/0-natsecact_1947.shtml [BJE]

Source: National Security Personnel System, Design and Implementation. <http://www.cpms.osd.mil/nsps/overview.html> [Broken link - must search for document on new site <http://www.cpms.osd.mil/nsps/docs/NSPSLegislation.pdf> - alternative link [BJE]

Assessment: “H.R 1588-230, which created the Dept. of Defense National Security Personnel System, changes the way the DoD will hire, pay, promote, discipline and fire its 320,000 civilian employees. The legislation effect members of more than 1,300 local bargaining units.” (Monthly Law Summaries. 2004. <http://www.aele.org/law/MLS2004JUN.html>)

Source: Office of Personnel Management, Executive Core Qualifications.

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<http://www.opm.gov/ses/competencies.asp> [BJE]

Assessment: OPM lists the core fundamental competencies for “successful performance” in the SES. These competencies include: Interpersonal skills, oral communication, integrity/ honesty, written communication, continual learning, public service motivation.

Source: Office of Personnel Management, Senior Executive Service, Federal Candidate Development Program. <http://www.opm.gov/ses/fedcdp> [Broken link - document not found] [Alternative link to PDF found at: www.opm.gov/ses/fedcdp/OPM_candidate.pdf] [BJE]

Assessment: This includes the “Executive Core Qualifications,” which could be included in “Vision and Guiding Principles” as well.

Source: "Pace Proposes Interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act." in Armed Forces Press Service [database online]. Available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2004/n09072004_2004090707.html. [BY]

Assessment: Marine Corps. Gen. Peter Pace advocates a Goldwater-Nichols Act for the interagency process. He claims that it has been successful for forcing the services to act more in concert than before, and that this same process can be applied to the interagency process. It will be important to get the cabinet officials to give up some of their day-to-day authority, and to get different federal agencies to take charge of different aspects under the National Security Council.

Source: Presidential Decision Directive / National Security Council 56, “The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations,” Washington, D.C., 1997. [This PDD is unavailable or still classified. The following link is an analysis of PDD-56 from NDU: www.ndu.edu/library/n1/98-ASE-05.pdf] [BJE]

Source: President’s Management Agenda, The <http://www.whitehouse.gov/results/agenda/competitivesourcing.html>
This link works, but it looks like the documents have all been updated since this paper was written; this source may have to be used as a reference on present agenda items only. [BJE]

Source: “Secretary Cohen Reshapes Defense For The 21st Century.” Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), November 10, 1997. http://www.fas.org/man/docs/dri/b11101997_bt605-97.html [BJE]

Source: Sirianni, Carmen and Lewis Friedland, *Civic Renewal Movement, Social Capital*, Civic Practices Network. <http://www.cpn.org/tools/dictionary/capital.html> [ECS]

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Assessment: A discussion of the forms, functions and benefits derived from social capital and the decline of social capital in the U.S. The article is useful for understanding domestic social interactions among the public but has little bearing on national security reform in a narrow sense.

Source: Shalikashvili, John M., General, JCSM 3500.04, September 3, 1996. Remarks by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the National Defense University Goldwater Nichols Symposium, December 3, 1996. [Date may be September 13, 1996 vice September 3]

Source: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Service Officer Thirteen Dimensions.
<http://careers.state.gov/officer/assess/index.html> [BJE]

Assessment: This is a list of personnel interview techniques and illustrates thirteen dimensions of the candidate that are observed in the process. This could prove useful in looking at skill sets to be developed in interagency liaison officers or skills to be developed by a joint governmental education program. The thirteen dimensions are: Composure, Cultural Adaptability, Experience and Motivation, Information, Integration and Analysis, Initiative and Leadership, Judgment, Objectivity and Integrity, Oral Communication, Planning and Organizing, Quantitative Analysis, Resourcefulness, Working With Others, Written Communication

Source: Wilson, George C., "Global hot spots require new breed of officer" Navy Times, July 1994. [BJE]

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